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**FROM**

**Major Louis A. Craig**





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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

• BY

M. ADOLPHE THIERS,

LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE;

MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE, ETC. ETC. ETC., AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF THE  
FRENCH REVOLUTION."

TRANSLATED BY

D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND H. W. HERBERT.

WITH NOTES AND ADDITIONS.

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Maj. Louis A. Craig

## BOOK XLI.

### THE COUNCIL.

DEATH of the King of Rome on the 20th March, 1811—The baptism deferred till the month of June—Various circumstances that impeded the general joy in France—Increased distrust of Russia—Acceleration of armaments and vigour of the conscription—Commercial crisis—Religious difficulties—Convocation of a council—Foreign affairs—M. de Lauriston succeeds M. de Caulaincourt at St. Petersburg—Preparations for commencing the war in the spring of 1812—Diplomacy with different European courts—Austria, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden—Bernadotte elected King of Sweden—Baptism of the infant King of Rome—National Council—Pope Pius VII.—Council dissolved and resummoned—New explanations with Russia—Preparations for war—Arrangement with Prussia—Close of the religious disputes.

WHILE the various and complicated events just recited were transpiring, Napoleon beheld the accomplishment of the first object of his desire; he had been blessed by Providence with a direct heir in a son, whom all France had longed for, and whom he had himself anticipated with the sanguine hope inspired by his unshaken confidence in his own fortune.

About nine o'clock in the evening of the 19th of March, 1811, the Empress Maria Louisa, after a healthy period of pregnancy, experienced the first pains of parturition. The skilful accoucheur Dubois repaired instantly to her abode, followed by M. Corvisart, a distinguished physician of the day. Notwithstanding the good constitution of the young mother, the incipient stages of accouchement were not wholly satisfactory, and M. Dubois could not divest himself of anxiety when he thought of the responsibility involved in his position. Napoleon, with his usual penetration, perceiving that the anxiety of the operator might endanger the mother and the child, laboured to diminish the weight of his responsibility. "Imagine yourself to be attending the wife of a tradesman in the Rue St. Denis," said he; "you can do no more in one case than the other, and, whatever happens, save the mother." He enjoined M. Corvisart not to quit M. Dubois, and he lavished on the young Empress the tenderest assiduities, endeavouring to alleviate her sufferings by the most affectionate and encouraging words. At length, on the morning of the 20th March, was born, without any of the unfavourable circumstances which had been apprehended, the child to whom high destinies were promised, but who was doomed to realize only exile and an early death. Napoleon received him into his arms with joy and tenderness, and when he knew that he was the father of a son, his countenance became irradiated with a lofty sentiment, as if by this important fact Providence had given a new and more distinguished mark of his protection. He presented the infant to his family and his court, and then consigned him to Madame de Montesquieu, who had been appointed governess of the children of France. The guns of the Invalides immediately announced to the capital the birth of an heir destined to reign over the greater part of Europe. He had previously determined that if the child should be a son, the number of guns should not be twenty-one, but one hundred and one. The population, therefore, hastening from their homes, and scattered through the streets, counted the number with extreme anxiety. After the twenty-

first gun, the general joy was not much inferior to that of the brightest periods of the reign; and, notwithstanding many causes of sadness, some of which have already been recorded, and others will appear in the sequel, the people rejoiced to see this pledge of the perpetuity of the Napoleon dynasty granted by Providence. Yet their joy was not the satisfaction and enthusiasm of earlier times, when they beheld in Napoleon the preserver of society, the restorer of religion, the author of national grandeur, the wise and invincible warrior, whose sole object in war was a glorious and lasting peace. Gloomy apprehensions, inspired by his unbounded and unrestrained genius, had chilled affection, disturbed repose, and filled the minds of men with alarming anticipations. Nevertheless, they abandoned themselves once more to joy, and resumed their confidence in the destiny of a great man so visibly favoured by Providence.

In accordance with the decree which had designated Rome the second city of the Empire, and in imitation of ancient Germanic customs which designated the heir to the throne the King of the Romans before he assumed the title of Emperor, the new-born prince was called King of Rome, and his baptism, which was to be performed with as much pomp as a coronation, was fixed for the month of June. For the present it was deemed sufficient to perform the Christian ceremony of *ondoiement*, and to announce the happy event to the different bodies of the state, to the departments, and to all the European courts.

Singular scorn of fortune! This heir so ardently desired, so pompously received, destined to perpetuate the Empire, arrived at the very moment when that colossal empire, secretly undermined in every direction, was drawing near its end! Few, indeed, could perceive the deeply-hidden causes of its approaching ruin; but secret apprehensions had seized the mind of the multitude, and the sentiment of security was lost, although that of submission remained entire. The report of a vast war in the North, which every one regarded with instinctive apprehension, augmented by the continuance of the war in Spain, had been widely diffused, and had created universal alarm. The conscription, the natural consequence of this new war, was enforced with the utmost rigour; commerce and industry were suffering from a violent crisis; the religious quarrel was acquiring additional bitterness and threatened a new schism. Such were the various drawbacks to the joy occasioned by the birth of the King of Rome.

Napoleon had suddenly passed from an armament of precaution against Russia to an armament of urgent necessity, as if the war was to commence in the summer or autumn of the current year 1811. In fact, Russia, who had hitherto confined herself to some works on the banks of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and to some movements of troops from Finland to Lithuania, impossible to be concealed, no doubt, but capable of an easy and specious explanation, learning from every quarter the daily-increasing development of Napoleon's preparations, had at length decided on the gravest of measures, the most painful to herself and the most significant to Europe,—that of weakening her armies of the Danube, which would render doubtful the eagerly-desired conquest of Wallachia and Moldavia. Of nine divisions which were engaged in Turkey, she had recalled five, three to the Pruth and two to the Dnieper. The news of this retrograde movement, transmitted by our accredited diplomatic agents in the Danubian provinces, had made a powerful impression on the mind of Napoleon. Instead of merely seeing in such conduct a proof of the fear which he inspired, he took alarm himself, and thought that in this conduct of Russia he perceived the indication of aggressive rather than defensive intentions. This was an error; but, accustomed to the hatred of Europe, and to the perfidy often consequent upon hatred, he imagined a secret understanding between Russia and his open or secret enemies, particularly the English, and he thought it not too early to contemplate the beginning of war in July or August of the current year. Thus, instead of remedying the evil by suspending his armaments with the power of resuming them should he fail to obtain a satisfactory explanation, he augmented it by multiplying and accelerating his preparations so as to be unable any further either to conceal or to explain them.

He had already resolved to send to the Elbe the 4th battalions; for, as we have said, the regiments of Marshal Davout only reckoned three present with their corps; he determined to send them off immediately and to form a 6th battalion in these regiments, (the 5th remaining at the dépôt,) which allowed him to furnish five battalions for actual service. Marshal Davout had used such diligence during his residence in the North, in giving his troops an amount of theoretical instruction equal to their practical instruction, that it was easy to find among them the *cadres* of a 6th or even 7th battalion for each regiment, in subalterns able to read and write, and who had seen service throughout the whole of Europe. In order to accelerate the formation of these 6th battalions, Napoleon recalled the *cadres* from the banks of the Elbe to meet the recruits who had left the banks of the Rhine; he also sent clothes, shoes, and arms to Wesel, Cologne, and Mentz, in order that the men might in their transit provide themselves with their complete outfit. He thus hoped to raise to five French divisions the corps of Marshal Davout without reckoning a 6th division, which was to be a Polish division, and to be formed of the troops of Dantzic, which were to be augmented. He ordered the purchase of horses, especially in Germany, preferring to exhaust that country rather than France, withdrew from their cantonments the

cuirassiers, the chasseurs, the hussars, destined for the Russian war, and ordered the colonels to hold themselves in readiness to receive horses and men in order to put their regiments on a war-footing. Supposing that he had not time to raise to five or even to four battalions the corps of the Rhine, composed, as we have said, of the old divisions which had served under Lannes and Massena, and which had been diffused through Holland and Belgium, he formed in them select battalions, into which were to be drafted the best soldiers of each regiment. He issued the same order for the army of Italy; commanded the union and equipment on a war-footing of all the corps of the old and young guard which were not in Spain; he wrote to all the princes of the German confederation, demanding their contingent, and thus put himself in a condition, for the months of July and August, to raise the corps of the Elbe to 70,000 infantry; that of the Rhine to 45,000; that of Italy to 40,000; the Imperial guard to more than 12,000, (total, 167,000 excellent infantry;) the hussars and chasseurs to 17,000 or 18,000; the cuirassiers to 15,000; the horse-guards to 6000, (total, 39,000 or 40,000 first-rate cavalry;) finally, the artillery to 24,000 men, capable of serving 800 guns, independently of 100,000 Poles, Saxons, Bavarians, Wurtembergians, Badians, Westphalians, which made more than 300,000 men perfectly prepared to enter the field within two months.

Napoleon recalled Marshal Ney from Spain, intending to intrust him with the command of part of the troops collected on the Rhine. The remainder he designed for Marshal Oudinot, who had already repaired to Holland. He also recalled from Spain General Montbrun, proved by his conduct at Fuentes d'Onoro and on many other occasions to be one of the first cavalry-officers of the time.

Fearing a sudden invasion of the duchy of Warsaw by the Russians, Napoleon instructed the King of Saxony and Prince Poniatowski, lieutenant of the King of Saxony in Poland, to transport all the artillery, ammunition, and equipage from open or partially-defended situations to the fortresses of the Vistula, such as Modlin, Thorn, Dantzic; and on this subject he reminded them both of the example of Bavaria, where the Austrians had always entered before the French, but which they had always been forced to quit almost immediately without having taken any of the material of the war. He recommended the King of Saxony to keep in readiness the Saxon troops in order to be able to bring them rapidly upon the Vistula beside those of Prince Poniatowski. Both of these troops were to be placed under the command of Marshal Davout, who had orders, on the first appearance of danger, to hasten to the Vistula with 150,000 men, of whom 100,000 French were to station themselves at posts from Dantzic to Thorn, and 50,000 Saxons and Poles from Thorn to Warsaw. With such precautions, they were in a condition to meet, or even to prevent, any hostile act of the Russians.

In order to complete the *cadres*, Napoleon had been obliged to hasten the conscription of 1811, which had been ordered since the month of January. But he did not confine himself to this measure; he had wished to retrieve the

deficiency of former conscriptions, amounting to 60,000 refractory recruits, or who, at least, had not rejoined their regiments. Our manners had not at that time wholly adopted the conscription as they subsequently did, and the rigour with which it was then enforced, the melancholy fate of the enrolled, who, before attaining manhood, were destined to perish in Spain, oftener by distress than by the fire of the enemy, were not calculated to insure the ready submission of the population. In certain provinces, and particularly in those of the west, the centre, and the south, where there was no want of valour, but where submission to the central authority was less firmly established, resistance had been shown to the conscription, and there had been at all times many who had refused to answer the summons of the law, or who had deserted after their first appearance. They traversed the woods, the mountains, everywhere favoured by the peasantry, and sometimes they even entered into conflict with the gendarmes. These men, far from being either cowardly or weak, formed, on the contrary, the bravest and hardest and most adventurous part of the population, and, in virtue of their energy itself, the most difficult to succumb to new laws. They were men of the same caste as those who, in La Vendée, had furnished the soldiers of the royalist insurrection. Naturally stronger in character, they had become still more so by age, the greater part of them having been in a state of insubordination for several years. Out of 80,000 such men, about 20,000 had been recovered by means of amnesties, pursuits, and *battues* of the gendarmes; but there remained at least 60,000 in different parts of France, whom it was equally important to restore to the army on account of their good quality, and to remove from the interior because of their aptitude to form a new *chouannerie*, for they principally belonged to the departments which still retained a leaven of ancient royalism.

Napoleon, who did not scruple about the means of accomplishing his ends, formed ten or twelve movable columns composed of light cavalry and infantry, and chosen from among the oldest troops, placed them under the orders of devoted generals, added companies of gendarmes as guides, and made them undertake a most active pursuit of the refractory. These columns were authorized to subject to military treatment the provinces which they were about to traverse, and to billet the soldiers in garrison upon those families whose sons had failed to respond to the call. These soldiers were to be lodged, fed, and paid by the relations of the refractory until such time as these last should have surrendered. Hence arose the name of *garnisaires*, a name full of alarm at that period. When it is considered that these columns, from their very composition, were apt to regard the refusal of military service as a fault both disgraceful and criminal, which caused the weight of the war to fall upon the old soldiers exclusively, and that they had acquired abroad the habit of living as a conquering army, it will readily be believed that they were often guilty of excesses though in their own country, and that their march, added to the vexation of the levy of 1811, might, in various provinces, carry the distress of conscription to the very verge of despair.

The prefects, who were enjoined to dispose the mind of the people favourably to the government, were in the highest degree alarmed by this measure. Some, however, wishing to meet the difficulty with proportioned zeal, exaggerated, in the execution, the orders of the supreme authority, and urged on, instead of repressing, the columns engaged in the pursuit of the refractory. Some others had the justice to allow the voices of the unfortunate relations thus ruined to be heard, and, among these, M. Lezay-Marnezia, in the Lower Rhine, had the boldness to resist, with all his power, the general in command of the columns in his department, and to write to the minister of police very forcible letters intended for the eye of Napoleon himself. But the greater number of these high functionaries executed the orders rather than renounce their office, contenting themselves with silent regret, and supposing that every claim of virtue was satisfied by confining their rigour within the bounds strictly enjoined by the law.

If the country-population had their griefs, those of the cities were not exempt. These were caused by a very serious commercial and industrial crisis. We have already related the ingenious though violent measures of Napoleon to debar English commerce from the continent, or to grant it access at a ruinous price, the advantage of which was to accrue to the Imperial treasure. These measures had obtained, if not all the result anticipated by Napoleon, at least all that could reasonably be expected, especially when, in order to succeed, it was necessary to contradict the interests, the tastes, the inclinations, not of one people only, but almost of the whole world. With a few rare exceptions, such as some clandestine importations by the Swedes, who fraudulently transported colonial merchandise from Gothenburg to Stralsund, and some others which were allowed in Old Prussia as much by negligence as by ill-will, and certain others effected in Russia under the American flag, all condemned to descend from north to south, through a thousand dangers of seizure, burdened with enormous expenses of transport, and subject to a ruinous tariff,—with these exceptions, no quantity of sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, wood, or indeed any foreign merchandise, could leave England, and thus diminish the disastrous accumulation of such produce in London. This situation, which we have already described, had become in no degree ameliorated. The manufacturers of Manchester, Birmingham, and all the manufacturing towns of England, overreaching themselves in their eager pursuit of gain, had produced three or four times as much merchandise as could be consumed by all the colonies of every nation. The vessels sent from Liverpool had been obliged to bring back part of their cargoes to Europe. A small number, having found the means of disposing of them, had received in exchange colonial produce, which remained unsold in the London warehouses, and became so deteriorated in value as to cost more for warehouse-room than they could realize. Yet it was upon this security that the bank discounted the paper of the manufacturers and gave them the value in bills, the increasing interest of which threatened every day a catastrophe. In 1811 the distress had become so



great that the British parliament, fearing a general bankruptcy, had voted an aid to commerce to the extent of £6,000,000 sterling, (150 millions of francs,) under the name of loan to the most embarrassed manufacturers and merchants. Such a situation prolonged a little further must inevitably end in a financial and commercial catastrophe, or in a desire for peace which the government would be unable to resist.

But in every combat, whatever may be the arms employed, the evils incurred are reciprocal. It was not possible for Napoleon to crowd into England so much produce, agreeable, useful, or necessary to the continental nations, without causing much disturbance, and he had just occasioned in France and the neighbouring countries a commercial and industrial crisis as violent, though fortunately less lasting than that which afflicted England. The cause was as follows:—

Cotton fabrics, having in a great degree taken the place of those of hemp and linen, especially since the introduction of machinery, had become the principal manufactures of Europe. The French manufacturers, having to supply Old and New France and almost the whole continent besides, had expected immense markets, and had regulated their speculations accordingly. They had speculated without bounds on the exclusive supplying of the continent, as the English had on supplying the colonies of England, France, Holland, and Spain. In Alsace, in Flanders, and in Normandy, cotton-spinning, weaving, and printing, had advanced with incredible rapidity. The profits being considerable, enterprise had equalled and even greatly surpassed them. The cotton manufacture in all its branches was not the only one to make this stride; that of woollen cloth, counting on the exclusion of English cloths and the entire possession of Spanish wools, had, in the same manner, indulged in unrestricted production. The manufacture of furniture had also been greatly developed, because French furniture, at that time designed after antique models, had acquired very general favour, and the admission of foreign wood, under the title of licensed colonial produce, allowed the construction of such articles at a moderate rate. The licensed admission of leather had also greatly augmented all branches of industry in which that material is used. French hardware, which, though very elegant, was then inferior to the English in respect to articles of steel, had also taken advantage of the exclusion of the English. Thus, advantages readily perceived had encouraged and multiplied these efforts beyond all proportion.

But the ardour of the moment was directed to the introduction of the raw material as well as to manufactures. Men repaired eagerly to every market where they could obtain sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, woods, leather, disputing for the smallest quantity introduced into the continent, and speculating without reason on those quantities. The public funds were deserted because they were low and almost unchanging in value, since Napoleon kept up the return of five per cent. at eighty francs by the secret intervention of the extraordinary funds. The bank-stocks, the only public transactions to be compared with the national funds, oscil-

lated between 1,225 and 1,275 for every fifty or sixty francs, and never passed beyond these extremes. In this there was nothing to tempt speculators who demanded the chances of great gains, and who, therefore, devoted themselves to the more promising field of colonial produce, such as sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo, and hastened to Antwerp, Mentz, Frankfort, and Milan, where the government put to sale the merchandise brought upon artillery-wagons, which had carried bombs and balls to the banks of the Elbe and had in exchange brought back sugar and coffee. Even the timber indispensable to Napoleon for the numerous vessels which he was constructing in every dockyard of the Empire had become the object of a wild jobbing, and on the changing and dangerous basis of these speculations were formed brilliant edifices of fortune, by turns appearing and disappearing before the eyes of a public struck with astonishment and stimulated by jealousy.

In such a period of excitement, prudence had naturally been the virtue least observed, and men had speculated, not merely beyond the demand, but beyond their means of payment. While industry produced much more than could be sold, the jobbers in raw material sought to buy more than industry could employ, and, by an inevitable consequence, inordinately raised the price. In order to pay all these imprudent bargains, artificial sources of credit had been invented. Thus, a house in Paris, engaged in the trade of timber and colonial produce, drew to the extent of 1,500,000 francs a month upon a house of Amsterdam which lent its credit, but which drew upon others, and these last again drawing upon Paris to reimburse themselves, fictitious resources had been created, called in commercial language *papier de circulation*. The police, having their eyes in every direction but not understanding every thing, thought that in this commercial contrivance they perceived some party machination, which they hastened to denounce to the Emperor, who, though at first puzzled, at length recovered confidence on learning the secret of this pretended conspiracy from his minister of exchequer.\*

Men had been as unscrupulous in their manner of enjoying their profits as they had been in their means of securing them. The newly-enriched had hastened to display their rapidly-acquired fortunes, and to purchase from the sinking-fund the hotels and castles of the old nobility, which the state had taken possession of under the name of national property. They bought them, not as formerly, at a low price and with assignats, but with ready money to a large amount and without hesitation, because the lapse of twenty years since the confiscation had obliterated the remembrance of the injustice of the state and the misfortune of the former proprietors. This was the resource of the alienation of estates to which Napoleon had recourse from time to time to complete his budgets, especially in conquered countries, and which the sinking-fund had husbanded for him by selling, as opportunity offered, in small portions and with suitable prudence, the real estates which

\* I have met with an entire correspondence between the minister of police and the minister of the exchequer on this singular fact, which for a long time perplexed the authorities before it was fully explained.

fell into their hands. There were at Paris manufacturers justly enriched by their labour, and speculators in colonial produce, enriched in a less honourable manner, who possessed the finest and best-entitled domains.\*

This outbreak of speculations, of sudden fortunes, and of immoderate enjoyment, had begun some years before, had been arrested for a moment in 1809 in consequence of the Austrian war, had been resumed after the peace of Vienna, had been developed without restraint or obstacle during the whole of the year 1810, and had issued in the beginning of 1811 in the inevitable catastrophe which attends industrial and commercial extravagances of this nature.

For some time men had been supported by fictitious credit accorded to each other, particularly between Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Paris, when a last sale executed at Antwerp for the benefit of the government, and consisting in American cargoes, attracted a great number of buyers. Merchandise to the extent of about sixty millions was to be bought and paid for. Napoleon, observing the embarrassment which was beginning to appear, granted delays for payment; but every one had perceived the difficulty, and nothing more was wanted to create mistrust. At the same moment considerable houses in Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, which had engaged in colonial transactions more or less legitimate, impeded at first by the continental blockade, and soon afterwards wholly paralyzed by the union of their country with France, either failed or retired from business. This concurrence of causes brought on the crisis. A large house of Lubeck was the first to fail, and was followed by the oldest and most respectable house in Amsterdam, which had been seduced by the bait of a high rate of commission to lend its credit to the most venturesome merchants in Paris. The Paris houses which depended on the resources derived from this Dutch house immediately beheld the secret of their subsistence exposed. They complained piteously, and implored the aid of government. Napoleon, who perceived plainly, without acknowledging it, the part which he himself had in this crisis, and who was unwilling that the birth of an heir so eagerly desired, so recently obtained, and so soon to be consecrated, should be accompanied by circumstances of melancholy, hastened to declare himself ready to afford assistance to the embarrassed houses. He rightly wished to do so speedily and without noise, that his aid might be the more efficacious. Unfortunately, the private opinions of his minister of exchequer, and the strange vanity of one of the assisted houses, prevented the exact fulfilment of his intentions. M. Mollien, opposing even useful expedients, disputed theoretically the principle of affording aid to commerce. Napoleon paid no regard to his arguments, but ordered him to aid a certain number of houses. But the minister made amends to himself for his defeat by contending with these houses either the securities which they offered or the possibility of saving them. Hence ensued a great loss of time. Moreover, one of them, boasting of a benevolence of which the

benefactor himself made no boast, proclaimed what the government had done for it, and thus was lost all the advantage of prompt and secret aid. The existence of a crisis was known, and the customary panic was the consequence. Speedily ensued a chaos of falling houses, each contributing to the fall of others. Napoleon, according to his custom, not intimidated by difficulty, publicly and repeatedly assisted the principal houses which were embarrassed, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his minister. But he had the satisfaction of saving only a very small part of the merchants and manufacturers in whom he was interested.

The houses which had speculated in sugar, coffee, cotton, and building-timber, were the first to fall. After these came those who had not speculated in the raw material, but who had pushed the weaving, spinning, or printing of cotton beyond the demand, and who were living on the credit afforded by certain bankers, which being now withheld, they inevitably fell. The towns of Rouen, Lille, Saint Quentin, and Mulhouse, were utterly ravaged. After the cotton manufacture came that of cloth. A wealthy Orleans house, occupied for a century in the woollen trade, wished to monopolize all the wool seized by the government in Spain and exposed to auction. They bought without restriction, and sold to manufacturers who manufactured without restriction, lent them their credit, but in return borrowed that of the manufacturers by creating a mass of paper drawn upon them, which the complaisant bankers discounted at a usurious rate. These bankers having stopped their assistance the whole scaffolding fell, and a single provincial firm thus failed for twelve millions, a large sum even at the present day, but much larger then. The exclusion of French cloths from Russia was a new blow to that branch. The refiners, who had speculated in sugar, and the manufacturers of prepared skins, who had speculated in leather introduced under the protection of license, were likewise seriously affected. Finally, the silk trade, which had manufactured largely, but had not speculated to excess, being an old and experienced branch of industry, less dazzled by the novelty and exaggeration of advantages, received a sensible blow from the last commercial regulations of Russia, and from the fall of the Hamburg houses, which, for want of Americans, served to export the products of Lyons. The contraction of credit in all quarters, added to the sudden privation of markets, caused a general suspension of the manufacture at Lyons.

Shortly were seen masses of unemployed workmen in Bretagne, in Normandy, in Picardy, in Flanders, in Lyonnais, in Le Forez, Venaissin, and Languedoc. At Lyons, of 14,000 looms 7000 ceased to work. At Rouen, St. Quentin, Lille, Rheims, Amiens, three-fourths of the hands at least were idle from the middle of winter and during the whole of spring. Napoleon, much distressed at these popular sufferings, wished to provide for them at any cost, fearing the effect they might produce during the fêtes prepared in honour of his son. He held repeated councils, and learned too late that there are perplexities against which the genius and determination of men, however great, are unavailing. It was not his system of exclusion

\* I have found the proof of this curious and remarkable fact also in the correspondence of the minister of the exchequer, who analyzed for Napoleon the cause of the greater number of bankruptcies at that time.

with regard to the English which had caused the evil, for excess of production sometimes takes place in countries where commerce is completely free as well as in others, and perhaps even more frequently. But his complicated combinations had contributed to foolish speculations in raw material; the usurpation of the sovereignty of Hamburg had precipitated the ruin of houses indispensable to the vast scaffolding of the continental credit of that epoch; his last sales had hastened the crisis, and his assistance, in consequence of the private opinions of his minister, had been either too tardy or too much the object of dispute. Finally, his celebrated tariff of fifty per cent. prolonged the evil, for the manufacturers who began to dispose of their stock, and wished to resume work, did not venture to do so on account of the dearth of the raw material, arising from the increase of dues. Thus, weaving, spinning, refinery, tannery, were wholly suspended. They could not be said to have diminished their manufacture; they wholly suspended it.

Rejecting the theories of M. Mollien, and holding frequent councils with the ministers of the interior and of finance, with the director-general of customs and several distinguished manufacturers or bankers, such as MM. Ternaux and Hottinguer, Napoleon hit upon a method which had some good results: this was to effect with great secrecy, and at his own expense, but apparently at the risk of certain large banking-houses, purchases at Rouen, at St. Quentin, and at Lille, so as to convey the idea of a natural return to mercantile enterprise. At Amiens he secretly lent the manufacturers who continued to produce woollen fabrics sums equal to the pay of their hands. At Lyons he gave orders to the extent of several millions for silk for the imperial residences. Certainly these succours were not equivalent to a real revival of business, but they were not without avail, especially at Rouen, where the purchases from an unknown quarter had the appearance of bona fide purchases, and led to the belief of a new commercial movement. At any rate, they allowed to await with greater tranquillity any such revival.

The town of Paris, in particular, whose lively, enthusiastic, and patriotic people had shown themselves alive to the glory of his reign, and in which a crowd of princes were to meet for the baptism of the King of Rome, was to Napoleon the object of unusual solicitude. He had already found that manufactures for the use of the troops were well executed at Paris. He immediately ordered a large collection of wagons, artillery-carriages, harness, clothes, linen, shoes, hats, and buff-leather. At the same time, he began earlier than usual, and on a larger scale, the annual works which were the great monuments of his reign.

Moreover, this situation, however painful, had, nevertheless, an essential advantage over that of England. Time must ameliorate it by removing the surplus of manufactured goods, by bringing the Americans, who were already making preparations to come, and who would replace the Hamburgers and Russians in our markets, and would bring us cotton and dyestuffs, which were greatly wanted. The situation of the English, on the contrary, if the blockade were continued and they were de-

barred from every ally on the continent, must soon become intolerable.

Nevertheless, the situation of French industry and commerce was at the time extremely critical. Napoleon received deputations from the chambers of commerce, and delivered to them a discourse in his own original, familiar, and vigorous language, which he wished to be as widely and as accurately divulged as possible. By turns questioning and hearing their replies, mingling soothing expressions with the most cutting sallies, he addressed the deputation nearly in the following terms:—"I have my ear open to what you say in your counting-houses; I know the conversations you hold in your families and among yourselves about my policy, my laws, and my person. 'He is a mere soldier,' you say; 'he knows nothing about commerce, and he has no one near him to enlighten him when he is ignorant. His measures are extravagant and have caused our present ruin.' You who say this are the persons really ignorant of commerce and industry. In the first place, I am not the cause of your present ruin, but you are yourselves. You thought it possible to make a fortune in a single day, as is done in war sometimes by gaining a battle. But this is not the case in the sphere of industry; it is by labouring during the whole of life, by wise conduct, by adding to the products of labour the accumulations of economy, that one becomes rich. But among you, some have speculated upon the rapid variations in the price of the raw material, and have often found themselves deceived; instead of making their own fortune, they have made the fortune of other people. Others have wished to make ten ells of stuff when they have markets for only five, and they have sustained loss where they might have secured profit. Is the fault mine if avarice have turned the brains of many among you? But with patience we may repair our own errors, and, by working more wisely, we may recover what has been lost. You have committed mistakes this year; you will be wiser and more successful in that which is at hand. As to my measures, how can you know whether they are good or bad? Shut up in your workshops, some of you acquainted only with what concerns silk and cotton, and others with what concerns iron, wood, or leather, not embracing all the various branches of industry, ignorant of the vast relations subsisting among states, can you know whether the means I employ against England are efficacious or hurtful? Yet ask those who went secretly to London to engage in the contraband, ask them what they saw. I know their language as I know yours, for I am informed of all your acts and of all your words. They returned astonished at the distress of England, at the crowding of her warehouses, the increasing fall of her exchange, the ruin of her commerce, and many on their return have said of me and of my measures, 'This confounded fellow may be in the right.' Well, I am in the right, and more entirely so than I imagined, for England has reached a state of desperation earlier than I could have supposed. She has saturated with her products the colonies of Spain, her own, and yours, for I know not how many years. They have been unable to pay her, or else, when able, they have paid her with sugar, coffee, or cotton, the value

of which I have destroyed when in her hands. On the security of this sugar, coffee, and cotton, the merchants draw bills which are taken to the bank and there converted into paper money. The government, in order to pay their armies and navy, also draw upon the bank, and cause new issues of this paper money. What do you suppose will come of all this in time? The edifice must fall. Are we at this point? No. I have relieved you from paper money, and there remains merely a few funds to receive the savings of the small proprietors. Europe has furnished me in cash with nearly a milliard of contributions for the war; I have still in my treasury 200 millions in gold or silver; I receive annually 900 millions in well-distributed taxes, which are paid in cash, and you have the whole continent to receive your products. Our position and that of England, therefore, are by no means equal. Sooner or later she must succumb. There are some channels in Sweden, in Prussia, and at a greater distance," (meaning Russia,) "by which English produce continues to find its way into the continent of Europe. But give yourselves no anxiety; I shall set every thing right. There are smugglers still; I shall contrive to reach them. Those who escape my custom-house officers shall not escape my soldiers; and I shall pursue them everywhere,—everywhere, do you understand?"

On pronouncing these words, Napoleon assumed the most threatening air, and a new war was evinced in his gestures, his accent, and his look. He resumed and said, "This war against England is long and painful, I well know. But what would you have me do? What method should I adopt? Apparently, since you complain so much of the sea being closed, you demand that it should be open, that a single power should not rule them at the expense of all others, nor take possession of the colonies of all other nations, nor arrogate to itself despotic power over every flag. For my part, I am irrevocably fixed in this matter: I will never abandon the rights of neutrals; I will never allow the principle to prevail that the flag does not protect merchandise; that the neutral is obliged to repair to England and there to pay tribute. If I had the baseness to maintain such theories you would shortly be unable to leave Rouen or Havre without a passport from the English. My decrees of Berlin and Milan shall be the laws of the Empire until England shall have renounced her foolish pretensions. The Americans ask leave to reappear in our ports, to bring you cotton and to take your silk, which would afford you great relief. I am ready to consent, but on the condition that they shall cause to be respected among them the principles that I maintain, and which are also their own, as they are those of all maritime countries, and that if they cannot oblige England to respect them towards themselves, that they shall make war upon her; if otherwise, however much you may need them,

I shall treat them as English, I shall close my ports against them, I shall give orders to fall upon them. How would you have me act? Undoubtedly, had I been able to make admirals as I have made generals, we should have beaten the English, and a good peace—not a patched-up peace like that of Amiens, concealing a thousand implacable resentments, a thousand conflicting interests, but a really solid peace—should be established." Unfortunately, I cannot be everywhere. Being unable to fight the English at sea, I fight them on land; I pursue them along all the coasts of the old continent. Yet I do not relinquish the design of reaching them at sea, for our sailors are at least as brave as theirs, and our naval officers will be as good as the British when they shall have had sufficient practice. I am about to have 100 vessels from the Texel to Venice; I should like to have 200. I shall make them venture out whether they will or no; they will lose one or two battles, but they will gain the third, or, at least, the fourth; for some man will certainly at length arise, who will cause our flag to triumph, and in the mean while I will keep my sword at the breast of any one who will offer aid to England. They *must* yield, though hell itself should conspire with them. This is tedious, I confess; but you will gain an opportunity of developing your industry, of becoming manufacturers, of replacing on the continent the English fabrics, hardware, and woollen cloths. And, after all, it is a tolerably good fortune to have to supply the continent. The world is incessantly changing; one age has no resemblance to another. Heretofore, in order to be rich, it was necessary to possess colonies, India, America, St. Domingo. These times are passing away. It is now necessary to manufacture, to provide for one's self what we have been wont to seek from others, to make our own printed calicoes, sugar, and indigo. If I have time you shall manufacture all these things yourselves; not that I despise colonies and maritime speculations; they are necessary: but manufactures are of equal importance, and, while I am endeavouring to secure the sea, the industrial power of France will be formed and developed. In such a position we can afford to wait. In the mean time Bordeaux and Hamburg suffer; but, if they suffer at present, it is to secure prosperity in the future by the re-establishment of the liberty of the seas. Every thing has its good and its evil. We ought to know how to suffer for a great end; nor yet are the sufferings of this year to be ascribed to the pursuit of this great end, but your own errors. I know your affairs better than you know mine. Conduct yourselves with prudence, with consistency, and do not be in haste to judge me, for often when you blame me you are yourselves the only persons deserving of blame. Moreover, I watch over your interests, and whatever relief it will be possible to procure for you, you shall obtain."\*

Such was the kind of language by which Na-

\* This speech, as several others of Napoleon which we have elsewhere reported, is here produced because it is in substance authentic, and we have been able to find the sense if not the actual terms, and hence it has all desirable and even possible accuracy. Notwithstanding the authority of the ancients, who have assigned speeches to their historic personages, and who have been excused on account of the vraisemblance of their discourses, we do not think such an example admissible with the moderns. The ancients, placed nearer than we are to the origin of things,

had not perfectly separated history from poetry; we have done so, and we cannot revert to their position. To history there ought to remain no other poetry than that which inevitably belongs to strict truth. We may analyze or condense a discourse held in a certain manner by any personage, but only on the condition that the discourse has actually been held, that the sense is the same, and also the form as far as it could be recovered. This is what I have always done in this history, and what I have done in the speech just recited. That speech, addressed

poison embarrassed and overcame those who spoke with him on the subject of commerce, whom he dazzled without convincing, though he was in the right in almost all points. But it is a matter of constant surprise to observe how possible it is for those to give wise counsel to others who are quite unable wisely to advise themselves. Napoleon was right when he told these merchants that they owed their sufferings to their own errors in over-production and over-speculation; that he was constrained to conquer the liberty of the seas, and for this end to engage England, and in order to engage England he must impede commerce; and that in the mean while the impediments thus created encouraged the rising industry of France and the continent. But he would have been much perplexed if one of these speculators on sugar or cotton had asked him, a speculator of a different kind, whether, in order to engage England, it was absolutely necessary to conquer the crowns of Naples, Spain, and Portugal, for the benefit of his brothers; whether the difficulty attendant on establishing his dynasty on so many thrones had not remarkably increased that of triumphing over the maritime pretensions of England; whether his designs would not have been as effectually aided by the Bourbons in a state of trembling submission at Madrid and Naples as by his own brothers in a state of semi-revolt; whether it would not have been better to risk between Dover and Calais all the soldiers now dispersed over Naples, Cadiz, and Lisbon; whether, at any rate, admitting the necessity of all these conquests, it would not have been better to have begun by driving Lord Wellington into the sea, and contenting himself with the blockade, as enforced by Russia, instead of changing his plan suddenly, of leaving the English triumphant in the Peninsula, to seek in the North a new and doubtful war under pretext of securing an amount of rigour in the blockade which was not absolutely necessary to the effectual undermining of the British commerce; and whether a continual change of plan, and rushing from one method to another without having fully tried any, simply from fickleness, pride, and the desire of subjecting the whole world to his authority, was the most certain and direct manner of putting an end to the tyrannous ambition of England.

But this bold and perplexing questioner was not to be found, and the truth was not expressed; but to withhold the truth is to conceal without arresting the evil, whose secret ravages are all the more dangerous in proportion as they become disclosed simultaneously and too late to be remedied.

To the two causes of uneasiness just stated—the conscription and the commercial crisis—was joined a third, viz.: the religious troubles recently augmented by a fresh outburst of the strong will of Napoleon.

We formerly saw the point to which matters had been brought with the pope, detained at Savona. Napoleon had sent to him the Cardinals Spina and Caselli, to obtain, first, by means of friendly interviews, the canonical institution

of the bishops designate, which was the principal difficulty with the church, and then to sound him on the arrangement of all the misunderstandings between the Empire and the Papacy. Napoleon was always desirous of prevailing on Pius VII. to relinquish the temporal power of the Holy See, to consent to the union of Rome to the territory of the Empire, to the establishment of a papacy dependent on the new Emperors of the West, fixing his residence at Paris or at Avignon, with the possession of beautiful palaces, a revenue of 2,000,000 of francs, and many other advantages, but subject to the authority of the Emperor of the French, as the Russian church was subject to the Czar and Islamism to the Sultan. Pius VII. at first received the two cardinals coldly; he afterwards became more softened towards them, expressed no decided opposition to the canonical institution of the bishops designate, but was little disposed to grant it immediately, in order to maintain an efficacious means of compelling Napoleon to occupy himself with the affairs of the church, and had seemed determined not to accept the material advantages offered him, demanding, he said, only two things,—the Catacombs for his residence and some faithful cardinals for his counsellors, promising, if he were allowed liberty, poverty, and a council, to bring to light all the religious questions which had fallen into arrears, and to do nothing to induce a revolt among the people in whose bosom he should bury his temporal decay.

Though the two cardinals returned without having effected their object, they had been brought to think that the pope was not invincible; that, by good treatment, and granting him a council to aid him in regulating the affairs of the church, he would resume his pontifical functions without leaving Savona, resigning himself to that place as a permanent abode, both because he was actually there already, and because, being there, as it were, imprisoned, he consecrated nothing by his own consent, while by allowing himself to be transported to Avignon or Paris, and accepting a revenue, he would sanction the Imperial acts by his acquiescence. The same conclusions might be drawn from certain subsequent interviews between the pope and M. de Chabrol, prefect of Montenoite; and Napoleon was labouring to find some way of reconciling the inclinations of the pope with his own views, when several incidents which transpired suddenly roused him to an unheard-of exasperation and to acts of the greatest violence.

The reader will doubtless remember the expedient devised for the provisional administration of the dioceses whose prelates had been designated but not instituted. There were no less than twenty-seven dioceses in this situation, including the sees of Florence, Malines, and Paris. The chapters, some free and others constrained, had conferred the title of capitulary vicars on the bishops designate, which allowed them to govern their new dioceses at least in the character of administrators. Cardinal Maury, who had been named Archbishop of Paris in the place of Cardinal Fesch, but not yet instituted,

to the chambers of commerce, was reproduced in a multitude of German journals, commented on by all diplomatists, sent to the court of Russia, collected by the police, and, though dispersed in the memory of contemporaries, yet preserved in such a manner as to be possible to be

recalled in its principal features. We, therefore, do not hesitate to affirm that it is true in substance and even in form generally as to the malice thrown out by Napoleon against his industrial interlocutors.



was in this manner administering the diocese of Paris. Only he had to encounter much opposition on the part of his chapter; and, as we have said elsewhere, when in certain ceremonies he wished the cross to be carried before him, (which is the essential sign of episcopal dignity,) some docile canons remained, but others, with M. l'Abbé d'Astros at their head, took flight with a very offensive amount of affectation.

At each refractory symptom of the clergy Napoleon allowed them to hear the lion's roar, but did not keep them long in alarm, calculating upon the speedy and simultaneous arrangement of all ecclesiastical affairs. However, certain reports from Turin, Florence, and Paris, revealed to him a plan brewing in secret by the priests and zealous devotees to render impossible the designed provisional government of the churches. The pope had secretly written to different chapters to engage them not to recognise as capitulary vicars the bishops who had been designated but not instituted. He founded himself upon certain canonical rules not very well interpreted, and maintained that that mode of administration was contrary to the rights of the Roman church, because it conferred upon the new prelates the possession of their sees by anticipation. He had formally forbidden the chapter of Paris to acknowledge Cardinal Maury as capitulary vicar, and to the cardinal himself he had addressed a very severe letter, in which he reproached his ingratitude to the Holy See, which, he said, had received him in his exile, bestowed upon him many benefices, particularly the bishopric of Montefiascone, (as if that cardinal had not done much more for the church than the church had done for him,) and enjoined him, under pain of disobedience, to relinquish the administration of the diocese of Paris. By a strange negligence, this double mission had been addressed to the chapter and the cardinal through the office of the minister of worship, with several other despatches relating to different matters of detail, which the pontiff was anxious to transact from time to time. The minister, having opened these papers, was much surprised at their contents, was unwilling to distress the cardinal by speaking of them to him, but remitted all to the Emperor, whose irritation will be readily imagined when he saw the imprisoned pope making efforts to wrest from his hands the last method of administering the vacant dioceses. He recommended secrecy, and ordered an inquiry to ascertain whether there had not been other letters from the pope. At the same time there arrived from Piedmont and Tuscany exactly similar information. M. d'Osmond, who had been designated Archbishop of Florence and was actually on the road to his new diocese, met at Placentia with a deputation from the chapter of Florence commissioned to announce to him that there was already a capitulary vicar performing the functions, and that it was not possible to elect another, and that instructions on this subject had been received from Savona which they had resolved not to disobey. The unhappy archbishop, a man of wise but timid character, had remained at Placentia in the most cruel perplexity. Princess Eliza, the sister of Napoleon, who governed her duchy with a skilful combination of mildness and firmness, had been informed of this scheme,

had summoned the principal leader of the chapter and a certain advocate who served as a means of communication with the pope, had caused the correspondence of Pius VII. to be delivered up to herself, and had sent the whole to Napoleon before venturing upon any measure of severity. At Piedmont, M. Dejean, nominated to the bishopric of Asti, had met the same reception with even less consideration; for, without any previous interview, they had refused him all authority over his new diocese, and had declared that they could accord him no other situation than that of provisional administrator. Prince Borghese, Governor of Piedmont, had, like his sister-in-law, forwarded to Paris the particulars of this bold and singular conflict.

Napoleon, seeing this concurrence of similar events at very distant points, discovered in it a system of well-combined resistance, the result of which must be either to oblige him to treat with the pope immediately or to excite a real schism. His anger was irrepressible. He had learned almost at the same time, on the 29th, 30th, and 31st of December, 1810, the different facts which we have just related. He determined to check everywhere the distribution of the pope's letters; and to succeed in this he wished to strike with alarm those who were the bearers of them, who had received them, or who had still retained them. On the next day, January 1, 1811, he was to receive the compliments of the great bodies of the state, especially of the chapter and clergy of Paris. He was not in the habit of pronouncing any formal speech in these solemnities, but of conversing familiarly with the visitors according to the humour of the moment, rewarding some by a flattering attention, rebuking others by words in which the power of his own individual mind united with that of the throne to overwhelm those who had the misfortune to have displeased him. His wonderful sagacity, as penetrating as his eye, seemed to fathom the very depth of their souls. At the head of the chapter of Paris was the Abbé d'Astros, a passionate and imprudent priest, embracing with fanaticism all the ideas of the clergy hostile to the Emperor. Napoleon, knowing with whom he had to do, attacked at once the most difficult points of the religious quarrel in such a manner as to provoke some imprudent act or speech on the part of the abbé which might lead to further discoveries. He succeeded perfectly; and, after having brought the Abbé d'Astros to speak as he had wished, and having afterwards treated him with rudeness, he at the very moment summoned the Duke of Rovigo, who was in the palace, and said to him, "Unless I am much deceived, this abbé has the missives of the pope. Arrest him before he leaves the Tuileries; interrogate him, and give orders to examine his papers, and we shall then certainly discover all that we wish to know."

The Duke of Rovigo, to prevent scandal, requested Cardinal Maury to bring the Abbé d'Astros to the office of the ministry of police, and at the same time ordered an examination of the house of that ecclesiastic. The Duke of Rovigo, who had already acquired all the dexterity necessary for his new functions, pretended, while interrogating the Abbé d'Astros, to know that of which he was ignorant, and

thus obtained the disclosure of what had passed. The Abbé confessed that he had received the two briefs of the pope,—one for the chapter, the other for the cardinal,—but affirmed that he had not as yet propagated them, and very imprudently confessed that he had spoken of them to his relation, M. Portales, son of the former minister of worship and member of the Imperial council of state. At the same time the agents sent to the residence of the Abbé d'Astros had found the papal letters, and many other papers disclosing all the scheme which they were endeavouring to trace. They found that there was at Paris a little council of priests, Roman and French, in frequent communication with the pope, concerting with him the line of conduct to be pursued in every circumstance, and keeping up correspondence by means of men devoted to their interest, between Paris and Lyons, and Lyons and Savona.

When every thing was thus discovered, Napoleon, wishing to strike terror, selected as his victim M. Portalis, the son of the principal author of the concordat, equally submissive to the church and to Napoleon. He had thought to reconcile the different demands of his position by saying to M. Pasquier, prefect of police and his personal friend, that there was in circulation a brief of the pope which was of a character much to be regretted and well calculated to sow discord between the church and the state, and the propagation of which it was very desirable to check;\* but he confined himself to this intimation without designating his relation the Abbé d'Astros, for his duty as counsellor of state did not require him to become an informer against his own family.

On the 4th of January, the council of state having assembled, and M. Portalis being present, Napoleon began by relating all that had recently passed between the pope and certain chapters, exposed the attempts which had been discovered, and which, according to him, were intended to urge subjects to disobedience to their sovereign; then, affecting extreme grief, he added that his principal vexation in this circumstance was to find among the guilty a man whom he had laden with benefits, the son of a former minister for whom he had entertained a strong affection, a member of his own council here present, M. Portalis; then, addressing himself sharply to him, he demanded point-blank whether he had known the pope's brief, if, having known it, he had kept it secret, if this were not a real crime, at once a treachery and black ingratitude; and thus, heaping his interrogations on M. Portalis, he allowed him not even time to reply. We have already seen the license of the multitude: it was now the time for the license of power. M. Portalis, an eminent magistrate, whose energy unhappily was not equal to his high intelligence, might have raised his head and replied to his master in embarrassing terms; but he was able only to

mutter a few broken words, and Napoleon, forgetting what he owed to a member of his council, and what was due to that council and to himself, thundered out, "Depart, sir! depart, and let me see you here no more!" The counsellor of state, thus violently treated, rose in alarm, and, crossing the council-chamber in tears, retired almost annihilated from the midst of his stupefied associates.

Although at all times the evil disposition of mankind rejoices secretly at the sight of remarkable disgrace, satisfaction was not the emotion excited on the present occasion. The prominent feelings of the council of state were pity and a sense of wounded dignity; they were offended at the scene, and manifested their feelings, not by murmurs, but by an attitude of the greatest coldness. There is no power, however great, which can with impunity offend the inward feelings of an assembly of men. Under the influence of fear their lips may be silent, but their countenance will speak. Napoleon, discovering from the mere aspect of those present that he had been cruel and inconsistent, experienced an indescribable embarrassment, which he vainly endeavoured to escape by assuming an excess of grief almost ridiculous, saying that he was distressed to be obliged thus to treat the son of a man whom he had loved; that power brought with it many painful duties, which he must fulfil at whatever cost; and a thousand platitudes of that kind which influenced no one. They left him to beat the air, and retired without uttering a word. Next to M. Portalis, the person most severely punished was himself.

To this outbreak Napoleon wished to add more efficacious measures, in order to intimidate the hostile part of the clergy and to prevent the consequences of the recently-discovered plots. He caused M. d'Astros to be detained, and arrested or removed from Paris several of the priests composing the cabal whose existence had been brought to light. He ordered his brother-in-law, Prince Borghese, and his sister, Princess Elisa, to arrest the canons who were known to be the instigators of the chapters of Asti and Florence, to send them to Fenestrella, to declare to those chapters that, unless they immediately submitted themselves and allowed to the new prelates the title of vicars-capitulary, their sees should be suppressed, and likewise the canonries, and the refractory canons themselves should be shut up in the state prisons. The same declaration was addressed to the chapter of Paris.

These acts of violence were followed by other measures of a still more painful character, because they were stamped with meanness as well as anger. Napoleon ordered the pope to be separated from all those who had hitherto surrounded him, excepting one or two domestics on whom they could depend, not to leave him a single secretary, to take advantage of the moment when he should be walking to deprive him of all means of writing, to seize his papers and to send them to Paris for examination, to reduce his expenditure to fifteen or twenty thousand francs, though it had formerly been princely, and to declare to the pope that he was expressly forbidden to write or to receive letters. An officer of gendarmerie was despatched to watch him day and night and to observe his least move

\* These details are gathered from the original sources:—*1.* the letters of Napoleon, of the minister of police, of the prefect of police, of Princess Elisa, of Prince Borghese, and, finally, of the minister of worship. They are therefore perfectly reliable. I would here remark that the explosion of anger of which M. Portalis was the victim was not occasioned by the bull of excommunication, as has been asserted by some, but by the pope's brief to the chapter of Paris.

ments. The prefect, M. de Chabrol, was ordered to excite the alarms of Pius VII. not merely for himself, but also for all those who should be compromised in the plots which should hereafter be discovered. He was to tell him that by his imprudent conduct he exposed himself to be judged, and even deposed, by a council, and his accomplices to still severer punishment.

Happily, the execution of these angry measures was intrusted to a man of tact and judgment. M. de Chabrol spoke to the pope not only as the threatening minister of an irritated power, but as a minister distressed with his duty, who only employed the force with which he was armed to impart counsels of prudence and wisdom to his august prisoner. But he could not avert from the pope the pain of removing his confidential advisers, of seizing his papers, and many other precautions as humiliating as they were puerile. The pope, at first troubled to a degree unsuited to his character, (which we relate with regret, for we cannot but be jealous of the dignity of such a victim,) soon recovered himself, and listened with mildness to M. de Chabrol; said that if his papers had been demanded he would have surrendered them without having driven them to such an act of deception as to take them while he was walking; promised to carry on no further correspondence,—not for his own sake, but for the sake of those who might become the victims of their devotion to the church; and added that as to himself, old, and overwhelmed with the events he had seen, he was now drawing to the close of his career, and would speedily elude his persecutors by leaving in their grasp a lifeless corpse instead of a pope.

M. de Chabrol consoled him, at the same time suggesting useful and necessary counsels, and contributed by what he wrote to obtain some alleviation of the orders received from Paris. The expenditure of the pope's residence was not in any material point diminished.

The chapters of Florence and Asti submitted themselves with a pitiable eagerness. The refractory canons, excepting one or two who were transmitted to the state prisons, fell on their knees to the temporal power, apologized, wept, and, without a single objection, intrusted to M. d'Osmond for the diocese of Florence, and to M. Dejean for that of Asti, almost all the powers, not only of an administrator, but of a fully-instituted bishop. At Paris, the eagerness to submit was still more marked. All was imputed to the imprudence of M. d'Astros, a kind of fanatic, they said, who had almost destroyed the diocese. Cardinal Maury had no other grief than that of obeying such a power and commanding such subordinates! The dioceses of Metz, of Aix, and others, where the same conflict had arisen, submitted with the same docility. The church was no longer distinguished either by genius or by the spirit of martyrdom. Their chief, Pius VII., notwithstanding some moments of weakness inseparable from human nature, and some outbreaks inseparable from his sufferings, was alone worthy of the better ages of the Roman church.

Napoleon, thus readily obeyed, resumed his calmness. Yet he resolved to put an end to these acts of resistance, which annoyed without terrifying him, which indeed terrified him less

than their true extent warranted. He adhered to one idea, which had already often presented itself to his mind,—that of a council of which he hoped to be the master, and which he hoped to employ either to induce the pope to yield, or to enable him to dispense with him by substituting the superior authority of the assembled church for that of the head of the church. He had already formed an ecclesiastical commission, composed of several prelates and priests, including M. Emery, the respected superior of the congregation of St. Sulpice. He convoked it anew, making a little change in its composition, rendered inevitable by the recent death of M. Emery, and referred to it all the questions arising from the project of a council. Must it be general or provincial? composed of all the bishops of Christendom, or only of those of the Empire, of the kingdom of Italy, and of the Germanic Confederation, which was nearly equal to all Christendom? what questions must be submitted to consideration, what resolutions demanded, what forms observed, in the nineteenth century, so different from any in which a council had been convoked? Napoleon urgently insisted on the speedy examination of these different questions, proposing to assemble the council at the beginning of the month of June,—the very day of the baptism of the King of Rome.

Meanwhile, Napoleon kept his eye upon the affairs of the North, and engaged with equal activity in diplomacy and in military preparations.

In respect to diplomacy, he had just made a choice which could not but exert an unfavourable influence on his fortunes, in appointing M. Maret, Duke of Bassano, minister for foreign affairs. Already, as we have seen, he had separated himself from the only two persons who could then be perceived through the aureola of glory which surrounded him,—M. Fouché and De Talleyrand. We have stated that he had replaced M. Fouché by the Duke of Rovigo,—the best choice possible in the circumstances. He had replaced M. de Talleyrand by M. de Champagny, Duke of Cadore,—a wise and moderate man, not thwarting the will of Napoleon, but not going beyond it, and rather restraining it a little by the moderation of his own character. M. de Cadore gave excellent reports on all subjects; but he spoke little, and thus gave little occasion to foreign diplomatists to speak. Napoleon often complained to Prince Cambacérès that his minister for foreign affairs was deficient in conversation, and at length yielded to the wishes of his secretary of state, M. de Bassano, who longed for the office of foreign minister and representative of the Grand Empire in the sight of Europe. Napoleon decided on this appointment in April, 1811,—the very period at which the state of Europe was becoming complicated, and at which such a nomination might be attended with the greatest inconvenience.

We have already spoken of M. de Bassano. The prominent part he was afterwards called to act requires us to speak of him again. This minister possessed all those qualities in which M. de Cadore was deficient. While the latter was modest and even timid, the former was the reverse. A man of honour, and, as we have said, devoted to Napoleon, but in that form of devotion which is fatal to the princes who are the objects of it, polite, endowed with taste and with skill in representation, speaking well, and

fond of hearing himself speak, excessively vain of the éclat derived from his master,—he was calculated to add to all the defects of Napoleon, if it were possible to contribute any thing either to his defects or his better qualities. When the imperious commands of Napoleon were issued through the hesitating lips of M. de Cadore, they lost part of their violence; when they passed through the lips of the cool and satirical M. de Talleyrand, they were robbed of their serious character. This manner of transmitting his orders Napoleon called *mal-adresse* in the first, treason in the second; a happy treason, which only betrayed his passions to promote his interests! There was nothing of this kind to fear in M. de Bassano; and he felt assured that not one of his intractable determinations would be moderated by the prudent reserve of his minister. The most haughty of masters was to have as an agent the least modest of ministers, and that at the very moment when Europe, driven to extremity, required more than ever the most delicate handling. It should be added, in excuse for M. de Bassano, that he regarded Napoleon not only as the greatest captain, but as the wisest politician, and, consequently, that he could perceive nothing in his views demanding improvement,—a degree of implicit confidence which, without any fault on his part, made him a most dangerous minister.

On the 17th of April, Napoleon summoned the Archchancellor Cambacérès, whom he now seldom consulted except in a matter of legislation, (when he almost always listened to him,) and in a case of religion, (when he hardly ever did so,) and in cases of individuals whom he would prepare to undergo the sudden effects of his will. He explained to him what he complained of in M. de Cadore, though he esteemed and loved him greatly, and his resolution to replace him by M. le Duc de Bassano. Prince Cambacérès remained silent with respect to M. de Bassano,—a silence which conveyed enough to Napoleon, who guessed all but took account of nothing,—and took his pen to draw out the decree. Napoleon signed it, and then ordered Prince Cambacérès to go with M. de Bassano to demand of M. de Cadore the portfolio of foreign affairs. Prince Cambacérès, followed by M. de Bassano, repaired to M. de Cadore, who was greatly surprised by the message, for that excellent man had no idea of having displeased his master; but he exhibited a tranquil and silent resignation. M. de Cadore consigned his portfolio to M. de Bassano with a vexation which he vainly endeavoured to conceal, and M. de Bassano received it with the blind joy of a satisfied ambition,—the former not aware of the cruel burden which he was laying down, the latter ignorant of the terrible catastrophes in which he was about to share. Happy and terrible mystery of fate, in which we walk as if enveloped in a cloud!

Prince Cambacérès, having remarked the vexation of M. de Cadore, reported it to Napoleon, who, always regretting the necessity of afflicting an old servant, granted him an honourable compensation by naming him general superintendent of the crown.

Napoleon had been more fortunate in his choice of a new ambassador to St. Petersburg. He had, as we have already said, appointed as successor to M. le Duc de Vicence, M. de Lau-

riston, one of his aides-de-camp, whom he had already employed with advantage in several delicate missions requiring tact, reserve, close observation, and administrative and military knowledge. M. de Lauriston was a man of simplicity and good sense, not willing to displease his master, but still less willing to deceive him. No ambassador was better adapted than he to reconcile the emperors of Russia and France, if they could be reconciled, by inspiring confidence in the former, and by persuading the latter that war was not inevitable, but that it depended simply on his will. There was, indeed, little probability of success in such a mission, especially in the present state of affairs; but it was certain that matters would not be made worse by the fault of M. de Lauriston.

Napoleon, after he had so much hastened his armaments on the news of the recall of the Russian divisions from Turkey, clearly saw that it was no longer time to dissimulate, and had ordered M. de Caulaincourt, on leaving, and M. de Lauriston, on arrival, to conceal nothing any longer, but to acknowledge all the preparations that had been made, and to display them with confidence, in order to intimidate Alexander, whom it was no longer possible to elude. But he had, nevertheless, ordered both of them to declare formally that he had no desire for war on its own account; that if he made preparations it was merely because he believed that preparations were made against him, because he was convinced that, if the affairs in Turkey were brought to a close, Russia would ally herself to England, were it merely to re-establish her commerce with her and enjoy by her own means what she would have owed to her alliance with France; that she had already partially done this by receiving the Americans into her ports; that, in his opinion, to admit smugglers was the next thing to making war; that, if it were possible that they owed him a grudge for a miserable object like that of Oldenburg, they had only to demand an indemnity, which he would readily allow, however great it might be; but that it was necessary at length to speak openly and without concealing their designs, so as either to assume or to lay aside arms immediately and not exhaust themselves by useless preparations. He had said all these things himself to Prince Kourakin and to M. de Czernicheff, with a mixture of grace, hauteur, and good nature, which he well knew how to employ in proper season; and he had urged M. de Czernicheff to repeat them at St. Petersburg. Yet, as he was unwilling to explain himself fully before his armaments were sufficiently advanced, he recommended M. de Lauriston, though he left Paris in April, not to arrive in St. Petersburg before May, by which time his own very significant preparations might be known. He had himself spoken openly to MM. de Kourakis and Czernicheff only shortly before this period.

But all this endeavour of Napoleon to avoid a sudden expression of his real designs was superfluous; for Alexander was informed day by day, and with singular exactness, of all that was passing in France. Several Poles who were devoted to Russia, many Germans who hated us intensely, the greater part of the ruined inhabitants of Dantzic, Lubec, and Hamburg, eagerly informed him of all the movements of our troops. At length a miserable

clerk of the bureaux of war, bribed by M. de Czernicheff, had communicated the effective of our troops. Thus, whenever M. de Caulaincourt endeavoured to deny or attenuate facts daily communicated to St. Petersburg, Alexander replied, "Do not deny, for I am sure of what I assert. You are evidently left uninformed, and you do not enjoy the confidence of your master. All the pains which I take to inform you, and which I take willingly, because I esteem and love you, are lost. The Emperor Napoleon does not believe you, because you tell him the truth: he pretends that I have seduced you; that you are in my interest and not in his. It will be the same with M. de Lauriston, who is also a man of honour,—who can only repeat the same things; and your master will say that M. de Lauriston is gained over."

M. de Caulaincourt, of whom Napoleon in fact said all this, and on whom the fascinating grace of Alexander had not been wholly lost, but whom it had not so far influenced as to induce him to write other than the truth, had replied in turn that France was indeed arming, but merely because he was doing so himself; and, having spoken of the works which were being executed upon the Dwina and the Dnieper, of the movement of the troops of Finland and of Turkey, Alexander perceived that he was discovered, extricated himself by throwing off all reserve, which he could now do without inconvenience, (for it was true that he had only taken his first precautions in consequence of numerous intimations from Poland and Germany; nor was he unwilling to have it known that he was fully ready to engage with good prospects of success.) "You pretend that I am arming," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "and I am far from denying it. I am arming indeed; I am ready, perfectly ready, and you will find me disposed to defend myself with energy. And what would you think of me had I done otherwise?—had I been so simple, so forgetful of my duties, as to leave my country exposed to a will so prompt, so exacting, and so formidable, as that of your master? But I did not arm till I had been informed from certain and infallible sources—which you will readily understand I may not disclose to you—that Dantzic was being put into a condition of defence and the garrisons augmented; that the troops of Marshal Davout were increasing and concentrating themselves; that the Poles and Saxons had orders to hold themselves in readiness; that Modlin was being rendered complete and Thorn was being repaired; and that all these fortresses were being provisioned. On receipt of this information, see what I have done." Then, conducting M. de Caulaincourt into a private chamber where all his maps were displayed, Alexander added, "I have ordered defensive works not beyond, but within, my frontier, on the Dwina and the Dnieper, at Riga, Dunaburg, and Bobruisk,—that is to say, at a distance from Niemen almost as great as that between Strasburg and Paris. If your master fortified Paris, should I complain of it? And, when he carries his preparations so far in advance of his frontiers, may I not arm so far within mine without being accused of an act of provocation? I have not withdrawn whole divisions from Finland, but have merely restored to the divisions of Lithuania the regiments that

had been taken from them for the war against the Swedes; I have sent to the army the garrison battalions, and changed the organization of my depôts. I increase my guard, of which you do not speak, and which I confess; and I endeavour to put it on a par with the guard of Napoleon. Finally, I have recalled five of my divisions from Turkey, of which I am far from making a mystery,—which, on the contrary, I consider as a ground of complaint against you; for you thus prevent my gathering the promised fruit of our alliance,—a very moderate result compared with your conquests. In a word, I do not wish to be taken by surprise. I have not such good generals as yours, nor am I myself to be compared to Napoleon either as a general or an administrator; but I have good soldiers and a devoted nation, and we will all die, sword in hand, rather than allow ourselves to be treated like the Dutch and the Hamburgers. But I assure you, on my honour, that I will not fire the first gun. I will allow you to cross the Niemen without crossing it myself. Believe me, I do not deceive you; I have no desire for war. My nation, though wounded by the conduct of your emperor towards me, and alarmed at your encroachments, and your projects against Poland, is no more desirous of war than I am myself, because it well knows the danger; but if attacked it will not recede."

M. de Caulaincourt having repeated to the Czar that, besides the war, there were circumstances which might equal the war itself in seriousness,—that the secret project of uniting themselves to England after the conquest of the Danubian provinces, and of re-establishing the Russian commerce with her, would be regarded by Napoleon as not less dangerous than open war,—Alexander showed himself as ready with a reply on this subject as on the others. "To ally myself with England after arranging the affairs of Turkey is what I never thought of! After the war of Turkey,—after having added Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to my empire, I shall consider the military and political task of my reign accomplished. I do not wish to incur further risks; I wish to enjoy in peace what I shall have acquired, and to occupy myself with promoting the civilization of my empire instead of seeking to extend its boundary. But to ally myself with England I must separate myself from France and run the risk of war with her, which I consider the most dangerous of all. And to what end? to serve England? to support her maritime theories, with which I do not accord? This would be madness on my part. The war in Turkey being finished, I wish to remain at rest, recompensed for what you shall have acquired by what I shall have gained;—very inadequately, say the adversaries of the policy of Tilsit, but satisfactorily to me. I shall remain faithful to that policy; I shall continue at war with England; I shall close my ports against her to the extent which I have made known and from which I cannot depart. I repeat what I have already said,—that I cannot cut off my subjects from all commerce nor prevent them having transactions with the Americans. There may by these means be introduced some English merchandise into Russia; but you introduce at least as much by your licenses, and especially by your tariff, which admits them at a duty of fifty per cent.



I cannot subject myself to restrictions which you shun. I require, in persisting in an alliance which you take no pains to render popular in Russia, not to render it intolerable to my people by a species of devotion which you do not indulge yourselves, and which is not necessary to effect the reduction of England to an extremity to which she will soon be reduced if you do not yourselves create allies to her on the continent. We must, therefore, adhere to these terms; for I declare to you that, if the war were at my gates on the ground of commercial measures, I will go no further. With respect to the other points at issue, I have also made up my mind. The Poles are very noisy and uneasy. They loudly proclaim the near restoration of Poland; but I reckon upon the word of the Emperor in that matter, though he has refused the agreement which I sought. As for Oldenburg, I require something which shall not be a mockery, I do not say for my family, whom I am sufficiently rich to compensate, but for the dignity of my crown. And in this respect, also, I appeal to the Emperor Napoleon. I have told you, and I repeat, that, although wounded and embarrassed by what has taken place in the duchy of Oldenburg, I will not, on that account, make war."

M. de Caulaincourt having urged the emperor to state what he would consider a suitable indemnity, he refused to give any explanation. "Where would you have me seek an indemnity?" said he. "In Poland? Napoleon would say that I was seeking from him a part of the duchy of Warsaw, and that I was making war for the sake of Poland. Thus, although he should offer me the whole duchy, I should refuse it. Should I seek the indemnity in Germany? He will tell the German princes that I wish to rob them. I cannot then take the initiative, but I will trust to him. Let us save appearances, and I shall be satisfied. My treasury shall complete the indemnity if it be not sufficient."

As the time for M. de Caulaincourt's departure drew near, Alexander redoubled his attentions to him; and, subtle as he was, he had evidently in his effusions with him displayed his true dispositions. The greatness of Napoleon was far from pleasing him; however, he yielded to it in consideration of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. He was unwilling, in order to ally himself more closely with England, to risk a war with France, which he trembled to think of; but neither would he sacrifice the remains of his commerce, and for the protection of this alone was he willing to brave a rupture. His nation,—by which we understand particularly the nobility and the higher grades of the army,—understanding his mind without any full explanation, and on this occasion entirely approving his views, not desirous of war more than himself, but as willing to incur it as himself and on the same conditions, showed no sign of boasting or even of animosity, but openly professed, in the same terms as their emperor, with a modesty mingled with a noble firmness, that they well knew the importance of war with France, but, if that power went so far as to violate their independence, they would defend themselves, and, if need be, fall with arms in their hands. An idea had already been diffused through all ranks of the nation, that

they should do as the English in Portugal had done,—viz.: retire into the interior of Russia, destroying every thing in their way, and that the French should perish by want and wretchedness, if not by Russian arms. But in language and manner nothing appeared calculated to provoke; and additional politeness was everywhere exhibited to M. de Caulaincourt and his countrymen.

The news of the birth of the King of Rome having reached St. Petersburg before the arrival of M. de Lauriston, Alexander sent all the grandees of his court to congratulate the ambassador of France, and behaved on the occasion with frankness and cordiality. M. de Caulaincourt had wished to close his brilliant, and, we may add, very useful, period of embassy, (for he had contributed to retard the rupture between the empires,) by a magnificent fête in honour of this event. He naturally wished the Emperor Alexander to be present; and the latter, anticipating his wish, addressed him in these words:—"Do not invite me, for I shall be obliged to refuse; I cannot go to dance at your house while 100,000 French are marching towards my frontier. I shall profess myself ill, in order to give you a reason for not inviting me; but I will send all my court, even my own family; for I wish your fête to be brilliant as it becomes the event you celebrate and your own position. When your successor arrives, he will perhaps bring something that may restore my confidence; then, if we can come to an understanding, I shall lavish upon your master and upon yourself the most significant testimonies of friendship."

This grand fête passed off as Alexander had proposed, and all appearances were saved. M. de Lauriston, anxiously expected, arrived at St. Petersburg on the 9th of May, 1811. M. de Caulaincourt immediately presented him to the Emperor Alexander, who received him with the most flattering and gracious assurances, convinced that, as regarded friendly and trustworthy dispositions, he was no loser by the change. After some days devoted to very splendid official receptions, Alexander, sometimes in the presence of M. de Caulaincourt, sometimes in private, subjected M. de Lauriston, as it were, to torture, in order to obtain some satisfactory light upon the projects of Napoleon; but he learned nothing more than he had already heard from M. de Caulaincourt and M. de Czernicheff, who had recently come from Paris. Napoleon did not desire a rupture; but he was arming because he had heard of the arrival in Lithuania of the divisions of Finland and Turkey; because they were commencing fortifications on the Dwina and the Dnieper; because war was threatened on every side, which he feared would be declared after the arrangement of affairs in Turkey; because Americans were admitted into Russian ports, &c. To these assertions of old excuses Alexander could only repeat explanations equally old:—that he was, no doubt, arming, but merely to reply to the measures of Napoleon; that he had no idea of beginning a new war after the settlement of the affairs of Turkey; that he would only take arms in self-defence,—to which he pledged his word as a man and a sovereign; that he admitted Americans because he could not dispense with the remains of his commerce; that, having engaged himself at Tilsit, not to the decrees of Berlin or Milan, of

which he knew nothing, but to the rights of neutrals, he had been faithful, more so than France herself, to that right, by admitting neutrals to his own ports; in a word, that he was ready to disarm if France were willing to do the same.

After this renewal of his former assertions, which he explained to M. de Lauriston as he had so frequently done to M. de Caulaincourt, he received the adieux of the latter, embraced him in his arms, entreated him to impart all the truth to Napoleon, requested M. de Lauriston, who was present, to confirm it, adding with sadness these characteristic expressions:—"But you will no more be believed than M. de Caulaincourt. . . . It will be said that I have gained you over; that I have seduced you; and that, having fallen into my nets, you have become more Russian than French."

M. de Caulaincourt left for Paris, and M. de Lauriston, after spending some days at St. Petersburg, wrote to the French ministry that he was bound as an honest man to speak the truth to his sovereign, and that he was resolved to do so; that he must declare that the Emperor Alexander, though in some degree prepared, was not desirous of war; that in no case would he take the initiative; that he would not make war unless it was brought to his door; that, as to Oldenburg, he would accept whatever was offered,—even Erfurt, though such an indemnity was a mockery; and that to save the deeply-wounded self-respect of Russia he would desire a better compensation; that, with respect to the commercial question, they might obtain an increased rigour in the examination of the papers of neutrals, although considerable severity had already been evinced, since one hundred and fifty English vessels had been seized in one year; but that Russia would never go the length of wholly dispensing with neutrals. "I can only see what I see," said M. de Lauriston, "and report what I see. Things are as I have said; and, if we are not content with the only possible concessions, we shall have war, but we shall have it because we have so determined, and it will be serious, as far as I can judge from what I have seen here and on my journey." M. de Czernicheff was again sent to Paris, to repeat in other terms, but with the same affirmations, exactly the same things, and also to maintain in the bureau of the war-department a species of corruption with which he alone of the Russian legation was acquainted, and to which his government attached a high value, because they derived from it valuable information with respect to all the military preparations of France.

When these new explanations reached Paris by the return of M. de Czernicheff and de Caulaincourt, and by the letters of M. de Lauriston, Napoleon inferred from them, not that peace was possible if he wished it, but that war might be deferred for a year; for the Russians would evidently not take the initiative, since they had not done so notwithstanding every provocation, and they had also many preparations to conclude, and would be desirous of finishing the war in Turkey before commencing another; and, as Napoleon was determined not to undertake this new campaign in the North without immense resources, he was not sorry to have another year before him, either to pre-

pare his troops or to complete his material, which constituted, as we have said, the principal difficulty of his approaching enterprise. Why did his understanding of his position not go further? Why did he not see that it was possible not only to defer but even wholly to avoid the rupture? Simply for the reason already assigned. He had so often experienced that after the first coolness war inevitably ensued,—he had so often seen his hidden enemies ready to rally round the first open enemy who ventured to raise the mask,—he saw so plainly in Russia an enemy conquered but not crushed, around whom would rally all the resentments of Europe,—that he said to himself that sooner or later he must enter into conflict with her; and in the probability of war detecting its inevitable declaration to such a degree that his own foresight became a snare to him,—reading the hearts of others profoundly without studying his own,—not perceiving that in the quick transition from coolness to an open rupture a principal cause was to be found in his own impetuous disposition, and that it depended upon him to break that fatal connection by becoming for one instant moderate, patient, tolerant of others,—encouraging none of these wholesome reflections, and having no one near him to force them upon him,—receiving no useful advice either from his ministers or from the bodies of the state, a kind of phantom intended to represent the nation, and yet not venturing to express their extreme sufferings,—wholly given up to himself,—he resolved a second time, we may say, in May, 1811, to make war upon Russia, at the same time resolving on delay. With his usual prompt decision, he made his arrangements accordingly from the end of May, and issued his military orders and diplomatic instructions, with the absolute certainty that the Russian war would not take place before 1812, but that it would be then inevitable.

Concealing nothing from Marshal Davout, he immediately wrote to him that circumstances were less urgent,\* but that he relinquished none of his preparations; only that whenever there was an advantage, either in point of economy or of execution, in terminating an affair in a fortnight instead of a week, it was well to take a fortnight; that his intention was to have the army of the North in readiness for the beginning of 1812, but on a much larger scale than he had formerly contemplated. He no longer spoke of 200,000 men: he wished to place 200,000 under the command of Marshal Davout upon the Vistula, to have 200,000 under his own command on the Oder, and a reserve of 150,000 on the Elbe and the Rhine, a nearly-equal force in the interior for the safety of the empire, and to send more troops into Spain, instead of withdrawing any from that country. Napoleon countermanded the departure of the 4th and 5th battalions of Marshal Davout, determined that they should be formed at the dépôt, where they would be better organized,—even projected a seventh, in order to have six fit for service; he reverted to the formation of select battalions ordered at a moment of urgent necessity for the regiments stationed in Holland and Italy, and even wished a 4th and 6th bat-

\* I relate these facts from the letters of Napoleon to Marshal Davout, to the minister of war, to the King of Saxony, and to Prince Poniatowski.

tation to be created in each of these regiments. Without restraining the purchase of horses, but rather extending it, he gave orders that it should be conducted more leisurely, that it might be done with greater accuracy, and ordered some immense carriages in great numbers, on a new model, to be described elsewhere. He availed himself of the remaining time to arrange the Polish army differently and on a larger scale, and sent funds to Warsaw to complete the construction and arming of the fortresses of Torgau, Modlin, and Thorn, in the following year. In a word, far from diminishing his preparations, he gave them at once more deliberation and a larger extent, that they might be more perfect and more vast.

Diplomacy was conducted with the same views. He had sounded Austria, and had obtained from her replies calculated to inspire confidence if in the least degree willing to be deceived. M. de Metternich had directed the cabinet of Vienna since the war of 1809. His declared policy was peace with France. Desiring to derive from it some distinguished result for his country, he wished to found on this peace a kind of alliance, and from this alliance to effect the restitution of Illyria, which, on account of Trieste and the Adriatic, was at that moment the principal cause of regret to Austria. For this reason the idea of a marriage between Napoleon and Maria Louisa had been so eagerly embraced. But this policy met at Vienna with more than one opponent. The court, not deeming themselves more than usually bound to the will of the ministry, and even yielding to their passions, received the Russians, and all malecontents in general, with the greatest favour, held the most unmeasured language with regard to France, and, in the clouds just rising towards the North thinking to perceive new storms, set themselves to turn them to their own purposes; for in courts, as well as in streets, malecontents generally long for tempests. The court of Vienna had welcomed authors with an eagerness quite unusual. MM. Schlegel, Goethe, Wieland, and others, had been invited to Vienna and received with much éclat. There prevailed at that time an underhand but otherwise very legitimate manner of saying that Germany would soon rise against France, by exalting highly the German genius and asserting its superiority to that of other nations, of adding, naturally, that it was not destined to live in a humiliated, conquered, and enslaved condition, and of announcing its speedy and splendid awakening. The society of Vienna wished to teach no other lesson than this by the incense so liberally burnt before these distinguished authors; and that aristocracy, characterized more by elegance than wit, had flattered men of talent in virtue of their hatred to France. The Austrian nation, weary of the war, and suspecting the imprudence of their aristocracy,—asking nothing better than to be avenged of the French, but with very little hope of attaining this object,—imitated their prudent and designing sovereign, who, between his courtiers and ministers, gave no decided opinion, but allowed the courtiers to give utterance to their feelings, which accorded with his own, and left the ministers to act on the principles which his own prudence could not but approve. It was fully believed at Vienna that

war would soon break out between France and Russia, and that Austria must choose her part; but she (that is, the government) had already determined on the course to be pursued if impossible to remain neuter:—which was to take the side of the strongest,—in this case, that of Napoleon. For this preference she meant to secure payment by the restitution of Illyria. In this she would only do what Russia had done against Austria in 1809: she would imitate that state exactly; she would be the ally of France, but an ally without much energy, and, like Russia, she would endeavour to gain something on the restoration of peace which she had been unable to procure during the war. These subtle views of the dominant minister were those also of the emperor, who, having been repeatedly deserted by his allies, felt he had a right to save himself from the wreck of old Europe as he best could; but this did not prevent his retaining a devout and affectionate interest in the welfare of his daughter, the Empress of France. But above all things, as the sovereign of a conquered and mutilated state, he wished to raise it by his policy, having failed in war against his formidable son-in-law.

The emperor, therefore, left the members of his court to act as they chose, content to take no part in any of their demonstrations; wrote the most friendly letters to his daughter; was delighted to hear from her that she was pleased with her condition; encouraged his minister to treat France with the greatest gentleness and prudence; immediately agreed to assist her in Turkey, where the effort was made to prevent the Russians obtaining possession of the Danubian provinces; and allowed him to hold out the prospect of the alliance of Austria in case of any new European difficulties, always on the ground of solid advantages. But, while entering into the intentions of his son-in-law to this extent, he wished that he should be continually advised to maintain peace; for it must be acknowledged, to his honour, that that wise emperor, having seen the calamities induced by war during the century, preferred a peace which should leave him as he was to a war which might restore something that he had lost.

M. de Metternich fully coincided with this policy; but by actual service men are often engaged beyond their inclination, and he leaned to our side perhaps a little more than the emperor, because, being obliged to be daily engaged in words and expressions of friendship towards us, it was not easy to confine himself to half measures. "Do not disturb yourself," he said to M. Otto, "at all that transpires at court. It is the nature of women to speak, and they often regulate their language by the fashion of the day. Let us leave them to speak, while we act." He then explained what he thought the right course of procedure.

This minister, one of the greatest that ever directed the Austrian policy, addicted to luxury and to the pleasures of the world, fond of speaking, of discoursing and teaching, but under dogmatic forms concealing a profound subtlety, professing and often practising sincerity, and with many other eminent qualities combining that of according to the passions which surrounded him merely verbal satisfactions, but allowing himself to be led in reality only by a comprehensive view of the true interests of his

country, in short a really superior mind, called upon to exercise during forty years an immense influence over Europe,—this minister said to M. Otto, with a singular mixture of coolness, cordiality, and self-confidence, “Leave all to me and all will go well. Your master is always in too great a hurry. At Constantinople you do nothing but commit blunders. You believe too much that the Turks are animals to be driven with a stick. But they have become as cunning as yourselves. They perceive the designs of which they are the object from every quarter, and, in particular, from France. They know that you delivered them over to the Russians in 1807, and that you would now regain them in order to employ them against the Russians. Depend upon it, they detest you, and all that you say to them operates in a manner contrary to your wish. Keep yourselves in the background; be reserved at Constantinople; and we will snatch from the hands of the Russians the rich prey which you had the imprudence to relinquish to them. Trust in me, and the Turks will not yield Moldavia and Wallachia. But, pray, show yourselves as little as possible. Every counsel emanating from you is regarded with suspicion at Constantinople.” These admonitions, as wise as they were profound, revealed a state of things unhappily too true. When they came to speak of the probabilities of war with Russia, M. de Metternich strongly advised peace, saying that, notwithstanding the acknowledged greatness of Napoleon, fortune might prove treacherous, as she had often done to other great men; that, no doubt, all the chances were in his favour; that nevertheless it would be better not to incur perpetual risk; that if agreeable to the Emperor Napoleon he would himself desire nothing better than to act as mediator with Russia,—an office in which he did not despair of success; that Austria was obliged to spare herself a good deal, being much worn out and in need of repose, and that, to induce her to engage in a war opposed to the inclination of the Austrian nation, a suitable reward must be offered, and one which could shut the mouths of all the opponents of the present policy.

These words, and others carefully blended with very refined theories, showed clearly that at the price of one province France might have an Austrian army, as by the price of Finland she had already had a Russian army. But M. Otto at Vienna and M. de Bassano at Paris had orders to envelop themselves in as much obscurity as M. de Metternich whenever there should be any question of Illyria or Poland, and to say that war was commonly fruitful in consequences,—that it was impossible to divide the spoil beforehand,—but that Napoleon had never allowed allies who had shown themselves useful to lose their pains.

The policy in Prussia was not equally calm: it was melancholy and depressed. M. de Hardenberg, who had been always esteemed the enemy of France, had solicited and obtained from Napoleon the authority to become principal minister of Prussia. The king had demanded that he should be allowed to assume this minister, saying that he was a man of intelligence,—perhaps the only one whom he could employ in present circumstances; that with his assistance they could effect indispen-

sable reforms and pay their debt to France. Napoleon, no longer regarding as an enemy a person thus recommended, and much alive to the hope of being paid by Prussia, had consented to the admission of M. de Hardenberg into the ministry; and he had actually effected some useful reforms, and some measures dictated by a liberal spirit, as that of equalizing the impost, of opening up access to certain grades to all officers of the army, which had offended some, enchanted others, and satisfied the greater number, and which had been represented by M. de Hardenberg to Napoleon as an imitation of the French, and to the Germanic party as one of those reforms which must attach the masses to the king's government and one day supply financial and military means for the emancipation of Germany. M. de Hardenberg and the Prussian ministers had devised an expedient for the army which has subsequently been rendered a permanent system in Prussia, which consisted in having many soldiers with the appearance of having few. The reader may remember that a secret article of the treaty of Tilsit forbade Prussia to have more than 42,000 men actually under arms. To evade this article they had chosen the best part of the Prussian army, and of them had composed *cadres*, through which they required as many men as possible to pass, training them as well and as quickly as possible, and then restoring them to their homes to supply their place by others. They thus counted upon having, in case of need, 150,000 men instead of 42,000,—the number fixed by treaty. At the depot of the regiment were kept the arms and clothes of the soldiers temporarily restored to their homes; and it was hoped that, owing to the hatred inspired in the Prussian nation by their misfortunes, these soldiers, though scarcely under arms for a single year, would behave, when called upon, like experienced warriors,—a hope which the future was destined to fulfil. In fact, the hatred of Prussia to France was intense. All the youth of the higher and middle classes, nobles and citizens, priests and philosophers, were formed into secret societies under various names, as “League of Virtue,” “Germanic League,” in which they engaged to love only Germany, to live only for her, to forget every difference of class or province, no longer to admit the distinction between nobles and others, Saxons, Bavarians, Prussians, Wurtembergians, and Westphalians, to reject all these distinctions and to recognise only Germans, to speak no other language, to wear no fabric manufactured elsewhere, to consume nothing but the produce of her soil, to love, to cultivate, and to encourage no art but that of Germany; finally, to consecrate all their faculties to Germany exclusively. Thus, the enthusiastic patriotism of Germany buried itself in clouds and mystery, and, while it met the demand of the moment, satisfied also the tendency of the German mind.

Placed over such a volcano, the king and M. de Hardenberg became the prey of cruel perplexities. The king, influenced by a sense of honour, as the Emperor of Austria was by prudence, was averse from a rupture with Napoleon; for he had pledged himself to him by the most solemn protestations of fidelity, in the hope of saving the wrecks of his monarchy. M. de Hardenberg, whose position was some-

what similar to that of M. de Metternich, anxiously inquired from what quarter he could find the greatest advantages for his country. The high-German party, resenting his apparent change of conduct and certain acts of necessary severity towards the secret associations, were nevertheless ready to pardon him on the condition of his becoming the instrument of a patriotic perfidy of which no one at Berlin made any conscience. This perfidy consisted in making a pretext of the threatening situation of Europe to arm with the greatest activity, to speak of alliance with Napoleon in order that he might tolerate this armament, to make overture of this alliance, to promise it, and even to sign it if necessary, and then, at the very moment, to plunge into Old Prussia with 150,000 men, and join themselves to Russia, in order to overwhelm France, while the whole of Germany should rise in the rear. Without narrowly examining this policy, and admitting that great license may be allowed to those who wish to emancipate their country, such a proceeding was liable to great objections even on the ground of prudence. At this perilous game Prussia might lose all that remained of her existence. This was feared by the king, M. de Hardenberg, and many wise men, who stigmatized such conduct as madness. To bring them to their views, the extreme Germanic party spread a thousand alarming reports, and sought to persuade them that Napoleon wished to carry off the king, and to put an end to the monarchy itself by a sudden irruption upon Berlin, which was altogether false, but which might, nevertheless, have been realized if Prussia had been guilty of any act of imprudence; for Napoleon, receiving intimations equally alarming, kept on his guard, and had ordered Marshal Davout to hasten to Berlin at the first appearance of danger.

Thus pursued by sinister phantoms, the king and M. de Hardenberg had in part adopted the proposed plan, without its perfidy, which was repugnant alike to the uprightness of the king and to his prudence. They had resolved to take arms, and they had actually done so in the manner described; and, although they had strictly confined themselves within the number of 42,000 effective men, yet they could muster in a short time 100,000 or 120,000. But, although they might quibble about the number of disposable troops, it was impossible for them to conceal certain preparations, such as those carried on in the fortresses which remained to Prussia. Napoleon, indeed, held the most important ones on the Oder,—Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin; and, besides, the two most important of the Vistula,—Thorn and Dantzic; but King Frederick William had still in his possession Breslau, Neisse, and Schweidnitz, in Upper Silesia; Spandau, towards the confluence of the Spree and the Havel; Graudenz, on the Vistula; Colberg, on the coast of Pomerania; Pillau, on the Frische-Haff; without reckoning Königsberg, the capital of Old Prussia; and he had expended great activity in the works of these places, especially in those of Colberg and Graudenz. Under the name of labourers had been employed the old soldiers whom it was important to retain, and who were thus kept in hand beyond the prescribed number of 42,000 men. The intention of the king and of M. de

Hardenberg, when they could no longer dissimulate these armaments, was to acknowledge them; to confess the motive,—which was the design imputed to Napoleon of commencing the war against Russia by suppressing the remains of the Prussian monarchy; to use the language of men in despair; and to place France in the alternative of either accepting their sincere alliance on condition of a solemn guarantee of their preservation and of various territorial restitutions, or of having them for determined enemies striving to the last man for the defence of their independence. This was, after all, the policy attended with the least risk, though it had its dangers; and, as to the proposal of alliance, this is explained on the part of the king and M. de Hardenberg by the opinion, then general throughout Europe, that to think of opposing Napoleon was madness. With this impression, though detesting in Napoleon the oppressor of Germany, the king and his minister thought it more prudent to ally themselves to him; to reinstate the condition of Prussia by seconding him; to reinstate it, no matter at whose expense, rather than to expose themselves to utter destruction.

Matters had arrived at the point in which it was necessary to speak openly; for to dissimulate further was impossible. Napoleon, in fact, warned on all sides, had ordered Marshal Davout to keep on his guard, to prepare to carry forward the Friant division to the Oder, in order to cut off the King of Prussia and his army from a retreat upon the Vistula, and to capture himself and the greater part of his troops on the first alarm; and had, moreover, ordered that marshal to hold in readiness three parks of siege-artillery, so as to take in a few days Spandau, Graudenz, Colberg, and Breslau. After issuing these orders, he had enjoined M. de Saint-Marsan, the French ambassador, to obtain a formal explanation from the cabinet of Berlin, to demand, as an ultimatum, the immediate and complete disarmament, and, if this ultimatum were refused, to withdraw, consigning the monarchy of the Great Frederick to the arms of Marshal Davout. These details evince the serious aspect assumed by events on every side.

No less serious events had transpired and were preparing in the neighbourhood of Prussia; that is to say, in Denmark and Sweden. Denmark, bound like all the rest of the European coast by the laws of the continental blockade, had been faithful to those laws as far as could be expected of an allied state defending the cause of another; for, although Denmark regarded the cause of neutrals as her own, yet, in the present state of affairs, the cause of neutrals had unhappily been merged in another cause,—that of the ambition of Napoleon. Denmark, consisting of islands, and having part of its fortune in other islands situated beyond the ocean, was dependent on the sea for subsistence; and, though the cause of the present quarrel was the sea, she felt it hard to be so completely debarred from it at the present moment in order to secure its being open at a future time. But the natural probity of the government and of the country, the memory of the Copenhagen catastrophe, hatred of the English, the courage and firmness of the reigning prince, all concurred to render Denmark the most faithful ally

of France in the great affair of the continental blockade. However, although the general spirit was thus disposed, the faithlessness of some individuals and the sufferings of others occasioned several instances of failure. Altona in particular, situated a short distance from Hamburg, still maintained communication with the English. The merchants of Hamburg, who had become French against their will, and who were, therefore, subjected to the rigorous laws of the blockade, and exposed, moreover, to the inflexible severity of Marshal Davout, fearing (what sometimes happened) that their books should be examined to discover whether they kept up any relation with England, retained at Hamburg only their family residences, and had at Altona their counting-houses, their books, and the register of their correspondence. They passed the day at Altona in the transaction of their business, and the evening at Hamburg in the bosom of their families. They made use of the Altona post for their correspondence, not daring to trust to that of Hamburg; and, although the King of Denmark openly supported Napoleon, he could not allow the French police, with their ingenious persecutions, to be introduced into Denmark. Marshal Davout remonstrated, but in vain. The zeal of the King of Denmark could not equal his own, although in character that king bore some resemblance to the illustrious marshal. By means of privateers and smugglers, so well aided by the natural form of the country, Holstein had been filled with colonial produce; and Napoleon, acting in regard to it as he had acted in regard to Holland, had endeavoured to empty that dépôt by granting two months to admit the colonial produce into the Empire on a duty of fifty per cent. The plan had succeeded, and had produced at that point alone a return of thirty millions. Holstein was emptied, and was no longer a magazine of English colonial produce. Smuggling in that quarter was almost wholly suppressed. Denmark had furnished us with more than three thousand excellent sailors for the Antwerp fleet. Nothing more could be demanded of that brave people for the maritime cause, since they were otherwise involved in questions so foreign from their own interests, in consequence of the conquering policy of Napoleon.

One motive, it must be confessed, which contributed to their fidelity, was the fear of Sweden; and in this respect their conduct was rewarded by the fidelity of Napoleon towards them. Sweden, having lost Finland more by the extravagance of her king than by the insufficiency of her arms, had indulged the guilty design of compensating herself by falling on a power weaker than herself; that is to say, by taking Norway from Denmark. On this point Napoleon had shown himself inflexible. But in order to understand this new European complication it is necessary to become acquainted with a fresh revolution which had occurred a few months previously in Sweden,—a country, next to France, the most fertile in revolutions.

We formerly saw how the Swedish people, wearied with the follies of Gustavus IV., which had cost him the loss of Finland, had freed themselves from that senseless monarch by a military revolution. This was the third prince of that period who had been affected by a men-

tal alienation. Each country had provided against this failure in the supreme authority agreeably to its particular institutions. In Russia, Paul I. had been assassinated; in England, George III. had been respectfully placed under private superintendence by a simple act of parliament; in Sweden, a revolted *corps-d'armée* had deprived Gustavus IV. of his sword and his sceptre. Since then, Gustavus IV. wandered over Europe as a maniac, exposed to the pity of all nations, everywhere obtaining the respect due to misfortune, while his uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, who had become king without having sought that dignity, reigned at Stockholm as wisely as the difficulties of the time allowed. At his request, Napoleon had granted peace to Sweden, on condition that she should immediately engage in war with England, that she should close her ports to British commerce, and should adopt all the regulations of the continental blockade. Thus, in order to have peace with Russia and France, Sweden was forced to relinquish Finland to the former and to sacrifice her commerce to the second. At this price she had recovered Swedish Pomerania, to which she held by an old national prejudice, which made her see in that province her footing on the continent, as if another Gustavus Adolphus or another Charles XII. were destined to descend to the conquest of another Wallenstein or another Peter the Great. At this price also she had recovered her commercial relations with the continent; but to what purpose were they recovered, if, when she acquired the power of introducing all kinds of merchandise into the continent of Europe, she lost, by a war with England, the means of receiving them? To the inconvenience of being blockaded by land she had substituted that of being blockaded by sea. The patient had therefore merely turned upon his bed of sickness. It is true that he had changed his position,—a kind of momentary alleviation which beguiles the pain and passes the time.

Sweden had escaped her embarrassment, as the weak commonly do, by deceit. Her declaration of war with England had been merely fictitious. She had closed her ports against her, but had left open the principal and the best-situated, that of Gothenburg. This port, situated in the Cattegat, opposite the shores of Great Britain, at the entry of a deep gulf, presented immense opportunities for the strange system of contraband carried on at this time. It was in the Gulf of Gothenburg and the islands dispersed through it that the English contraband trade was concentrated, after it had left Heligoland in consequence of a threat of an expedition prepared by Marshal Davout. The English fleet, under Admiral Saumarez, was stationed either at the isle of Anholt, or in the different moorings of the Gulf of Gothenburg. Under protection of the British flag, hundreds of merchant-vessels openly discharged on the coast of Sweden all kinds of goods, sugar, coffee, cotton, and the products of Birmingham and Manchester. These goods, placed there in store, were exchanged for the products of the North, such as timber, iron, hemp, grain belonging to Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and Germany, sometimes also for the raw silks of Italy, and were then transported throughout the Baltic under different professedly-neutral flags, par-

ticularly the American. Small English divisions, consisting of frigates and of seventy-four-gun ships, escorted the vessels engaged in this commerce, led them across the Belts so as to avoid the Sound, protected them against the privateers, French, Danish, and Dutch, and conveyed them to the approaches to Stralsund, Riga, Revel, and Cronstadt. An appointed signal, consisting in a vane attached to the mainmast of these vessels, caused them to be recognised, like a password in a town at war, and distinguished them from all those which might have been disposed to insinuate themselves among the convoys. In this point of view, Napoleon was in the right when he said that neutrals, even those which legitimately carried the flag of the United States, were accomplices of the English. But the principal issue for this commerce on the continent was the port of Stralsund, in Swedish Pomerania; introduced into which port as Swedish merchandise, the English produce had free access to Germany since the peace between France and Sweden. An extensive agent of the country had forwarded as many as a thousand wagons of this merchandise.

In this manner the Swedes evaded the conditions of their peace with France. They had carried their anxiety for this traffic so far as to place round Gothenburg a cordon of cavalry, which, under pretence of an epidemic, prevented the approach of any one who might see the thousands of bales of contraband goods spread out under tents, and the great number of English officers who came on shore for fresh provisions and to console themselves for the ennui of their long cruises. Various agents sent by Marshal Davout had succeeded in breaking the cordon, which covered no other epidemic than that of the contraband, and heard the Russian and German languages, but especially the English, in that vast establishment called into sudden existence by the genius of smuggling.

Such facts, though concealed for a moment, could not long remain unknown to Napoleon. And, besides, a recent difficulty had occurred to augment the peculiarities of the situation. The Duke of Sudermania, uncle of Gustavus IV., had no children. The simplest method would have been to adopt as his heir the son of the dethroned king. But the people of the court who composed the party of the deposed prince, and especially some of their leaders, had contrived to render themselves hateful to Sweden. Among the principal was reckoned the Count de Fersen, a name which had already occurred in one revolution; the Countess de Piper; finally, the queen, the wife of the reigning king, who gave expression to passions little suited to her new situation. There was no evil design or sinister project which men were not disposed to impute to this party; and, seeing the hatred which it inspired, it had become impossible to re-establish hereditary right in the family of Vasa, by taking for a future king the son of the dethroned monarch, a child perfectly innocent of his father's follies. In this emergency, the new king, Charles XIII., had adopted a Danish prince, the Duke of Angustenburg, brother-in-law of the King of Denmark. The crown of Denmark was likewise threatened with disherison, for the King of Denmark had no direct heir. Many sensible people in Sweden,

seeing the thrones of Stockholm and Sweden destined soon to become vacant, and seeing the progressive decay of their country, threatened by Russia on land and by England by sea, thought that to restore it it would be necessary to revert to the famous union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms, which may have left painful remembrances of the past, but which alone could insure the future greatness and independence of those kingdoms. They also thought that this union of the three crowns, and the alliance of France,—too far removed to cherish any evil design against Sweden, and greatly interested in her continental and maritime independence,—constituted the true policy for Sweden, that which the Swedes ought to desire for themselves, and that which Europe ought to desire for the Swedes. Unfortunately, although a certain national instinct supported the enlightened men who had embraced this idea, yet, among the peasants who formed the popular order, the union of Calmar was attended with painful reminiscences, and the idea which they formed to themselves of the reigning king of Denmark—a harsh and severe prince, wholly occupied with military details—was not of a nature to attract them. The Duke of Sudermania, now become King of Sweden, altogether inclined to support this wise and profound policy, had approached it, as it were, by a side wind. Not venturing to adopt as his heir the King of Denmark himself, he had adopted the brother-in-law of that king, who had been destined for the throne of Denmark.

The Duke of Angustenburg, thus designed one day to wear the three crowns of the North, possessed no attractive but many estimable qualities. He was cold, much given to business, and especially occupied in military affairs. Before he had time to gain the still undecided inclinations of the Swedish people, he was suddenly carried off by an unforeseen and extraordinary accident. He was on horseback at a review, when he was suddenly observed to fall and to remain motionless. They ran to his assistance: he was dead. Nothing indicated any violence, and the misfortune was clearly shown to have arisen from a natural cause. But the Swedish people, suddenly taking a lively interest in the prince thus stricken in a moment, was convinced that some interested crime had snatched him from their dawning affection. With the violence common to popular passions, they sought out and named the guilty,—persons really innocent of this crime: they accused the Count de Fersen, the Countess de Piper, the queen, and all the party of the old court. They uttered threats which were unhappily not without effect. A few days afterwards, Count de Fersen, conducting the funeral of the prince in virtue of the office he held at court, excited a tempest of fury by his presence. Assailed and surrounded by the populace, he was dragged along the streets and murdered.

All Sweden trembled at this popular crime, and felt increasingly the danger of her situation. Enlightened men, with Charles XIII. at their head, inclined more to the union of the kingdoms in proportion as difficulties increased; and they were tempted to take another step in the same direction, either by adopting the cousin of the King of Denmark, Prince Christian, destined to succeed him, or by adopting the

King of Denmark himself. It is certain that if the dynasty must be changed the best plan would have been to do it in such a manner as to re-establish the grandeur and independence of the three crowns of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. To apply immediately to the King of Denmark was a bold step, first, on account of his own character for severity, and, next, on account of the Swedish pride; for Sweden would have been very willing to impose her king upon Denmark or Norway, and, as it were, join herself to them, but she was not willing to give herself to Denmark by giving herself to her king,—the old and eternal difficulty of that union, each of the three states readily consenting to absorb the other two, but not to unite fraternally with them. To select Prince Christian, afterwards destined for the throne of Denmark, seemed to be a more prudent policy, and equally well directed to the desired end. It was possible to aim somewhat less directly by choosing the Duke of Augustenberg, brother of the deceased prince, and not quite so near the throne as Prince Christian. But during this conflict of ideas and sentiments, a party whose numbers were daily increasing directed their eyes towards another quarter. Many Swedes, inclining to France from sympathy with the ideas of the French Revolution, and from military enthusiasm, as well as from that ancient instinct which always approximated France and Sweden, had conceived the plan of addressing Napoleon, the great establisher and subverter of thrones in Europe. He was regarded in Sweden with nearly the same feelings as those which he had excited in Spain before the revolution of Bayonne, which involved a singular combination of admiration, enchantment, and confidence in his genius, both military and civil. Every act of his was satisfactory except the continental blockade; and they flattered themselves that they should be able to elude or to be emancipated from that. To address the Emperor of the French, with a view of obtaining from him either one of his relations or one of his captains, was a more popular proposal than to combine in one the three Scandinavian kingdoms, and was in strict harmony with the warlike character of the Swedes.

The reigning king, inclined to the union of the three crowns, but no less deeply convinced of the necessity of the support of France, had despatched a confidential agent to Napoleon with a letter stating that his inclination was to labour for the union of the three crowns, which appeared to him the best line of policy, but that he was unwilling to do any thing without consulting the arbiter of Europe, the powerful Emperor of the French; that if that arbiter agreed with his views he would choose his successor in the family of the princes of Denmark, with an immediate or more distant prospect as circumstances might direct; but that if on the contrary Napoleon were willing to extend a protecting hand to Sweden, and to grant her a prince out of his own family, or one of the illustrious warriors under his command, Sweden would cordially accept his choice. The secret envoy of the king was charged to urge Napoleon to select a king for the Swedes.

This embassy had rather perplexed than flattered Napoleon. He was not so satisfied with the system of restoring crowns, by filling the

thrones which had become empty by a natural course or by his own means, sometimes with brothers, sometimes with brothers-in-law, and, after these nearer connections, with marshals, to persist in the plan, especially at so great a distance. He had just found that it became necessary to maintain at a great expense these recently-created kings, who, notwithstanding their cost, resisted him at least as much as the former kings, because they were obliged to become the instruments of the resistance of their people,—a spirit which was fostered by the presence of a foreign king. He was, therefore, little disposed to undertake new difficulties of this kind. Besides, he had given sufficient umbrage to Europe by the creation of French departments at Hamburg and Lubeck, without increasing it by raising to the throne of Sweden a French prince, soon perhaps to become a foe. Recovering, therefore, all the accuracy and depth of his thought as soon as his passions ceased to draw him astray, he preferred to see the three crowns of the North concentrate their forces against Russia and England by union, than to procure to himself the empty gratification of his vanity by raising a new French dynasty in Europe. Besides, they had hitherto so little indicated the individual French prince who might be called to the throne of Sweden, that the possible choice had exercised no influence on this excellent disposition.

Napoleon, therefore, immediately replied that he had neither prince nor general to offer the Swedes; that at the moment he coveted nothing for his family or his lieutenants; that Europe might be offended by such a proceeding; and that the policy which contemplated the ultimate union of the three crowns of the North appeared to him the best, and the most worthy of the present able king; that he demanded of Sweden nothing more than that she should remain a faithful ally to France and assist her against England by the rigid execution of the continental blockade.

On the arrival of this reply, the king, Charles XIII., no longer hesitated to follow his own inclination. Not venturing to do so entirely, he had resolved to adopt the brother of the deceased prince, the Duke of Augustenburg. The revolutionary and military party who had overthrown the Vasas, not desiring either a Vasa or a king of Denmark, who was considered harsh and absolute, had urged Charles XIII. to this choice, which, after all, was merely a repetition of his former adoption. But a new incident had once more complicated this oft-thwarted election. The King of Denmark, Frederick VI., aspiring to the union of the three crowns, and especially hoping to see it immediately accomplished in his own person, had forbidden the Duke of Augustenburg to accept the proffered honour, and had publicly, in the most frank and noble terms, solicited the adoption of Charles XIII. in the interest of the three nations.

The union so boldly suggested, particularly under a king of Denmark, who not only offended the Swedish pride, but by his real or supposed character alarmed the numerous partisans of her ideas, had occasioned a general commotion, and men's minds had become more confused than ever. In this strange situation, which was prolonged during the whole of 1810, opinion, ever more and more changeable and



perplexed, again reverted to Napoleon without being able fully to penetrate his designs. "Why," said many Swedes, particularly among the military,—"why will not Napoleon extend to us his powerful hand? Why does he not assign to us a prince or a general of his own? Do the brave Swedes appear to him undeserving of such a lot?" They even spoke with some degree of bitterness of the commercial men, who, wholly absorbed in their own interests, feared to increase the intimacy with France, from notions derived from the continental blockade. This disposition, daily augmented by the difficulties experienced, had soon become general.

Meanwhile, men looked around for the prince or general whom Napoleon might point out for the choice of the Swedes. There was one—Marshal Bernadotte, a warrior and a prince, allied to the Imperial family through his wife, the sister of the Queen of Spain—who had sojourned some time upon the frontiers of Sweden, and formed relations with several Swedes. At the time of his being in that latitude, he was commissioned to threaten Sweden with an expedition which should leave from Jutland and second the Russians in Finland, but he had received secret orders not to act. Willingly pluming himself upon merits which did not belong to him, he had claimed the good-will of the Swedes by his inaction, as if it had been voluntary, while in fact it had been commanded. Everywhere courting the general good-will, from a vague instinct of ambition, aroused by all the thrones actually vacant or likely to be so, he had secured friends among the Swedish nobility whose taste was military. By flattering others, and setting forth his own merits, he had gained over some enthusiasts, who saw in him an accomplished prince. Certain leaders, therefore, pronounced the name of General Bernadotte as a relation dear to Napoleon and a soldier who had rendered him immense service, and who would secure to Sweden all the favour of France, as well as distinguished honour.

The idea was rapidly propagated, and renewed efforts were made to wrest a response from the unwilling oracle. A last incident, as singular as all the rest, which marked this dynastic revolution, had recently occurred, and was not calculated to clear up the doubts of the Swedes. Our *chargé-d'affaires*, M. Deraugiers, had just been superseded for a conversation held with a Swedish personage, which might convey the idea that France inclined to a union of the three kingdoms. This anxiety to conceal a thought which nevertheless she entertained strongly evinced the unwillingness of France to express her real opinion. At what, then, did she aim?

In this painful state of embarrassment, the king, being obliged at length to subject a proposal to the committee of the assembled states, had presented three candidates:—the Duke of Augustenburg, the King of Denmark, and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, (Bernadotte.) The committee of the states, under the influence of M. d'Adlersparre, chief of the revolutionary and military party which had dethroned Gustavus IV., had adopted a resolution which appeared to be the most prudent and least dangerous, and clearly in accordance with good policy, by the adoption of the Duke of Augustenburg,

brother of the deceased prince. That candidate had eleven votes, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo only one. It was hoped that this circumstance would overcome the opposition of the King of Denmark to the acceptance of the Duke of Augustenburg.

At this juncture there suddenly arrived a person who had formerly been a French merchant, long established at Gothenburg, but unsuccessful in his business, and who was an excellent agent to employ in such an election. He was furnished with letters and funds by the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, with orders to use every means in favour of the French candidate. For a short time the strongest rumours were in circulation. Without the exhibition of any orders or instructions from the French cabinet, which indeed did not exist, it was everywhere said that very little penetration was necessary to discover the real thought of France,—a thought which, for obvious political reasons, it was necessary to conceal, but which was both manifest and undoubted; which was no other than the elevation to the throne of Sweden of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, an illustrious general and wise counsellor, the prompter of Napoleon in his most brilliant campaigns and most illustrious political acts. Everywhere it was asked how any one could be so obtuse as not to perceive this thought, and not to see the motive of apparent and affected silence which France was compelled to assume. This farce, artfully conducted, had perfectly succeeded. No one was willing to be considered stupid, unable to penetrate the deep thoughts of Napoleon; every one had suspected it to such a degree that in a few hours this new opinion had taken possession of the government and the states, the king had been obliged to reconsider the presentation already made, the electoral committee the vote they had passed, and in one night the Prince of Ponte-Corvo had been proposed and elected, almost unanimously, prince-royal, heir of the crown of Sweden. This strange phenomenon, which was to raise to the throne the only one of the Napoleonic dynasties destined to be permanent in Europe, proved two things,—the extent to which public opinion in Sweden supported a monarchy of French origin, and how very short a time is sufficient to give circulation to a popular opinion, though suppressed and concealed for the moment.

But every thing in this revolution was destined to be inconsistent. Napoleon, being warned of the departure from Paris of the secret agent who had led to this sudden electoral reverse, suspecting that he would make an unwarranted use of the name of France, had charged the minister of foreign affairs to disown connection with him,\* a disavowal which reached Stockholm when too late. The prince chosen for the sake of the French alliance had been elected; we shall see in the sequel with what result. On learning this election, Napoleon smiled with some degree of bitterness, as if penetrating the secrets of the future. He spoke, indeed, with indifference, having unbounded confidence in his own strength, and regarding ingratitude as a necessary and almost complimentary attendant of the career of a great man. With mildness and hau-

\* I here speak from the authority of the letter of disavowal, still extant in the archives of foreign affairs.

teur he received his former general Bernadotte, who came to solicit his approbation, which was deemed indispensable in Sweden; he told him that he was a stranger to his elevation, for his line of policy did not allow him to meddle with it, but that he saw with pleasure the homage paid to the French armies; that he felt assured that Marshal Bernadotte, an officer in these armies, would never forget what he owed to his country; that in this confidence he acquiesced in the election of the Swedes; and that, being unwilling that a Frenchman should present an appearance to the foreigner unworthy of France, he had ordered M. Mollien to supply him with all necessary funds.\* Napoleon then conducted the Prince to the door of his cabinet with a gracious but cold dignity.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo, who then thought of presenting himself in Sweden surrounded with the favour of Napoleon, had received 1,000,000 from M. Mollien, and had left without delay for Stockholm, where he was received with rapture. He immediately proceeded to court the favour of all parties, assuming a different aspect with each, with the old court affecting the manner of an old aristocrat of the army of the Rhine, who had caused himself to be addressed as "monsieur" when others were addressed as "citizen;" with the liberal party, that of an old general faithful to the republic which he had served; and, finally, to the secret partisans of England, who composed a large part of the commercial classes, revealing all the hatred which he indulged in his heart towards Napoleon, the author of his fortune.

For a time it was possible to sustain these contradictory parts, which might all succeed until it became necessary to give place to a single one,—that of an irreconcilable enemy of France, the final part destined in its turn to succeed when a deplorable opportunity should be given to it by the outburst of a storm of universal hatred against us. Urged on by an impatient desire to offer some gratification to the national pride of Sweden, the prince-royal, with the haste of one appointed to a new office, had ventured to make a strange overture to the minister of France, which conveyed some idea of his notion of political fidelity.

It was the time at which, as we have said, Napoleon was preparing, but not urging, the campaign with Russia. A great war in the North was everywhere spoken of. These reports were for a moment to be moderated by the delay of hostilities till the ensuing year; but at this moment they were at the highest point. The Prince-royal of Sweden, exhibiting on the occasion an affected devotion to France, said to our minister that he clearly perceived what was in preparation; that a great war was at hand; that he remembered that of 1807, in which he had rendered important services, (which was no more than the truth, as the reader will remember;) that the coming war would be hazardous and difficult; that Napoleon would require powerful alliances; that a Swedish army thrown into Finland, almost at the very gates of St. Petersburg, might be of immense advantage, but that it was not probable that they could recover that province; that in

Sweden this was little expected; that, on the contrary, every one regarded Norway as the natural, necessary, and only possible compensation for the loss of Finland, and that if Napoleon would immediately insure Norway to Sweden, he might place all the Swedes at his feet and regulate them according to his pleasure. The new prince-royal had the unbecoming boldness, after offering his co-operation, to threaten his immediate hostility if his proposal were rejected, and to labour to show how far he could injure, after having shown how far he could assist, and this with a want of delicacy absolutely disgusting in one who had so recently worn the habit of a French general and by it obtained access to the throne.

The minister of France, surprised and agitated at this revolting spectacle, hastened, in consideration of the gravity of the proposition, to write to Paris, that Napoleon might dictate to him the reply he ought to give. Napoleon, we should say to his praise, experienced an emotion of indignation which led to important consequences, and which ought to have secured him another lot, as it certainly would have done if his prudence in all things had equalled his honour in this. To give Norway to Sweden, it would have been necessary to rob his most faithful ally, Denmark, who, though afflicted by the laws of the continental blockade, endured them with admirable patience, and even supplied our fleets with excellent sailors. He blushed with indignation and contempt at such a proposal, and addressed to his minister of foreign affairs one of the best and most honourable letters which he had ever written. He said that he perceived clearly and without astonishment that the mind of the new prince-royal was ill-regulated, excited, and effervescing. Instead of studying the country which he had entered, in order to secure esteem by an attitude of calmness, dignity, and seriousness, the prince laboured only to flatter one and soothe another, and imprudently started questions which might lead to an outbreak. Such conduct was to be regretted, and he could in no degree aid it. To betray Denmark was a crime impossible to France, and it was as unwise as it was unbecoming in him to propose it. All this display of services to be rendered to France, or of evil to be inflicted on her, could not touch her; for she was dependent on no enemy in the world, still less upon any ally. The prince, then, forgot himself in using such language; fortunately it was used by the prince-royal, and not by the king or the government. It might therefore be disregarded. Agreeably to these reflections, Napoleon recommended our minister, M. Alquier, not to wound the prince, but to make him understand that he was in error in acting and speaking with so much precipitation, especially in such a tone; not to reply to him on the subjects which he had broached with so much levity; to engage little with him in matters of business, since after all he was merely heir by designation; to keep up relations only with the king and the ministers; and to tell each of them, both in public and private, that what France expected of Sweden was fidelity to her treaties, particularly to the last treaty of peace now so scandalously violated; that she expected of her, moreover, the total suppression of the mart of Gothenburg, without which the

\* M. de Talleyrand, an eye-witness of this interview, repeatedly mentioned the details reported above.

war would be renewed; and that Swedish Pomerania, recently restored, would again become the pledge which we should seize to force Sweden to a return to duty. By the same courier Napoleon recommended Denmark, without assigning a reason, to maintain constantly a force in Norway.

Such is a sketch of the general disposition of Europe on the eve of the last great struggle of Napoleon. Externally it exhibited the most complete submission; but at heart there existed either implacable hatred, or, at least, perplexity. Thus, our German allies, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, and Baden, did all that we could wish, and prepared their contingents, but secretly trembled when they saw the hatred which lurked in the hearts of their subjects and the aversion inspired by the conscription. Attached to the cause of Napoleon by fear and interest, often wounded by his exactions and his language, but fearful of losing the advantages derived from him, they were anxious that he should not expose them to fresh dangers, and for this reason greatly feared the coming war. The King of Wurtemberg especially, who formed alliances without scruple, and observed them only as far as they increased his revenue or his territory, and who therefore felt no remorse at having surrendered himself to Napoleon, and who united to great intelligence a remarkable energy of character which enabled him always to utter his real sentiments to the powerful protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, had addressed to him some objections relative to the preparations for the new war and to the transmission of a Wurtemberg detachment demanded for Dantzic. Napoleon immediately addressed to him a long and curious letter, which disclosed fully the strange fatality which carried him away to new adventures. In this letter he stated that he did not attach importance to a regiment more or less, but to the advantage of having at Dantzic Germans rather than French, because they excited less umbrage in that quarter; that, as he wished to have Germans, he was desirous to have some from all the States of the confederation; that it was absolutely necessary to take position at Dantzic, for that city was the true base of operations for a campaign in the North; that this campaign was not to his taste, or the whim of a young and warlike prince seeking a brilliant debut; that, far from being pleasing to him, it was the reverse, (which was true, and more strikingly illustrated the folly of his ambition,) but he regarded it as inevitable; that, if the war did not break out in 1811, it would in 1812, for it could not be deferred beyond a year, and that he must have managed his affairs and those of the confederacy very badly, if he allowed himself to be surprised by an enemy against whom he might have made preparations with impunity; that he yielded to necessity, not to his inclinations, and insisted on having two battalions of Wurtemberg, which were destined to complete the garrison of Dantzic. Necessity! Such, we have said, was the thought of Napoleon, and such really existed if we grant it necessary that he should be instantly obeyed, without the slightest restriction on his authority, by all the powers of Europe, far and near, both those whose co-operation was indispensable to his views and those whose co-opera-

tion, though valuable, was not indispensable, and had been granted to an extent sufficient to meet every demand but that of his own pride! Such was the necessity that might be claimed for this war! The King of Wurtemberg, who had a real liking for Napoleon, and who, on the receipt of his last letter, perceived the uselessness of remonstrance, had ceased to resist. Filled with unhappy forebodings, he had forwarded his two battalions.

News had just been received from the East, which brought an account of the manner in which the first overtures had been met at Constantinople. Moldavia and Wallachia had been preserved; but it was not so easy to convert the Turks into allies. When they saw Russia withdraw a part of her forces, they had promised to yield nothing for the sake of peace with her; but, placing no confidence in us, as M. de Metternich had said, they carefully avoided listening to any proposal of alliance with us. Far from being disposed to fight at our side, they were resolved to fight neither for nor against any one, convinced that those who assisted them would merely do so for their own purposes and then abandon them forever. They therefore awaited with impatience the day when Russia, close pressed by Napoleon, should be constrained to treat, before they would conclude with her a peace which they were resolved should be advantageous, and which, in order to be so in their eyes, must deprive them of no part of their territory. Russia, convinced that that time was near at hand, had addressed to them a medium proposition,—namely, that she should retain Bessarabia and Moldavia but restore Wallachia. She had, in addition, demanded the independence of Servia. The Turks, seeing the near approach of the time when Russia could no longer leave her troops upon the Danube, rejected all her offers, and demanded simply and without reserve the *status ante bellum*. But, with a degree of cunning equal to that which they ascribed to their enemies, they concealed from France their secret resentment, pretended to have forgotten every thing, to be even ready to ally themselves with her on the condition that, in proof of a sincere return of friendship, the French armies should immediately cross the Vistula. Hitherto they affected to doubt of any such great political change as was spoken of, though in reality they fully believed it. They were so careful not to pledge themselves, that they even eluded the overtures of Austria, with whom they were no less evasive than with us, and whom they accused of having abandoned her when it suited their convenience; that they therefore felt themselves obliged to no party, and that, if Austria should again become their ally, this would be from obedience to Napoleon, and not from friendship to them. At this time, there was in their language a kind of verbal trifling, which, combined with their general conduct, showed that, although they might have lost somewhat of that wild energy to which they owed their grandeur, they daily gained in political finesse. A melancholy progress in their career, to become Greeks, and such Greeks as those from whom they had taken Constantinople in 1453!

M. de Metternich, therefore, had no more weight with them than the French diplomacy. To prevent the surrender of Moldavia and

Wallachia to the Russians was accomplished; but to make them engage the Russians for the benefit of the French and Austrians was in the highest degree improbable.

Whilst preparing his alliances and armies for the great war in the North, deferred, but now unhappily inevitable, Napoleon, with his usual activity of mind, endeavoured to expedite his internal affairs, that he might leave no source of perplexity behind when obliged to absent himself for a time of which no one could foretell the duration. He had wished, as we have said, to summon the council from which he hoped for a solution of religious questions, for the very day of the baptism of the King of Rome. It appeared to him suitable to combine with all the bodies of the state convoked around the cradle of his son, the Catholic church herself, and by her to consecrate the title of King of Rome given to the heir of the new empire. Whether it were that this kind of engagement was repugnant to the bishops, already for the most part at Paris, or whether the alleged reason were sincere, they pretended that the greater number of them were too old to endure the fatigue of a twofold ceremony in the same day; and the convocation of the council was deferred to the Sunday after the baptism. Thus, the bishops could only be present at the baptism in their individual capacity, not in a body representing the whole church.

The 9th of June was chosen for the solemn ceremonial of the baptism of the King of Rome. Every effort had been made to render this ceremony worthy of the greatness of the Empire and the vast destiny anticipated for the young king. On the evening of the 8th of June, Napoleon removed from St. Cloud to Paris, surrounded with a brilliant cortege, nearly the same as that which he had exhibited at Paris on the occasion of his marriage at the Louvre. A year had scarcely elapsed, and he already possessed an heir; and he could say with pride that Providence fulfilled all his desires with all the punctuality of a subject power. But Providence was soon to show that such was not the case, but rather that favours were heaped upon his head to augment the crime of abusing them and to render more terrible the consequent punishment. On the evening of the 8th of June, he entered Paris, followed by the kings of his family: by Joseph, who availed himself of this pretext to withdraw from the horrors of war in Spain; by Jerome, who had quitted his kingdom to be present at this solemnity; by the Duke of Wurzburg, sent by the Emperor of Austria as his representative at the baptism of his grandson. Napoleon had, indeed, shown his father-in-law the delicate attention of requesting him to be godfather to the august infant; and the Emperor Francis, anxious to please his formidable son-in-law, had accepted the office, and had sent the Duke of Wurzburg as his proxy.

The whole population of Paris had run to meet the superb cortege, already in some degree consoled for the commercial sufferings of the year by a marked return of industrial activity, and by the immense orders of the civil list and the administration of war. They rejoiced, also, in this new pledge of perpetuity granted by heaven to the unprecedented grandeur not of a man only, but of France; and, if at any time

they were sensible of displeasure with Napoleon, it was when he seemed to expose this grandeur to peril. They still applauded him, though not with the enthusiasm of earlier days; they applauded him under the fascinating influence of his presence and the astounding contemplation of his glory, as well as under the temporary excitement of a splendid display, which generally captivates the popular mind. Paris shone with a thousand lights; all the theatres were open gratuitously to an eager crowd; the public squares were filled with presents from the happy father of the King of Rome to the people of Paris, and the general satisfaction was greatly enhanced by the delay of the war for a year, which led to the hope that it might be altogether avoided. Reports of peace gave the finishing stroke to the charm of these fêtes.

On Sunday, June 9, Napoleon, accompanied by his wife and family, conducted his son to Notre Dame, the church of his own coronation, and presented him to the ministers of religion. A hundred bishops and twenty cardinals, the senate, the legislative body, the mayors of the principal towns, the representatives of Europe, filled the sacred enclosure where the imperial child was to receive the waters of baptism. When the pontiff had completed the ceremony and restored the King of Rome to the governess of the children of France, Mde. de Montesquiou, she handed him to Napoleon, who, taking him in his arms and raising him above his head, presented him to the magnificent assembly with a visible emotion, which soon became general. The spectacle touched every heart. But what mystery surrounds the life of man! How painful would have been the surprise if behind this scene of grandeur and prosperity could have been suddenly perceived so many ruins, so much bloodshed and fire, the flames of Moscow, the ice of the Berezina, Leipsic, Fontainebleau, the Isle of Elba, St. Helena, and, lastly, the death of the august child at eighteen years of age, an exile, deprived of every crown which was now heaped upon his head, and so many other revolutions destined to restore the fallen fortunes of his family! How graciously has Providence concealed the future from man! But how difficult the task assigned to his prudence to calculate the future and to modify it by his wisdom!

On leaving the metropolis, surrounded by an immense multitude, Napoleon repaired to the Hotel de Ville, where an imperial banquet had been prepared. Under absolute governments the people are often readily flattered, and the city of Paris, in particular, has often received from her masters marks of attention which, though gratifying to the people, imposed no obligation on themselves. In the bosom of Paris Napoleon had celebrated the birth of his son, and in its bosom also he spent the remainder of the day. The inhabitants of Paris, admitted to the fête, could see him seated at the table in his crown, surrounded by the kings of his family and a crowd of foreign princes, taking his repast in public like the ancient Germanic emperors, successors of the Emperors of the West! Dazzled by the splendid spectacle, the Parisians applauded, and trusted that his grandeur should be lasting and that glory

should be tempered by wisdom! They did well to rejoice; for these were the last joys of his reign. From this date our narrative will be a continual tale of sorrow.

The following days presented a series of varied fêtes; for Napoleon wished as much as possible to prolong the manifestation of public joy. But the terrible destiny which regulates the life of the most exalted as well as of the most humble of men, and urges them on without pause to their appointed goal, allowed him no long period of repose. The gravest affairs were closely intermingled, and succeeded each other without intermission, demanding his entire and uninterrupted attention. On Sunday, June 9, he had baptized his son; on Sunday, June 16, the council was to be convoked.

We explained at the commencement of this book the motives which had induced Napoleon to convoke a council. An ecclesiastical commission composed of prelates, a civil commission composed of important political personages, including the prince Cambacérès, had examined and resolved as follows the numerous and weighty questions which arose from the summoning of such an assembly.

The first question was whether it were possible to form a council without the will and presence of the pope. The history of the church left no doubt upon this point, for councils had been convoked by the emperors in opposition to the popes, to condemn these when unworthy of their office, and others convoked by the popes in opposition to the emperors who oppressed the church. Besides, common sense, which is the surest light in religious matters as in all others, taught that the church having been constrained to save herself, and having succeeded in so doing with remarkable prudence, sometimes against hypocritical popes, sometimes against tyrannical emperors, it was necessary that she should be able to constitute herself independently of those whom she was required to restrain or punish.

Again, was it necessary to form an œcumenical or general council, or only a national council? The former would have greater authority, and would have accorded better with the policy and the lofty imagination of Napoleon. But, although Napoleon possessed in his empire or in allied states the greater part of Christendom, there remained too many prelates beyond his power, in Spain, in Austria, and in several parts of Germany and Poland, to incur the inconvenience of their absence or opposition. Probably they would not have come, but would have protested against the formation of a council, and forthwith have rendered questionable the legitimacy of that which had been held. By convoking a council exclusively national, which should comprise the bishops of the French empire, those of Italy and of part of Germany, a very imposing assembly should be formed, which should be fully adequate to the solution of all questions submitted to them.

If they had been called upon to settle the great question of the temporal sovereignty of the popes, of their residence at Rome or at Avignon, with an allowance of two millions and dependence on the new power of the West, an œcumenical council alone would have been competent; and it is very doubtful whether they would ever have found an assembly of prelates,

however terrified they might be, who should sanction the spoliation of the patrimony of St. Peter and should consent to erase the head of the church from the list of sovereigns. But Napoleon would have carefully avoided these questions. In the present crisis, what did he require? To provide for the government of the churches by securing the canonical institution of the bishops named by himself. It was by refusing this institution, and by opposing the expedient of vicars-capitular, by which he wished to supply the defect, that the pope held Napoleon somewhat in check and stopped short the course of his government. If, on the contrary, it were possible, by means of a decision imposed upon the pope or approved by him, to secure the canonical institution and prevent its being an arm in the hands of the Roman church to impede the administration of dioceses, Napoleon would be relieved from his difficulty; for, not wishing to undertake any thing against the doctrines of the church, but leaving every thing of a spiritual character in its former position, and inclined even to favour the development of religion, there was no ground to fear a schism. He trusted that if religious affairs were, by the confirmation of the canonical institution, extricated from their present entanglement, the captive pope, seeing every thing advance satisfactorily without his aid and without his authority, would at length acquiesce in the new situation which was offered him.

The manner of nomination and canonical institution, not being uniform in different countries, and having varied with the progress of time, raised a question of local discipline which might be resolved by a national council, as far as concerned France and Italy, which was sufficient for Napoleon, for the pope would be then dispossessed of the arm by which he could arrest every thing.

For these different reasons it was agreed that a council should be formed of the bishops of Italy, France, Holland, and part of Germany which would constitute a very vast and majestic assembly; that they should meet at Paris, in the beginning of June, and that to them should be submitted the serious conflict now existing between the temporal power and the church. The question was to be brought forward in an imperial message nearly in the following terms.

Napoleon, on attaining the government of France, found the altars thrown down and the ministers of the altars proscribed: he had raised the one and recalled the others. He had employed his power to overcome the formidable prejudices which had sprung from a long revolution and a whole century of philosophic speculation: he had succeeded, and the Catholic religion, re-established by him, had resumed its position. Numerous and well-known facts proved that since his accession to the throne he had not committed a single action contrary to the faith, but had adopted many measures for its protection and diffusion. In truth, a unhappy disagreement had occurred between the pope and the Emperor.

Napoleon, considering Italy among the number of his conquests, had wished to establish himself there firmly. But, since he had brought back the pope to Rome, (which he had done even before the Concordat,) he had found in the temporal sovereign of the Roman States an enemy,

open or concealed, but always intractable, who had neglected nothing to shake the power of the French in Italy. The pope had given an asylum to all the cardinals hostile to the King of Naples, to all the brigands who infested the Neapolitan frontier, and had wished to keep up relations with the English, the irreconcilable enemies of France. It was, therefore, not the *spiritual*, but the *temporal*, sovereign of Rome, who for a purely worldly interest had engaged in a quarrel with the temporal sovereign of the French empire. And what arm had he employed? Excommunication, which was either impotent, and therefore exposed the spiritual authority to contempt, or destructive of all power, and tending to nothing less than to throw France and Europe into anarchy once more.

Here the grounds of complaint were plain, and would find an echo, for the bull of excommunication had been censured by nearly the whole clergy, excepting the fanatical portion; and enlightened men in all states had maintained that the papacy had in that instance employed a weapon either ridiculous if impotent, or culpable if efficacious,—a weapon worthy of the anarchists of 1793.

After this first step, the pope had recourse to a second,—that of refusing the canonical institution to the bishops designate. But already, from temporal motives, he had so far neglected the episcopate in Germany, that, of twenty-four Germanic sees, not more than eight had been filled, which must afford a great temptation to the princes, chiefly Protestant, to seize the revenues of the sees. Would the pope act in the same manner in France? This might be feared; for there were already twenty-seven sees vacant, for which the Emperor had provided, but for which the pope had refused on his part to provide by refusing the canonical institution. But was it possible to allow the pope, in defence of his temporal interests, to endanger the church and neglect her spiritual interests?

The church ought to take care that this should not take place, and she had the means of doing so. The pope, by refusing the institution, had violated the Concordat. From that time the Concordat was abolished, and they were at liberty to resume the practice of former times, when the pope did not institute the bishops, and when the bishops chosen by the laity were confirmed and consecrated by the metropolitan. Such was the question which the Emperor was unwilling to solve on his own authority, but which he proposed to the assembled church in order that she might provide for her own preservation, and that she might save herself from the danger which had overwhelmed nearly the whole church of Germany.

The form of the council and the question to be subjected having been determined, the principal personages who were in the habit of enlightening and supporting Napoleon in ecclesiastical matters entreated him to make a final attempt upon the pope, by sending him two or three prelates of great weight, to announce the meeting of the council, and to induce him to render their task easy by acquiescing in certain solutions beforehand, which, once admitted by him, would be unanimously adopted. They would thus escape the threatening tempest, and would procure to the church peace, security, reconciliation with the temporal power, and a

termination to the distressing captivity of the pontiff.

Napoleon had already sent to Savona Cardinals Spina and Caselli; and the small success of that mission led him to lose confidence in every such attempt. He thought that the prelates assembled at Paris under his own hand would obey his wishes, and would draw up at his dictation a decision which he would then send to Savona, clothed with the authority of the council, and that the pope would not venture to resist. Nevertheless, they pressed him with the strongest and most irresistible arguments.

Among the ecclesiastics who had been summoned were several of great influence and real merit, well deserving to be heard. These were not his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, who, placed by himself at the head of the clergy, had conducted himself like his brother Louis in Holland, but without his good faith; nor Cardinal Maury, towards whom the whole church, from jealousy or affected austerity, had shown themselves cruelly ungrateful; nor the Abbé de Pradt, promoted to the archbishopric of Malines, and one of those to whom the institution had been refused,—a prelate of much intelligence, but of an irritable temper inconsistent with his profession, especially in an age which had substituted gravity for talents; nor M. de Boulogne, Bishop of Troyes; nor M. de Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, who, after having been the foremost and most useful supports of Napoleon at the time of the Concordat, had passed from the warmest adherence to a degree of violent irritation, natural and legitimate, but imprudent: they were M. de Barral, Archbishop of Tours, M. Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, M. Mannay, Bishop of Treves, and some others.

M. de Barral was one of the most respectable and learned prelates, and the best versed in the traditions of the French church, and the best adapted to the conduct of affairs. He had been the general agent of the church, and enjoyed great influence. In M. Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, formerly a distinguished professor in the Sorbonne, were combined a profound knowledge of ecclesiastical affairs with great intelligence, extreme tact, the art of treating with men, and a remarkable talent for politics,—a talent gradually becoming less among ecclesiastical chiefs, and which does not consist in the art of gaining the confidence of sovereigns in order to govern them, but in that good sense which has induced the church to accommodate herself to the different periods of the world, and thus to pass through them with honour. And M. Mannay, Bishop of Treves, though inferior to the two former, and of a very timid disposition, was nevertheless a wise and learned man and valuable counsellor.

MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay made no attempt to gain over Napoleon for their personal advantage; for M. Duvoisin, especially, had refused all the various steps of advancement at different times offered him by Napoleon, lest he should impair his power of doing good by incurring the suspicion of ambition. These prelates, while deploring the domineering character of Napoleon, who wished to render the church dependent on the Empire, and profoundly distressed at his violent measures towards the holy father, were, nevertheless, of

opinion that, considering his great power and his undoubted destiny to found a dynasty, regarding him as the friend of the church though in creed a philosopher, endowed with every gift of genius, and amenable to judicious and delicate treatment, it was necessary to calm and direct him, instead of irritating him by an opposition whose design was readily detected, as being founded neither on the principles of religion nor of liberty, but of a regard to royalty. The church, in order to attain dominion, had sometimes had recourse to intrigue: could she not, when existence rather than dominion was at stake, employ prudence to guide a man of genius, possessed of irresistible power? Many men, moreover, feared lest in Napoleon they should see a new Henry VIII., prepared to push forward his nation into a sort of religious independence, destined to issue in actual Protestantism. Napoleon frequently threatened this; and, when French prefects were seen exercising power at Hamburg and at Rome, an archduchess marrying an artillery-officer and giving birth to the heir of one of the greatest empires in the earth, could any thing be deemed impossible?

Such were the reasons assigned by these prelates for treating Napoleon with address, though they deplored the insane despotism which led him to aim at changing the constitution of the holy see, and at making the church dependent on the emperors, as it perhaps was under Constantine, but as it was not under Charlemagne. M. Emery, the respected head of St. Sulpice, was dead. He was the enemy of Napoleon from his attachment to kingly government, but of opinion, notwithstanding, that the part of the church was to treat Cæsar with address; and he would certainly have shared the opinion of MM. de Barral and Duvoisin. At the urgency of these gentlemen, assisted by Cardinal Fesch and many prelates assembled at Paris, Napoleon consented to send to Savona a new deputation, composed of MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay, to make a conciliatory offer to Pius VII. before the opening of the council.

These three prelates were not to speak in the name of the Emperor, who was to be supposed to know and to allow this mission but not to have ordered it, but in the name of a multitude of bishops already assembled at Paris, and desirous, before forming themselves into a council, of coming to an understanding with the head of the church, and acting in concert with him if possible. About thirty bishops, after conferring among themselves and with Cardinal Fesch, had written letters for the holy father, in which, with the utmost profession of devotion to himself and of a desire for the Catholic unity, they entreated him to restore peace to the church, threatened with a new schism by the power of the man who had restored it, and who alone could save it.

M. the Archbishop of Tours, MM. the Bishops of Nantes and Treves, were to forward these letters to the pope, and then to propose to him, in the name of the French clergy, first, to give the canonical institution to the twenty-seven prelates named by the Emperor, in order to fill up the vacancy in so many churches and to terminate the conflicts occasioned by the creation of vicars-capitular; and, secondly, to add to the Concordat a clause relative to canonical

institution. Every clergyman was struck with the degree to which the pope might abuse the canonical institution, by refusing it to persons to whose suitableness he could not object either on the ground of morals, attainments, or orthodoxy, but whose sovereign he might wish to punish, to contradict, or to constrain, by arresting the course of religious observances in his dominions. It became then a weapon in his hands to satisfy resentment or to serve a selfish purpose. The three prelates sent to Savona were, therefore, to prepare a clause according to which the pope was to be compelled to give institution within three months if no valid reason could be brought against the persons chosen. After the expiration of these three months, the metropolitan, or, in defect of him, the oldest prelate of the ecclesiastical province, should be authorized to confer canonical institution.

If any thing could prove the extent to which the French church, afterwards so eager to sacrifice even her national traditions to the holy see, was, at the time referred to, inconsistent in her opinions, it is that which occurred on the present occasion. They were not only the moderate among the clergy who were disposed to treat with Napoleon, and on that account to guard against the abuse which a pope might make of the canonical institution, and thus to limit the prerogatives of the holy see; they were even the most violent enemies of Napoleon, zealous royalists, who were soon to expose themselves to confinement at Vincennes. The simplest reflection is sufficient to show on how feeble a foundation of doctrine such an error in the clergy of that time rested.

If there be any disposition conformable to good sense, to policy, and to the respective rights of the church and the state, it is incontestably that which confers the choice of the bishops upon the temporal sovereign of each country, and the confirmation of this decree upon the head of the universal church, under the form of canonical institution. Such a power as that of the bishops cannot, indeed, emanate except from two authorities,—first, that of the temporal sovereign, which alone ought to confer powers efficacious throughout the extent of the national territory, and can alone be the proper judge of the merit of the subjects; and, secondly, that of the spiritual sovereign, which ought to take cognizance of the orthodoxy of the individuals named by the state. Without the intervention of the first authority, the state is no longer its own master; without the intervention of the second, the Catholic unity is endangered. It is very true that a pope may abuse the power of canonical institution, as a temporal sovereign may that of nomination. Each abuse is possible, and has occurred in unhappy times, from which, however, the church and the state have escaped without destruction. But the destruction of the double bond which unites the pastors to the heads of the state and of the church would overturn the beautiful system, which has allowed throughout Christendom the simultaneous existence of two governments without confusion, strife, or impediment,—a religious government devoted to train souls for heaven, a civil government devoted to form men to all the duties of political society.

The partisans of the opposite opinion, pro-

fessed at the moment by Napoleon, who had thought differently at the time of the Concordat, enforced ancient traditions and recalled the earliest times of the church, when the pope did not institute the bishops; for in France the power of papal institution had not been recognised before the Concordat of Francis I. and Leo X. To this the reply was very simple: if the concordat agreed upon between Francis I. and Leo X. had recognised the power of the Holy See to institute, it had also recognised the royal power of nomination; and, if we were to trace the matter a little further still, we should neither find the head of the state nominating nor the pope instituting the bishops; we should find the simplicity of primitive times,—that is to say, believers choosing their pastors and the metropolitan consecrating them. In the course of time these powers had gradually been displaced; the power of choice had successively been transferred from the assembled believers to the chapters, from the chapters to the kings, and the power of confirming the election in the spiritual aspect had been transferred from the simple metropolitan to him who was the metropolitan of the metropolitan,—that is to say, to the pope. A great moral and religious interest had been involved in these changes; for it must be acknowledged that, if the practice of election were in our days applied to the nomination of bishops, it would produce strange results. It was impossible to revert to one of these traditions more than to the other; if one were adopted both must be; and hence the election would be re-established. This would be to make time and reason retrograde.

Hence a strange concession was demanded of the pope when he was required to relinquish the canonical institution. It is true that the principle of institution was not disputed, since three months were granted to the pope for this purpose, and it was allowed him to refuse institution on the ground of unworthiness. But who was to be the final judge of these reasons of unworthiness? Evidently the Emperor, in the proposed plan, since, if he insisted, the metropolitan must at length institute. From that time the pope would lose the power of institution. But at the moment every mind was struck with the destruction of the Germanic church by the vacancy of almost all the sees, with the danger which threatened the French church by the vacancy of one-fourth of the existing sees, and, finally, by the spectacle of Pius VII. using the canonical institution as a weapon in a contest, plainly legitimate, but a weapon nevertheless; and no one was disposed to grant that institution ought to be any thing but a method of preserving the unity of faith, by rejecting prelates rendered unworthy by their morals, their attainments, or their orthodoxy.

It would have been better to have endeavoured to obtain from the mildness and prudence of the pope the institution of the twenty-seven prelates nominated by the Emperor, to demand it of him in the cause of religion, and not to require of him any sacrifice of principle. He would indeed, for the present, have disarmed himself, but it would have been laying aside a dangerous weapon; for Napoleon, if inflamed with anger, might break that weapon and many others besides, and proceed to the utmost extremities against the church. But Moscow and Leipsic

could not then be foreseen, nor were the clergy the most likely politicians to foresee such events. It would have been right, then, to obtain from Pius VII. a concession of fact, not of principle, and thus to leave Napoleon to arrange the affairs of the church in general under the influence of longer time and calmer reason.

However this may be, the prelates who had commissioned the three envoys to speak in their name supported the additional clause to the Concordat as much as Napoleon himself, who made it the price of maintaining the Concordat; and, as this word Concordat had been invested with a sort of magic sense, importing the re-establishment of the altars, the cessation of the persecution of the priests, and a thousand other precious benefits, when Napoleon should declare the Concordat abolished he would seem tacitly to announce that all guarantees given to religion, to public worship, and to the priests, should be abolished at one stroke, and that in respect of these things their former experience might be renewed. He might, therefore, reasonably hope to produce a great effect, as he actually did, by proclaiming the abolition of the Concordat unless the new clause relative to canonical institution were admitted.

If the three envoys found the pope more tractable than he had hitherto appeared to be, they were authorized by Napoleon gradually to extend the object of their mission, originally much restricted, to speak to the holy father of the situation of the holy see, of the future establishment of the popes, and to go the length of even signing with him a provisional convention on this subject, of which the conditions were to be as follows. The pope should be allowed to reside at Rome, Avignon, or Paris, either selecting one of these residences or all three alternately. A splendid establishment should be secured to him at the expense of the Emperor. The pope should enjoy 2,000,000 of revenue, without any of the expenses of the papacy, for the cardinals and all the ministers of the spiritual government should be richly supported by the imperial treasury. The pope should be entitled to receive the ambassadors of all foreign powers and to maintain representatives with them. He should be entirely free in the government of spiritual matters, and should be herein responsible to none. Whatever could contribute to the prosperity, éclat, and propagation of the Catholic faith should be maintained, extended, or restored. Foreign missions should be renewed, with all the support of the French name in their favour. The fathers of the Holy Land should be protected, and the Latins reinstated in all the honours of divine worship at Jerusalem. But to this sumptuous state, to which nothing was wanting but independence, Napoleon attached one condition. If the pope should prefer to reside at Rome, he should take the same oath to the Emperor as was taken by all the prelates of his empire, which evidently involved the abandonment by the pope of the patrimony of St. Peter; and if this condition were too repugnant to him, and he should prefer to reside at Avignon, he should simply promise to do nothing contrary to the principles contained in the declaration of 1682.

The alternative, then, proposed by Napoleon to Pius VII. to terminate his captivity and



secure a magnificent but dependent establishment, a residence at Rome, with an oath involving the abandonment of the Roman States to the Empire, or the recognition of the Gallican liberties if he would live free and richly endowed at Avignon. The three envoys were secretly furnished with necessary powers to sign a convention on these principles. But they were to let no one know, especially the pope, that they possessed these powers, until they were secure of success in their mission, both as regarded the canonical institution and also the new establishment of the papacy.

As there remained only a few days between the time when Napoleon determined to send this deputation and the time appointed for the meeting of the council, the three prelates set out in all haste; for only ten days were allowed to fulfil their mission to Savona.

M. the Archbishop of Tours, (de Barral,) MM. the Bishops of Nantes and Treves, (Duvoisin and Mannay,) set off without delay for Savona, and arrived there as quickly as the methods of conveyance then in use allowed. The pope, though singularly resigned to a captivity which had recently been much aggravated in severity, (for he was left without paper, pens, or ink, or secretary, and always under the surveillance of an officer of gendarmerie,) felt, nevertheless, the weight of his chains, and, though he conjectured what they might be about to announce on the subject of the council,—though he might fear, for example, as had happened in former ages, that Napoleon had convoked this council only to pass judgment upon himself,—yet he experienced a kind of consolation when he learned that three prelates in the confidence of the Emperor had been sent to seek an interview with him. He knew the weight and merit of these men; he also knew that they were opposed to opinions designated in France ultramontane, which was equivalent to their being opposed to himself; but all this seemed to lose importance when compared with the gratification of their visit and conversation. The unhappy pontiff was like a prisoner who experiences a thrill of joy at the opening of his prison door, even though it promise him no liberty.

Pius VII. had communication with no one but the prefect of Montenotte, who, as we have said, had pleased him by his attention, his tact, and his perfect circumspection. Having learned from M. de Chabrol the arrival and the name of the three prelates, he consented to admit them immediately into his presence. He even evinced a degree of impatience to receive them. They all three presented themselves with expressions of respect in their lips and in their manner, with a mien more humble than if the pontiff had been at Rome on the throne of the Cæsars, almost apologizing for not sharing his captivity, and entreating him to crown all his virtues by adding to his former sacrifices some others new and indispensable, abandoning for the sake of religion itself certain prerogatives which were dear to him. The tone, the lofty language, and the profound respect of these worthy prelates deeply touched Pius VII., and all the graces of his character immediately reappeared under the influence of the pleasure he experienced. He showed himself full of gentleness and goodness, almost of joy, as soon as he entered into confidence with them, and especially

when he knew that, instead of assembling as his judges, the council wished to concert with him the means of putting an end to the religious troubles, and had caused him first of all to be entreated to devise some way of accommodation with the power which had restored the altars, and which, while able to destroy them, was unwilling to do so, provided that it met no impediment in the temporalities.

After an interview occupied in becoming mutually acquainted, the pope and the prelates met every day, and even several times a day, although the three envoys, wishing to spare the feeble health of the pope, were careful not to occasion unnecessary interviews. The pope summoned them when respect forbade their voluntary approach. The Bishop of Faenza, nominated patriarch of Venice, and at that moment at Savona on his way to join the council, had inquired if he might be admitted to this species of ecclesiastical congress; and he had been received by the consent of all parties, for he was pleasing to the pope as an Italian and as a very intelligent Italian, and he by no means displeased the three imperial envoys, as an Italian filled with the desire of a speedy pacification of the church. The pope, though well acquainted with the French language, would only speak in Italian, and often employed the Bishop of Faenza as interpreter, and felt more at ease when he had at hand an ultramontane by birth, and educated in his opinions though not coinciding in all.

The pope, after having pointed out with mild dignity the hateful captivity of the head of the church, the total isolation to which he was condemned, the privation of all counsel and of every means of communication to which he was reduced, had related, in his usual manner, all his former affection for General Bonaparte, now the powerful Emperor of the French, the difficult step he had taken in going to his coronation at Paris, and then, showing the walls which surrounded him, had calmly remarked the strange contrast between the services he had rendered and the recompense he had received. After saying this, he entered minutely into the questions which the representatives of the council had been authorized to treat at Savona.

In the matter of the canonical institution of the twenty-seven prelates, he seemed disposed to yield, acknowledging, in a manner, without saying it, that his refusal to acquiesce was rather a weapon employed against Napoleon than a just opposition to the claims of the persons promoted on religious grounds, demanding, at the same time, whether the interests of religion were not really involved in the independence and liberty of the pontiff, the respect of the holy see, the preservation of the patrimony of St. Peter, the maintenance of the temporal power of the popes, and whether the weapon employed by him to defend things of so great importance could be considered as improperly employed. Yet he was prepared to yield even in a matter of form, and consented to institute the twenty-seven prelates in question, omitting in the act the name of Napoleon, to which the latter did not object, and at the same time omitting the expression *motu proprio*, which would have given the appearance of his having nominated instead of merely confirming the nomination of the imperial authority. In

fact, he had already granted canonical institution in the form of *motu proprio* to several of the twenty-seven prelates; among others, to the Archbishop of Malines. But Napoleon would not allow this; for, though he consented that his own authority should not be mentioned in the bulls, he could not suffer that of the pope to be substituted for his.

In these various points Pius VII. was ready to yield, and to put an end to the interruption of the ecclesiastical government in France, in order that he might avoid any further reproach of being influenced by personal motives; but he could not prevail upon himself to admit the additional clause in the Concordat, which limited the time within which the canonical institution should be granted. In the first place, the period of three months appeared to him much too short; but, whatever period might be allowed, he affirmed that, if in the lapse of that period the institution could be imparted by the metropolitan, the head of the church would be robbed and deprived of one of his most valuable prerogatives. To this the three prelates replied by an appeal to the experience of former ages. They said that the pope had not always enjoyed the power of instituting the bishops; that if the period of three months were too short, certainly six months would suffice to examine the fitness of the candidates, to object if there were ground of objection, and to come to an understanding with the temporal power in the appointments requiring alteration; that this power should not be considered so unreasonable as to nominate bishops unworthy in character or doubtful in orthodoxy, for the mere gratification of making a bad arrangement of the clergy; that if these guarantees were not sufficient, it must be because the spiritual power wished to make a different use of the right of institution than merely to secure a proper selection, but to employ it as a method of influencing the temporal power and holding it in dependence. But there was nobody, they added, in any party, who was ready to admit that the power of instituting ought to be converted into a weapon in the hands of the popes. In this point he must not hope to find support in any portion of the clergy whatever.

The unfortunate Pius VII., though very intelligent, did not possess that grasp of mind which would have enabled him to embrace the great principles on which is founded the double investiture of the pastors by the temporal and spiritual power, and who, when told that the power of institution might be converted into a weapon in the hands of the popes, thought that he was personally reproached, because, in fact, many people had said that he was accused of sacrificing the interests of religion to those of the holy see, knew not what to reply, acknowledged that it would be wrong to possess a power at Rome of abusing the right of institution, and then, nevertheless, refused to yield, because it was in question to abandon a prerogative with which he had found the holy see provided. But, in his eyes, to transmit the holy see to his successors less rich in prerogative than he had received it was a weakness, a baseness, with which no price should induce him to stain his memory. Much alive to public opinion, he feared to be accused by Christendom of yielding either to fear or the irksomeness of cap-

tivity. And when it was represented to him that he was mistaken in his opinion of the judgment that the Catholic world would pass on him if he should yield, (which was true, for men were not then so devoted to Rome as they profess to be now,) he replied, "But how do you suppose that I can judge of this, a solitary prisoner, deprived of all counsel, ignorant of any opinion on which to rest in adopting such important determinations?" And to this argument, as true as it was melancholy, the three prelates, indignant at his captivity, though the envoys of Napoleon, knew no reply, and either maintained a tearful silence, or spoke to him of consulting Cardinal Spina, who was in his neighbourhood, and the only cardinal whom they were authorized to call to his aid.

It was still more difficult to touch the question of the establishment of the papacy in general. To propose to the pope to sanction the abolition of the temporal power of the holy see in return for a wealthy endowment and fine palaces in the imperial capitals was to propose to the pope the most distressing and dishonourable abdication. Yet he knew the decree which had united the Roman State to the Empire; and it was necessary to suppose the fall of Napoleon, which few minds could then foresee, in order not to regard that decree as irrevocable. It was then possible, and the prelates made the attempt, to advise him, from motives of prudence and for the interest of the holy see itself, to accept a compensation, which might by-and-by not be in his offer,—a compensation, moreover, accompanied with so many advantages for the protection and propagation of the faith. MM. de Barral and Duvoisin, while expressing sincere grief at the enterprises of Napoleon, insisted much on the necessity of humouring a man who could so easily in France play the part of Henry VIII. in England, on the wisdom of profiting by the compensation which he felt obliged to offer at the very moment of robbing the church, and which he would probably think of no longer when the abolition of the temporal power would be merely one of the catastrophes to which the world had become accustomed during the last twenty years; on all the aid that might be obtained from him for the propagation of the faith, when they should have given some satisfaction to his inordinate ambition. The pope, moved by the tone and language in which these counsels were addressed to him, received them kindly, and reasoned with the envoys of Napoleon as with friends who enjoyed his confidence, not as with the ministers of an adversary, before whom he must maintain reserve. He acknowledged the difficulty of altering the resolutions of Napoleon, and also the probable duration of his empire, without supposing it to be imperishable; for on this point he exhibited sometimes some remarkable doubts, whether arising from a kind of inspiration of the ardent faith of a man as pious as he was intelligent, or whether it was a certain illumination which from time to time suddenly broke upon his mind; but, apart from all these considerations, which might be called worldly, he seemed invincibly opposed in conscience and honour to make the proposed concession. To take up his pontifical residence at Paris seemed an intolerable disgrace. "Napoleon," said he, "wishes to make the successor of the apostles his chief

almoner; but he shall never obtain from me this degradation of the holy see. He thinks to conquer me because he sees me under lock and key; but he is deceived. I am old, and he will soon hold in his chains only the dead body of a poor priest."

To take up his abode at Avignon, on account of the preceding circumstances which had made that city a refuge to the popes in periods of persecution, would have been much more agreeable to Pius VII.; but to acknowledge the declaration of 1682—which was the condition of his obtaining leave to reside at Avignon—was, though less hateful than the other proposal, still very painful to one so impressed with Roman prejudices. He constantly repeated that Alexander VIII. before his death had condemned the propositions of Bossuet, and that to acknowledge them and engage to observe them would be regarded as an act of weakness resulting from his captivity. Yet he drew a distinction between the propositions of Bossuet, and was ready to admit that which refused to the pope the power of subverting temporal sovereigns by releasing subjects from their allegiance. But he was full of scruples in regard to the rest, which affirmed, as is known, that the church is not an arbitrary government; that she has her laws which are the canons; that the authority of the pope, though commonly superior to every other, sometimes meets an authority superior to itself,—that of the church assembled in ecumenical or universal councils. These maxims, which are a resumé of the ecclesiastical history of Bossuet, and which place the church at the head of regular and legal governments, instead of reducing it to the level of despotic and arbitrary governments, agitated and perplexed Pius VII. in a high degree. "I will undertake nothing against these maxims," he said: "I give my word of honour, and my character is well known: but let me not be forced to consecrate them by any formal approval, for I prefer remaining in prison to perpetrating such an act of weakness." The plan which would have been most satisfactory to him would have been to return to Rome even though deprived of his temporal crown. To re-enter Rome without money, without a court, without soldiers, without any of the honours of a sovereign, would have been to him almost equivalent to a restoration to the chair of St. Peter. But to re-enter Rome at the cost of an oath which constituted him the subject of Napoleon, and obliged him to admit the spoliation of St. Peter's patrimony, was to him more unendurable than any other demand that had been made. "I seek no endowment," said he: "I have need of none. They contest the temporal power of the popes: let them rather dispute their wealth: but never let them deprive them of Rome. From that point it is that they ought to govern and to sanctify the souls of men. I do not demand the Vatican; I am content with the Catacombs: let me be permitted to return thither with a few old priests who may aid me with their counsels, and from that point I shall continue my pontifical functions, submitting to the authority of Cæsar like the early apostles, without in any way attempting to destroy or undermine that authority." The holy pope became warm and eloquent, his mild but lively eyes glistening at the mere thought of returning

to Rome, though stripped of all revenue and eating the bread of charity, and suspecting, it must be acknowledged, notwithstanding the sincerity of his humility, that this humiliated pope would be more powerful than when seated on the throne of St. Peter, and from the lowest catacomb would hold Napoleon in check, and might, perhaps, survive his gigantic empire.

On this subject his desires were not concealed, but were avowed with zeal. But MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay would not allow him to deceive himself. They made him distinctly understand that Napoleon would never allow him the liberty of returning simply as a dethroned prince to the capital where he had reigned as a sovereign, unless he should return thither compensated for his loss and submissive to his conqueror; that he must renounce the glorious poverty of the Catacombs, as enviable for a man of ambition as for a saint, and choose between Savona, where he was a captive deprived of his pontifical functions, and Avignon, Paris, or Rome,—cities where he would be free, crowned with the tiara, in full exercise of his spiritual authority, richly endowed, but subject whether he should take the oath or not.

These explanations occupied several days. MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay, to whom were joined the Bishop of Faenza, had at length greatly softened Pius VII., and—which was of great importance with a conscientious pontiff—had acted upon his convictions by demonstrating that if, on his own account, he might prefer captivity to the smallest concession, for the sake of the church he ought to guard against sacrificing advantages which might not readily occur again. They also reminded him that May was near its close, and that they must, therefore, leave to be present at the opening of the council early in June, and that he must come to a determination, and enable them to enlighten the assembled prelates on his ultimate resolutions.

After having enumerated the questions in succession and obtained his opinion upon each,—after having brought him to say that he did not refuse to institute the twenty-seven prelates designate, that, being desirous of giving to the church of France a testimony of confidence and affection, even at the cost of a great sacrifice, he admitted, without renouncing the canonical institution, that it was necessary to prevent the abuse which an ill-advised or ill-intentioned pontiff might make of it,—after having extracted from him the confession that there was at least room to deliberate upon the new establishment offered to the church, but only when he should be free, and assisted by his natural and legitimate counsellors,—they asked of him why he would not allow them to put in writing these different declarations, which he might refrain from signing, that they might not have the character of a treaty, but which might serve to evince, if not his pontifical will, (which could not be expressed unless he were surrounded by his cardinals,) at least his personal inclination, to which nothing could be added and from which nothing could be taken away.

Urged by the entreaties of the four prelates, and by the announcement of their departure, he allowed a declaration to be written, but not signed, which comprised the substance of the propositions we have just explained:—1. The

consent, on the present occasion, to institute the twenty-seven prelates designate, without mentioning the *motu proprio*; 2. The obligation on the part of the holy see to institute, within six months, the bishops named by the temporal sovereign, in defect of which the metropolitan should be considered authorized by the pope to institute in his name; 3. A readiness, when the pope should be free and surrounded by his cardinals, to listen to the arrangements that should be submitted to him for the final establishment of the holy see. The nature of these arrangements was not even indicated.

Thus reduced to general terms, this declaration, considering the opinions then prevalent with regard to the canonical institution, contained nothing inadmissible, or dishonourable, or compromising. The pope, after having granted it, separated himself with regret from these wise prelates, so unworthily maligned by a portion of the clergy; and he gave them his blessing with much tenderness. They left on the 20th of May.

Yet Pius VII. was the prey to inward agitation. On the night following their departure he had no sleep. Susceptible as well as conscientious, almost as fearful of the public judgment as he was of the Divine, having the support of no second person, he allowed himself, after a sleepless night, to believe that he had been guilty of remarkable weakness,—that all Christendom would thus judge, and would accuse him of having abandoned the interests of religion from the fear of Napoleon or from weariness with his captivity; and this fear he entertained much less on account of the first two propositions than the last, by which he engaged himself eventually, when free, and assisted by a council, to examine the propositions which might be made to him relatively to the pontifical establishment. He feared lest by that he should have indicated a future approval of the suppression of the temporal power of the holy see, and of the union of the Roman States and the French Empire. This vision threw him into such a state of perplexity and despair that he immediately summoned the prefect, whom he asked if the prelates had quitted Savona, entreated him, when he found that they had left the evening before, to send a courier after them to bring them back, or to signify to them, if unwilling to return, that the declaration must be considered as if it had never taken place; that he had been taken by surprise from his weakness, fatigue, and failing health; that he had been as it were stupefied by the urgency of their appeals, and that he had dishonoured himself by yielding; and he added, "This comes of withdrawing wise counsellors from a poor priest, old, exhausted, and, though devoted, yet incompetent. He covers himself with disgrace." On saying these words, the unhappy pontiff, with ill-merited severity, charged himself with every kind of weakness in exculpation of his act.

The return of day, and the presence of real objects, act favourably on minds agitated by the excitement of the night. The prefect of Montenotte, who had acquired over the pontiff a certain ascendancy by the calmness, the mildness, and the wisdom of his conversation, succeeded in tranquillizing him a little, in proving to him that the first two propositions were, after all, in accordance with what he had always thought and said, and that, as to the

third, it was merely a promise to examine without containing any hint at a solution, or any mention of any system of arrangement whatever. Yet, to satisfy Pius VII. on the last point, the prefect sent a courier to tell the prelates that the paragraph and declaration relative to the last proposition were to be erased,—absolutely erased; that as to the rest, provided they saw in it, not a treaty or engagement, but only a preliminary that might serve as the basis of an arrangement, the pope still adhered to it. This being obtained, Pius VII. became calm, and wrote to Cardinal Fesch a letter in which, with many commendations of the three prelates, and a guarantee of the truth of what they should report to the council, he expressed nearly the sentiments which we have just stated.

When the prelates who had been sent to Savona had returned to Paris, Napoleon expressed himself well pleased with the result of their mission; for, although as to the future establishment of the papacy they were far from agreeing with Pius VII., yet, in respect to the canonical institution, and, in particular, the individual twenty-seven prelates, they had obtained all that could be desired, and the government of the church was no more threatened with interruption. All fear of a schism was avoided. The council, in fact, in respect to the canonical institution, could not reject a solution which the pope himself had accepted; and, as to the pontifical establishment, unanimity would be the result of time, of necessity, of the power of Napoleon and the impotence of the unfortunate Pius VII.

The bishops had almost all arrived, in number about one hundred, of whom nearly thirty represented Italy. Those who failed to come, either of the French or the Italians, were infirm old men, unable to travel a great distance, or some Roman bishops who had refused the oath on account of the subversion of the pontifical government. Such as it was, the union of the prelates actually present was sufficient to give suitable éclat and authority to the council; for, with very few exceptions, all had come who were able.

The dispositions of the bishops were of a nature calculated to deceive the government, and even to deceive themselves, as to the result of the council. Though at the bottom of their hearts full of the most respectful compassion for the misfortunes of Pius VII., completely disapproving the abolition of the temporal power of the holy see, driven to discontent by the coteries of devout royalists, among whom the greater part of them usually resided, they were careful not to display their sentiments, especially since the catastrophe of the black cardinals. They were so alarmed by the terrible reputation of the Duke of Rovigo that many of them had made their will before leaving their dioceses, and had embraced the principal members of their flocks as if they were no more to meet. In general, the most hostile were the most submissive, for in their terror they thought that Napoleon penetrated their secret thoughts almost with the accuracy of the Deity, but without his clemency. The moderates, accustomed to regard Napoleon with a little less severity, were less alarmed: they would have been glad to appease the misunderstanding that had arisen between the Emperor and the pope,

by some middle course satisfactory to both, and thus escape from the difficulty, the church saved, the pope emancipated, and Napoleon satisfied. Yet let a spark set fire to the hidden sentiments of their hearts, and it might occasion an explosion. This no one apprehended, and no one in the government of Napoleon could foresee. M. Bigot de Preameneu, a mild and honourable minister, had no idea of deliberative assemblies; and Napoleon himself, though accustomed to conjecture when he could not know, believed, if we may judge from his legislative corps, that he could manage his bishops as he could his dumb and salaried legislators. He gave himself little more concern for his difference with the pope than for a difference which he might have had with the Grand Duke of Baden, though he was annoyed by this "quarrel of the priests," as he called it, which proved somewhat too long and too obstinate for his taste. The Duke of Rovigo alone, though without any previous experience of a deliberative assembly, but possessed of much natural sagacity, had skillfully gained the confidence of more than one prelate, and, knowing the care expended by the royalists of Paris to circumvent the members of the council, had conceived some apprehensions, which he had communicated to Napoleon; but the Emperor, who had always at his command Vincennes, his grenadiers, and his fortune, and was, moreover, dazzled by the effect produced by the birth of the King of Rome,—an effect equal to that of his most brilliant victories,—had paid no attention to the alarm which it was wished to create in his mind.

The council, which was first to have met on the day of the baptism, having been deferred in consequence of the true or pretended reason of the impossibility of old men assisting at two grand ceremonies in the same day, met the following week, on Monday, June 17, in the church of *Nôtre Dame*. At the urgent request of Cardinal Fesch, who claimed the presidency of the council in virtue of his see, (being Archbishop of Lyons,) that honour had been granted to him at a preliminary meeting held at his house. The bishops had adopted this resolution not from consideration for his rank as Primate of the Gauls, (which they did not acknowledge,) but in order to begin the operations of the council by an act of deference to the Emperor's uncle. They had also decided that they should follow the precedent of the ceremonial adopted at the Council of *Embrun* in 1727, and should take the oath of fidelity to the holy see, which, since the Council of *Trent*, had been imposed on every meeting of prelates, provincial, national, or general.

On the morning of June 17, cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, to the number of more than a hundred, repaired in procession from the archbishop's palace to *Nôtre Dame*, observing the ceremonial practised in councils. Though Napoleon, who knew no other precaution against liberty than silence, had strictly excluded the public, and especially those connected with the press, a great number of inquisitive persons had collected at the gates, some to gather whatever news they could, others to feast their eyes on the imposing spectacle.

The mass was celebrated with much pomp; after which, M. l'Abbé de Boulogne, Bishop of

*Troyes*, who was appointed to preach the sermon customary on the opening of councils, preached at great length and with studied eloquence. In his harangue he held the balance pretty equal between the pontiff and the Emperor, spoke with respect of each power, of the importance of their agreement, not with the stately eloquence of Bossuet in 1682, but with a certain brilliancy of language which impressed the auditors. He formally expressed his adherence to the doctrines of Bossuet; said, further, that in case of necessity a church ought to find the means of preservation in herself, which was the imperial doctrine, tending to dispense with the pope; but at the same time he made a great profession of devotion and love to the imprisoned pontiff. A singular symptom of the sentiments which filled every heart! What he said of the doctrines of 1682, of the necessity of a church being able to secure its own preservation, passed for conventional language adapted to the occasion: the respect he expressed for the papal power produced, on the contrary, a profound sensation. His discourse, therefore, though reviewed and corrected by M. le Cardinal Fesch, had all the appearance of secret hostility to the Emperor.

Immediately after the sermon, Cardinal Fesch, wearing his mitre, ascended a throne prepared for the purpose, and administered the oath prescribed by Pius VII.:—"I acknowledge the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic church to be the mother and mistress of all other churches; I promise and swear a true obedience to the Roman pontiff, successor of St. Peter, chief of the apostles, and vicar of Jesus Christ."

These words, though merely a conventional formula, deeply moved the parties present; for to swear obedience to a captive pontiff, at a few steps from the palace of the Emperor who held him in captivity, seemed strangely audacious. Thus it is always in assemblies: whatever affects indirectly the secret sentiment of the members, especially when that sentiment is restrained, startles them. They retired in emotion, surprised at what they had seen; and every man of experience who might have seen that assembly could not have failed to foresee that it would escape those who pretended to lead it, the government, and even itself.

Napoleon, being informed by some reports of what had transpired, wished to become acquainted with the discourse of M. de Boulogne and the oath which had been administered, complained loudly of having been left in ignorance of them, which indicated in himself and his ministers the inattention of persons strange to the conduct of deliberative assemblies, reprimanded every one for a degree of negligence of which he was himself the most culpable, particularly scolded Cardinal Fesch, for whom he entertained very little respect, and whose knowledge, virtue, and weight of character he very lightly esteemed, and listened only to M. Duvoisin, who explained to him the origin and the meaning of the oath, first adopted in 1564, immediately after the Council of *Trent*, in order to meet the Protestants with a solemn formula of adhesion to the Roman church. They succeeded in calming him by showing that on the eve of a decision, which might somewhat detract from the authority of

the holy see, it was necessary that the church of France, in performing an act of independence, should also perform an act of fidelity to avoid suspicion, calumny, and the loss of moral weight.

Napoleon, though appeased, was from that moment a little less confident in the result of the council. He wished that the direction of the council should be intrusted to hands in which he might confide; and he decided by a decree that this direction should be assigned to a committee composed of the president, of three prelates named by the council, and of the two ministers of worship in France and Italy,—MM. Bigot de Préameneu and Bovara. In this decree he confirmed the resolution conferring the presidency on Cardinal Fesch.

A message, moreover, had been prepared, drawn up by M. Daunou in language, as excellent in its literary character as it was deficient in political judgment, frequently revised by Napoleon, but not sufficiently so to render it suitable to the object,—a message in which all the history of the conflict with Rome was stated at length, and the question to be resolved presented in a manner far too imperative. The decree regulating the holding of the assembly and the message were brought before the council on Thursday, the 20th. The two days which had elapsed between Monday and Thursday had been occupied with secret interviews, greatly more actively on the part of the malecontents than of the supporters of power. Whenever liberty springs up in any direction, it is sure to find power unprepared, awkward, irritable because awkward; and it becomes a source to it of annoyance as well as of serious trouble. A new proof of this was now to be experienced,—of foolish irritation with circumstances which there had been no known means of preventing.

The council held a general meeting on the 20th. The two ministers, conveyed to Notre Dame in court carriages, and escorted by the imperial guard, arrived there in great state, having in their hands the decree on the formation of the committee, and the message. They took their places beside the president, and read first the decree, each in his own language. This authority, which recalled that of the Roman emperors over the early councils, before Christianity had established her own government and treated the rulers of the earth on a footing of equality, caused a lively sensation, which, however, was exhibited only in the countenance. They allowed the modern Cæsar to confirm the president whom they had themselves chosen, to establish his two imperial clerks on the right and left of the president's chair, and proceeded to throw names into an urn to designate the three prelates who were to constitute the committee. In a well-regulated assembly the votes are divided into two classes, one representing the prevailing opinion, the other the contrary one,—an indispensable condition for the successful issue of every combination of men. As this assembly was under no direction, the votes were extremely scattered. Out of about a hundred members present, there were scarcely thirty votes for the successful candidate. The greatest number were obtained by the Archbishop of Ravenna, who owed his superiority thus to the courtesy which led the members to wish to include an Italian prelate in their com-

mittee. The next in order was M. d'Aviau, Archbishop of Bordeaux, an ecclesiastic of respectable character but limited intelligence, and who exhibited, without any disguise, his indignation at the captivity of the holy father; he obtained twenty-seven votes. M. the Archbishop of Tours, (de Barral,) and M. the Bishop of Nantes, (Duvoisin,) each well known for his merits, his conciliatory part, and his recent mission to Savona, obtained each nineteen. As only one member was necessary to complete the three nominations which were to be made, they cast lots between MM. de Barral and Duvoisin, which gave the seat to the latter. After the formation of the committee, the message was read. Its harsh and haughty style produced the most painful impression. All the complaints against the church were renewed with excessive bitterness, very little accordant with the pacific mission to Savona, which seemed to have been framed with the desire of an amicable arrangement, and with which the government had professed itself satisfied in order to propitiate general opinion. The meeting, therefore, broke up in sadness and perplexity.

The first disagreeable symptom was the choice of the committee. It is, indeed, by selections of this nature that assemblies, even the most discreet, betray their real inclinations; for they have thus the advantage of indicating their opinions without incurring the danger or trouble of expressing them. But on this occasion, when from want of direction the votes had been so much divided, the only member of the council who had obtained a true majority after the Archbishop of Ravenna (who had been elected by courtesy) was the Archbishop of Bordeaux, well known to disapprove the religious policy of the government.

Another equally annoying symptom, due in a great measure to the tergiversations of Cardinal Fesch, was the position occupied by the bishops designate but not instituted. Of twenty-seven prelates thus situated, there were eighteen whose episcopal character was indisputable, though their see might be contested. These were bishops who had been promoted from one diocese to another, and whose title was indisputable as to their former diocese but questionable in regard to the new one. Thus, in the eyes of the pope, Cardinal Maury could not be Archbishop of Paris; but he was certainly Bishop of Montefiascone. Nine ecclesiastics in twenty-seven, promoted to sees for the first time, were not yet fully bishops in the church, though they were so in the eyes of the power which had nominated them. Since they had been convoked, they could not consistently be refused a deliberative voice, especially as former councils offered the precedent of members deliberating who were not bishops. In the preparatory meetings in the house of Cardinal Fesch, Cardinal Maury having proposed to introduce one of the non-instituted bishops, M. de Boulogne, who preached the opening sermon, exclaimed that it was a scandal to see these prelates in their diocese, and that it would be much augmented, and become even intolerable, in an assembly which was to decide upon their condition. This vehement apostrophe, tolerated in the house of the president of the council and the uncle of the Emperor, ought to have received an instant reply. On the contrary, every one seemed to bow be-

fore the words of M. de Boulogne, Cardinal Maury as well as Cardinal Fesch; and the non-instituted, as they were called, had been excluded, without opposition, from the preliminary meetings. In the scrutiny for the committee, they had been allowed a deliberative voice, with the distinct understanding that it was only for that time and was not to form a precedent. No one dared to controvert the opinion which separated the non-instituted prelates. It became evident that if out of the council men trembled before the master who ruled the Empire, in the interior of the council they trembled still more, if possible, before another master already very apparent,—namely, public opinion, which condemned the despotic violence of Napoleon towards the holy see, and, it must be allowed, condemned his despotic violence much more than his theological doctrines, since M. de Boulogne himself seemed disposed to admit some limits to the canonical institution. Undoubtedly, some old royalists, concealed in the shade, laboured to establish this opinion. But a forced opinion is soon discovered: it must be urged on in order to be conspicuous. That which is spontaneous, true, and natural, seeks to restrain itself, and bursts forth notwithstanding, like the outbursts of passion, and regrets that it is left to its own impetuosity. This was seen on the present occasion; and it appeared with increasing vividness at each sitting of this singular assembly.

After these preliminary meetings, a degree of anxiety was everywhere seen. The prelates who sided with the government, who were not the greater number, desired more support, and that their non-instituted colleagues should not be abandoned. They complained that they were neither supported by Cardinal Fesch nor by the minister of worship, each ignorant of the true manner of conducting an assembly, and yielding by turns to the Emperor and to the council. The greater number of the prelates who, without being strictly the partisans of the government, desired an accommodation between the Emperor and the church, from their love of what was right and their fear of a collision, were distressed at the nature of the message. They had been assured, and they had believed, that the envoy had returned from Savona reconciled with the pope. Was this true, or false? They knew not what to think after having heard a message so harsh, so sour, and, one might say, so brutal! Why, for example, this violent sally about the bull of excommunication? It was agreed that that bull was an error; for no one thought it right to aim at shaking a power established after a bloody revolution, the memory of which was still fresh. But the pope, if he had had the liberty of speaking,—what might he not have said of his palace broken into, his holy person carried off by gendarmes and kept prisoner like a state criminal? And why these recriminations if each party was willing to come to an understanding and reconciliation? Was there any chance of success in this endeavour? Might it still be hoped for? Why not explain themselves on this subject? Why not at least make it perfectly clear whether or not they were in accordance with the holy see?

Such was the language of the moderate prelates, who formed the majority, and who longed

for a pacific termination to those troubles. Among them, the Italians seemed to be the most struck with astonishment. They had left their homes with the idea that Napoleon was everywhere admired and feared; and they found that at Paris, in the centre of the capital of France, he was, no doubt, greatly feared, but they saw that, notwithstanding fear, the Parisian population, always indomitable, judged and criticized their master, sometimes strongly censured him, and were far from showing entire submission to the man to whom they wished the whole world to be subject. These poor Italians begged some explanation of this contrast, and to the anxiety shared by all added the strangest astonishment, arising from their peculiar circumstances.

As to the prelates resolutely hostile to the government, as few in number as those who were resolutely favourable to it, some were influenced by sincere indignation at the violence exercised towards the pope, others by the passions of old royalism, which began to revive owing to the faults of the reigning power. And, whatever may have been the motive of their hostility, they were well pleased with the spirit which was shown in the council, though alarmed at the consequences to which it might lead, and they gave the rein to their inclination with a total inexperience of the world and of men, for holiness is not identical with wisdom.

A new and important opportunity was to present itself to the council of expressing their dispositions in drawing up the answer to the imperial message. The government having, from their own point of view, stated the facts and the questions which they would originate, the council was now to do the same. Hence the necessity of an address. It was naturally the part of a committee to draw it up. The committee, formed in the spirit of the council, consisted of the Cardinals Spina and Caselli,—men of tolerable intelligence, but who, like all the Italian members of the assembly, sought to elude rather than to solve difficulties; of the Archbishops of Bordeaux and Tours,—the first, as we have said, a man of honour but blinded by passion, the second, M. de Barral, just returned from Savona, and already well known; of the Bishops of Ghent and Troyes, MM. de Broglie and de Boulogne,—respectable prelates, who had passed from an enthusiastic admiration of the First Consul to an extravagant hatred of the Emperor; of the Bishop of Nantes, M. Duvoisin, who has been already made known to the reader; finally, of the Bishops of Comacchio and Ivree,—Italians who endeavoured to pass safe and sound among all the rocks by which they were surrounded. The committee met at the house of Cardinal Fesch, the president.

They there discussed all the general questions naturally arising from their position, much more than the special question of the canonical institution. It was difficult to come to agreement on such subjects as the propositions of Bossuet, especially in the presence of the Italian prelates; on the bull of excommunication, which was generally regretted, but in different terms by different parties; on the connection of the holy see with the temporal power, at a time when an irresistible master wished to deprive the popes of their condition as princes; on the

prerogatives of the papacy, and the power which it possessed of abdicating them in particular cases. The point on which all were agreed was the necessity of reconciling Napoleon and Pius VII.; but, while bending beneath the more powerful of the two, and acknowledging the service he had rendered to the church, they in their hearts inclined (to their honour be it spoken) to the one who was proscribed and in prison. The text of the address, which was composed by M. Duvoisin, while prudent towards Napoleon, was full of affection to Pius VII.; and, after undergoing various modifications, it was presented to the assembled council on the 26th of June.

Although the draft of the address, composed by a prudent man, and subsequently amended by several persons of opposite tendencies, had lost the asperities which might wound the susceptibilities of contrary minds, it produced on the prelates, affected as they were by the peculiarity of their situation, and by their collection in a large body, the same emotions as it had produced in the committee. The Italians were shocked by the too open adoption of the doctrines of Bossuet; the moderates in general heard with pain fresh allusions to the bull of excommunication, a great error of the pope, which had perplexed everybody, except the decided partisans of the government, who considered that the rights of the temporal power ought to have been more expressly stated and the competence of the council more clearly enunciated. Their opponents, on the contrary, did not wish to pledge themselves beforehand in this last question, and preferred contenting themselves with generalities expressing their good-will to terminate the evils of the church.

These are the customary perplexities of every deliberative assembly, unless long previous experience have determined the method of procedure and imparted the power of self-government, which could not be the case with an assembly of such recent creation and called upon to treat such difficult subjects. But there occurred a phenomenon, strange to the inexperienced, but familiar to those accustomed to free governments. Scarcely had these prelates, so timid at Paris, assembled in council than they became as it were transformed: they lost their fear: the sentiment which actuated the greater number of them became disclosed, and that sentiment was a profound grief for the situation of Pius VII.,—a grief which the slightest opposition might convert into indignation. The effect of large assemblies of men is to efface the sentiments of individuals, to give utterance to the general sentiment which animates them, and which, in turns, violent if opposed, peaceably governing if left to itself, often carries those who entertain it to a length greater than they wish. This is why, in deliberative assemblies, so much character and *sang-froid* are necessary to govern one's self and others, and why these assemblies become so useful or so dangerous according to the manner in which they are managed.

Not one of the prelates present at the debate on the address could have conjectured the emotions which he should experience or the resolutions he should have been ready to adopt at this meeting. The greater part of the members of

council, intimidated before entering the council-chamber, but heated and emboldened as soon as they had assembled, expressed approbation or censure with freedom, interrupted each other with the rudeness of laymen, some demanding one alteration, some another,—demands to which M. Duvoisin, who brought up the draft of the address, replied with much patience and moderation in order to arrive at some conclusion. The discussion had lasted five hours, when the Bishop of Chambery, a respectable prelate, brother of a general in the Emperor's service, M. Dessoles, arose, and, full of emotion at the nature of the proposal he was about to make, said that bishops assembled in council could not deliberate as members of the church while the head of the universal church, the venerable Pius VII., was in chains. He proposed to the council to go in a body to St. Cloud, to demand of the Emperor the liberty of Pius VII., and added, that after this step had been taken, and the liberty of the pontiff had been obtained, they might then resolve the questions proposed, and probably come to some understanding. At these words every heart was filled with emotion, with respectful pity, and remorse; for there was little dignity in deliberating tranquilly under the roof of the metropolitan cathedral, while the imprisoned pope had not a friend to whom he could unbosom himself, not a sheet of paper on which to write the thoughts that agitated his soul. A great part of the prelates, even of the more moderate, transported with enthusiasm, rose involuntarily, exclaiming, "Yes, yes; to St. Cloud!" The more reserved, perceiving the danger of such a step, wished but dared not to oppose the counsels of prudence to the impulses of generosity. They were more afraid of the sentiment which regulated the minds within the council, than of the terrible power which governed all without. Cardinal Fesch, in dismay, at a loss what to do, consulted the committee, and, deriving no light from the two ministers whose presence irritated the council without affording any guidance, followed the opinion of M. Duvoisin, the only person competent to advise, and adjourned the meeting till the following day. The resolution was prudent, and was immediately executed, the most judicious of the prelates hastening to quit their seats as an example to others, while the more animated were demanding that they should not separate without having brought their deliberation to a close.

Notwithstanding the silence of the journals, this session produced a great effect at Paris. The joy was great among the enemies of Napoleon, formerly few in number, but by his own fault gradually increasing. Partisans pressed around the fathers of the council, and by flattery and encouragement sought to urge them still further. But these unhappy bishops, strangers to political manœuvring, though many had formerly been partisans of the house of Bourbon, were astonished at their own boldness, and, when they had left Notre Dame, again fell under the terror of the Duke of Rovigo, who had not failed to warn them, by trustworthy prelates, that they must reflect upon their conduct, for he was not a man to spare them, nor to allow them to renew the scenes of the Revolution under the cloak of religion.

The legislative body, assembled at the time



for the purpose of being present at the baptism, and that, being assembled, the opportunity might be improved of sanctioning the budget, were surprised, confused, and jealous. An indolent and lifeless body, in the pay of the government, without any serious question to resolve, they were ashamed of their nullity; and their members were everywhere heard to say that, if care were not taken, this convocation of priests would become the convocation of the states-general of the Empire, and would induce consequences which no one could foresee, but that no doubt the Emperor would keep them in check, and that, for themselves, they were ready to vote such laws as might be necessary to terminate these quarrels, worthy only of another age. Their remark was not without foundation. The council bore a real resemblance to the states-general, especially in one point,—that the first meeting of citizens in this reign had caused to burst forth suddenly, with unforeseen and ungovernable violence, the sentiments which animated the hearts of men in general.

Napoleon, who, notwithstanding his penetration, had not expected this explosion, was surprised and irritated: he paced his room with agitation, uttering menaces, but indulging in no open outbreak, being restrained by MM. Duvoisin and de Barral, who promised him a successful result of the convocation if he could treat the members with patience and moderation.

On the following day the council was calm; for assemblies, like individuals, experience an alternative of agitation and repose. MM. Duvoisin, de Barral, and all those wise men who shrunk from violent measures, and who did not yet despair of a favourable issue, mingled in the ranks of the holy assembly, saying that when they should have adopted the address, and guarantees should have been given to the government against the papal power, which was liable to abuse, as was proved by the bull of excommunication,—when they should have evinced the disposition of the council to terminate the refusal of canonical institution,—Napoleon, having regained confidence, would become more accommodating and would restore the pope to the faithful. In virtue of many private explanations of this nature, and of fresh retrenchments which deprived the address of all point, it was voted by nearly all the members of council, except the Italians, who could not associate themselves with it by their vote because of the propositions of 1682, but who gave no opposite vote, to indicate that their conduct merely implied withdrawal, not opposition.

After all these difficulties and discussions, the address was adopted. Napoleon, much wounded at the amendments it had undergone, declared that he would not receive it, which intimidated the council without introducing moderation: for it is possible to excite alarm without effacing the sentiment which has given offence, but which will break out again on the first occasion.

In these sittings the non-instituted prelates had been definitively sacrificed, or rather they had sacrificed themselves by renouncing the power of voting, which they had despaired of obtaining. The prince-primate, Chancellor of the Confederation of the Rhine, chief of the German church, had been with great difficulty admitted into the council; for these bishops,

little acquainted with the men and events of their own time, had imagined, agreeably to what they had heard, that this ecclesiastical prince was a philosopher, an infidel, one of the *illuminati*. They could not suppose that a nobleman and a priest who ventured to call himself the friend of Napoleon could be any thing else. Yet they had heard with some interest and advantage his lamentation on the state of the German church, which afforded the most striking proof of the abuse of the canonical institution, since, instead of being a guarantee of a good choice, it had become a weapon of offence. They had formed a better opinion of this prince after they heard him speak, and they admitted him to the council with one of his suffragans.

It was necessary at length to open the great question for which the council had been summoned, and M. Duvoisin had announced that the Emperor required them to engage in it immediately. The meeting in fact annoyed Napoleon, and he was unwilling that it should effect nothing. To the committee who had drawn up the address were added the Bishop of Treves, one of the envoys to Savona, and the Bishop of Tournay, an Alsacian of indifferent morals and violent opinions; and to the committee then was assigned the knotty question of the canonical institution. The government had declared that the Concordat was violated in their eyes by the refusal to institute, which left twenty-seven sees vacant; that they should, therefore, hold themselves released from that treaty, and that it could not be resumed unless on the adoption of modifications which should prevent the return of the abuses of which they complained. The council must devise and vote upon such modifications.

The committee, consisting of twelve members, met at the house of Cardinal Fesch. They had now come to the heart of the business. They must renounce all tergiversations, and explain themselves on the weighty matter subjected to the assembled fathers. If any one at that time had concentrated in himself wisdom and power, which is unfortunately rare, he might have decreed at once that the principle of canonical institution ought to remain inviolable, and that the pope should institute the twenty-seven bishops designate; if, moreover, wisdom had been combined with power in a high degree, he would have caused Napoleon either to restore Rome to Pius VII., or, at least, to give him Avignon, without any stipulation unfavourable to the just susceptibilities of that pontiff: he might, for instance, have granted him Avignon, his cardinals, his government, suitably endowed, without obliging him to sanction the abandonment of the Roman territory, or recognise the declaration of 1682, so unquestionably true, and yet so embarrassing to the head of the Roman church, and so little to his honour to accept in his present position. The papacy would thus have resided in a place associated with historical recollections, free and honoured, leaving the future to God, in whose hands it lies, and not in ours. This was all that the time required. But, no one having the power of enforcing this middle course, which exists in almost every question, and which is often the best solution, they carried on the dispute with violence, each maintaining a part of the truth.

The first thing to do was to declare what had

been agreed upon at Savona between the holy father and the three prelates who had been sent to him, which, indeed, closely resembled the conclusions we have just suggested as the most suitable. M. de Barral performed this duty in an admirable manner, with great respect for the pope combined with the most lively sympathy and perfect sincerity. He communicated the note agreed upon with Pius VII., taking care to withdraw the last article, which had occasioned the pontiff so many scruples. This note contained in itself an arrangement already complete, and on this account was little to the taste of the committee. They asked why it had not been signed: M. de Barral explained, and Cardinal Fesch read the letter of the pope, which fully authenticated the note. Both letter and note were rejected. In this unsigned article they refused to recognise any thing more than an unmeaning document, which the piety of the pope, and perhaps the irksomeness of his captivity, had allowed him to yield by surprise, and which, after all, was only the commencement of an arrangement, not an arrangement precise and definite. According to the members of the committee, therefore, every thing was to be done as if the pope had never been seen.

The simple solution to which Pius VII. had been brought having been rejected by the minds of those who were not anxious to find a ready determination of the question, it became necessary to treat the subject itself; and the first point to examine was the competence of the council. This M. Duvoisin established with equal clearness and force of logic. It was, in fact, evident that, although incompetent for a question of doctrine or of general discipline, which the universal church alone could settle, the council was fully competent to a question of national discipline, affecting only the French church; and that a question of merely private discipline was in agitation was proved from the fact that the manner of nomination and institution varies in different countries, and is regulated by special treaties between different governments and the church. On hearing these reasonings, the Bishop of Ghent, (M. de Broglie,) the Bishop of Tournay, (M. d'Hirn,) and the Archbishop of Bordeaux, (M. d'Avau,) became restless with impatience, and demanded leave to reply to the learned professor of the Sorbonne, whom they called their master in ecclesiastical knowledge, but whom, nevertheless, they wished to instruct in the question at issue. Such a difficulty, they asserted, could not be solved without the pope and in concert with him, and hence the council was not competent in itself. M. Duvoisin replied that it would no doubt have been better to have been so, but the question was how to meet a case of extreme necessity, and it must be allowed that for these very rare cases each church had resources in herself; that if, by any superior force whatever, they were separated for some years from the pope, or that there were no pope for several years, and that St. Peter's chair were vacant, or, as had happened, were filled by a pope unworthy of the office, it became necessary that the metropolitan should resume the faculty formerly possessed of instituting the bishops. Cardinal Caselli himself exclaimed, that if there were only one bishop in the world he would have the right to institute all the rest. This supposition drove the Bishop

of Bordeaux out of his senses; he said that it was opposed to the promise of Jesus Christ that his church should be forever. "It is to secure the eternity of the church," they replied, "that she must have the means of perpetuating herself, by obeying the laws of good sense, and by effecting her own preservation in case of necessity." Wise men wished that they should lay aside these chimerical suppositions, and contemplate the reality, and examine, for instance, whether in the present case they could dispense with the pope in the institution of bishops. And in fact, in the actual case,—that of a pope obstinately employing the refusal of institution as a weapon,—it was impossible to maintain that a church had no power to aid herself and to withdraw from the abuse of a power conferred with quite another intention.

It became necessary, however, to put an end to all these subtleties and to give a final answer. But when it came to the vote, only three voices were in favour of the competence of the council,—those of the three prelates who had been sent to Savona. Cardinal Caselli himself, who had stated the question in the same manner as M. Duvoisin, dared not adopt his opinion; and Cardinal Fesch, who always studied the party opposed to his nephew, was guilty of the same weakness. Thus, out of twelve votes, only three ventured to assert the competence of the council. It was perfectly right that this competence should be used with the greatest reserve, simply to act as a check on the pope and on Napoleon himself, to deliver the one from his scruples and the other from his despotic disposition; but to deny the competence of the council in a question of private discipline was completely to disarm themselves, and to leave Napoleon and the pope in mutual opposition without any intermediate power to reconcile them.

From that moment, the object of the convocation was lost, and they became exposed to all the chances of Napoleon's anger, who would resolve the difficulty without the help of pope or council,—that is to say, by force. Men hastened to St. Cloud to know the result. Napoleon was exasperated. The sight of his uncle coming to communicate and to deplore the result which he had not had the courage to prevent threw him into a paroxysm of irritation, which expressed itself in contemptuous and insulting language. The cardinal pretending to defend the committee on theological grounds, Napoleon interrupted him, and demanded with disdain where he had acquired his learning; said that, although a soldier, he knew more about it himself; that the greater part of his colleagues of the French church were almost as ignorant; that he had wished to restore to the Gallican church the greatness which she enjoyed under Bossuet, but that they were not worthy of the mission; that, instead of being the princes of the church, they were merely the beadles, and that he took upon himself the task of drawing her out of the difficulty; that he would pass a law in which he should declare that each metropolitan should suffice to institute the bishops designate; that it should be instantly put in execution throughout the Empire, and that they should see whether the church could not save herself without the pope. All this was certainly possible; but it implied a

return to the ancient civil constitution of the clergy which Napoleon had formerly treated with so much scorn, and from which he had had the glory of escaping by means of the Concordat.

At this moment arrived M. Duvoisin, who had hastened to calm a passion easily foreseen, and to prevent the consequences that might ensue. The sight of that prelate delivered Napoleon from the state of irritation into which he was almost always thrown by the presence of Cardinal Fesch; and, resuming his coolness, he said, "Let us hear M. Duvoisin: he knows what he speaks about." M. Duvoisin, though regretting with reason that the council should deprive itself of power by disputing its own competence, maintained, nevertheless, that they ought not to act as if all were lost, and that by assuming another base than the competence of the council, and relying on the Savona note, it was possible to reach their end by a different route. According to him, it would be possible to make a declaration stipulating, for example, that the episcopal chairs should not remain vacant more than a year; that six months should be allowed to the temporal power to nominate, and six months to the pope to institute; that on the lapse of these six months the pope should be supposed to delegate to the metropolitan the power of instituting those who had been named. They might, also, at the close of this declaration, thank the pope for having by this arrangement, which emanated from his Holiness, put an end to the calamities of the church. M. Duvoisin added, that it appeared to him impossible that the committee should refuse a solution accepted by the pope himself.

Napoleon consented to make this new attempt, and to defer till the next day the exercise of his supreme authority, which seemed to him sufficient to settle every question, whatever might happen, and whatever might be said. MM. Fesch and Duvoisin retired with the charge of securing the adoption of this new plan by the committee.

The committee, according to the practice of that unhappy council, hesitating between two masters and two fears, between Napoleon demanding obedience and opinion demanding respect, was refractory one day and trembling the next. Cardinal Fesch made a great display of the rage of his nephew. M. Duvoisin did not conceal that unless they could come to a decision they would expose the church to great risk: that certainly the pope had much to complain of, but that it was necessary to extricate him from his frightful position by interposing themselves between him and the Emperor; that they had the means of doing so in the note of Savona accepted by him, which they had only to convert into a law of the state by a decree of the council, and to thank the pope for having himself saved the church from an abyss by accepting this solution; that, part of the religious controversies having been thus terminated, the rest would also find their solution, for Napoleon when satisfied would become more accommodating, and would certainly put an end to the captivity of the pope. These very sensible proposals of M. Duvoisin decided the committee: his opinion was adopted, and the declaration of Savona converted into a decree of the council unanimously, with the exception of two votes,—those of the Archbishop of Bor-

deaux and the Bishop of Ghent, who were always very obstinate and violent.

Although in principle the power of institution ought to belong purely and simply to the holy see, the measure now adopted was the most reasonable in the present emergency, since it terminated, with the consent of the pope, a very formidable conflict. This result, therefore, yielded genuine satisfaction to prudent men, especially to the little court of Cardinal Fesch; for, though that cardinal made a great boast of his heroism in opposition to his nephew, his friends were well pleased to see him freed from the necessity of displaying it. They found it much more agreeable to enjoy with him the honours of resistance and the profits of relationship. They even carried their joy too far; for, warned of the triumph, the party men, whether royalists or devotees, kept themselves astir all the evening and all the night, visiting the members of committee, alarmed them with what they had done, maintained that they were disgraced, that they had delivered up the church to the tyrant, that every thing was lost, and that it was necessary to retreat when they should explain their vote at the next meeting. These pious leaders at length gained their cause; and they promised them, after having endeavoured to save themselves from Napoleon in the one day, that they would the next day save themselves from dishonour.

In fact, the committee, having again met the following day, appeared to be completely changed. It was no longer the fear of Napoleon that prevailed, but that of the Catholic party. The Cardinals Caselli and Spina, weak men, though intelligent, were the first to retract. They pretended that when they voted the evening before they were ignorant of the true character of the laws of the state; that they had since learned that they were irrevocable in their nature; and that, therefore, while persevering in the adoption of the decree, they were obliged to demand the previous consent of the pope, which was to fall into the old track,—that of the incompetence of the council. The Bishop of Tournay, a member of the extreme party whose morals singularly contrasted with his opinions, did not use the same precaution in his retraction. He wholly retracted the opinion which he had adopted the previous evening, and declared that he was not for the decree. The Bishops of Comacchio and Ivree, vacillating as the Italian priests had always been in this affair, explained their vote in their turn, and retracted it. M. de Boulogne, commonly more firm, also retracted his; and nothing remained of the previous day's work. They fell into a strange confusion, and finally, in order to escape from it, they admitted the bases of the decree, which was founded on the incontestable note of Savona, on the condition that it should receive the assent of the holy father, so as to obtain the signature which was wanting to the note. This equivocal solution, without saving in principle the canonical institution, which it reduced to very narrow limits, cut off none of the immediate political difficulties; for, by abolishing the authority of the council, it made every thing depend on a second proceeding of the pope, whom it exposed to new scruples and perplexities, and, if he had not strength to surmount them, to every kind of danger.

This vote, such as it was, having been obtained, Cardinal Fesch strongly urged M. de Barral, and then M. Duvoisin, to consent, one or other of them, to draw up the report of the resolution. These gentlemen, whose advice had not been followed, did not feel it right to accede; in which they were wrong, for the conclusions themselves were, perhaps, of less consequence than the language which should be held to the council. In reality, since both parties admitted limits to the canonical institution, reserving an appeal to the pope to ratify the new system, which concerned Pius VII. as much as Napoleon, every thing depended on the manner in which it should be presented; and it was much better to confide this duty to persons really desirous of a peaceable solution of the difficulty than to those who desired nothing but trouble and confusion. But MM. Duvoisin and De Barral were irritated in their turn. The passions belong to all states and to all professions, and after long opposition they often seize the most moderate minds. These two prelates obstinately refused the office proposed to them, on which they applied to the fiery Bishop of Tournay, who accepted it, though ignorant of the French language, and they requested M. de Boulogne to undertake the grammatical correction which it would very probably require. Certainly, Cardinal Fesch could have had very little sense to allow such a choice, for it concerned him more than any other to prevent affairs going to confusion.

Persons of excited minds, who demanded nothing but disturbance, had great cause of joy. The reporter put in the statement all the opinions of his party; M. de Boulogne effaced all that offended his finished rhetoric, but left all that a wise policy would have retrenched. The report was to be read to the council on the 10th of July.

The secret had been carefully kept, as party secrets often are. On the 10th of July, the council assembled with extreme curiosity and manifest anxiety. Scarcely had the report been read, uttered with a foreign pronunciation, when the emotion of all ranks of that august assembly reached its height. A skilful compiler might have calmed all opinions by granting reasonable satisfaction to each, and might have rendered acceptable to the Emperor a solution certainly acceptable to the hostile part of the council, for it emanated from that quarter. But the report, made exclusively for a party which it exalted by gratifying its wishes, enraged the opposite party, which was deeply wounded. Among all these prelates there was not a man capable of recovering this irritated and disunited assembly, of rallying the members around some wise resolution and reducing them to reason! there was a chaos of interruptions, reproaches, and reciprocal accusations. The partisans of government said that to proclaim the incompetence of the council was again to remit the whole question into the hands of the pope; and in this manner they would never come to a termination. The others replied that, even if the council were competent, the acts could not dispense with the sanction of the pope, for the decisions of a council had no weight unless approved by the holy see. This omnipotence of the pope, which some maintained, induced others to recall the recent manner in which Pius VII. had employed it, by quoting the bull of excommu-

nication, which they reproached as a crime,—a work of anarchy; for, if it had succeeded, in what condition, said they, would affairs be now?

At these words the Archbishop of Bordeaux rushed into the middle of the assembly, holding in his hands a book, the acts of the Council of Trent, opened at the very article which confers on the pope the power of excommunicating sovereigns who make an attack upon the rights of the church. In vain they endeavoured to restrain the old man, feeble but obstinate, from deafness scarcely hearing what was said, and listening only to himself and his passions; he pressed forward and threw the book on the table, exclaiming, "You pretend that sovereigns cannot be excommunicated: condemn, then, the church which has determined that they may!" These words produced an immense effect, both upon those who approved them and upon those who feared the consequences, for they almost amounted to a renewal of the excommunication in the very face of Napoleon, in the neighbourhood of his palace, and in the grasp of his formidable hand!

Upon this, Cardinal Fesch, recovering a little of his presence of mind, declared that it was impossible to deliberate in the present state of the council, and deferred till the next day the final vote on the subject of discussion. They separated, with little satisfaction on one side and great indignation on the other, and agitation and terror in all, not understanding the irresistible feeling to which they had just succumbed.

Though there was neither public, nor tribune, nor journal, a thousand echoes had already conveyed the news of this sitting to Trianon, where the Emperor resided. Thither the Duke of Rovigo, the Archbishop of Malines, and the Cardinal Fesch, repaired. When Napoleon heard these details, he fancied that he saw a renewal of the whole revolution. Why could he not see that which was indeed the revolution, but the revolution in its best aspect,—that is to say, public opinion, bursting forth spontaneously and unconsciously, and reproaching him not with the desire to free the state from the dominion of the church, but with oppression of the conscience, and especially with tormenting a venerable pontiff formerly his friend, his co-operator in his best works, and dragging him from prison to prison like a state criminal? Why could he not learn this striking lesson:—that it was impossible to bring together a number of men, old priests, weak and trembling, strange to all measures of policy, without occasioning an outburst of violent reprobation of his own acts? No doubt there were some prejudices, some narrow views, some trivial theological doctrines,—some weaknesses, in short,—in the members of this council; but their emotion was of an honourable character, and disclosed a great fact,—the unsolicited and unconscious revival of liberty, and *that* among aged priests the greater part of whom were the victims and the enemies of the French Revolution, and wholly without intention of renewing the disorders attendant upon it.

In all this Napoleon only saw what despotism might discover,—the necessity of employing force to check disagreeable demonstrations; as if an evil could be suppressed by attacking the effects instead of the cause. Napoleon treated

his uncle with great harshness, reproached his weakness and his errors, accused him of a serious act of imprudence in throwing every thing upon the Bishops of Troyes, Tournay, and Ghent, who had been very troublesome in the committee,—an imprudence, however, committed very innocently,—and then ordered an immediate decree pronouncing the instant dissolution of the council, and issued the most violent orders in regard to the individuals who had been the heads of the opposition. The Bishop of Tournay, (M. d'Hirn,) for having drawn up the report in the worst spirit, the Bishop of Troyes, (M. de Boulogne,) for having so badly corrected it, the Bishop of Ghent, (M. de Broglie,) for having exerted a greater moral influence upon the committee than any other member, were designated as the most guilty, and as destined to be the first victims of this episcopal insurrection. The Archbishop of Bordeaux had also well deserved this distinction; but an ecclesiastic recently nominated to the bishopric of Metz, who enjoyed the confidence of the government, M. Laurent, urged the deafness and incapacity of that prelate, and at his prudent entreaties they contented themselves with three victims. By the order of Napoleon, the Duke of Rovigo arrested them in the night, and conducted them to Vincennes, without trial or explanation. It was for the public to understand the reason, and for them to submit.

On the next day it was learned without any great excitement, owing to the suppression of all publicity, that the council was dissolved, and that three of the principal prelates had been sent to Vincennes. These extraordinary acts were very sensibly felt by the clergy; but, unfortunately, it must be added that their fear was equal to their indignation. The partisans of the government said, in excuse for these severities, (but very privately, from the fear of calling forth a denial,) that the three prelates had been found to be compromised in a dark plot which had occasioned imprisonment to M. d'Astros, and had excluded M. Portalis from the Council of State. But there was, indeed, no great difficulty in opposing the majority of the council, for almost all the members trembled with fear, and sought rather to justify themselves than to recriminate. And, being deprived of mutual support by the dissolution, they lost the strength which is derived from union, and found themselves consigned to their individual timidity. Among the most alarmed and the most ready to cry for pardon were the Italians, who regarded every thing as a quarrel, in which they were not concerned, between the Gallican church and the Emperor, and were unwilling, after retaining their sees notwithstanding the captivity of Savona, to find themselves wrecked in the very harbour, in a matter of pure form such as the canonical institution. They said that the French prelates were imprudent and foolish; that the Italians had generally taken no part in these questions, because they were little interested in them, but that they were ready, if their support were needed, to grant it without reserve. Cardinal Maury, who was unwilling to share in any new revolution, whose heart was full of gratitude to Napoleon and of resentment against the church which had proved so ungrateful to him, did not fail to repeat this language to the minister of worship and to the

Emperor himself. Nineteen Italians had offered themselves, and they might count upon fifty or sixty French prelates, less indifferent to the solution than the Italians, but almost as much alarmed, who were demanding that some end might be put to the matter as it suited the government. "Take them one by one," said Cardinal Maury, "and you will manage them more easily than when combined," adding, with his customary familiar originality, "The wine is excellent; but it will be better when bottled than in the cask." His advice was followed, and a decree was drawn up nearly the same as that which had prevailed in the committee, limiting to one year the delay allowed to fill vacant sees, granting six months to the temporal power for nomination and six months for canonical institution by the pope, after which the metropolitan of the ecclesiastical province was to institute those who had been designated. To this decree was added the clause of a fresh appeal to the pope, to request his sanction, but with an understanding directly contrary to the conclusions of the Bishop of Tournay. It was, in fact, understood that, if the pope did not adhere, the council would adopt an independent resolution, would pass the new decree, and send it to the Emperor to be converted into a law of the state. It was even agreed that while a deputation should repair to Savona in order to obtain the agreement of the holy father, the principal members of the council should be detained at Paris to secure from them a second vote in case of a refusal from the pontiff. This plan having been agreed upon, they summoned successively to the house of the minister of worship the prelates on whom they thought they could count. Nineteen Italian bishops adhered with eagerness; sixty-six French bishops followed their example, which made eighty-five adherents out of one hundred and six members of council. Those who did not adhere, to the number of about twenty, were not all determined opponents: one-half rather expressed reservation than refusal.

When this result had been obtained, Prince Cambacérès, who was always called when moderate terms or ingenious expedients were in request, and who had much contributed to the adoption of this pacific measure, advised that the council should be reassembled, and that the act should be presented to it whose adoption must solve every doubt. Napoleon consented to this, and ordered by decree a new convocation for August 6.

On that day the council assembled in their usual place. No one inquired why they had been so suddenly dissolved and so suddenly recalled, or why three members of council, instead of being present, were at Vincennes: they heard the reading of the decree, and voted it almost unanimously.

It remained to obtain the sanction of the pope, not that they recognised the incompetence of the council, but because it was necessary to conform to the natural and necessary practice of submitting to the head of the church the acts of every assembly of prelates. Napoleon consented to send a deputation composed of bishops and archbishops, to solicit the papal approbation, and to add to it some cardinals to take the place of the council, of which he always complained of being deprived as soon as he was

required to pass any resolution whatever. The cardinals chosen were those of Bayane, Fabrice Ruffo, Roverella, Doria, and Dugnani. To them was added the Archbishop of Edessa, the pope's almoner. The prelates appointed were the Archbishops of Tours, of Malines, and of Pavia; the Bishops of Nantes, Treves, Evreux, Placentia, Feltre, and Faenza. They were to set out immediately, that they might not too long detain their colleagues at Paris, who were to pass a new vote in case of a refusal by the pope. This refusal was not much expected, especially when they remembered the note brought back by MM. de Barral, Duvoisin, and Mannay.

Napoleon had accepted this conclusion of the council, first, because it was a conclusion, and then because he had almost attained his end by obtaining a very strict limitation of the canonical institution. But morally he felt himself overcome; for an opposition, all the more significant because it was involuntary, and, as it were, even trembling, had manifested itself among the clergy, and declared to him openly that he was the oppressor of the pontiff; and this had found an echo in a thousand hearts. He consoled himself with the hope that very soon would be brought from Savona, if not the decree itself, at least the institution of the twenty-seven prelates designate, which was sufficient to complete the church of France, and to remove the difficulties which impeded the administration. As to the question of principle, he would contrive to escape from it as he might at a later time. Besides, at the present moment, all questions, material, moral, political, and military, resolved themselves in his mind into one,—that of the great war in the North. If he were once the conqueror of Russia, who alone appeared, if not actually to resist him, at least to contest some of his purposes, he would in her subdue every kind of opposition, public or concealed, which he might yet meet in Europe. What would then be the poor captive priest who wished to dispute Rome with him? Nothing, or almost nothing; and the church would recognise the power of Cæsar as she had often done before. The Concordat of Fontainebleau, obtained even after his return from Moscow, proves that, if Napoleon were often blinded, it was not principally upon this occasion.

The cardinals and prelates who had been named set off for Savona; and he himself, weary of this quarrel of priests, as he called it ever since he began to despise the Concordat, his best work, devoted himself entirely to his great political and military affairs.

Though deprived of free journals, at least in France, the European public followed with a curious and anxious attention the broil, already much noised abroad, between the Emperors Napoleon and Alexander. Sometimes it was said that the war was inevitable and near at hand, that the French were about to pass the Vistula and the Russians the Niemen; sometimes that the quarrel was settled, and that each party was about to retire far within his own frontiers. Especially since the arrival of M. de Caulaincourt at Paris and M. de Lauriston at St. Petersburg, it seemed possible to hope for the continuance of peace. Wise men in every country, doubtful of the issue of a new struggle, but certain that torrents of blood would be shed, ardently wished for peace, and applauded

every thing which seemed to promise it. But the continual movements of troops from the Rhine to the Elbe was little calculated to give confidence, and destroyed the good effect of the pacific reports which had been circulated for two or three months. The friends of peace had too good cause for uneasiness; for Napoleon, resolved to defer the war, but yet determined to engage in it, had continued his preparations, adopting only the precaution of concealing them sufficiently to avoid occasioning in 1811 the rupture which he wished to be delayed till 1812. Thus, for example, after having first retarded the departure of the 4th and 6th battalions of Marshal Davout, and having detained them at the dépôt, he changed his mind, and, thinking that they could nowhere be better formed than under that vigilant and accurate instructor, he sent them on the way to the Elbe. Not less than thirty-two battalions were sent at once beyond the Rhine, and this could not be kept secret. To balance this too striking movement by a contrary one, he had recalled two Westphalian battalions, which were going to complete the German portion of the garrison of Dantzic, and had enjoined that this retrograde movement should be much spoken of, and to say of the French battalions *en route* for the Elbe, that they were only finishing a march begun long before. Having at his command the French and many of the German journals, he might easily thus abuse the public for a moment; but certain spies of Russia in all nations were soon able to establish the truth, and even to exaggerate the facts.

The Russian cabinet had not deceived itself, and the Emperor Alexander had said to M. de Lauriston that two German battalions had indeed made a retrograde motion, but that at the same time more than thirty French battalions were advancing from Wesel to Hamburg. "At any rate," added the Emperor Alexander, "I will not be behind the Emperor Napoleon in pacific manifestations. He has recalled two battalions: I will recall a division." He had, indeed, brought a little nearer to the Lower Danube one of the five divisions which he had formerly sent to the Dnieper to transport them into Poland. It should be acknowledged that in this matter his sincerity began to be equal to that of Napoleon; for, having too much diminished his forces before the Turks, he felt the need of augmenting them by bringing back to the Danube one of the divisions which had removed from it.

M. de Lauriston, who much feared a war in the North, and who saw with despair that this mutual arming would soon end in actual war, earnestly entreated Alexander to be the wiser of the two, and to take the initiative in explanations which were deferred either from a false vanity or mistaken calculation. "Demand," said he to the Emperor Alexander, "indemnity for Oldenburg, and I have no doubt it will be granted. Send some one to Paris with your complaints, and I am convinced that he will be cordially received. Each party may then explain, and you may understand why you are preparing to slaughter each other." To these pressing instances the Emperor Alexander gave a resolute refusal. He would, as he had said, demand nothing for Oldenburg either in Germany or Poland, because in Germany it

would be denounced as a desire to rob the German princes, and in Poland Napoleon would accuse him of seeking to dismember the grand duchy of Warsaw, and would use this as an argument of great weight with the Poles. Nor was he willing to assume the character of an intimidated prince seeking peace from the court of the Tuileries. He was, besides, fully convinced that he would not obtain it, and even feared that he might hurry on the war by categorical explanations on certain points,—such, for example, as commercial affairs. If, in fact, he were urged, he was resolved to state formally that he would never close his ports to those whom he called neutrals but whom Napoleon called the English, and he feared lest so explicit a declaration would occasion an immediate rupture. The war which Napoleon proposed at the distance of a year was equally plain to himself, and he preferred its occurrence at that period to its being at the present moment. For this reason he maintained extreme reserve, sincerely affirming that he desired peace, and, as a proof, promising to disarm instantly if the other party would do the same, and adding that the grievance of the spoliation of the Prince of Oldenburg was not urgent; that, although he expected an indemnity, he did not press for it immediately; that he could wait; and that in this he was not acting on the principle of keeping a grievance in store, for he hesitated not to declare that he would not make war on that ground.\*

In this delicate and difficult situation, much care and prudence were necessary to prevent war, but a single word might render it inevitable and perhaps immediate. But, with the excitable character of Napoleon and his boldness of speech, it was to be feared that such a word might escape.

On August 15, 1811, his *jour de fête*, he held a great levée at court. As he was known to give ready utterance to what was in his mind, his words were eagerly watched to discover any that might bear upon the important question of the day. On this occasion he was cheerful and inclined to converse. His noble countenance was radiant with good-humour and intelligence, and he would have attracted men less curious and less interested than those who surrounded him. The greater part of the guests had left; there remained with him the ambassadors of Russia and Austria, (the Princes Kourakin and De Schwarzenberg,) the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, and one or two of the ministers of those small German courts who are ever listening to learn the designs of the giants who are wont to trample them under foot.† Followed about by these personages, and engaging in general conversation, Napoleon said to the Spanish ambassador that it was a bad season in his country for military operations; that nothing could advance rapidly

at the present moment, but in the autumn he would use more urgency, and would lead Spaniards, Portuguese, and English at a quick step. Then, turning to Prince Kourakin, he spoke of a despatch invented by the English of a very arrogant character, supposed to be addressed by France to Russia, but not having even the appearance of probability; to which Kourakin replied that certainly it was not very probable, for such a despatch would never have been received. Napoleon smiled at this sally of pride from Prince Kourakin, and then, as if to avenge himself a little, led the conversation to the events of Turkey, on which, indeed, there was much to say. The Russians, in the last campaign, had remained masters of all the fortresses of the Danube from Widin to the Black Sea. They had been less fortunate this year, had not been able to cross the Danube, and had had an affair near Rutschuk in which they claimed the advantage, but which the Turks on the contrary asserted was in their favour, and after which the latter had actually re-entered Rutschuk. It was manifest that the divisions that were brought back had given the slip to the Russians. Explaining matters from his own point of view, Prince Kourakin endeavoured to palliate the disadvantages of the campaign, and naturally boasted of the bravery of the Russian soldier. During these explanations, Napoleon regarded Prince Kourakin with a satirical pleasure, seeing his vain efforts to extricate himself from his embarrassment. "Yes, yes," said he, "your soldiers are very brave; we French are quite willing to allow this: but your generals are not so good as your soldiers. They have unquestionably manœuvred unskilfully. It is very difficult to defend a line as long as that on the Danube from Widin to the Black Sea. The bank of a river cannot be otherwise disputed than by retaining the power of passing to the other bank and possessing a great number of bridges and *îles de pont*: for the true art of defence consists in knowing how to attack. Your generals have acted against all these rules." Hereupon Napoleon, who spoke of war as wisely as he conducted it, held his auditors for a long time attentive and astonished. Prince Kourakin, wishing to excuse the Russian generals, said that their forces were deficient; that they had been obliged to remove a part from the theatre of the war, and, perceiving his error, he added that the finances of the empire required it. Napoleon smiled at the awkwardness of the prince, and, continuing to play him off with wit and grace, replied, "Are you quite sure that the state of your finances obliged you to remove from the Danube? If so, you have made a bad speculation. In general, you should send all the troops whose support is too expensive into the enemy's country. This is my habit, and I find my finances flourish under it." Then suddenly,

Bassano, to be by him communicated to all courts. These three versions, none of which absolutely contradicts the others, but which mutually implement each other, are the documents which I have employed to make a résumé of this curious interview. The *item* only is mine, and I have endeavoured as much as possible faithfully to represent the language of Napoleon. This is my part as a historian, whose duty is to collect what deserves the trouble of abridging, for otherwise it would occupy as long a time to read a history as to perform the acts which it records. It would take twenty years to read what took twenty years to transpire.

\* I relate all this from the most authentic sources.—the letters of M. de Lauriston, of Napoleon, of Marshal Davout, &c. These details may, therefore, be regarded not as conjectures, but as absolutely certain.

† Here also I speak on the authority of the most certain documents. I set little by invented speeches, and still less by supposed conversations, which are less probable than speeches, because more difficult to gather and respect. But the conversation which I relate, as well as two or three others of Napoleon already recorded, were caught by several witnesses,—the Austrian ambassador, and the minister of Wurtemberg,—and repeated by Napoleon to M. de

without relinquishing the kind tone of the interview, but with the petulance of one who could no longer refrain himself, he continued, "Prince, are we speaking seriously? Are we here dictating despatches, or are we writing for the journals? If it be so, I will agree that your generals have been constantly victorious, that the pressure on your finances has obliged you to withdraw part of your forces who were living at the expense of the Turks, to make them live at the expense of the Russian treasury; all this I will allow: but, if we are speaking unreservedly before three or four of your colleagues who know the whole state of affairs, I will tell you that you have been beaten,—thoroughly beaten; that you have lost the line of the Danube by your own fault; that this is less the fault of your generals (though they have manoeuvred unskilfully) than of your government, which has deprived them of the forces which were indispensably necessary to them, and has recalled four divisions from the Danube to the Dnieper; and why? in order to arm against me, your ally, as you say,—against me, who had no wish to make war with you, and who do not wish to do so at the present moment. Herein you have committed fault after fault. If I had occasioned you uneasiness, you should have demanded an explanation. At any rate, instead of withdrawing your forces, you ought to have accumulated them against Turkey, to have overwhelmed her and constrained her to make peace, which might have been done in one campaign as advantageously as was effected with Finland, and then you might have thought of taking precautions against me. But you have done nothing right in a political, financial, or military point of view: and all for whom? For the Prince of Oldenburg and a few smugglers! For persons such as these you risk a war with me. And yet, you know very well, I have 600,000 men to oppose you with: I have 400,000 in Spain; and I know my trade well: hitherto you have never conquered me, and, by God's help, I hope you never will!—But you prefer to listen to the English, who tell you that I wish to make war upon you: you had rather trust to some smugglers enriched by your commercial measures, and you proceed to take arms: of course I am obliged to arm in turn, and thus we are brought face to face ready for action! You are like a hare, which, being struck in the tail, rises on her paws to look round, and then exposes herself to be struck on the head. For my part, I am suspicious, like man in a wild state: I observe: I see that I am aimed at: I suspect: I put my hand upon my weapon. But this situation must have some termination." Napoleon, who spoke with great rapidity, and allowed the prince no time to reply, without changing the benevolence and even friendship of his manner, here gave an opportunity to answer. The latter, who possessed little knowledge of facts and little power of recollection, though he wanted neither foresight nor experience in public affairs, did not think of recalling to Napoleon that in the course of military preparations France had proceeded Russia, and threw himself into confusion with protestations of friendship and devotion: that every thing remained as at Tilsit; that if any power had a right to be astonished, it was Russia, which had never violated her fidelity to the

alliance; that she could not be otherwise than profoundly affected by the treatment of the Prince of Oldenburg, a near relative of the Emperor, to whom the court of Russia was much attached; that nothing could more sensibly affect the Emperor Alexander than to interfere with the states of that prince; that, moreover, Russia had confined herself in this matter to complaints and protestations. "Protestations!" exclaimed Napoleon; "protestations! you have made a formal protestation, [which was true;] you have denounced me as a robber to Germany, to the Confederation of the Rhine. Perhaps you are not aware that your Prince of Oldenburg was a great smuggler; that he failed in his treaties with you and me; that he violated the agreement subsisting between the members of the Confederation of the Rhine; that according to ancient Germanic right I could have called him to my tribunal, have placed him under the ban of the Empire, and have dispossessed him without your being entitled to say a word. Instead of that, I gave you warning, I offered him compensation." While pronouncing these words, Napoleon smiled, as if he had not spoken them seriously, and seemed almost to acknowledge that he had acted much too hastily. He then added, in a tone of regret and mildness, "I allow that if I had known the great interest you take in the Prince of Oldenburg, I should have acted otherwise: but of this I was ignorant. But what is now to be done? Shall I restore to you the territory of Oldenburg occupied by my custom-house officers? for otherwise I will not restore it! You would not have it. In Poland I would give you nothing,—nothing." And Napoleon pronounced these last words with an accent which proved that Alexander was right in not wishing to furnish that weapon against himself. "Where, then," said he, "shall we find an indemnity? Only say, and I shall endeavour to satisfy you. Why did you allow M. de Metternich to leave at such an emergency?" (M. de Metternich, principal director of the affairs of the legation, had, in fact, just left Paris.) "Your master must either send back him or some other person, with powers of explanation, to conclude a convention which may embrace all your grievances and all mine: otherwise I shall continue my armament. I shall probably levy the conscription of 1812, and you well know that I am not in the habit of allowing myself to be beaten. You count upon your allies: where are they? Is Austria one, against whom you made war in 1806, and from whom you took a province at the peace?" On saying these words, Napoleon regarded Prince Schwarzenberg, who remained silent with his eyes fixed upon the ground. —Is Sweden one, from whom you have taken Finland? or Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at Tilsit, after having been her ally? You deceive yourself: you will have none. Let us, therefore, come to an understanding and not renew the war." On closing this interview, Napoleon seized the hand of Prince Kourakin with much friendliness, and then dismissed the circle present astonished as much at his intelligence as at his imprudent boldness, and joyously laughing at the embarrassment of the Russian ambassador, who exclaimed on leaving the Tuilleries, that he was suffocated,—and the colour of the Emperor was very warm. This cur-



versation recalled those which Napoleon had had with Lord Whitworth immediately before the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and with M. de Metternich before the campaign of Wagram; and, though it possessed neither the violence of the former nor the studied gravity of the latter, it gave occasion to very dangerous exaggerations, very embarrassing to the Emperor Alexander, already too much compromised in the eyes of his people on the ground of wounded dignity.

On the next day, the flatterers of Napoleon, accustomed to celebrate the prowess of his tongue no less than that of his sword, did not fail to relate that he had baffled the Russian ambassador; and his detractors, accustomed to misrepresent his least actions, took great care to say that he had violated all civility to the representative of one of the principal European powers. Prince Kourakin wrote nothing of the kind to St. Petersburg: he was simple and moderate in his statement; and the Emperor Alexander would have passed over without remark this new sally of his formidable ally, had not a number of letters written to St. Petersburg, some from Paris, others from Vienna and Berlin, strangely disfigured the conversation of August 15. Set at defiance, as it were, in the sight of his own nation and of all Europe, he naturally became more susceptible, and henceforward demanded explanations instead of offering them. "I should have been very glad," he said to M. de Lauriston, "to take no notice of this conversation; but all the saloons of St. Petersburg resound with it, which serves to strengthen the resolution of my people, while avoiding any provocation to war, to defend their dignity and independence to the death. Besides, Napoleon never speaks in this manner unless he has determined on war; then he lays no restraint upon himself. I remember his conversation with Lord Whitworth in 1803, and with M. de Metternich in 1809; I can, therefore, only see in what has passed an indication of very ill augury for the maintenance of peace."

After this, the Emperor Alexander appeared to be extremely sad: his minister, M. de Romanzoff, whose political existence depended on the continuance of peace, was no less so; but both repeated that they would not take the initiative. It was, nevertheless, evident that they had no doubt of war, at least in the following year; that the favourable impressions due to the presence and language of M. de Lauriston at St. Petersburg were completely dissipated, and that during the autumn and winter preparations would be made with increased activity for a terrible and decisive struggle.

The disposition of Napoleon was nearly the same, with this difference,—that, as the motives for war were in himself, he always regarded it as certain, and was continually preparing for it. He had sent to the Elbe the 4th and 6th battalions, which would give five war-battalions to each regiment; and, as Marshal Davout's regiments were sixteen in number, the whole would amount to eighty battalions of the finest infantry. By the addition of the chasseurs of Corsica and of the Po, and some Spanish and Portuguese detachments, he proposed to raise the corps of the Elbe to ninety battalions, and to distribute it in five divisions of equal force.

An excellent Polish division, another composed of old soldiers of the Hanse towns at present disbanded, a third composed of Illyrians, would give eight divisions to Marshal Davout. Many French officers, some returned from foreign service since the union of their native country to France, others from the school of Generals Friant, Morand, and Gudin, would contribute to raise the spirit of these foreign troops. Napoleon flattered himself that under the iron hand of Marshal Davout, and at the very focus of patriotism and military honour afforded by his army, these Spaniards, Portuguese, Illyrians, and Hanseatics would become equal to the French.

Behind the Elbe, Napoleon, as we have said, laboured to form another army, called the corps of the Rhine, with a dozen regiments which had fought at Essling under Lannes and Massena, to which he wished to annex the Dutch troops. He designed to raise these regiments to four or even five war-battalions, since he had relinquished the idea of select battalions, well assured that he would still have a year to complete his preparations.

On this occasion was evinced the incredible fecundity of Napoleon in creating resources,—a fecundity which, when carried, like all great faculties, to an extreme, induced the creation of artificial means, the weakness of which appeared but too plainly in the following campaign. We have seen that to the class of 1811, which was a full levy, he had proposed to add a supplement, very considerable both in the number and the character of the men which might be made up of the recusants of the previous years. Eleven or twelve movable columns, traversing France in all directions, had brought in 50,000 or 60,000 of these recusants. The measure was severe, but effectual. But it was to be feared that they would desert anew whenever they learned that their relations were relieved from billeting the garrison-troops. To detain them was to endanger their health and encumber the prisons; to send them to their depôts was to open the door for their escape. Napoleon, therefore, formed the design of training them in the isles on the coast of France, from which it was impossible for them to escape. For this purpose he created in those isles, with a good framework, (*cadres*.) regiments for training of indeterminate effective which might be raised to 15,000 men. One was formed in the isle of Walcheren, a second in the isle of Ré, a third in Belle-Ile, and two in the Mediterranean,—one in Corsica and the other in Elba.

To this subject Napoleon devoted constant attention; the arms, habiliments, and instruction all passed under his personal review. At length, deeming them mature, he proposed to send several thousands taken from the Walcheren regiments, to complete the 4th and 6th battalions of Marshal Davout. If this attempt should succeed, his design was to furnish that marshal with as many men as would raise each of his battalions to 1000.

To transport them from the mouths of the Scheldt to the banks of the Elbe, Napoleon arranged that they should pass by the isles on the coast of Holland, sometimes in boats in the interior waters, sometimes on foot across the heath of Gueldres and Friesland, and, when they should reach the continent, that they should

be escorted by the light cavalry of Marshal Davout, which was little inclined to spare the deserters and would bring them to their ranks at the point of the sabre.

The first detachment succeeded, only about one-sixth of the whole having been lost by desertion. That portion, in order to reach France, traversed the woods by day and the roads by night, crossed the rivers as they best could, and found an asylum among the Germans, whose hatred of the French rendered them hospitable to deserters from our army. The five-sixths remaining in the ranks were robust men of mature age, who might by good treatment be rendered valuable soldiers.

Marshal Davout, who, when requisite, could lay aside his extreme severity, had given orders that they should be trained to discipline by mildness. The attempt was made, and succeeded. They were then brought by thousands from all the isles of the ocean, in companies and in quick march, to prevent desertion. Unhappily, many brought with them the fevers of Walcheren and communicated them to others. But the proposed route was not suitable to all, especially to those belonging to the provinces of the East. These they pressed on towards the Rhine, then embarked them in boats which transported them to Wesel without touching at land. But these also in the transit had contracted serious diseases in consequence of close crowding and confinement. They were then conducted across Westphalia, often while invalid and always greatly averse to military service, which began under such unfavourable auspices to them. At first, time was allowed to equip and train them; but before long they were sent in peasants' dress, wholly untrained, to Marshal Davout being assigned the task of converting into soldiers men who had been treated like herds of cattle.

The marshal gave all his attention to rectify part of these evils,\* to soothe and study the unhappy men who had been sent to him, to provide them with necessary supplies, to impart to them the spirit of his old soldiers, and even to profit by the adventurous habits they had acquired during their period of desertion to inspire them with a taste for a camp-life, and to teach them to find in the hard and heroic life of arms the pleasure which it yielded to himself and his soldiers. But what a task was his!—to subdue the hearts of Corsicans, Tuscans, Lombards, Illyrians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, Hanseatics, and to make them Frenchmen, and to convert into robust, well-disciplined soldiers wholly dedicated to their flags, Frenchmen torn from their families at a tender age!—to tear men thus from the banks of the Po, the Arno, the Rhone, the Rhine, the Garonne, and the Loire, to kill them with cold and hunger in the bivouacs on the Elbe, the Vistula, or the Borysthenes! What a task! and what danger there was that after twenty years' success he might at length fail when all the most natural feelings, chilled beyond endurance, should be driven to despair!

Until this terrible time, the external state of affairs was in the highest degree satisfactory,

and the engine of war under the hands of Marshal Davout had acquired a formidable aspect. Napoleon had forwarded to him in succession the cavalry-regiments, to remount in Germany and for the instruction of the recruits. Fearing to exhaust all the horses of France, (for an extraordinary number was requisite for the armies in Spain,) he had determined to take all that could be obtained from the North of the continent. He ordered horses for the light cavalry to be procured in Poland and Austria; for the cavalry of the line and the heavy cavalry, in Wurtemberg, Franconia, and Hanover. He everywhere promised to pay in ready money, and gave orders for the purchase of 80,000 or 40,000 horses, for all branches if they could be procured, and the same for draught-horses. He ordered the formation of all the cavalry into divisions, and despatched generals to superintend the equipment and instruction of their corps.

Nor did the *materiel* of the troops obtain less consideration than the organization. The design of Napoleon, as we have said, was to have at Dantzic, besides the subsistence for a garrison of 20,000 men for a year, a year's supply also for an army of 400,000 or 500,000 men. To secure this, he had ordered General Rapp to pay great attention to the transactions in grain in that city, which is one of the largest depôts for cereal produce in Europe, and to keep himself always acquainted with the amount in store, that he might buy at the most favourable times. Having thus laid his plan, he ordered to begin purchasing to the extent of 600,000 or 700,000 quintals of wheat, and several million bushels of oats, and to secure a monopoly of all actual stores of forage. The funds necessary for these purchases were to be derived secretly from three banks,—one at Dantzic, another at Magdeburg, and a third at Mentz, whose existence was known only to himself, to prevent their being too readily drawn upon.

It was not enough to possess all these provisions: the means of transport were necessary. Napoleon, we have seen, had ordered the reorganization of a certain number of train-battalions capable of horsing and conveying about 1500 wagons of biscuit. His mind, continually dwelling on the subject and inventing new combinations, had, since the preceding year, devised methods of transport still more effective and ingenious than those of which he had first thought. The ordinary tumbril with four horses and two men was adapted to transport daily bread for the corps. A wagon could thus supply a battalion for a day. But something more than this was required by Napoleon, who proposed that he should be followed by fifty or sixty days' provision for the whole army. He formed the idea of large wagons, with eight horses and four or even three men, which could receive ten times the load of an ordinary tumbril. While the result was tenfold, the expense would be little more than doubled. Yet, upon reflection, thinking this method would be too heavy for the miry roads of Poland and Lithuania, he reverted to the idea of a wagon with four horses and two men, which would leave untouched the ordinary organization of the train, and would transport four times as much as the usual tumbril, or three times, if they

\* My authority is not derived from the pamphlets of 1815, but from the administrative correspondence of the government agents.

were afraid of making the burden too heavy. He immediately ordered the construction of such wagons in France, Germany, and Italy, wherever the train-dépôts existed, in order that the corps might have at the same time the former tumbrils for each day's bread and the new wagons for the transport of one or two months' provisions. Setting his wits on the rack, so to speak, to provide for every possible emergency, he wished to add to his material wagons *à la comtoise* and ox-wagons. The former of these are light, easy, drawn by one horse accustomed to follow that which precedes, so that one man is sufficient for several. The ox-wagons are slow; but the animal which draws them is resolute and vigorous, extricates them from the deepest ruts, and during the moments of rest, tied to a wheel, he grazes the pasture under his feet, and, after performing the most valuable service in the day, gives no trouble in the evening. He also himself yields much better nourishment than the horse, which is only the last resource. For these reasons, Napoleon determined to add to the eight train-battalions destined for Russia four battalions *à la comtoise* and five battalions *à bœufs*, himself regulating the mode of organization, which would allow the wagoners to convert themselves instantly into soldiers to defend their convoy. Some were to be organized in Franche-Comté, others in Lombardy, Germany, and Poland. It was hoped that the bread and meat might thus be united in the same convoy.

Napoleon reckoned that these seventeen battalions, comprising from 5000 to 6000 carriages, secured to him provisions for two months for 200,000 men, or for forty days for 800,000 men. This result satisfied him; for he calculated upon embarking his provisions on the Vistula at Dantzic, bringing them by water from the Vistula to the Frische-Haff, from the Frische-Haff to the Pregel, from the Pregel by inland canals to the Niemen. He had even sent some naval officers to determine secretly the plan of this navigation. Having arrived upon the Niemen with 500,000 or 600,000 men, the utmost he could bring into the interior of Russia would be 300,000; and having, according to the preceding calculation, forty days' provision in his carriages, he hoped, with what he should find in different places, to have the means of subsisting; for, notwithstanding their designs of destruction, the Russians could not possibly have leisure to destroy every thing. Destruction is a hateful work, but it is also a work of time; and Portugal afforded an instance in proof that time might fail the enemy most bent upon effecting it unsparingly. From these reasons and these immense preparations, Napoleon hoped to sustain himself in the vast plains of the North, which he expected to find in turn deserted or laid waste.

But these 5000 or 6000 carriages themselves required 8000 or 10,000 men and 18,000 or 20,000 horses or oxen; and, if to them be added 80,000 artillery-horses, an idea may be formed of the obstacles to be overcome merely in respect to provisions, for these animals destined to the support of the army must be supported themselves. Napoleon hoped to provide for this by deferring his offensive operations till the herbage should have been well advanced.

Knowing that the soldier much prefers bread

to biscuit, and having observed that the difficulty in procuring bread does not lie in the baking but in the grinding, he ordered the greater part of the grain in Dantzic to be ground, the flour to be packed in barrels adapted to the new wagons, and everywhere masons to be engaged to construct ovens wherever they might sojourn. These masons were to be incorporated in the companies of workmen of all professions that he wished to take with them, such as bakers, carpenters, smiths, lightermen, &c.

Finally, the pontoon-equipages—a no less weighty subject of thought to Napoleon—received further improvement in this second year of his preparations. He had ordered at Dantzic the construction of two pontoons of one hundred boats each, capable of throwing two bridges over the widest rivers, and carried upon drays, according to custom. As wood is seldom wanting, especially in the country which was to be the scene of their operations, and as the great difficulty is to collect iron-work and cordage, Napoleon brought together the materials for a third equipage in cables, anchors, rivets, and every kind of apparatus, except wood, which, it was expected, might be found on the spot. Wishing also to have permanent bridges, he caused to be prepared at Dantzic iron heads of piles, rivets to unite them, engines for driving them, so that the pontooneers should be provided with every thing necessary to construct them, independently of the bridges of boats and those upon piles or buttresses. All these materials were to follow the army upon numerous wagons. General Eblé, who, at the Tagus, had, almost without resources, performed such wonders in this way, was placed at the head of the pontoon-service. Two thousand horses were appropriated to this new park. "With such means," exclaimed Napoleon, "we shall surmount all obstacles."\*

Though Napoleon had intrusted to Marshal Davout the organization of the greater part of the army, because he considered him consummate in the power of organization and just and severe in administration, he did not intrust to him the entire command, which he naturally reserved to himself. But he wished, in case of sudden hostilities, that there should be on the Elbe and the Oder, and under a sole command, an army of 150,000 French and 50,000 Poles ready to move with rapidity upon the Vistula. Subsequently, when operations should have commenced, he proposed to detach a portion, which, joined to the corps of the Rhine, should be divided between Marshals Oudinot and Ney. The former was to collect at Munster the regiments cantoned in Holland; the latter, at Metz, those cantoned on the Rhine. Both had been enjoined immediately to repair to their corps and to commence the organization of their infantry and artillery. Of the cavalry, each was to receive his part on entering Germany, whither all the mounted troops had already been sent to be remounted. Indepen-

\* I need not repeat that these details, hitherto vaguely known, and never recorded with the necessary precision and exactness, are here derived from the correspondence of Napoleon himself, particularly admirable for this kind of forethought, that of Marshal Davout, of General Rapp, of the minister of the administration of war, and the generals commanding the artillery and bridge-service.

dently of these considerable forces, 100,000 allies of all nations were to be scattered through our different *corps-d'armée*. The French generals appointed to the command of these allies were ordered to take their station at their place of rendezvous.

Napoleon enjoined Prince Eugene to be in readiness at the close of the following winter to pass the Alps with the army of Italy. As we have already seen, in his entire confidence in Austria, he had collected in Lombardy almost all the armies of Illyria and Naples. In each of the best regiments, now raised to five battalions, he had chosen three select battalions destined for Russia. Of these he proposed to construct an army of 40,000 French, reinforced by 20,000 Italians, which, under Prince Eugene, should cross the Alps in March. The 4th and 5th battalions detained at the dépôts, with several entire regiments and the Neapolitan army of Murat, were charged to guard Italy against the English and the malecontents. The conscription of 1811, and the deserters in the isle of Elba, subjected to a severe discipline, were during the winter to implement successively the 4th and 5th battalions, which would have been exhausted to complete the first three. Besides this, Napoleon had taken from the troops of Illyria and Italy ten or twelve entire regiments, to form an army of reserve which was to replace in Spain the Imperial Guard, and the Poles who had been ordered to Russia. Thus, while preparing to strike a great blow in the North, Napoleon did not relinquish the attempt of inflicting a blow in the South, pursuing, as was his wont, all ends at once. One year before, this army of reserve could have been nowhere better placed than in Spain, since that country was the theatre of decisive events; at the present moment, on the contrary, the struggle being transferred to the North, it was necessary to carry all his forces thither, and to confine himself in Spain to an energetic defence on the borders of Old Castile and Andalusia. But, in his ardour, Napoleon, regarding all the conceptions of his sanguine imagination as realities, thought that he could hurl his thunderbolts at the same time upon Cadix and upon Moscow.

While he surrendered himself to those vast ideas the execution of which was fixed for the following spring, he formed the design of personally visiting a country recently annexed to the Empire, to which he attached much importance, and which he hoped favourably to influence by his presence, and whence he would be able to inspect a part of his warlike preparations,—viz.: Holland. He had frequently deferred this design, and he eagerly desired to realize it before the great war in the North, unwilling that, when on the Dwina or the Borysthènes, the English should be able to occasion anxiety for the Texel or Amsterdam, as they had formerly done for Antwerp during the campaign of 1809.

The plan of his maritime operations was another motive for this journey. Agreeably to his habit of embracing every thing at once, he had in no degree renounced his naval schemes, and he occupied himself in them with as much activity as if he had never thought of the war with Russia. He wished, in the first place, to keep the English on the alert by continual

alarms, to prevent their withdrawing troops from England to send them to the Peninsula. For this purpose he had resolved to keep them in constant apprehension of expeditions against Ireland, Sicily, and even Egypt, and he thus hoped, in the very improbable but not impossible case of the war in the North being avoided, that he would have the means of embarking about 100,000 men.

Now that the Scheldt was entirely at his command, he had differently arranged his Boulogne fleet. After having reduced it to its principal vessels, it might be possible to embark in it 40,000 men instead of 150,000 as formerly. By confining himself to this number, the departure, the transit, and the arrival of an expedition were perfectly practicable. In the Scheldt he had, besides, sixteen vessels at Flushing, which might perhaps be raised to twenty-two. By adding to these a fleet of brigs, corvettes, frigates, and large gun-sloops, he reckoned on the means of transporting 80,000 men, independently of a war-squadron able to keep the sea and to provide for a pretty long voyage. He reckoned, moreover, on eight or ten vessels at the Texel, so long and so vainly demanded of his brother Louis, and ready ever since he had the administration of Holland. This squadron escorting a fleet was in a condition to embark 20,000 men. There were some frigates at Cherbourg, two vessels at Brest, four at Lorient, seven at Rochefort; and, with these elements, Napoleon thought by skilful combinations to reconstruct the fleet of Brest. He wished to make use of it in sending some troops to the isles of Jersey and Guernsey, which he wished to seize. Finally, at Toulon there were eighteen vessels, which he hoped to raise to twenty-four with the aid of Genoa and Naples, without including many frigates, flat-bottomed barges, and vessels for the transport of horses, on a new model. He had thus prepared in the Mediterranean the means of embarking 40,000 men, and might calculate upon about thirty by bringing into use a certain number of old men-of-war converted into *flûtes*. This expedition was alternately to threaten Cadix, Algiers, Sicily, and Egypt. Finally, three ships and several frigates were ready at Venice, and were going to leave the lagunes for Ancona, supported by floating butts. They were soon to be followed by two other vessels and several frigates, so as to govern the Adriatic.

These resources, already so vast, Napoleon wished to augment in 1812 and 1813; he hoped to attain 80 or even 100 ships, and thus to bring together the means of transporting nearly 150,000 men. Already he had sufficient for about 100,000, and, without attempting the invasion of England, he might possibly land 30,000 in Ireland, 20,000 in Sicily, 30,000 in Egypt, and thus cause great annoyance to the English. He might also recover the Cape, lost a long time before, and the Isle of France and Martinique, lost more recently. Should, then, the peace of the continent be settled without securing peace at sea, he had the means of inflicting a blow directly upon England. For these different reasons, and on account of certain preparations for the Russian war, a journey to the coasts seemed to him indispensable.

Leaving Compiègne on the 19th of September,

and resting successively at Antwerp and Flushing, he inspected the works that had been ordered with a view of making the Scheldt inaccessible, gave special attention to the heavy artillery, necessary in these positions, embarked in the Flushing fleet under the flag of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, was overtaken with rough weather, remained thirty-six hours at sea, without any means of communicating with the land, and was well pleased with the training and steadiness of the crews. The prudent and sagacious officer who commanded them had availed himself, though blockaded, of the waters of the Scheldt, to go in and out frequently, and by navigating these shoals had trained his sailors in a remarkable degree. Napoleon rewarded everybody, greatly commended the admiral, and left the navy in those parts impressed with emotions of satisfaction and encouragement.

But, as his mind was always stimulated by whatever he saw, he devised very ingenious methods of bringing some things to a higher degree of perfection and of correcting others. We have seen how his army was becoming checkered with soldiers of every nation,—Illyrians, Tuscans, Romans, Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, Hanseatics, &c.: it was the same with the fleet. Besides the French, it included Hamburgers, Catalonians, Genoese, Neapolitans, Venetians, Dalmatians. On board the ships there was some apprehension of the fidelity of these heterogeneous sailors, and, though they might serve well in port, it was to be feared that they might, at sea, interfere with the manœuvres so as to be taken by the English, which would be captivity for the French but deliverance to the rest. In the vessels that had left the ports were frequently discovered injuries to the rigging, evidently caused by design, and consequently to be ascribed to a secret want of fidelity which might become a source of danger. Napoleon formed the idea of placing on board each ship a garrison of one hundred and fifty French infantry. Independently of the Imperial Guard and foreign regiments, he had one hundred and thirty infantry-regiments, some of five, others of six battalions. He determined to take from the best-organized *depôt*-battalions a company of infantry, to be permanently quartered in the ships-of-the-line. The actual number of armed vessels was about eighty; it would be sufficient to add a company in eighty *depôt*-battalions to fill up the vacancy and to secure a very useful force in the fleet, whether to insure its safety or to assist in any engagement with the enemy.

Napoleon, according to his custom of following up his designs by instant execution, gave the necessary orders for sending these garrison-companies to all the seaports where the squadrons were stationed. Ever impatient for results, he had strongly urged at Antwerp the unremitting construction of ships, and that as soon as one was launched another should take its place in the docks. Timber for building was wanting. To procure it, he planned a large system of transports from Hamburg to Amsterdam, by means of small vessels passing between the mainland and the islands bordering the shore of the North Sea, from the mouths of the Elbe to the Zuyder Zee. Nor did he confine himself to this. A very dry summer, which had yielded excellent wines, (called those of the

Comet,) had impeded the development of the cereal fruits. A scarcity was announced in all directions: the price of grain continually rose. Napoleon withdrew the license for the exportation of grain, and ordered Hamburg to purchase corn to be transported to France, and along the coasts, or else by the rivers and canals, and at the points where these did not unite by short land-transits, for example from the Elbe to the Weser, from the Weser to the Ems, from the Ems to the Zuyder Zee. Twenty thousand artillery and draught-horses, unemployed until the opening of the Russian war, were used for these short transits, in easy journeys, sufficient to keep them in exercise without exhausting them.

After having inspected the regiment of Walcheren and prescribed various measures relating to the health and equipment of the men, Napoleon passed on to Holland and repaired to Amsterdam. The Dutch people, though much distressed at the loss of their independence, hoped to find some recompense in their annexation to a great empire and in the restorative administration of Napoleon. There had occurred some time before, on occasion of the conscription, some sanguinary executions in East Friesland; nevertheless, whether from the prestige of glory or from the attraction of *fêtes* even for the most phlegmatic people, the Dutch received with acclamations the conqueror who had deprived them of independence, and for whom, as they were soon to prove, they entertained no affection. His reception was such that even Napoleon might be deceived. At the sight of this country, so wealthy, so well adapted to great maritime operations, and affording him so gratifying a reception, he conceived a thousand new plans, granted facilities for fishing, suppressed various hinderances to the internal navigation of the Zuyder Zee, and left it filled with hopes which were to prove temporary and illusive.

Among the inducements to Napoleon to visit Holland, notwithstanding the unfavourable weather, one of the more powerful was the defence of our new frontiers. With the admirable glance which enabled him, by simply studying a map, to discern how a country should be attacked or defended, he immediately discovered the best mode of defence for Holland. He first decided that, considering the dangers which might threaten from the side of England, the great *depôt* of war-material ought not to be at the Texel, nor at Amsterdam, nor even at Rotterdam, but at Antwerp; and he ordered the immediate transport to Antwerp of all the riches of the Dutch arsenals. He determined that there should be a first line of defence passing by Wesel, Kœwerden, and Groningen, embracing not only Holland properly so called, but Gueldres, Over-Yssel, and Friesland,—a line weak in itself, and being only valuable as advanced works. He planned a second stronger line, from the Rhine towards Emmerich, following the Yssel, passing by Deventer and Zwolle, embracing Gueldres and half the Zuyder Zee, protecting almost all Holland, except Friesland. But he determined that the true line of defence was that which, leaving the Rhine, or Wahal, only at Gorcum, should abut upon the Zuyder Zee at Naarden. This line would in fact protect the most truly Dutch part of Holland, com-

sisting of fertile lands and flourishing cities, all situated below high-water, and capable of being converted by means of inundation into impregnable islands which would be connected with the Rhine by the large arm of the Wahal, so that New France, defended by the magnificent line of the Rhine from Bâle to Nimeguen, would from that point become changed into islands altogether inaccessible to the enemy, even though maritime, by means of the fine works of the Texel, which would form the extreme points and would be invincible.

Seconded in his plans by Chasseloup, the able general of engineers, Napoleon ordered the construction of noble works on the Texel itself, the object of which was to shelter an immense fleet with its magazines, to secure for it ingress and egress in all winds, and completely to close the Zuyder Zee.

Having issued these orders, founded on the supposition of a vast and formidable struggle continually present to his mind but incapable of exciting alarm, he repaired to Wesel, where he issued orders for the defence of that city, and to secure to it a political importance not hitherto possessed. He wished to make it the Strasbourg of the Lower Rhine. He had ordered the fine road from Antwerp to Amsterdam; he projected that from Wesel to Hamburg, and at the same time availed himself of the pretext of his presence in these parts to review two fine divisions of cuirassiers. He inspected them between Dusseldorf and Cologne, supplied what they wanted in relation to organization and equipment, and took advantage of their arrival on the Rhine to forward them quietly to the Elbe. This was a convenient method of transmitting, almost unperceived, his heavy cavalry, of which these two divisions formed nearly one-half. On this occasion, he occupied himself with the formation of a body of lancers. He had already perceived in Poland the value of the lance. He resolved to turn it to account in the approaching war, and determined to convert into regiments of lancers six regiments of dragoons, one of chasseurs, and two of Polish cavalry, making nine regiments of that arm. He had brought teachers from Poland, trained in their own country to handle the lance, and these he distributed among the new regiments. After having given the necessary attention to these various subjects, he repaired to Cologne, and settled the kind of defence of which that place was susceptible.

While he thus occupied himself, on his journey, with these innumerable details, he was obliged also to adopt several determinations relative to the exterior and interior policy of the Empire. The court of Prussia had no rest from her anxiety on account of the threatening war. She perceived clearly that, the Prussian territory being necessarily in the path of the belligerents, it would be impossible for her to remain neutral, and being in no degree indebted to Russia, who, in 1807, had concluded a peace at her expense, and had even accepted a portion of her territory, (the district of Bialistock,) she was disposed to form an alliance with Napoleon, provided he would guarantee the integrity of the rest of her states, and a territorial compensation if she served him well. Unhappily, Napoleon appeared deaf to her proposals, lest he should prematurely reveal his designs, and, in her present terror, she ascribed his reserve to a design

of some day seizing the crown, the army, and the whole dominion of Prussia. The king, incessantly haunted by this afflicting thought, lost not a moment in having recourse to arms, and instead of 42,000 men, (the number stipulated by treaty,) he had more than 100,000, one-half of whom were on leave, but ready to join by means of the plan previously described.

As we have already said, the plan of the court of Prussia was, as soon as affairs seemed mature, to oblige Napoleon to give his answer, and, if he refused her alliance, to cross the Vistula with 100,000 or 150,000 men, and to join the Russians by Königsberg. However concealed might be the preparations of that court, they could not escape the practised and watchful eye of Marshal Davout. Besides, M. de Hardenberg, daily endeavouring to bring M. de Saint Marsan, the French minister, to some explanation, and for that purpose labouring to show all that Prussia had to offer to the ally whose cause she should espouse, allowed himself to say that although she had only under arms about 40,000 men, she could, in case of need, arm 150,000 in a few days. These words of the Prussian prime minister had thrown a flood of light, and Napoleon ordered M. de Saint Marsan to repair immediately to the minister and to the king, and to declare to them that his eyes were now open to the designs of Prussia, that she must disarm immediately, and trust to his word of honour to receive her into alliance on satisfactory terms, when prudence should allow him to explain himself, or expect to see Marshal Davout march upon Berlin with 100,000 men, and efface from the map of Europe the last trace of the Prussian monarchy. Orders were accordingly given to Marshal Davout to go without delay to the Oder, to cut off the road of the Vistula from the Prussian army, and, if need be, to cut off the court from Potsdam.

Napoleon was also called upon to form very important resolutions in respect to Sweden. We have already given an account of the election of the new prince-royal. That prince could not forgive Napoleon for refusing to listen to the proposal of yielding Norway to him. Recently arrived in Sweden, owing his election to temporary circumstances, and especially to the glory of the French arms, and having in reality no party personally attached to himself, and gaining little on more intimate acquaintance, being soon found to be vain, boasting, liberal of foolish promises, and less military than he professed to be, he had thought to recommend himself to the Swedes by a brilliant acquisition which might flatter their patriotism. But, although distressed at the loss of Finland, the Swedes perceived that that province, so necessary to Russia, would be the eternal object of her desires and efforts; that in taking the Gulf of Bothnia as the boundary of the two states they would adopt a truer frontier, (except the isles of Åland, indispensable to the safety of Stockholm, especially in winter,) and that it was much rather in Norway that Sweden must seek compensation for what she had lost. This, as we have seen, was the motive that induced Prince Bernadotte, in his feverish excitement, to ask Norway and not Finland from Napoleon. But Napoleon might promise and even give Finland on the supposition of a prosperous war with Russia, but he would have been guilty of actual treason towards a faithful ally, Denmark, if he had even hesitated

with regard to Norway. His significant silence had enlightened the prince-royal, and from that moment he resigned himself to a hatred the germ of which he had long cherished in his heart. The reigning king, weakened by age and ill health, had intrusted the regency of affairs to him, at least for the present. Bernadotte had taken advantage of this to court the Russian and English party, without ostensibly abandoning the French party, to which he owed his election. Though not openly declaring himself against France, he professed himself Swede before every thing, and ready to sacrifice all to his new country: he repeated that Sweden was the property of no power, and that she would have for allies only those who would study and promote her interests. While holding this language in public, he favoured more than ever the contraband trade, intimated privately to the English that they might continue to frequent the environs of Gothenburg, notwithstanding the apparent declaration of war, and insinuated to the Russian legation that although undoubtedly the loss of Finland was a mortification to the national pride of Sweden, yet that what was lost was lost, and that she sought indemnity elsewhere. He had, moreover, maintained the order given to the Swedish navy to repel our privateers, and had openly protected some soldiers who, at Stralsund, had injured certain French sailors to the effusion of blood.

M. Alquier was our minister at Stockholm, and as he had the misfortune to be at Madrid a little before the fall of Charles IV., and at Rome at the time of Pius VII. being carried off, he was accused unjustly of being always the sinister precursor of Napoleon's designs. All that could be alleged against him was, that he combined with real uprightness and remarkable penetration a degree of stiffness somewhat dangerous in delicate circumstances. With him the new prince of Sweden had been obliged to come to explanations on the grievances mentioned by France, and there had occurred between them an interview, the account of which would have been incredible, if M. Alquier, who reported it to Napoleon, had not been a witness worthy of all confidence. After some vain and insincere explanations of the English establishment at Gothenberg, of the neglect of the principal clauses of the last treaty, and of the French blood shed at Stralsund, the former General Bernadotte insolently demanded of M. Alquier how it was that France, whom he had so greatly served, and who owed him so much, behaved so ill towards him, that at Constantinople, at Stralsund, and at Stockholm itself he was exposed to the misconduct of her agents. At these strange words, M. Alquier, scarcely believing his ears, replied to the new Swede who complained of the ingratitude of France, that if France owed him any obligations, she had certainly repaid them by raising him to the throne of Sweden.

No doubt, if at that moment the future could have been foreseen, it would have been right to humour this insane pride; but one can easily understand the indignation of the French minister, for there are things which we ought not to allow, even at the cost of our life. Continuing the conversation, the newly-made prince indulged in prodigious boasts, recalled all the battles in which he had been present, and pretended, as he

commonly did with his intimates, that it was he who gained the battle of Austerlitz, where he had not fired a shot, that of Friedland, where he was not present, that of Wagram, where he had followed the rout of his soldiers. He then said that he was well aware of the ill-will borne to him at Paris, but they could not dethrone him; that in Sweden he had a people who would die for him; that recently they wished to take the horses from his carriage and drag it themselves; that he had almost fainted with emotion; that as soon as he appeared the Swedish soldiers were filled with enthusiasm; that he had recently reviewed them; that they were superb men of colossal stature; that with them he need not fire a shot; he need only say, Forward! and they would overthrow any enemy; and that under his orders they would be what the Saxons had been at Wagram,—that is to say, the first soldiers in the French army. "Ah! this is too much," exclaimed M. Alquier, who could contain himself no longer; "if these colossal men should ever be opposed to our soldiers, they will do them the honour to fire a shot, nor will their mere presence suffice to break the ranks of the French army." Bernadotte, in feverish excitement, exclaimed, like a maniac, that he was the sovereign of an independent state, that no one should treat it with contempt, that he would rather die than suffer such an indignity.—His infant son happening to enter the room when this conversation was held, he snatched him up in his arms and said, "Is it not so, my son? will you not be like your father, and die rather than be disgraced?" Then, not knowing how to escape from this ridiculous scene, and heartily wishing that he could keep it secret, he carried his rhodomontade so far as to say to M. Alquier, "I beg you to communicate to the Emperor Napoleon all that you have just seen and heard." "If that is your will," replied M. Alquier, "it shall be as you desire." And he withdrew without another word. In the mouth of a person so regardless of truth as the prince-royal, his last words signified, "Say nothing of what you have heard." But M. Alquier, who would have better served his master by passing over this scene in silence, dared not fall short of the strict requirement of his profession, and he communicated an account of the whole to Paris.\* Napoleon, who did not yet anticipate the severe punishment reserved for him by Providence, nor how, for his greater humiliation, the blows which he should suffer should be inflicted by those below him, smiled with pity when he read this dangerous recital, said that he had well judged that envious heart, which he had for a long time considered capable of the blackest treason, and he would answer such ridiculous bombast by a lofty contempt. He ordered M. Alquier to quit Stockholm without even taking leave of the prince-royal, and to repair in person to Copenhagen. He ordered M. de Cabre, secretary of legation, to take the affairs of it in hand, never to visit the prince-royal, to have intercourse only with the Swedish ministers, and with those only in reference to the indispensable business of his mission. He informed the Swedish minister at Paris that if satisfaction were not given, especially for the affair at Stralsund, the treaty of peace with

\* While I write, I have before me the actual despatches of M. Alquier.

Sweden would be null, and the relations between the two countries would be the same as under Gustavus IV.,—that is to say, a state of war. This was to announce beforehand the fate reserved for Swedish Pomerania.

Napoleon had also, during his journey, to give some orders relating to religious affairs.

The deputation of prelates and cardinals sent to Savona had found Pius VII. mild and benevolent, as usual, though agitated by the serious nature of events, and they had not had great difficulty in persuading him that the decree of the council might be accepted. This new decree, as the reader will remember, required the pope to give canonical institution to the bishops designate within six months, after which the metropolitan was authorised to confer it. Though this arrangement evidently affected the principle of canonical institution, which no one at that time was particularly concerned to maintain, every one being exclusively occupied with the abuse to which it was liable, even in the hands of a good pope, all urged upon Pius VII. the approbation of the decree of the council. As to the great question of the possession of Rome, and the future situation of the papacy, they repeated that the urgent question of canonical institution once settled, the other would be resolved in its turn, and probably in a satisfactory manner. Pius VII., deeply touched by the appeal of the council to his authority, in which he saw the implicit recognition of the rights of the holy see, yielded to the entreaties of the deputation, and accepted the new decree, promising even to institute, without delay, the twenty-seven new prelates. Only he wished to draw up the decree in language suited to him,—that is, in Roman language, which was designed, not to save the principle of canonical institution, but to guard himself against the great and noble principles of Bossuet, which are, however, the honour and dignity of the French church, without in any way affecting the authority of the church universal.

Having secured these results, the cardinals and prelates took their departure, leaving the pope more calm, and better disposed to a reconciliation with the Emperor. They hoped on their arrival in Paris to obtain, in return for the concession they had secured, a condition less severe to the pontiff, and more worthy of the church.

The news from Savona had been brought to Napoleon during his journey in Holland, and the great affair of the church was one of those on which he had to pronounce *en route*. The quarrel with the pope annoyed him almost as much as the war in Spain. In each he found that obstinacy in the nature of things, against which the sword avails nothing, but truth and time, that is to say, reason and constancy alone are sufficient. Now he liked whatever might be solved by a blow, but he disliked that which required to be disentangled. He thought he had found the means of uniting under one head all these difficult, annoying, and obstinate questions, which now stood in his way, and of solving them by one blow of his terrible sword, by overwhelming Russia in the approaching war. In his own mind, a conqueror in that last struggle, he would triumph over every resistance, moral or material, that the world could present:—over the interested resistance of commerce, the patriotic resistance of the Spaniards, the maritime resist-

ance of the English, the religious resistance of the clergy, and, so to speak, the resistance of the human mind itself. He, therefore, sought to be left unmolested by those innumerable affairs which did not affect the great affair, the war with Russia, which alone occupied his mind; and when, in the middle of his progress in Holland, his attention was called to some new phase of the religious quarrel, by despatches from the minister of worship, he was much annoyed, and answered by an expression of impatience rather than a real solution.

He was pleased with the acceptance of the decree of the council, though he set less by it than at the time when the bishops were assembled and in a state of ferment. In July, it would have been a victory; at the present moment, it was an advantage somewhat diminished in value, as being produced by the events of the council. That which pleased him most was the promise to institute the twenty-seven bishops, for this was to restore the interrupted administration of the church. But he was much displeased by the brief which accompanied and explained the grounds of these concessions, because it was opposed to the doctrines of Bossuet. For Napoleon, who was no friend to liberty where he might exercise power himself, was a great friend to it where he could not,—that is to say, in the present instance, in the bosom of the church. He was, therefore, an ardent disciple of Bossuet, a disciple who would no doubt have flattered as much as alarmed the illustrious legislator of the French church. He, therefore, resolved to make his own distinctions in the brief from Savona, and, while he accepted the conclusions, to reject the reasons assigned. He determined to present to the council of state the decree of the council approved by the pope, in order to be placed among the laws. In reference to the brief itself, which contained ultramontane doctrines, he ordered it to be referred to a commission of the council of state, which should examine with the greatest deliberation the conformity of this brief with Gallican doctrines, and should keep them in suspense as long as possible. The articles referring to the twenty-seven bishops he ordered to be sent instantly to Rome, in order that canonical institution might be demanded and obtained without loss of time. Finally, anxious to annihilate the whole affair, he ordered the Duke of Rovigo to dismiss the bishops who had remained at Paris, awaiting the decision of the pope. They had in fact, only remained to see whether, after that decision, their further meeting would be necessary.—Napoleon being satisfied, they had no part to play, and the winter approaching, and the age of the greater part requiring them to set off before the bad season, it was natural, and in no degree offensive, to give them leave to depart. The Duke of Rovigo had the necessary means of authority and courtesy to hasten their departure, and he well knew how to mingle complaisance with terror sufficiently to discharge his commission to the great satisfaction of his master and the rest concerned. Napoleon issued the order, being unwilling on his return to Paris to find what he called an assembly of devotees.

After having adopted these resolutions, Napoleon continued his journey, completed the inspection of the troops and *matériel* which was sent from the Rhine to the Elbe, and then set off for Paris, where he arrived early in November.



A series of other great affairs awaited him there. Prussia and Sweden had replied to his imperious summons. Prussia, reduced to the alternative of suspending her armaments or being exposed to a march of Marshal Davout upon the Rhine, had submitted. The solemn assurance given by Napoleon had reassured the King of Prussia, and that prince had merely asked an immediate discussion of the treaty of alliance which should guarantee his present states, and an augmentation at the return of peace. To this Napoleon consented, with the order to prolong the negotiation, in order that Russia, who believed the war to be certain, might not believe it so near.

The order sent to M. Alquier to remove to Copenhagen had terrified the Prince-royal of Sweden, who was bold only in appearance. He undertook to say that M. Alquier, accustomed to embroil his government with every court at which he resided, had given a false view of the scenes which had taken place. This was not the case: M. Alquier had spoken no more than the truth. But this new Swede, so taken up with his adopted country, who had demanded that every thing should be reported to Napoleon, was now much troubled at what he had said, for his evil conduct towards his native country was to be ascribed to imprudence rather than to design. The reigning king, unwilling to disturb any further the relations of his country with France, resumed the conduct of affairs, but the hatred of the prince-royal, though a little more concealed, was all the more dangerous. From that moment he began secret schemes to associate England

with Russia, and when obliged to explain himself to those who had chosen him from their leaning to France, he extricated himself from the difficulty by saying, that the misunderstanding which they all deplored was to be ascribed to a particular misfortune in his life which he was forced to acknowledge,—that of having excited a strong feeling of jealousy in the breast of Napoleon.

One can readily understand the disdain with which Napoleon would receive such empty boasting: he again enjoined a total cessation of intercourse with the prince-royal, and the moderate but inflexible remonstrances on the part of France relative to the contraband trade and to the effusion of the blood of French sailors.

Having returned to Paris, he ordered his ministers to make diligent inquiry for any affairs of administration requiring solution, that nothing might be left unsettled at his departure for Russia in the spring, and he proceeded to examine all without relaxing his attention to his military preparations. His powerful organization was, in fact, equal to all. But unfortunately, however great and prompt the genius of man may be, there is something still greater, which is the universe, which certainly escapes his grasp when he wishes to monopolize it! Before following Napoleon into the gulf in which he is soon to fall, we must retrace the last events which had transpired in Spain, whose importance in themselves, and in their relation to affairs in general, was by no means small. This recital shall form the subject of the following book.

## BOOK XLII.

## TARRAGONA.

CONSEQUENCES of the events in the Peninsula—Return of Joseph to Madrid—General state of Spain—Situation of Badajos after the battle of Albuera—Relieved by Marshals Marmont and Soult—Lord Wellington prepares to attack Badajos or Ciudad Rodrigo—Operations in Aragon and Catalonia—Siege of Tarragona—Recapture of Figueras—Extreme peril of the English army—Resistance of Sagonta—Surrender of that fortress—Marshal Suchet demands reinforcements for the capture of Valencia—Valencia taken, January 9, 1812—Ciudad Rodrigo invested by Lord Wellington, and taken—Also Badajos—Resume of the events in Spain during 1810, 1811, and the earlier months of 1812.

It is now time to relate the condition of affairs in Spain, since the indecisive battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, and the lost battle of Albuera, each fought in May, 1811. The army of Portugal, which had been deprived of the only general capable of commanding it, the illustrious Massena, was scattered about Salamanca in a state of misery and demoralization hard to be described. Marshal Marmont, an intelligent and careful administrator, had lavished all his assiduity upon it; but the evacuation of Portugal, and the apparent impossibility of driving the English from the Peninsula, increased the boldness and confidence of the insurgents, rendered the provinces of the North less submissive than ever, and thus aggravated the distress of our troops as well as that of the inhabitants. A recent event had given a melancholy prominence to this state of things.

On the 25th of May, the celebrated Mina, successor of his nephew, who was detained at Vincennes, having succeeded in forming a band of 3000 men, whom he was able to transport alternately from Navarre to the Basque provinces, and from the Basque provinces to Navarre, had attacked a convoy of 1000 Spanish prisoners and about 100 wagons of wounded French, which was returning to France under the protection of 400 fusiliers of the young guard, and 150 men, subalterns and soldiers, forming the *cadres* of the 28th light and 75th of the line. Colonel Dentzel, who commanded the escort, had pointed out its insufficiency to General Caffarelli, but without effect, and the convoy had set off from Vittoria for Bayonne. Mina, always well informed, had concealed himself in the woods on the right and left of the road of Tolosa, and when the column of prisoners and wounded, extending more than a league, had crossed the mountain which rises opposite to Vittoria, and had entered the defile of Salinas, he pounced upon them like a vulture, first extricated the Spanish prisoners, and then, with their aid, proceeded to slaughter without mercy our sick and wounded. The escort, in three divisions, one at the head, one in the centre, and one in the rear, assailed at once by the enemy and the prisoners, made heroic but unsuccessful efforts to retain their prisoners and save the wounded. This fatal encounter cost the lives of more than 150 of the escort, and many of our unhappy wounded received their deathblow from that ferocious enemy. If any thing could console us for this terrible scene, it was that the Spanish prisoners, placed between the fire of our soldiers and that

of Mina, had expiated in great numbers the cruelty of their savage liberator.

At the noise of musketry, General Caffarelli had rushed with a reinforcement to assail Mina in turn; but he found the Spanish prisoners liberated, our sick and wounded killed, and Mina fled. Instead of accusing himself alone, he accused the brave men who had just sustained a desperate encounter of which they had not been properly warned. And yet General Caffarelli was a man of honour, worthy of his illustrious brother! But this was another instance in a thousand of the state of absolute confusion to which affairs had been brought in Spain.

At Madrid, the absence of the king, who was not expected to return, the misery of those in office, the dearness of provisions, carried off by bands of men from the very gates of the capital, the fatigue, destitution, and dispersion of the army of the centre, exhausting itself by hasty marches from Guadalaxara to Talavera, from Segovia to Toledo, without succeeding in protecting the communications, brought discouragement and even despair into the very heart of the kingdom.

In Estremadura and Andalusia affairs were no better. After the battle of Albuera, fought to preserve Badajoz, Marshal Soult had retired to Llerena and taken his position on the slope of the mountains which separate Estremadura from Andalusia. From these heights he threatened the English, gave to the unfortunate besieged all the moral support in his power, and demanded succours with urgency and good reason. Though he had not listened to the voice of Massena the year before, it was necessary to listen to his on the present occasion, and to run to his aid, were it merely for the brave garrison defending Badajoz, which, surrounded by walls overturned by the enemy's fire, had repeatedly hurled the English to the foot of the breach which they attempted to assail. If the aid sought did not arrive, if the army of Portugal, forgetting its grievances, did not promptly descend upon the Guadiana notwithstanding the difficulties of the march occasioned by the heat, Badajoz must fall, and the powerful army of Andalusia, which left Madrid the previous year amounting to 80,000 men,—much reduced, alas! since that time,—would find itself obliged to carry off a single trophy as the sole reward of its courage and sufferings.

The situation in Andalusia, though less perilous, was equally sad. The siege of Cadiz—which ought to have been the only duty of

the army of Andalusia, while the conquest of Badajoz, desired by Marshal Soult to give himself an excuse for not going to Portugal, had merely divided his forces and created for himself useless dangers—made no progress. Marshal Victor, reduced from three divisions to two, had not more than 12,000 men ready for action, and could with difficulty defend his own lines. He remained before the isle of Leon with the small fleet which he had created, and the large mortars he had founded, without sailors to man the one or ammunition to serve the other. Annoyed and ashamed at the part forced upon him by Marshal Soult, he demanded, as the only reward of his services in Spain, to be immediately recalled. The insurgents of La Ronda were no less annoying to General Sebastiani, always occupied in maintaining his position at Grenada against the English on one side and the troops of Murcia and Valencia on the other. That general, a wise and moderate administrator, had been denounced by Marshal Soult as unable to govern the province of Grenada, which, nevertheless, he governed better than the marshal governed Andalusia; and he solicited his recall as eagerly as the Duke of Belluna.

Only one province, as we have said, and only one army, presented an aspect at all satisfactory,—the province and army of Aragon, under the command of General Suchet. That general was skilful and also fortunate, for there are some lives in which a certain kind of wisdom seems to attract a certain kind of good fortune. It should be remembered that he had successively taken Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, and had caused order and good government to prevail in his province, which, by additional good fortune, was neither traversed by the French armies, for it lay not in their way, nor threatened by the English, for it was not their end; so that it may have been called almost happy in the midst of the frightful convulsions of Spain, and it almost loved its conqueror amid the general unrestrained hatred of the French.

It was on the frontiers of his government that General Suchet met serious difficulties. On the boundaries of the territories of Valencia, Guadalajara, Soria, Navarre, and Catalonia, he found himself incessantly assailed by banditti. Villa-Campa near Calatayud, l'Empecinado in the direction of Guadalajara, Mina in Navarre, and the mountain-bandits on the frontier of Catalonia, allowed his troops not a day's rest. But that fortunate general commanded officers and soldiers worthy of himself, and every affair with the bandits was a little triumph.

In Catalonia, on the contrary, every thing was in combustion. The miquelets, or mountain-bandits, excited by the Spanish army of Catalonia, whose base was at Tarragona, desolated that province. There was no defile near which they did not watch the convoys to attack the escorts when too weak, to rescue the prisoners, to slaughter the sick and wounded before their eyes, and to carry off the provisions they might be taking to the fortresses, particularly Barcelona. While the interior roads were rendered impracticable by the miquelets, those along the sea-shore were rendered equally dangerous by the English fleets. The town of Barcelona,

where it was necessary to feed both the garrison and the inhabitants, had scarcely the means of subsistence, though a whole army—that of Marshal Macdonald—was exclusively devoted to its supply, and several maritime expeditions had been undertaken in order to convey into it provisions and ammunition. In general, scarcely one-fourth of the intended amount gained admission. General Maurice-Mathieu, the governor, displayed equal intelligence and firmness in order to maintain himself in this difficult situation, and to intimidate the inhabitants without driving them to despair. He had recently succeeded in extricating himself from a great danger. Within the city had been discovered a plot contrived by the enemies within to deliver it up to those without. The general had been informed of it in good time, had pretended not to know it, had allowed the insurgents to advance with security, and then, suddenly awaking from this feigned slumber, had inflicted slaughter on the assailants from without, and severe justice on the conspirators within. By this act of vigour, united to a firm and just administration, he had secured fear and respect. But he wrote that it was impossible long to restrain so numerous a population in such circumstances.

The Catalanian army, finding at Tarragona a solid base, as well as provisions, ammunition, and every kind of aid, furnished by the English navy, and a secure refuge in case of need, sometimes ventured to quit the sea-coast on which Tarragona is situated, and to go as far as the foot of the Pyrenees; and, to the great astonishment of every one, it had recently introduced succour into the important fortress of Figueras, which, as we have seen, had been taken from us by treachery. Profiting by the time before the French, under General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, had been able to bring up sufficient troops to commence the siege, M. de Campo-Verde had broken our feeble line of blockade and introduced succours in men and provisions, amid the great applause of all Catalonia.

We have already said what, in the midst of all this misery, was the situation of our officers and soldiers, enduring greater evils than they could inflict on the enemy, urged sometimes to lamentable excesses by the cruelties which they saw perpetrated upon their companions, but always showing themselves the least inhuman of all soldiers of any nation then attacking or defending the Peninsula. The soldiers were almost content when they could procure themselves a little grain or a few cattle in the uncultivated and wasted fields, or when they could make themselves shoes from the skins of the animals they had consumed. The officers, on the contrary, accustomed to a different mode of life to maintain the dignity of their rank, were subject to cruel sufferings in mind and body. For want of pay, they had no boots to their feet. Napoleon thought he had done enough when he granted for pay 4,000,000 a month, or 48,000,000 a year, and left the bread, meat, and rice to be supplied by the country. But the pay alone required 165,000,000 for the years 1810 and 1811,—that is to say, more than eighty millions instead of forty-eight. Of the sums due he had sent twenty-nine millions in 1810, and forty-eight in 1811,—that is to say, seventy-seven millions instead of one hundred

and sixty-five. The balance, amounting to eighty-eight millions, had either remained unpaid or had been drawn from the country by means of military governments. As to the seventy-seven millions forwarded by Napoleon, part had been pillaged on the road, part had been devoted to necessary purchases, or to the indispensable repairs of artillery, part had remained at particular depôts. The army of Andalusia had received scarcely any thing; but it was located in a rich country, and, if Marshal Soult had been as skilful in administration as General Suchet, it would have wanted nothing. The army of Portugal, condemned to carry on the war in the stony fields of Portugal or Salamanca, was deprived of the necessaries of life. The officers were a pitiable sight, and they had little prospect of any compensation for their sufferings, for, on the one hand, the Emperor was at a distance, and, on the other, they could show nothing but reverses after conducting themselves in a manner that deserved the greatest success. Such was the picture presented by the conquest of Spain, after all the hopes indulged in 1810, after two years of fresh combats, after a reinforcement of 200,000 men had been sent since the peace of Vienna, after so many soldiers and generals had been sacrificed, and so many illustrious reputations compromised,—those of Massena, of Ney, of Jourdan, of Augereau, of Soult, of Victor, of Saint-Cyr.

Was, then, this fatal country invincible, as an ancient tradition asserted, as in its legitimate pride it boasted, as general opinion maintained since the great invasion attempted by Napoleon? Certain excellent judges, with a horror at the war in Spain, having been eye-witnesses,—Saint-Cyr, Jourdan, and Joseph himself,—did not think so, but believed that they might have succeeded with more adequate means, with greater patience and unity. Much, no doubt, was done, much more than was necessary for an object which was only secondary in the imperial policy; but everywhere, for want of the necessary completeness, the great means actually employed remained without effect. The army of Portugal, for want of a reinforcement of 40,000 men and some millions for food and clothing; the army of Andalusia, for want of 25,000 men, for want of sailors, of ammunition, and of a fleet which was lying idle at Toulon; the court of Madrid, for want of some millions to pay the officials and the Spaniards who had engaged in their service; the armies of the North, for want of about 20,000 men, and a few millions to procure magazines; became merely impotent and unfortunate. In a word, nearly 400,000 men became useless for want of 100,000 additional and a few millions in money. On all occasions, the greatest sacrifices remain fruitless, without the crowning one which is necessary to render them complete. It was certainly cruel to incur such sacrifices for the sake of Spain, but what need was there to engage in that country at all? Would it not be better to give 100,000 men more to that war, than to prepare 500,000 for the war with Russia?

Undoubtedly, if the additional 100,000 men were to remain useless as the 400,000 already sent had done, it would have been right to sacrifice no more; but it was easy to discern, in certain provinces, the symptoms of fatigue which might be turned to account. The sentiment

which had roused Spain was violent, unanimous, and legitimate; yet, after four years of war, at the sight of so much blood and ruin, she could not but ask herself why and for whom she endured so much. In fact, as soon as a little calmness prevailed and gave room for reflection, as at Saragossa, Madrid, Seville, and some other large cities, men said that the princes for whom they fought were very little deserving of their devotion; that, of the illustrious and august family of Bourbon, the Spanish branch was the most truly degenerate, that which most deserved to be surrendered to the destructive sword of the time; for the principal of the descendants of Philip V., the good and simple Charles IV., lived at Marseilles, between the Prince of Peace and his wife, enslaved to the two equally in private as when on the throne; his eldest son, a prisoner at Valençay, daily requested the conqueror who had robbed him, to grant him a princess from his own family, and, from fear of being compromised by those who attempted his deliverance, denounced them to the imperial police; and finally, among them all, there was not one branch, man or woman, who thought of tendering a hand to the heroic nation whose blood was shed for them in abundance. The cortes of Cadiz, after having proclaimed some principles incontestable in themselves, but premature for Spain, had issued in anarchy. The members lived at Cadiz in misery, discord, and perpetual contest with the English. All these things Spain knew, and appreciated as soon as they were for a moment relieved from the horrors of war. Joseph, on the contrary, was, in the eyes of all who approached him, a mild and enlightened prince, a moderate representative of the French Revolution, giving good grounds to expect a government wisely promoting reforms. He was a new prince,—a usurper, indeed, and imposed upon them by a usurper; but was it not traditional to Spain to be renewed by foreign dynasties? Did not Philip V. revive Spain, by supplanting the degenerate descendants of Charles V.? And was not Charles V., though the lawful heir, a foreign prince, who brought the brilliant civilization of Flanders into Spain, where there remained to Ferdinand and Isabella none but Joanna the insane? Might not similar hopes be entertained of Joseph? At Madrid, where he had been seen near at hand, men had learned to appreciate him, and to become less irritated by his presence. In Aragon, where the new government was represented by General Suchet, men became accustomed to think well of that government, and to say that, were it not for the war, it was a hundred times better than that of the Inquisition, of the Prince of Peace, and of Queen Maria Louisa. But the most moderate Spaniards were revolted by eternal war, by misery, by fire, by pillage, and by the generally-received idea that, if Napoleon did not take to himself the whole of Spain, he would, at least, take the provinces of the Ebro. Yet it was easy to see, at and around Madrid, that if Joseph could have remunerated his functionaries, paid his army, supported it at the expense of his own magazines and not of the country, maintained order and discipline as in Aragon, obtained from Napoleon and his generals the respect due to the sovereign of any country, but especially that of a nation so haughty as the Spanish, that if, above all, he could have dissipated the fear of,

the banks of the Ebro being lost to Spain, he might have obtained the beginning of submission. And this sentiment, taking rise in the capital, where it appeared whenever affairs showed the slightest improvement, would have been communicated to the large towns, where already it was perceived from time to time. It is worthy of remark that the Spanish soldiers, who, at the beginning, deserted when enrolled in the service of Joseph, began now, whether from fatigue or from jealousy of the guerillas, to remain faithful when duly paid. Joseph had 4000 or 5000, who served well, and stood to their flag on the single condition of being regularly paid. It was evident that, if they had money, they might have had 20,000 or 30,000, or as many as they might wish, who, under French teaching, would have become excellent troops. Even the guerillas, true bandits who sought only plunder, were gradually attracted by pay. Amnesty had been granted to a certain number in La Mancha, around Toledo, and towards Guadalaxara; they had been paid, had rendered submission, and had even accepted service.

None of these favourable symptoms, indeed, occurred near the centres of insurrection, where the passions were strong and enduring, where the English excited and sustained sentiments hostile to France, where hopes of success were maintained in all their vigour, especially when pillage was profitable; but elsewhere it was otherwise, and, though the situation of the French in the Peninsula was exceedingly difficult, it is true that fatigue, very sensibly felt in the easy classes, and most oppressive among the peasantry, and the want of a reasonable aim, (for to regain the Bourbons from Marseilles and Valençay could not be regarded as such,) would secure the submission of the Spaniards, if a last, powerful effort were made, if, above all, the English were expelled, if on this essential step adequate forces were employed, if Lisbon and Cadiz were taken, which they might be, if they devoted themselves to the suppression of the guerillas without imitating their ravages, if to the existing forces were added those demanded by these various objects, if they not only added the forces, but supported the expense, and thus spared the country the principal miseries of war, if, finally, to these means were added a regulating power impossible to be exerted at a distance, that is to say, if to Spain had been devoted not the half but nearly all the resources of the Empire, and the Emperor himself, success would have been nearly certain. A part, only, of what was prepared for entering Russia, would have sufficed victoriously to solve the question raised by the invasion of Spain. But this is just what Napoleon would not resolve upon. "Spain," he wrote to Joseph, "would consume me if I allowed it." Deplorably inconsistent speech, soon to be followed with fatal results! We have already said, that since Napoleon had committed the error of removing the European question to Spain, he ought to have resolved it there, and not to have sought to do so elsewhere. Since fortune, still favouring him even in his errors, as if wishing to give him time to repair them, had brought to the continent the English, unapproachable on the sea, we ought at every cost to have conquered them on the element where we bore rule, for, if they were subdued, the whole world would have surrendered. But to have

them within reach of our armies and not to conquer them, but, on the contrary, to be beaten by them, was voluntarily to renounce the prestige of our invincibility on land, and to excite in the continent the purpose to subdue us, by showing that the attempt was not hopeless. To expel the English by a great military effort, to subject the Spaniards by perseverance and mildness, was the double task, self-imposed by the outrage of Bayonne, the accomplishment of which would have terminated not only the affairs of Spain, but also those of Europe generally, (as far, at least, as any termination can be given to the exorbitant love of dominion;) and to turn away from this necessary task, from disgust at the difficulties and especially at the tardiness of the war, in order to seek elsewhere a most hazardous solution with only one-half of his forces, the other half remaining useless in Spain, is a fault often recurring in this history, and which we cannot refrain from repeatedly pointing out, for it pursues the mind with the energy and the bitterness of a frightful remorse.

When Joseph, driven to despair, had quitted Madrid to go and demand of Napoleon either another direction to Spanish affairs, or the privilege of returning into private life, many honourable men at Madrid, Valladolid, Burgos, and Vittoria, addressed him in such terms as these:—"See what we suffer, and judge if you can hope to gain us by such a regime! We are pillaged, burnt out, often assassinated by your soldiers and those which call themselves ours; our property and our lives are at the mercy of bandits of all nations. We hope nothing of the anarchical government of Cadiz, of the corrupt government of Ferdinand, and we are willing to resign ourselves to receive everything from you. But, deprived forever perhaps of our colonies, we are still further threatened to be deprived of our provinces on the Ebro, and we are even cut off from any honourable return to you. You are yourself despised and publicly insulted at the very moment when they are labouring to make you our king: how do they suppose that we shall submit to you? Your functionaries, scoffed at by the generals, almost dying of hunger, are reduced to the soldier's rations: how can they expect the least consideration? You are going to Paris: report our words to the Emperor. Your departure is interpreted in two ways; by your enemies, as the time when the veil shall be torn asunder, when Spain shall be declared a French province, like Lubeck, Hamburg, Florence, and Rome; by your friends, as yet few in number, as having recourse to the superior genius of your brother, to inform him where he is ignorant, perhaps to bring him here, and to arrange all by his presence. Endeavour to realize this last supposition. Hasten to Paris, spare not your words, make the truth be heard, obtain new forces, secure authority for yourself, and for us an encouraging assurance of the integrity of our territory, bring back means of discipline,—that is to say, of paying your troops and ours,—and be assured that, if this cost France money, Spain will soon repay her with interest. The time is propitious; for, notwithstanding your apparent reverses, and the momentary success of your enemies, the prevalent feeling is weariness of the war, which may be converted either into submission or despair, a despair which would be terrible to those who should have provoked it."

These words, uttered by men worthy of all respect, had been conveyed to Paris by Joseph, who, having come into France to attend the baptism of the King of Rome, spent there the months of May, June, and July. Unfortunately, Joseph, though in the right, had his foibles, which, though very pardonable, lost to him that influence with Napoleon which he required. He was, as we have said, kind, sensible, honourable, but indolent, fond of pleasure, of expense, and of flatterers, (in which newly-created princes agree with those of long standing,) with a very exaggerated impression of his own military talents, and was very jealous of his authority. There were, undoubtedly, trivial defects; but when he said that he required money more even than French soldiers, for with well-paid Spaniards he could conquer Spain and gain the affection of his subjects; that he, nevertheless, wanted French soldiers, especially to oppose the English; that he also wanted power,—in particular, the supreme command of the armies,—in order to check excesses and to secure the respect due to his rank as king; these things, in a great measure true, but heard from his lips with suspicion, had been so badly received that it was necessary to employ a third party in order to avoid disagreeable scenes between the two brothers. Prince Berthier, as generalissimo of the armies of Spain, had been chosen; nor could any one have been found more judicious, more discreet, or better informed in every respect. Unfortunately, his influence was not equal to the justness of his views, and, though incapable of betraying the truth, he had not always the boldness to state it fully. Besides, Napoleon was, at this moment, exasperated against his brothers. Recently, Louis had thrown the crown of Holland at his feet; Jerome, who had received Hanover in addition to Westphalia, on condition of bearing certain expenses, had not fulfilled his engagements, and had been punished by the withdrawal of a part of Hanover; Murat, good-natured, but fickle and restless, excited by his talented and ambitious wife, had given great displeasure by his excessive expenditure and the neglect of his navy. Besides, he had been accused of having, under various pretexts, parleyed with the English along the coasts of his kingdom. Napoleon had been irritated to such an extent as to send secret instructions to General Grenier to keep his eye upon Naples, and to be ready to march upon it with the *corps de reserve* under his command. And, finally, we have seen the indignation of Napoleon at the semi-treasons of Cardinal Fesch. The unfortunate Joseph, therefore, came to express disagreeable truths at a very unseasonable time. Napoleon had even sent him word that if he wished to abdicate like Louis he was at liberty to do so; that all his brothers might relinquish the thrones which he had given them; that he had no need of them; that this conduct on their part might even simplify many things in Europe; but that up to this time they were not merely kings, but generals under his orders, and that he did not intend that they should desert their posts without giving intimation and gaining his sanction; that if Joseph should present himself at Bayonne without this indispensable preliminary step, he would be arrested. These were the first explosions of Napoleon's hasty temper. When they had subsided, they came, by the mediation of Prince

Berthier, to more exact and calm explanations. Joseph said that it was highly necessary that he should meet with the respect due to the brother of the Emperor and to the King of Spain; that the generals should not be allowed to treat him, as they did, with the greatest contempt; that they were divided among themselves to such an extent as to sacrifice the blood of their soldiers to their mutual jealousies; that if it were wished to show him suitable respect, to re-establish unity in military operations, to prevent excesses and pillage, it would be necessary to give him the supreme command, with the exception of assigning to him, as a chief of the staff, a marshal in whom he could place confidence, and of sending him from Paris instructions to which he would scrupulously conform; it would be necessary to leave in the provinces only generals of character and ability; that such were to be found in the French army, often very superior to the marshals under whom they served; that it was equally necessary, if they would put an end to the exasperation of the Spaniards, to renounce the ruinous system of making the war support the war; that, instead of endeavouring to draw money from Spain, they ought, in the first place, to send some thither, which in course of time would be abundantly repaid; that, if they granted him a subsidy of three or four millions a month, he would have well-paid and faithful functionaries, a devoted Spanish army, better fitted than the French to repress banditti; that even some of these last were ready to take service under his flag, provided they were paid; that, if it were preferred to change this subsidy into a loan, he would repay it with punctuality in a few years; that for each million advanced he would return 1000 of the French troops; that if, moreover, they were willing to pay these last and to support them from their own stores, and employ them in the repulse of the English, and, finally, give assurance to Spain of the preservation of the provinces of the Ebro, they would see formed at and around Madrid a region of calmness and tranquillity which should extend itself gradually from the capital to the provinces, and that, before long, Spain, reduced to submission, would restore to France her armies and her treasures, would, a second time, to the advantage of both nations, be subject to the policy of Louis XIV.; that, on the contrary, if the present method were continued, Spain would become the tomb of Napoleon's armies, the confusion of his policy, perhaps even the limit of his grandeur and the ruin of his family.

All these allegations were true, with the exception of some errors which gave Napoleon a pretext for refusing the most reasonable demands. That a favourable moment was arrived for subjecting Spain exhausted by the war; that she must lose hope if once the English were expelled, and that the weariness of past sufferings being united to the loss of hope, to the re-establishment of discipline, and the suppression of devastation, Spain must shortly be subdued, was proved by what was passing in Aragon and around Madrid. That with a few millions might be created a devoted administration, and a faithful Spanish army, capable of maintaining internal tranquillity, was an expectation warranted by what was actually seen at Madrid; that without even displacing Napoleon, which would be difficult, his presence might be supplied by a

firm and able chief of the staff, such, for example, as General Suchet; that by giving him absolute authority over all the generals, and a sufficiency of men and money, he would at length conquer Cadix and pacify Spain, as he soon succeeded in conquering Tarragona and pacifying Valencia; that leaving out of his direction one operation alone,—that of expelling the English, which might be intrusted to Massena, to whom should be granted an army of 100,000 men and sufficient means of transport,—there was no doubt that the wise Suchet and the energetic Massena would agree between themselves, and that the combined genius of the two would terminate the cruel war which, under bad guidance, threatened to become the abyss which should engulf the fortunes of Napoleon and of France. But it was an error in Joseph to suppose that it was necessary to give millions of money and not thousands of men; both were necessary; it was a mistake in him to suppose himself capable of command, and that he might have a favourite as chief of the staff, for it was requisite that he should submit to a real chief, such a one as General Suchet, who had the art of combining a wise direction of the war with skilful administration and conciliatory policy; he must also put up with a Vendôme,—that is to say, Massena, who should make war on the English to drive them from the country, while Suchet should make war on the Spanish, not to expel but to subdue and reconcile them.

There was, then, much truth combined with some error in the plan proposed by Joseph, and this sufficed to open up the pitiless satire of Napoleon against the pretensions of his brother: \* he repeated his old assertion that Joseph wished to command; that he fancied himself a general; that in order to be one he thought it enough to be not absolutely void of sense, to be able to ride and to give some words of command; but that the real state of the case was very different; that perhaps many incompetent generals may have been placed at the head of armies to their own shame and loss, but that it was different with generals truly capable to command; that for this end profound and extensive intelligence must be combined with great decision, invincible labor, continued attention to the smallest details; that he himself always kept on his table the condition of his troops; that these statements were his favourite studies; that he had them within reach when he retired to rest, and pondered them when sleepless at night; that in virtue of this natural aptness of mind and character, and this incessant application, and an immense experience, he was able to secure obedience to his commands, because his soldiers placed confidence in him; but with Joseph it was otherwise; God had not made him a general; he was mild and intelligent, but

indolent; he sought pleasure rather than toil; that men instinctively detected these dispositions, and that if he intrusted to him the direction of the French armies, nobody would believe that such a chief was the real commander, but behind him would always be seen the officer appointed to prompt him, whom no one would obey, because all would ridicule the royal general and would be jealous of the general king, who would in reality exercise supreme authority; that he, therefore, could not grant him any thing more than the command of the army of the centre, extending its operations to twenty or thirty leagues from Madrid; that as for money he had it not; that his brothers, though reigning over the richest countries of Europe, were incessantly demanding it of him; that Spain had enough to supply the world; that if Joseph were capable of administration he would find resources; that he had been very well able to procure money for his favourites, for the building of royal residences and the support of a useless luxury; that, if Spain suffered, this was an evil without remedy,—the French soldiers suffered also; that war was war, and if the Spaniards were weary of their sufferings they had only to submit; that the pretensions of Joseph to good nature and to the art of securing popular affection were ridiculous; and not less so was his hope to effect with millions of money what he could not effect with thousands of soldiers; that, if in return for soldiers he sent him money, it would soon be spent, and Joseph with his court would be brought back disgracefully to Bayonne by an armed banditti; that many soldiers, much vigour, and even terror, were necessary to subdue the resistance of Spain; that terror would induce submission, and, if this were secured, a good administration, which was due to every nation, would follow, and that when Spain was by these means bound to her new king, the time would have come for Joseph to secure their worship, if he were so clever in that way as he pretended, &c.

Napoleon, looking only at the ridiculous feature in Joseph's demands, did not reply to them in good faith, for he was much too intelligent not to perceive the amount of truth they contained; but he could not change his plan, nor give to the war in Spain what he had made it necessary for him to devote to that in Russia. He wished, therefore, to continue to maintain the Spanish war nearly by the same means, hoping that, by exacting a great deal from men, they would act as a horse which is urged, and would yield more than usual; that with less resources they would still succeed, though more slowly; and, even though they should not succeed, yet he himself individually would succeed, and his success on the Borysthènes would make up for his failure on the Tagus: a fatal thought, arising in his mind from the wide separation of the places in respect to which he was reasoning, and from the intoxication, a little voluntary, of his wonderful fortune.

In such a disposition, the journey of Joseph, undertaken to persuade Napoleon to adopt a different line of conduct in Spain, could not produce any result, certainly none beyond mere superficial palliation. After the first hasty effusions, Napoleon, whose harshness was only temporary, and who really loved his brothers,

\* In reporting these conversations, I avoid, as usual, any indulgence of my own fancy. Napoleon held with M. Rüdiger, on his return from Madrid, certain conversations sparkling with wit and genius, in which he said what I have recorded, but more at length and with greater bitterness. M. Rüdiger, who kept a diary of what he saw and heard, wrote down these conversations at the time, and it is by comparing them with the letters of Napoleon, by means of a communication which I owe to his family, that I have been able to relate the sentiments of the Emperor. The greater part of these observations were also written, by order, to M. de Labret, our minister at Madrid.

granted certain changes rather in form than in substance. Joseph was still confined to the command of the army of the centre, but he was to have a civil, judicial, and political authority over all the provinces. The generals were required to respect him as the king, and as the sovereign of a country whose provinces were for a time occupied by the exigencies of war. Only, if Joseph should, contrary to probability, wish to be present at one of these armies of the Peninsula, the command should be immediately transferred to him. Moreover, recognising the advantage of increasing his influence over the northern provinces which were traversed by the line of communication with France, and where were many persons worn out with suffering and inclined to surrender, Napoleon offered to Joseph to replace Marshal Bessières, the Duke of Istria, by Marshal Jourdan. The difficulty was to induce the latter to return to Spain and to receive any office from Napoleon, between whom and himself there was no mutual affection, and whose inordinate measures he uniformly resisted.

As to money, Joseph would have required, in order to pay his functionaries in the capital and central provinces and to meet the expenses of his house and Spanish guard, four millions a month, and that without extravagance; for he had no longer any government paper which he had at his disposal in the beginning of his reign, a part of which, not very large in amount, he had bestowed on his favourites and on one of the royal residences. He had on one occasion been obliged to sell the plate of his chapel for his house-expenses. Of four millions a month which he required, he hardly received one, his sole revenue being derived from the local dues of Madrid, and he therefore was deficient to the extent of three.\* Napoleon consented to a subsidy of one million a month, and to grant him one-fourth of the contributions imposed by the generals in all the provinces of Spain. It seemed that this fourth part ought to be sufficient to make up the four millions indispensable to Joseph. But what chance was there that the generals in command would divert several millions from their own chests, and would be able to send them across Spain, when they often left their own troops without pay and found the greatest difficulty in the transmission of a single courier? General Suchet could scarcely do so, although, after having well paid his soldiers, he devoted the surplus of the revenues of his province to the necessities of the country; yet he did it, as we shall see, but he alone, for none of the others had either the power or the will.

However this be, these were the pecuniary succours offered to Joseph. On the weighty question of the territorial integrity of Spain the language of Napoleon was most evasive. He said to Joseph that he was very willing to leave his kingdom to him just as it was, but that it was necessary to intimidate the Spaniards by suggesting the fear of losing some provinces if they continued obstinate in their resistance, and that, if the war became lengthened and costly, France would seek an indemnity for her sacrifices. He advised him, instead

of seeking to satisfy the Spaniards on that point, to use it as a means of influencing them, a strange means to be employed with a nation requiring to be appeased rather than alarmed. But, unwilling to have a new family scene which should issue with the King of Spain as it had with the King of Holland, in an abdication, Napoleon endeavoured to soothe the vexation of Joseph, to encourage him, and to give him hopes; he said that he would send an imposing reserve into the Peninsula; that Suchet, after having taken Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, should take Tarragona and then Valencia; that, after this conquest was achieved, they would have an army to direct towards the South; that the army of Andalusia might then second that of Portugal, occupied at the moment in reorganizing itself; and that both of these, augmented by the reserve which was then crossing the Pyrenees, would towards autumn renew the campaign against the English, probably with a better result than the last; that at no very distant time the Peninsula might thus be conquered; that the military commands would cease of themselves; that Joseph would then regain the royal authority which he might exercise according to his own judgment: strange and fatal illusions, which Napoleon, no doubt, shared, but in a less degree than he professed, for in his mind Spain had lost its importance, and all the failures in the South of Europe were to be repaired by the successes in the North.

Though disgusted with a throne from which he could discern no prospect but that of distress, yet not wishing a family-scene which should occasion Napoleon the loss of another brother, and should sentence himself to a private life, of which he liked the quiet but not the humility, Joseph satisfied himself with these empty promises, and set off for Spain, less chagrined, no doubt, than he had left it, but little encouraged by the vague promises of Napoleon.

While traversing Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid, he found the inhabitants still more unfortunate than he had left them: he could say nothing to encourage them either in regard to the provinces of the Ebro or the other subjects of their anxiety; he imparted to them what he had himself received, insignificant promises, and, in order to withdraw himself from unreasonable questions, hastened his arrival at Madrid, where every thing had become worse since his departure. The only real advantage which he had gained at Paris was the promise of a million monthly in money sent from France. Two of these millions had failed. The first had been spent in Paris in travelling-expenses and in display; the second ought to have been brought by the military convoys, but had not arrived: the appropriation to Joseph of one-fourth of the contributions levied by the generals was a new chimera, and there remained nothing but the local dues of Madrid, which were continually diminishing. Besides all this, the royal household, the Spanish guard, and the functionaries, had not received a piastre during the absence of Joseph. To increase the distress, the terrible drought which had so greatly deteriorated the harvest of that year throughout the continent had been experienced in Spain as elsewhere, and the price of bread

\* All this is quoted from the correspondence of Joseph with Prince Berthier and M. de Laforêt.



at Madrid had reduced the people to actual famine. Joseph, therefore, returned to his capital to behold the most melancholy spectacle. He transmitted his griefs to Paris in terms still more bitter than those employed before his journey. But Napoleon, concentrated on one object, would listen to nothing; and the reserve drawn from Italy, now on the march to the Pyrenees, was the only succour which he thought of granting to Spain.

In these circumstances, the best thing would have been to make use of this reserve to consolidate the position of the French, and by combining it with the army of Portugal to form a body capable of checking the English, of disputing with them alternately Badajoz or Ciudad Rodrigo, and of preventing their making any progress in the Peninsula until Napoleon should have solved all the difficulties of the North. The fatal expedition of Andalusia, which Marshal Soult had desired in order to efface the remembrance of that of Oporto, and Joseph in order to extend his royal authority over a new country; which had lost us Cadiz and Lisbon for Badajoz, the conquest of which decided nothing; which had made us neglect the principal object of the war by uselessly scattering 80,000 men, who would have been sufficient to expel the English;—this deplorable expedition might have taught us a lesson, and if they did not retrograde from Andalusia to La Mancha, which certainly would have been the wisest plan while Napoleon was penetrating the North, they ought, at least, to have remained at the limit of the conquered country, and firmly established themselves there. General Suchet might have preserved Aragon, and even taken Tarragona, whence the Catalan insurgents derived their resources; Marshal Soult might have kept Andalusia without taking Cadiz; finally, the army of Portugal, reinforced by the reserve, might have followed all the movements of Lord Wellington upon Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, and have rendered them futile. But Napoleon did not take this view. Judging every thing from a distance, and rather according to his own imagination than the reality, believing that Joseph only sought money to squander it, that his generals demanded reinforcements only from the habit of seeking more than they required, he persuaded himself that, if he granted a part of the reserve to General Suchet, that general, after taking Tarragona, would be in a condition to conquer Valencia, that, Valencia once conquered, it would be easy to advance towards Grenada, that after that, Marshal Soult, being free on that side, would be at liberty to go towards Extremadura, and that, joining the army of Portugal reinforced by the reserve, he might with its aid drive the English back towards Lisbon. As Napoleon did not propose to recall the guard and the Poles before winter, he thought that, the reserve entering Spain at the end of summer, there would be ample time during the autumn to advance the affairs of Spain and to conquer almost the whole of the Peninsula except Portugal, before he should himself set out for Russia. Such were the new illusions on which was founded the plan of operations for the end of the year 1811.

But, in the mean while, before the reserve could arrive in Spain or General Suchet take Tarragona, Marshal Soult, posted at Llerena in

sight of Badajoz, sent for aid to save that place, which, notwithstanding a heroic defence, was on the point of yielding.

Marshal Marmont, a generous companion-in-arms, and impatient to signalize himself at the head of the army of Portugal, used every effort to prepare to fly to the help of Badajoz. Though Napoleon had advised him to undertake nothing until his army should be sufficiently rested, tolerably equipped, and provided with horses, he did not hesitate to set off as soon as he had satisfied the most pressing wants of his soldiers. Well aware that if united with Marshal Soult he would be sufficiently strong in numbers, he was more anxious about the quality than the quantity of his troops. He raised all his battalions to 700 men, fusing the effective in the best *cadres*, and leaving those that were then stripped of their men to be recruited at Salamanca, and then to receive the convalescents and the recruits from France. He thus reduced his army, which did not exceed 40,000 men since the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, to about 30,000, including 3000 cavalry. He was able to horse thirty-six guns. This was very little, but it was all that circumstances allowed. He suppressed the division of the troops into *corps-d'armée*,—a good arrangement under Napoleon, who was able to intrust the *corps-d'armée* to marshals, and secure the obedience of those high officers, but troublesome, inconvenient, and unmanageable by a mere marshal having scarcely 30,000 men at his disposal. He substituted for it the formation into divisions, which he intrusted to the best lieutenant-generals, retained only Reynier of the old chiefs of corps, in order to have, in case of need, one who might fill his place, sent back all the officers who were either worn with fatigue or disinclined to the service, and, after having restored a little discipline and physical strength to his troops by a month's rest and good care, he resolved to reply to the urgent demands of Marshal Soult, and to execute a movement upon the Extremadura, descending upon the Tagus by the defile of Banos, crossing that river at Almaraz, and advancing by Truxillo upon the Guadiana. Foreseeing the difficulty he would have in supporting himself in the impoverished valley of the Tagus, especially in the month of June, he solicited from Joseph's head-quarters 300,000 or 400,000 rations of biscuit, to be sent by the Tagus to Almaraz with a pontoon-equipage, which he knew existed in Madrid, that he might not be detained at the passage of that river.

All these precautions having been taken, he had recourse to a feint to deceive the English and detain them before Ciudad Rodrigo while he made his way to Badajoz. With this view he caused to be prepared some provisions, as if he merely wished to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, and went thither on the 5th of June with his advanced guard and part of his *corps de bataille*, while Reynier with the rest of the army, consisting of two divisions, crossed the defile of Banos, descended on the Tagus, and, with the material sent from Madrid, prepared to cross the river at Almaraz. General Spencer, who had been left at the Agueda with some English and Portuguese troops in the absence of Lord Wellington, who had led three divisions to the walls of Badajoz, was unable to stand against

the French army, and he did not attempt to do so. He fell back at the sight of Marshal Marmont's advanced posts, who was thus enabled without difficulty to communicate with Ciudad Rodrigo and to introduce provisions. This operation being successfully accomplished, the marshal returned quickly upon his steps, and rejoined Reynier at the Tagus, without attending to the objections of Marshal Bessières, who declared this movement of the army of Portugal to be premature, and attended with much danger in the North of the Peninsula, until a strong party of the *corps de réserve* should have entered Castile. Nevertheless, Marshal Marmont persevered in his resolution, and continued his march towards Estremadura.

It was high time that he should appear before Badajoz, for without immediate succour that fortress must surrender. Though Marshal Soult had been joined by General Drouet with the 9th corps, which had been ordered to Estremadura after the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, this reinforcement only raised the number of his troops actually under arms to about 25,000 men; he was, therefore, afraid to venture a battle with the English army, which mustered at least 40,000 strong since the arrival of Lord Wellington with three divisions. He could not even convey to the unhappy besieged the intelligence of approaching aid, so closely were they blockaded; but they, resolved to perish sword in hand, had yielded neither to threats of assaults nor to actual assault, and had determined, rather than surrender, to bury themselves in the ruins of the place, ingulfing with themselves as many of the English as they could. Nothing in the whole war of sieges, so fruitful to the French in admirable deeds, surpasses the conduct of the garrison of Badajoz during the months of April, May, and June, 1811.

After having sustained a siege from the 22d of April to the 16th of May, (the date of the battle of Albuera,) and having during that time checked the approach of the enemy by a fire always superior to theirs, who had lost a thousand men without effecting a breach,—after having been invested anew after the battle of Albuera, without being able to admit either a man or a sack of grain,—this brave garrison, since May 20, had been besieged by an army of 40,000 men, and, on this occasion, attacked to the last extremity, Lamare, chief of the engineer-battalion, who had directed the defence-works, had taken care to renew and complete the works of the fort of Pardaleras, to close it at the gorge, and, besides, to construct some mining-galleries in advance of the fronts which the French had chosen for their point of attack when they took Badajoz.

The English, being aware of this, had not ventured to use their efforts on that side, but had directed them to the east against the castle and to the north against the fort of St. Christoval, situated, as we have said, on the right bank of the Guadiana. The waters of the Rivillas, checked by a dam, had become a powerful means of defence for the castle. Unfortunately, it was built upon a salient point of ground, and offered its sides unprotected to the English artillery, which, firing upon it incessantly with more than twenty guns, had completely demolished its high towers and outer casing; but the earth at this point, being very

firm, had retained its steepness, and the garrison, clearing the breaches of the debris under a continual fire of grape, grenades, and howitzers, had rendered them impracticable. Moreover, the commandant Lamare had raised an inner intrenchment behind the breach, and had arranged on the flanks an artillery loaded with grape, while General Philippon, posted in this place with his best troops, awaited the assailants to receive them at the point of the bayonet. On sight of this, the English had changed their plan and directed all their fury against the fort of St. Christoval, on the other side of the Guadiana. Attacking this fort by the right bastion, they had effected two large breaches, and had resolved to make the assault before they had brought their approaches to the border of the ditch. The threatened bastion was defended by 150 infantry, and some artillery and engineers, under Captain Chauvin of the 88th. The besieged, after having, as at the castle, cleared the foot of their walls with great courage under the enemy's fire, had also placed all sorts of obstacles at the bottom of the ditch, disposed a line of bombs at the summit of each breach, planted on the flanks several guns loaded with grape, and drawn up behind a line of grenadiers, each provided with three muskets. In the night of the 6th of June, 700 or 800 English, boldly leaving their trenches, and running over several hundred metres fully exposed, reached the border of the ditch, were obliged to leap into it, the counterscarp not having been demolished, and had then tried to scale the trench. But the fire of musketry meeting them in front and the grape in flank, and the bombs rolling among their feet, they had not been able to stand against so many obstacles, and had retired, leaving 300 men killed or wounded in the ditches of the fort of St. Christoval.

The brave garrison, having only five or six wounded, were in a state of enthusiasm, and merely demanded to renew the encounter. The population, who had suffered cruelly from the fire of the enemy, and had at length almost sided with the French, whose triumph alone could save them from the horrors of capture by assault, were filled with admiration. Confused and irritated, the English had avenged themselves during the following days by loading the unfortunate city with burning projectiles, and attempting to enlarge the breaches of the fortress of St. Christoval by a powerful reinforcement of artillery. On the 9th of June they made a new attempt, and with equal bravery, to assail the two breaches, which were defended by 200 men of the 21st, under Captain Joudiou, and Brette, serjeant of artillery, the same precautions having been adopted to render the access almost impossible. In the middle of the night the English rushed from their trenches and scaled the debris of the walls. But our grenadiers had inflicted dreadful slaughter by falling upon them with the bayonet, after having by a fire of musketry thrown them to the foot of the breaches. About 100 English lost their lives in this fruitless attempt.

No danger could now intimidate this noble garrison. Unfortunately, provisions were wanting, they were worn out with fatigue and privations, and it was feared that they must yield to want if not to the attacks of the enemy. But the approach of a succouring army, which could

not be known to them, was known to Lord Wellington, who was always well informed of our movements, and on the 10th of June, having learned the march of General Reynier on the Tagus, the English general resolved to raise the siege, and began to remove from the place. One reason in particular contributed to this sacrifice. They had exhausted the ammunition collected at Badajoz, and it was necessary without loss of time to employ all the means of transport they had to seek more at the distance of twenty-five leagues, — i.e. at Abrantes, the principal depôt of the British army.

Lord Wellington, much vexed at the unavailing loss of 2000 of his best troops at Badajoz, and at having twice failed before that place deterred by a handful of French, struck all his camps in succession on the 13th and 14th of June, and withdrew on the 17th to the Caya, and went to assume a well-chosen defensive position, which he always did in the presence of the impetuous soldiers of the French army, having the mountains of Portalegre in the rear.

The brave garrison, seeing the gradual disappearance of the enemy's camp, wondered what was going on, and soon learned with transports of joy, in which the population shared, that, owing to their own valour and the approaching succour, it would issue triumphantly from this second siege as it had from the first. In fact, Marshal Marmont, after having lost some days before the Tagus by the insufficiency of his means of crossing, (for they had been able to send him from Madrid only a part of what he sought,) crossed the river, traversed the mountains of Truxillo, and on the 18th of June entered Merida. On the same day he effected a junction with Marshal Soult, who thanked him with much emotion for the help that he had brought, without which he would have had the mortification of losing Badajoz, the sole and insecure trophy of two years of war in Andalusia.

On the 20th of June, the two marshals, with upwards of 150,000 men, entered Badajoz, congratulated the heroic garrison which had so valiantly defended the fort intrusted to their courage, distributed the well-merited rewards, and carried their advanced posts very near the English, who, at sight of the combined army, kept themselves carefully within their camp. If this fine army, which, except that of Marshal Davout, had not its equal in Europe, being composed of the old soldiers of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, and having added to its long campaigns three years of formidable hardships in Spain, — if this fine army, unsuccessful only from the fault of its chiefs, had been commanded by one marshal instead of two, and that marshal Massena, it would certainly have gone in pursuit of the English and have made Lord Wellington expiate his great success, due, no doubt, to his incontestable merit, but also to the errors and passions of his enemies. But Marshal Soult, too happy to have escaped the shame of seeing Badajoz fall before his eyes, was not disposed to incur fresh risks. Marshal Marmont felt an insuperable want of confidence in his colleague,\* and very little inclination to

concur with him in action. And, regarding his recent march as an instance of success, he was unwilling to compromise that success by exposing himself to the chances of a decisive battle. But there was at that time in the French army none but Massena in whom the sight of the enemy excited that ardent military patriotism which knows no alternative but death or victory.

The two marshals committed one of the greatest errors of this epoch, — that of remaining with 50,000 men in the presence of 40,000 enemies, of whom not more than 25,000 were English, without engaging. They spent several days in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, in order to provide for the wants of the place, to reinforce the garrison, to repair the breaches in the walls, and to replenish their exhausted magazines. Marshal Marmont, observing a want of activity in this last particular in the army of Marshal Soult, obliged his regiments to reap the wheat which was ripe, and to transport the grain to the interior of Badajoz. Many of the inhabitants had absented themselves ever since the first siege. At the approach of the second others had followed their example. The fear of a third had put still more to flight, and thus the greater part of the city was deserted. This would not have been an evil but that those who remained were of the poorest class, and those who were least capable to provide for themselves and the most difficult to restrain. Moreover, though a third siege was probable, it did not appear to be near at hand, and the garrison, being reinforced, had time to take precautions and to prepare for a new trial.

The two marshals had been united only a few days, when a collision had wellnigh occurred between them. Marshal Soult had now been long absent from Andalusia. Having left Seville to fight the battle of Albuera, having then, with good reason, obstinately resolved on remaining in position at Llerena, whence he had succeeded in effecting a concentration of forces in Estremadura, he was very desirous of drawing the army of Portugal fully within the ordinary circle of his operations, of leaving to it the protection of Badajoz, of thus devolving upon it this difficult part of his task, and, finally, consecrating all his forces to the siege of Cadix, so unhappily neglected for that of Badajoz. This wish was natural, but not reasonable, under a more comprehensive view of affairs, for the position of the army of Portugal was necessarily at Salamanca, the conquest assigned to it was the preservation of Ciudad Rodrigo and its essential task the defence of Old Castile, against the English, that province being the base of operations for all the French armies. It was still within its own sphere, but at its utmost limit, when, pursuing the English from north to south, it had disputed Badajoz with them; but to require it to establish itself permanently in Estremadura was to call upon it to relinquish the principal for the accessory. In fact, while that army should have been guarding Badajoz and Marshal Soult besieging Cadix, Lord Wellington would inevitably have taken Ciudad Rodrigo, (which he actually did at a later time in consequence of an error somewhat similar to that now advised,) and then by moving on Valladolid have cut off all the French communications. We must add

\* The manuscript memoirs of Marshal Marmont, some day to be published, will furnish details on this subject which it seems to be unnecessary to produce here.

that to confine the army of Portugal to Badajoz by leaving it there alone was to condemn it to the impotence in which Marshal Soult had found himself at Llerena, and to the shame of seeing Badajoz taken before his eyes. Reduced to 30,000 men, as it then was, it could do nothing, and it had no chance to augment that number to 40,000 or 45,000 effective men except by returning to the North, and putting itself in a condition to collect all the invalids, wounded or fatigued, which had been left at Salamanca. It was neither reasonable nor just to require it to be stationed at Badajoz or in the neighbourhood.

Marshal Soult, urged by letters from Seville, having, one morning, presented himself at the quarters of Marshal Marmont to communicate to him his difficulties and his wishes, filled him with astonishment and distrust. To leave Marshal Marmont alone at Badajoz was to expose him to the danger of being attacked by more than 40,000 enemies, to whom he could oppose only 30,000 men. It was to gratify the most ardent wish of Lord Wellington, who waited on the Caya until one of the two marshals should desert the other and thus enable him to overwhelm him. Marshal Soult, whose mind was much prejudiced against his colleague, thought he perceived in this proposal, besides enormous ingratitude, the perfidious desire of exposing the army of Portugal to a disaster; and this gratuitous supposition inspired profound resentment. He greatly exaggerated the errors of his colleague, and, as is usual, assigned motives of which he was perfectly innocent. Marshal Soult, in fact, never thought of compromising the army of Portugal, for this would have compromised himself, but he wished to devolve upon it the most disagreeable part of his task, at all hazards, and then to give himself up to his own proper duties. Marshal Marmont replied with extreme bitterness that if he would separate himself from him while he left the main part of the army of Andalusia at Badajoz, nothing would be easier, for he would himself remain to command the united armies; that, otherwise, he would immediately leave and not return to the Guadiana till he should be assured of finding there a force so considerable that by uniting with it he might be able to overcome the English. After having said this to Marshal Soult, he wrote the same to him in dry and peremptory terms, and made his preparations to depart.

Since they did not remain united to engage the English, the two marshals could not have done better than put Badajoz into a tolerable state of defence and then separate each to his respective duty. The presence of Marshal Soult in Andalusia was indeed indispensable, and nothing but a great victory gained over the English would have excused his absence. The North of the Peninsula also required the presence of Marshal Marmont. Consequently, Marshal Soult left Badajoz, June 27, with a considerable portion of his army, to go to Seville, leaving only General Drouet d'Erlon with two divisions and some cavalry as a corps of observation around Badajoz. This was an error; for this corps, useless if the English removed, insufficient if they remained, could not but be compromised, as the result of it proved; and it would have been much better to have merely left in Badajoz a garrison of 10,000 men, in-

stead of 5000, with provisions in proportion, and to have carried away the whole of the army of Andalusia. Badajoz would have been in a better condition to defend itself, and Marshal Soult more capable of fulfilling his appropriate task elsewhere.

However this may be, he left Badajoz for Seville, and Marshal Marmont took the road for the Tagus. The English, wearied with two fruitless sieges, and not possessing the necessary *materiel* for a third, including in their army many invalids who had contracted the fevers of Estremadura on the banks of the Guadiana, had established themselves in the Sierra of Portalegre, in great need of rest. They went into summer quarters, which, in hot countries, is of the same import as winter quarters in the North.

Marshal Marmont, whose mission as general-in-chief of the army of Portugal was to oppose the enterprises of the English, chiefly those which they might attempt in the North, where was one principal line of communication, and secondly those which they might attempt towards the South, chose with great judgment the position of the Tagus, between Talavera and Alcantara, as that from which he might most easily discharge all his various obligations. In fact, from the banks of the Tagus he might reach Salamanca in four marches by the defile of Banos, there form a junction with the army of the North, and in union with it succour Ciudad Rodrigo. From this position, also, he might descend by Truxillo in a short time to Merida and Badajoz, there join, as we have said, the army of Andalusia, and alternately rush to the aid of Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, the two gates through which the English could penetrate from Portugal into Spain. Having formed this determination, he chose the bridge of Almaraz as the centre of the communications which he proposed to guard. For his headquarters he adopted the village of Naval-Moral, situated between the Tagus and the Tietar and protected by these two streams. He began by strengthening the bridge of Almaraz as much as possible, providing it with two strong *lites de pont*, and, since the plain of Estremadura towards the defile of Mirabele presented commanding positions from which the works of Almaraz might be attacked with advantage, he constructed several forts upon these positions, in which he placed small garrisons. On the course of the Tietar he also established a bridge and a *lité de pont*, so as to be able to debouche as easily on that side as the other upon the enemy. Having taken these precautions, he cantoned one of his divisions at Almaraz, and dispersed his light cavalry *en échelons* on the road of Truxillo, to attack Estremadura, collect bread, and obtain news from Badajoz. Another of his divisions he established at Naval-Moral to guard his head-quarters; he kept two at Plasencia, always in readiness to cross the mountains and descend upon Salamanca, and one at the defile of Banos itself, in order to be still more at hand to debouche in Old Castile. Finally, he left the 6th on his rear to defend the rich province of Avila against the insurgents. After having made this prudent and intelligent distribution of his troops, which enabled him with equal rapidity to enter Estremadura or Castile, Marshal Marmont hastened

to form his magazines, to repair his artillery, and to tend his sick and wounded remaining in the neighbourhood of Salamanca. Placed on the limit of the army of the centre, with which he found himself at question on the extent to which he might carry his demands for provisions, he repaired to Madrid in order to come to an understanding with Joseph, with whom he was well acquainted, and with whom, by a fatality peculiar to Spain, he had frequently sharp altercations, though both were extremely mild and in heart well disposed to each other.

The reader will not have forgotten that Marshal Bessières had greatly feared the effect which might be produced upon the Northern provinces by the removal of the army of Portugal, and had used much urgency to prevent its departure. The English, on their side, hoped to see the provinces rise in insurrection when the army of Portugal was no longer present. These fears and hopes were unfounded, and, notwithstanding the agitation of the regency of Cadiz, the Castilians, almost as much opposed to the guerillas as to the French, had remained tranquil. The banditti had indeed availed themselves of the opportunity to make some attempts. Le Marquisito had surprised Santander, and greatly ravaged that province. The insurgents of Leon had annoyed General Seras. They had been dispersed by Marshal Bessières and some regiments of the young guard. Fearing that he could not occupy at once Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Leon, and Astorga, that marshal had blown up the works of Astorga, and withdrawn General Bonnet from the Asturias, where during three years he had maintained his position with equal vigour and ability, at the same time keeping in awe Galicia, which dared not stir from fear of being taken from behind. It was, then, an error to recall him from the Asturias, for the Asturians and Galicians were thereby left at liberty to descend upon Castile. Yet, notwithstanding these difficulties, Marshal Bessières was perfectly in a condition to master Castile, and he had been still further reinforced by the Souham division, one of the three composing the *corps de reserve* at that time on the march for the frontiers of Spain.

Events of still greater weight, but very glorious for our arms, though unavailing for our power, were passing in Catalonia and Aragon with the army of General Suchet. The reader will, no doubt, remember the vigour and precision with which General Suchet had conducted the sieges of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, whose success, occurring after the capture of Girona, almost completed the conquest of Aragon and Catalonia. Still there remained Tarragona, the most important fortress of that country, since to its own strength, which was great, it added the support of the sea and the English fleets. It served as a support, a refuge, a magazine, and an inexhaustible arsenal, to the insurrectional army of Catalonia. Its capture was therefore of importance, and for this end General Suchet had made vast preparations. He had collected large supplies at Lerida, and a superb park of heavy artillery at Tortosa, with 1500 horses,—a most valuable resource in Spain, especially in those arid provinces where forage was particularly scarce. All this General Suchet had succeeded in procuring without

injury to the country, owing to the repose he had been able to afford his province, and the system of regular contribution which he had substituted for rapine.

Besides the stores of grain collected in Aragon and that part of Catalonia which had been assigned to him, he had formed folds of cattle by buying oxen of the inhabitants of the Pyrenees for ready money, and by carefully preserving the flocks taken from the insurgents of Soria and Calatayud. His *materiel* being prepared, he had distributed his troops in such a way as not to leave Aragon exposed to the enemy while he should go into Lower Catalonia to attempt the conquest of Tarragona. Napoleon, when detaching from Catalonia the extreme part of that province to annex it to Aragon and assign it to General Suchet, had, at the same time, given him from sixteen to seventeen thousand men of the army of Catalonia, and had replaced them in that army by one of the three divisions of the *corps de reserve*. In these sixteen or seventeen thousand men were found the 7th of the line, serving for some years gloriously in Spain, the 16th of the line, one of the regiments immortalized at Essling under General Molitor, and, finally, the Italians of General Pino, now an excellent troop, equal in courage and in discipline. With this reinforcement, General Suchet had under arms about 40,000 men. Of these he left 20,000 to guard Aragon, and 20,000 he appropriated to the great siege he contemplated. The advantage of recovering Figueras did not divert him from his object, and, thinking that Napoleon would provide specially for the recapture of that fortress, by means derived from France, he marched in two columns upon Tarragona. One, under General Harispe, descended thither from Lerida; the other, under General Habert, approached from Tortosa. The latter escorted the siege-equipage. The two together drove the enemy within the works. Besides possessing a garrison nearly equal to the besieging army, Tarragona was formidable from its situation and its works.

Built upon a rock, on one side washed by the Mediterranean, on the other by the river Francoli, which passed under its walls to the sea, Tarragona was divided into the upper and lower town. The upper town was surrounded by high Roman walls and modern works of great prominence. The lower town, situated at the foot of the higher, on plains watered by the Francoli, and on the sea-shore, was defended by a bastioned enceinte regularly and strongly fortified. Above the amphitheatre formed by the two towns was seen a fort called the Fort of Olivo, built upon a rock, commanding all the environs with its guns, and communicating with the town by an aqueduct. The three tiers of fortification were furnished with 400 heavy guns. The garrison consisted of 18,000 excellent troops, and a good commander, General Contreras, whom the fanatical and devoted population were resolved to second with all their might. The English fleet could incessantly renew the *materiel* of the fort, whether in ammunition or provisions, and supply the place of the dead or exhausted men with others brought from Catalonia and Valencia. Never, then, did any siege present a more alarming aspect.

Whatever method of attack might be adopted, the difficulty would be found equal. To the

south and east, along the sea, were met the steepness of the rock, a series of well-built lunettes connecting the enceinte of the two towns with the sea, and also the English fleets. To the north was no longer met the steepness of the rock,—because at that point the site of the fortress was connected with the mountains of Catalonia, which could be reached on foot by keeping the high ground,—but a stony arid soil, and the fort of Olivo, which itself would involve a real siege. Finally, on redescending by the west to the south, they would find themselves opposite to the two towns built one over the other, before two tiers of fortifications, in the low marshy lands of the Francoli, with the serious inconvenience of the English guns to the right. Every access then was extremely difficult, and required a long siege, which would certainly be frequently impeded by the assaults of the Catalonians and Valencians, aided and sustained by the English.

But all these difficulties did not repel General Suchet, who considered Tarragona the most certain pledge of the security of Catalonia and Aragon and the key of Valencia. His opinions were shared by his two principal lieutenants, who were ready to second him to the utmost of their power: these were Roignat, general of engineers, a man of not well-balanced but sagacious mind, obstinate, profoundly versed in his art, and General Valée, a man of refined, exact, and elevated mind, who united to the *coup-d'œil* requisite for the field the administrative foresight indispensable to officers of his arm. After conference with them, General Suchet resolved to attack the place from two sides at once,—by the southwest, i.e. from the lowlands of the Francoli bordering the lower town, which must be taken before thinking of attacking the upper, and by the north, i.e. by the fort of Olivo, which must be wholly conquered before these vast works could be mastered.

While the approach-works were beginning before the lower town, two of the bravest regiments of the army, the 7th and 16th of the line, under a very promising young general, named Salme, undertook the attack of the Olivo fort. They opened the trench before that fort in the night of the 21st and 22d of May. It was requisite to make their way on arid heights, in a rocky soil, without shelter from the cold of the night, the heat of the day, or the fire of the fort. There was in front of the Olivo a work which annoyed our trenches, and which, if it fell into our hands, would afford them support. Our soldiers carried it with the bayonet. But the Spaniards, who boasted themselves as invincible in defence, and not without reason, reappeared to the number of 800, uttering furious cries, and led by intrepid officers who came to plant their flag at the foot of the work they aimed at regaining. The men of the 7th and 16th shot down these brave officers, and then drove, at the point of the bayonet, to the very walls of the Olivo, the bold column which sought to deprive them of their conquest.

This fort presented a large surface, but without depth. It was a line of bastions built upon the rock with ditches dug in the rock, having in the rear a crenellated wall communicating by a postern with the fortress. Within was a redoubt higher than the fortress itself, capable of opposing a second resistance to the victorious

assailant. The Spaniards had a garrison of 1200 men and fifty large guns in these formidable works, and also the power of receiving reinforcements from the city, which might be supplied indefinitely by its communication with the sea.

For several days they wrought under continual fire and with sensible loss, for every evening the two brave regiments intrusted with this first siege numbered from fifty to sixty killed or wounded. They advanced in zigzag on a crest adjoining the Olivo, and made their way by means of sacks of earth, for it was scarcely possible to penetrate the rock by digging. At length, wishing to terminate these murderous approaches, they used all haste to establish the breaching-battery at a short distance from the fort, and it was ready to receive the artillery on the evening of the 27th. As it was impossible to employ horses on that ground, men were attached to the carriages, and drew them under a shower of grape which made many vacancies without damping the ardour of those who remained. The enemy, having, notwithstanding the darkness, detected the object of the groups on which they were firing, wished to frustrate them more directly by a brisk sortie. The young and valiant General Salme, with a reserve of the 7th, marched against the Spaniards, and, on exclaiming "Forward," he was struck down, and expired. He was deservedly adored by his soldiers for his courage and intelligence. To avenge his death, they rushed upon the Spaniards, whom they pursued with the bayonet to the ditches of the Olivo, and were checked only by the shower of grape and the manifest impossibility of scaling the place.

In the mean while the twenty-four-pounders had been placed in battery, and the next day at dawn the fire commenced on the right bastion opposite our left.

At their present distance the effects of artillery were terrible on each side. In a few hours the breach was effected, but the enemy repeatedly overturned our epaulements, and, in the midst of our disordered sacks of earth, an intrepid officer of artillery, Duchand, chief of a squadron, under the fire of the enemy, repaired the damage done to our batteries. On the next day, the 29th, they continued an incessant battery of the breach, and they resolved to give the assault, whatever result might be obtained by the artillery, for they had been no less than a fortnight before Tarragona, and, if one of the works cost so much time and so many men, they might despair of taking the place itself.

Notwithstanding the losses they had sustained, the 7th and 16th of the line would not have left to others the honour of taking by assault the fortress after having made the approaches. A column of the 7th, containing 800 men, under Miocque, chief of battalion, was to bear directly upon the breach; a second of the same strength, composed of soldiers of the 16th, under the commandant Revel, was to turn by our left, attack the right of the fort, and endeavour to penetrate by the gorge. General Harispe was ready to support these two columns with reserves. The whole army had received orders to be under arms and to feign a general attack.

In the middle of the night the signal was given, and the attack commenced. Around the

two towns our *tirailleurs* opened a brisk fire, as if about to fall upon the enceinte. The besieged, in alarm, replied with all their batteries, without knowing on whom they fired. The English fleet, in conjunction with them, fired at hazard along the shore. The Spaniards, in order to ascertain the danger which threatened them, threw some hundreds of fireworks, and mingled their cries of fury with the prolonged cheers of our men.

During this tumult, designed on our part, the two columns of assault rushed from the trenches, and for sixty or eighty paces were exposed to the fire of the Olivo. They reached the border of the fosse cut in the rock, into which they threw themselves, and while Miocque's column, provided with ladders, ran straight to the breach, which was only in part practicable, that of Revel turned to the left to assail the fort of the gorge. At this moment 1200 Spaniards, sent from the fortress to the assistance of Olivo, effected an entrance, and the gate of the fortress closed against them. Papigny, captain of engineers, at the head of thirty sappers, attacked the gate with hatchets. It resisted, and he seized a ladder to pass over it. But he fell, struck with a ball, and he expired with his mother's name upon his lips. Revel, the commandant of the column, profiting by the want of a fosse in that part, applied the ladders to the escarpment. The sappers and grenadiers scale the wall, leap into the fort, and open the gate to the column, who enter with fixed bayonets. At the same moment Miocque's column, directed against the breach, not finding it practicable, made use of ladders, which being too short, Meunier, serjeant of miners, lends his strong shoulders to the *voltigeurs*, who, by climbing up, penetrate the fort and join hands with their comrades. But, this method being too slow and too sanguinary, a part of the same column sought to enter by another way. Fortunately, Vacani, the officer of engineers, suddenly discovered an exit on our left, which consisted in the extremity of the aqueduct which brought water to the Olivo, and which was only closed by palisades. These he overthrew by some sappers, and effected a new entrance for our impatient soldiers. The two columns of Revel and Miocque, having forced their way through these different channels, fall upon the Spaniards, who abandon the fort and retire into the reduct. Our soldiers follow them and maintain a terrible hand-to-hand combat with the bayonet and the musket. The Spaniards, seeing no safety, defended themselves with desperation, and, being double our numbers, and their resistance being seconded by the escarpment of the reduct, success seemed to be uncertain. But the brave General Harispe, after being almost killed by a bomb, ran up with his reserves. Five hundred Italians, under Marcogna and Sacchini, chiefs of battalion, renew by their presence the ardour and confidence of the assailants. All together scale the reduct, and, transported with fury, put to the sword the obstinate defenders of the Olivo. General Suchet and his officers, arriving seasonably, saved about 1000 men, but about 900 Spaniards fell in that terrible combat. The cries of victory convey the intelligence of this important triumph to the besieger and the besieged.

In the Olivo were found about fifty guns, with a great many cartouches; and the besiegers im-

mediately set to work to turn the defences of the fort against Tarragona to prevent the Spaniards regaining it, and to turn to their own advantage an artillery lately so destructive to them. Confident of the result of the siege from the success just obtained, but shocked at the loss which this very success presaged, General Suchet was anxious to profit by the moral effect produced upon the two armies, to tempt the garrison by conciliating language and the proposal of a truce under pretext of burying the dead. The garrison, astonished at our boldness, but reckless of having lost 2000 men, replied to the overtures of General Suchet in accents of disdain and anger, and he was obliged to trust only to force. The season having rendered the earth hard and difficult to excavate, it was necessary to burn the dead instead of interring them. The number was lamentably great.

Being masters of the Olivo, they began the approaches opposite the lower town. Leaving the banks of the Francoli, they advanced from west to east, having on the left the Olivo, whose fire was now directed against the Spaniards, and on the right the sea, which required great precaution, owing to the English fleet. Along the shore they raised a series of redoubts, armed with heavy artillery, to keep the English at a distance, and especially to ward off their gunboats. They had opened the trench 180 toises from the enceinte which, at that part, formed a salient well adapted to an attack. On this side it presented two bastions very close to each other,—that of the Chanoines and that of St. Charles on our right. This last was connected with the wall of the port and quay for embarkation. The amount of fire, therefore, to which our men were exposed was not very alarming, for they could only receive that of the two bastions towards which they were making way. It is true that above and a little in the rear of these bastions was the Royal fort, a very elevated work, and that at our right, along the sea-shore, was also found another small fort, called Francoli, being situated at the mouth of that shore. This last work was connected with the fort by a bastioned wall. It was agreed to direct a breaching-battery against the fort of Francoli to take it by assault, without interrupting the approaches against the two bastions of Chanoines and St. Charles.

Twenty-five guns having been distributed between several batteries which fired at the same time on Tarragona and on the fort of Francoli, the latter, notwithstanding a very brisk fire of the enemy, was promptly rendered accessible to our assaulting columns. Though it possessed scarp and counterscarp in mason-work, and many ditches filled with water, they resolved to take it at once, and it was accordingly assailed, in the night of the 7th and 8th of June, by St. Cyr Nugues, the respectable chief of the staff to General Suchet, at the head of three small columns of infantry. Our soldiers threw themselves into the ditches, up to the breast in water, and climbed the breach under a brisk fire. The Spaniards at first resisted with their usual obstinacy, but, the work being connected with the town only by a long narrow communication parallel to the sea, they were afraid lest they should be cut off from it, and fled to the town. Our men pursued them, shouting, "To

the town! to the town!" in the hope of ending the siege by a *coup de main*, but they were forced to yield to a tremendous fire, and to works so imposing as to render all surprise impossible. Colonel St. Cyr Nugues called back his men to the Francoli fort, where he hastened to take his position, to protect himself by earth-works from the town, and to turn against the roadstead the artillery which they had just secured.

This was the second work carried by assault. But there were many others to be carried in the same manner. There remained a lunette, called the Prince's, having the sea in the rear, occupying the middle of the wall joining the Francoli to the main fortress. In this a breach was made, and it was taken on the 16th, after a long and sanguinary assault. From that moment there remained no further intermediate obstacle to overcome in order to attack the two bastions of St. Charles and the Chanoines, which met us like the bull's head. That of St. Charles, on the right, rested on the sea and protected the wall of the port; that on the left covered the angle formed by the western and northern aspect of the enceinte. Above was seen the Royal fort with four bastions. If the guns of the enemy were not very widely extended, they were formidable from their height, and this attack must cost us many men in the approaches, in serving the batteries, and in the actual assault, which would certainly meet an energetic resistance, since on its success depended the fate of the lower town and of the port itself.

General Suchet greatly desired to accelerate the siege, for he saw difficulties becoming more numerous both within and without the fortress, besides his daily losses, amounting to 2500 men in about twenty days. The English fleet, escorting an immense convoy, had brought to the garrison a reinforcement of 2000 men, provisions, ammunition, and a brave officer, General Sarfield, intrusted with the defence of the lower town. It had then disembarked on the road of Barcelona the Valencian division, 8000 men strong, which was to join General Campo-Verde, chief of the Catalonian army, who at the head of 15,000 men kept the field in the hope either of surprising our convoys, or of falling upon our trenches by a concerted movement with the garrison and the fleet.

General Harispe, established on the road of Barcelona with two divisions, one French and one Italian, kept his eye on the attacks which might come from that side. General Habert, posted with a French division on the banks of the Francoli, guarded the road of Tortosa, by which our convoys of artillery reached us, and that of Reus, by which we received our convoys of provisions. The rest of the troops were employed in the siege-works. Precautions were then taken against an attack from within and from without, and General Suchet trusted to the valour of his soldiers to resist any such combined movement. But our posts, stationed at intervals on the route of our convoys, were exposed daily to sanguinary encounters with the detachments of Campo-Verde, who boasted of having received numerous reinforcements, and of being in immediate expectation of receiving others still more considerable. At the risk of weakening his line of defence on the side of the insurgents of Teruel and Calatayud commanded by Villacampa, General Suchet resolved to summon to

himself General Abbé with a brigade. The fate of the country depending on the siege of Tarragona, it was necessary to sacrifice every thing to that essential object.

Influenced by such reasons, and by the unbounded devotion of his troops, General Suchet lost not a day nor an hour. From the first parallel they had passed to the second, and had arranged a series of batteries which, embracing in their wide circuits the bastions of Chanoines and of St. Charles, were to effect a breach in both, and in the Royal fort itself. The general wished to carry the lower town and all its defences by a simultaneous and energetic assault. After this grand effort he hoped that the difficult conquest of Tarragona would have been nearly achieved.

The fire was maintained by forty-four sieg-pieces in battery, while the work of the trenches was continued, which were vigorously answered by the artillery of the fort, which at this part was at least double of ours. Our epaulements were thus continually thrown down, and our brave artillerymen, impassible amid the subversion of their batteries, renewed their works without interruption, and often even fired without protection with admirable coolness and precision. They were seconded by the infantry with equal zeal.

On the 18th the third parallel was finished. By a subterraneous gallery they descended into the ditches of the two bastions, threw down the counterscarp, then completed the debouches through which the columns of assault were to disperse themselves through the ditches and thence rush upon the breaches. They even occupied themselves, by means of new batteries, in enlarging the breaches and levelling the incline.

On the morning of the 21st of June, at the moment when the people of Badajoz were rejoicing at the deliverance effected for them by the union of the two marshals, a frightful scene was preparing under the walls of Tarragona. At a given signal all the batteries, both old and new, opened fire, and were most vigorously answered. The noise of the fiercest battle does not equal that of a town besieged under such circumstances. The explosion of the powder-magazine overthrew our principal battery. Colonel Ricci was almost buried under the ruins, but, being speedily extricated, he reconstructed the battery and renewed the fire. The infantry, impatient for the assault, urged on the artillery by their shouts, and they, anxious to meet their wishes, redoubled their activity and ardour.

In the evening three breaches were considered practicable, one at the bastion of the Chanoines, the other at the bastion of St. Charles, the third above the two others, at the Royal fort. General Suchet and the officers who aided him with their counsels were determined to risk the success of the siege in a general assault, and either to fail or to take the lower town, which, once taken, secured the conquest of the upper town. General Suchet gave the command of the assault to General Palombini, on duty in the trenches on that day, and put under his orders 1500 grenadiers and voltigeurs, with sappers provided with ladders. General Montmarie kept a little to the left with the 5th light and the 116th of the line, either to act as a re-



serve, or to resist any sortie from the fortress. Still more to the left, two battalions of the seventh regiment of the line supported Montmarie. It was agreed that a mass of projectiles should be thrown upon the two towns from the Olivo, and that, in the opposite direction, General Harispe should threaten them with all his division. The Spaniards, on their side, had placed in the lower town General Sarfield with their best soldiers. Such was the fury which animated each side that the usual practice of summoning the city before making the assault was omitted.

At 7 o'clock P.M., before sunset, three columns rushed at once upon the three breaches. The first, composed of chosen men of the 116th, 117th, and 121st, under Colonel Bouvier of the engineers, made for the breach in the bastion of the Chanoines, and endeavoured to carry it, notwithstanding the Spaniards, who met them either with a close fire or the bayonet. After a desperate struggle, they reached the summit of the breach, repulsed the Spaniards, and were in their turn repulsed, but resumed the charge and maintained the conquest with fury. About one hundred grenadiers carried a lunette situated to the right, against which they were sent, and then rushed to the Chanoines to support Colonel Bouvier's troops. Meanwhile a second column under Fondzelski, a Polish chief of battalion, composed of men selected from the 1st and 5th light and 42d of the line, who had fallen upon the St. Charles Bastion, had met an obstinate resistance; but, being supported by a third column under Colonel Bourgeois, they maintained their position on the breach, of which they remained the masters. Fondzelski then pursued the Spaniards across the lower town, carried the intersections of the streets, and fought from house to house, while Bourgeois's column, which followed, took to the left to combine with Colonel Bouvier in conquering the Chanoines bastion, which, by this aid, was at length taken, and the two forces united fell upon the royal castle, which they penetrated by scaling the breach. The Spaniards defended themselves here to the utmost and were killed to the last man.

In the mean while, General Sarfield, at the head of a reserved force, fell with fury on Fondzelski's column, which had already invaded half the lower town. This column, agreeably to instructions, took refuge in the houses, where they defended themselves with obstinacy till the arrival of succour. Fortunately, Colonel Robert, of the 117th, with M. de Rigny, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, who brought up a reserve of the 5th light, and 42d, 116th, and 121st of the line, supported Fondzelski's column, repulsed Sarfield's soldiers, killed or threw into the sea some, and drove others back to the gates of the lower town, and did not stop till they reached the wall of the upper town, where the boldness of some of our men caused their death.

The assault, which began at seven o'clock, was finished by eight. We had in our possession nearly one hundred guns, an immense quantity of ammunition, few living prisoners but many killed and wounded, the bastions of St. Charles and Chanoines, the Royal fort, all the lower town, and the port and batteries which closed it. Without loss of time they

proceeded to fire upon the English squadron, which immediately set sail, after firing a few shots. We then began to reckon the losses on each side. We had been opposed to 5000 Spaniards; of these we had killed about 1200, and taken prisoners about 200, the greater part wounded. Five hundred of our men were disabled. Fourteen hundred bodies of the French and Spanish were burnt.

We had already made four murderous assaults; nor was this the last which the siege of Tarragona was to cost,—an extraordinary example of heroism in attack and defence. It was absolutely necessary to bring it to a termination, for the English fleet, having a second time coasted Catalonia from south to north, had brought to General Campo-Verde a new Spanish detachment and a body of 2000 English. There still remained at least 12,000 men in the upper town, with an immense artillery, and we might have been surprised at any time by a sortie from within combined with an attack from without. On the 24th great excitement was observed in the garrison, and scouts were seen in the direction of Barcelona. The general-in-chief placed General Harispe, on whom he willingly devolved the most important undertakings, in front of Tarragona, on the Barcelona road, with two divisions, and all the cavalry of the army. He kept himself between the fortress and the troops of General Harispe, ready to afford his aid where it should appear most necessary, and spent the last days between the trench and the outer camps.

The trench had been opened upon a kind of gently-inclined plateau, which was the base of the upper town, and was on a level with the roofs of the lower town. Our first and only parallel embraced almost all the front of the upper town, composed in part of four bastions, and had for a principal aim the establishment of two breaching-batteries against the St. Paul bastion, the last to the left. This bastion covered the angle formed by the west face which we were attacking, and the north face which we were proposing to scale. They pressed on the works in order quickly to effect a breach; for they had no idea that this resolute garrison, after having sustained four assaults, would spare itself the last, though it might expose them to be cut in pieces. A herald, having presented himself in front of our trenches waving a white handkerchief, had received only insult in reply. A deserter having announced an attack from without on the 29th, the commander-in-chief used every effort to be in a condition to make the assault on the evening of the 28th. They hastened the construction of the breaching-battery, which was completely armed on the night of the 27th-28th, the troops with enthusiasm harnessing themselves to the guns, which, with the greatest difficulty, were hoisted up to this steep plateau. On the 28th of June, which was to be the last day of this memorable siege, they opened fire at dawn with some anxiety, for it was of importance to render the breach practicable in the course of the day. Three hundred good marksmen, placed on the salient points of the ground, fired upon the enemy's embasures to dismount their artillery, and the Spaniards on the other hand, boldly presenting themselves over the breach, fired on our cannoners, whom, however, nothing could

move. The places of those who fell were taken by others, who continued with unabated devotion the work of destruction which was to open to us the walls of Tarragona. At length, about mid-day, the breach appeared sensibly to enlarge, while the increasing ruins diminished the suddenness of the declivity. Our soldiers came from all quarters to assist, while the Spanish garrison from the top of the ramparts provoked us by cries and insults.

About five P.M., General Suchet wished to make the assault, in order to avoid a night-encounter, if, as was said, we should find the great street of La Rambla, which cuts transversely the upper town of Tarragona, barricaded and defended. General Habert, who had taken the town of Lerida, commanded the assault. Fifteen hundred men, in two detachments, selected from the 1st and 5th light, and 14th, 42d, 114th, 116th, 118th, 117th, and 121st of the line and the first Polish regiment of the Vistula, were placed under his orders. A second column of almost equal force, taken from the French and Italian regiments present, was kept in reserve under General Ficatier. To the left, on the north aspect, which made an angle with the west aspect which we were attacking, General Montmarie, at the head of the 116th and 117th, was to endeavour to take by escalade the Rosaire gate, very near the bastion which had been breached, and corresponding to the very extremity of La Rambla. These arrangements being concluded at half-past five P.M., the commander-in-chief gave the signal, and the first column advanced rapidly through a considerable space unprotected, turned aside to avoid some aloes which were growing at the foot of the rampart, and then resumed its march directly towards the breach, which it began to ascend under a terrific fire. The boldest of the Spaniards, armed with guns and pikes and hatchets, awaited the assailants on the summit with furious cries. On this unsteady ground, under blows from pikes and bayonets, and under the very muzzles of the guns, our soldiers fell, recovered themselves, fight hand to hand, advance, recoil, under the double impulse which repels them in front and supports and urges them forward from behind. One moment they almost yield to the fury of the Spaniards, when, at the signal of the commander-in-chief, a second column advances, led on by General Habert, Colonel Pepe, Ceroni, chief of battalion, and all the aides-de-camp of General Suchet, MM. De St. Joseph, De Rigny, D'Aramon, Meyer, Desaix, Ricard, and Auvray. To these was joined an Italian named Bianchini, who, in return for his prodigies of valour at the attack of the Olivo, had solicited and obtained the honour of marching at the head of the last assault of Tarragona. This reinforcement gave a new and powerful impulse to our first column, and lifted it to the summit of the breach, which they ascended together. The brave Bianchini fell, after having received many wounds. The young Aramon was thrown down by a wound in the thigh. At length they make their way through the mass of defenders, penetrate the town, and turn some to the right and others to the left, in order by a round to pass the barricaded streets, particularly that of La Rambla. The commander-in-chief brought up the reserve of General Ficatier for this second combat, which threatened to be very sanguinary and

doubtful, for the garrison, still from ten to twelve thousand strong, resolved to defend themselves to the last. General Montmarie, in the mean while, advanced towards the Rosaire gate with the 116th and 117th of the line, carried the palisades of the covered way, and threw himself into the ditch under a murderous fire. He wished to apply the ladders to the gate, but found it walled up and barricaded. A knotted cord, suspended from one of the embrasures which the Spaniards had used in mounting this part, was then discovered by our voltigeurs, who get possession of it and climb one after another, while the two regiments in the ditch are exposed to the fire from the walls. But scarcely had some of our bold voltigeurs in this manner forced their way into the place, than the Spaniards rushed upon them to overwhelm them. They were about to yield, when Vicani, an engineer-officer, who had entered the town with a detachment of sappers along with the first columns, opened the Rosaire gate with his hatchet and gave access to the troops of General Montmarie, who then rushed into the interior of the upper town and attacked La Rambla with the troops of Generals Habert and Ficatier. Our exasperated soldiers heard nothing more, and killed with the bayonet all whom they met. Enraged against a troop of the enemy who fled towards the cathedral, they pursued them towards that edifice, which is approached by about sixty steps, which they ascend under a murderous fire, penetrate into the church, and kill without intermission the unfortunate wretches who had fired upon them. Yet, finding in the cathedral several hundreds of wounded, they arrest their revenge and spare them. At this moment 8000 men, the whole living remnant of the garrison, leaving by the Barcelona gate, endeavoured to save themselves in the direction of the sea. But General Harispe, stopping their way, forced them to surrender their arms. From this moment, the upper town as well as the lower, the Francoli and the Olivo, were in our power.

Such was this most terrible assault, perhaps the most furious they ever made, at least to that time. The breaches were covered with the bodies of the French, but the town was choked up with those of the Spaniards in still greater number. Incredible disorder prevailed in the burning streets, where from time to time a few fanatical Spaniards exposed themselves to certain death in order to gratify themselves by the slaughter of a few French. Our soldiers, yielding to a feeling common to all troops who have taken a city by assault, considered Tarragona as their property, and scattered themselves through the houses, where they destroyed more than they pillaged. But General Suchet and his officers, urging upon them that to exercise the right of war to so extreme an extent was barbarous, recalled them with no great difficulty, especially as the battle had ceased and they were no longer excited to rage by the fire of the enemy. Order was gradually restored, the flames were extinguished, and they could now reckon their trophies as well as their losses. They had taken more than 800 guns, innumerable muskets, projectiles and ammunition of all kinds, about twenty flags, 10,000 prisoners, at the head of whom was the governor, De Contreras, himself, whom General Suchet treated with the greatest respect, though the last assault was an act

of desperation which might have been spared to both armies. But patriotism should be honoured even though carried to an extreme. Besides the 10,000 prisoners, the garrison had lost not less than 6000 or 7000 men by fire and sword. The last assault especially had been most destructive. Our own losses were very considerable. No fewer than 4300 of our men were disabled, of whom 1000 or 1200 were killed and 1500 or 1800 so mutilated as to be rendered incapable of serving again. We lost about twenty officers of engineers; for that corps, which is admirable in the French army, had displayed equal courage and intelligence in this memorable siege, which lasted nearly two months, during which we had opened nine breaches, effected four descents into the fossé, made five assaults, three of which—those of the Olivo, of the upper and lower town—might be reckoned among the most furious in history.

The capture of Tarragona was an exploit of the highest importance; it deprived the Catalonian insurrection of its principal support, it separated it from the Valencian insurrection, and was calculated to produce a great moral effect in the Peninsula generally, from which great advantage might have been derived if we had been at the moment prepared to overwhelm the Spaniards by a vast concourse of forces. Unfortunately, this did not exist, and, owing to Napoleon being exclusively occupied with other designs, the only result of this great siege was to open to us the road to Valencia. General Suchet had orders to blow up Tarragona; for Napoleon, with reason, determined that Tortosa should be the only occupied fortress in that part of Spain, and that only on account of the mouths of the Ebro. But Suchet, having observed, in accordance with General Rogniat, that by preserving only the upper town it might be occupied with about 1000 men, blew up the works of the lower town, left in the upper town a garrison well supplied with ammunition and provisions, encouraged the inhabitants to return, deposited his siege-park and ammunition at Tortosa, sent back his principal detachments towards the stations from which they had been brought, in order to suppress the bands which had regained their audacity during the siege, and, with a brigade of infantry, pursued Marquis de Campo-Verde, that he might disperse his corps before they should have time to re-embark. Though he used great activity, he could not overtake him. At Villa Nova he found 1000 wounded at the siege of Tarragona, who had been carried thither by sea, and completed the number of 18,000 men in garrison, of whom 10,000 had been taken and 6000 or 7000 had been killed. He then followed the steps of Campo-Verde by the Barcelona road. The Valencians having become seditious from their desire to return home, Campo-Verde was obliged to separate himself from them and to embark them on the English fleet at Mataro; and, at the very moment when this was accomplished, General Suchet reached Mataro, accompanied by General Maurice-Mathieu from Barcelona. He then devoted himself to the pursuit of Campo-Verde and the capture of the celebrated convent of Montserrat, which his troops carried shortly after with singular boldness. He thus rendered all the service in his power to the army of Catalonia, absorbed in the blockade of Figueres and the periodical revictualling of Barcelona, and

then returned to Saragossa to restore order to his own government. He then received the marshal's baton, a just reward of his services; for if the memorable sieges of Aragon and Catalonia, the most remarkable since the time of Vauban, were due in a great part to the engineer-officers and brave soldiers of the army of Aragon, they were also due in a great measure to the military sagacity of the commander-in-chief and the great prudence of his administration.

The months of July, August, and sometimes of September, are, in Spain, months of inaction. During this period of excessive heat the English were unable to move; our own soldiers, though more active, and more accustomed to privations, required, nevertheless, a little rest from their continual marches, and even the Spaniards at this season lose a little of their passion for roving the country, were it only for the purpose of gathering the harvest. Yet, in Andalusia, Marshal Soult had left so many things in abeyance, owing to his forced stay at Llerena, that he had been obliged to employ in activity these months, commonly devoted to repose. Two Spanish divisions which, under General Blake, had assisted in the battle of Albuera, were detached from Lord Wellington to agitate Seville. But instead of marching directly to that end, which was well worth the trouble of such a diversion, they repaired to the county of Niebla, near the mouth of the Guadiana. Marshal Soult had followed them with one of his divisions, and with the rest had gone to Seville, to give the necessary attention to the affairs of his government. He had found the insurgents of the mountains of Ronda, who were always very active, now engaged in laying siege to Ronda itself; and those of Murcia, after having compelled the 4th corps to confine themselves in Grenada, venturing as far as Baeza and Jaen, near the defiles of Carolina, in a position where they could interrupt the communications of Andalusia with Madrid. It was, therefore, necessary to march at once upon Ronda, Jaen, Baeza, and Granada, to repress the audacity of these different companies. Marshal Soult, profiting by the departure of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, had suppressed the organization into *corps d'armée*,—always a bad arrangement, except under the personal command of Napoleon,—and had persisted in leaving only about 12,000 men before Cadiz, including the artillery and the sailors, and then, recalling the detachment, which had been sent into the county of Niebla, and whose mere presence had occasioned the two divisions of General Blake to re-embark, had directed his course towards the kingdom of Grenada with all the troops he could assemble.

He had sent in advance General Godinot, with a detachment comprising three fine regiments of infantry—the 12th light, the 55th and 58th of the line—and the 27th dragoons. This detachment was to drive the insurgents from Jaen to Baeza, while the principal corps should aim directly for Grenada. The insurgents, though numerous, could not maintain their ground in the open country on this occasion more than formerly, and they successively abandoned Jaen and Baeza to return into the kingdom of Murcia. The marshal entered Grenada, where he assembled part of the 4th corps, and on the 8th of August left that city to continue his march. In

this interval the insurgents of Murcia had joined Generals Blake and Ballesteros, who had come in English vessels from the mouths of the Guadiana to Almeria, and had taken up a strong position at La Venta de Baul. They amounted on the whole to about 20,000 men. The steep and almost inaccessible position which they occupied presented a difficult obstacle, and we lost many men in fruitless attempts to take it. But General Godino—who had driven the insurgents of Murcia from Jaen—advanced to turn the position; and scarcely was he seen appearing on the left of Marshal Soult, when the Spaniards retired in confusion into Murcia. Once in retreat, they lost all order and choked the roads with scattered soldiers, who were taken or slain in great numbers by the cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg. The prompt and total dispersion of this body gave the assurance, not that we should never see them again, but that we should not have them on our hands for several months. Marshal Soult, after having established at Grenada part of the troops of the old 4th corps, and sent reinforcements to Ronda under General Leval, re-entered Seville, to occupy himself with the siege of Cadiz and with providing the *materiel* still wanting for its execution.

The remainder of August was spent in almost total inaction, Marshal Soult granting a little rest to his troops, which, from 80,000 men, were now reduced by fatigue and slaughter to 40,000 at the most, and disputing with Joseph for certain detachments which the army of the centre demanded of the army of Andalusia; Marshal Marmont remaining encamped on the Tagus towards Almaraz, and also contending with Joseph for the foraging of his army, which he claimed to extend as far as Toledo; Joseph continually complaining of poverty, demanding that, in lieu of the fourth part of the contributions due from the generals but constantly refused by them, Napoleon should send him an additional million per month, and obtaining as his only consolation that his friend Marshal Jourdan should be sent as chief of his staff; Marshal Suchet, a master within his own province, and disputing with nobody, but silently preparing the expedition of Valencia, which Napoleon had assigned to him as the necessary consequence of the conquest of Tarragona; finally, General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, specially charged with the blockade of Figueras, driving back into that fortress the Spaniards who sought to escape, obliging them to surrender themselves prisoners of war and thus to expiate the surprise of that frontier-fort.

During these months of inaction, Lord Wellington arrested his plans to resume operations in September, and his plans were nothing less than the conquest of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Indeed, since he had succeeded in delivering Portugal from the French, he had nothing better to do than to take either Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, and both, if possible, for they were the keys of Spain,—one to the north and the other to the south. If master of these places, he would prevent the French from invading Beira or Alentejo, and it would be easy for him on the first opportunity to invade Castile or Andalusia. To take them, therefore, would be the way to close his own door and to keep open that of others. He had a second motive for

thus acting in the desire to effect something; for, during the six months since the reconquest of Portugal, he had added nothing remarkable to his previous exploits. His operations had been greatly extolled in England, and with reason, though perhaps a little beyond their merits, which generally happens when from any one has been too long withheld that which is justly his due. The fickleness of public opinion raises suddenly to the clouds the man whom it had not condescended to notice. There also remained the opposition, which, partly in sincerity, partly from systematic hostility, was ever ready to repeat that they had no doubt been able to preserve Portugal for a time, but that they could not go further; that they were carrying on in the Peninsula a ruinous war without any probable result,—certainly without any result worth the terrible chance to which they were constantly exposed of being some day driven into the sea by the French. There was no need of a long period of inaction, nor a long want of important news, nor yet many such events as the last raising of the siege of Badajoz, to recall these opinions to many prudent men who had sincerely entertained them. Lord Wellington was, therefore, by many reasons, military and political, obliged to distinguish himself by some new act, and, therefore, to take either Badajoz or Ciudad Rodrigo,—two obstacles which rendered impossible every ulterior operation of importance.

But this was no easy task; for, if he presented himself before Badajoz, it was to be presumed that he would find there Marshal Soult and Marshal Marmont; if he appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, he might expect there to find Marshal Marmont reinforced with all that could be collected of the armies of the centre and of the North. In each case, he ran the risk of meeting forces too considerable to admit of his executing an important siege in their presence; for, as usual, he was unwilling to engage without a certain prospect of success,—that is to say, in defensive positions almost invincible, and with a numerical superiority which, combined with a good selection of his position, rendered the result as secure as the uncertainties of war allow. Yet, if condemned to meet, either in the South or North, concentrations of forces superior to those at his disposal, Lord Wellington, on the other hand, possessed unquestionable advantages. The road which he had made for himself within the frontiers of Portugal, from north to south, and which he had so frequently traversed, which descended from Guarda to Espinhal, from Espinhal to Abrantes, from Abrantes to Elvas, had been carefully marked out, supplied with numerous magazines, and provided with bridges over the Mondego and the Tagus. He was followed by 6000 Spanish mules loaded with provisions; he possessed sole command, was dependent on none, was instantly obeyed, and was exactly informed of our movements by the Spaniards,—an advantage to which he himself ascribed a portion of his success. The French generals, on the contrary, were independent of each other, placed at great distances, not harmonious, destitute of every thing, informed of nothing, and it was a wonder if they were ever found combined in a common aim with the *materiel* necessary to any operation of importance. In order that Marshal Soult should

receive aid from Marshal Marmont, it was necessary that the latter, forgetting all the resentment of the army of Portugal, should hasten to his aid, that he should be both able and willing to do this, and that, in particular, he should possess a bridge and provisions at Almaraz. In order that Marshal Marmont should seasonably protect Ciudad Rodrigo, it was necessary that the commander of the army of the North should be willing to aid him,—that, with this view, he should consent to suspend the pursuit of the bands, to collect 12,000 or 15,000 men at one spot, and thus neglect almost all others, and in prospect of this should prepare vast magazines at Salamanca; or else that the army of the centre, which was scarcely adequate to protect Toledo, Madrid, and Guadalaxara, should neglect one of these important posts for the safety of one not confided to him, and that, finally, these different generals should march upon Ciudad Rodrigo without any mutual jealousy. And, supposing they were both able and willing to do all this, it was still necessary that they should know in time the movements of the enemy which led to this concentration of forces. Napoleon had strongly recommended reciprocal assistance; but, not being able to foresee the particular case, he had only recommended it generally, and we have already seen how they executed even the most exact orders, given in a definite and urgent case. It was not, then, impossible for Lord Wellington, by conducting his preparations with secrecy and skilfully concealing his movements, to secure twenty-five or thirty days for the conduct of a great siege, which he might finish before the French could come to the aid of the besieged. On this chance Lord Wellington formed his plans of operation for the autumn of 1811 and the winter of 1811 and 1812.

At the present moment, his soldiers being a little discouraged by the resistance of Badajoz, he wished to change their aim, and with this view proposed to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. He had also very judiciously remarked that Marshal Marmont, in going from Naval-Moral to Salamanca to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, had less chance of being joined by adequate forces than in entering Estremadura to succour Badajoz, in which case he was sure to find Marshal Soult, with many more resources at his disposal than Marshal Bessières in Castile, and having a great personal interest in the defence of Badajoz. It was, therefore, much better to make an attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo than upon Badajoz; only there was one difficulty in this case, which consisted in his not having a park of siege-artillery, and no closed place in which to put it in security, which caused Lord Wellington never to cease regretting having seen Almeida destroyed before his eyes by the French. On the contrary, for the attack of Badajoz he had two large closed magazines,—that of Abrantes, where the English navy had transported by water an immense *materiel*, and Elvas, which was reached from Abrantes by a good road, and where might be laid up in security all the *materiel* for a great siege.

Nevertheless, not allowing himself to be discouraged by this difficulty, Lord Wellington had transported secretly into the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo a park of heavy artillery, sending one piece after another, and had the precau-

tion to conceal it in several villages. He had, besides, brought in succession all his divisions into Upper Beira, except that of General Hill, which had been left in observation on the Guadiana, and had encamped his troops behind the Agueda, leaving to Don Juan, the guerilla chief, the care of starving out Ciudad Rodrigo by constant inroads of the neighbouring country.

Towards the end of August and beginning of September, Marshal Marmont, better informed of the enemy's movements than usual, had learned the removal of the English army, and received from General Reynaud, commandant of Ciudad Rodrigo, intimation that the place would be reduced to the utmost extremity, that the garrison, already on half rations, had meat only to the 15th of September, bread to the 25th, and that after that time they would be obliged to surrender. After such an intimation there was no time to lose. The care of revictualling Ciudad Rodrigo devolved at that time upon the army of Portugal. Marshal Marmont concerted with General Dorsenne, who had just replaced the Duke d'Istria, recalled to Paris; and it was agreed that that general should prepare a strong convoy of provisions to the environs of Salamanca, whither he should repair with part of his troops, that on his side Marshal Marmont should quit the banks of the Tagus, re-pass the Guadarrama by the defile of Banos or Peralba, and descend upon Salamanca to aid in revictualling Ciudad-Rodrigo at all risks.

All these arrangements were faithfully observed. Marshal Marmont concentrated his divisions and made them cross the Guadarrama in succession. He had wished to bring all six towards Ciudad Rodrigo, which might have gained him more than 80,000 men, his corps having been joined by a part of their sick and wounded. But in order to this it would have been necessary that Joseph should send him one division of the army of the centre, to guard the position of the army of Portugal between the Tietar and the Tagus, which that prince could not do without great personal inconvenience, nor without exposing the capital on the side of Guadalaxara and La Mancha. Joseph not daring to do this, Marshal Marmont was obliged to leave an entire division on the Tagus to guard his bridges and depôts; and this office he assigned to the division which had been stationed on the road of Truxillo in observation towards Estremadura. He crossed the Guadarrama with the five others, and found himself early in September in the neighbourhood of Salamanca with 26,000 men. General Dorsenne, on his side, made for Astorga with 15,000 excellent troops, comprising the Young Guard and one of the divisions of reserve which had recently entered the Peninsula. The cavalry, in particular, was magnificent. He met on the road a nearly-equal number of Galician insurgents, commanded by the Spanish general Abadia, whom he drove before him as far as Villa-Franca, taking or killing several of their men, and then turned to the left upon Zamora and Salamanca.

On the 20th of September the armies of the North and of Portugal met. They were both in good condition, well rested, and provided with necessary *materiel*, and they contained at least 6000 excellent cavalry. Their whole effective war more than 40,000 men. The English army, commonly so well informed, did not expect so

rapid a concentration of forces in such great numbers. It was almost as numerous as the French army, but consumed with disease, in no way prepared for a battle, dispersed through widely-separated cantonments, so that Crawford's light division was before the Agueda engaged in the blockade of Ciudad, while the main body of the army was far in the rear of that river. The total effective of Lord Wellington comprised only 25,000 English: the rest were Portuguese.

Had the French generals taken sufficient pains to procure information, they might have known these facts, and have profited by them to inflict a decisive blow on the English general, which his fortune as well as his prudence had enabled him hitherto to avoid. Whether informed or not, they might have considered that at any moment they might encounter the English army, either concentrated or divided, and that in one case they ought to be ready to engage it, in the other to overwhelm it.

Their duty was, therefore, to march as if every instant liable to fight. But they did nothing of the kind; nor did they even agree among themselves as to the resolution to give battle if urged by necessity or invited by a convenient opportunity. It was merely agreed that General Dorsenne, marching to the right upon Ciudad Rodrigo, should introduce the convey, and that Marshal Marmont, advancing with his cavalry to the left, should practise a reconnaissance on Fuente Guinaldo and Espeja. The safety of the army of Portugal not having yet arrived, General Dorsenne lent the Thiebault division to Marshal Marmont to be disposed of as occasion required. They set off, then, before all the army had assembled or was in a condition to receive the enemy should he appear. It was, indeed, very improbable that the English would fight, for at the time their position before the Agueda was not good; but, whatever might be their actual position, it was not right to approach them so closely unless we were ourselves in a condition to profit by good chances or to parry evil ones.

In this disorder, then, they marched upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and had the satisfaction of introducing into that city a large quantity of provisions without striking a blow, on September 23. This end being attained, the two French generals had, no doubt, fulfilled their principal mission; but they were tempted to discover the state of the English army, and Marshal Marmont, directing himself to the left, resolved to execute the projected reconnaissance. Advancing with his cavalry, still commanded by the brave Montbrun, he perceived Crawford's light division divided into two brigades widely separated from each other, and in such a state that they might have been destroyed in succession if attacked by a strong advanced guard. Moreover, Lord Wellington, with an army badly kept together, deprived of one of his divisions, and not upon ground such as he liked to occupy in a battle, would probably have been conquered if he had gone to the help of Crawford's two brigades, and, once conquered, would probably have been destroyed.

Unhappily, having only cavalry, no other arm could be put in the van. General Montbrun threw himself upon the English infantry with his accustomed vigour, routed them though well positioned, took four guns which they could not

retain, for without a single battalion it was impossible to resist when the infantry should rally and return upon them. Marshal Marmont, who was present at this action, loudly called for Thiebault's division, which had been destined to him; but General Dorsenne, a person of very peculiar temperament and great self-esteem, though a brave officer, forbore to send that division till too late to be serviceable, either from want of will or from want of time. When at length it appeared, the two English brigades, having rallied and combined, were out of reach.

On the following day, all the infantry of the army were drawn out; but the English were in full retreat, and were so far in advance as to render it impossible to overtake them,—at least in a single march. It became evident that if they had been properly attacked they might have been crushed. It would still have been practicable to follow, overtake, and beat them if our soldiers had been provided with three or four days' provision in their kits. But they had it not. It was therefore necessary to retrace their steps with the single satisfaction of having reinvaded Ciudad Rodrigo, and the bitter regret of having let slip the English army when an opportunity had been afforded of wholly subduing it. Want of reflection in the principal of our two generals, want of concord in the other, thus obtained for Wellington another instance of good fortune, rescued him from imminent danger, and lost us the opportunity of destroying a mortal enemy,—an opportunity which had been repeatedly presented, but in vain. This was a new proof, after a thousand others, of the inconvenience of want of unity in command, and of the impossibility of supplying that unity by the authority of Napoleon exercised at the interval of Paris from Madrid.

Napoleon, as we have seen, confident that the reserve, recently prepared, would suffice for the war in Spain provided the autumn and winter were well employed, after which it would be possible for him in the spring to recall the Imperial Guard, wished the important operations to begin in September.

The first of these operations in his eyes was the occupation of Valencia; and it was because the conquest of Tarragona led the way to that of Valencia that he heard with so much pleasure and rewarded with so high distinction the last exploit of Marshal Suchet. He enjoined him therefore to be in motion about the 15th of September at the latest, promising him, as soon as he should be on march, a strong support in the rear, either by means of General Decaen, who had replaced Marshal Macdonald in Catalonia and was then unembarrassed with Figueras, or by means of General Reille, commanding in Navarre, who was to receive two divisions of the reserve. If Valencia were taken, Napoleon flattered himself that Marshal Suchet would extend his operations as far as Grenada; that the army of Andalusia could, after that, fall back almost wholly towards Estremadura; that, at least half of that army uniting with that of Portugal, restored to a force of 50,000 men by the return of the wounded, sick, and absent, they might penetrate Alentejo with 70,000 men, while the army of the North, reinforced by two divisions of the reserve, would descend upon the Tagus by the road adopted by Massena, and would unite with these 70,000 men. Napoleon

was then in hopes that he should be able to drive the English very near the precipice which was involved in their obstinate maintenance of their station at Lisbon. He even hoped, though aiming at such vast results, to be able to withdraw his young guard, always on the condition of supplying its place with Dronet's 4th battalions, which had been sent back to Bayonne and there filled with the conscripts of 1811 and 1812, which ought to make up, at least in numbers, for the departure of the regiments of the guard. We shall see by the results how far this great genius could, with all his greatness, dispense with a personal observation of affairs in forming a correct appreciation of them.

Marshal Suchet was as well inclined for the conquest of Valencia as Napoleon. But of the 40,000 men fit for service which he possessed out of a nominal effective of 60,000, he had lost from 4000 to 5000 men at the siege of Tarragona and in subsequent operations, and of the 35,000 remaining he must detach at least 12,000 or 13,000 to guard Aragon and Lower Catalonia. He could, therefore, have only 22,000 or 23,000 men actually in hand, which was a very small number for the conquest of Valencia. He had already once advanced to the gates of that great city, and was able to judge of the difficulties of the enterprise, for, on his road, he must take Peniscola, Oropesa, Sagunta, and then occupy Valencia itself with a strong force, though defended by the whole army of the Valencians, by that of the insurgents of Murcia, and even by Blake's army, composed of the two divisions of Zayas and Lardizabal, which had been brought from the banks of the Albuera to Grenada the previous month. Nevertheless, whatever might be the difficulties, Marshal Suchet, resolved upon his course, left one division between Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa, under the orders of General Frère, to guard Lower Catalonia, another under the orders of General Musnier on the Ebro, to guard Aragon, and marched upon Valencia with 22,000 men. According to his custom, he displayed the most eager solicitude in organizing the supply of provisions and ammunition in the rear. Tortosa, at the mouth of the Ebro, was his principal dépôt. He had there collected, after repairing it, the siege-park which he had used at Tarragona; he had formed vast magazines, which were supplied with the excellent corn of Aragon by means of fourteen large barges, well escorted, which kept a constant traffic between Mequinenza and Tortosa, by the Ebro. From this place they were to obtain their provisions and ammunition, while they pursued the road by the sea from Tortosa to Valencia. Each regiment was to bring its own supply of meat by taking with it a flock of sheep.

After these precautions, Marshal Suchet set off for Valencia on the 15th of September, 1811, in three columns. With the principal of these, composed of Habert's division of infantry, of Robert's brigade, of the cavalry and artillery, he followed the highroad from Tortosa to Valencia. The Italian division of Palombini went to the right by the mountains of Morella to San Mateo, the French division of Harispe still farther to the right, across the mountains of Teruel. After having cleared these different roads they were to effect their junction in advance of Murviedro at the entrance of the beautiful plain called Huerta de Valencia.

The army nowhere met any serious obstacle, and they drove before them all the bands that infested the country. The principal column alone, following the highroad from Tortosa, met with any difficulties, and these were presented by the forts of Peniscola and Oropesa, the latter of which commanded both the sea-shore and the road. As the fort of Peniscola jutted out upon the sea at a considerable distance from the road, they satisfied themselves with driving back the garrison, which had attempted a sortie, and then passed on, leaving a detachment to occupy the passage. They could not do the same before Oropesa, which commanded both the sea and the road. To avoid it they made a detour of two or three leagues, which was difficult for the field-artillery, and absolutely impossible for the siege-train. But as this last had been left at Tortosa with the design of bringing it up when in possession of the plain of Valencia, they resolved to continue their march, but to send back some battalions to Oropesa to open the highroad for the siege-train.

On the 20th of September, the three columns met in the neighbourhood of Castellon de la Plana. On the 21st, they encountered several hundreds of Spaniards at the passage of the Minjares, a torrent which descends from the mountains to the sea. The dragoons dispersed them, and on the 22d they arrived at the entry of the magnificent semicircular plain of Valencia, the circumference of which is formed by beautiful mountains, the middle traversed by numerous canals, studded with the palm, the olive, and the orange, is clothed with rich cultivation, and the diameter is formed by a resplendent sea, on the border of which is seen Valencia with its many steeples. Entering from the north, (and the army was in fact passing from north to south,) the first obstacle was presented by Murviedro, an unwall'd town, but built at the foot of the rock where formerly stood Saguntum, and where remained a fortress of various construction, Roman, Arabic, and Spanish, occupied by 3000 men with provisions and ammunition, who ought not to be left in the rear of our army when attacking Valencia, which was defended by a whole army. General Blake had in fact joined the Valencians with the two divisions of Zayas and Lardizabal.

On the 23d, Marshal Suchet took Murviedro with Habert's division, which was not very difficult, though the garrison of Saguntum had descended from their position to endeavour to save the city at their feet. Our forces became masters of Murviedro, and, notwithstanding the brisk fire of the fortress, they barricaded themselves in the houses, which they converted into battlements, and thus forced the garrison to confine themselves to their redoubt: but thither they could not follow them, their position being almost inaccessible.

After an attentive examination of this fortress, so much in the way of the army, it was discovered to be inaccessible on all sides but one,—that of the west, by which it joined the mountains which encompass the plain of Valencia. On this side, a tolerably gradual incline led to the first works, consisting of a high and solid tower which secured the long narrow rock on which the fortress was built, and which was connected by strong walls with the other towers forming the enceinte. It appeared too tedious

and too dangerous a plan to advance by regular approaches on this bare hard rock, where their only protection could be sacks of earth, and where it would be very difficult to hoist up the heavy artillery. The greatest confidence was placed in the troops who had made so many extraordinary assaults, and they resolved to venture on an escalade. In the middle of the night of September 28, two columns of 800 chosen men, with ladders, supported by reserves, approached the fortress by the side which appeared the most easily scaled. By a singular coincidence, the garrison had chosen the same night for a sortie. Though vigorously repulsed, they were on their guard, and therefore it was not a favourable opportunity to effect a surprise. Unfortunately, the columns of assault were in motion, filled with ardour scarcely to be restrained, and in the confusion of a baffled sortie it was impossible to countermand them. They had planted their ladders, and boldly attempted to reach the summit of the walls. But the ladders were too short and too few, and the attempt was known to the enemy, so that wherever the ladders were placed men were seen at the top rising with fury and at gun's-length on the assailants or throwing them down with the pike and axe. To scale was, therefore, impossible. The second column, obstinately renewing the attack, was in the same manner repulsed, and his bold attempt, designed with the view of saving time and life, cost us about 300 men in killed and wounded without any beneficial result.

Much vexed at this check, Marshal Suchet found himself obliged to resort to the ordinary method. A regular siege seemed to be indispensable to the mastering of the rock of Saguntum. It was debated whether it would not be better to evade this obstacle by a simple detachment and to pass on to Valencia. But the marshal, having neglected Peniscola and Oropesa, feared to leave on his rear a third fortified post with a garrison of 3000 men, and he determined to make himself master of it before carrying forward his operations.

It was necessary to bring the heavy siege-artillery from Tortosa, and for that purpose to take Oropesa, which completely intercepted the road. Orders were, consequently, given to General Compère to appear before Oropesa with 1600 Neapolitans, and the convoy of the heavy artillery were ordered to move from Tortosa. The first guns that should arrive were to be employed in opening the road by overthrowing the walls of Oropesa. The Neapolitans, directed by the French engineers, began the approach-works, and carried them on with much ardour and intrepidity. On the 9th of October, they were able to establish the breaching-battery, to arm it with several heavy guns, and to clear for themselves an entrance into the principal tower of Oropesa. The little garrison which defended it, not venturing to meet the chances of an assault, surrendered on the 10th of October. They have found some ammunition, they established a station, and were enabled to bring without obstacle as far as to the camp the park of heavy artillery, under Murviedro.

Generals Valée and Rogiat, having returned to the army after being absent on leave, arranged the plan of attack against the fortress of Saguntum. They decided upon attacking it from

the west,—that is to say, by the slopes which connected the rock of Saguntum with the mountains. It was necessary to dig the trench in a very hard ground, often in the bare rock, by mining, and to make their way towards a group of walls and high towers, so situated that from their summit they could fire into our trenches; and thus they disabled thirty or forty men daily. Moreover, it was necessary to carry every thing to that height, even the rubbish which filled our earth-sacks, which prevented our giving the necessary thickness to our épaulements,—another serious inconvenience, for they afforded a very insufficient protection. While engaged in these troublesome labours, the banditti who invested the mountains of Teruel, Calatayud, and Cuenca, situated between the provinces of Aragon and Valencia, had become more active than ever, attacked our posts and carried off our flocks, so that it was impossible longer to delay sending some columns to the rear to repress their audacity.

Eager to triumph over this obstacle to their progress, the army impatiently demanded the assault. The generals wished nothing more, but the establishment of batteries under the continual fire of the Spaniards had occasioned vast labour and very sensible loss, and they were unable to batter in breach before the 17th of October. Our well-directed artillery destroyed the first casings, but in the thickness of the walls was found old mason-work, hard as a rock, and the Spaniards from above, with an energy scarcely equalled even at Tarragona, remaining exposed under the fire of the breaching-battery, took aim at our gunners, killed them one by one, and thus retarded our efforts.

At length, on the 18th, in the afternoon, the breach, though still presenting a difficult escarpment, was pronounced practicable, and the order for assault was given. The Spaniards above the breach and on the summit of the tower in which it had been effected were armed with guns and hatchets and uttering cries of rage. Colonel Matis, with 400 select men of the 5th light, and 114th and 117th of the line and of the Italian division, advanced boldly under a violent fire. But, notwithstanding the daring of the assailants, the breach was so steep, and the firing so brisk, that the soldiers were thrown down in their attempt to climb the ruins, and they were obliged to relinquish the attempt after a further loss of 200 men killed and wounded. This unluckily citadel of Saguntum had thus, without any result, already cost us 700 or 800 men, including the first unsuccessful escalade and the losses experienced during the works. The Valencian army, watching the spectacle from the middle of the plain, felt their confidence in their own walls hourly increase, and after having seen the failure of Marshal Moncey's efforts against Valencia in 1808, and of those of General Suchet in 1810, they flattered themselves that the present fresh attempt would be equally ineffectual.

Upon this self-gratulating army Marshal Suchet designed to throw the weight of his vengeance; by the result of a pitched battle with it he hoped to repair the checks he had received from the obstinate garrison of Saguntum. He considered that if he should succeed in conquering the Valencian army in the open country, he would discourage the garrison of Saguntum, and



would, perhaps, even take Saguntum and Valencia at once by the moral force of events. But he was unwilling, for the purpose of meeting the enemy's army, to remove too far from Saguntum and to approach too near to Valencia, and he was endeavouring to discover some ground on which they might meet, when General Blake himself gave him the opportunity he sought.

Though the garrison of Saguntum had occasioned us some loss, they had not remained scathless themselves: their moral force was nearly exhausted: they eagerly desired succour, which they sought by means of signals with the vessels passing along shore. General Blake had no less than 30,000 men whom he could put in line, among whom were the two divisions of Zayas and Lardizabal, the best in Spain. He had also been joined by the Murcians under General Mahy and the brave leader Villa-Campa.

He, therefore, advanced into the middle of the plain, withdrawing from Valencia and approaching Saguntum, with the aspect of a general disposed to give battle. Marshal Suchet was delighted, and immediately prepared for action. The two armies met on the morning of October 25.

General Blake drew upon his right beyond the ravine called Picador, and along the sea, the Zayas division, which the English fleet was to support with its fire; in the centre, the Lardizabal division, supported by all the Spanish cavalry under General Caro; on the left, the Valencian division Miranda, that of Villa-Campa, and finally, beyond the left, with the design of getting round us by the mountains, the troops of Mahy. He ought to have, as we have said, about 30,000 soldiers as good as Spain could furnish. The remainder had been left to guard Valencia.

General Suchet reckoned only 17,000 or 18,000, being obliged to leave some at Saguntum; but they amply supplied in courage their numerical deficiency. Towards his left, in the direction of the sea, he placed Habert's division opposite that of Zayas; to the centre he placed the Harispe division, the Italian division Palombini, the 4th hussars, the 13th cuirassiers, and the 24th dragoons, in opposition to the Lardizabal division; and towards the right, at the opening of the mountains, he charged the brigades of Robert and Chlopiski, and the Napoleon Italian dragoons to keep the ground against the troops of Miranda, Villa-Campa, and Mahy, which threatened to cut us off from the road to Tortosa, our only line of retreat. Our engineer-companies, with the Neapolitan infantry, were to continue to play upon the towers of Saguntum during the battle.

From the break of day, the troops employed in the siege began their cannonade, while the army of General Blake, moving in its whole line, marched to meet ours. At this moment, Marshal Soult traversed the field of battle with a squadron of the 4th hussars, and perceived in the centre the Spaniards of Lardizabal, advancing in order and confidence against a hill which might serve for a support to our whole line. On seeing this, he ordered Harispe's division to make for the spot in all haste; and, as the Spaniards were in advance of us, he sent his hussars against them to impede their movements. But the hussars, though charging bravely, were repelled by

the Spaniards, who boldly mounted the eminence and took up their position there. General Harispe, arriving after the hill had been already taken, was in no degree embarrassed. He marched to the spot at the head of the 7th of the line formed in columns by battalions, and left in reserve the 116th of the line with the 3d of the Vistula. The Spaniards poured upon them a brisk fire and supported the shock with unusual firmness. But the 7th of the line attacked them with the bayonet and routed them. Harispe's division then deployed before the Lardizabal division, which had halted, while the two wings of the Spanish army continued to gain ground. Marshal Suchet immediately resolved to profit by this situation to divide the Spanish army in the middle; he, therefore, advanced Harispe's division, and checked the movements of Habert's division on his left, and the Robert and Chlopiski brigades on the right. During the execution of these orders, Duchand, chief of a squadron of artillery, having with much boldness brought forward the artillery of Harispe's division, in order to pour grape upon Lardizabal's infantry, was charged by the whole cavalry of General Caro. The hussars who wished to support him were themselves driven back, and several of our guns fell into the hands of the Spaniards, who, unused to such success, uttered shouts of joy. At the same moment, all the infantry of Lardizabal marched upon us with the utmost confidence. But the 116th, which was sent to meet them, checked, by their firmness, General Caro's cavalry; then the brave 13th cuirassiers, sent full charge by General Bousard against the Spanish infantry, routed them and cut them in pieces. From that moment, the centre of the enemy, being broken, was obliged to sound a retreat. Not only was the French artillery regained, but some Spanish artillery was taken, and many prisoners, including General Caro himself.

Soon the two wings of the army, at first held in and afterwards advanced by Marshal Suchet, who had been wounded in the shoulder, but had not left the field, were in line with the centre. General Habert, opposed to the Zayas division, drove it at the first charge upon the village of Pouzol, then upon the heights of Puig, which he carried with the bayonet, while Colonel Delort, uniting the left with the centre, charged at the head of the 24th dragoons the remains of Lardizabal's infantry. To the right, the Generals Robert and Chlopiski repulsed the troops of Mahy, whom the Napoleon Italian dragoons put to a final rout by a vigorous charge.

Thus routed at all points, the Spaniards withdrew in disorder, leaving in our hands twelve guns, 4700 prisoners, about 1000 killed, and four standards. This struggle, more obstinate than usual with the Spaniards in the open country, cost us about 700 men in killed and wounded. The most important result was to have overcome the moral force of the Valencian army, to have discouraged the garrison of Saguntum, and destroyed the proud confidence of the inhabitants of Valencia in their walls.

The marshal, after collecting the trophies of the day, summoned the garrison of Saguntum, which was deprived of all hope of succour by the defeat of the Spanish army. They agreed to capitulate, and delivered into our hands 2500 prisoners, the remains of the original garrison

of 8000 men. This first result of the battle of Saguntum caused lively satisfaction to Marshal Suchet, who then found himself master of the plain of Valencia by the solid *point d'appui* which he had just acquired there, and who further possessed in the town of Murviedro a secure refuge for his siege-artillery, his invalids, and ammunition. Having also on the high-road from Tortosa the fortress of Oropesa, which alone commanded the road, that of Peniscola commanding only the sea, he felt perfectly confident of his line of communication as far as the Ebro.

But he was much delayed by his efforts to dispose of his prisoners, amounting to 7000 or 8000, who incommoded him greatly; and equally so by his endeavours to disencumber his rear; for the bands had taken advantage of his absence to attack the whole circle of the frontiers of Aragon. L'Empecinado and Duran, taking the place of Villa-Campa, had forced the garrison of Calatayud; Mina, issuing from Navarre, though pursued by several columns, had carried off an entire battalion of Italians; and the Catalonians, regaining Montserrat, had threatened the position of the Frère division, which had been appointed to guard Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa. The marshal ordered various movements in his rear, sent his prisoners towards the Pyrenees under the escort of a strong brigade, and sent repeated couriers to Paris to make known his situation and his need of prompt succour.

He had still to pass the Guadalaviar, a little impetuous stream on the borders of which Valencia is built, to invest that vast city, which was occupied by a numerous army, and which, besides its old enceinte, was further protected by a continual line of intrenchments, bristling with artillery, forming one vast intrenched camp. To these defences were added the multitude of canals for irrigation, wide, deep, full of running water, which constitute the wealth of Valencia in peace and her safety in war. These were obstacles difficult to surmount, against which the 17,000 men remaining after the dismissal of the escort of the prisoners were not a sufficient force.

While waiting for the reinforcements which he had solicited, and which might be sent to him from Navarre, the marshal employed the month of November in closing in upon Valencia by directing his forces to the banks of the Guadalaviar. To the left he advanced Habert's division as far as Grao, the port of Valencia, and ordered the construction of three enclosed redoubts to serve as a defence for that division. He caused the centre to take the faubourg of Serranos, notwithstanding a powerful resistance of the Spaniards, who defended it step by step. This faubourg was separated from the town itself by the Guadalaviar. They made their way by sap and mine into three large convents, which command it, and from that moment they were masters of the place. Ascending to the right along the Guadalaviar, they took possession of the villages on the left bank of the river, which we occupied, and there fortified themselves. They thus formed a long line of circumvallation from the sea to above Valencia, and it only remained, for the entire surrounding of the city, to cross the Guadalaviar before General Blake, to force the canals which intersected the plain,

and to enclose the relieving army itself in the city. The marshal delayed this operation, which was not the last, since it was necessary then to take the intrenched camp and the old enceinte, until the arrival of the succour which had been promised him, and which was announced as being near at hand.

When Napoleon heard of the battle of Saguntum, all the affairs of Spain appeared to him to be concentrated around Valencia, and the destiny of the Peninsula in some way dependent on the capture of that important city. It is certain that the conquest of that city which for many years had resisted all our attacks, following that of Tarragona, must produce in the Peninsula a great moral effect, almost equal to that which would have been produced by the taking of Cadiz, though not to be compared with the result of the occupation of Lisbon, which would have implied the ruin of the English. Napoleon, therefore, wished that every thing should be regarded as subordinate, and even sacrificed, to this important object.

By a despatch of November 20, he ordered General Reille immediately to quit Navarre, however important it might be to make head against Mina, and to enter Aragon with the two divisions of reserve under his command; General Caffarelli to replace General Reille in Navarre and to pursue Mina to the last extremity; General Dorsenne to replace Caffarelli in Biscay; Joseph to send one of his own divisions against Cuenca; Marmont, though very far from Valencia, to detach under General Montbrun one division of infantry and one of cavalry to unite at Cuenca with that sent by Joseph; and Marshal Soult to take one corps to Murcia. He wrote to all of them, what was true but much exaggerated, that the English had many sick, (18,000 according to him,) that they were unable to undertake any thing; that, therefore, without danger they might evacuate the Castiles, Estremadura, and Andalusia; that Valencia was actually the only important point; that if it were taken, many troops would become disposable, and that a little later they might move from east to west, to act vigorously against the English, the numerous forces which at the present moment were concentrated about that city.

These orders, expressed with extreme precision,\* and some commands of a very imperious character addressed to lieutenants who, contrary to the general practice, willingly afforded mutual aid, were better executed than usual; and, by a sort of fatality attached to the affairs of Spain, this punctual obedience was obtained on the only occasion on which it was not desirable, for General Reille would have sufficed to enable Marshal Suchet to complete his task, and the forces which they were about to displace unnecessarily would soon be misused elsewhere. However this be, General Reille, who had already advanced the Severoli division into Aragon to restrain the guerilla bands, entered that province himself with a French division, and marched at the head of these two divisions on Valencia by the road of Teruel. General Caffarelli took his place in Navarre. Joseph, who set much by the conquest of Valencia, without hesitation sent to Cuenca

\* I speak from actual inspection of Napoleon's own letters, which had become very rare during the last year, for he had consigned the correspondence with Spain to Prince Berthier.

the Darnagnac division which formed part of the army of the centre. Marshal Marmont, who was becoming weary of his inaction on the Tagus, and who would gladly have marched against Valencia himself, having no authority to go there in person, sent thither, with some regret, General Montorin with two divisions, one of infantry and one of cavalry. Marshal Soult replied that it was scarcely possible for him in the heart of Andalusia to assist Marshal Suchet in the kingdom of Valencia. He was right, and he acted accordingly, for he sent nothing.

The fortunate Marshal Suchet saw the successive arrival of more aid than he had solicited, and towards the end of December he learned that General Reille, an officer equally intelligent and active, was approaching from Segorbe with Severoli's Italian division, and a French division composed of the finest regiments of the old army of Naples. This was a force of about 14,000 or 15,000 men and forty guns. After having himself reviewed these troops at Segorbe on December 24, he returned to the walls of Valencia, and resolved immediately to cross the Guadalaviar to complete the investment of that city before General Blake could leave it, or to draw thither, if he did not leave it, a new division of General Freyre, who was said to be about to appear in these parts. He fixed the 26th of December for the execution of this project, which would allow General Reille to occupy in good time the left bank of the river which he was going to abandon, and even to aid the completion of the operation.

Accordingly, on the 26th of December, while part of the Habert division was masking the faubourg of Serranos, the rest of that division, going to the left, crossed the river towards its mouth, spread itself round Valencia, which it encompassed in the direction of the sea, and took up a position opposite a height called Mount Olivete. In the centre, and a little above Valencia, the Italians of the Palombini division forded the Guadalaviar up to their waist, and under a very brisk fire, attacked the village of Mislata, strongly defended, and protected especially by a deep canal, more difficult to cross than the river itself, called by the inhabitants *Acquia de Favara*. In order to second this movement and completely surround Valencia, General Harispe, with his division, had crossed the Guadalaviar above the village of Manisses, a point where are established the reservoirs which serve to turn the course of the Guadalaviar in order to diffuse it in a thousand channels through the plain of Valencia. Marshal Suchet had calculated that General Harispe, avoiding thus the obstacle of the canals, might more rapidly get round Valencia, and invest it to the south.

The movement of General Harispe was a little delayed because he expected the arrival of General Reille, unwilling to leave unsupported the few troops remaining on the left of the Guadalaviar. Without this support, in fact, General Blake, whom they were to blockade on the right side, would be able to save himself by the left, by overcoming the feeble detachments there to be found. As soon as they saw the troops of General Reille, which arrived worn out with fatigue, General Harispe pushed forward, took Manisses, fell on the rear of Mislata, relieved the Italians from a most troublesome contest,

and facilitated their occupation of the disputed position, and then descended to the south of Valencia, and completed the investment of the city about the close of the day. During this circular movement round Valencia, General Mahy, at the head of the insurgents of Murcia and Villacampa, with his division had retired upon the Xucar and Alcira, unwilling to be shut up in Valencia, and rightly judging that General Blake's force was abundantly sufficient to defend it if it could be defended, and much too large to surrender if at length reduced to capitulate. The commander-in-chief sent the dragoons in pursuit of the troops in retreat, but they were unable to do more than cut off a few men and hasten the flight of the rest.

This operation, though successful, cost us about 400 men, killed and wounded, the greater part Italians, for the only considerable resistance was at Mislata. It completed the investment of Valencia, and gave us the assurance that when we took the place we should also take General Blake with about 20,000 men. If the Valencian population, which was not less than 60,000 souls, aided by 20,000 regular troops, well supplied with provisions and with numerous and well-contrived defences, had been animated by the same sentiments as in 1808 and 1809, it might have resisted long and sold its submission at a high price. But the enthusiastic and sanguinary men who had killed the French in 1808 had been either quieted, dispersed, or terrified. Three years of civil and foreign war, of distant incursions into Murcia and Catalonia, had worn out the active and ardent population and exhausted their passions. Valencia was at the same point as Saragossa and many other parts of Spain. If those could be disarmed who had acquired a taste for arms and the habit of wearing them, or who wore them for the sake of pillage, the rest, weary of an insupportable tyranny exercised by all parties in turn, were ready to submit to a conqueror known to be clement and honourable, whose dominion rather indicated repose than slavery. The memory of the massacres committed upon the French in 1808, which would have been a motive for extreme resistance to a pitiless enemy, was, on the contrary, a reason for an early surrender to one whose natural clemency was well known, and whom it was desirable not to render more severe than his disposition would lead him to be.

These sentiments, influencing also the army of General Blake, caused that neither party should resolve to destroy Valencia, as they had destroyed Saragossa, rather than deliver it to the enemy. Marshal Suchet was informed of this disposition, and was anxious to hasten the approaches as much as possible in order to effect the surrender, for the concentration of the forces which he had obtained was only temporarily assured to him. He, consequently, resolved to commence the works upon two points of the enceinte, which seemed the most favourable for attack. In the first days of January, 1812, Colonel Henri of the engineers, who had distinguished himself in all the memorable sieges of Aragon and Catalonia, opened the trenches towards the south of the town, before a projection formed by the line of outer works, and to the southwest before the faubourg St. Vincent. In a few days the works were pushed to the foot of the intrenchment, but we here lost Colonel

Henri, who was justly regretted by the army for his courage and talents. General Blake, seeing around him no preparations for a resolute defence, abandoned the line of outer intrenchments and withdrew within the encointe.

Marshal Suchet, clearly perceiving the state of things, immediately came under the walls of the city, and placed a battery of mortars to accelerate the termination of a waning resistance; but, though desirous of alarming the population, he was far from wishing to destroy a city whose riches would become the principal resource of his army. After a few bombs, which carried more alarm than damage, he summoned General Blake, who returned a negative though equivocal answer. He then continued the bombardment without interrupting the negotiations. At length, on January 9, 1812, General Blake's army surrendered as prisoners of war to the number of 18,000 men. Marshal Suchet made a triumphal entry into Valencia, the just reward of combinations wisely conceived, bravely executed, and happily favoured by circumstances. The population received with calmness, almost with satisfaction, a chief whose good government was extolled in Aragon, and they were not sorry to see the end of a frightful war, which, ignorant as they were of the future, seemed to promise advantage only to the English, who were no less odious to the Spaniards than were the French themselves.

Marshal Suchet lost no time in introducing into the government of Valencia the same order which he had caused to prevail in Aragon, in order to secure to his army the continuance of that good condition which enabled it to yield such valuable services. The population, both at Valencia and the neighbouring towns, was well disposed to yield to his authority, and he could promise himself as entire submission as that which he had obtained in Aragon. Nevertheless, it was necessary that he should retain sufficient troops to keep in awe the turbulent part of the population, who had already betaken themselves to the mountains, and were preparing to profit by the scattering of our forces necessarily occasioned by the extension of our dominion, to endeavour to disturb Murcia, Cuenca, Aragon, and Lower Catalonia. Here events no longer depended upon him, but upon a much higher authority, which alone could derive from the recent success the advantage it was calculated to afford.

The capture of Valencia, succeeding that of Tarragona, was undoubtedly a fortunate and brilliant event capable of exerting a considerable moral influence upon the Peninsula, but only on certain conditions, viz.: that far from diminishing his forces, they should be augmented in proportion to the extent of the territory occupied; that the haste with which so large a part had been sent to the east, thereby exposing the west to the English, should be immediately rectified; that the English should not be allowed to profit by it, but that, on the contrary, the present moment should be seized for acting against them with the utmost vigour. If, indeed, they would augment the army of the North to such an extent that it should be able not only to restrain the guerillas, but to protect Ciudad Rodrigo, and the army of Portugal so that it should be able to invade either Beira or Alentejo, or at least check the progress of Lord Wellington; if they would reinforce sufficiently the army of Andalusia to

enable it to take Cadiz, and to add the *éclat* of that conquest to that of the conquest of Valencia; in this case, one-half of the army of Andalusia united with the whole army of Portugal and a detachment of the army of the North, might drive the English back upon Lisbon and confine them to their lines until they should be in a condition to make a final effort at forcing them. It was, unfortunately, difficult to fulfil these conditions in the present situation, when every thing was directed to the Vistula instead of the Tagus. Napoleon had recently ordered that as soon as Valencia should be taken, General Reille should re-enter Aragon with his two divisions, to enable General Caffarelli to return to Castile, and the Imperial Guard to return to France. So that scarcely were they established in Valencia when General Reille retraced his steps, and Marshal Suchet was reduced to his own forces alone, which were, no doubt, sufficient for the peaceable government of Valencia, but not for any distant operations, especially at so great a distance as Murcia and Grenada. He took advantage, however, of the retrogression of the troops, to free himself of some of his prisoners by sending them into France.

Though Napoleon had, at first, wished after the capture of Valencia to send against the English a mass of forces that must prove decisive, and for this reason to leave his guard at Castile at least during the whole winter, he had relinquished this design, urged as he was by certain circumstances soon to be related, to carry his arms to the Vistula, and he had determined to recall immediately his guard, the Poles, the *cadres* of a certain number of the fourth battalions, and part of the dragoons.

Accordingly, towards the end of December he had recalled his young guard from General Dorsenne, which involved a diminution of at least 12,000 men, and from Marshal Suchet and Marshal Soult the regiments of the Vistula, involving a further diminution of 7000 or 8000 Poles, excellent soldiers,—a diminution particularly inconvenient to Marshal Suchet, who remained in the kingdom of Valencia with 15,000 men. He had also recalled the 4th battalions, which had composed the 9th corps, almost all of which belonged to the regiments of the army of Andalusia. He had ordered that the effective of these 4th battalions should be fused in the first three, and that the *cadres* should return to Bayonne, where a reserve would be formed by filling up the numbers with conscripts. But the departure of these would immediately occasion a further reduction of 2000 or 3000 valuable men. Finally, he had recalled twelve regiments of dragoons of the twenty-four employed in Spain. It is true that all these movements were effected with much precaution, for only four entire regiments of dragoons were immediately withdrawn, and the eight others were only to be withdrawn by squadrons in succession, and in proportion as they lost their effective. Thus, they were to begin by sending back the third squadron, draughting what remained of it into the two first, withdrawing only the *cadre* itself; thus to act in the same manner by the second, and thus in succession, always leaving the soldiers and withdrawing only the officers and subalterns. So that they need very little diminish in Spain the real effective of the cavalry, for experience had proved it almost impossible to maintain there in good condition

twenty-four cavalry-regiments, especially on account of the consumption of horses, and twelve regiments kept at their full complement were of more value to the service than twenty-four regiments almost always deficient, often reckoning only thirty or forty mounted men for every squadron.

Notwithstanding these skilful combinations, the new arrangements would nevertheless withdraw from Spain more than 25,000 of the best men. Nor was this all: Napoleon, no more thinking of the combined march of the two armies on Lisbon, one advancing by Beira, the other by Alentejo, but simply intent on guarding himself against an offensive movement of the English in Castile, which would have endangered our line of communication, had, at the very moment of taking Valencia, changed the destination of Marshal Marmont, and recalled him from the banks of the Tagus to those of the Douro, and with that view had caused him to recross the Guadarrama. He had ordered him to quit Almaraz, and to establish himself with six divisions of the army of Portugal, to which he had added a seventh, that of General Souham, which was one of the four of reserve. The Bonnet division was to form the 8th, but to wait further orders in the Asturias. Marshal Marmont, then, had seven for Castile. General Caffarelli, who had returned from Navarre, which he had occupied temporarily during the movement of General Reille upon Valencia, had succeeded General Dorsenne in the command of the army of the North. He was to receive in return for the guard one of the four divisions of reserve, and was ordered to furnish at least 12,000 men to Marshal Marmont in case of an offensive operation on the part of the English. Joseph was to lend him 4000 of the army of the centre. Napoleon, supposing that in consequence of these combinations the marshal would be in command of 50,000 or 60,000 men, charged him to keep his ground against the English, to protect our line of communication from them, and at the same time to cover Madrid if they should attempt to go thither as they had done at the time of the battle of Talavera. And finally, as it was the departure of the guard that occasioned the new position assigned to the army of Portugal, Marshal Marmont was ordered to act immediately in accordance with the instructions he had just received.

But at the time when these orders reached him, (the early part of January, 1812,) Marshal Marmont found it to be very difficult to obey, for, in the extreme haste with which the forces had been concentrated towards Valencia, he had been required to detach for that city General Montbrun with two divisions, one of infantry, the other of cavalry. But General Montbrun, instead of remaining at Cuenca, as the Darmagnac division sent by Joseph had done, and waiting there till required to advance further, had acted quite differently. Availing himself of his liberty, and of the season, which rendered marching easy in Spain, he had advanced as far as the very gates of Alicante, which, though ready to open to Marshal Suchet, were closed against him.

General Montbrun may have committed an error, which was very excusable in his temperament, and very slight when compared with his services; but, whether he were in error or not, he was no less than 80 or 100 leagues from Almaraz; and while he was at so great a distance with one-

third of the army of Portugal, it was very difficult for Marshal Marmont to leave the Tagus with the other two-thirds, and thus to place fresh distances between himself and his principal lieutenant. Yet, however competent Marshal Marmont might be to form an independent estimate of the orders he received, he executed them, because he was an observer of discipline and less animated than most of his comrades by personal passions. Besides, he had received information that the English, repulsed from Ciudad Rodrigo at the close of the preceding September, were preparing a new attempt against that place, and he set himself in motion to transport his establishment from the banks of the Tagus to those of the Douro, and to change his head-quarters from Naval-Moral to Salamanca. To meet the inconveniences of this strange situation, he first sent forward only his hospitals, his *material* and two divisions, and he left two divisions on the Tagus to unite with General Montbrun. With an unusual amount of foresight, he prepared at Salamanca a second *material* of artillery for the troops which he left on the Tagus, in order that they might be able, in case of need, to join him by very short roads, but impracticable to artillery. These troops were ordered, if their arrival were very urgent, to abandon their guns and bring only the horses.

We may see at once the singular and perilous situation occasioned by this haste to make everything bear upon Valencia, followed by the haste to make every thing bear upon Castile in order to prepare for the departure of the troops intended for Russia. The English must have been very indolent or very ill-informed to let slip such opportunities. Lord Wellington, though not fertile in forming skilful and daring combinations, was yet very attentive to the opportunities afforded him by fortune. He did not create them, but he seized them, and this is in general sufficient, for those presented by fortune are always the most certain, while those which we create ourselves are generally at the cost of many risks and dangers.

We have already explained how Lord Wellington, feeling himself obliged to do something, and seeing nothing better to be done than to attempt the conquest of Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, had kept on the watch on a well-beaten road, ready to throw himself on either of these two places as soon as he should think that he could command twenty or twenty-five days for the siege. But the collection of all the forces of the French towards Valencia, which he knew would become a subject of anxiety to the court of Madrid,\* was a conjunction which insured him the twenty-five days he required. He certainly had time to attack and take the place before Marshal Marmont could receive warning and recall General Montbrun and put all his army in motion, and before General Caffarelli could return from Navarre to reinforce the army of Portugal, and that in virtue of all these combinations 40,000 men should meet under the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo. Add to this, that every thing had been transported thither, that he had never quitted the environs since the reuniting of it effected by Marshal Marmont and General Dorsenne, that he had employed his time in the care of the

\* I here assert nothing on supposition, but on the authority of Lord Wellington's despatches.

sick, in quietly bringing together his park of heavy artillery,—that, in a word, he had no preliminary operation to effect, and that he might begin the siege the very day after he should have begun his march. He therefore resolved to undertake it without loss of time.

Even before the cruel surprise which he was preparing as the punishment of our errors, he had occasioned us one of the bitterest vexations in the unfortunate skirmish of the Girard division near Arroyo del Molinos. We have seen that Marshal Soult had left General Drouet at Merida to observe Estremadura. General Drouet no longer commanded the 9th corps, which had been dissolved and distributed among the divisions of the army of Andalusia: he commanded the 5th, which had become vacant by the return of Marshal Mortier into France. Marshal Soult had authorized him to extend the levy of contributions as far as the environs of Cáceres; and General Girard, at the head of one of the divisions of this corps, a very energetic but not a very vigilant officer, had advanced as far as the town of Cáceres, in the basin of the Tagus, while the corps to which he belonged was at Merida, on the Guadiana. It was very imprudent to send him so far, and equally imprudent in Girard not to take better care in so hazardous a position. The English general, Hill, was not far from him, in the neighbourhood of Port-Alegre. Urged by Lord Wellington not to remain inactive, he eagerly seized the opportunity which presented itself, and which was particularly favourable, for he had merely to ascend in silence the basin of the Tagus, to cut off the too confident General Girard from his communication with the Guadiana. He did so, and on October 27, in the evening, he arrived very close upon the rear of General Girard. The latter had been warned of his danger; but, with the *brusquerie* of too thoughtless courage, he replied to General Briche, who gave him the warning, "You see nothing but the English in every direction,"—a very offensive reply, and very little deserved by the brave general to whom it was offered. General Girard, however, recognising the necessity of retracing his steps, had already set in motion one of his two brigades, and with the second he remained till the morning of the 28th near Arroyo del Molinos, awaiting the Alcáide of Cáceres, who had promised to bring 1000 ounces, which was the amount of contribution levied on that city, when he was convinced, though too late, of his injustice towards General Briche. Surrounded by more than 10,000 men, of whom 6000 were English and 4000 were Portuguese, he endeavoured to redeem his want of foresight by his valour, and succeeded in extricating himself, but by the sacrifice of a battalion of the rear-guard, composed of select companies under Voirol, an officer already distinguished at Albuera. This battalion, surrounded on all sides, defended itself with heroism, but was wholly overcome and taken prisoners. This cruel skirmish cost us nearly 2000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and was a source of real gratification to the English, because it filled up the long blank of summer and gave a subject of flattering self-gratulation to public opinion in England, which had dwelt upon the repulse at Badajoz and the last revictualing of Ciudad Rodrigo by the French. General Girard was referred by General Drouet to Marshal Soult, by Marshal Soult

to the Emperor, to give account of his conduct, and his chiefs ought, in justice, after accusing him of improvidence, to accuse themselves of the same defect in at least an equal degree.

But a still greater misfortune was in store for us, owing to the same want of vigilance, so frequent in every war, but unusually so in that of Spain, on account of the great variety of accidental circumstances and particularly the extreme division of command. Of this, a new and sad example was soon to be afforded by Ciudad Rodrigo, which Lord Wellington was preparing to besiege during the conveyance of our forces towards Valencia. This fortress, situated between the army of the North and the army of Portugal, was placed under the responsibility of two chiefs, (which is equivalent to none at all,) viz.: Marshal Marmont and General Dorsenne. However, the latter, to whom had been assigned the duty of provisioning the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, (a measure designed to diminish the expenses of the army of Portugal,) ought to have devoted himself to it more earnestly. But, though very capable of commanding a division in the open country, General Dorsenne understood nothing of the defence of fortresses, and had intrusted the protection of Ciudad Rodrigo to General Barrié, who was little more capable than himself. He had given him 1800 men to occupy a place requiring at least 5000 for its defence. The French had taken it in twenty-four days, though defended by 6000 Spaniards, well provisioned, brave, and fanatic. How long could 1800 French be supposed to hold it, when unprovided with the means possessed by the Spaniards, and regarding themselves as sacrificed by the negligence of their commander? General Dorsenne hardly proposed this question to himself, and, remembering that a few months before he had brought some provisions to Ciudad Rodrigo in concert with Marshal Marmont, thought little more on the subject.

However, General Barrié, who had examined the situation, had not failed, since the close of December, to communicate to the commander of the army of the North the movements of the enemy, which, though carefully concealed, were nevertheless very perceptible, and to announce that his provisions would be exhausted in February, that his garrison was altogether insufficient, and that he must speedily yield, if attacked in earnest. This information was received, like that of General Briche to General Girard, as the importunities of officers who are always complaining and demanding more than is necessary or than can be supplied. Men always model themselves by their chief; and as Napoleon, either by design or mistake, had habitually treated his generals in this manner, every inferior officer dealt out the same measure to his subordinates.

The place, then, was left to itself with a garrison of 1800 men, further reduced to 1500 by disease, desertion, and daily skirmishes with the guerillas. The breach by which the French entered had been repaired, but with stones without mortar for want of better materials. Upon the mamelon, called the Grand Teso, from which Marshal Ney had made his approaches, had been constructed an insignificant redoubt, and the convents of St. Francis and St. Cruz, outside of the town, had been occupied with about 200 men, which reduced the whole garrison of the enceinte to 1800 men.

Lord Wellington, after having brought up his park of siege-artillery with much secrecy near the frontier, crossed it on January 8, 1812, hoping that before the return of the troops sent to Valencia by the army of Portugal, to Navarre by the army of the North, he should have taken a place so deprived of the means of defence as Ciudad Rodrigo then appeared to be. To insure this, he resolved to hasten all the attacks, which the weakness of the garrison enabled him to do with little risk.

Having passed the Agueda, and invested the place on the 8th, he wished on the same evening to carry the lunette built upon the Grand Teso. Defended by three guns and fifty men, it could not offer much resistance, and accordingly that small detachment was soon killed or taken prisoners. Immediately afterwards, Lord Wellington, who had no less than 40,000 men, began the works with an immense command of labour, and surrounded the whole place with his trenches, from the convent of Santa Cruz to that of St. Francis. The course indicated was to batter the wall at the point where the French had effected a breach, and accordingly the approaches were begun on that side. As the convents of Santa Cruz and St. Francis commanded the flank of the English trenches, it was resolved to take possession of them by assault. This was not difficult, for the one contained only about fifty of our men, and the other about 150. That of Santa Cruz was taken in the night of the 13th and 14th, and the inadequate garrison of fifty men retired after having conducted themselves in the best possible manner. General Barrié made a sortie to recover the post, and not without temporary success, but he was obliged again to yield to superior numbers. The convent of St. Francis was of still greater importance to the enemy, for its fires annoyed the left of the English trenches by which Lord Wellington wished to make a second attack. The garrison of 150, assailed by overwhelming forces, and in danger of being cut off from the town, withdrew, after spiking their guns. A more extensive experience in the defence of fortresses would have taught General Barrié that to attempt to hold detached posts with so small a force was to compromise the lives of men without cause. He would also have known, what he really did not know, that it was impossible to have done much better with the forces at his disposal; and it must also be added that in shutting himself up in the place, and confining himself to the defence of the enceinte, he would not have greatly prolonged the resistance.

All the exterior works having been taken, Lord Wellington directed twenty-five guns against the old breach, and in some hours the uncemented stones rolled down with frightful facility. The assault became practicable. The besieged, as in Badajoz, acting on the English practice of battering in breach before destroying the counterscarp, laboured consequently to clear the foot of the walls. But, being very small in number, and badly protected by the counterscarp and glacis, they were soon driven away by the enemy's fire, and the English artillery, by accumulating the ruins at the foot of the breach, was easily able to restore the incline. Lord Wellington had learned at Badajoz what it was to assault a fortress defended by the French, and he perceived that to secure his end a second

attack would be necessary, and that not feigned but serious, in order to divide the attention of the besieged and to disturb them by two simultaneous assaults. He therefore established a new breaching-battery to the left of his trenches, towards the convent of St. Francis, and the materiel at his command enabled him to batter the enceinte to the last extremity. The artillery of the fort, which was well served, greatly impeded these new works, but availed nothing against the multitude of labourers, and the breach at this point also, though smaller, was deemed practicable.

General Barrié, determined to fight to the last, had employed the usual means of art to resist the assault. He had raised a double intrenchment behind the breaches, placed guns loaded with grape on the flanks, and, on the summits, bombs, which they could direct at pleasure, and select troops in the rear. Having no more than 1000 men for the defence, and two breaches to guard, and the whole circumference of the place to survey, there remained to him only about 100 men as a reserve against a column which might penetrate the enceinte. Nevertheless, when summoned by the English general, he replied, like a man of honour, that he would die upon the rampart rather than capitulate. The reply was honourable, for in their actual condition the rules for the defence of forts would have allowed him to treat without any reflection on his character.

In the night of the 18th and 19th of January, Lord Wellington sent two columns of assault on the enceinte, and drew up the reserves to support them. The column directed against the great breach to the right, after having crossed the open ground to the border of the fosse, and throwing themselves into it, endeavoured to climb up the ruins of the wall, and were frequently arrested by the grape, the grenades, and a close fire of musketry. General Barrié, who was at this place because it was the most threatened, flattered himself for a moment that he should succeed. Attracted by shouts to the little breach, he thought that it had been taken, and rushed thither with his reserve, when, finding it a false alarm, he returned to the larger breach. But the second English column, after having been repulsed from the little breach, returned in force, conquered the voltigeurs who defended it, and made their way into the city. On this occasion, General Barrié, supposing it another false alarm, did not repair to them with sufficient speed, and his column, which was defending the large breach, being taken in the rear, was obliged to lay down their arms. The garrison and its commander had carried resistance to the utmost extreme; nothing could be alleged against them but some technical errors, and even if these had been avoided the city could not have been saved. The city, though belonging to an ally, was pillaged, Lord Wellington being obliged to make that barbarous concession to the spirit of his troops. We have a profound respect for the English nation and her gallant army, but we may be allowed to remark that such a stimulant is not required by French troops.

The capture of the city, then, had occupied ten days,—from the 8th to the 18th of January. Such a result may appear extraordinary; but the ruined state of the fortifications, the insufficiency of the garrison, the great number of

besiegers, and, it must be added, the lavishness with which Lord Wellington sacrificed his men, whom he so carefully spared in the open country, explained the promptitude of this success. The siege had cost him no less than 1300 or 1400 men, killed and wounded, and several of his most distinguished officers, in particular the gallant Crawford, commander of the light division. The English, having no special troops of engineers, and their engineers, though very intelligent, being little theoretically versed in the profound art of Vauban, pushed on their approaches, neglected the position on the border of the fosse, left the counterscarp standing, and then attempted the assault by main force. This system, after having failed before Badajoz, had only succeeded at Ciudad Rodrigo in virtue of several simultaneous attacks,—a manner of proceeding which requires a considerable army, immense sacrifice of men, and great energy, and which even with all these advantages may fail before numerous and devoted garrisons.\*

Whatever may be the force of this purely-technical question, the promptitude of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo fell like a thunderbolt upon the commandants of the armies of the North, of Portugal, and on the staff at Madrid. This last party ought to have been the least surprised, for they had blamed the convergence of all the disposable forces towards Valencia, a movement of which Lord Wellington had taken such advantage. The person most distressed was Marshal Marmont. When he first learned, on the 10th of January, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, he was occupied with transporting his troops from the banks of the Tagus to those of the Douro, calculating on a defence of at least twenty days; before that time he hoped to have brought together five of his divisions, perhaps six out of seven, and to have obtained from the army of the North 1200 or 1400 auxiliary troops, which would have allowed him to march with more than 40,000 men to the help of the besieged town. But the negligence of General Dorsenne, charged with the protection of Ciudad Rodrigo, had much abridged the period of possible resistance, and it must be added that Marshal Marmont himself, in allowing twenty days for bringing aid to the place, though he did not in this calculation go beyond the limit allowed to an ordinary siege, had not sufficiently taken into consideration the accidents which often frustrate the best-founded plans. Nevertheless, though naturally very generous, Marshal Marmont asserted that General Barrié was a poor creature unable to defend his post; General Dorsenne excused himself in the same manner; and, as often happens, the most guilty charged those who are the least so, who in this case were not guilty at all, for nothing more can be demanded of the commandants of fortresses than that they should resist the threat of an assault, receive it when made, and surrender only when the assailant has secured the victory.

It is easy to imagine the despair of the generals of the armies of the North and of Portugal, for Old Castile was henceforward unprotected, and our line of communication was exposed to the attempts of a powerful army which we had never in reality fought, and which was beginning to emerge from its accustomed circumspec-

tion. What would it avail, if the English should penetrate as far as Valladolid, to occupy Valencia, Seville, and Badajoz?

Marshal Marmont, ever watchful in what immediately concerned his own duty, perceived the danger of this position, and, seeing that Ciudad Rodrigo was taken, he hastened to supply its place by defence-works of Salamanca, which had become the capital of his department, and which was soon to be the theatre of a bloody battle. He exhibited much activity and intelligence in the selection of works to be constructed, made use of three large convents around Salamanca to serve the purpose of regular fortifications, of which that city was destitute, and then established a sort of intrenched camp, which might be defended for a considerable time by a resolute body. He then occupied himself in forming magazines and hospitals, in making the condition of his army as complete as possible,—a taste which he had acquired, as well as the art of effecting it, in the school of Napoleon.

The troops of General Montbrun had at length returned, but Marshal Marmont, though having at his disposal seven fine divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, was not free from anxiety, owing to the extent of the task assigned him. He could scarcely reckon upon 44,000 infantry, and he required no less than 10,000 to guard the bridge of Almaraz over the Tagus, the defiles of Banos and of Perales on the Guadarrama, Zamora on the Douro, Leon and Astorga towards the Asturias. There remained to him then only 34,000 infantry, and not more than 40,000 combatants, including cavalry and artillery. But the Anglo-Portuguese army was at that time able to bring forward 60,000 men, of whom one-half were English and the other half good Portuguese soldiers. It was not prudent to engage such an army even with 50,000 men, unless they were all under command, well clothed, well armed, well fed, and not detached on various accessory duties, as is necessary in a country where the population are unfriendly. The aid of 4000 men from the army of the centre, Marshal Marmont regarded as chimerical in the present situation of Madrid. Nor did he reckon any more confidently upon the 12,000 men of General Caffarelli, who had replaced General Dorsenne, and who could find, in the condition of the Northern provinces, many plausible reasons for delaying and even refusing his contingent. He therefore could not be at ease while he thought of all the dangers that threatened him. Another part of this task, not less alarming, was the defence of Badajoz. A secret presentiment, which did honour to his intelligence, suggested to him that Lord Wellington, after taking Ciudad Rodrigo, might very easily surprise Badajoz; and he asked himself how it would do for him to quit Castile and leave it almost unprotected in order to fly to the defence of Badajoz, at least fifteen marches from Salamanca. In the midst of these perplexities, he sent a confidential aide-de-camp to Paris, to explain all these dangers to Napoleon, and to say that the only way of meeting them, in his opinion, was to combine the armies of the North, of the centre, and of Portugal, under one command. In this case, assured of obedience, and of having at command 50,000 or 60,000 men, by a right distribution of his forces he thought he would be in a condition to resist the English. Though

\* We here nearly express the sentiments of Lord Wellington himself on the method of the English engineers.



this was a very considerable command, and one to which neither his reputation nor his services gave him a claim, yet what he proposed was better than the present division of the forces, and might perhaps have prevented many disasters. Should this concentration of command not be granted, Marshal Marmont requested to serve elsewhere.

To exhibit any personal pretensions, even by giving wholesome advice, was to assume a disadvantageous position with Napoleon, inclined to suspicion by natural temperament and by long experience of mankind. Napoleon loved Marshal Marmont, who had been his aide-de-camp, and whose amiable and brilliant qualities he appreciated; but from long familiarity he had acquired the habit of treating him with levity, and he set little by his advice, saying that his head was affected by ambition, that he was unequal to such a command, and that to satisfy him it would be necessary to deprive Joseph of the army of the centre, which was impossible; that the marshal, besides, was meddling with what did not concern him; that Badajoz was not assigned to his care; that his only duty was to take good care of the North of the Peninsula against the English; that nothing more was demanded of him; that it belonged to the army of Andalusia to defend Badajoz, to which it was perfectly adequate, provided the English should attack it with only two divisions, *i. e.* with Hill's corps reinforced, but that if they should attack it with five, *i. e.* with almost the whole of their army with Lord Wellington at the head, there would be then one certain method of making them let go their prize,—by the army of Portugal falling upon the detachments left along the Aguëda, pouring down upon Coimbra, and marching upon Thomar, in which case Lord Wellington would be obliged to retrace his steps and relinquish Badajoz; that it was now necessary to adhere to this method of manœuvring, and no more to abandon the care of Castile, and that if it became urgent to assist the army of Andalusia, this must be done by advancing, by Beira and the left of the Tagus, as far as Coimbra or even Thomar, always taking care to protect our line of communication with the Pyrenees.

These views were just, as were all those of Napoleon concerning war, but only just in general, and in their application they might cease to be so, and become even fatal, if circumstances which Napoleon could not at a distance appreciate with the requisite precision should not accord with the suppositions on which they were founded. If, for example, Badajoz, instead of being in a condition to defend itself for two months, could only hold out for one, the diversion to the Tagus, however specious, could not be a reason for Lord Wellington's raising a siege when about to succeed. Besides, the march on the Tagus must be attempted with adequate forces, and in order to that it was absolutely necessary that the armies of the North and of Portugal at least should be under one command, even if it were impossible to include that of the centre. And Marshal Marmont was of more value when acting for himself than when contradicted by General Caffarelli, however honourable and devoted that general might be. But, unfortunately, this Napoleon would not allow.

The secret presentiment of Marshal Marmont with respect to the designs of Lord Wellington

was but too well founded. The latter, encouraged by the rapid conquest of Ciudad Rodrigo, and every day more convinced that the French armies in their unconnected movements would leave him time to execute short and unexpected sieges, had prepared every thing, the day after the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, for a violent attempt upon Badajoz with immense resources and prodigious sacrifice of human life. In this view, he had already sent a vast *material* from Abrantes to Elvas, and set in motion in succession all his divisions for the Alentejo, taking care to remain in person on the Coa, to conceal his design. He had perfectly succeeded so far that at Badajoz they suspected preparations for a siege, but not the collection before that place of the whole English army; and this was wholly unknown in Castile and Andalusia.

The garrison of Badajoz had incessantly uttered the cry of alarm in the ears of Marshal Soult, and demanded speedy succour from him. The marshal, reasoning as men commonly do, and thinking that circumstances which had once occurred would occur again, attending little to the change which had occurred, thought that Badajoz, which had already resisted for nearly two months, could arrest the enemy for at least one month, especially since the defences had been perfected, that he would consequently have time to run to its aid, and that Marshal Marmont would hasten to it on his side, and that he need entertain no serious uneasiness about this threat of a fresh siege.

But he ought to have considered that succour expected from a distance ought not to be depended upon, that the English had shown great want of skill in their first siege of Badajoz, but that in a second they might conduct themselves better and with greater resources, and that it was therefore necessary to put that place in a perfect state of defence. But a garrison of 5000 men reduced to 4400 shortly before the siege, and to 4000 at the time of the investment, was totally insufficient. It would have required 10,000 men, with provisions and ammunition in proportion, to frustrate again the attempts of the English. And it would have been much better to raise the garrison of Badajoz to that number than to leave in Estremadura the corps of General Drouet, who could do nothing but retire at the first appearance of the English. After having detached what was necessary for Badajoz, they might then have concentrated the rest, and the garrison, increased by 5000 men and some cavalry, would have had the means of extending their expeditions to a greater distance, would have served as corps of observation for Estremadura better than the corps of General Drouet, and would have been almost invincible if besieged. Besides, they might have supplied themselves both in wood and in provisions. But at the end of February, a month after the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, when the design of a new siege had become manifest, the place had provisions for only about two months; it had not powder for a long siege, it was deficient in wood for palisades and blinds, and was continually demanding the supply of its wants. The provisions which it possessed were partly obtained from corn cut by their own foragers at three leagues distance. The defences of the place had, in'deed, been improved both in the right

of the Guadiana. On the right bank the wall of St. Christoval had been repaired, the parapet raised, the ditches deepened in front of the rock. On the left bank the castle had been situated, the foot of the rock on which it stood rendered more steep, the lunette of the fort, which protected it, made perfect, the position of the Rivillas considerably increased by the construction of a strong dam, and the fort of Pardal completely closed at the gorge. The south-eastern fronts which projected were always the exposed parts; but some mines had been placed under these fronts to keep off the enemy. Unfortunately, there had been a deficiency of the palisade and blind the ditches; but the position of the garrison enabled them to dislodge it, though they remained exposed to the enemy's and howitzers. Finally, as we have seen, the powder was deficient, and the provisions which in February were considered sufficient for two months could be no longer esteemed an invulnerable arch.

At the state of the place when the English appeared under its walls on the 16th of March 1812, calculating as at Ciudad Rodrigo during the siege before they could be immediately the concentration of our forces. They had at least 50,000 men, an immense material they were resolved, being little more in the art of besieging than they were in the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, to push the breach sufficiently to establish the breaching-batteries, then to open several breaches at once, to profit by their numerical superiority to make two or three assaults simultaneously,—an arduous method, but very well calculated to overcome a garrison, however brave, if limited in resources.

On the first day the investment was commenced without delay the English fixed on the point of attack. Disgusted by their failures the last year at any attempt upon the fort of St. Christoval, they directed their efforts against the bank of the Guadiana,—that is to say, the fort itself. The attack of the south-east, though more easy, was again neglected, this occasion from the fear excited by the breaches formed in that part of the ground. The English went to the east towards the castle, the front contiguous to the gate of Ciudad, notwithstanding the inundation of the river and the lunette of Picurina. On the 17th, the day after the investment, they opened the trench before the lunette of Picurina, a slight work of small prominence, closed off by a simple palisade, which might easily be carried by assault, and, if taken, it was easy to form a breaching-battery against the front of this new attack. On the 19th, the English resolved to employ a method very usual in the case of a garrison, when the garrison is brave and determined,—viz.: sorties which, by overthrowing the ranks of the besiegers, prolong the duration of the approaches, and consequently prolong the siege. A sortie, effected with vigour, drove the English from their trenches, which they were obliged to fill up, but, as usual, it was repulsed by a counter-charge of the enemy. The English soldiers, instead of retiring with well-earned pride, since their end was attained, only disputed the ground and lost 200 and 160 wounded. The loss of the English was less than 300 men. This was a trifle to

them, who numbered 50,000, while it was much for us, who had scarcely 4000 in fighting-condition. This method was therefore relinquished, because, though powerful in prolonging the defence, it is dangerous when the garrison is deficient in numbers.

The works having been pressed on with extreme activity, the English were able on the 25th of March to cannonade the lunette of Picurina with twenty-three guns, to demolish the salient, and to make some impression on the sides. In the evening, without further delay, they assailed it with three strong columns and the reserves. The lunette was defended by only 200 soldiers draughted from all the regiments. In the actual state of the garrison it was scarcely possible to grant more men, but it would have been better to take men belonging to the same battalion, likely to behave as men generally do when they act in conjunction with those with whom they are familiarly acquainted. The three columns having thrown themselves into the fosse, (for the English persisted in their method of carrying their approaches only as far as the borders of the fosse,) one went to the back of the work and endeavoured to tear up the palisades in order to enter by the gorge, but fell back under the discharge of musketry; the second, aiming to penetrate by the breach, was equally routed; but the third, placing the ladders to the least protected part, reached the parapet at the moment when the second column, recovering from its repulse, was scaling the half-demolished salient. The little garrison, being constrained to meet two invasions at once, was not sufficient, and was in a few moments obliged to lay down their arms. Eighty-three men were killed or wounded and eighty-six were taken prisoners. The enemy lost about 350 men.

Our artillery immediately poured a terrible fire upon the conquerors in possession of Picurina, and made them pay dearly for holding it. They had much trouble in turning up the ground so as to protect themselves on the side towards the fortress, but by means of abundant material and a large number of men, many of whom were sacrificed, they at length effected a lodgment in the conquered work, and undertook the establishment of breaching-batteries against the two bastions which played upon the lunette of Picurina. From this time they abandoned almost all their other batteries, which had not been judiciously placed, and confined themselves exclusively to the new ones, which, being very near the enceinte, commanded a view of it from top to bottom. The French artillery, admirably served, made them pay dear for this rash method of procedure; but their powder began to fail, and the garrison supplied the want of cannon by musketry, which the best marksmen of each regiment directed against the English gunners. If the garrison had possessed sufficient powder and men, this would have been a suitable time to unite a heavy fire of artillery with a vigorous sortie against the position at the gorge of Picurina. A successful sortie against so near a point would probably have destroyed all the advantages acquired by the besiegers, and have brought them back to the point where they were at the beginning of the siege. But it would have been necessary to effect this sortie with 1100 or 1200 men, and to sacrifice 800 or 400, and the garrison were obliged to reserve their powder

and men for the last and decisive day of the assault.

That time could not be far distant, so rapid was the progress of the assailants and so unequal the resistance of the besieged. However, the garrison had already gained fifteen days, though at the loss of 700 men out of 4000, without the enemy having succeeded in breaching the two bastions by which it had been resolved to penetrate the place. On the 31st they succeeded in establishing different batteries, containing twenty heavy guns, against the two bastions which they proposed to demolish. They prolonged their trenches, right and left, in order to raise several other batteries with a view of replying to the artillery of the fort, of sweeping the defences, and of effecting a third breach. There were soon fifty-two heavy guns in position, with which they opened a formidable fire. The garrison, which had reserved their fire till the last, replied with equal violence. They dismounted several guns, but the English, who abounded in *material* and exhibited great courage, replaced the dismounted guns in the middle of the ruined *épaulements* under a shower of projectiles. Our artillerymen, who allowed none to surpass or even equal them, kept by the broken embrasures of their guns and redoubled their efforts under balls, bombs, and howitzers. The garrison had attained that pitch of excitement at which all thought of danger is lost, and all had sworn to die rather than to surrender their flag and to perish in the infected hulks to which England, to her disgrace, consigned her prisoners. The most unfortunate in this terrible struggle were the inhabitants, who had remained in the city to the number of 5000 out of 15,000, the greater part in poverty. They were supported by the garrison, who, with the remains of their meat and vegetables, prepared a kind of nourishment just sufficient to keep them in life. But, having neither casemates nor blinds for themselves, they were unable to protect them from the bombs in the midst of which they ventured to live. Frightful groans therefore filled the air of this wretched town and lacerated the soul of our soldiers, who, though insensible to their own danger, were full of pity for the unhappy men whom they had accustomed themselves for fifteen months to regard as their countrymen.

At length the final struggle drew near. Three large breaches had been effected in the masonry of the bastions. The besiegers, after first scattering their fire, had afterwards concentrated it on these two bastions, had also succeeded in diminishing the depth of the inundation by destroying a part of the dams, and had rendered the breaches accessible, without, however, having taken the precaution to overthrow the counterscarp according to the rules of art,—a neglect which was to cost them dear.

Lord Wellington had done the garrison the honour not to summon them, for he knew that every demand to capitulate would be vain. In fact, the governor having assembled the principal officers, it had been decided unanimously, with the acclamation of the troops, to abide the assault, and rather to die than surrender. Immediately they rushed to the breaches, there to employ all the resources of art and ingenuity against a determined foe. The skilful and intrepid commander of the engineers had marked out the works, which the soldiers executed with

enthusiasm. While one half of them were in guard upon the ramparts, the other half were working in the ditch, clearing the foot of the breaches, a work which, though very dangerous, is possible so long as the enemy has not got possession of the border of the ditch. The men fell under the howitzers and grenades, but others continued their labours in the removal of the slope occasioned by the debris, which was unhappily too readily restored by the artillery of the English. The most effectual resource was that which they had contrived for themselves on the rampart itself, where had been constructed a second intrenchment behind the breaches, erected some *chevaux de frise* in front, placed on the sides some barrels for explosion, and barricaded the streets abutting on the points of attack. A final and formidable method had been prepared. The enemy persisting in not carrying the approaches to the border of the ditch, and therefore not having destroyed the counterscarp, a wall of the ditch opposite the fort, it was possible to work as they chose at the foot of this counterscarp. Lamare, commander of engineers, placed there a long chain of loaded bombs and barrels filled with fireworks connected by a train of gunpowder, to which Mailhet, a brave engineer-officer, concealed in the fosse, was to set fire at the moment of assault.

Every thing being thus disposed, the chosen troops being placed at the summit of the breaches with three muskets to each man, guns loaded with grape being levelled on the sides, and a reserve as strong as could be obtained attending the orders of the commander in the principal square of the city, they awaited the assault. Lord Wellington had prepared every thing for the evening of the 6th of April, the 21st day after his arrival before Badajoz. But he had resolved to make the assault with such a preponderating force as almost infallibly to insure success, even though he should lose double the number of men that he had ever lost in the greatest battle.

Accordingly, about 9 p.m. on April 6, the artillery of the besiegers poured torrents of fire upon the place. Two divisions, under General Colville, marched directly towards the breaches, while Picton's division with ladders went to the right to attempt to scale the castle by a part which had been remarked as weak, and Leith's division, turning to the left, was to attempt to scale the southwest extremity, hitherto neglected by the English. About 20,000 men, therefore, marched to the assault,—an enormous number, almost unprecedented. The two columns under General Colville reached the border of the ditch, into which they leaped and rushed to the breaches. A general shout from our soldiers intimated their approach: they were allowed to advance, and when they had begun to climb the debris a close fire of musketry met them in the face, the grape took them in flank, and rolled them pell-mell over the breach. While the rear endeavoured to support the van, a new calamity was in store for them. Mailhet, lieutenant of engineers, descending into the ditch in the midst of this frightful confusion, and waiting the propitious moment with his match in hand, set fire to the long train of bombs and barrels placed at the foot of the counterscarp. There ensued on the rear of the assaulting columns, and on the steps of those who supported them, a series of formidable explosions in momentary succession,



*Wellington*



emitting grape and bombs, and torrents of perplexing light. Every moment this murderous light alternated with the darkness, and bore with it death in a thousand forms. Unhappily, the gallant Mailhet was himself struck with a bomb. The two English divisions sent against the three breaches, notwithstanding their bravery, at length yielded to the violence of the resistance, and lost their impulse under the incessant fire of grape and musketry. Already nearly 3000 English had fallen, and Lord Wellington was about to order the retreat, when in other directions the scene changed. To the right of the attack, General Picton, with singular intrepidity, had applied the ladders to one of the walls of the castle. The care of this point had been assigned to some Hessians, who, from surprise, confusion, or want of fidelity, allowed the precious redoubt intrusted to their courage and loyalty to be invaded, and an English officer, instantly throwing himself upon the gates which lead into the town, closed them with haste, in order to establish himself firmly in the castle before the French should have time to rush thither. The Governor Philippon, who had been repeatedly deceived by false cries of alarm, and who was keeping his reserve for a case of extreme danger, at first refused to believe in the news of the capture of the castle. Convinced, when too late, of the reality, he determined to send thither 400 men, who, being met by a murderous fire, were checked before the first gate: they vainly attempted to force the second. In the eager desire to force open the castle and expel the English, they sent for a part of the forces which were defending the southwest fronts, hitherto neglected by the enemy, and little menaced in appearance. These were, therefore, stripped in order to regain the castle. Upon this, Leith's division, which contemplated an escalade on that side, finding the rampart abandoned, applied a number of ladders, and succeeded in climbing the wall, which was by no means high. Immediately upon entering, they ran along the rampart, to take in the rear the troops which hitherto had successfully defended the three breaches. On seeing them, the party which guarded the nearest front charged them with the bayonet and stopped their course. But, quickly returning in great numbers, they regained their advantage over our few soldiers and spread themselves on all sides through the city. An indescribable confusion was now thrown into the ranks of the heroic garrison, which disputed with the enemy the remains of Badajoz. The defenders of the breaches, taken in the rear, were obliged to surrender or fly. The governor, the commander of engineers, and the staff, after having done all that could be required of them, endeavoured, by rushing to the bridge of the Guadiana, to withdraw with some wrecks of the garrison into the fort of St. Christoval to make a further defence. But they were either taken or killed. After such a marvellous resistance, nothing remained but submission.

On the next day they were led to the camp of Lord Wellington, who, though receiving them with courtesy, refused to listen to their entreaties in favour of the unhappy town of Badajoz. It certainly was not our part to intercede for the Spaniards, nor did it belong to the English to punish them for our resistance; but Lord Wellington, after politely receiving our officers,

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pitilessly resigned the city of Badajoz to pillage. Less could not be granted to troops who had made such a gallant assault!

The siege of Badajoz cost us about 1500 killed and wounded, and 3000 prisoners; but it had disabled more than 6000 of Lord Wellington's men,—a greater number than any of his battles. The assault alone had cost him 3000 men,—a sad compensation for our double misfortune! Lord Wellington had, nevertheless, attained his end: he had accomplished his design of employing the days allowed him by our disconnected movements to take in turn Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz! These two towns were taken from us, Portugal was closed against us, and Spain, henceforward, was open to the English!

Marshal Soult, on learning the danger of Badajoz, which had been repeatedly intimated to him, had slowly quitted the lines of Cadiz, where he was occupied in throwing upon the roadstead some ineffectual bombs, and had at length put himself on the march to assist the besieged place. He brought with him 24,000 men, the only troops at his disposal so long as he determined to preserve Grenada and Seville, and he hastened to Llerena in the hope of there finding, as in the preceding summer, Marshal Marmont with 30,000 men. The hope was vain, for the marshal was not there. The news of the disaster of Badajoz threw Marshal Soult into consternation, for the only trophy of his campaign in Andalusia had now escaped him, and Lord Wellington, if tempted to carry on his operations through Estremadura and Andalusia, had every avenue open before him.

Nor had Marshal Marmont remained inactive. Confined to Old Castile by the positive orders of Napoleon, he had had recourse, on learning the extremity to which Badajoz was reduced, to the manœuvre suggested to him. He had passed the Agueda with five divisions, unable to bring more; he had scattered the guerilla-bands which infested the country, thrown back the detachments of English troops who guarded the frontiers of Portugal, and then checked himself from the fear of wanting provisions, and from the conviction that he was pursuing a perfectly-useless course. Yet his manœuvre had not been altogether without effect; for on the news of his appearance Lord Wellington, who might have been tempted to fall upon Marshal Soult, whom he knew to be reduced to 24,000 men, had immediately suspended his march and resumed the route of the North of Portugal.

Napoleon, seeing the successive fall of the two fortresses which had cost so much blood and so many efforts, and which were the principal obstacles to the course of the English whether to the north or south, was equally distressed and irritated: he laid the blame on everybody; on Marshal Soult, who, with 80,000 men, he said, did nothing; on Marshal Marmont, who had been unable to modify orders issued at the distance of three hundred leagues from the seat of war. These reproaches were only very partially deserved. Marshal Soult had, at the time, scarcely 50,000 disposable men, and could not have made any serious opposition to the enterprises of the English, without sacrificing Grenada. His real error consisted in leaving General Drouet's corps in Estremadura, where it could effect nothing, and in not having simply recalled it to himself, leaving 10,000 men and some cavalry in Bada-

joz, well supplied with provisions and powder. By these means Badajoz might have held out for several months, and have allowed time for sending succour. With respect to Marshal Marmont, the order to remain in Old Castile, not to descend into Estremadura, nor to assist Badajoz except by a diversion into the province of Beira, was so precise, that no general, however bold, would have ventured to disobey.

The position originally adopted by that marshal—that of Almaraz on the Tagus—was the only suitable one, the only one which would have allowed him to assist in turn Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz. If indeed a reinforcement of 20,000 men had been granted him whom he might have placed at Salamanca, he might have marched upon Badajoz with the 80,000 whom he had upon the Tagus, and, when united to the army of Andalusia, he might have opposed Lord Wellington with 55,000 men, which would have been sufficient to save Badajoz. If, on the contrary, the danger had been in the North, he might have repassed the Guadarrama, and, finding the 20,000 men posted at Salamanca, he might still have opposed 50,000 to Lord Wellington under the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus have frustrated all his attempts. By refusing him a reinforcement of 20,000 men and confining him to Old Castile, Napoleon had rendered the fall of Badajoz almost inevitable. Certainly the idea of a diversion directed from Salamanca to Beira was correct, as every thought of Napoleon on the subject of war was sure to be, and the result proved it, since it had brought back Lord Wellington towards the North of Portugal the day after the capture of Badajoz, but it brought him back the day after, not the day before. This idea was correct, but its correctness was too general to suffice for execution, for without a rigorous precision in the calculation of distances, times, and forces, the most correct ideas become either chimerical or fatal. Undoubtedly, if Badajoz had contained a garrison of 10,000 men with a sufficient quantity of ammunition and provisions, if the Duke of Ragusa had had 50,000 men either of his own or borrowed from General Caffarelli's army, which was placed under his orders, if, moreover, he had had magazines always well supplied, and in these conditions had seriously marched against Coimbra, Lord Wellington would infallibly have missed his aim again, and abandoned the siege of Badajoz; but Badajoz having scarcely the means of self-defence, and the Duke of Ragusa being unable with the means at his disposal to utter more than a vain menace, it was impossible by a simple demonstration in Beira to turn from his design a mind so intelligent and so resolute as that of Lord Wellington.

Thus, in 1811 as in 1810 all combinations had failed in Spain, all the reinforcements sent thither had become unavailing. Before recording events still more sorrowful than those we have just related, let us resume what had taken place in the Peninsula during the last two years. We have already seen, in the 40th book of this history, how the campaign of 1810 had failed, how at that epoch, with the wise thought of employing in Spain all his disposable forces in order there to resolve the European question, which he had himself transported thither, how also, with the wise design of directing his principal effort against the English, Napoleon had allowed him-

self to be turned from his purpose by the urgency of Joseph and of Marshal Soult, and had consented to the fatal expedition of Andalusia, which had occasioned the dispersion of 80,000 men, the best warriors then in the Peninsula; we have seen how Massena, when sent to Lisbon with 70,000 men, reduced to 50,000 by local circumstances, had met before Torres Vedras an almost insuperable obstacle, which, nevertheless, he would have been able to surmount by the aid of 25,000 men from Andalusia and a similar aid from Castile; how Marshal Soult had been neither able nor willing to afford this aid; how General Drouet had been equally unable, and how Napoleon, carried away by a lamentable fickleness to other objects, had refused the 50,000 men, who could have decided every thing; and, finally, how a campaign which ought to have inflicted a mortal blow upon the English army had merely turned to our disadvantage, and had unprofitably occupied the 150,000 men sent to Spain after the peace of Vienna. These affecting recitals are, doubtless, present to the mind of the reader. The accounts of the close of 1811 are neither less affecting nor less significant, as the recitals of this book have proved.

Since from the middle of 1811 Napoleon had resolved to carry his arms in person towards the North, that is, to Russia, he ought in the South, that is, in Spain, to have confined himself to an imposing attitude of defence, until he should have terminated every thing between the Vistula and the Borysthene, if, indeed, he could terminate any thing in those regions. By leaving Marshal Suchet in Aragon and Catalonia, without granting him new forces, but also without assigning to him any new task, that marshal, especially after the conquest of Tarragona, would have remained the peaceable and unquestioned master of these provinces; by leaving Marshal Soult at Seville, and Marshal Marmont on the Tagus, without requiring of them any change of forces towards Valencia, but with the orders to each to repair to Badajoz at the first appearance of danger, as they had already done with so much success; by further granting Marshal Marmont the power to draw to himself the army of the North, and by consigning to him exclusively the greater part of the reserve, it is probable that he might for a long time have baffled the efforts of the English against Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and have reduced Lord Wellington to inaction, perhaps for a whole year, which would have been a source of great embarrassment to him, considering the inordinate demands of public opinion in his country. But unwilling to relinquish any thing, and even, while preparing the gigantic expedition against Russia, aiming at the vigorous prosecution of affairs in Spain, flattering himself that he would advance them greatly in the autumn and winter of 1811, Napoleon, by ordering the expedition of Valencia, repeated the fault which he had committed by permitting the expedition of Andalusia; he condemned Marshal Suchet to extend his operations without granting him reinforcements, and while for a moment he caused all the disposable forces to converge towards him, Lord Wellington, who was ever on the watch, took Ciudad Rodrigo, and closed Beira against us by opening Castile to himself. Marshal Marmont hastened, indeed, to Ciudad Rodrigo; but, being obliged to gather his forces, which were scat-

tered as far as the environs of Alicante, he arrived too late, and the single trophy of the campaign in Portugal was snatched from our hands. There remained Badajoz, the single trophy of the campaign of Andalusia. The same cause deprived us of it. Napoleon, obliged sooner than he had supposed to recall from Spain his guard, the Poles, the dragoons, and the 4th battalions, and attracting every thing to the North of the Peninsula in order to be able to draw every thing to the North of Europe, brought Marmont from the Tagus to the Douro, and by fixing him there exposed Badajoz, which Lord Wellington, ever on the watch, carried as he had done Ciudad Rodrigo, by availing himself of the blank left before that place by our false movement. Thus, in order to take Valencia, which weakened us by forcing us to extend our operations, we lost Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, the only result of two difficult campaigns, the only serious obstacle to the offensive march of the English! Such was, of necessity, the result of giving orders from a distance, with the mind otherwise preoccupied, and of devoting to each subject only one-half of the resources and of the attention which were requisite to insure success!

As the result of all these errors, the state of Spain was as follows. General Suchet remained at Valencia, simply with the means of holding the country, but by no means of acting at any distance; Marshal Soult found himself in the midst of Andalusia, with a force insufficient to take Cadiz, and unable to give battle to the English, if they, after the capture of Badajoz, had thought fit to march against him, which, however, was not very probable; finally, Marshal Marmont in the North, where in reality the English wished to strike a decisive blow either on Madrid or on the line of communication of the French armies, deprived of Ciudad Rodrigo, might, if Joseph and General Caffarelli reinforced him in time, muster 40,000 men in opposition to 60,000 under Lord Wellington. Such was the state of Spain after we had sent thither a reinforcement of 150,000 men in 1810, 40,000 good troops and 20,000 conscripts in 1811, independently of more than 400,000 who had entered the Peninsula from 1808 to 1810. Of these

600,000 men, not more than 300,000 survived, yielding, at the most, 170,000 men capable of active service; and we should add, that of these 170,000 men, 40,000 at most, by skilful manœuvring, might protect Madrid and Valladolid, that is to say, the capital of the country and our line of communication!

Napoleon, on the point of leaving Paris, having learned by repeated experience the difficulty of giving suitable orders from a distance, determined to confer upon Joseph the command of all the armies serving in Spain, without, however, prescribing the only course which could have saved every thing,—that of leaving Marshal Suchet at Valencia because he was there already; but, recalling the army of Andalusia to the Tagus, there to unite with the army of Portugal under one command, to establish these two armies, amounting to a compact force of 80,000 men in a well-chosen position, from whence they might, at the first sign of danger, march upon Madrid or Valladolid, according to the course adopted by the English. But Napoleon contented himself with giving orders to all to obey Joseph, without knowing how Marshal Suchet, accustomed to exercise sole command in his own province, and to exercise it well,—how Marshal Soult, resolved on reigning exclusively in Andalusia,—how Marshal Marmont, still engaged in perpetual contests with the court of Madrid for the interests of the army of Portugal,—could or would behave in regard to this authority of Joseph, so long denied, ridiculed, and slighted by Napoleon himself, and proclaimed at the last moment as a kind of extreme remedy in which must be suddenly reposed a degree of confidence which had never hitherto been secured. Marshal Jourdan, appointed chief of the staff of Joseph, drew up a memoir on the subject full of good sense and reason, which disclosed all the inconveniences we have pointed out, and which was forwarded to Paris. Before stating how it was replied to by Napoleon, and, what is still more serious, by events themselves, we must recur to the North, to that abyss where Napoleon, drawn on by his impetuous genius, was about to bury himself and his fortune, and, unhappily, also the fortune of France.



## BOOK XLIII.

## PASSAGE OF THE NIEMEN.

Events in the North—Success of the Russians on the Danube—M. Nesselrode sent to Paris to negotiate—Coldly received by Napoleon—Last preparations for war—Distribution of Napoleon's forces—Political alliances of Napoleon—Treaties with Russia and Austria—Negotiations for an alliance with Sweden and with the Porte—Efforts to create a war between England and America—Internal condition of the empire—The Emperor Alexander leaves St. Petersburg for his headquarters—Napoleon quits Paris May 9, 1812—Arrives at Dresden—Meeting of almost all the Continental Sovereigns in that capital—Views relative to Poland—Napoleon at Thorn—His reception of Marshal Davout and King Murat—His stay at Dantzig—Arrival at Königsberg—Final rupture with Bernadotte—Declaration of war with Russia—Plan of the campaign—Arrival at the banks of the Niemen—Passage of that river—Contrast of the projects of Napoleon in 1810 and his enterprises in 1812—Fatal presentiments.

NAPOLEON and Alexander had remained since the month of November last in a position of vigilant observation, each responding to the hostile preparations of the other,—Alexander, rather fearing than desiring war, nevertheless resolved to carry it on, sooner than sacrifice the honour or the commerce of his nation, and in the mean while neglecting nothing which might terminate his struggle with Turkey, either by arms or by diplomacy,—Napoleon, on his part, without exactly desiring war, determined on engaging in it, rather from ambition than from inclination; making the most active preparations, because he was fatally convinced that war must sooner or later ensue; which was certainly most inevitable if he exacted from Russia an absolute submission as he had done from Prussia and Austria. In this situation, having said all respecting the taking possession of the territory of Oldenburg, the admission of the neutrals into the Russian ports, the origin of the reciprocal armaments of France and Russia, and having nothing further to communicate upon these already tiresome subjects, they acted in silence. Various corps were successively organized and sent respectively to the Dwina or the Dnieper, the Oder or the Vistula. By such a course were they soon to be brought into immediate contact in the most threatening attitude. All men of sense and honour in Russia, in France, and in Europe—some from reason and humanity, others from honourable patriotism—declared with sorrow that, in persisting some days longer in this silence and this activity, torrents of blood would flow from the Rhine even to the Volga. The most active of those who entertained these noble sentiments, M. de Lauriston, incessantly wrote to Paris that war was not wished at St. Petersburg; that it would be carried on reluctantly, but that it would be made terrible; and that, nevertheless, if France consented a little to humour Russian susceptibility, to concede something in favour of the Prince of Oldenburg, and be satisfied with a little more rigour against the English flag, she would be certain to preserve peace, whatever might happen in other parts of Europe. His urgency had at length brought upon himself from Napoleon some cutting but not bitter remarks, such as, "Lauriston permits himself to be caught;" remarks to which M. de Bassano on his part added despatches full of arrogance and ignorance. Grieved at not having been listened to in Paris, M. de Lauriston insisted upon being heard at St. Petersburg,—endeavouring to show

the uselessness and the danger of a fresh struggle with Napoleon, (of which they were perfectly convinced,) and repeating that, after some more days of this constrained and awkward silence, one of the parties must inevitably be found on the brink of a precipice. He earnestly demanded, with the dignity of a firm conviction, that they should send to Paris instructions to Prince Kourakin to bring about a satisfactory explanation respecting all contested points, "for," he incessantly repeated, "nothing which seems to divide the two powers is worth a war." The cabinets of Berlin and of Vienna acquiesced in this proposal, the one from sincerity, the other from prudence. Prussia foresaw new hazards in another European conflagration in which she would have to take a part; and the wise king, Frederick William, was not one of those who think that in sickness it is necessary to shift your position at the risk of increasing your malady. Besides, the necessity of siding with Napoleon in the event of war breaking out wounded his Germanic feelings, which though suppressed were not the less sincere. He therefore ardently wished for peace, and he had sent earnest solicitations to St. Petersburg, even offering his good offices; steps which had been received with contempt, wounded as Russia was at not having Prussia on her side. Austria, although she foresaw that a new struggle between France and Russia would furnish her with the opportunity of re-establishing her affairs at the expense of one or the other, feared war not the less, especially because she foresaw the necessity of being allied to France, and on this account ceased not to urge peace at St. Petersburg. She had offered her intervention, which had met with no better reception than that of Prussia. Russia at length, wearied with entreaties which seemed to imply that peace depended upon her, had answered the ministers of these two powers, "Urge peace upon others, since you desire it so much; urge it especially upon those who wish for war, and who oblige me to prepare for it in spite of myself."\*

In virtue of hearing it often repeated that it was necessary to come to a clear understanding before proceeding to open hostilities,—that Prince Kourakin, having exhausted all his influence with Napoleon, (his character being better suited to the part of a representative than to actual business,) was not sufficient to settle the quarrel,

\* I speak on the authority of the Prussian and Austrian despatches.

they had concluded at St. Petersburg, by directing their attention to a man well calculated to re-establish good feeling, if that were possible, namely, M. de Nesselrode, principal secretary of the legation of Paris, then very young, but already much distinguished, being possessed of a refined, clear-sighted, and prudent mind, inspiring Alexander with confidence from that period, and to whom Napoleon attached more weight than he did to Prince Kourakin, and who was at that time on leave at St. Petersburg. They had heard from him, since his return from Paris, that, if it was desired, all might be arranged; that Napoleon was by no means so eager for the war as was generally believed; that with him it was necessary to come to a direct explanation, to speak openly and plainly; so that, proceeding in this manner, satisfaction could be obtained, and an honourable agreement might be entered into. They had therefore thought of M. de Nesselrode, and had been tempted to send him to Paris with instructions and power to treat of all questions recently agitated, and irritating less by what was expressed than by that left unsaid. M. de Nesselrode felt himself honoured at his age by so important a mission, and showed himself disposed to do all in his power to insure success. Unhappily, what flattered him aroused a troublesome jealousy in M. de Romanzoff, much interested, however, in preventing war, but taking offence at the progress of the young diplomatist, and at the confidence which Alexander appeared to place in him. He made, therefore, some objection to this mission, although he was ready to make many sacrifices to preserve peace, and even effect an alliance with France. One objection of M. de Romanzoff which touched the Russian susceptibility of Alexander was that of appearing to sue for peace by sending a diplomatist, whose special mission was to negotiate, especially when they were not the originators of measures which were justly considered irritating.

However, a fortunate event for the Russians recently occurring in Turkey furnished an opportunity, of which they resolved to avail themselves, of sending M. de Nesselrode to Paris, without the appearance of weakness on their own part. General Kutusoff, appointed at this time to direct the war, had taken advantage of the negligence of the Turks, (who after having recaptured Rutschuck had remained inactive,) had drawn them on towards Nicopolis, pretending to aim at crossing the Danube at that point, had then crossed it near Rutschuck, surprised the camp of the vizier, dispersed a portion of his troops, and closely blockaded the remainder in an island on the river. This success, which it seemed must compel the Porte to treat, had caused great joy at St. Petersburg, where the intelligence was received in November, 1811. Immediately General Kutusoff was authorized to open negotiations, and to propose peace, modifying the original Russian claims. Thus, they no longer demanded the provinces of the Danube, that is to say, Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, but only Bessarabia and Moldavia, the latter as far as the Sereth, a kind of independence for Wallachia and Servia, a small territory on the side of the Caucasus at the mouth of the Phasis, and the sum of 20,000,000 piastres as indemnity for the war. Conferences on these principles were held at Giurgewo, and an armis-

stice of many months had been agreed upon. Every hour, a courier to announce the conclusion of the peace was expected to arrive at St. Petersburg.

These results, although they were less brilliant than Alexander hoped, (for he had expected, besides Finland, to add at the same time to his empire Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia,) were yet very satisfactory, and the acquisition of Finland and Bessarabia alone was a sufficiently-brilliant commencement of a reign which promised to be of long continuance. But these results were of still greater advantage to him in another respect, as they enabled him to send M. de Nesselrode to Paris without proclaiming weakness at St. Petersburg. Master of all his forces by the conclusion of the war on the Danube, he appeared as much to give as to receive peace, besides being in a position to demand it on more favourable terms.

Instructions were therefore prepared for M. de Nesselrode. Alexander took the trouble to draw them up himself, and authorized M. de Lauriston to announce the approaching departure of the new plenipotentiary. A higher rank in the Russian diplomacy was given to M. de Nesselrode, so that he might appear invested with every token of the imperial confidence. They awaited impatiently a last courier from the banks of the Danube, in order that M. de Nesselrode should set out just at the moment when the conclusion of the war in Turkey should be made known, and thus have at the same time more dignity and more force in his negotiations.

These arrangements were made known to the different continental courts, and particularly to those of Prussia and Austria. M. de Lauriston wrote concerning them to Paris, with the evident satisfaction of a good citizen, better pleased with having acted faithfully than certain of being approved, for his language clearly shows that he doubted much whether his zeal for the maintenance of peace would be pleasing to his court.

The news of the departure of M. de Nesselrode, though frequently rumoured, was not authenticated at Paris till towards the end of December. It greatly disconcerted Napoleon and thwarted his designs in more ways than one. He had already received intelligence of the check to the Turks, "who," he said, "had behaved like brutes," and he regarded the conclusion of the war with Turkey as the commencement of a war with France. He had indeed always supposed that the Russians had only waited for this event to turn against him, offering him either unacceptable conditions, or war, his choice regarding which alternative was already fully determined. The news of the journey of M. de Nesselrode left him no longer in doubt. He concluded from it, that Russia, viewing the war with Turkey as nearly terminated, hastened to take advantage of it by dictating conditions to him. There was in this sufficient to irritate him deeply, and even to drive him to a sudden rupture, of which he was only too desirous, had he not conceived a vast scheme, requiring on his part the greatest dissimulation. He wished, while continually asserting his desire for peace, and that he was taking arms merely for precaution, to arrive successively at the Oder and then at the Vistula, before the Russians had crossed the Niemen, in order to save immense resources in the way of grain and forage, which were to

be found in Poland and Old Prussia,—resources which the Russians would not fail to destroy should they be allowed time, for they boasted much of being ready to make a desert of their provinces, as the English had already done in Portugal. Now, the greater the distance of the commencement of this desert, the less would be the stock of provisions requisite for the army to carry. This is why Napoleon, after having made himself sure of Dantzic, intended to secure the navigation of the Frische-Haff by his negotiations with Prussia, in order to pass by water from Dantzic to Königsberg, then from Königsberg to Tilsit. It was only from Niemen that he intended to make use of the land transports, and, expecting to carry with him provisions for a distance of two hundred leagues, he hoped to be able to advance sufficiently far to bring the sword into the very heart of Russia. All this scheme would be frustrated should the Russians foresee it, and if, falling suddenly upon Old Prussia and Poland, they should convert them into a desert, by burning the granaries and carrying off the cattle. It was necessary, therefore, little by little, silently, without rupture, to arrive at the Vistula, then at Pregel, before the enemy; it would also be necessary and not less important to delay hostilities until the summer of 1812, for the immense transports Napoleon had prepared depended on the collection and maintenance of a large number of horses. Now, to employ their strength in carrying sufficient provisions for themselves would be useless trouble, for there would remain nothing for the men. In short, if the six thousand wagons must be laden with oats in place of wheat, so vast an equipage would not repay itself, and to allow of its being dispensed with, the war should not begin till June. The land in the North would then be covered with forage and crops, and by permitting the harvests of the Russians to be consumed *en herbe* by the cavalry, artillery, and baggage horses, (the number of which already exceeded 100,000 and was soon to be raised to 150,000,) they would be sure of finding support on the territory of the enemy for the numerous animals which followed them. These animals were necessary to the support of the men, and summer was necessary to the support of these animals. The Russians would in vain set fire to their fields: they would not burn pasture. Besides, to complete the immense preparations, the advancement of which had already occupied two years, Napoleon knew by experience that two months were not to be despised: that the Russians using destruction as their weapon, while his consisted in the creation of resources, time was not an essential to them, whilst it was indispensable to himself.

From these deep motives it was necessary to reach the Vistula, and not only gain ground but time, without provoking a rupture. Nothing was more calculated to aid this design than this state of indefinite hidden quarrel, originating such observations as "You arm!" "So do you." "It is you who have commenced." "No, it is not we, but you." "We do not wish for war." "Neither do we," and other similar remarks, apparently insignificant, but most serviceable to him who, with these wearisome bickerings, occupied entire months, gained from December to January, from January to February, and hoped still to gain till June,

1812. Now, a clear and definite explanation would at once put an end to a position so favourable to the schemes of Napoleon, and the arrival of M. de Nesselrode, by bringing about such an explanation, was by no means agreeable to him.\* With all his natural address, and with all the self-command he could assume when necessary, it was impossible, with so penetrating a man as M. de Nesselrode, not to be led to an immediate and clear explanation, to a decision of yes or no, after which nothing would remain to be done but for each to march against the other. Now, as we have just seen, it was important to him that the French should arrive at the Pregel, the Russians at the Niemen, before the declaration of the war, constantly repeating that an explanation was necessary, without ever coming to an explanation.

He therefore formed the resolution to give immediately his last military orders, and at the same time, in so doing, he adopted the most effectual way of preventing M. de Nesselrode coming to Paris, always avoiding wounding Russia and driving her to an immediate rupture. He saw Prince Kourakin very frequently; he knew, for the rumour of it was spread throughout all Europe, that the embassy of M. de Nesselrode was approaching; yet he never alluded to it to the prince, a perfectly unaccountable silence, were he not opposed to the projected mission. He did not stop there: in explaining himself on this subject to the Prussian minister, whose position led him to collect his words and forward them to Berlin, where the desire to be useful to the cause of peace would lead to their being speedily known at St. Petersburg, he did not exactly express an intention not to receive M. de Nesselrode, but he showed himself cold, reserved, almost displeased, and appeared to disapprove of the *éclat* given to this kind of extraordinary embassy, for thus, he maintained, was enlisted the self-love of the two powers, and they were rendered more decided, and more careful not to concede one unnecessary point. To this indirect disapprobation of the mission of M. de Nesselrode, he added a marked coolness towards the Russian legation upon a somewhat important occasion. On the first day of the year, a day devoted to receptions, he scarcely addressed a single word to Prince Kourakin, who, being very attentive to little things, did not fail to remark this, from which he concluded that the mission of M. de Nesselrode, whether coming too late or not being welcome, had no chance of success. What was yet more important was the rumour of the orders given by Napoleon, a rumour sufficient, however slight, to catch the ear of an ambassador, however little informed. Napoleon had recommended the most absolute discretion; but so many people were obliged to be taken into his confidence, and some of his orders were so difficult to be concealed from their nature and their importance, that, though the great body of the public might be kept in ignorance, it was impossible to deal with a diplomacy which too

\* In so important a matter, (not more, however, than in one of less consequence,) I should wish to take nothing for granted. But the most exact of Napoleon's letters to three or four men intrusted with his confidence, the Prince Eugene, Marshal Davoust, M. de Croscq, and M. de Larosière himself, leave no room for doubt about the truth of this opinion. We shall hereafter cite substantial and undeniable proofs.

well rewarded the traitor. Indeed, M. de Caernicheff, aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, often on embassy at Paris, had bribed a clerk, who revealed to him the most important secrets of the minister of war. By these different means, Prince Kourakin obtained a knowledge of all that Napoleon had commanded, and these orders could leave no doubt about his irrevocable intention to commence hostilities.

First, he had given orders to M. de Cessac, who had become minister of the administration of war, to prepare a decree of the senate for the raising of the conscription of 1812,—a measure which was necessarily very significant, since the *cadres*, having already received the entire conscription of 1811, were sufficiently numerous for a purely-precautionary armament. Napoleon had then demanded their complete contingent from the German governments, not only from the principal among them, as Bavaria, Saxony, or Wurtemberg, who might have kept a secret, but from all the minor princes, to whom he could not apply without the deed soon being made known. He had written in cipher to Marshals Suchet and Soult, to send to him immediately the regiments of the Vistula, regiments he considered excellent and wished to employ in Poland. He had given orders for the immediate return of the Young Guard, quartered in Castile, and for that of the dragoons, appointed to re-enter France in successive squadrons. This explains how in Spain, after having directed his forces upon Valencia with the intention of falling back upon Portugal, he had suddenly concentrated his forces on the coast of Castile instead of on the coast of Portugal, so that the English, having taken advantage of the movement towards Valencia to take Ciudad Rodrigo, had taken advantage soon after of the movement towards Castile to capture Badajoz.

Besides these orders, Napoleon directed towards the Rhine not the detachments of the guard which were in Paris, which would have produced too great a sensation, but those which were stationed in the environs, such as the regiments of the Dutch guard. He urged afresh the purchase of horses in Germany, which in his opinion was not carried on with sufficient speed, and set in motion the battalions of equipages the organization of which was completed, providing them with shoes, spirits, and the other articles with which they were generally equipped. Finally, he forwarded his first order of movement to the Italian army. This army having to traverse Lombardy, the Tyrol, Bavaria, and Saxony in order to be in line with the army of Marshal Davout upon the Vistula, required to be in motion at least a month before the others, in order to be in time. However, since of all the measures which he had adopted the latter was the most striking, (for he could not displace the Italian army and withdraw it from its quarters, to march it through half of Europe, without some definite intentions respecting the war,) he endeavoured to keep his secret, and wrote directly to Prince Eugene, taking care to avoid the interference of the cabinets. He enjoined this prince to dispose of his division at Brescia, Verona, and Trieste by the middle of January, so that they should be ready to march towards the end of that month with all their *matériel*. Although he

named January, he calculated upon February, knowing from his great experience that a month is not too much to allow for inevitable delays. He purposed marching the Italian troops towards the end of February, and not to move those of Marshal Davout till the course of March, except to send the latter rapidly down towards the Vistula if the news of the movement of the Italian army should bring the Russians upon the Niemen. If not, he proposed gradually to direct his columns towards the Vistula, where he did not wish them to arrive before the middle of April, then to carry them to the Pregel by the middle of May, and by the middle of June to the Niemen. In thus allowing three months for the movement from the Elbe to the Niemen, the men and horses would arrive there without being fatigued, and the complete armament would be brought at once upon the scene of action.

Of all these measures the Russian legation was ignorant only of the departure of the Italian army, of which Prince Eugene was alone cognizant, and of the recall of the Poles from Spain, effected by cipher despatches to Marshals Soult and Suchet. But it knew of all the others, and they were sufficient to dissipate the last doubts, if any yet existed, as to the commencement of the war in the present year, 1812. Prince Kourakin indeed had entertained none since the first days of January. The silence evidently intentionally kept with him about the mission of M. de Nesselrode, the unusual coldness suddenly shown towards him, and which contrasted with the attentions generally manifested to him, in short, all the arrangements made known even by public rumour, were equivalent to the most open demonstration. Thus, Prince Kourakin sent an extraordinary courier, on the 13th of January, to inform his court of all that he had learned and observed for himself, and to declare that in his opinion war was resolved upon, and that immediate preparations must be made to sustain it. He even demanded orders for extreme cases, as that of being obliged to leave Paris. Perhaps his extreme sensibility to indifference on the part of the court had given more strength to his convictions; but, if it were his personal displeasure which had led him to say that war was resolved upon, this displeasure had tended to his enlightenment, for it was certain that from that moment war was inevitable.

When the despatches of Prince Kourakin were made known at St. Petersburg, they were still desirous of sending M. de Nesselrode to Paris, and they only awaited the determining circumstance of a courier arriving from Constantinople, to order his departure. Unfortunately, this courier did not arrive, and M. de Romanzoff made a bad use of this delay from motives of jealousy towards the young negotiator. The courier of Prince Kourakin set off on the 18th of January, and arrived on the 27th at St. Petersburg, where he created the most lively sensation. Upon reading the despatches which he carried, all shared the sentiments of the ambassador, and, like him, no longer doubted the commencement of war. Already they were inclined to believe that the actual crisis should terminate thus, and, sooner than submit, as Prussia or Austria had done, to the will of Napoleon, rather than sacrifice the remainder of the Russian commerce, they were resolved to brave the greatest

extremities. However, between the contemplation of a fact, and the fact itself, there is always a wide difference, deeply felt by all, and to such a degree were those at St. Petersburg affected, that M. de Lauriston says, without exaggeration, that they were perfectly dismayed. In the opinion of Europe at that time, it was such a risk to run to brave Napoleon, his genius, and his valiant armies, everlasting memorials of which were to be seen in Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, and Friedland, that even with the noblest feelings of patriotism or with the most ardent hatred towards us felt by the European aristocracy, they were seized with a kind of terror at the thought of renewing a struggle which had always terminated so unsuccessfully. Besides on this occasion were fortune still against them, that power which they so desired to overthrow might be permanently consolidated, for Russia would be exposed to the danger of falling into that second rank to which Prussia and Austria have to this day descended,—a fate which they greatly dreaded. Providence, ever guarding carefully her secrets, had not revealed her will, and the Russians knew not they were on the eve of their greatness, and Napoleon still less deemed himself on the eve of his downfall! However, in these secret decrees of Providence there is always something discoverable by genius, sometimes even by passion.

Passion, which generally blinds, and so seldom enlightens, had this time discovered to the Russians a part of the truth. They recollected that in 1807 Napoleon had vanquished their armies, but that he had narrowly escaped sinking into their marshes and there dying of hunger or cold amid the frost. The catastrophe of Charles XII. came to their memory. Also the recent distress of Massena in Portugal, originating in devastations, (and published throughout Europe with a kind of barbarous boasting;) and they maintained that, without burning the fields of others as the English had done, by setting fire to their own plains they should place Napoleon in a still more terrible position than that of Massena. Thus it was declared throughout the entire Russian army that it would be necessary to burn every thing, to destroy every thing, and then to retire into the centre of Russia without giving battle, when they would see what the terrible Emperor of the French could do in desert plains, deprived of grain for the soldiers and herb for the horses, and whether, like a new Pharaoh, he should perish in the immensity of the void, as the other had done in the immensity of the waters. This plan of avoiding great engagements and of destroying as they retired sprang up in all minds, and on this solemn point every one was agreed.

There were even among the officers of the Emperor Alexander characters more ardent than the rest, who advised him to extend the desert in front, and for this purpose not to await the arrival of Napoleon upon the Niemen, thereby allowing him to obtain possession of the rich granaries of Poland and Old Prussia, but immediately to invade these countries, some belonging to the odious Poland, the true cause of the war, the others to Prussia, whose weakness would make her the ally of Napoleon, to occupy them but for a few days, to destroy every thing, and evacuate them immediately afterwards.

Alexander, agreeing on this point with all the

soldiers and officers in his army, was inclined to oppose Napoleon by distance and destruction, to refuse to give him battle, and to retire into the interior of Russia, only stopping to fight when they should find the French worn out with fatigue and hunger; but he was not of the opinion of those who desired immediately to invade and destroy Old Prussia and Poland. To take the offensive by advancing was to give the great gainer of victories a chance of conquering in the very country in which he should be anticipated; it was also to be a sharer with him in the wrongs of aggression, at least in the eyes of the nations; and Alexander, before demanding the greatest sacrifices of his people, desired to convince the world that he had not been the aggressor. In short, there was one reason which Alexander did not say much about, but which actuated him greatly: it was his desire to preserve peace as long as it could be honourably maintained, and not to expose it by an imprudent initiative. For his part, M. de Romazoff, whose policy was founded upon the French alliance, and who should lose by the war the basis of his system and the true reason of his presence in the councils of the empire, imagined still, that when Napoleon should be upon the Vistula, and Alexander upon the Niemen, they should be able to establish a kind of armed negotiation, and that on the point of engaging in the most dreadful measures each would perhaps be more accommodating; that Napoleon himself, having seen more closely the difficulties of this remote war, would be less exacting, and that they should end by discovering at the last moment a means of compromise which should save the honour of all: doubtless a feeble hope, but one which M. de Romazoff and Alexander could not bring themselves to renounce.

With these views, Alexander, with his minister and some generals intrusted with his confidence, determined the plan of warfare which it would be proper to adopt. It was decided that there should be two considerable armies, all the elements of which were already collected, one upon the Dwina, the other upon the Dnieper,—two rivers which, rising at some leagues from each other, flowed, the former towards Riga and the Baltic, the latter towards Odessa and the Black Sea, thus describing a vast transverse line from the northwest to the southeast, constituting, we may say, the interior frontier of the great Russian empire. These two armies, having their advanced posts upon the Niemen, should retire concentrically at the approach of the enemy, presenting to them a compact mass of at least 250,000 men, to which they hoped soon to be able to add reserves to the number of 100,000. A third army of about 40,000 men should be placed in observation upon Austria, should unite with that of the Danube, which was of 60,000, and these two armies themselves, following the events in Turkey, should present themselves upon the scene of action, and increase the sum total of the Russian forces to 450,000 men.

These means, independently of the climate, of distance, and of the proposed ravages, had considerable importance, and sustained the confidence of the Russians. But other causes contributed further to strengthen it. The Russians thought that, in this struggle, opinion would play an important part, and that those who should succeed in gaining it to their side would

have a great advantage. They knew that France herself, although obliged to be silent, did not approve of those incessant wars in which torrents of blood were shed for reasons which she could not understand, since her frontiers had not only reached, but actually passed, the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees. They knew that after intense enthusiasm for the person of Napoleon, a silent hatred was springing up against him, and would declare itself at the first reverse of fortune; that in Germany this hatred was not silent and hidden, but ardent and public, more violent even than in Spain, where it was subdued by exhaustion; that in the allied states, as Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, the people were much offended with their princes for having sacrificed them to a foreign master, simply with the view of territorial aggrandisement, and that the conscription had become among them the most odious of institutions; that in Prussia, besides all the evils resulting from continual wars, they were inconsolable for their lost greatness; that in Austria, where they were a little calmed since the peace and the marriage, the court cherished more aversion than ever against France; that they regretted bitterly Italy, and especially Illyria; that finally, in the North, even in Poland, there were sufferings which greatly diminished the enthusiasm for Napoleon, and made many sharers in the opinion of some great Polish lords, who thought that it was necessary to reconstitute Poland not by France but by Russia, placing the crown of the Jagellons upon the head of Alexander or upon a prince of his family. And it was true that unhappy Poland, having no other wealth than her grain, her wood, and her hemp, which could no longer cross the port of Dantzic since the continental blockade, suffered terribly; that the nobility were ruined, the people crushed with taxes, and the town of Dantzic, from a rich commercial city converted into a war-city, reduced to the utmost extremity. General Rapp, an able courtier and an excellent man, had been so touched with the spectacle of these evils that he had ventured to make them known to Marshal Davout, saying that if the French army experienced one single reverse there would be immediately a general insurrection from the Rhine to the Niemen. The cold and severe Davout himself, little regarding the sufferings which he shared equally with the soldiers, observing with respect to public affairs the same silence which he imposed upon others, had, however, transmitted to Napoleon the letters which General Rapp had written to him, accompanying them with these remarkable words,—"Indeed I remember, Sire, that in 1809, without the miracles of your Majesty at Ratisbon, our situation in Germany had been difficult."

These were sad truths for us, but, added to the conviction of their real strength, they inspired the Russians with confidence in undertaking a formidable struggle. They said, therefore, that if war presented great risks it also presented advantages; that if Napoleon, as Charles XII., should meet in Russia the plagues of Pultowa, entire Germany would rise upon his rear; that the allied princes would be compelled by their subjects to detach themselves from his alliance; that Poland itself would embrace the idea of being reconstituted otherwise than by the hand of Napoleon; and that France,

wearied of bloodshed, and tired of making sacrifices required by an unlimited and unreasonable ambition, would not make the efforts she had previously made to preserve her greatness.

These reasons confirmed Alexander's resolution to let wrongs be on the part of Napoleon and not on his own, not to adopt the initiative by aggression, to come to the banks of the Niemen without passing it, and, in a formidable but unobtrusive manner, to await the enemy without going to seek him. This line of conduct appeared to him the best in every point of view, both military and political; besides, by acting thus, every chance was given for peace, for it was always possible that at the last moment a happy negotiation should cause all to lay down their arms. This system was extended to the point of leaving the enemy to take the initiative in all evidently hostile acts, as the departure of the Imperial Guard, and that of the Emperor for the army. Thus, they resolved not to let the Russian Imperial Guard set out from St. Petersburg until the French Imperial Guard should have left Paris, and Alexander himself did not propose quitting his capital until Napoleon should have set out from his. We shall hereafter see that in all but this last point he adhered strictly to his plan.

The diplomacy was directed in the same way. There was evidently nothing to hope from Prussia nor Austria. All that could be obtained from these powers was neutrality, if Napoleon would permit; but, as for co-operation on their part, it must not be thought of. However, there were allies who offered themselves readily, almost with importunity: these were England and (is it credible?) Sweden. The alliance with England was natural, legitimate, and was inevitable after the first shot between France and Russia. The English cabinet, in its impatience to complete it, had chosen the pretext of a demand for saltpetre addressed by Russia to the neutral commerce, to despatch to Riga a dozen vessels laden with powder. Then she had sent into Sweden an agent, Mr. Thornton, who upon the slightest hope of being received was to enter the first Russian port which should open to him. Meanwhile, Mr. Thornton was to endeavour at Stockholm to meet the Russian legation, making use of the Swedish cabinet to render his overtures acceptable.

Nothing, it must be repeated, was more natural than the impatience of the British cabinet: it can only be said that it was too petulant, and that in so putting itself forward it was in danger of effecting a reconciliation, if a reconciliation were yet possible, between those whom it wished forever to disunite. But for Sweden, or, to speak more accurately, for the prince who by the aid of France was now placed on the steps of the throne of Sweden, eagerly to seek those who should be our enemies, and to form alliances against us,—this may well astonish and even disgust every honourable mind; yet this might now be seen as one of the most striking features of the extraordinary picture presented to the eyes of the world.

Prince Bernadotte, who had been elected heir to the throne of Sweden, (we have shown in what manner, on what occasion, and with what view,) had now exhibited himself as the most active and undisguised enemy of Napoleon. The

refusal of Norway, an honourable act on the part of a policy not always so scrupulous, and the contemptuous silence enjoined upon the French legation, had rekindled in his heart his former hatred of Napoleon,—a hatred (can it be believed?) founded on envy. Envious by nature, he had ventured to be jealous of one who seemed to be placed far beyond the reach of such a passion, so greatly did the glory and the position of General Bonaparte place him beyond comparison with General Bernadotte. It were conceivable that he should envy Moreau, Massena, Lannes, and Davout, though a thousand times superior to himself; but to envy Napoleon seemed to imply that that mean passion had been carried even to madness in a mind and heart equally contracted! Invested for a moment with the regency, in consequence, as we have said, of the illness of the reigning king, then deprived of this office in consequence of the fear entertained by the king of too great an alteration in his relation with France, but still the secret instigator of affairs, he had suddenly turned his regards to those parties who had not at first called him to the throne,—viz.: the English party, consisting of merchants and landed proprietors supported by smuggling, towards the aristocratical party who detested France and all revolutions, proclaiming aloud or in whispers, as circumstances required, but with singular imprudence, that he was by no means disposed to be the slave of Napoleon, that he was a Swede and not a Frenchman, that, however it might suit France to ruin Sweden by destroying her commerce, he would lend himself to no such design, that his first and most anxious thought should be consecrated to his adopted country. To those who had elected him, comprising all the friends of France, enamoured of the revolution of 1789, of ancient Swedish greatness, of the martial glory which had induced them to select a French general, he spoke of honour, of country, of military valour, and, without specifying how or where, he promised to lead them to victory and to restore the greatness of Sweden. Thus flattering all parties in their most susceptible points, he had endeavoured to bring himself into close relation with the English and Russian legation, the former existing clandestinely, the latter officially, at Stockholm, by addressing each in terms most acceptable to itself. He said to each that he was ready to shake off the yoke of France; that, if the principal powers would give the signal, he would follow; that he knew the weak side of the genius and power of Napoleon, and would teach them the secret of conquering him; that the influence of General Bernadotte, in the French armies at least, had been great, and that if England and Russia would come to an understanding with Sweden, he might assist them greatly; that when Napoleon should have advanced into Poland, where he had almost perished in 1807, and where he certainly would have perished without the service of General Bernadotte,—he, the Prince-Royal of Sweden, would be able to descend upon the continent with 30,000 Swedes, or even 50,000, if they would grant him subsidies, and that he would rouse all Germany on the rear of the French army. In return for this aid, he demanded, not Finland, which he knew to be essential to Russia, but Norway, which it was very unreasonable to leave to Denmark, the constant

ally of Napoleon and traitor to the cause of Europe.

These confidential communications, imparted with incredible indiscretion to England and Russia, had by their singular character created a degree of suspicion and inspired little esteem for their author. When addressed to the King of Prussia in a secret interview solicited from his ambassador, they shocked the honour of that monarch, who did not dare to denounce that faithless child of France, but had given us sufficiently clear warning to keep a watch over him. The powers either already at war with us, as England, or on the point of becoming so, as Russia, had studied an enemy of Napoleon whom they might turn to their own advantage, without, however, putting confidence in him. In order to get the most out of each, the new Swedish prince had proposed to employ the former influence of Sweden in Turkey to negotiate peace between the Turks and Russians, and he had even undertaken negotiations with this object both at St. Petersburg and at Constantinople. So that this personage, who so recently had appeared upon the stage of the world, and who was so unexpected an enemy of France, offered himself as the means of reconciling England with Russia, and Russia with the Porte, and wished at any cost to be himself the bond of all these alliances and the sword of their combined power.

Alexander, with his habitual reserve, designed, as we have said, to throw all the blame on his adversary, and to keep himself free from every engagement, in order that he might have peace at his option to the last, lent himself neither to the impatience of England nor to the intrigues of Sweden, whose conversion he deemed too hasty to be trustworthy. He had reflected very naturally that, if the rupture with France were once healed, peace with England would be easily secured on his own conditions; that his own preparations had been completed a year ago, and those of England ten years ago; that the delay of two or three months in their reconciliation would not injure the organization of their resources, and that the employment of these resources could only be well determined at the very moment of war; that he had therefore no cause for haste, and that by acting a little earlier he would gain nothing unless to compromise himself with Napoleon and finally sacrifice the last hopes of peace. Consequently, Alexander refused the vessels laden with powder, ordered them from the waters of Riga on pain of being fired upon, and led Mr. Thornton to understand that the time had not yet come for presenting himself at St. Petersburg. Being less secure of Sweden, (for that fickle and ambitious state might abandon Russia if her advances were rejected, as she had abandoned Napoleon because her proposal had been refused,) Alexander resolved to listen to his incredible overtures, and to present the appearance of giving them all the attention and deliberation which their importance demanded. He sent some magnificent furs as a present to Bernadotte, and lavished upon him the most flattering assurances of personal regard. With respect to Turkey, which obstinately resisted the conditions proposed, and would at no price abandon Moldavia as far as the Sereth, which would not consent to the protectorate of Russia over Wallachia and Ser-

via, nor yield the smallest territory along the Caucasus, nor pay any indemnity for the war, being well convinced that, by resisting a few days longer, Russia, under the pressure of France, would be obliged to desist from all her pretensions, Alexander once more modified the conditions, renounced the protectorate of Servia and Wallachia, the territory along the Caucasus, and the indemnity for the war, but insisted upon the whole of Bessarabia, or Moldavia as far as the Sereth, and flattered himself that on these new conditions he would be able to secure peace, which would enable him to employ all his forces against France.

Such were the plans of Russia,—plans well devised and well adapted to her actual position. In the present state of affairs they could no longer think of sending M. de Nesselrode to Paris, for it certainly was not worth while to present the appearance of imploring peace with the certainty that it would not be obtained. The design of this step was therefore relinquished, to the ill-judged satisfaction of M. de Romanzoff. Alexander communicated this new resolution to M. de Lauriston with undissembled grief: he assured him that the courier which left Paris on the 18th allowed not the slenderest hope of peace, at which he was much distressed, for he continued sincerely to desire it; that to preserve it he had resolved to abide by the conditions of Tilsit, i.e. to remain at war with England, to permit even the spoliation of the states of Oldenburg, with the exception of an indemnity determined by France, and to suffer the existence of the grand duchy of Warsaw, provided always that this was not made the germ of a new kingdom of Poland. He said, further, that as to the continental blockade, he was ready to co-operate to the extent of closing his ports against the British flag, under whatever protection it might come, but that it was impossible to carry it to the extent of totally excluding American commerce, for this would reduce his country to the present miserable condition of Poland; that he was well aware that the Americans whom he admitted had communicated with the English, but that he was perfectly convinced of their nationality, that he did not admit them under the slightest doubt, that if he were not allowed to admit them after they had communicated with the English, he should not be able to admit them at all, which would be ruinous to Russia, and which could not be shown to be obligatory except in virtue of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, in which he had no participation; that he once more repeated these assertions, already uttered a hundred times, to prove his innocence, but that no power in the world should divert him from his present terms; that he would maintain the war for ten years if necessary; that he would rather betake himself to the heart of Siberia than descend to the condition of Austria or Prussia; that, in provoking this rupture, Napoleon showed a very false estimate of his true interests; that England was almost at the end of her resources; that by continuing to close the continent against her, as it actually was, and by directing against Lord Wellington all the forces prepared against Russia, he might have peace within a year; that by pursuing a different course, Napoleon would involve himself in new and incalculable circumstances, and restore to England all the chances

of success which she had lost. Alexander added that, for his part, he remained immovable in the path he had selected; that his troops should remain behind the Niemen, and should not be the first to cross; that he wished his nation and the whole world to be witnesses that he was not the aggressor; that with this view he had been so scrupulous as to refuse to listen to any of the proposals of England; that he had sent back her powder, and would also send back Mr. Thornton if he should appear; of this he gave his word of honour as a man and a sovereign. Alexander added that in present circumstances it was no longer possible to send M. de Nesselrode consistently with his own dignity, nor indeed with common sense, for the mission could issue in nothing. M. de Lauriston urging that M. de Nesselrode would be well received at Paris, Alexander related to him what we have mentioned of the significant silence of Napoleon with respect to that mission, his coolness to Prince Kourakin ever since the mission was spoken of, and he ended by declaring that he knew from other sources that it was not approved by Napoleon. The source, indicated by Alexander but not named, was Prussia, who, with a very good intention, and with a desire of maintaining peace, had communicated the reflections of Napoleon on the inconvenience of giving too much prominence to the journey of M. de Nesselrode. That power, therefore, in the honest desire of peace, had impeded rather than promoted it.

While holding this language, Alexander displayed more emotion than ever, but as much resolution as emotion: he evidently spoke as a man who had no fear of expressing his grief at the war, because he was determined to enter upon it in its most terrible form. M. de Lauriston was affected equally with himself, for that excellent citizen regarded the war with a kind of despair, anticipating all that could result from it. His own reception with Alexander had been of the most friendly character, and he had been loaded with marks of attention. Only, in return for the coolness exhibited to Prince Kourakin, he had been less frequently invited to dinner at the court and to the privacy of the imperial family. But, wherever he went, he met the same marks of respect. The example of Alexander was understood and followed by the society of St. Petersburg. Everywhere M. de Lauriston was received with great respect, with reserved politeness, with tranquil and unostentatious resolution,—in a word, with the indication of regret without weakness. He saw everywhere men who feared war, but who were determined to accept it rather than to shrink from the course prescribed by their emperor. The French nowhere met with insult or injury. They awaited in calmness the moment when they should resign themselves to the fury of patriotism and hatred.

M. de Lauriston, who had received the communications of which we have given an account at various times between January 25 and February 8, transmitted them to his court by a courier on February 8, with extreme accuracy, adding a lively and striking description of the state of feeling at St. Petersburg. His courier reached Paris between the 16th and 17th of February. He had been preceded by others who indicated nearly the same things, and who led to the sup-



position, now fully confirmed, that the mission of M. de Nesselrode would not take place.

Napoleon, on obtaining the assurance that M. de Nesselrode was not coming to Paris, had attained his end, but he considered Russia rather too resolute, and, though she appeared sufficiently intimidated to avoid taking the offensive, he still feared lest she should be induced to cross the Niemen and anticipate the French at Königs-berg and Dantzic. He consequently thought right to conclude his alliances, and finally to set his troops in motion, that he might not be the last to arrive at the Vistula, and took care to accompany these decisive acts with certain political steps calculated to allay the emotions of Russia by holding out the hope of peace.

Hitherto Napoleon had been unwilling to conclude his alliances from the fear of too greatly alarming Russia, and in particular he kept the unfortunate Prussia in a state of uncertainty, ever fearful lest these long delays should conceal some dangerous snare. The reader should remember that he had imperiously required the interruption of her armament, threatening to deprive her of Bâle, Spandau, Graudenz, Colberg, the king, the army, and whatever remained of the monarchy of Frederick the Great, unless she put an end to her preparations, promising at the same time, if she yielded, to conclude with her an alliance, the very first article of which should guarantee the integrity of the Prussian territory. Under various pretexts he had kept her in doubt since the previous October, and had at length mentioned the cause of his postponement, which he might readily avow. The month of February being come, and affairs admitting of no further delay, he formed his resolution, and imparted a very sensible joy to the king and M. de Hardenberg by announcing to them his intention of signing the alliance. The King of Prussia, whom Russia had so much urged to war in 1805 and so entirely abandoned in 1807, felt himself bound only to his country and his crown, and being persuaded, like every one else, of the ultimate success of Napoleon, declared himself his ally, being unable to remain neuter. His present policy was, since he was obliged to give a contingent, to render it as powerful as possible, in order to secure, on the return of peace, the largest recompense in the form of the restitution of fortresses, the diminution of contributions to the war, and the extension of territory. He offered 100,000 men, if required, all excellent soldiers, commanded by General de Grawert, and ready to yield faithful and valuable service whenever they should find in the French alliance the certain restoration of their country. As a reward of this aid, the King of Prussia demanded the restitution of one of the fortresses on the Oder which had been left in pledge in the hands of Napoleon.—Glogau, for example, which, not being, like Custrin or Stettin, in the route of the armies, was of less consequence to France,—in addition to exemption from the remaining debt of fifty or sixty millions, and, on the return of peace, an extension of territory proportioned to the services they should have rendered. King Frederick William would gladly have obtained, in addition, that a territory—Silesia, for instance—should be regarded as neutral for himself and his court, whither he might retire at a

distance from the tumult of arms; for Berlin, situated in the line of all the armies of Europe, could not fail to become the scene of war.

The policy of Napoleon was very different: he intended neither to destroy Prussia nor to restore her power. He was satisfied with finding her submissive and disarmed, and he did not place sufficient dependence on the Prussian soldiers to allow them to be rearmed in large numbers. He did not exactly distrust their courage or their fidelity, but he feared, with some reason, that, should he meet a reverse, they might be carried away by the torrent of the Germanic spirit. He was therefore unwilling that Prussia should have more than the stipulated number of troops, (42,000,) and incur greater expense as a pretext for not fulfilling her pecuniary engagements. For these reasons, he at once declined her proposals, and said that 20,000 Prussians would suffice, for he was not in need of men but of provisions, and of horses to transport them. He therefore refused to abate the contributions of Prussia, since that state did not require to incur any great expense, and simply agreed to accept of horses, oxen, and grain in part payment. He also refused to restore Glogau, for that fort, he said, was in the line of his operations, and besides, if the alliance were really formed, the interests of Prussia and France would be common, and the king need not regret the loss of any of his fortresses. With respect to regarding Silesia as neutral ground, he replied, truly, that he was ready to do so, but that this did not depend upon France only: Russia also must concur. He had no hesitation in promising to observe the integrity of the present Prussian territory, and to grant her an improved frontier on the return of peace.

In her present humiliated condition, Prussia could make no remonstrance, and consequently, by treaty of February 24, the following conditions were agreed upon. Prussia engaged to furnish 20,000 men, under the immediate command of a Prussian general, but subject to the orders of the commander of the *corps d'armes* with which they should serve. The 22,000 men remaining to Prussia should be thus distributed: 4000 at Colberg, 3000 at Graudenz, (places reserved strictly to himself by the King of Prussia,) 2000 at Potsdam to guard the royal residence, and the rest in Silesia. Except at Colberg and Graudenz, there were to be only militia in any town, whether open or fortified. The war-contribution still chargeable by France upon Prussia was fixed at forty-eight millions, of which twenty-six were payable by mortgages already exhausted, fourteen in supplies, and eight in money, the last sum to be paid at the termination of the present war. For the fourteen millions payable in supplies they were to furnish 15,000 horses, 44,000 oxen, and a considerable quantity of wheat, oats, and forage. It was agreed that these supplies should be brought together at the Vistula and the Oder.

On these conditions, Napoleon guaranteed to Prussia her present territory, and, in the case of a successful war with Russia, promised her an extension of frontier in compensation for her previous losses. Notwithstanding the complaints of the Prussians against France, this treaty deserves the approbation of wise men, for, as the King of Prussia owed nothing to Russia, he was

right in seeking his securities where he thought it likely to find them. And Napoleon, not adverting to the policy, then too late, of reconstituting Prussia on a firm and grand scale, which, being dependent upon him, should ever remain faithful to him, his best plan was to act as he did,—that is to say, to disarm her, to scatter part of her troops, to carry the rest with him to prevent their being on the rear of the French army, and, finally, to consume her provisions and cattle, and to take possession of her horses.

The position of Austria was very different. She had no fear for her existence, and had no need of the alliance of Napoleon; for, far from being, like Prussia, in the power of 400,000 French, she would have Italy almost at her own discretion as soon as Prince Eugene should have left it. She would therefore have preferred to avoid the French alliance, and to remain spectator of the contest, and at last to divide with the conqueror some of his spoils. She inclined to think that Napoleon would be conqueror, and therefore that there would be more to gain with him than with Alexander; but for greater security she would have preferred to involve herself with neither, and to spare herself the disagreeable task of avowing at St. Petersburg that she had allied herself with France against Russia. But there was no way of escaping the iron grasp of Napoleon: it was necessary to choose a side, and, after all, since he was more likely to triumph than Alexander, by pronouncing in his favours he had the probable advantage of recovering Illyria, that is to say, Trieste, which of all her losses was that which occasioned her the most lively regret. And, indeed, the marriage of Napoleon with an Austrian princess rendered the alliance with France natural and intelligible.

The court of Vienna, therefore, consented to a treaty of alliance with France, but on condition of the greatest secrecy and for as long a time as possible, for, said M. de Metternich, there was no one in Austria but the Emperor and himself who favoured this alliance, and, if such a negotiation were too soon made public, insurmountable objections might be raised. Besides, it would be better to take Russia by surprise, by suddenly presenting in Volhynia a *corps d'armée* which she did not expect. This corps would be in readiness in Galicia, where it already was, under the pretext of keeping troops of observation on the frontiers. Hence nothing was lost, but, on the contrary, much was secretly gained.

Napoleon acquiesced, for it sufficed him to be able to rely upon Austria, and he was indifferent about the time when his alliance should be made known. He also shared with Austria the desire of concealing the alliance, in the hope of deferring as long as possible the final breach with the Russians.

It was therefore agreed, by an authentic treaty signed March 16, that France and Austria should mutually guarantee the integrity of their actual states; that for the present war Austria should furnish 30,000 men, who should repair to Lemberg on the 15th of May, on the condition that at that time the French army, by an offensive movement, should have drawn upon it the Russian forces; that this corps, commanded by an Austrian general, Prince Schwarzenberg,

should be under the immediate orders of Napoleon; that, finally, if the kingdom of Poland should be restored, France should, in return for Austria's co-operation, compensate her in Illyria, and in any case, should the war prove successful, the Emperor Napoleon should treat the Emperor Francis, in the new arrangement of territory, in a manner consistent with the friendship which ought to unite a son-in-law and a father-in-law.

This treaty, as we see, engaged Austria only in a feeble co-operation, and still allowed her to state at St. Petersburg that her alliance was merely formed with a view of avoiding a war with France, for which she was unprepared. She might also add that in thus acting she only imitated the conduct of Russia in 1809.

Napoleon had obtained from Austria all that he could wish, by forcing upon her a formal engagement which rendered treachery highly improbable though not absolutely impossible, and by calling into activity a very small number of Austrian soldiers, who as co-operators were very inert, but who might by circumstances be rendered very energetic enemies. At the same time he had been able to present to Austria a hope which might insure her sincerity, in the recovery of Illyria.

After having concluded these treaties of alliance, which they had agreed upon four or five weeks before they were signed, Napoleon occupied himself with setting his troops in motion. He had already ordered the army of Italy to concentrate at the foot of the Alps, and Marshal Davout to hold himself in readiness to hasten to the Vistula, if, contrary to all probability, the Russians should be the first to cross the Niemen. Every thing being ready, he gave orders to march, but so as not to reach the Niemen before the month of May. This army was perhaps the most numerous ever seen since the barbarian emperors displaced whole nations; certainly it was the largest regular army which had ever existed, being the largest combination known of powerful, disciplined, and well-trained warriors, without the anomalous addition of women, children, and servile attendants which previously formed three-fourths of invading armies. The exact numbers we shall collect from the private estimates of Napoleon, which were much more precise than those of the ministry of war. The distribution of it was as follows.

Though Napoleon had delegated to Marshal Davout, on account of his peculiar talents, the care of organizing the greater part of the army, he did not give him the command of all the troops he organized, since he reserved to himself exclusively the arrangement of large masses. He merely wished that the marshal, being the nearest to the theatre of war, and the most conveniently situated for action in case the Russians should cross the Niemen, should have a force sufficient to arrest their progress. He therefore confided to him five unequalled French divisions: these were the three old divisions of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, which had been converted into five divisions by raising each regiment from three to five war-battalions. To these were added several Badian, Spanish, Dutch, and Hanseatic battalions, comprised in excellent *cadres*. The two new divisions were to be under the command of two generals of the

highest merit,—Compans and Desaix. A Polish division, which was already at Dantzic, but which did not form part of the garrison, made a sixth. It was composed of good soldiers who had made a successful campaign against the Austrians in 1809.

Napoleon had retained the old division of his mounted troops into light cavalry, devoted to reconnoissances, and cavalry of reserve, devoted to attacks in line. The latter also contained a certain proportion of light cavalry, but it chiefly consisted of heavy and medium cavalry, namely, cuirassiers, lancers, and dragoons. This reserve was divided into four corps on account of its force. The first, comprising five regiments of light cavalry and two divisions of cuirassiers, was annexed to the army of Marshal Davout, who therefore had about 82,000 infantry and artillery, 3500 light cavalry, specially attached to his corps, and 11,000 or 12,000 cavalry of reserve, i.e. 96,000 or 97,000 men of the finest troops in Europe. They were to be called the first corps. Their head-quarters were to be at Hamburg.

Napoleon further confided to Marshal Davout the Prussian division of 16,000 or 17,000 men, under the immediate orders of General Grawert, which raised the number of men under that marshal's command to 114,000.

To Marshal Oudinot, Napoleon assigned the 2d corps, comprising, with the divisions stationed in Holland, the rest of the troops organized by Marshal Davout, who were not to remain under his orders. These were the two French divisions of Legrand and Verdier, formed from part of the old divisions of Massena and Lannes, and of a fine Swiss division, to which had been added some Croatian and Dutch battalions. With the light cavalry, artillery, and a division of cuirassiers taken from the cavalry of reserve, this corps amounted to about 40,000 excellent troops. Their head-quarters were at Munster. Three or four thousand Prussians, the balance of the 20,000 due by Prussia and destined to the 2d corps, guarded Pillau, Nehrung, and all the posts which enclose the Frische-Haff.

Under title of the 3d corps, Napoleon intrusted to Marshal Ney, whose energy he wished to turn to special account in this campaign, the rest of the old troops of Lannes and Massena, combined in two fine French divisions, under Generals Ledru and Razout. To these he added the Wurtembergians, who had already served under Marshal Ney, which made a total of 89,000 infantry, artillery, and light cavalry. Napoleon, proposing to employ Marshal Ney in cases requiring prompt and vigorous action, added an entire corps of cavalry of reserve, which was the second, reckoning about 10,000 men, chiefly cuirassiers. The head-quarters of Marshal Ney were fixed at Mentz.

The army of Prince Eugene was called the 4th corps. It consisted of two divisions of French infantry, including the best part of the old army of Italy, of an excellent Italian division, and the Royal Guard. The whole might amount to about 45,000 men of all arms, under the command of Prince Eugene, with General Junot as his principal lieutenant.

The title of the 5th corps was assigned by Napoleon to the Polish army. We have seen that a Polish division, in the pay of France,

had already been given to Marshal Davout. Two other divisions, one composed of the regiments of the Vistula, were still in receipt of French pay, and were to be mixed with the French troops. Prince Poniatowski had specially under his orders the Polish army properly so called, which was in the pay of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and had already under him made the campaign of 1809,—a campaign equally honourable to the soldiers and their commanders. This 5th corps, mustering about 86,000 men of all arms, had its head-quarters at Warsaw. The Bavarians, to the number of 25,000 men, who had served with the French since 1805, assumed the title of the 6th corps, and were intrusted to General St. Cyr, whom Napoleon withdrew from disgrace on account of his merit, notwithstanding an unyielding disposition which was frequently inconvenient. The point of rendezvous for the Bavarians was Bareuth, where they were to meet the army of Italy, in order to fight by its side. Napoleon, endeavouring to compensate the difference of nationality by congruities of a more private character, had resolved to combine the Bavarians with the Italians, on account of the connection not of relationship only, but of affection, between Prince Eugene and the court of Bavaria.

The Saxons, to the number of 17,000 good soldiers, and of all the Germans the least hostile to France, because she had restored Poland to their king, were placed under General Reynier, a skilful officer well fitted to command the Germans, and already known for his services in Spain and elsewhere. They assumed the title of the 7th corps, and were naturally to serve with the Poles. They were ordered to assemble at Glogau on the Oder, and to repair as quickly as possible to Kalish, in order to hasten to the Vistula if the Poles should require their aid.

Finally, the Westphalians, carefully organized by King Jerome, but including many Hessians,—soldiers more distinguished by personal bravery than by attachment to their new sovereign,—formed the 8th corps, and were to muster around Magdeburg to the number of 18,000 men.

There remained two admirable troops, the cavalry of reserve and the Imperial Guard. Of the four corps composing the cavalry of reserve, one had been attached to Marshal Davout and another to Marshal Ney, and one division of cuirassiers had been temporarily assigned to Marshal Oudinot. Napoleon reserved to himself the power of resuming them according to circumstances, to act, if necessary, directly under himself. The portion of this magnificent cavalry which had not as yet been attached to any *corps d'armée* amounted to 15,000 superb horsemen, marching, in the mean while, with the Imperial Guard, which had grown into an army of itself, numbering not less than 47,000 men, including 6000 chosen horsemen and some thousands of artillerymen, with a reserve of two hundred guns. It had been divided into two bodies, the one being the Young Guard, comprising the tirailleurs and voltigeurs, the other the Old Guard, comprising the chasseurs and foot-grenadiers, the cavalry, the reserve of artillery, and the regiments of the Vistula, the fidelity of whose sentiments rendered them worthy to serve with the Imperial Guard.

The first corps of the guard was commanded by Marshal Mortier, the second by the old Mar-

febre. It would be impossible to give trustworthy commanders to more gallant. The guard had no rallying-point until quarters should be fixed. For the present, secretly left Paris or the environs by regiment with two provisional destinations,—Berlin and Esden. Whenever the Emperor should see an army, all were to gather round him. A long enumeration must be added the ranks of engineers, including the sappers, pontoneers, and the workmen descriptions; the grand park of artillery, including all the provisions peculiar to that arm; the train of equipages, comprising all grooms and 18,000 men in charge of an immense number of horses.

It was simply the active army whose duty it was to cross the Niemen and penetrate the interior of Russia. Independently of sick, and the aged, of which there were a great number, Austrians, who were far from the theatres of operations, the men actually present and ready for action amounted to 423,000 healthy ill-trained soldiers, of whom 300,000 were infantry, 70,000 cavalry, 30,000 artillery, bringing with them one thousand field-pieces, six months' equipages, and one month's provisions only. Instead of one month's provisions, there ought to have been two, if Napoleon's had been seasonably executed.

Imagination is confounded when it is required that these are the real numbers, from which has been excluded the non-effective, and various numbers, such as are given by most historians, ancient and modern, who commonly from popular rumours, seldom from statements, and making no account of the sick, wounded, and deserters. Yet these were the forces prepared by Napoleon for this struggle, after which he promised himself some appearance of reason, to become the master of the world, or else the greatest which the world had ever seen vanquished. Getting that his route from the Rhine to the sea would be thick-set with terrible re-entrenchments, he had disposed upon his rear a large army of reserve, of which the forces, dispositions, and the distribution were as follows:

Napoleon, with much tact, employing all the officers who had returned from Spain from the Peninsula; become incompatible with those who had operations in that country, had chosen for his second-in-command, a new Polish division, under Victor, Duke of Belluna, for the command of Berlin, as soon as the army should have passed through that capital. He reserved for himself the French division, the 12th, composed of the light regiments, and several 4th battalions under General Partouneaux, the troops of the Grand Duke of Baden, a new Polish division, as a part of the dépôts of the Marshals of France and Oudinot, intrusted with the protection of the important fortress of Magdeburg. The 1st, amounting to 38,000 men, formed the rear, and were to guard Germany from the mouth of the Oder.

There were still, in troops detached in the various forts, such as Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Erfurth, about 10,000 men. At Hanover there was an immense dépôt of cavalry, where 9000 horse-soldiers, marching on foot from France, were to be remounted on German horses. Napoleon had determined that part of the 4th battalions withdrawn from Spain, and some 6th battalions belonging to regiments to whom that number had been assigned, should form a *corps de réserve* under Marshal Augereau amounting at the time to 37,000 men. Finally, he had carried foresight so far as to send forward from the dépôts 15,000 or 18,000 recruits to repair the losses of the first marches, and, as in all previous wars, to rejoin their corps as provisional battalions. There remained the division of the small German princes, in number about 5000 men, and a Danish division of 10,000 men, which Denmark, in whose cause we had incurred the enmity of Sweden, had engaged to furnish in case Prince Bernadotte should execute his design of falling upon the rear of the French army. This division was collected on the frontiers of Holstein.

These different corps formed another body of 130,000 men, intended to maintain the acting army always at its full numbers, and able to furnish, on the first occasion, 50,000 or 60,000 efficient men, either to oppose the English, if this time they kept faith with their allies, or the Swedes, if their new prince should put his threats in force.

By adding to this acting army of 423,000 men, this army of reserve of 130,000, and some detachments dispersed in various stations, to the amount of 12,000, some invalids due in part to the winter services required by the rigorous maintenance of the continental blockade, amounting actually to 40,000, we reach the enormous number of more than 600,000 men set in motion by this formidable conflict. With them were comprised 85,000 cavalry, 40,000 artillery, 20,000 wagoners, 145,000 horses for the saddle or for draught. How great must have been the administrative genius that could employ so many living beings in the same cause, especially when it is remembered that there remained 150,000 men in France in the dépôts, 50,000 in Italy, 300,000 in Spain, which brings the amount of our forces to more than 1,100,000 soldiers under the command of one man! But also, how great the danger that this vast machine, so artificially constructed, should be suddenly broken if exposed to any violence by a reverse, or by any physical accident! Then, like those mighty machines, the marvels of modern science, which advance with an irresistible force as long as all the parts are in harmony, but, if that harmony cease but for a moment, fall into irreparable disorder, it might fall with a frightful crash and cover the continent with its ruins. And how many reasons were there to fear, considering the composition of this enormous engine of war! 370,000 French, 50,000 Poles, 20,000 Italians, 10,000 Swiss, making 450,000 soldiers, who might be relied upon to the extent of their moral and physical strength; add to these 150,000 Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Wurtembergians, Westphalians, Dutch, Croats, Spaniards, and Portuguese, who, though generally regarded us with detestation, were so skillfully mingled with our soldiers as to be carried along, as it were,

\* scarcely necessary to repeat, that my authorities are private accounts of the Emperor himself, which are more exact than those of the minister of war, before they have been corrected on the spot, and founded upon the reports of the corps made at every period of the campaign—reports which have never seen the light since they have been in the hands of Napoleon to be entered in the archives.

in the torrent of general good-will. Such was this incredible accumulation of forces, which cannot but secure our admiration as a prodigy of art, but must also blend alarm with our admiration, for, independently of its heterogeneous composition, this vast mass was to move from the Rhine to the Niemen, over a soil thick-set with animosity, was bringing with it an immense *materiel* and a multitude of animals, the slightest confusion among which might lead to frightful disorder, which might baffle even the genius which had called the vast engine into being. Napoleon was therefore on the eve, either of the supreme triumph of his art, or of the confusion of that art when pushed to excess,—on the eve either of universal dominion, or of a catastrophe frightful beyond example. And, unhappily, he had not for excuse the patriotic and hereditary hatred which filled the heart of Hannibal, for he was led on by the most inordinate ambition which had ever sprung up in the heart of a favoured child of fortune.

His first care was, naturally, to bring from Spain, from Italy, from France, and from Southern Germany, to the frontiers of Poland, this crowd of men, to move them with order and caution, so as not to exhaust them with fatigue nor to cover the roads with invalids and stragglers, especially so as to avoid a too powerful excitement among the Russians, which might provoke them to invade Poland and Old Prussia. In this Napoleon called into exercise all his subtlety and sagacity.

We have already pointed out his design of effecting all his operations under the shield of Marshal Davout, who, being almost on the spot, since he was between the Elbe and the Oder, had only eight or ten marches to bring him on the Vistula with 150,000 men, in a condition to check the Russians, if necessary. In his rear were to advance all the troops in succession to take up their position on the Vistula. We have already seen that Napoleon had forwarded orders to the army of Italy, which had the greatest distance to traverse in order to join the troops assembled in Germany. When the first movement of this army should have been disclosed, which was fixed for the end of February, Napoleon proposed, early in March, to bring Marshal Davout on the Oder, the Saxons a little in advance as far as Kalish, that they might more quickly join the Poles, and at the same time to advance in a second line, Oudinot on Berlin, Jerome on Glogau, Ney on Erfurth, and then order a halt till the end of March, in order to give all the corps time to bring up their rear, particularly their innumerable wagons. On the 1st of April he proposed to set them again in motion, to bring Davout on the Vistula between Thorn and Marienburg, to combine the Saxons and the Poles around Warsaw, Jerome's Westphalians at Posen, and then to establish on the Oder, always as a second line, Oudinot at Stettin, Ney at Frankfort, Prince Eugene, with the Italians and Bavarians, at Glogau. A third line was to be formed between Dresden and Berlin by the guard and the park of artillery. Once arrived at these points, they were again to halt till April 15, on which day they were to resume their march, Davout remaining in person at Dantzic on the Lower Vistula, to complete the preparation of the *materiel*, the second and third lines to advance upon the Vistula, and then

establish themselves in the following order: the Prussians as an advanced guard between Elbing, Pillau, and Königsberg, (which could afford the Russians no ground of remark, since here the Prussians were at home,) the troops of Davout behind, between Marienburg and Marienwerder, those of Oudinot at Dantzic, those of Ney at Thorn, those of Eugene at Plock, the Poles, the Saxons, the Westphalians at Warsaw, the guard at Posen. In this position he wished them to remain during the greater part of May, occupied with rallying the men and *materiel* in the rear, with throwing bridges over the different arms of the Vistula, with organizing the navigation of the Frische-Haff, with supplying the wagons with the horses and the oxen of Prussia, with furnishing the magazines and remounting the cavalry. In the month of June, when the herbage should have covered the fields, they were to advance between Königsberg and Grodno, and cross the Niemen from the 15th to the 20th of June.

The instructions of Napoleon were issued accordingly. Prince Eugene received orders to cross the Tyrol as quietly as possible, but with sufficient speed to reach Ratisbon early in March. The Bavarian generals were ordered to be in readiness to join Prince Eugene at the same point and at the same time; Ney, Jerome, and Oudinot immediately to put themselves in line with the right, which was coming from Italy. These different movements having been begun, Marshal Davout was to advance rapidly Friant's division towards Swedish Pomerania to punish Sweden for her conduct, to carry his other divisions on the Oder from Stettin to Custrin, to occupy Pillau and the points which cover the navigation of the Frische-Haff by the Prussians, to unite himself by his cavalry with the Poles on the side of Warsaw, and if, contrary to all probability, the Russians should have assumed the offensive, not to halt, but to march directly upon them and throw them back beyond the Niemen. However prepared the Russians might be, Marshal Davout, with 150,000 men at his disposal, was in a condition to deprive them of the rich harvests of Poland and Old Prussia.

Every thing being thus regulated, Napoleon wished to unite diplomatic to military precautions, to prevent the Russians assuming the initiative. By his coldness and his silence, he had already evaded the mission of M. de Neesselrode. There was even room to fear that his success might have transcended his wishes, and that, by rendering war manifestly inevitable, he should rouse Alexander from his system of temporizing. To obviate this danger, he addressed to M. de Lauriston, by a trustworthy courier, a very detailed and therefore very secret despatch, in which he fully disclosed his plan, the march of Prince Eugene, and that of Marshal Davout, and that of all the other French corps, and declared that the intention of all these movements was to reach the Vistula, there to take his position, then to stretch himself as far as Elbing and Königsberg, in order to snatch from the Russians the rich granaries of Poland and Old Prussia. To succeed, he said that it was necessary to gain time at any cost, and to prevent the exasperated Russians from ravaging the country from which he wished to draw a part of his resources; that, with this view, it was necessary, when the movement of the army of Italy, which was to

be the earliest, should be known, to deny it absolutely, at the same time acknowledging the march of some Tuscan and Piedmontese conscripts sent across the Alps to join their corps in Germany; that afterwards, when denial was no longer possible, to admit the concentration of the French army on the Oder, adding, however, that this concentration did not necessarily imply war, any more than the concentration of the Russians on the Dwina and the Dnieper; that the advance of the French army on the Oder was not equal to the movement of the Russian army; that the dignity of the Emperor Napoleon required him not to be behind the Emperor Alexander; that, even if the French army should go a little beyond the Oder, this would merely be with the view of taking a position exactly corresponding to that of the Russian army; that the firm intention of Napoleon was always to negotiate rather than to fight, but that he wished, while negotiating, to maintain an attitude consistent with his power.

In this despatch, he ordered M. de Lauriston to observe a tone as encouraging as possible, to enforce on the Russians the idea of an armed negotiation rather than a predetermined war; even to solicit the mission of M. de Nesselrode, as if the former interruption of it had been a matter of regret; to offer, if the excitement at St. Petersburg were very great, an interview between the two Emperors on the Vistula, taking care always to reserve this proposal for the very last extremity, for it was by no means desired at Paris, the sole object being to gain time, so as to arrive at the Niemen before the Russians could have crossed it. Finally, if, to prevent the premature commencement of hostilities, it were necessary to undertake to detain the French army on the Vistula, M. de Lauriston was authorized to do so, assuming, however, the appearance of a negotiator who, from an ardent desire for peace, was exceeding his instructions; and if, notwithstanding all these artifices, he could not prevent the passage of the Niemen, M. de Lauriston was immediately to declare war without delay, to demand his passports, and to require the legations of the allied courts to do the same. But it was urgently enjoined upon M. de Lauriston to use every possible endeavour to avoid the necessity of so speedy an outbreak, one so much opposed to the views of the Emperor.

The greatest dependence might be placed on the zeal of M. de Lauriston to avoid a rupture, even though it was openly acknowledged to him that his efforts could do no more than defer it.

But even this result was to him a source of satisfaction. Yet Napoleon, fearing to fail in his attempt, had recourse to a still more direct method of acting upon the Emperor Alexander. There was then at Paris one M. de Czernicheff, a person frequently employed in missions between St. Petersburg and Paris, and holding various relations with the French court, where he had the talent of rendering himself agreeable, who had so far abused the liberty allowed to him as to corrupt one of the principal clerks of the war-office. This fact was suspected, but the present was not considered a good time for disclosure. Napoleon proposed to send M. de Czernicheff to St. Petersburg to assure Alexander of his pacific intentions, and that he himself was quite ignorant of what was required of

him, that he merely armed because they had done so, that he desired nothing more than the conditions agreed upon at Tilsit, and that, if they were disposed to come to an explanation rather than to proceed to the extremity of war, he was perfectly ready to negotiate.

Napoleon had a very feasible pretext for this measure, so inconsistent with the attitude he had assumed towards Russia. In the latter discussions with M. de Lauriston, the Emperor Alexander and the Chancellor De Romanzoff, considering the war determined, and inquiring what motive Napoleon could have for desiring it, had ascribed the cause to Poland; supposing that Napoleon, considering the creation of the grand duchy of Warsaw as incomplete, had resolved to reconstitute the whole of Poland; that this was manifestly his secret desire, and that which had dictated his refusal to sign the convention proposed in 1810. M. de Lauriston, who related every thing with the utmost exactness, had, in his recent despatches, mentioned this conjecture of Alexander and his minister. This was sufficient to give Napoleon the opportunity of taking a step to disavow the intention attributed to him.

He was residing at the palace of the Elysium, where he had taken his abode, though, from being long unoccupied, it was cold and damp. He had there contracted a severe indisposition, and could hardly speak. Yet he conversed at great length with M. de Czernicheff in a tone of good-humour and affability, which he well knew how to assume with advantage. He said to him that, according to his last intelligence from St. Petersburg, he perceived that views were entertained of his designs which were entirely erroneous; that he was supposed to aim at the reconstitution of Poland in his military preparations, but that this was a mistake, for he had never contemplated the possibility of such an enterprise; that, if he had seriously thought of it, he would have made the attempt in 1807 and 1809, and that in 1810 he had refused the convention by which the Emperor Alexander required him to engage not to attempt the re-establishment of Poland, because the proposed form of the engagement was dishonourable, not because he contemplated any thing of the kind; that he was anxious that the court of St. Petersburg should not be deceived in this matter or invent chimerical sources of alarm; that his only reason for taking arms was his opinion that Russia was at the moment changing her alliance and passing, bag and baggage, from the French camp to the English; that the noise made about the duchy of Oldenburg, the ukase of the 31st of December, 1810, relative to manufactures, the introduction of the American flag into Russian ports, and finally, the armaments of Russia, carried so far as to withdraw her troops from Turkey at the risk of being there conquered, had been to him convincing indications of a radical change of disposition on the part of the Emperor Alexander, and that he had then made his preparations and undertaken all the armaments of which Europe was the witness; that at any rate the evil might be repaired; that at Tilsit peace had been made as soon as Alexander declared his hatred of the English, which rendered every thing easy and removed all further ground of contest; the circumstances were unaltered; that

peace and war depended on the real intentions of the Czar; that if he wished alliance with England he must prepare for immediate war; that if, on the contrary, he were willing to maintain serious hostilities with her, to close his ports against her, and to assist Napoleon in reducing her power by annihilating her commerce, he had only to explain himself in order to secure not peace only, but the most intimate alliance.

Napoleon repeating his everlasting subject of the fraudulent re-establishment of commercial relations between Prussia and England, M. de Czernicheff repeated the Russian story, and nothing was gained on either side. But Napoleon endeavoured to impress on M. de Czernicheff that the war was not inevitable, that he had himself taken no step irrevocably, and that an explanation of the two armed forces, one on the Niemen, the other on the Vistula, could arrange every thing. Nothing more was necessary, for as long as Russia retained the hope of preserving peace, she would abstain from all aggression and would not pass the Niemen, even though the French should go to the Vistula. Napoleon, in fact, made considerable impression upon the mind of M. de Czernicheff, and would have fully persuaded him, had he not a few hours before received from the war-office certain proofs of the activity of our preparations, and that they were on so large a scale and urged on with so great haste as to be inconsistent with the idea of a military demonstration designed merely to support pacific negotiations.

However, M. de Czernicheff left Paris less fully convinced of the imminence of the war than he would have been without this interview, and supplied with a letter from Napoleon to Alexander, polite and friendly, but haughty, requesting Alexander to believe all that M. de Czernicheff should say, and repeating the assurance that, however far each party had advanced in preparations for war, every thing might still terminate amicably, if he were willing.

On the same day, M. de Bassano addressed a new despatch to M. de Lauriston, unveiling completely the intentions of Napoleon. "Your duty," he said, "is constantly to exhibit the most peaceable intentions. The Emperor is anxious that his troops should gradually advance to the Vistula, and there rest, reform themselves, establish defences and *têtes de pont*, secure every possible advantage, and, in particular, the initiative in ulterior movements.

"The Emperor has treated Colonel Czernicheff well; but I will not conceal from you that that officer has employed his time at Paris in disseminating corruption. This the Emperor knew, but took no notice of it, being satisfied with being made acquainted with every thing. The preparations of his Majesty are really immense, and their being known cannot be other than advantages to him. . . .

"The Emperor Alexander will no doubt show you the very simple letter written to him by his Majesty. . . .

"The Emperor is not anxious for an interview. He is even indifferent about any negotiation that should take place anywhere but in Paris. He places no confidence in any negotiation whatever, unless the 450,000 men set in motion by his Majesty (speaking only of the

effective army) and their immense apparatus should cause the cabinet of St. Petersburg to reflect seriously, and bring that court back sincerely to the system established at Tilsit, and place Russia in the position of inferiority which she then occupied. . . . Your only end should be to gain time. The head of the army of Italy is already at Munich, and the general movement is everywhere developing itself. Maintain on all occasions that, if war occur, it is caused by Russia, that the affairs of Poland had nothing to do with his Majesty's resolutions, which have no other object in view than the re-establishment of the system which Russia, by her armaments and her movements, has plainly shown a disposition to renounce."

This despatch expressed the real design of the Emperor, a design of universal and supreme dominion, particularly as regarded Russia, which he wished to retain in the condition of inferiority which she held after Friedland, which she had not ceased to occupy, and in which she consented to remain, since she left Napoleon to act as he chose in Europe, but an inferiority which she was not willing to render as manifest, nor, in a commercial point of view, as disadvantageous as he required. With such a submission he ought indeed to have been satisfied, for, next to France, Russia was the chief continental power, and was not inferior to England as a European power.

Napoleon then went to St. Cloud with all the court, though the season was still severe, being near the end of March. He went thither from a motive which may seem strange to operate on one so powerful,—viz.: to escape the murmurs of the people, which were beginning to be heard, and which threatened to burst forth with violence even in his presence. This boldness of complaint was no longer habitual to the inhabitants of Paris, and it disclosed the depth of their sufferings, which arose from a variety of causes, the famine, the conscription, the levy of national guards, and, finally, the war, which occasioned or aggravated all these evils.

An excessive drought which had continued the whole summer of 1811, combined in some countries with violent storms, had destroyed the cereals throughout almost the whole of Europe, though it had contributed to the production of an excellent vintage known as "the wines of the comet." The harvest had been deficient even in Poland, without, however, producing a famine in that country, which was rendered impossible by the accumulation of unsold stores; but these could not avert the misery arising from the want of markets. In Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and England, the destruction of cereals had been immense. In France, the price of corn had risen to fifty, sixty, or seventy francs the hectolitre,—a price much higher than would be indicated by the same figures at the present day. The people could not afford this price, and in many places interfered with trade, stopped the wagons, broke into the markets, cried out against monopolists, and with their usual blindness opposed their own interests, for their violence occasioned provisions to be concealed rather than brought out for sale, and raised the price in the compound proportion of its real and apparent scarcity.

Napoleon, formerly the enemy of revolutionary doctrines, (meaning by that term not the pure

and noble principles of 1789, but the insane opinions springing out of the excitement of popular passions,) was gradually recurring to them, by allowing himself in every thing to be carried beyond the bounds of reason. Though an enemy to regicide, we have seen him, in a fit of passion, order the death of the Duke d'Enghien; a bitter censurer of the civil constitution of the clergy, he nevertheless held the Pope prisoner at Savona; severely rebuking the violence of the Directory, he at that moment had prisons occupied with persons confined on religious pretences; despising the revolutionary policy which had excited universal war, he was at war with Europe in order to place his brothers on the thrones of the West; finally, after satirizing the administrative principles of 1793, such as the maximum, and the commercial restrictions with regard to America, he had recently, by his legislation respecting colonial produce, created throughout the whole of Europe the strangest and most violent commercial system that could be conceived. For these last proceedings, he might, perhaps, find excuse in his war upon the English commerce, which had been attended with such serious results. But in regard to the cereals, eager to be relieved from popular murmurs, and to disconnect his policy from all questions about the dearness of provisions, in a word, to flatter the masses whose sufferings in so many places he had occasioned, he had formed a council for provisions, composed of the minister of the interior, the director-general of provisions, the councillors of State, Real and Dubois, the prefects of the Seine and of the police, and finally, the arch-chancellor, and he maintained doctrines altogether unworthy of his superior intelligence, spoke even of a tariff upon grain, and of fixing the price according to the pleasure of local administrations, founding himself upon the fact that landed proprietors and farmers abused the distress of the people to demand an exorbitant price, which was true and much to be regretted, but which could neither be impeded nor repaired by an arbitrary tariff; for the possessors of cereals, when they found themselves insufficiently paid, would cease to supply the markets, would keep in their own hands the grain and demand a still higher price, would excite a temptation to pillage, and thus provoke disorders greater than those against which the present efforts were directed.

The arch-chancellor, Prince Cambacérès, had resisted the erroneous theories of Napoleon, and had hitherto deterred him from following his first impulse. But he could not long succeed, especially in respect to the supply of Paris. The inhabitants of the capital, more numerous and more formidable than those of any other part, placed near the ear of the sovereigns, can reach them more easily and affect them more deeply. In the course of many years, and by the expenditure of many millions, Napoleon had created at Paris a reserve of 500,000 quintals in grain and flour, which the administration of the interior had allowed to fall to 300,000, when various other cares had called off his special attention from this subject. It was therefore no longer possible to moderate the price by pouring into the market of the capital the quantities accumulated by the State. And the means of grinding were still more deficient than the grain. Instead of 30,000 sacks of flour, which it was

proposed to secure in order to present every day a sufficient quantity at the market, they had at most only 15,000, and this was not enough to maintain the price of a sack of flour at seventy or seventy-two francs, which already showed a tendency to reach one hundred and twenty. At the price they had resolved not to exceed, they were bound to supply Paris, which consumed 1500 sacks daily, to accomplish which it was necessary not only to exhaust the reserve of grain, but even to employ unusual methods to convert it to flour. Napoleon, indifferent about the means employed when required to satisfy the people of Paris and prevent them attributing their sufferings to the war, required the mills in the neighbourhood to grind the government grain, and interdicted the purchase of provisions in the neighbourhood of the capital for the supply of Nantes and other cities. Not succeeding, even with these violent proceedings, in moderating the high price of provisions, which became all the more extravagant in proportion as commerce was discouraged, he granted the bakers an indemnity for the difference between the cost-price of the bread and that at which he required it to be sold. By his orders also, and on a less objectionable principle, soap was distributed gratuitously, with the view always of silencing, at the expense of all the rest of France, the people of Paris, so formidable and so close at hand. And he threatened that he would not confine himself to these measures, but spoke of a tariff on grain if the dearness increased. Such a measure was sufficient to aggravate the evil by deterring commercial enterprise.

The formation of cohorts of the national guard was another cause of suffering and complaint. Men could not believe, what however was true, that Napoleon, so filled with the idea of his own power as to provoke unnecessarily a new conflict with Europe, was at the same time haunted incessantly with a vague and confused thought of a great danger, and that his precautions in the way of fortifications were all founded on the probability of an invasion of France, a proof of the lamentable struggle between passion and genius in his soul. Genius enlightening him at intervals, but passion habitually enslaving him, he evermore hastened to his fatal termination, agitated sometimes, but never checked. In this disposition he thought it not enough to have a certain number of 4th battalions withdrawn from Spain and recruited in France with part of the conscription of 1812, intended to create a powerful reserve between the Rhine and the Elbe; nor to have one hundred and thirty 5th battalions forming the dépôt-battalions made up of conscripts of 1811 and 1812, and constituting another very imposing reserve within the Empire; to this he wished to add 120,000 men levied under the title of the first batch of the National Guard, organized in cohorts, and taken from the conscriptions of 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812, at the rate of 30,000 men for each. To assure them that they were merely National Guards, they had been promised not to be called upon to leave their departments; but this they would not believe, and they regarded themselves simply as conscripts of the four preceding years, free, according to law, from all obligation, and nevertheless sought out afresh to be sent to the slaughter, as they



expressed it at the time. But this last measure, the utility of which, though not perceived, was, unhappily, too real, and proved the danger in which Napoleon had placed both his own existence and that of his country, had produced a general irritation at Metz, Lille, Rennes, Toulouse, and several other large cities of the empire. There had been seditious movements in almost every city. Even at Paris, the young men in the schools, commonly animated with warlike emotions, now expressed the pacific dispositions of the nation with their characteristic ardour, and in the places of public concourse, had uttered seditious cries against the new levies, and driven away the agents of police, stigmatizing them with the odious name of spies.

To add to these various sufferings, Napoleon had renewed in the departments the employment of movable columns to effect the execution of the laws of the conscription. The amount of the refractory, which, in the previous year, had fallen from 60,000 to 20,000, had now risen to 40,000 or 50,000, in consequence of the numerous recent calls. It was of importance to diminish the number once more, and to obtain from them 20,000 men to fill up the regiments of the isles. From this naturally arose new vexations, new murmurs, new sources of irritation. The soldiers of the movable columns were billeted, as we have said, on the families of the refractory, enforcing board, lodging, and pay of several francs daily, and often reducing them to the greatest misery. In some departments, they had extorted in this manner sixty, eighty, or even one hundred thousand francs from the poorest families. Some prefects had protested, but the greater number had remained silent, and caused the execution of the law at all risks. If, in France, where greatness made some compensation for such tortures, they were nevertheless keenly resented, they could not fail to produce a very fatal effect in countries recently annexed, which in such measures could see merely a method of perpetuating their own slavery. At the Hague, at Rotterdam, at Amsterdam, there had been disturbances on the occasion of the conscription. In East Friesland they had attacked and put to flight the prefect who directed the levy in person. Prince Lebrun, the Governor of Holland, having interceded in favour of the delinquents, exposed himself to a sharp reprimand for his weakness. Napoleon had ordered some wretches to be shot publicly as a lesson to those who should be tempted to follow their example; a melancholy lesson, which taught them to submit for a moment, and to rise against us when we should be found in opposition to the whole of Europe!

In the Hanseatic departments, the aversion from the levies of soldiers and sailors was still stronger, for, although Holland might expect some advantages from its union with the Empire, none could arise to the cities of Bremen, Hamburg, or Lubeck, the natural ports of Germany, and their interests were as much opposed as their sentiments. They had been alarmed, but not reduced to submission, by the shooting of a poor shipmaster who had brought over passengers to Heligoland. The city of Hamburg was covered in the night with inflammatory placards, which the police had great difficulty in removing. The whole population favoured the desertion from our service, not only of Ger-

mans, Italians, and Spaniards, but even of Frenchmen, and treated them as friends as soon as they had left the army. They sheltered them by day, and transported them by night, sending them up the rivers in boats, supporting them gratis, and restoring them to their country.

The Hanseatic regiments, composed of soldiers formerly in the service of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, among whom had been introduced a certain number of French officers, had partially revolted. Some companies of these regiments, employed in guarding the distant shores of the North Sea, had committed violence on some faithful officers, and, taking possession of some fishing-vessels, had taken refuge in the island of Heligoland. It had been necessary to send back the most suspected of these three regiments, the 129th, into the interior, and to surround it with tried troops under Marshal Davout. Nothing very satisfactory could be said of the Dutch troops, nor of the Westphalian, though the last were the objects of continual care to King Jerome. At the populous city of Brunswick, which still remembered her former duke with regret, there had been a tumult in which several of our soldiers had been maltreated. King Jerome had interfered in order to punish the guilty with less severity, to whose intercession Napoleon had replied by an order of the day, in virtue of which every crime committed against the French army should be instantly judged by military commissions composed exclusively of French officers.\*

Nor were the dispositions of men more favourable in the South than in the North of the Empire, in Italy, for example. The Italians, who at first had eagerly surrendered themselves to France, had at length been converted into enemies, by the total loss of political freedom, and the almost total loss of national independence, by the imposition of a yoke, which, though less galling than that of Austria, was still very irksome, by the conscription, by incessant wars, by the loss of commerce, by the quarrel with the church. It is true that in Lombardy, where the government of Prince Eugene was mild, equitable, and regular, and had succeeded the harsh government of Austria, quietness prevailed; it is also true that in Piedmont (except Genoa, which longed for the opening of the sea) men began to accustom themselves to France, and excused her warlike tendencies rather more readily than elsewhere; but in Tuscany, where war had always been regarded with horror, where there had always existed an Italian government, mild, wise, and philosophical, where the spirit of Southern Italy began to prevail, and where the clergy possessed a certain influence,—at Rome, where the people were inconsolable for the loss of the papacy, where dislike to ultramontane rulers was as strong as in Calabria,—hatred was little concealed, and there, as in the rest of Europe, a reverse of fortune might occasion a general insurrection. The presence of the smallest English force would be sufficient to produce such a result.

These sentiments, everywhere diffused, were certainly in no degree checked by the public reports of every day, which, by exaggeration,

\*The preceding is wholly extracted from the correspondence of Marshal Davout and the police-reports of the Duke of Rovigo.

circumstances on the notice of those who hadly conceal them from themselves: experienced these sentiments for himself, as he learned, from the reports of travellers of commerce, that other provinces were to the same hardships; his hatred was deep, and the storm imperceptibly increased.

Napoleon was certainly much too slow to perceive this state of things, from concluding from them that it was necessary to guard against aggravating it by a treaty; or from reasoning as he had done on the result from the campaign of Wagram, when he thought for a moment of restoring peace to Europe; he concluded that the Russian war was in order to suppress quickly in 1812, as done in 1809, those insurrections which were likely to break out. He hoped then, after gaining universal power and dominion, to occupy himself in softening his government, and conforming it to the demands of different nations having rendered it glorious to them; he reasoned as many do who are sunk in misery in which they sincerely desire to escape, and defer their amendment from day to day, till life closes before it is accomplished. He remained alive only to the clamours of Paris, the voice of popular want, and for that reason he went to St. Cloud a month before the spring.

withstanding the meanness by which he was surrounded, and which more humbly excited admiration in proportion as his errors were more flagrant, he perceived, by the comparison imposed on the countenances and the words of those about him, that the new war which he hastened was regarded with fear, and fretted, as it were, at objections that never made to him, but which he divined, and they were expressed to him by his own weakness, and he often replied to them in conversation with persons who had neither thought of them, and who, if they had thought of them, would not have dared to address him. Among the most important persons was one, the Arch-Chancellor Cambronne, whom he willingly consulted in interviews, but with whom he had long avoided going upon foreign questions, because he was aware that he was opposed to him, and at the same time he knew that his opinion was not despised. He held two or three conversations with him on the approaching war with Russia: the arch-chancellor, notwithstanding his diffidence, which never carried him the length of saying by deceit a master whom he loved, constrained himself to dissuade him from the enterprise; he found him to be determined, rather than truly convinced, and argued along, as it were, by an irresistible logic. Napoleon repeated to him, as to one, that, whatever might be done, he would sooner or later come into collision with Russia; that she had been beaten but not subdued, therefore, a first blow was necessary to force her to subjection; that since this was necessary, the sooner it was done the better; his own powers were entire, his armies were invincible, and that he preferred imposing this task upon himself while young, than leaving it to be should be old and weak; that with the better reason he preferred assuming it himself to assigning it to his successor, who

was still an infant, and who might not be equal to him in talent; that the die was cast, that he would do what he thought right, and that God would decide. The difficulties he did not deny: he acknowledged that it was not a war to be carried on in haste, as some had been; that it would occupy at least two campaigns; that they were mistaken if they supposed that he was going to plunge into wild and probably desolated countries, there to expose himself to all the rigours of cold and want; that this year he would advance no farther than the Dvina and the Dnieper, where he would establish himself, strengthen his position, and create vast magazines, and defer inflicting any mortal blow on Russia till the following year.

Strongly suspecting that he had not the requisite patience, Prince Cambacères, after insisting on the difficulties of this war, spoke also of the disposition of Germany of which an alarming description had been given by all reports, of the little confidence he could place in the constancy of the small German princes, his allies, on the sincerity of Austria, on the power of the King of Prussia to keep all his engagements. Napoleon treated the fears of his wise counsellor as chimerical. He said that the small German princes had gained territories which they could not preserve without his aid, which would be sufficient to secure their alliance; that Austria had anticipated all that he required of her in the hope of recovering Illyria; that Prussia, trembling and submissive, would remain faithful from the fear of the terrible consequences to which she would be exposed by treason; that, at any rate, he had taken every precaution, and that a powerful army encamped upon the Elbe would secure him against the influence of the open or secret ill-will of the powers whom he should leave in the rear.

Napoleon evidently regarded himself as pledged to himself and all the world to persevere in his fatal enterprise whatever might happen, and he took refuge from any casual doubt by reverting to the incredible success of his past life, and to the hopes of universal dominion which it seemed to sanction. There was therefore no longer room to insist, and the institutions of the time allowed nothing but submission, with grief to those who loved Napoleon, and with despair to those who loved France.

Disregarding these slight obstacles, Napoleon hastened to put the last stroke to his affairs, in order to be ready to quit Paris at the first movement of the Russians. With the exception of the wagons, which were a little behindhand, every thing went according to his wish, and he could reckon upon having all that he had ordered for the terrible struggle he contemplated, before May, or at least before June. His finances were, at the time, adequate to his expenses. His budget, reckoned at from 740 to 770 millions, or from 860 to 890 millions including the expense of collection, had suddenly risen to about 960 millions, or 1070 millions including the expense of collection. This increase was partly due to the union of the Roman States, of Illyria, of Holland, and of the Hanseatic departments. The Roman States had promised him an augmentation of 12 millions, Illyria 11, Holland 65, the Hanseatic departments 20, forming a total of about 100 millions, without a corresponding increase in expenditure. Owing

to the annexation of all these administrations to that of France, already amply repaid, many expenses had been suppressed or diminished. Holland alone cost more than she yielded, on account of her debt, which absorbed nearly 81 millions out of a revenue of 55 millions.

To this sum of nearly 100 millions, the customs had added an increase of about 60 millions, owing to the famous tariff of August, 1810, which allowed the introduction of colonial produce at a duty of 50 per cent. The receipts had therefore increased to the extent of 160 millions, and still there remained a deficit. This could not be ascribed to the expense of the countries annexed, for we have seen that this was more than equalled by the revenue: it could only be ascribed to the war. The war-expenses in 1810 had been, for men 250 millions, for *materiel* 150 millions, in all 400 millions; in 1811, about 480 millions; and they were soon to exceed 500 millions. The navy, hitherto falling within 140 millions, would cost 170 millions since the union of the Dutch and Hanseatic navies. It is thus that the new resources were more than absorbed by the expenses of the military administration. It is true that to the augmentation of 160 millions, the source and particulars of which we have just described, we must add another resource, purely accidental, and due to the customs. We have seen that much colonial produce seized for smuggling had been confiscated, that many American and Turkish vessels accused of contravening the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been taken and sold for the benefit of the treasury, that a quantity of wool belonging to great Spanish families had been proscribed; we have also seen the admission into France, at a duty of 50 per cent., of large quantities of colonial produce existing in Holland and Holstein before the latest laws of the continental blockade. The returns from these different sources had been united under one name, that of *extraordinary customs-returns*, and amounted to 150 millions. These were to take the place of the money obtained by credit in countries possessing it. Of this sum Napoleon had devoted about 90 millions to the payment of the balance of all previous budgets, and thus had no arrears, which gave prodigious facility to his movements. There remained, then, to him about 60 millions, besides his *treasure extraordinary*, which, after all the pensions that had been granted and all the sums expended on public works, amounted still to about 340 millions, including the returns of the last Austrian war. The reader will remember that of these 340 millions he had lent 84 to the treasury, on the suppression of the bonds of the receivers-general; he retained 85 in ready money, the greater part of which was in the vaults of the Tuileries, 38 in perfectly valid bonds, and 132 in obligations of Westphalia, Saxony, Bavaria, Prussia, and Austria. He could only reckon on the last sums in the case of his being a conqueror; nor was that to be regarded any longer as a resource which he had formerly lent to the treasury. There remained then at his immediate disposal 85 millions of ready money, 38 of good bonds, i.e. 123 millions, or nearly 180 including the 60 millions still in the treasury extraordinary of customs. With a budget allowing 500 millions to the two war-offices and 170 to the navy, with a reserve of 180 millions in ready money,

with scarcely any funded debt, and all arrears completely cleared off, we might consider ourselves sufficiently provided, especially if the war, being successful, as Napoleon supposed, should support itself. He could thus regularly pay a force which, with the new call upon the National Guards, should exceed 1,200,000 men, of whom 900,000 were French. And if it be asked how it was possible with 500 millions to support 900,000 men, we reply that in the Peninsula there were 300,000 who cost scarcely 40 millions to the treasury, the surplus being supplied by Spain either in contributions for the war, or in produce;\* that there was in Illyria† and in Germany a certain number who received part of their support from the country, as, for example, the troops remaining in Westphalia; and finally, that expenses and the value of money were very different at that time from the present. Such were the financial resources of Napoleon, perfectly adapted to his military resources, but both of them exposed to danger by the immoderate use he was inclined to make of them.

While putting the last touch to his domestic affairs, Napoleon was naturally much occupied also with foreign affairs apart from those of Russia, which must submit to the rule of arms. The principal of these was the alliance he wished to form with America against England. Nothing was more important, or proved more clearly the extent to which he was in error, in seeking in a war in the North the means of overcoming the enemies which he had made for himself throughout the world. Notwithstanding the success of Lord Wellington in Spain, the internal condition of England had become worse than before. Paper money was at a discount of 18 per cent.; foreign produce was so depreciated that sugar, for example, which sold for six francs a pound at Paris, was scarcely worth six or seven pence at London. The Thames was covered with laden vessels converted virtually into magazines. The number of bankrupts in London had risen from 600 to 700 annually to 2000. The exchange had experienced a still further fall, and, in consequence of all these causes, the manufactures which had at first been prosperous, had been suspended. The workmen were out of employ, and, to increase the evil, the famine prevailing in England almost as much as in France, the people had less means of paying for bread at the time when the price of it was high. In almost every county bands of famished men traversed the fields and broke the machinery. The situation of England, therefore, had not been sensibly changed by the opening which was said by Napoleon to have been offered by Russia to her commerce; and what would have happened if, while prolonging this state of things for a short time, he had thrown upon Lord Wel-

\* In 1810 and 1811 the army of Spain had cost, in appreciable expenses, 165 millions, of which Spain had paid by contributions 88 millions, and the French treasury 77. Besides this, Spain had furnished all that had been taken on the spot, and all the contributions which had been collected by her oppressors. This is the result of a very elaborate estimate made by the treasurer and subjected to Napoleon.

† We say Illyria and not Italy, because the troops in Italy were entirely paid by the French treasury, by means of an annual subsidy of 30 millions received by the treasury from the kingdom of Italy, which was carried to the budget of the Empire.

lington part of the forces which he was preparing to bury in the snows of the North?

The British cabinet was about to add a fresh aggravation to all these evils by her extravagant conduct towards America. With the exception of the Spanish, French, and Dutch colonies, which scarcely afforded any market in consequence of the accumulation of goods, North America was the only great country remaining accessible to British commerce. England sent thither for produce to the value of about 200 or 250 millions, and exported to America to a nearly equal extent. In this state of affairs, it was a very useful school for her navy and market for her industry, without considering that among the articles with which she paid America there were many colonial products which the Americans, by one means or another, always contrived to introduce into the Continent, notwithstanding the rigour of the blockade. England, therefore, had great cause to study America. Far from that, she conducted herself towards that country as Napoleon had behaved to the continental States, misled as he was by passion and the pride of system. Her famous orders of council, which Napoleon had met by the equally-famous decrees of Berlin and Milan, were the cause of the quarrel which threatened to break out into open war.

We may remind the reader once more, that, by her orders in council, England had at first blockaded (by a *paper blockade*) all the coasts of the French Empire and her allies, and had then required that, in order to obtain access, every vessel should purchase permission to navigate by paying for it in the Thames; to which Napoleon had replied by declaring as good prize, and as unprotected by their national flag, all vessels which submitted to such dictation. We have seen that the Americans, to protect their vessels from this double violence, had at first forbidden them, by the law of embargo, to frequent the coasts of Europe, and had subsequently restricted their prohibition to the coasts of France and England, adding, that the law would be revoked in regard to whichever of the two powers should renounce her own system. Napoleon, with well-judged moderation, had withdrawn his decrees of Berlin and Milan as far as regarded the Americans, and said that he had done so in the hope that the Americans would defend their flag against those who insulted it. In answer to this prudent conduct, the Americans had removed the interdiction as far as concerned France, but maintained it towards England, and thus became at open variance with her on this subject.

Had England been guided by reason, she would simply have imitated the conduct of Napoleon, have revoked her orders in council, and permitted Americans to communicate with France.

The advantage which we should have derived from this would certainly not have been equal to that which would have accrued to England. No doubt we should have paid less for sugar and coffee, and, which was more important, for indigo and cotton, so useful to our manufactures; but a part of the sugar, coffee, and cotton admitted to France would have come from English colonies. But if the high price of colonial produce were an inconvenience to France, their being undersold would be a calamity to England, who would have gained much more than France by

allowing the Americans free circulation; but, the spirit of maritime dominion prevailing with the British ministers to a degree amounting to folly, as the spirit of continental dominion prevailed with Napoleon, England had very slightly modified her orders in council, instead of completely rescinding them. She had ceased to require the Americans to pay tribute on the banks of the Thames, but she had declared the ports of the French Empire to be in blockade, from the mouths of the Ems to the frontiers of Portugal, from Toulon to Orbitello. This was still the claim to a fictitious blockade,—a blockade upon paper, consisting in a desire to close the shore and ports which they were unable to blockade effectually by a real force.

The Americans replied that this was not to re-establish the common right of neutrals, which absolutely rejected a fictitious blockade, and they declared that, since England persisted in a part of her orders in council, they would persist towards her in their law of non-intercourse, though they had relinquished it in regard to France. The English ministers replied to the reasons of the Americans by the feeblest arguments. They pretended that the French had not seriously relinquished the decrees of Berlin and Milan; that the relinquishment they had made was not authentic in form; that they still arrested many American vessels at the entry to French ports,—which was true and unavoidable, for England had allowed the manufacture of false papers, which required the greatest precautions; that the Americans had not required of France the privilege of introducing the products of British industry,—which was puerile, for, though the Americans had demanded that English property should not be seized under the protection of their flag, they could not require that English produce should be admitted by France in opposition to her commercial system. These reasons, then, were untenable, and the Americans so regarded them. Another very serious error of England, which was daily renewed with equal audacity and violence, threatened war with America. Under pretence that many of her sailors, in order to escape service, had emigrated to America, she boarded certain American vessels, which is always permitted to ships-of-war when the visit is intended merely to determine the accuracy of the flag, but never otherwise, and she availed herself of the opportunity to carry off all the sailors who spoke English. But as the two nations speak the same language, the British navy carried away almost as many American sailors as English, and consequently put in force the press not only upon British subjects but also upon foreigners, by abuse of a conformity of idiom arising from a conformity of origin. Frequently had the resistance of American vessels given rise to collisions at sea which had resounded through all America. Exasperation was now at the highest pitch, and men of foresight regarded the war as inevitable.

The English opposition found herein numerous grounds of complaint against the ministry, and one of the greatest orators of England, Lord Brougham, in the full force of youth and talent, had triumphantly shown the folly to which their maritime system had led. In fact, while they obstinately adhered to the orders of council in regard to the Americans, under pretence of

preventing communication with France, they had, by the system of licenses, authorized a number of petty flags, Swedes, Norwegians, and Prussians, to communicate with France, so that the English mercantile marine had been replaced by minor neutrals to whom they allowed by exception what they refused to the larger, i.e. the Americans, who could appeal to the right of nations. Besides, the habit of falsifying their origin, introduced by the system of licenses, had given birth to a crowd of subterfuges, and disseminated among merchants immoral practices which were becoming truly alarming.

No doubt the opposition, as usual, exaggerated the errors of the government, and were not perfectly scrupulous in representing them with accuracy, but the vehemence with which they attacked them was perfectly legitimate. They would have expressed the truth fully and exactly, if they had said that the interests of England demanded access for herself to all the world, while the interests of Napoleon demanded that it should be prohibited; that by supplying France with sugar, coffee, and cotton at a lower price, England conferred on her a benefit a hundred times less valuable than she derived herself by discharging her crowded magazines. To open every place was her interest, to close every place was the interest of Napoleon: it was utterly unreasonable to persevere in adherence to the orders in council, and thus to prepare for herself the greatest possible loss by sacrificing her connection with America, and also a war of the most threatening aspect if it should receive support from a new triumph of Napoleon in the North.

The city of London, irritated in the highest degree, had presented a petition to the Prince of Wales, who had been regent for a year, to demand the dismissal of the ministers, and a large part of the mercantile community had supported the petition. The Prince of Wales, to whose power had been assigned certain restrictions for the duration of a year, had just entered on the full prerogative of royalty, and every thing indicated that he would enjoy them definitively, as the health of his father, George III., showed no sign of improvement. Though now accustomed to the former ministers of his father, and in some degree embroiled with those statesmen whom he had at first designed to select as his own, he wished to unite both parties in a coalition ministry, in order to satisfy in some degree the excited state of public opinion. Unfortunately, the Marquis Wellesley, the brother of Lord Wellington and minister for foreign affairs, had recently quitted the cabinet, without any definite motive, simply because he could no longer sympathize with Mr. Perceval, a man of narrow and violent character, an exaggeration of Mr. Pitt, possessing his faults without his talents. It was, therefore, very improbable that if Marquis Wellesley, a man of open, affable, and elevated mind, and belonging to the same party as Mr. Perceval, had been unable to sympathize with that minister, it would be practicable to associate with him Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, the leaders of the opposite party, neither of them very tractable, both enlaid with the pride of high place and the haughtiness of deeply-rooted convictions. Moreover, the serious question of the emancipa-

tion of Ireland presented an insuperable obstacle to union. Ireland was the most unfortunate portion of the British Empire. Its miserable condition rendered necessary the precaution of leaving in that island troops which might be much more usefully employed in Portugal. The opposition, inflexible on this subject, eagerly maintained that the only way of quieting Ireland, and of rendering available the troops now occupied in watching it, was to grant emancipation, i.e. an equality of rights with other parts of the United Kingdom; and, though the Prince-Regent had proposed to leave the question open, Lord Grenville and Lord Grey had firmly declined his overtures. It was therefore impossible to effect any coalition. But the situation was so critical that the least disaster abroad would have brought down the war-policy. Thus, notwithstanding all the advantages gained by the English in Spain, and all the disasters that had fallen to our lot, Napoleon might still have inclined England to peace by directing all his forces to that end rather than obstinately determining to bury them in the North. A single check to England would have sufficed, and thus the opportunity afforded during the preceding year had not been wholly lost, so rapidly did England seem to compensate the errors of Napoleon by her own. A singular spectacle is presented by the history of the world! It is commonly a rivalry of errors, in which those succumb who commit the greatest number. And these errors are commonly committed by the most able governments when under the influence of passion, whose dominion ever neutralizes the power of reason.

Though Napoleon closed his eyes on this state of things, he understood that, while England obstinately exposed the Americans to all kinds of vexation, it was his part to gain them over by opposite treatment. A few more vexations from one quarter, and a few more facilities from the other, and America would be found at war with England, which would be a result of the greatest importance. The difficulty consisted in granting the Americans the commercial advantages which they sought without relaxing the continental blockade. To meet this inconvenience, Napoleon at first wished to allow them to trade only by means of licenses granted to merchants in whom he could rely. These licenses being found a source of great annoyance, he had relinquished their use, but had designated the American ports which they might leave, and the French ports where they might arrive. He hoped, by concentrating his surveillance over a small number of points, to succeed in preventing smuggling. Finally, in order to favour Lyons and Bordeaux, he had designed that the American vessels should be obliged to take from France a certain quantity of her silk and wine. These restrictions had given great displeasure to America, and from every quarter came accounts stating that something more than this was necessary to detach the government of the United States from England and to incline it effectually to France. M. Collin de Sussy, who had been made minister of commerce, devised a plan which, while giving satisfaction to the Americans, would have prevented the inconvenience of their free admission to our ports: he proposed to suppress all the obstacles of which they complained, and to

admit them freely, with the sole exception of coffee and sugar, whose source could not be traced, and which were almost exclusively English, but, instead, to receive cotton, which could easily be traced, and likewise wood, tobacco, and other substances which we required, and which indisputably came from America. Napoleon, always suspicious, and inclined to grant little and to claim much, did not immediately adopt the plans of M. de Sussy, but diminished to some degree the annoyance complained of by the Americans, and despatched M. Sérurier to Philadelphia, to promise the freest admission into France on condition of a definite rupture with England. He therefore flattered himself that in a few months he should secure the alliance of America against England, and the event proved that he was correct.

Nor did he here close the efforts of his diplomacy in prospect of the new war. Though such irritated with Sweden, he nevertheless, as the crisis drew near, listened to some insinuations emanating probably from Stockholm and transmitted by the wife of Prince Bernadotte, sister of the Queen of Spain. That princess was distressed at the threatened rupture between Sweden and France, and up to this moment had never left Paris. It seemed to be implied that M. Alquier had not managed well, that he had not studied the susceptibility of the prince-royal, who wished nothing more than to be allied with France on advantageous and honourable conditions; that his toleration of contraband commerce simply arose from the bad state of the Swedish finances; that this commerce produced a customs-revenue on which Stockholm greatly depended, and that if France wished Sweden to be able to keep troops in readiness, it would be necessary to grant her a subsidy; and upon this condition the prince would close his ports against the English and furnish an army to France against Russia. Napoleon had great doubts of the sincerity of these overtures, but it was possible that Bernadotte, whose proposals had been coldly received by Russia and England, (which was known at Paris,) should be inclined to return towards France, and it would not be right to repel such an ally, for the march of a Swedish army upon Finland, while a French army was marching upon Lithuania, must occasion a useful diversion. He therefore proposed to Bernadotte, through the princess-royal, to unite with France, and to direct 30,000 or 40,000 men against Finland, and promised in return not to treat with the Emperor Alexander without obliging him to restore that province to Sweden. In place of the subsidy which he could not give, Napoleon consented to admit through Stralsund the sale of colonial produce to the extent of twenty millions, the price of which should be immediately paid. An agent pointed out by the princess-royal was immediately authorized to carry these conditions to Stockholm.

While thus engaged, Napoleon still kept his eye upon the march of his troops. The month of March, 1812, had just terminated, and hitherto every thing had turned out as he wished. Swedish Pomerania had been invaded by one of Marshal Davout's divisions, that of General Friant, and that division, after laying hands on the contraband organized by the Swedes, marched for Stettin on the Oder. The Gudin division

had advanced still farther, and taken position at Stargard, having before it the cavalry of General Bruyere on the Dantzic road. The Desaix division was established at Custrin on the Oder, with its light cavalry at Landsberg in the direction of Thorn. Marshal Davout, with the divisions of Morand and Compans, and the cuirassiers attached to his *corps d'armée*, had approached the Oder, and was ready to cross that river at the first signal. His troops had marched in good order and without haste, in exact discipline, provided with every thing by the Prussian government, who, at the sight of these formidable soldiers, hastened to fulfil her engagements with their master. Marshal Oudinot, after concentrating his forces at Munster, had advanced *en échelon* on the Berlin road; Marshal Ney had gone from Mentz to Erfurth, and from Erfurth to Torgau on the Elbe. The Saxons had crossed the Oder. The Viceroy of Italy, having crossed the Alps with his army, had traversed Bavaria, collected the Bavarians, and almost reached the Oder. The officers of all grades, in compliance with Imperial orders, had marched at the head of their soldiers, maintaining discipline among their troops and restraining their speech as far as possible, but not always with success. In the corps of Marshal Ney and Prince Eugene were committed deplorable excesses, whether from being exposed to greater privations, owing to the greater length of their route, for which they consoled themselves at the expense of the countries they traversed, or because the route assigned to them had been less prepared for their reception. Resting-places were appointed at intervals, that each corps might rally the stragglers and concentrate the front and rear. An immense track of wagons, such as had not been previously seen, indicated the course of the columns long after their passage.

Hitherto nothing had been said of the Niemen, nor had any report intimated that this vast display of forces, now evident to all, had induced Russia to take the initiative. Consequently, Napoleon, according to his plan, prescribed a new movement to his troops early in April, to carry them forward from the Oder to the Vistula, with the design of establishing themselves there, in expectation of the three things which he had resolved to await with patience in this gigantic march,—viz.: the concentration of his columns, the arrival of his wagons, and the progress of vegetation.\*

He ordered Marshal Davout to make for the Vistula with his five divisions and all his cavalry; Marshal Oudinot to enter Berlin with the greatest possible military state, there to remain for a short time and then to take his course for the Oder; Marshal Ney to cross the Elbe at Torgau in order to reach Frankfort on

\* Some very ill-informed writers, inferring from the results of the campaign that the operations were begun too late, have ascribed to other than the true causes the slowness of Napoleon's movements. They have pretended, for example, that internal affairs, particularly the famine, had detained Napoleon at Paris, and thus caused the disasters of 1812 by delaying the opening of the campaign. This is a complete error. Napoleon, having experienced how greatly the troops were exhausted and decimated by distant marches, wished to traverse leisurely the space from the Rhine to the Vistula, to complete the organization of his wagons, and, above all, to find on the ground the food of 150,000 horses. His correspondence and his orders prove this beyond a doubt. As to the famine, it exercised no influence over his military arrangements.

the Odet; the Saxons and Westphalians to take up their position at Kalisch; the Bavarians and the army of Italy to reach Glogau; and, finally, the guard to post itself *en échelon* on the Posen road. When the troops should have marched five or six days, they were to rest nearly the same time. Marshal Davout, on whom the organization of every thing devolved, was ordered to cause the wheat of Dantzic to be ground without delay, and to store the flour in barrels, to prepare without loss of time the navigation of the Frische-Haff and the Pregel, to finish the bridges over the Vistula, to form at Thorn and Elbing, with provisions from Prussia, magazines similar to those of Dantzic, to occupy Pillau and the point of Nehrung, and above all to be on his guard as to the movements of the Russians. The plan was, if the latter should cross the Niemen and seriously adopt the offensive, to march against them with the 150,000 men under Davout and the 80,000 of King Jerome. If, on the contrary, the Russians made no movement, they were to remain quiet, not to show the advanced posts of the French beyond Elbing, beyond which place they were to employ only Prussians, who from Dantzic to Königsberg were in their own country. Napoleon had made every arrangement to start at the first signal, and to reach his advanced guard with the rapidity of a courier. As soon as Marshal Davout should have reached the Vistula, there would be nothing more to fear of a hasty march of the Russians, and his only wish was to delay hostilities till the herbage should cover the fields.

In order still more certainly to secure the accomplishment of this wish, he forwarded another courier to M. de Lauriston, to announce to him this second movement, and to dictate the language he was to use. He was ordered to say that the Emperor of the French, having learned the march of the Russian armies towards the Dwina and Dnieper, (which was a pure invention, for he had heard nothing of the sort,) had determined to post himself upon the Vistula, fearing an invasion of the grand duchy, but that his wish was always to treat, though under arms, even to meet the Emperor Alexander between the Vistula and the Niemen, and if possible to arrange every thing with him in a friendly conference, like that of Tilsit or Erfurth. In order to gain credit for such a disposition, M. de Lauriston was authorized to declare that the French troops should not pass the Vistula, and that any French uniforms which might be seen beyond that river, even perhaps as far as Elbing, would be the advanced posts of light cavalry, employed in surveillance, which could never be neglected in the neighbourhood of a large army.

While these events were transpiring in France, the counter-stroke had been powerfully felt at St. Petersburg. The effect of the news brought from all parts of the continent was not likely to be softened by the presence of M. de Czernicheff, who arrived on the 10th of March, bearing a friendly letter from Napoleon, but personal impressions of a totally different character, for on his road he met troops in alarming numbers. The movement of Marshal Davout upon the Oder and beyond it, the invasion of Swedish Pomerania, the demand of the German contingents, the passage of the Alps by the army

of Italy, the positive announcement of the two treaties of alliance with Prussia and Austria, had dissipated the last doubts of Alexander, and caused him and his court profound grief, for there could be no doubt that the struggle would be terrible, and, if unsuccessful, that the greatness of Russia would receive a check as decisive as that which had been met by Prussia and Austria. The signature of these two treaties had, above every thing, disclosed the imminence of the danger to the Emperor Alexander and his Chancellor Romanzoff. The Emperor Alexander, sufficiently well informed as to the movements of French diplomacy by well-concealed treachery, knew that Napoleon had for a long time withheld any treaty of alliance from Prussia, that he might avoid giving too great umbrage to St. Petersburg. It might be inferred, from his having concluded this treaty, that he had formed his determination, and that without any reserve. The dissimulation of the court of Austria with respect to her engagements could not deceive Alexander, who was perfectly acquainted with all European transactions, and could be merely ridiculous to any one who witnessed the embarrassment of M. de St. Julien, the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg. He was obliged as much as possible to keep out of the way, to avoid being obliged to own the new engagements contracted by his court, or being covered with confusion if he should deny them. Prussia, less hardened in lying, had acknowledged all. We have said that she had sent M. de Knesebek to St. Petersburg, to explain to Alexander the melancholy necessity in which she found herself of taking part in the war, and in so doing of ranging herself on the side of France. Whether M. de Knesebek had been authorized by the king, or was merely yielding to national feeling, he had carried his confidence somewhat too far. He had said that the king was acting against his will, that all his wishes were with Russia, and that he did not despair of being able to join her, an event which would be rendered inevitable by a prudent conduct, and on this subject M. de Knesebek, who was an enlightened officer, had imparted very wise counsels, fatal to us but useful to the Czar, who was perplexed with the variety of military opinions deduced by the serious state of affairs. He had advised him not to abide the first shock of Napoleon, but rather to retrograde, and thus draw the French into the interior of Russia, and only to attack them when exhausted by hunger and fatigue. He had promised that all Germany would join the Russians to accomplish the ruin of the shameless invader who had been ravaging Europe for twelve years.

Whether this was merely the foresight of M. de Knesebek, expressed in advice under the influence of national feeling, without any sanction from his master, or whether he had been authorized to carry thus far the excuses of Frederick William to Alexander, it is impossible now to say, though we have the confession of M. de Knesebek himself, who perhaps exaggerated his real guilt in order thereby to enhance his foresight and patriotism. However this may be, the oppression to which Prussia was at this time subjected affords an excuse for many things, though we cannot but regret that M. de Knesebek should be authorized to use such a language, for the sake of the dignity of the king.

who was a man of perfect honour. Alexander received with haughty indulgence the explanations of Frederick William and with infinite respect the wise counsels of his envoy, assured him that he deplored the determination of Prussia, but that, as he was defending the cause of all Germany as well as that of Russia, he did not despair of seeing the Prussians on his side.

He was less indulgent to M. de St. Julien, who, after long remaining in retirement, was at length constrained to encounter Alexander. He, at first, denied the treaty of alliance, and apparently not wholly without foundation; for his cabinet, in order more successfully to deceive Russia, had deceived their own ambassador by leaving him in ignorance. All his information he had gathered from some confidential communication with M. de Lauriston, who had told him more than he wished to learn. He, therefore, attempted to call in doubt the existence of the recent treaty of Austria with France, on the ground of his having heard nothing of it from Vienna, but Alexander interrupted him at once. "Do not deny it," he said; "I know every thing. Parties on whom I may fully confide, who have never led me into error, have sent me a copy of the treaty signed by your court;" then, showing it to the astonished M. de St. Julien, he added, that he was much surprised at such conduct on the part of Austria, which he considered as a real abandonment of the European cause; that he was not the only person interested in the struggle, but every prince who professed the slightest regard to independence; that, as long as he had seen in the French alliance only the smaller German states subject to Napoleon, and even Prussia now deprived of her force, he had experienced neither surprise nor alarm, but that the accession of Austria to this kind of league had, indeed, amazed him, and shaken his firmest resolutions; that he could not defend Europe by himself; that, since every one left him, he must do like the rest, and treat with Napoleon; that, after all, he had less to lose than others by this universal submission; that he was at a distance from France; that Napoleon required little of him; that he might escape with a little sacrifice of self-esteem, after which he might remain at ease, still independent in his distance, but that those who had abandoned him would be slaves. In pronouncing these words, Alexander exhibited emotion and anger, with some degree of contempt in his manner and language. M. de St. Julien, less surprised and agitated, might have replied that in 1809 Russia had not scrupled to make war upon Austria without troubling herself about the independence of Europe, and that, if now she summoned all the world to resistance, it was because, instead of offering her the spoils of her neighbours, she was required to sacrifice her commerce to the maritime policy of France, and that now for the first time she began to fear for the independence of Europe. M. de St. Julien, who belonged to the vast continental aristocracy which was animated with profound hatred for France, could only excuse himself on the plea of ignorance, and promised in a few days to offer satisfactory explanations. What these were it was easy to foresee,—viz.: that the alliance with France was not serious, but an act of constraint, and that in this new war no

great injury could be inflicted on the Russian arms.\*

The Emperor Alexander had no longer any doubt on the issue of this crisis, and he regarded an amicable arrangement as altogether impossible. He was nevertheless resolved, in accordance with M. de Romanzoff, who remained strongly attached to the policy of Tilsit, not to take the first step in hostilities, and thus to reserve to himself the only remaining chance of peace, if, contrary to all probability, Napoleon merely aimed at an armed negotiation. He proposed to keep his advanced posts upon the Niemen, without crossing that river, without even coming so far as it in the environs of Memel, where the right bank partly belonged to Prussia, and thus scrupulously to respect the territory of Napoleon's allies. Some excited spirits, principally among the German refugees in the Russian service, sought to urge him forward, advising him to invade not only Old Prussia, but the grand duchy, always with the view of enlarging the desert which they wished to create in the path of Napoleon. This the Czar refused, and in so doing was in agreement with his family, his court, and his nation; for, though unwilling to submit to the empire of Napoleon, they were equally unwilling to rush precipitately into war with that formidable adversary. He therefore determined to await, before leaving St. Petersburg in person, some act, not indeed more significant, but more formally aggressive, than that of the march of the French to the Vistula. He held some final conversations with M. de Lauriston, in which he concealed none of his sentiments, when he even shed tears in speaking of the war, which he considered certain, and of the constraint imposed upon him, by obliging him, contrary to all justice, and to the treaty of Tilsit, which said nothing on the subject, to renounce all commerce with neutrals. He repeated that the decrees of Milan and Berlin did not affect him, having been passed without his having been consulted; that he was only pledged to maintain war against England and to close his ports against her; that he fulfilled this engagement better even than Napoleon with his system of licenses, and that to require more was to demand the impossible, to drive him to war, which he would not enter upon willingly, as might be seen by his whole conduct, but which he would render terrible and desperate if compelled to draw the sword.

Ever occupied with news from the frontiers, which he daily expected to hear had been passed, he inquired of M. de Lauriston whether he had power to suspend the movement of the French troops. M. de Lauriston, who was not authorized to pledge himself in this respect further than to prevent the passage of the Niemen by the Russians, gave no distinct reply, but said that he would undertake to send to the French advanced posts, and endeavour to stop their march, if any proposition were in hand sufficiently important to be sent to Paris. Alexander, understanding by this vague reply that M. de Lauriston's powers were not great, said, that it was very natural that Napoleon, whose designs were al-

\* I here speak on the authority of M. de St. Julien's despatch, which became known to the French government, and was written with a degree of vexation at the alliance which proved its sincerity.



ways well calculated, should not have left to an ambassador the power of interrupting the movement of his troops, and appeared entirely to renounce this last step. M. de Lauriston urged him much, if he would not send M. de Nesselrode, at least to respond to the mission of M. de Czernicheff, and to despatch some one with instructions, powers, and a letter, which, in any case, was due to Napoleon, since he had taken the initiative in writing. Alexander, as if annoyed by such a demand, to which he would have spontaneously replied if he had seen any way of preserving the peace, replied that he would undoubtedly send some one, but that this step would be fruitless, that there was no chance of any profitable negotiation, for certainly it was not with a view to negotiation that Napoleon had set in motion such masses of men and carried them to so great a distance.

In order to be chargeable with no fault, and to be the subject of no regret, Alexander determined to write a letter to Napoleon in reply to that brought by M. de Czernicheff, a letter sad and mild, but haughty, in which he said, that he had been at all times ready to come to an amicable arrangement, and that the world would one day be witness to what he had done to secure it; that he forwarded to Prince Kourakin powers to negotiate, powers which that ambassador had always possessed, and that he ardently wished that a pacific arrangement might be made on the new bases now indicated. M. de Serdobin was to be the bearer of this last message. The conditions which he was to transmit to Prince Kourakin were such as are commonly proposed when hope of success is relinquished and the only attempt is to save one's dignity. Alexander, he said, was ready to enter upon negotiation, and to receive any compensation for Oldenburg that might be offered; to introduce into the ukase of December, 1810, of which the French commercial interest complained, any change compatible with Russian interests, even to examine whether the commercial system designed by Napoleon was admissible in Russia, on condition that he should not be required to enforce the absolute exclusion of neutrals, especially Americans, and that Napoleon should promise to evacuate Old Prussia, the duchy of Warsaw, and Swedish Pomerania. In this case, Alexander undertook to disarm immediately, and to treat the various questions in dispute on pacific and amicable terms.

Had it been believed that Napoleon would negotiate in earnest at Paris, no mention would have been made of any retrograde movement. But both Alexander and M. de Romanzoff had relinquished all such expectation, and their mission of M. de Serdobin was merely in compliance with the urgent entreaties of M. de Lauriston, who, without a ray of hope, still put forth the last efforts for the sake of peace. M. de Serdobin left on the 8th of April, about a month after the arrival of M. de Czernicheff at St. Petersburg. Alexander spent several days in extreme agitation, during which time the society of St. Petersburg, who fully comprehended his feelings, and respectfully conformed to them, carefully avoided giving any provocation to the French, studied them on all occasions, and exhibited neither alarm nor insolence, but a spirit of determination firm though distressed.

No engagement had yet been formed with England, in the anxious desire of remaining free and of avoiding any step which might render war inevitable. But, by the intervention of Sweden, there had occurred some indirect conferences to prepare the way for a closer intercourse at a time when it would be no longer necessary to observe such caution. That time having now come, or being just at hand, since Napoleon had not hesitated to form alliances with Prussia and Austria, Alexander despatched M. de Suchtelen for Stockholm, in order to have an interview with an English envoy in that capital, Mr. Thornton, and to agree with him not only on the conditions of peace with England, but on those of an alliance, offensive and defensive, in the prospect of a war with France.

It was necessary, while using the intervention of Sweden, to come to an understanding with that power as to her own proceedings, and to choose between close alliance and open hostility, since Prince Bernadotte—who, without being invested with royal authority, exercised royal power—had become urgent for a definite answer to his proposals. Russia had long hesitated to form any engagement with the court of Stockholm, because she did not wish to be allied again, because she considered it a very serious thing to rob Denmark for the profit of Sweden, and, finally, because she had no confidence in the character of the new prince-royal,—for, whether faithful or treacherous towards his former country, he must equally be regarded with suspicion. Yet necessity had silenced these reasons. There was no longer any call for delicacy. Denmark was not to be considered when the existence of the Russian Empire was at stake, and the occupation of Swedish Pomerania by Marshal Devout's troops was speedily to put beyond all doubt the nature of the relations between Bernadotte and France. Consequently, on the 5th of April, (24th of March according to the Russians,) the Emperor Alexander concluded a treaty with the court of Stockholm, in which he conceded the great object of desire,—viz.: Norway. By this treaty of alliance, intended to be kept secret, the two states guaranteed their present possessions; that is to say, Sweden guaranteed Finland to Russia, and thus sanctioned her own dispossession. In return, Russia promised to aid Sweden in the present conquest and future retention of Norway. For the accomplishment of her common views, Sweden was to bring together an army of 30,000 men, and Russia was to lend her 20,000; the prince-royal was to command these 50,000 men, and with them to invade Norway, and when this operation, which was regarded as void of difficulty, should be accomplished, he was to descend upon some point of Germany and take the French army in the rear. It was not said, but it was understood, that the British forces should co-operate in this formidable diversion. Some step of courtesy was to be taken towards Denmark, so dexterously robbed: she was to be warned of the stipulation, and an offer made to her to acquiesce on condition of a compensation taken from some part of Germany, which, though not named at present, could not fail to present itself in the course of the war. Should Denmark not yield to these terms, war was to be declared against her; and, since a doubt might be entertained of the effect

as a treaty on the public opinion of Europe, was even on that of Sweden itself, who was not friendly to France, it was agreed, and not in writing, that the Swedish cabinet should begin, not by declaring her alliance with us, but her neutrality with regard to the present powers. From neutrality she should enter into open hostility with France. Thus was issued this act of treachery, one of the most sordid in history.

The most important question for Alexander was that of peace with the Turks. On the conditional demand of a part of their territory, the Turks had broken off negotiations and renewed hostilities. The certainty of an approaching rupture between France and Russia had afforded a decided reason for making no concession. Nevertheless, they persisted in refusing our peace, for they still retained their sense of conduct pursued at Tilsit, though the new policy of France was calculated to atone for it. He wished to avail themselves of the opportunity of coming out of the present war without entangling themselves in the quarrel to break forth between powers which at that time they were sufficiently short-sighted to wish with equal bitterness. Nothing could be so unfortunate for Russia than a continuation of hostilities with Turkey, for, independent of an army of 60,000 men in actual service (which implies not less than 100,000 effectives) she was obliged to maintain another army of 100,000 men under General Tormasof, to conquer the forces of the Danube with those of Napoleon. Whatever plan for the campaign was adopted, it was a matter of great importance to have these two armies at her disposal.

Great excitement prevailed around Alexander, both among the Russian generals and German officers who had fled to his court to escape the influence of Napoleon. The chimerical pretended that it was possible, with the 60,000 Russians occupied by the Turks, to invade Illyria and Italy, to call off Austria, and even prepare the subversion of the Russian Empire in revenge for the aggression attacked by Napoleon upon Russia. This result seemed to them almost certain if they hesitated to make peace with the Turks and carried out reconciliation the length of an alliance.

Practical minds thought that, without going at such vast results, 100,000 men sent from the Danube to the Vistula, on the part of the French, would suffice to change the fate of the war. Alexander, who, by occupying his mind with military combinations, had at length acquired just ideas on the subject of the latter opinion. He had at hand a man who pleased him much by his opinions, a man who was almost liberal, and by a brilliant and witty wit, from whom he hoped to derive valuable service: this was Admiral Tchitchakoff, on whom he fixed his eyes as suited to an important mission to the East. The choice was judicious, for the admiral was indeed well adapted both to tactical and chimerical part he was called to perform. Alexander gave him the immediate command of the army of the Danube, and the nominal command of General Tormasof's army, stationed in Volhynia, authorized him to make peace or war in Turkey, and to depart from a consideration of the Russian demands, contenting himself with Bessarabia, and assuming the

Pruth as the frontier instead of the Sereth, to negotiate on this condition not only peace but alliance with Turkey, but, if they refused to enter into the policy of Russia, to endeavour by an act of prompt vigour to seize what could not be obtained by negotiation, to make himself master even of Constantinople, and then to return, with or without the Turks, to throw himself upon the French Empire by Laybach, or upon the French army by Lemberg and Warsaw. The brilliant imagination and no less brilliant courage of the admiral rendered him a very suitable person for these different and adventurous duties.

In the midst of these resolutions, which were alternately interrupted or precipitated every moment by fresh intelligence, anxiety at St. Petersburg was continually on the increase, when there suddenly arrived an employee of the Russian legation, M. Divoff, who had been sent from Paris by Prince Kourakin to communicate a recent unfortunate circumstance. M. de Czernicheff, on quitting Paris, had imprudently left in his apartment a letter seriously compromising an employee of the war-office,—the same who had imparted to him some of the secrets of France. This letter, having fallen into the hands of the police, had disclosed all the means by which M. de Czernicheff had contrived to corrupt the fidelity of the bureaux. Through the researches of the police, one of the servants of the Russian embassy had been arrested, and had been refused to be surrendered to Prince Kourakin, who demanded him in vain on the ground of diplomatic privilege. A criminal information had been commenced, and every thing announced the sacrifice of several lives for this act of treason, which, on the part of the French agents, could admit of neither excuse nor pardon. But M. Divoff, the bearer of this disagreeable news, brought the still more serious intelligence of having met Marshal Davout's troops beyond Elbing. The liveliest emotion occasioned at St. Petersburg was not that excited by the despatches he bore, however painful, but that which was due to the fact he had observed. The old and zealous advocates of the war, as well as the more recent and moderate, affirmed that Alexander could no longer absent himself from his headquarters; that he could scarcely arrive there before the French should have crossed the Niemen; that he therefore ought no longer to delay; that his presence was necessary to prevent any act of imprudence, for the Russian generals were so excited against the army of Lithuania that they were ready to venture upon some imprudent step which might destroy the last chance of peace, if any still remained. M. de Romanzoff wished to prevent this departure; for to allow Alexander to leave St. Petersburg was to force Napoleon to leave Paris, which would render a collision inevitable. But in the prevalent state of feeling he could not carry his point, and the departure of Alexander for his headquarters was immediately resolved upon. That which greatly contributed to hasten this step was the desire to satisfy public feeling, and at the same time to prevent the generals from losing the last chance of peace by some irreparable act. Alexander had not time to see M. de Lauriston, but he expressed the highest esteem for his noble conduct, and repeated the assurance that he left his capital, not to commence the

war, but, on the contrary, to retard it if possible, affirming, for the last time, that, even at head-quarters, he would be ready to negotiate on the most moderate and equitable terms.

On the morning of the 21st of April he repaired to the church of Cazan to attend public worship with his family: he then set out, surrounded by a numerous multitude excited by their own emotion and by that which was depicted in the countenance of their sovereign. He ascended his carriage amid cheers, and set off accompanied by the most considerable personages of his court and government, including Prince Kotchoubey, minister of the interior, Balachoff, minister of police, Tolstoy, the grand master, M. de Nesselrode, General Pfuhl, a German who taught the Emperor the science of war, and, finally, an expatriated Swede, much mixed up with the intrigues of the time,—Count d'Armsfeld. M. de Romanzoff was to join the imperial cortège some days later, in order to place himself at the head of negotiations should any take place. The Emperor, in repairing to Wilna, proposed to take up his abode in the castle of Souboff, where he would, as it were, make an appeal to all parties, by visiting a family famous for the part they had acted since the death of Paul I. General Benningsen, famous for the same reason, and for others also, having commanded the Russian army with glory, was to be there likewise. Thus the most legitimate private feelings were sacrificed for the moment to the common interests of their country in danger. At the very moment of his departure, the Emperor received a gratifying communication. Austria conveyed to him the assurance that he ought to take no offence at the alliance she had just concluded with France, for she had been unable to act otherwise; but that the 30,000 Austrians sent to the frontiers of Galicia would be there rather in the character of observers than of actors, and that Russia need fear little from these 30,000 men unless she made some direct attack upon Austria.\* Alexander, who indeed had suspected that it might be so, hastened his journey towards Wilna. M. de Lauriston remained alone at St. Petersburg, treated with respectful silence, and awaiting the orders of his court to deliver him from his false position. He was unwilling, by demanding his passports, to add a new signal of war to those which had been given by others without his consent.

Napoleon merely deferred quitting Paris till Alexander should have left St. Petersburg. M. de Lauriston had sent him an account of the preparations for departure before the departure had actually taken place, and he could therefore make all his arrangements. The principal of these was to order a third movement of his troops, to bring them actually upon the Vistula,

where they were to spend the whole month of May. Marshal Davout was already on the Vistula, and had even crossed it to reach Elbing. Napoleon ordered him, without intermitting the special operations assigned to him in respect of *materiel* and navigation, to concentrate his forces between Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Elbing, the Prussians being always in advance as far as the Niemen. He ordered Marshal (Judinot) not to concentrate his forces at Dantzic, to form the left of Marshal Davout, Ney to establish himself at Thorn to form his right, Prince Eugene to repair to Plock on the Vistula with the Bavarians and Italians, King Jerome to collect at Warsaw the Poles, the Saxons, and the Westphalians, the Guard to assemble at Posen, the Austrians to hold themselves in readiness to debouch from Galicia into Volhynia. In this new position the army was to occupy the line of the Vistula from Bohemia to the Baltic, and then to present the formidable mass of 500,000 men, without including reserves, the Prussians always serving as advanced guards on the Russian frontier, without incurring the charge of any act of aggression, since they were still in their own territory. They were thus able to await the progress of vegetation without fear, for at the first movement of the Russians they would be ready to bar their progress before they should have time to commit any devastation.

Though he had no longer any fear of the sudden outbreak of hostilities, Napoleon, impressed with the experience of 1807, and remembering that in those countries he could never act efficiently before the month of June, was anxious, as far as possible, to secure himself from all unnecessary exposure during the month of May, and with this view had recourse to new subterfuges,—subterfuges destined to prove his ruin, as if Providence, resolved to punish his political imprudence by frustrating his military prudence, had urged him on to all that could destroy him; for it was the delay of operations which was to be one of the principal causes of the misfortunes of this campaign. Napoleon, fearing that Alexander, surrounded while with the army by men of the most ardent character, and no longer counterbalanced by the influence of M. de Lauriston, might at length take the initiative, resolved to despatch a fresh envoy, to repeat, if not in new terms, at least in a new person, the language so often held by M. de Lauriston. Napoleon had at hand a person very well adapted to this task, M. de Narbonne, who had entered his service in 1809, as Governor of Raab, subsequently employed as minister in Bavaria, and at present on a mission to Berlin, where he had much to do to appease the unhappy King of Prussia, whose territory was wasted by the passage of so many thousand men. Napoleon ordered M. de Narbonne to repair to the head-quarters of Alexander as a mark of respect, and, while avoiding all subjects foreign from his mission, to express the desire, and even hope, of an armed negotiation, to take place on the Niemen between the two sovereigns, and which should almost certainly issue not in war, but in a renewal of alliance between the two empires. M. de Narbonne was to assign as the reason of his mission the desire to prevent or rectify the errors of the generals, who, from impatience or want of reflection, might have indulged in acts of aggression without the

\* I advance no statements without being well convinced of their truth, and I increase my caution in proportion to the gravity of the facts. I have been able to procure a very full and curious correspondence between Alexander and Admiral Titchakoff during the year 1812. The admiral deserved and enjoyed the entire confidence of his master. In this correspondence I have found the proof of the fact which I here advance, and also a plain and exact indication of the sentiments I ascribe to Alexander and his court. It is my duty to add, that it is not to the family of the admiral, the depositary of his papers, and now resident in France, that I owe the communication of these letters, which are of the greatest historical importance.

order of their government. Had the Russians been guilty of this, M. de Narbonne was to exhibit the greatest indulgence, and if, for example, in the very natural desire of bordering the Niemen, as we were bordering the Vistula, they should have invaded the small portions of the Prussian territory which in the neighbourhood of Memel formed the right bank of that river, he was to consider that part of their conduct in the light of a very excusable military precaution, to offer to come to an amicable understanding, and to entertain Alexander for twenty or thirty days with the idea and hope of a negotiation which should not issue in war. He was also enjoined to explain to him the following piece of diplomacy.

Napoleon had never entered upon any of his great wars without a preliminary overture of peace to England. He proposed to act in the same manner on the present occasion, and to send a message to the prince-regent, by means of the navy at Boulogne, proposing peace on the following conditions. France and England were to retain all their present possessions, subject to special arrangements in Italy and Spain. In Italy Murat was to keep Naples and relinquish Sicily, which should belong to the Bourbons of Naples. In the Peninsula Joseph was to keep Spain, but resign Portugal to the house of Braganza. This, it may be remembered, was the peace proposed through the medium of M. de Labouchère to the Marquis of Wellesley. It was of no great consequence that the proposition should ever be heard, but it was a pacific manifestation which might have a certain moral effect on the eve of the most terrible war in history, and might furnish the subject for further interviews with Alexander. M. de Narbonne was specially charged to communicate the intelligence to the Czar, and to give him this new proof of the pacific and friendly disposition of the powerful Emperor of the French.

While requiring M. de Narbonne to maintain this language, Napoleon, nevertheless, acquainted him with the whole truth, that he might more effectually fulfil his mission. He declared to him that the real object was not to secure a peace, which was not truly desired, but to gain time, and to defer military operations for a month; and he recommended him, as he was an able officer and correct observer, to examine every thing, men and things, soldiers and generals and diplomatists, in order that the staff of the French army might be enlightened by the head-quarters of the Russians. M. de Narbonne was ordered to quit Berlin on the receipt of the letter. He was to be on the road to Wilna early in May.

Having taken these ultimate precautions, Napoleon prepared to set off. His plan, in quitting Paris, was to go to Dresden, there to remain two or three weeks before placing himself at the head of his armies, to hold a magnificent court, and to present a spectacle of power superior, perhaps, to any that the world had ever seen in the times of Charlemagne, Cæsar, or Alexander. The Emperor of Austria requested the privilege of attending, in order to see his daughter and to study the difficult part he would soon be required to play between France and Russia. The King of Prussia expressed a similar desire, in order to plead for his people trodden down by so many thousand soldiers.

When sovereigns such as these sought to visit, to entertain, to supplicate the future conqueror of the world, it need not be said that many others aspired to the same honour. The eagerness was general; and Napoleon, who wished to astonish his adversary by the display of his political as well as of his military power, granted every request, and made Dresden, as it were, the rendezvous for the whole of Europe. The Empress and her court were to accompany him.

At the moment of departure, notwithstanding the entreaties of the prince arch-chancellor, he determined upon a most violent administrative measure, which, with the exception of the scaffold, an instrument equally opposed to his heart and his understanding, placed his government on a footing with all the preceding revolutionary governments. This was the tax upon corn. The famine had continued. Corn was selling at sixty or seventy francs the hectolitre,—a price which would be exorbitant at the present day, but which was still more so at that time. The populace uttered the ordinary cry of hunger,—a cry at once the most legitimate and the most ignorant,—and accused the farmers and merchants of monopoly. Up to this time Napoleon had merely brought into the Paris market the reserved grain, which, though not an act of violence, was a method of thwarting the wholesome working of commerce by providing a substitute. But this method being insufficient to restrain the price even at Paris, where this introduction of the reserves nevertheless produced some effect, Napoleon could not resist the desire of forcibly preventing this excessive dearth; and, thinking that he could act upon commerce as he acted upon Europe, he passed several decrees in the early part of May, enabling the prefects not only to fix a price upon corn according to local circumstances, but even to force it to be brought to market. Thus, on the very eve of setting off for an unreasonable war he endeavoured to impose arbitrary prices, and thus to put a constraint upon commerce which has ever proved vain. It was, as it were, a testimony of affection to a people whose children he was leading to death in thousands,—a melancholy testimony, or rather an empty and fatal flattery, to appease the rumours excited by hunger and the conscription. On the 9th of May, after having deputed his own authority to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, urging him to use it, not with fidelity, for of this he had no doubt, but with energy, of which he was not equally sure,—after leaving him, for the protection of his wife, his child, and the centre of the Empire, some hundreds of the old Imperial Guard, no longer capable of active service,—after having repeated, not only to Prince Cambacérès, but to all those with whom he conversed, that he would risk nothing in this distant war, that he would act with deliberation and moderation, that he would accomplish in two or even three campaigns, if necessary, what might not be wise to attempt in one,—after repeating these assurances without removing anxiety,—he left for Dresden with the Empress, no longer surrounded with the affection of the people, but accompanied by their admiration, their fear, and their submission,—a fatal departure, which no resistance of men or of law could prevent, for of men there was none who ventured the impossible task of securing a hearing, and the only remaining law was that

of his own will, which led him to the Niemen and to Moscow.

Napoleon had sent Prince Berthier before him to expedite his military orders, and had left the Duke of Bassano behind to complete certain diplomatic affairs. He prosecuted his march, accompanied by his military and civil establishment, with a degree of pomp seldom surpassed by the most magnificent sovereigns, but without being personally less simple or less accessible, as it became an extraordinary man, who never feared to present himself to others, confident of influencing them by the power of his genius as well as by the unequalled pomp that surrounded him.

He arrived at Mentz on the 11th, and employed the 12th in visiting the works of the place and in giving orders, and began those sovereign receptions in which were to figure successively the greater number of the continental princes. At Mentz he received the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Prince of Anhalt-Coethen. On the 18th the Imperial court crossed the Rhine, made a short stay at Aschaffenburg with the prince-primate, always much captivated by the genius of Napoleon, and little suspecting that he would be so by his power, then met in the course of the day the King of Wurtemberg, a haughty sovereign of a small state, who by his violent but indomitable character and penetrating mind had attracted more of Napoleon's respect than the most powerful monarchs, and who was induced by politeness to meet him on the road, but not led by flattery to accompany him to Dresden. The Imperial court passed the night at Wurtzburg with the Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, formerly Grand Duke of Tuscany, uncle of the Emperor, an excellent prince, who retained for the Emperor Napoleon the friendship he had formerly conceived in Italy for General Bonaparte, a friendship sincere though not disinterested. On the following day, the 14th, Napoleon slept at Bareuth, on the 15th at Plauen, crossing Germany through an unheard-of crowd of Germanic people, whose hatred was counterbalanced by their curiosity. Never, indeed, had the prestige of the potentate whom they detested appeared so remarkable. Men spoke with surprise and terror of the 600,000 men who from all parts of Europe obeyed his summons; they ascribed to him projects still more extraordinary than those which he had formed,—for instance, that he was making his way through Russia to India; they spread a thousand fables a hundred times more foolish than his actual resolutions, and they almost believed in their accomplishment, so greatly had his constant success deprived hatred of hope. Vast piles were prepared on the road, which were kindled at the approach of night to enlighten his march, so that the emotion of curiosity equalled in its eagerness that of love or joy. On the morning of the 18th, the facile sovereigns of Saxony went as far as Freyburg to meet their potent ally, and in the evening they re-entered by his side the capital of their own kingdom.

On the next day, the 17th, Napoleon received at his levee the officers of the crown, those of the crown of Saxony, and the German princes who had preceded or followed him to Dresden. He behaved in a courteous but haughty man-

ner, and he must have appeared to them intoxicated with his power much more than he really was, for on the approach of danger some rays of light had reached his inmost mind, and he proceeded to this new struggle less under conviction than fascination of the career of war to which he had leagued himself. But his doubts were of short duration, and scarcely interrupted the confidence he placed in the permanence of his success, the extent of his forces, and the consciousness of his genius. Though polite to the German princes, he was heartily friendly only to the good King of Saxony, whom he loved and by whom he was loved, whom he had drawn from a simple and upright life to plunge into the torrent of his own adventures, and whom he had at length seduced by restoring to him, under the title of the Grand Duke of Warsaw, the kingdom of Poland, one of the ancient dignities of his family,—a royalty to be further augmented if the present war should prove successful. This excellent king was charmed, and flattered by his illustrious guest, whom he exhibited with pride to his subjects, who almost forgot their German feelings at the sight of the splendour already restored, and the hope of others promised to the reigning family of Saxony.

Napoleon waited at Dresden for his father-in-law the Emperor of Austria, and his mother-in-law the Empress, sprung by the female line from the house of Modena, and the third wife of Francis II., mother by adoption to Maria Louisa, a princess endowed with very agreeable properties, but vain, haughty, and in heart detesting the grandeur she was compelled to witness. She had repaired to Dresden in compliance with the policy of her husband and her own curiosity.

The Emperor and Empress of Austria reached Dresden a day after Napoleon and Maria Louisa, exactly in time to allow the latter to take possession of the palace of the King of Saxony. The Emperor Francis, who loved his daughter, and who, without forgetting the policy of his family, was pleased to find her happy and treated by her husband with the highest respect and the most assiduous attention, embraced her with lively satisfaction. He opened his arms to his son-in-law with some degree of frankness, and lived at Dresden in a kind of inconsistency more sincere and more frequent than is imagined, balanced between the pleasure of seeing his daughter so great and the pain of seeing Austria so small, floating almost unconsciously between different sentiments, promising Napoleon his co-operation after having assured Alexander that his co-operation would amount to nothing, and flattering himself that after all he had acted for the best, by securing himself against the success of each adversary, but much more confident in that of Napoleon, and preparing to avail himself of it by the conditions of his alliance. So weak, in general, are the characters and so vacillating the minds of men, that many, even though honourable, live without remorse in this kind of treason, excusing themselves in their own eyes by the necessity of a false position, frequently not even seeking to excuse themselves at all, but escaping the reproaches of conscience by a total want of reflection.

The Emperor Francis had prepared for his daughter a singular present, and one which well



MARIA LOUISA

EMPRESS OF FRANCE

*Louise*

dedicated the spirit of the Austrian court. One of those poor scholars, of whom it is to be hoped there are now none remaining in France, caught at that time there were some in Italy, to discover genealogies for those who value them and pay for them, had discovered that in the Middle Ages the Bonapartes had reigned at Treviso. The Emperor Francis, after having ordered these researches, brought the result to his daughter and son-in-law with great joy. He latter laughed heartily, though he made use of the discovery on certain occasions; Maria Louisa added this toy to her incomparable greatness, and the courtiers were able to say that his family was destined from the beginning to ignore over men.

The Empress of Austria, treated by Napoleon with the most delicate respect, flattered by his deception, jealous occasionally of the magnificence of her step-daughter, but compensated by thousand daily gifts, became much softened at the time, though destined to revert to her sternness on her return to Vienna. Napoleon, who would not have allowed precedence to any monarch in the world, yielded on this occasion

to his father-in-law with a perfectly filial deference, and always offered his arm to the Empress with the most devoted courtesy. So that the Emperor Francis was charmed with the part she was acting at Dresden, as if the house of Austria had recovered by these proceedings something that she had lost.

On the first day a sumptuous banquet was given by the King of Saxony, but on the following days it was Napoleon, whose establishment had been sent forward to Dresden, who entertained the numerous sovereigns who had come to meet him, not excepting the King of Saxony, who in his own capital seemed to be the guest rather than the host. An immense crowd was collected at Dresden, though Napoleon had decreed, to be sent to Posen, every one of a purely military character,—even his brother-in-law Murat, and his brother Jerome, who had been sent to their respective head-quarters. Notwithstanding this precaution, the concourse of princes and their principal officers and ministers was extraordinary. Whenever Napoleon went out on horseback or in a carriage, the crowd pressed round to see him, and it was necessary that the Saxon grenadiers, who were at this time his only guards, should attend to prevent accidents. In the interior of the Imperial apartments the eagerness was scarcely less tumultuous. Men rushed before him as soon as he appeared; they stumbled upon each other in order to gain the slightest notice or a single word; then, perceiving that in their impatience they had elbowed a superior, a prime minister, perhaps a king, they drew back respectfully, begged pardon, and immediately renewed their pursuit of the great object of attraction. The most distinguished political personages were not the last to trace his steps, for to the desire of being openly honoured by his intercourse was added the anxious desire to divine some of his intentions by the turn of his discourse; and yet, when the tumult ceased, and they felt themselves secure from eaves-droppers and babblers, they did not fail to ask themselves if this dazzling scene did not lead to a tragical termination, and whether the vast distance, and the bitter cold to which the conqueror was about

to expose himself, afforded no probability of exonerating them from a yoke which they hated in secret though they wore it in public with pride. But, after silently indulging these hopes, they were soon brought back to fear and submission by the remembrance of his uninterrupted good fortune, and therefore, especially in public, they assured nothing but victory; they proclaimed Napoleon invincible, and the Czar insane; and though they could not say these things to Napoleon, who, though always courteous, was difficult of access, they said them to M. de Bassano, who had recently arrived at Dresden, and whose vanity inhaled with delight the incense which the pride of Napoleon found insipid. But these pompous exhibitions were only a veil thrown over an incessant activity, military and political. The multitude of courtiers who followed Napoleon brought him innumerable affairs, which he transacted at night when he had been unable to do so during the day.

With the King of Prussia in particular, who, though invited to this rendezvous, had not yet arrived, he had serious and delicate questions to treat. The outcry of the German people against the passage of the troops had become general and violent. Napoleon had reckoned, for the nourishment of his armies during their march, upon the provisions which Prussia had engaged to furnish at a fixed price. But, being unwilling to make known the direction of his movements, he had not given any intimation of the route of his troops, which had consequently been obliged to consume the subsistence of the people through whose country they passed. The soldiers of Marshal Davout, always well provided in advance, and those of Marshal Oudinot, who had just left the orders of Davout, had caused less evil because they had experienced fewer wants. But, on the contrary, those of Marshal Ney and Prince Eugene, who had come from a great distance and had been exposed to much hardship, and whose ranks included a great many Germans, had behaved very ill. The Wurtembergians in Marshal Ney's corps, the Bavarians in that of Prince Eugene, had occasioned much distress in their march, little concerned at incurring detestation, which was directed against the French still more than against themselves. A still more serious circumstance had occurred. Napoleon, though he had upon the Oder Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and upon the Elbe Magdeburg and Hamburg, wished also to have obtained admission to Spandau, particularly on account of Berlin, which was very near to that fortress. He also wanted Pillau, which was the key of the Frische-Haff, a fine inland sea, by means of which he might go by water from Dantzic to Königsberg without meeting the English. These places had scarcely been mentioned in the treaty of alliance, but it had been said that Prussia would maintain there only veterans, and that France might there deposit her *matériel* of war. These insidious stipulations had been employed to get possession of Spandau and Pillau. Along with the *matériel* had been introduced French artillerymen to guard it, and soon after some infantry-battalions. This had caused lively emotion at Berlin; and all the address of M. de Narbonne, who had occupied himself with these matters before starting for Wilna, had failed to calm the King of Prussia and M. de Hardenberg, who had reverted to

their wonted fears. The king had wished to see Napoleon at any price; but, ever since his misfortunes, that prince had been always inclined to melancholy, had disliked display, and thought that in every countenance he read the expression of an offensive pity; he scarcely felt at ease even at home, and still less so abroad, and, consequently, he wished to receive Napoleon at Potsdam, rather than to carry his complaints and grievances and urgent difficulties to the conqueror amid all the pomp of Dresden. Nevertheless, anxious to obtain a personal interview, no matter where, in order to make himself sure of his intentions, and to make Napoleon hear the cry of his people, he had made up his mind to go to Dresden if absolutely necessary, and he had sent M. de Hatzfeld to Napoleon to give explanations upon the subject. M. de Hatzfeld was that powerful Prussian nobleman whom Napoleon had almost caused to be shot in 1806, and whom he had afterwards received into peculiar favour, (a proof, independently of still higher considerations, that we ought not to be in a hurry to shoot people:) he now came to lay before Napoleon the perplexities of his sovereign.

Napoleon received him graciously, and gave him all the encouragement that he could; but, not desiring to hear the complaints of the Prussians too closely, nor to lose his time by making a long detour, and wishing above all things to complete the great spectacle which he was exhibiting at Dresden by the presence of the King of Prussia, he sent him word that Potsdam was not in his route, that he could not possibly pass that way, and that he was very anxious to meet him at Dresden. This desire amounted to a command, which was immediately transmitted to Frederick William.

M. de Bassano, on arriving at Dresden, had brought news of a no less serious character: first, the reply of England to the last pacific message of France; secondly, an account of a very singular and unforeseen step of Prince Kourakin. The English ministry had received with less than the usual haughtiness this new proposal for peace, as though wearied by the struggle but rendered incredulous by experience. They would have been satisfied with the surrender of Sicily to the house of Bourbon, and of Portugal to the house of Braganza, notwithstanding all the other changes effected in Europe, if to these concessions had been added the restoration of the crown of Spain to Ferdinand VII.; not that the British government cared much for the prisoners at Valençay, but because the London public, who had taken up the cause of the Spaniards, would not abandon them. This was therefore a step of approximation between the two powers; but, besides the unchanged and insurmountable obstacle of the crown of Spain, the English cabinet had not placed confidence in the sincerity of the proposal, though they received it with more politeness than usual.

This reply of England to our overtures was, in reality, of no greater importance than the overtures themselves; but the last step of Prince Kourakin greatly affected Napoleon. Constantly occupied with the effort to defer hostilities till June, to allow time for the growth of pasture and for the repose of the troops for twenty days on the Vistula, he had never lost the apprehension that, notwithstanding all his precautions,

the Russians might suddenly take the initiative: and the act of Prince Kourakin was calculated to confirm these fears. That prince, ostentatious and easy, and much inclined to peace, which he had laboured incessantly to preserve, had demanded his passport on the eve of M. de Bassano's departure. His motives, at the time rather difficult to divine, were as follows. In the first place, they had refused to surrender to him the servant of the embassy compromised in the affair of the clerk of the war-office: the clerk himself had been tried, condemned, and shot; the domestic was detained; and secondly, they had not deigned to discuss the propositions brought by M. de Serdobin, because they were unwilling to come to an explanation, and because the retrograde movement, at least as far as the Oder, gave great displeasure. Prince Kourakin, susceptible though conciliatory, regarding the refusal and the silence as a personal affront, and believing that in the present state of affairs he would be exposed at Paris to treatment more and more humiliating, had demanded his passports without the order of his own government. M. de Bassano had laboured to show all the serious inconvenience of such a step, had explained the refusal to give up the servant on the ground of the peculiar nature of the offence with which he was charged, and the refusal to negotiate on the principles proposed by M. de Serdobin, by the inadmissibility of a retrograde movement, and had by these means induced him to withdraw or to suspend the demand for his passports. But there remained the fact of this unexplicable demand, and Napoleon was so bent upon his plan that the slightest doubts of its execution filled him with uneasiness. His troops were resting on the Vistula since the beginning of May. He persisted in his plan of leaving them there till the approach of June, of then spending a fortnight in bringing them upon the Niemen, and thus commencing war in the middle of June. Fearing that Alexander would not be sufficiently held in when he no longer had M. de Lauriston at his side, and not reckoning much on the influence of M. de Narbonne, he devised, in addition to all his previous steps, a new method of guarding against the danger he so much apprehended. M. de Lauriston had remained at St. Petersburg, and M. de Kourakin at Paris, since the departure of the two Emperors from their respective capitals. - M. de Lauriston, though always treated with respect, saw nobody, but occasionally met M. de Soltikoff, who was intrusted with the superintendence of foreign affairs during the absence of the chancellor; but their interviews were always destitute of any confidential communications. On the 20th of May, Napoleon forwarded to him an order to ask leave to repair immediately to Wilna, to the presence of the Czar, on business of importance, which he could communicate to no one but the Czar or his chancellor; then to go to Wilna to see Alexander and M. de Romanzoff, to inform them of M. de Kourakin's demand of his passports, to declaim loudly against so hostile a movement, and, with equal vehemence, against the conditions required by M. de Serdobin, which, before all negotiations, required the immediate evacuation of Old Prussia, (a supposition much exaggerated, for the evacuation was to follow, and not to precede, the negotiations;) to declare that at no period,



not even after Austerlitz or Friedland, had Napoleon imposed on the conquered Czar so humiliating a condition; and to learn whether the Czar had finally resolved upon war, and determined to render it inevitable and terrible, by insulting the honour of an adversary who did not include weakness among his faults nor humility among his virtues. If M. de Lauriston should not obtain access to the Emperor Alexander, which would imply a degree of rigour, (for an ambassador has always a right to address the sovereign to whom he is accredited,) he was to demand his passports. But, as the transmission of these new communications to Wilna must occasion the transmission of replies to St. Petersburg, considerable time would be occupied; and, as the object was merely to gain fifteen or twenty days, there was some hope that it might be secured. Should M. de Lauriston obtain permission to go to Wilna, he was ordered to observe every thing with his well-practised military eye, and to forward daily well-selected couriers to the French headquarters; for, added Napoleon, in the moment of threatening hostilities, when all communications are more difficult than in open war, an intelligent courier, who has just passed through the advanced posts, is the best of all informers.

Other affairs, also, attracted the attention of Napoleon in the midst of the fêtes of Dresden. Sweden and Turkey afforded him some occupation. From Stockholm had been received communications, professedly from the prince-royal: they were calculated to give the impression that he might be regained, and Napoleon, who had no idea of the extent to which the heart of Bernadotte was imbued with hatred to himself, and the ambition of the Swedes diverted from Finland to Norway, and who was also ignorant of the secret treaty of the 5th of April, almost indulged the hope of a diversion on the Russian flank effected by 30,000 or 40,000 Swedes. He therefore impatiently looked for M. Signeul, whose arrival had been frequently announced.

The news from Turkey seemed to promise another equally-important diversion. Information had been brought of the events which had occasioned the mission of Admiral Tchitchakoff to the Lower Danube, by the refusal of the Turks to treat, and the resumption of hostilities against the Russians. Moreover, the Turks, thinking themselves deceived by everybody, and wishing to deceive everybody in turn, had not said that, while refusing Moldavia and Wallachia, they were nevertheless ready to sacrifice Bessarabia for the sake of peace, and, in order to engage the French to enter immediately on a campaign, they promised their alliance, which they were well determined never to grant. Napoleon, who on leaving Paris had named General Andreossy, a well-informed and influential man, as his ambassador at Constantinople, sent him urgent instructions to conclude a definite alliance with the Turks, with the assurance that hostilities would have begun before the arrival of these news. He flattered himself that, while he led the Prussians and Austrians with himself against the Russians, he should be able to fall upon their flanks by the Swedes on one side and the Turks on the other.

It remained, before plunging into the Northern regions, to settle the important affair of Poland, which seemed to be involved in the present war.

If there ever was a suitable opportunity for reversing the odious and impolitic act of the division of Poland, which Frederick the Great had the boldness to conceive, Maria Theresa the weakness to allow, and Catherine the address to propose, it certainly was when the greatest of modern warriors—having no further terms to keep with the division of Poland, having torn from Prussia the part which she had formerly borrowed, and being able to pay Austria for that which still belonged to her—was marching against Russia at the head of 600,000 men. One such battle as he had gained in the plains of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland seemed at the moment to suffice. Everybody was expecting to see the reconstitution of Poland, and thought that was the principal motive that led Napoleon to resume arms. They were deceived, as this narrative must have shown; but, urged to this new war by the force of his destiny and the determination of his will, what could he accomplish by crossing the Vistula and the Niemen if he did not attempt to restore Poland? To what purpose could he put those noble provinces which a fortunate war would place in his power, if not to the accomplishment of that noble result? Every thing seemed to indicate that he would conquer Lithuania and Volhynia; he might purchase Galicia: was it not natural to unite them to the grand duchy of Warsaw and constitute them a kingdom? Without admitting that the restoration of Poland was the great end to be pursued without intermission by the nations of Europe, Napoleon, involved in a new war with Russia, had recognised this project as the natural consequence of the approaching war. Unfortunately, his good sense, which, in his rash undertakings, haunted him as a spirit of remorse, left him little hope of the success of this work of reparation. In his first campaign of 1807, he had met with enthusiasm at Posen, at Cracow, and particularly at Warsaw, and in some other large towns, the ordinary focus of national sentiments; but nowhere had he met that universal and irresistible ardour which might render practicable a national reconstitution. And there was no perceptible change in 1812. The higher nobility were divided, the lower were ruined, the people were painfully struggling against want, and no one was sufficiently sanguine of success to devote all his energies to the new enterprise. To this may be added the effect of the continental blockade, which was particularly felt in Poland, and consequently had very little united the interests of that country with those of France, and had wholly alienated the Jews, whose extensive commercial resources would have been of great avail in war. The fervour of Polish sentiments was to be seen almost exclusively in the army, one part of which had fought by our side in Italy, Germany, and Spain, and another, formed under Prince Poniatowski but in our school, had rendered itself illustrious in 1809 in the defence of the grand duchy. Each of these branches were, indeed, animated by a noble ardour. The corps intrusted to Prince Poniatowski numbered about 36,000 men. Of these about 9000 or 10,000 were in one division, which served in Marshal Davout's corps under General Grandjean, and a nearly equal number in another division serving in Marshal Victor's reserve under General Girard. Finally, there

were coming from Spain, under the name of the legion of the Vistula, three excellent regiments, which Napoleon proposed to place in his guard. The total, including several dépôts at Dantzic, Modlin, and Warsaw, and several regiments of Polish lancers, amounted to about 70,000 men, worthy companions of the French, with whom they were united in the bonds of mutual affection, while their hatred to Russia amounted to fury. True Poland was to be found in this company of men, and also in the great and patriotic city of Warsaw, and two or three other cities of the grand duchy, whose enthusiasm it would be easy to revive. But Napoleon little hoped to rouse the whole nation by a general, sudden, and electric movement fruitful in striking results, when he recalled the year 1807, when, notwithstanding the novelty and fascination of ill-defined hopes, the result was so limited. As he did not expect to obtain from the Poles all that he could wish, he was unwilling to promise all they might demand, and, for example, was willing to engage to exact from Russia their re-establishment as a nation only on the condition of their aiding in the entire subjugation of that empire. That on which he chiefly depended was the possibility of developing the Polish army, of raising it perhaps to 150,000 or 200,000 men, and thus restoring the nation by means of the army. This was, in fact, practicable, for the valiant race of Poles might furnish excellent officers among the inferior nobility, and excellent soldiers, in considerable numbers, among the people, on the condition, however, of bearing the expense of this organization, for Poland herself was ruined. For this end it was necessary to expend fifty or one hundred millions, to combine all the Poles into one body, instead of diffusing them through the French army, and to employ a whole campaign in draughting into it 120,000 recruits, levied between the Vistula and the Niemen. But it was not very likely that Napoleon should come so far merely to instruct the Poles at so great a cost to himself. As he possessed no credit, and could procure financial supplies only by command, while he had to support immense armies, he had become almost miserly. We have seen him refuse to his brother Joseph sums which would have greatly facilitated the pacification of Spain, bitterly quarrel with Murat, Jerome, and Louis, for sums of very disproportionate importance; and he may be said to have been as lavish of the blood of his people as he was sparing of their money, well aware that they were nearly as much attached to the one as to the other. It was therefore very doubtful whether, for the reconstitution of Poland, he would make the principal effort, that of spending money,—an effort which would have been the most efficacious; for, when an army is made, the nation itself may almost be considered made also.

Napoleon, without expecting much from Poland, flattered himself that at the report of so vast an expedition undertaken principally on her account, as it appeared, he could excite a patriotic enthusiasm from which he might obtain at least men and money. He was therefore resolved to neglect nothing with this view, excepting only engaging irrevocably in a war of destruction with Russia, unless Poland should accomplish wonders; for, even when plunging into

this war, his good sense, unhappily too slowly and too doubtfully, hinted that he must avoid rendering it implacable. He was pleased to think that a brilliant stroke like that of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland might place the Emperor Alexander at his feet and instantly procure him peace on the continent and at sea. He did not fear the liberty of the Poles, for liberty occasioned him little alarm since he had so completely stifled it in France. But the pledge to sign nothing but a triumphant peace, which would have been necessary to secure from Russia and Austria the restoration of Poland, he would give to none, because fortune had not given it to him. In these somewhat uncertain sentiments, which might unfortunately excite corresponding sentiments among the Poles, he resolved to make choice of a man of influence to send as ambassador to Warsaw, which might be regarded as a tolerably-plain intimation that he recognised in Warsaw a new state, no longer merely annexed to Saxony, but self-existent, and possible to become ultimately a kingdom of Poland. This person should take the guidance of the Poles, should urge them to combine, to rise *en masse*, to form a general diet, to double and triple the army of Prince Poniatowski, to send agitators into all the provinces most early detached from Poland, as Lithuania and Volhynia, delaying such measures in Galicia, on account of Austria, whose alliance must be studied. This ambassador, charged with the reconstitution of ancient Poland, must be a considerable personage, as well suited to inspire prudence as boldness, capable of assuming a commanding position, and whose name alone should prove the importance of the enterprise with which he was intrusted. For this difficult mission Napoleon had thought of Prince Talleyrand; and, though that sneering and reckless individual was deficient in zeal for such a part, the choice was excellent, for, besides having been every thing in the course of his life, not excepting a revolutionist, and being quite able to go through the same vicissitudes again, he possessed the art of flattering the passions, and a dexterity in managing them, as well as a personal greatness, which might have rendered him the true restorer of Poland, if he could be restored. To all these qualities was added another not to be despised,—that of being the confidant and favourite of the court of Vienna, even to the brink of treachery, and therefore he would occasion less anxiety than any other by being engaged in the accomplishment of a task delicate in its own nature, but especially so in reference to that court. But it was on this very side that the project failed: for, with a kind of impatience little worthy of him, he was guilty of indiscretions on this subject in regard to Vienna, whether from a desire to raise his own estimate or to render himself more agreeable, which greatly displeased Napoleon, awoke in him new suspicions, and deprived him of this valuable instrument. He therefore relinquished M. de Talleyrand, and, on his arrival at Dresden, looking round for some one to send to Warsaw, fixed his choice upon an archbishop,—for a priest was very well suited to Catholic Poland. This was M. de Pradt, Archbishop of Malines. It would have been difficult to fix upon a man with more intelligence and less tact. Without consistency, without tact, without the

of guiding himself in the midst of parties, without any of the skill in administration with which it was necessary to aid the Poles, capable only of sparkling sallies, and, moreover, rather timid, he could only add to the confusion of a patriotic rising the confusion of his own mind. At Napoleon, much confirmed in his choice of men to employ in a free country, and finding M. de Pradt, whom he had brought with him as an emissary, ready to his hand, suddenly called for that prelate, briefly and imperiously explained to him his mission, the course he was to pursue, the end at which he was to aim, and added, with perfect sincerity, that he was about to diminish the greatness, the ambition, and the pride of the Russian colossus without attempting his destruction. To the accomplishment of these intentions the restoration of Poland was manifestly one step, but on the condition that Poland should assist in her own restoration and furnish him with the means of conquering Prussia so completely as to insure her consent to such an undertaking. By what means he would succeed in overcoming a power which could take refuge in immensity of space, and which could suffer no great loss by relinquishing territory, because it would be territory without culture and without inhabitants, he could not say, nor was he quite decided on the steps to be taken. Perhaps he would strike a crushing blow and terminate the war in a few months, but this could be only possible if the enemy should come into sufficiently close contact to admit of his dealing a vital blow. If no such favourable chance presented itself, he would fix himself on the limits of Old Poland, which he would organize, and demand from her 200,000 men, to whom he would add 100,000 of his own, and leave them the care of exhausting the constancy and the means of Russia. In all these cases, and especially in the last, it was necessary that Poland should evince great energy, that he should not spare her blood, or France could not restore her life simply by the sacrifice of men. And along with much energy was required much prudence in regard to Austria, the proprietor of Galicia, which she was very little disposed to relinquish, and therefore, without moderation as well as boldness, the enterprise would fail at the first step. But above all was necessary an entire devotion on the part of Poland, for his efforts on her behalf should always be proportioned to her own. "Depart, therefore, my lord archbishop," said Napoleon,—"depart instantly, lavish your money, stimulate the minds of men, and set Poland in motion without embroiling me with Austria, and you shall have well understood and well fulfilled your mission." On saying this, he took leave of the archbishop, without allowing him time to start objections, which he little thought of presenting, though he afterwards professed to have perceived them. The archbishop set off, at once alarmed and dazzled with his task, for he was ambitious of becoming in his time one of those great politicians of which the clergy has furnished such striking instances, but he had neither patience nor courage for the part he had undertaken, and regarded it with dislike and fear from the beginning. He was richly appointed, and despatched immediately for Warsaw. His nomination had been so hasty that he had at his command none of those things

which are necessary to give *éclat* to a mission: he borrowed money, servants, and secretaries, and then set off for his destination.

The order he had received to study Austria while endeavouring to excite the Poles was very requisite at the moment. Austria, in fact, who was actually in our power, since her Emperor and prime ministers were at Dresden, showed little zeal in the restoration of Poland. She, nevertheless, had a great interest in the matter, and the thing for the first and perhaps last time was possible; Prussia and Russia had both suffered loss in that direction, and were still to suffer more than herself in territory, and Illyria would be a good price for Galicia. But at that time, when oppressed by Napoleon, it was natural that Austria should be little concerned in creating barriers against Russia, nor was she very confident of the promised compensation. In fact, Napoleon, who held out the hope of Illyria, might very possibly deprive her of Galicia, and then merely grant her some tracts in Illyria, which would be far from an adequate recompense. She had been so badly treated in the arrangements of the time, especially those of which Napoleon was the author, that she was little disposed to treat with him again on questions of territory. On this subject, therefore, her language was cold, evasive, and dilatory, and Napoleon, knowing that she would soon be on his rear and flank, studied her, and looked for every thing from victory, a divinity to whom he had ever directed his aspirations.

To these various affairs he had already devoted a fortnight, and was preparing to leave, when the King of Prussia, after a hasty preparation, appeared at Dresden to complete the assemblage of crowned heads. He arrived on the 26th of May, and was received with the respect due to his character, respectable though thwarted by a stern necessity, and his rank still elevated among sovereigns, notwithstanding the calamities of Prussia.

Napoleon spoke to him with sincerity of his plans, which in no way involved the destruction of the kingdom of Prussia, whatever might be said at Berlin and throughout Germany, but which would promptly ensue if he saw the least cause of suspicion in a power whose territory he must use as the base of his operations. He then succeeded in giving confidence to Frederick William and his chancellor, M. de Hardenberg, and in persuading them that the occupation of Spandau and Pillau was not the result of an after-thought, but of a very natural prudence considering the distance to which he ventured from his capital, and the hostile spirit of the people through whom he passed; he apologized for the injury done to the king's subjects on the ground of necessity, and consented to set down to the account with Prussia all the supplies taken from the inhabitants by the soldiers in their march; and he promised to the king and his minister a territorial compensation if the war should terminate in his favour. Yet, notwithstanding the simplicity of his language, which was marked by frankness no less than by hauteur, he did not convey to the king or his minister that entire security which was requisite to insure their sincere alliance, and which was scarcely possible to be conveyed by a sovereign so prompt and so variable in his designs, who, since his appearance on the stage of the world,

had annually impressed some new aspect on the continent of Europe. However, King Frederick William, who had at first resolved to retire into Silesia rather than remain at Potsdam under the guns of Spandau or at Berlin under the authority of a French governor, consented not to quit his royal residence, in order to exhibit a degree of confidence in his ally which should act favourably on the mind of the people. The king presented his son to Napoleon, and offered him as one of his aides-de-camp, and appeared less melancholy than usual, though, in this assembly of princes, the object of less general attention than he deserved, or than was even accorded to him by Napoleon himself. Little generosity is commonly exhibited towards misfortune either by kings or people, who love only strength, glory, and distinction. Agonizing misfortune affects them as a theatrical exhibition; misfortune characterized by melancholy and reserve meets nothing but coldness, neglect, and repugnance. It was the case in this instance; and such of the princes as had sold themselves to Napoleon for territory took it ill that, in order to save the remains of his crown, Frederick William should have espoused the alliance of France. Yet they observed decorum, for they were under the eye of a master who would have allowed no impropriety in his presence. They were content to neglect misfortune, and to sacrifice to fortune, in the midst of an unheard-of tumult of visits, of fêtes, and of compliments, in which, to complete the singular scene, were not wanting secret prayers against the object of so much devotion, nor secret whisperings about the danger which he was about to incur.

The month of May was drawing to a close, the season for military operations was about to commence, and it was time to put an end to this exhibition, which could be no longer carried on with advantage, every political effect which it was reasonable to expect having been produced. Besides, M. de Narbonne had just arrived from Wilna, after having fulfilled his mission with the Emperor Alexander. He brought back the conviction that war was inevitable, unless at the price of renouncing the commercial restrictions, and promising to evacuate the Prussian States without delay. He affirmed that Alexander, though melancholy, was resolute, and would maintain the struggle with obstinacy, would withdraw, if necessary, into the interior of his empire, rather than conclude the peace of a slave, as had all the monarchs of Europe; that it was, therefore, necessary to anticipate a serious war, probably one of long continuance, certainly one of a very sanguinary character. He affirmed, moreover, that the Emperor Alexander would not take the initiative in hostilities. Though Napoleon perceived the greatness of the difficulty in proportion as it drew near, there was nothing in the report of M. de Narbonne that could shake his purpose. He was at the moment full of hope in respect to the Porte and Sweden: he was leaving Dresden well pleased with the submission of the German princes, particularly of the two principal, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia. Deceived, notwithstanding his sagacity, by the apparent deference of all these sovereigns, great and small, by their protestations of devotion, and by the gathering of nations whom an ardent curiosity

had attracted to his path, he thought that every king would remain submissive to him on the continent, and that the combined forces of Europe would concur in his designs. The only thing that astonished him, but without producing any embarrassment, was the resolution of Alexander, whom he had not expected to find so firm and constant as he was described: but he hoped soon to dissipate it by a decisive blow inflicted on the Russian army. And the only part of M. de Narbonne's communication that particularly interested him was the repeated declaration of Alexander that he would not be the aggressor, and that he would allow his frontiers to be violated before he would himself act. This declaration gave Napoleon entire security as to the peaceable completion of his preparatory movements, and he regarded himself henceforward as sure of having sufficient time to move from the Vistula to the Niemen. But he judged that it was now time to leave: for it would occupy from the 1st to the 15th of June to bring his army from the Vistula to the Niemen, especially as he wished to march without haste. He therefore determined to quit Dresden on the 29th of May, to repair to the Niemen through Posen, Thorn, Dantzic, and Königsberg. After having loaded his father-in-law with truly filial affection, and his mother-in-law with delicate assiduities and magnificent presents, frequently reducing the well-known malevolence of that princess to the exhibition of a ridiculous inconsistency,—after having expressed the deepest respect for the King of Prussia, the most cordial friendship for his host, the King of Saxony, and a dignified but gracious politeness to his royal visitors,—he embraced the Empress with emotion, and left her more distressed than could have been expected in a wife selected from policy, but one who had been soon captivated by the person and the power of her illustrious consort, as well as by his extreme kindness to herself. It was agreed that she should go to Prague, to the bosom of her family, where, amid fêtes and compliments and the souvenirs of her childhood, she might forget this her first separation, which she seemed incapable of enduring for any considerable time.

After these adieus, Napoleon, leaving the ceremonies of the court to the Empress, and taking with himself a purely military escort, including MM. de Caulaincourt, Berthier, and Durbé, leaving MM. de Bassano and Daru at Dresden to wind up affairs, left for Posen on the 29th of May, spreading abroad the report that he was going to Warsaw, though resolved to do nothing of the kind. He wished, indeed, to form no personal engagements with the Poles before discovering what he could obtain from them; but he wished to leave them indefinite hopes, and, at the same time, to persuade the enemy that his first efforts would lead him to Volhynia, while his real designs led him in an opposite direction.

On reaching successively Glogau and Posen, he everywhere found the trace of the suffering of the population occasioned by his troops. Disregarding those of the Prussians, he exhibited more interest in those of the Poles, whose zeal he wished to excite rather than their hatred. At Thorn he was himself disgusted by the excesses of the Wurtembergians, the Bavarians, and the Germans in general, who, naturally

less considerate than the French, and laying the blame of the present war upon the Poles, had pillaged and laid waste without pity the whole duchy of Posen. Napoleon severely reproached Marshal Ney, who had the Wurtembergians in his corps, and Prince Eugene, who had the Bavarians, and the hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg, who commanded his own troops, and exclaimed that they would draw upon him a *Portuguese war* if they thus devastated the country through which they passed. What then would be their case when they should find themselves in a country already ravaged by the enemy?

Though there may have been something to blame in the conduct of these commanders, they had some excuse in the length of the march, and in the time allowed for its execution, which, though long, was scarcely sufficient. Prince Eugene, coming from Verona with the French and Italians, and from Augsburg with the Bavarians, and Marshal Ney, coming from Mentz with the greater part of his troops, had experienced great difficulty in supplying the wants of their soldiers, and succeeded in doing so only by living at the expense of the countries through which they passed. Their difficulty had been greatly increased by the numerous artillery which Napoleon had provided for them, and especially by the enormous amount of wagons employed in carrying provisions. The species of carriage chosen to replace the old infantry-wagon was considered too heavy for the miry plains of Lithuania, and the light carriages *à la comtoise* were preferred. The former, therefore, were relinquished for the latter, as far as possible. Marshal Davout had already taken upon himself to cause the construction of a large quantity of carriages *à la comtoise*, and he made up the deficiency by using the wagons of the country, for which he paid. They had also met with various other miscalculations. The oxen which they had prepared to substitute for horses seemed in practice not to afford all the advantages that had been anticipated: they were difficult to shoe and to guide, and they contracted serious diseases from their accumulation, and thus when employed for food became very unwholesome. Finally, the train-battalions—a special troop charged with a dangerous and disagreeable service in the countries they required to cross—were filled with half-formed recruits, who had none of the qualities of their department. Already, therefore, many mistakes had been discovered either in the value or the extent of the means devised by Napoleon to overcome the great obstacle of distance. A multitude of carriages, some from Italy and some from the banks of the Rhine, obstructed the routes of Germany, broke them into deep ruts, and covered them with the bodies of horses worn out by a service too laborious for their age, whose places were supplied by the horses of the peasantry, for which payment was made in Prussian bills. But it was hoped that a halt of some days on the banks of the Niemen would allow the long line of carriages to make up to the main body, and to enter upon their appointed service of following the army with provisions. Fortunately, the navigation of the Frische-Haff, organized by Marshal Davout, would suffice for the transport of the general magazines of the army as

far as the Niemen, for no living power could have conveyed them by land.

The city of Thorn—where Napoleon arrived on the 2d of June, after having employed four days in visiting Glogau, Posen, and the intermediate places—was the scene of unprecedented confusion. The most elegant youth of the time, belonging both to the old and new *noblesse*, were anxious to make this campaign, the dangers of which were recognised only by men of the greatest discernment, but which, conducted under the eyes of the Emperor, and with his immense resources, promised to thoughtless minds the most brilliant success and the most dazzling rewards. According to these bewildered youths, they were marching to certain triumph, to conquer the capitals of the North and even of the East,—St. Petersburg, Moscow, and who could say what else? For these wonderful journeys they had provided themselves with rich equipages, and the number of the travellers was great. In fact, besides the Emperor's staff, and that of the Generalissimo Berthier, that of King Murat, of Prince Eugene, of King Jerome, of Marshals Davout, Ney, Oudinot, &c., there were the aides-de-camp of aides-de-camp, for the Emperor's officers had also officers at their command. The headquarters, being intended to centralize a variety of departments under the hand of Napoleon, included several thousand men, several thousand horses, and a prodigious quantity of carriages. The confusion was increased by the variety of languages and nations; for, while the inhabitants spoke only Polish, they were addressed in French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. Thus had been carried to a frightful excess that pompously-monarchical military system which had grown up about Napoleon at the very moment when there was special need of light equipment. Napoleon was deafened and irritated by the tumult at Thorn, and alarmed at the embarrassment threatened by the taste and luxury of some and the anticipations of others. He gave the most rigorous orders to lighten as much as possible the burden which they seemed to increase at pleasure. He made various regulations on the number of carriages allowed to each, according to his grade, whether king, prince, or marshal; he divided his headquarters into great and small,—one, the heavier, which was to follow at a distance the changing theatre of military operations, the other, lighter, composed of certain indispensable officers and articles which were always to accompany himself and to keep in the neighbourhood of the enemy. He limited the staffs of the kings and princes under his orders, and sent back a number of diplomatists whom the allied monarchs had chosen from the most able of their profession and sent after the grand army to obtain information through their means on the most trivial circumstances. Napoleon took care to get rid of these witnesses, as inconvenient by their curiosity as by their apparatus, and forbade them to approach within twenty leagues of the headquarters.

After these acts of severity, very reasonable in themselves, though in a short time very useless in respect to the staffs, he occupied himself in reducing within the strictest limits the transports of the army. Unwilling to bring with him

any thing but the provisions indispensable to men and horses, he determined to send out to grass all the draught-horses, employed all the wagons in carrying bread or corn, granted a definite number of carriages to each corps, and a certain amount of cattle to be slaughtered each night. In this manner he hoped that the men would not scatter themselves in the evening in search of provisions, and that every one would abide by his flag. He fixed on the 6th of June for the general movement from the Vistula to the Niemen. King Jerome, forming the right, was to advance, by Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Goniondz, upon Grodno, with the Saxons under Reynier, the Poles under Poniatowski, and the Westphalians under his own immediate orders. Reynier alone, separating a little from this direction by a movement to the right, was to ascend the Bug to join with the Austrians. The viceroy Eugene, forming the centre with the Bavarians under St. Cyr and the army of Italy under his own immediate orders, was to leave Soldau on the 6th, whither he had gone on quitting Plock, to pass by Ortelzburg, Rastenburg, Oleskow, and come out upon the Niemen in the neighbourhood of Prenn, thus crossing the poorest provinces of Poland. Marshals Oudinot, Ney, and Davout, and the Guard, which constituted the left of the army and its most important mass, were to ascend the roads of Old Prussia, to advance in a parallel line, but by different routes, so as not to impede each other, and to line the Niemen from Tilsit to Kowno.—Ney passing by Osterode, Schippenbeil, and Gerlaun, Oudinot by Marienwerder, Liebstadt, Eylau, and Vehlau, Davout by Elbing, Braunsberg, and Tapiau. The Guard and the artillery were to keep in the rear, and at a certain distance, to prevent encumbrance. Napoleon, with his usual depth of combination, had calculated that Marshal Davout, being the most to the left of all the corps, would, in consequence of the bend made by the Vistula towards the north in leaving from Bromberg, be the nearest to Königsberg, and in a condition to meet the enemy with 90,000 men, if, contrary to all probability, the Russians should take the initiative. He reckoned that about the 15th or 16th of June all his corps would be in line along the Niemen, and that after three or four days' rest they would be able to commence operations about the 20th. After having given his last orders, and seen the departure of the beautiful troops of Marshal Ney, and inspected at Marienwerder the equally fine troops of Oudinot, he repaired to Dantzic by Marienburg, where, besides examining many objects, he had to entertain his lieutenants Davout and Murat, whom he had not met for two or three years.

At Marienburg, on the Vistula, Napoleon met Marshal Davout at the moment of his departure for Königsberg to take the head of the movement. His reception was not in conformity with the confidence which Napoleon had always placed in the great talents and solid character of the illustrious marshal. The causes of this coolness were as follows.

Marshal Davout had just exercised a very extensive command. Besides the care of blockading all the coasts of the North intrusted to his probity and severity, he had the office of organizing the army, and had discharged that duty with a talent for organization which, with the

exception of Napoleon, belonged to no one at that time except himself and Marshal Suchet. He had under his command as many as 300,000 men at once, and, by means of admirable order and constant application, he had made of them not indeed experienced soldiers capable of marching, of securing their own provision, and of fighting, but well-trained recruits, who could manœuvre with accuracy and were possessed of all the hardihood of youth. His own corps, properly so called, composed in a great part of the oldest soldiers in Europe, formed at the time of five divisions, and constituting, with the artillery and cavalry, an army of about 90,000 men, was a spectacle never surpassed in the world. Every thing had been anticipated, as regards equipment, armament, and provision, for an expedition to the very extremity of Europe. Besides the munitions of war and the means of encampment, the troops of the first corps carried food for ten days; and, as soldiers too often throw away their provisions, preferring to trust for their subsistence to chance rather than to carry it on their shoulders, every man was in the evening to give account of his provisions as well as of his arms. Independently of this ten days' supply in the soldier's knapsack, a further supply for fifteen days was carried by convoys, and, although part of the means of transport prepared for the first corps had been taken for the Imperial Guard, the foresight of the marshal had immediately supplied the deficiency. Finally, a herd of oxen which followed the regiments, under the care of soldiers trained to the service, supplied a moving magazine of animal food. Such was the organization given by Marshal Davout to his corps *d'armée*. He had also brought together the immense material of an army of 600,000 men, comprising 1800 guns provisioned for two campaigns, six pontoon-equipages, two parks of siege-artillery, a vast park of engineers' artillery, and the immense magazines of Dantzic, Elbing, and Braunsberg.

Marshal Davout had effected these unparalleled results by following the orders of Napoleon, modifying them by his own experience as occasion required, according to local circumstances, and without any doubt of giving satisfaction to his master. Marshal Davout had given himself no thought whether in thus acting he incurred displeasure or not, and whether his incessant and somewhat domineering activity exposed him to the calumnies of jealousy. Unhappily, he had a secret and dangerous enemy near Napoleon, in the person of the Generalissimo Berthier, who had remained inconsolable because in 1809 he had been accused of compromising the army, and to Marshal Davout had been ascribed the merit of saving it; he was also jealous of talents in that marshal somewhat analogous to his own, for, besides being a formidable general in action, he would have been an accomplished chief of the staff to Napoleon, had he been more refined. For these unworthy motives, Prince Berthier, whom age had rendered sour and suspicious, repeated to Napoleon the slightest deviation of Marshal Davout from the Imperial orders, and elicited a severe letter for any details at all at variance with the general plan conceived at a distance, which could scarcely fail to occur. By an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, the Poles, in quest of a king in the case of their approach

ing restoration, seeing the mediocre Bernadotte elected heir to the throne of Sweden, had thought of the Prince of Eckmühl, in whose probity, firmness, and talent for organization they observed qualities admirably adapted to create for them a military kingdom, and even in his stern severity a useful corrective of their own brave and brilliant but fickle character. After having entertained the idea, they had repeated it in the saloons of Warsaw, till it had reached the Tuileries; and Napoleon, offended at the attempt at royalty in Portugal, still more so at that in Sweden, considering that his lieutenants, brought up in his own school, were becoming too ambitious, and suspecting that another spontaneous cry of the people was about to elevate one of his lieutenants to royal dignity without his knowledge and independent of his support, had been extremely displeased by this disposition of the Poles, which he had laid to the charge of Marshal Davout, to whom it was unknown, and to whom, if known, it would have been a matter of indifference. That marshal, a gentleman by birth, had been somewhat astonished when made Prince of Eckmühl, and in that borrowed grandeur had possessed only a temporary revenue, which, under the wise economy of a prudent wife, would insure an adequate support to his children. Always residing in the plains of the North in the midst of his soldiers, so that in ten years he had not spent three months at Paris,—exclusively occupied with his profession, taciturn, severe to himself as well as to others,—he was of the small number of those associated in arms who had not been intoxicated with the unwonted favours of fortune. Napoleon, without sufficiently inquiring into the truth, meeting everywhere on the banks of the Vistula proofs of profound submission to Marshal Davout and of the power of his will, while his name was in every one's mouth, was not indeed jealous, (for of whom could he be jealous?) but annoyed by an importance which he had himself created, and gave a ready ear to those who, with Berthier, said that this marshal did every thing, ordered every thing, behaved in every way like a master until he could behave like a king, and ascribed his energy to ambition, his severe gravity to pride, his habitual taciturnity to a dangerous design. He received the marshal with coolness, and on many occasions yielded to the prejudices of Berthier. The marshal disregarded his conduct, being accustomed to the *brusqueries* of Napoleon, and ascribed their renewal to a degree of irritability which increased with age, with fatigue, and with care, and hastened to Königsberg to prepare every thing for the army, in order to surmount the difficulties of an enterprise which his good sense would have pronounced madness if his strong character had not been bent to absolute obedience. Yet his great favour was at an end. Thus, Lannes was dead, Massena wholly disgraced, Davout sinking into disregard. And thus Napoleon, fickle towards his lieutenants as Fortune was soon to be to himself, anticipating towards them the caprice of that uncertain divinity, strewed with death and disgrace the fatal road in which he was travelling to a frightful catastrophe.

Having reached Dantzic on the 7th of June, he met one of his lieutenants, Murat, less fortunate in having become a king than Davout was in having remained simply the commander of

an army. This prince, as we have often said, good but inconsistent, whose fidelity might be shaken by vanity, ambition, or bad counsel, always the most brilliant of cavaliers, the most rash of heroes, had inspired Napoleon with such suspicion by some maritime communications with the English, that General Grenier, as we have seen, had received orders to hold himself in readiness to march upon Naples. Napoleon, who feared in Murat no greater fault than levity, had summoned him to the army, first, that he might have at his disposal the best cavalry-officer in the world, and secondly, to have at hand a relative who when near him would be always submissive and devoted, but if at a distance would be the prey of every kind of suggestion. At the first intimation of this will, Murat had hastened to head-quarters to serve under the orders of his brother-in-law, and to resume his ordinary command,—that of the cavalry-reserve. To avoid the inconvenience of an interview, he had sent him on to the Vistula, instead of appointing him to meet at Dresden. Murat, fatigued and ill, had stopped at Berlin, where he was compensated for the rigours of his chief by the assiduities of the court of Prussia. Napoleon, seeing him at Dantzic pale and worn out, and without his customary mien, asked him sharply what ailed him, and if he were not content with being king. "Sire," replied Murat, "I am hardly a king." "I have not made you and your brothers kings," replied Napoleon, sternly, "to reign according to your own taste, but according to mine, to carry out my policy, and to continue Frenchmen though on foreign thrones." After these words, Napoleon, overcome by the simplicity of Murat, and stern only in word, restored to him that familiarity which, though varying with circumstances, was always gracious and captivating, which he was wont to exhibit to his lieutenants. At Dantzic he also met Governor Rapp, who had displeased him by the expression of some sincere opinions on the state of Poland, and by some suspected facilities granted to the commerce of Dantzic, but whom he excused in consideration of his great bravery and open and original mind. Here he spent several days with Berthier, Murat, Caulaincourt, Duroc, and Rapp, inspecting the fortifications of a place which was to play so important a part in the war, visiting the magazines and bridges of the Vistula, correcting and completing whatever had been done, with a *coup-d'œil* unequalled when cast upon things themselves, and then when driven in-doors by the extreme heat of the season and the locality, entertaining himself familiarly with his companions-in-arms, and expressing more than his actual conviction of the utility of the war, which they appeared to regard with deep-seated apprehension. From Dantzic he went to Elbing, from Elbing to Königsberg, where he arrived on the 12th of June, to occupy himself with the means of inland navigation, which were to bring his immense supplies from the dépôt of Dantzic to the very bosom of the Russian provinces.

Marshal Davout had already by his orders prepared this navigation, to which Napoleon gave the finishing-stroke. To understand its importance, it will suffice to observe the form of those countries. The Vistula, like all large rivers, becomes divided into two branches near its mouth, by the effect of alluvial accumula-

tions, and sends one arm towards Dantzic, the other towards Elbing. The latter falls into the immense lagune called the Frische-Haff, separated by a tongue of land from the Baltic, with an opening only at Pillau, and which receives the Pregel, near Königsberg. Vessels coming from Dantzic, by following the two arms of the Vistula, and then entering the Frische-Haff, might thus reach Königsberg. This was a very considerable extent of water-passage. From Königsberg they were to ascend the Pregel as far as Tapiau. From Tapiau to Labiau, the river Deime would afford passage to the smaller boats into another lagune, called the Curische-Haff, which extends as far as Memel. The Frederick's Canal afforded a shorter road to the Niemen, which it joined at Tilsit. They must then ascend as far as Kowno, and at Kowno enter the Wilia. That river, which is navigable as far as Wilna, enabled them to complete a water-transit of about two hundred leagues. To Colonel Baste—a naval officer of the Guard, already distinguished at Baylen and upon the Danube, equally intrepid on land and at sea, and endowed with an indefatigable activity—was assigned the direction of this navigation, which, beginning at Dantzic, and passing by the Vistula, the Frische-Haff, the Pregel, the Deime, the Curische-Haff, the Niemen, the Wilia, ended at Wilna. He was to collect boats, to adapt them to each stream, to avoid as far as possible all trans-shipment, to organize the means of traction, to supply the place of sails when at a distance from the sea, by means of relays either of horses or of the peasantry. To him also was intrusted the defence of the Frische-Haff and the Curische-Haff, and for this purpose were placed under his orders two naval battalions of the Imperial Guard, which were to occupy these vast lagunes with gun-sloops heavily armed.

Napoleon then devoted his attention to the fortresses of Dantzic, Pillau, and Königsberg. In all of these were Saxons, Poles, (who might be relied upon as certainly as the French,) Badians, (who were less to be trusted,) and artillery and marines exclusively French. At Dantzic were found the depôts of the Guard and of Marshal Davout. With the assistance of each of these, independently of the troops left in the works, might be furnished a movable division of 8000 men at Dantzic and one of 6000 at Königsberg, which, keeping up communication by means of cavalry, should be always in a condition to unite in case of an unexpected attack. Napoleon, having satisfied himself, by personal inspection, of the execution of his orders, immediately ordered the departure of the first convoy, containing 20,000 quintals of flour, 2000 quintals of rice, 500,000 rations of biscuit, and all the *material* of six pontoon-equipages, the composition of which we have explained elsewhere, under the supreme direction of the illustrious General Eblé. The second convoy was to carry the same quantity of flour, rice, and biscuit, besides oats and artillery-ammunition. The subsequent ones were to carry flour, in some few cases grain, and in many cases clothing, and one of the siege-equipages,—namely, that which was destined to the attack of Riga.

While these convoys were on the way to the Pregel and the Niemen, Napoleon gave his attention to the hospitals, in which he made preparation for 20,000 sick between Königsberg,

Braunsberg, and Elbing. After having employed in these various objects the first fortnight of June, he prepared to commence at length this formidable and celebrated campaign, which was to be preceded by certain diplomatic formalities, to which he devoted a short time before repairing to the banks of the Niemen.

He had been joined by the Duke of Bassano, who brought the news from Sweden which had been waited for in vain in Dresden. The very day after Napoleon had left that capital, M. Signeul had arrived there from Stockholm with a message from the prince-royal. That crafty prince had sent a double communication,—one official, by the accredited ministers of Sweden, and intended for all courts, the other strictly secret, and transmitted in great confidence to M. Signeul, in reply to the overtures suggested by the princess-royal. The official communication, in a cold and haughty tone, asserted the intention of remaining neutral among the belligerent powers, which was itself an infraction of the obligations contracted with France in the last treaty of peace. It asserted that the true enemies of Sweden were those who threatened the independence of the North of Europe; that in this point of view Russia was at the time the threatened party rather than the threatening, which was the reason for not declaring against her, though she had not afforded her aid; that she offered her mediation, which she undertook to be accepted by Russia if France sincerely desired peace. This pretence of the prince-royal to act as mediator between two such potentates as Napoleon and Alexander was simply ridiculous; but it was the necessary consequence of engagements formed with Russia by the treaty of the 5th of April. In the secret communication, Bernadotte, as faithless to his new ally as to his former country, repeated that the only point in question was the possession of Finland, which, being always coveted by Russia, would place Sweden in perpetual conflict with that power; that the natural compensation for Finland was Norway, a province destined by its situation to belong to Sweden, having little connection with Denmark, from which it was separated by the sea, while it formed with Sweden only one whole, so to speak, of which it was the half; that in this would be found a very valuable acquisition for himself on his accession to the throne; that in Swedish Pomerania would be found a plainly-indicated compensation to Denmark, whose acquiescence, after all, was not of sufficient importance to occasion much uneasiness; that, in regard to the subsidy, Sweden could not dispense with it if called upon to equip an army; that the power of introducing colonial produce on the continent, estimated at twenty millions, would be an illusion, for the English could not fail to perceive the motives for such introduction, and would instantly prevent it. On the double condition, then, of the annexation of Norway and an effective subsidy of twenty millions, the prince-royal offered to unite himself with France by a treaty in violation, no doubt, of that which he had signed in April with Russia.

Napoleon, on hearing this communication, which was brought by M. de Bassano, broke out into a violent passion. "The scoundrel!" he exclaimed; "he proposes that I should betray a faithful ally, Denmark, as the price of his



fidelity to France! He speaks of Norway and of the interest that Sweden has in the possession of that province, and he forgets that it is the first interest of Sweden to reduce the power of Russia, which sooner or later will certainly devour her; that if Finland forces her into collision with Russia, it is because Finland protects Sweden and exposes Russia; that the temporary peace with her formidable neighbour, acquired by the abandonment of Finland, would by-and-by be disturbed whenever Russia should wish to acquire the Sound, and that in one day of frost the Russian soldiers might go from the islands of Aland to Stockholm; that the present opportunity of humbling Russia, if neglected, would never return, for never again shall be seen a commander like myself marching at the head of 600,000 men against the formidable empire of the North! The scoundrel! he betrays his own glory, Sweden, and his own country; he is not worthy of our thoughts. I wish no more to hear his name, and I forbid any reply being sent to him, either official or otherwise." Although he became calmer after this burst of rage, he persisted in refusing any answer to M. Signeul, who had gone to the baths of Bohemia to await the determination of the French cabinet.

This resolution, though very honourable, and perhaps rendered compulsory by the difficulty of compelling Denmark to relinquish Norway, was, however, much to be regretted; for the whole result of the war might perhaps be changed by 30,000 or 40,000 Swedes threatening St. Petersburg instead of Hamburg. Perhaps it would have been possible to induce Denmark to meet the wishes of Bernadotte, by offering that power certain compensation, whether in Swedish Pomerania or in the Hanseatic departments; but Napoleon was prevented from entertaining the thought by his irritation, and by the confidence he placed in his own resources.

The second diplomatic business which was to engage his attention was the declaration to be published in commencing the war. It was now no longer a question whether Russia would or would not take the initiative in hostilities. We were about to reach the Niemen with 400,000 men, not reckoning a reserve of 200,000, and we had no great cause to be anxious about the conduct of Russia. The point, therefore, was no longer to allay the suspicions of Alexander, but to throw upon him the responsibility of the war. M. de Lauriston, who had been ordered to request permission to go to Wilna in order to detain Alexander a few days longer, had not yet given any reply. If it had been known that his request was refused, this would have constituted a valid reason for requiring him to demand his passports; but this was not known. But it was necessary to invent some motive, for it was now the 16th of June, and the Niemen must be crossed between the 20th and the 25th, and, to do this with any decency, some reason for an immediate rupture must be discovered. The fertility of Napoleon had invented one which, though very superficial, was sufficiently specious to have imposed upon several historians,—which was, that Russia, having demanded the evacuation of Prussia preliminary to all negotiation, had proposed a dishonourable condition to France. But in this there was an essential inaccuracy. Russia had demanded this evacua-

tion not as preliminary, but as the certain consequence of all negotiations that might be entered upon in reference to the points in dispute. This distinction was overlooked, and it was resolved to maintain that the preliminary demanded, which implied the withdrawal of Napoleon from the Niemen to the Vistula, or even to the Elbe, was an insult which France could not support; that they had taken care to keep secret this condition to avoid the necessity of taking offence at it, but that now it had been made known to the world at large, and that the offence having been made public, it could no longer be tolerated, but must immediately occasion war. To this ground of offence was added the repeated provocation of Prince Kourakin, who had demanded his passports of M. de Bassano on the eve of his departure from Paris, and had subsequently redemanded them with urgency. It must be allowed that this condition of evacuating the Prussian territory, which was known merely to a few well-informed persons, and which merely signified the evacuation of the territory after they should have come to a mutual understanding, and that the demand of Prince Kourakin, at first withdrawn, and then renewed when he found himself left alone at Paris without communication with any minister, could not be regarded as making an insupportable offence for which a nation is warranted to shed her blood; and that, at any rate, Napoleon had sufficiently encroached upon others to warrant some little endurance on his own part. But a plausible pretext was required, and Napoleon adopted this for want of a better. M. de Lauriston was accordingly ordered immediately to demand his passports, under the pretext that, the claim to make us evacuate Prussia having been made public, the insult could no longer be endured; and, in case M. de Lauriston should have already gone to Wilna, (which absolutely precludes the idea that the cause of the rupture was the refusal to receive him at Wilna,) he was recommended not to present his demand for his passports before the 22d, as Napoleon wished to cross the Niemen on the 22d or the 23d. He was at the same time informed that the despatch written to him on the 16th from Königsberg would be antedated, and would bear date of Thorn, June 12, to persuade the Russians, when presented to them, that Napoleon was still at a distance, and less ready to act than he really was. A courier was then sent from Königsberg to M. de Lauriston, with the orders and instructions we have just recorded.\*

\* M. Fain, in his MS. of 1812, trusting to the information of M. de Bassano, his principal authority, and ignorant of several despatches which had not been communicated to him, is among the number of historians who have persisted in maintaining that Napoleon was drawn into this war against his will, and after having exhausted every means of avoiding it. In his view, the missions assigned in turn to M. de Narbonne and to M. de Lauriston had no other object than to prevent the rupture with Russia; and yet the very words of the despatches prove incontrovertibly that their only end was to gain time, with a purely military object. He regards as an insult the condition of evacuating Prussia and the strongholds on the Oder; while nothing more was demanded than the assurance of that evacuation, after the negotiation should have terminated agreeably to all parties. Napoleon was not required to restore the fortresses on the Oder till after the payment of the contribution for the war, agreed upon in the convention of September 17, 1806. Finally, M. Fain dates the resolution to make war from Gumbinnen, the 19th, the day when M. Prevost, secretary of the French legation, came from St. Petersburg to announce the refusal of permission to M. de Lauriston to visit

Having completed this diplomatic formality, Napoleon, thinking the time for action had now come, left Königsberg the next day to join his troops on the Pregel, there to review them, and assure himself that they were supplied with every thing necessary to begin the campaign. For his first operations, he was satisfied with procuring them ten days' provisions, hoping in these ten days to execute manœuvres of a decisive character, and being unwilling to be impeded in his movements by the difficulty of finding subsistence, a difficulty which was trifling in Italy and Germany, because those countries abound in large villages, which they did not hesitate to turn to their own use, but which was very great in Lithuania, where they commonly met only marshes and forests. His soldiers having provisions for ten days, he hoped (as at Ulm in 1805, at Jena in 1806, at Ratisbon in 1809) to strike one of those terrible blows which, at the commencement of operations, overwhelmed his enemies, and disconcerted them for the rest of the war. The first convoys by water had brought provisions as far as Tapiau, on the Pregel: it was necessary to transport them by land at least as far as Gumbinnen, a point sufficiently near to that at which they were to cross the Niemen. From that place, ten days' provisions ought to suffice to bring them to the middle of Lithuania. To secure this result, Napoleon went to Insterburg, where he arrived on the evening of June 17.

He had arranged in his mind the general plan of his first operations, and had resolved to pass the Niemen at Kowno. In this, his views were, as always, equally vast and profound; for, though he may have had equals as a tactician on the field of battle, he had neither superiors nor equals in the general direction of military operations. To comprehend his motives, it is necessary to take a view of the vast countries which were to be the theatre of this formidable war, certainly the greatest and the most tragical of many centuries.

The immense plains extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Caspian are traversed on the one side by the Oder, the Vistula, the Pregel, the Niemen, and the Dwina, flowing to the west, and on the other by the Dniester, the Dnieper or Borysthènes, the Don, and the Volga, flowing to the east, and constitute the territory of Old Prussia, Old Poland, and Russia. It was in this vast plain that Napoleon, who of all known warriors embraced the largest extent of ground, for from west to east he went from Cadiz to Moscow, and from south to north he went

from the Jordan to the sources of the Volga,—in this plan it was that he was about to endeavour to conquer, by the efforts of his genius, the most serious difficulty of war,—that of distance, especially when the intervening space is neither inhabited nor cultivated. The lower parts, as it were, the mouths of the Oder, the Vistula, the Pregel, and the Niemen, form the dreary but wonderfully-fertile territory of Old Prussia. Ascending these rivers, and proceeding from west to east, we reach more sandy countries, less covered with vegetable soil, where there is less material and moral cultivation, fewer habitations, more forests and marshes, where appear, instead of neat, rich, Protestant towns, dirty Catholic villages grouped around castles inhabited by brave and indolent nobility, and a nest of Jews, who multiply wherever they are invited by the indolence and ignorance of half-barbarous people. The farther we go to the east, towards the sources of the Vistula, the Narew, the Niemen, and the Dwina, the more such characteristics do we discover. Having reached the sources of the Vistula and its tributaries, and those of the Niemen and the Dwina, in advancing towards the other aspect, i.e. the sources of the Dniester and the Dnieper, we meet a soil of uncertain inclination, through which the rivers scarcely flow, but which is covered with marshes and gloomy forests: we are then in Old Poland, or Lithuania, in the thickest part of those damp and well-wooded countries, which are traversed by means of long series of bridges, thrown not only over rivers, but over the marshes; and where the roads, owing to a deficiency of stones, are constructed upon sleepers of fagots and beams of wood. In continuing across this region to the east, we arrive between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, distant about twenty leagues, and are thus placed in a sort of opening from Witepsk to Smolensk, which leads from Old Poland into Russia. Then, the waters flowing more freely, we lose sight of the marshes and forests, and we behold before us the plain of Old Russia, in the bosom of which arises Moscow,—the holy Moscow, as it is called by the patriotism of its inhabitants.

With his unequalled glance, Napoleon had at once perceived that his march from the west ought to be directed to this opening, between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, between Witepsk and Smolensk. These are, as it were, the gates of the East, and there in former times the Poles and the Muscovites, in their alternate victories and defeats, had been arrested, for the Dwina on one side, and the Dnieper on the other, were the limits between Russia and Poland before the famous division which constitutes the misfortune and the shame of the last century.

But, before reaching these gates, it was necessary to cross Old Prussia, and the recently-restored part of Poland, which was called the grand duchy of Warsaw. The frontier which separated the grand duchy and Old Prussia from the Russian territory is the following.

The superior course of the Bug, and also that of the Narew, each a tributary to the Vistula, formed in their different windings the first part of the frontier-line, of the grand duchy on the side of Russia. This frontier-line, after following sometimes the Bug, sometimes the Narew

Wilna, while that resolution, already of long standing, was virtually taken on the 1<sup>st</sup> at Königsberg, though ascribed to the 12<sup>th</sup> by an acknowledged falsification of the date. We may add, that there are some historians, as simple in their hatred as M. Fain in his idolatry, who suppose that, on receiving M. Prevost on the 19<sup>th</sup>, Napoleon resigned himself to absurd transports of rage, and, losing all self-possession, broke the peace at once and crossed the Niemen. Now, authentic documents actually in existence contradict both these partial recitals, by referring the resolution to make war to the 18<sup>th</sup>, the very day when Napoleon's calculations determined him to act. He did not make a single effort in favour of peace, for he desired war, although, as it drew near, he perceived the danger, and he only feigned to negotiate in order to have time to cross the Niemen without striking a blow. By endeavouring to describe him as a victim he is rendered ridiculous, for this is to convert the lion into a lamb by depriving him of his mane and claws. He is deprived of his real strength without being endowed with weakness, which did not belong to him, and a foolish caricature is made of a form equally grand and original.

from Brezesc-Litowsky to the environs of Grodno, joined the Niemen at Grodno, kept along that river to the north as far as Kowno, thus separating Poland properly so called from Lithuania. At Kowno, the Niemen, taking its final direction towards the west and running towards Tilsit, no longer separated Poland but Old Prussia from Russia. The frontier-line which was to be crossed ran, therefore, to the north from Brezesc to Grodno, following by turns the Bug or the Narew, and then ran to the north of Grodno to Kowno, following the Niemen, and at length, turning sharply round to the west towards Kowno, went as far as Tilsit, continuing from that point to follow the course of the Niemen. At its northern extremity, therefore, it made a bend towards Kowno. At this point Napoleon resolved to cross the Niemen, in order to recover, by going in a straight line to the Dwina and the Dnieper, all the remains of ancient Poland,—a point where, according to circumstances, he might perhaps halt, and from which perhaps he might start to force the gates of Old Russia and to plunge into her immense plains.

His motives were as follows. Four roads presented themselves through which it was possible to enter Russia,—one to the south, tending to the east by the southern provinces of the Russian Empire, crossing the Bug at Brezesc, keeping the right bank of the river Pripet, as far as its junction with the Dnieper above Kiew, consequently crossing Volhynia, formerly a Polish province, and from Kiew renewing its course towards the north to reach Moscow through the finest provinces of the empire; the second, between the south and the north, taking a north-east course by Grodno, Minsk, Smolensk, in Lithuania, passing across the opening which separates the Dnieper from the Dwina, and coming out upon Moscow by the shortest line; the third, parallel to the preceding but situated a little higher, going, by Kowno and Wilna, to the opening between the Dnieper and the Dwina, penetrating Old Russia by Witepsk instead of Smolensk, and likewise terminating at Moscow; the fourth going straight to the north across the northern provinces of the Russian empire, by Tilsit, Mitau, Riga, and Narva, to end at St. Petersburg.

Of these four roads, that of the south by Brezesc and Kiew, and that of the north by Tilsit and Riga, had the inconvenience of being on the borders, and were not to be chosen by a man of so accurate a judgment in great military operations as Napoleon. Each would expose the invader to a formidable manœuvre of the Russians, who, being concentrated in Lithuania, might, by way of Kobrin, Pinsk, or Mosyr, fall *en masse* on the flank of the army which should march upon Kiew, or, by Witepsk and Polotsk, on the flank of the army which should march upon St. Petersburg. Each of these two outer roads had also inconveniences peculiar to itself. That which, traversing the southern provinces, passed between Volhynia and Galicia, crossed a beautiful country; but it would have rendered the French army absolutely dependent upon Austria, and would thus expose that power to a very dangerous temptation. The road to the north traversed only countries covered with marshes and heath, under the rudest climate of Russia, and in countries whose soil would

have yielded nothing to the support of the troops.

Neither of these two roads, therefore, could be thought of. The only choice was between the intermediate roads, each leading by the northeast and east to Moscow, without precluding a march upon St. Petersburg by a turn to the north, and each penetrating the opening between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper,—one by Grodno, Minsk, and Smolensk, the other by Kowno, Wilna, and Witepsk.

After a mature examination of these roads, Napoleon preferred the last. The first, from Grodno to Minsk, though shorter, bordered the marshiest part of the country, known by the name of the marsh of Pinsk, into which we might be finally thrown by a vigorous attack of the enemy. The second, a little less direct, going from Kowno to Wilna, the capital of Lithuania, and from Wilna to Witepsk, though traversing difficult countries, as were all those which our army was to cross, did not present the same inconveniences as the preceding, and, moreover, (which could not fail to decide the preference in its favour,) afforded the means of cutting the enemy's forces into two bodies, which might possibly be unable to reunite during the whole of the campaign.

The distribution of the Russian forces, as far as this could be known, was calculated to confirm Napoleon in his design, which he had formed ever since he had received the first reports of the enemy's army.

Though the Russians had their advanced posts on their actual frontier, on the upper part of the Bug and the Narew, and the whole length of the Niemen, yet they only regarded the Dwina and the Dnieper as the true line of defence. These rivers, as we have said, take their rise at a distance of about twenty leagues from each other, the Dwina taking its course towards the Baltic, the Dnieper towards the Black Sea, and, except the opening between Witepsk and Smolensk, present a vast continuous line running from northwest to southeast, and crossing the whole empire from Riga to Nikolaieff. Since the commencement of the concentration of their forces, the Russians had naturally formed two principal points of rendezvous, one on the Dwina from Witepsk to Dunabour, one on the Dnieper from Smolensk to Rogaczew, and these had gradually been converted into two armies, which had advanced, one as far as Wilna, the other as far as Minsk, with the design either of subsequently uniting or of acting independently as circumstances might require. But both had their base on the grand line which we have described. The first, commanded by General Barclay de Tolly, established on the Dwina with its head-quarters at Wilna and its advanced posts at Kowno on the Niemen, was to receive the reserves from the North of the empire. The second, commanded by Prince Bagration, established on the Dnieper, with its head-quarters at Minsk and its advanced posts at Grodno on the Niemen, was to receive the reserves from the centre of the empire, and to connect itself with the troops of Turkey by General Tormasoff's army. Such was the distribution of the Russian forces until a definite plan of the campaign should be adopted at Wilna. This distribution of forces naturally arose from the nature of the locality, and was not liable to censure, provided they could be

severally set in motion with sufficient rapidity before an enemy so prompt as Napoleon.

Napoleon, who, to other characteristics of military genius, added, in the highest degree, that of divining the thought of the enemy, had clearly foreseen this distribution of the Russian troops. From the reports of those who had been sent to reconnoitre, though always confused and often contradictory, he had discerned with certainty that there was an army of the Dwina and one of the Dnieper, of which one was to advance in the direction of Wilna and Kowno, and the other in the direction of Minsk and Grodno, one estimated at 150,000 men under Barclay de Tolly, the other at 100,000 men under Prince Bagration. He was little concerned with their number, for in his first line alone he had 400,000 men, and the only point to consider was the arrangement of the enemy's forces.

He immediately formed his determination. The Niemen, as we have seen, flows northerly from Grodno to Kowno, then, taking a sudden turn, flows westerly from Kowno to Tilsit. Napoleon, advancing on Kowno at the very angle formed by the Niemen, had only to cross that river at Kowno with 200,000 men, to fall upon Wilna with that irresistible force which always signalized the opening of his operations, and there, placing himself between the army of Barclay de Tolly on the Dwina and that of Bagration on the Dnieper, he was sure to keep them separate during the rest of the campaign. He might, even, thus advance as far as Moscow, if he wished, having on his right and left merely the divided *débris* of the Russian force.

In addition to this capital advantage, this manner of operation possessed other secondary advantages of high importance. While penetrating to the very point of the angle of the Niemen, he would march under the protection of the two branches of that river on his wings. After crossing the Niemen at Kowno, and pushing on to Wilna, he would find from Kowno to Wilna the navigable river Wilia, which would thus afford a valuable prolongation to our line of navigation. And at Wilna itself he would at his very entrance strike a blow which could not fail to have a powerful moral effect, for he would drive Alexander from his first head-quarters, and get possession of the capital of Lithuania, which was of no small importance to the Poles.

Having once formed these plans, so worthy of his genius, Napoleon immediately occupied himself with putting them in execution. He consequently resolved to bring together under his own hand, in order to make his way by Kowno, the corps of Marshals Davout, Oudinot, and Ney, the Imperial Guard, and two of the four corps of cavalry-reserve. This would be a mass of about 200,000 men, after allowing for losses occasioned by the distance of the march. While with this overwhelming force, comprising his best soldiers, Napoleon should advance by Kowno upon Wilna, Marshal Macdonald, with whose conduct in Catalonia he had not been satisfied, but on whom he set a high value in this great war, was to pass the Niemen on his left at Tilsit, to take possession of the two banks of that river, to drive away the Cossacks and secure free navigation to our convoys. Napoleon had formed for him a corps of about 30,000 men by means of the Polish division of Grand-

jean and the Prussian contingent, now reduced to 16,000 or 17,000 men by the garrisons left at Pillau and elsewhere. The aim of his ulterior operations was to be in Courland. Napoleon had made preparations for another passage of the Niemen on his right, which he had intrusted to Prince Eugene. That prince, who formerly formed at Plock the general centre of the army, and who now was to form the right, was, with the French and Italian troops from Verona, with the Royal Italian Guard, the Bavarians, and the third corps of cavalry reserved under General Grouchy, (about 80,000 men,) to pass the Niemen a little below Kowno, at a place named Prena. Still farther to the right and more to the south, i.e. at Grodno, King Jerome was to cross the Niemen with the Poles, the Saxons, the Westphalians, and the 4th corps of cavalry-reserve under General Latour-Maubourg. This extreme right comprised about 70,000 men. There were, then, 380,000 men, making with the artillery 400,000 men, having with them 1000 guns well supplied, independently of a reserve of 140,000 or 150,000 men left in the rear, which, with 60,000 invalids, many of whom were only slightly indisposed, completed the total of 600,000 or 610,000 men. It is to be remarked that the number of invalids had already increased from 40,000 to 60,000 by the marches from the Elbe to the Oder, from the Oder to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Niemen. The 30,000 Austrians who had left Galicia for Brezsec were in addition to this enormous army, and raised to about 640,000 the number of soldiers engaged in this crusade of the Western nations against Russia, a crusade undertaken unfortunately at a time when those nations, more alive to present evil than to future danger, would have preferred combining their forces against France to combining them against Russia.

Napoleon had ordered his brother Jerome, if he should learn that Prince Bagration was ascending the right bank of the Niemen from Grodno to Kowno, to imitate that movement on the left bank, and thus to keep himself close to Prince Eugene, whilst the latter should keep close to the principal army. If, on the contrary, Prince Bagration should call to himself the corps of Tormasoff, which was in Volhynia, and effect an opposite movement in order to fall upon Warsaw and the Austrians, he was to avail himself of this good fortune, to leave him unmolested, to give warning to the Austrians, that they might fall back upon Warsaw and Modlin, and then, when Prince Bagration should be so far engaged on our right and rear as to be unable to return, to fall back upon him and take his whole force, as Mack had been taken seven years before at Ulm.

After having arranged these vast combinations in the minutest details, Napoleon left Königsberg on the 17th to repair in succession to Vehlau, Insterburg, and Gumbinnen, on the Pregel, a river which flows parallel to the Niemen, but at some leagues in the rear, on the banks of which all our *corps d'armée* had been drawn up to receive their provisions. Here he reviewed them, and found Davout's corps perfectly prepared and provisioned, that of Oudinot a little fatigued by the march and by want, for their course had been through a barren country, and with less perfectly organized means of

transport; that of Ney in the same state for the same reasons. The well-appointed Guard presented an attitude corresponding to its good condition and good discipline. The 22,000 horsemen of Generals Nansouty and Montbrun, one-half of whom were cuirassiers, displayed their magnificent squadrons under Murat, and evinced an extraordinary ardour. They only comprised one-half of the cavalry attached to the principal army, which Napoleon commanded in person, since there was nearly an equal number in the corps of Davout, Oudinot, and Ney. Napoleon, by means of wagons already arrived, hastened to bring from Vehlau to Gumbinnen sufficient rations to enable each to carry six days' provision instead of ten, which he had hoped to collect for the beginning of his operations. He sent forward the cavalry-reserve under Murat, the artillery-reserve, and the pontoon-equipages, and ordered Marshal Davout to escort them with his corps to Wilkowsk, so as to be before Kowno by the 22d or 23d.

While at Gumbinnen, M. Prevost, a secretary of legation, came to announce that General Lauriston had not obtained leave to go to Wilna, which, if known a few days earlier, would have been very useful to bring forward and dwell upon as a grievance. But there was no longer time to do so, and, besides, General Lauriston had been furnished with motives quite sufficient to enforce the demand of his passports, if a warlike policy were seriously proposed.\* Napoleon, without attending to a report in which he took no interest, for he considered it indifferent whether M. de Lauriston were received at Wilna or not, left Gumbinnen on the 21st, and reached Wilkowsk on the 22d, being separated from Kowno and the Niemen only by the great forest of Wilkowsk. The fatal moment, then, had now arrived, and he was now on the river which might be called the Rubicon of his prosperity. All his corps were on the Niemen, and he could no longer hesitate to cross.

The news was uniform from the extreme left to the extreme right, and disclosed the complete immobility of the Russians. Thus his designs were being accomplished to his misfortune, and he fell into the snare which was laid for him. He ordered Marshal Macdonald to cross the Niemen immediately at Tilsit, on the left; Prince Eugene to approach Prenn, on the right, in order to cross the river as early as possible; and King Jerome to be at Grodno on the 30th at the latest. He wrote an account of his intentions to the Duke of Belluna at Berlin, in order that that marshal might arm Spandau and keep on his guard, for the first gun was about to be fired, which would be followed by great results, and it was important to have an open eye and a ready hand in reference to the Germans.

On the 23d of June, after having slept in the middle of the forest of Wilkowsk at a small farm, surrounded by 200,000 soldiers, Napoleon issued from the forest with that superb army, and drew up above Kowno, in front of the river

which he was about to cross. The bank which we occupied everywhere commanded the opposite bank; the weather was beautiful; and the Niemen was seen flowing from our right to left to discharge itself peaceably in the west. Nothing indicated the presence of an enemy, except some Cossacks, who ran like flights of wild birds along the banks of the river, and some burning granaries whose smoke darkened the air. General Haxo, after a careful reconnaissance, had discovered at a league and a half above Kowno, near a place called Ponionon, a point where the Niemen, taking a very marked turn, presented great facilities for crossing. Owing to this semicircular movement of the river around the opposite bank, that bank appeared like a plain surrounded on all sides by our soldiers, commanded by our artillery, and affording a most convenient place for passage under the protection of 500 or 600 guns. Napoleon, having borrowed the cloak of a Polish lancer, went, under the protection of a few horse-soldiers, to reconnoitre the ground, in company with General Haxo, and, having found the places as favourable as the general had reported them, he ordered bridges to be established the same night.† General Eblé, who had brought up his bridges of boats, was ordered to construct three, with the assistance of Morand's division, at the front of Marshal Davout's corps.

And accordingly, at 11 p.m. on the 23d of June, 1812, the voltigeurs of the Morand division entered some boats, crossed the Niemen, from sixty to eighty toises in width at that part, and took possession of the right bank without striking a blow, and assisted the pontooners in fixing the cables to which the boats were to be attached. By the end of the night, three bridges, at one hundred toises' distance from each other, were firmly placed, and the light cavalry were able to cross.

On the morning of the 24th of June, which in that country and at that season indicates about 8 a.m., the sun arose in glory to irradiate a magnificent scene. To the troops, who were full of enthusiasm, had been read a short and energetic proclamation conceived in the following terms:—

"Soldiers, the second Polish war has begun. The first was terminated at Friedland and Tilsit! At Tilsit Russia swore eternal alliance with France and enmity with England. She now violates these oaths; she refuses any explanation of her singular conduct, until the French eagles shall have recrossed the Rhine and thereby left our allies at her mercy. Russia is dragged on by her fate to her end. Does she, then, suppose us to have become degenerate? Are we no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She presents us the alternative of dishonour or war: our choice cannot be doubtful. Let us then march forward; let us cross the Niemen; let us carry war into her own territory. The second Polish war will be glorious to the French arms. But the peace which we shall conclude will bring with it its own guarantee: it shall put an end to the fatal influence exerted by

\* This detail proves the incorrectness of the assertions both of Napoleon's flatterers and enemies, who ascribe to M. Prevost's return the final determination to make war, some affirming that such an insult could not be tolerated, and others that Napoleon had resigned himself to the blind fury of a tyrant incapable of self-control. These ridiculous suppositions of idolatry and hatred are negated by the mere force of dates.

† This borrowed disguise of Napoleon has been denied; but it is authentic, and is proved by the account of the passage of the Niemen drawn up by Napoleon himself, in which he would not have given a false statement of a matter of so trifling importance and subject to so many eye-witnesses.

Russia over the affairs of Europe during fifty years."

This proclamation having been received with warm applause, the troops descended from the heights in three long columns, which alternately appeared and disappeared in the ravines leading to the river. All the twelve-pounders, ranged on the semicircle of the high ground, commanded the plain where the army was to debouch,—an unnecessary precaution, for no enemy was in sight. Napoleon, leaving his tent, surrounded by his officers, viewed with his glass this prodigious spectacle; for, rare as it is to see 200,000 men acting at once in war, still more rarely is that number to be seen collected on one spot, and with such magnificence; and yet, almost at the same moment, at a few leagues' distance, 200,000 others were also crossing the Niemen.

Marshal Davout's infantry, preceded by the light cavalry, was the first to reach the border of the river, and each division, passing in turn, ranged itself in order of battle in the plain, the infantry in close columns, the artillery in the intervals of the infantry, the light cavalry in front, the heavy cavalry in the rear. The corps of Marshals Oudinot and Ney followed; after them the Guard, and after the Guard the parks. In a few hours the right bank was covered with these magnificent troops, which, descending from the heights on the left bank, and passing in long files over the three bridges, seemed to flow like three inexhaustible torrents into that encircled plain which they already filled with their crowding waves. The rays of the sun glittered on the bayonets and the helmets: the troops, in ecstasies with themselves and their commander, continually shouted "Vive l'Empereur!" It is not from them that we could expect that calm reason which could have estimated this vast enterprise at its true value and therefore have prevented its occurrence. They thought only of triumphs and of distant journeys, for they were convinced that the expedition into Russia would be terminated only with the Indies. We have often heard of a sudden storm, which, like an unfavourable oracle, uttered an unheeded warning: there was no such storm: the weather was beautiful, and Napoleon, who had never heard the warnings of public opinion, received none from the dictates of superstition.

After having for some hours contemplated this wonderful spectacle,—a contemplation which, while it may have intoxicated him with pride, was barren in any profitable instruction,—Napoleon mounted his horse, and, quitting the high ground on which his tent had been pitched, descended to the banks of the Niemen, crossed one of the bridges, and, turning sharp to the left, preceded by some squadrons, hastened to Kowno. Our light cavalry entered without difficulty in the rear of the Cossacks, who lost no time in crossing the Wilna, a navigable river flowing from Wilna to Kowno, where it joins the Niemen, a very winding course of about forty leagues. Napoleon, accompanied by the Polish lancers of the Guard, wished to be immediately master of the two banks of the

Wilna, there to construct bridges, and to be able to follow the Russian rear-guards. Anticipating his wishes, the Polish lancers threw themselves into the rivers, closing their ranks, and swimming their horses with all their strength. But, on reaching the middle of the current, they were overcome by its violence, and began to be separated and carried away. They rushed to their aid in boats, and succeeded in saving some. Unhappily, twenty or thirty paid with their lives for this act of enthusiastic obedience. Communications were immediately re-established between the two banks of the Wilna, and from that moment it was possible to march on the two banks as far as Wilna. Napoleon slept at Kowno, after having ordered Marshal Davout to place his advanced guards *en échelon* on the road to Wilna.

Thus the die was cast! Napoleon was marching to the interior of Russia at the head of 400,000 men, and followed by 200,000 more! Into what strange contradictions are men drawn by their passions! The same man, two years before, on his return from Austria, having reflected for a moment on the lesson taught at Essling, had thought of restoring peace to his empire and to the world, of giving to his throne the stability of hereditary right, and to his character the appearance of a regard to family, and in that thought had formed a marriage with Austria, the most ancient court and the most consistent. He wished to appease animosities, to evacuate Germany, and to bring all his forces into Spain, in order to compel England to peace, and, with England, the whole world, which only waited from her the signal for submission. Such were his thoughts in 1810, and, in the sincere desire to realize them, he designed the continental blockade, which was to force England to make peace by commercial sufferings, constrained himself to subject Holland to this system, and, on the resistance of that kingdom, withdrew it from his own brother, annexed it to his empire, and astonished Europe, which he wished to soothe, by the spectacle of a large kingdom annexed to France by a simple decree. Finding then the system of blockade incomplete, with a view of completing it he assumed the Hanse towns, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, and, as if the lion could only rest while devouring new prey, he added the Valais, Florence, and Rome, and was astonished to find that such proceedings occasioned some degree of offence. Meanwhile, he had sent his principal lieutenant, Massena, against Lisbon to inflict a mortal blow upon the English army, and, judging, by the murmurs of the continent, that it was necessary to keep an imposing force in the North, he formed a vast combination of troops upon the Elbe, henceforth devoted to Spain only inadequate forces, left Massena without aid to lose a portion of his glory, allowed exasperated Europe to hope that from Torres-Vedras, a place unknown, should arise a captain fatal to him and to us: then, not supposing that Russia would be emboldened by distance to put any obstacle to his views, he suddenly directed all his thoughts, his power, and his genius to the North, there to finish the war by one of those great strokes to which he had accustomed the world, and too much accustomed his own mind, thus relinquishing the certain which he might have found upon the

\* A storm indeed occurred, but at a considerable distance, and a few days later. The army of Italy was exposed to it when passing the Niemen at Prenau.

seek the uncertain between the Dnieper and the Dwina. Such had been the issue of this Cæsar, who for a moment had become an Augustus! At this he was advancing to the North, leaving France exhausted and disgusted with military glory, pious souls wounded by religious tyranny, independent souls by civil tyranny, Europe in revolt against a yoke that he wished to impose upon it. He was bringing with him an army in the greater part of these sentiments already fermenting, which comprised all that and which was held together simply

by his genius and his hitherto invariable prosperity! What, at so great a distance, would become of that prodigious army of 600,000 men of all nations, who were following the guidance of a star, if that star itself should suddenly grow pale? The world, to our sorrow, has learned this so as never to forget it; but it is necessary for its instruction to teach by the detail of events what it has only learned by the noise of a frightful crash. In this recital of grief and heroism we are now to engage; glory we shall find recorded in every step; prosperity, alas! we must relinquish at the passage of the Niemen.

## BOOK XLIV.

### MOSCOW.

preparations to march upon Wilna—Takes measures at Kowno to secure the possession of that town, and to make disposition of his line of navigation—Movements of the various corps of the French army—M. de Balaschoff and Emperor Alexander to make a last attempt at reconciliation—The reasons which had induced the Emperor to take this step—The Emperor Alexander and his staff—The opinions prevalent in Russia relative to the war—The system of retreat into the interior proposed by General Pfuhl—The opinions of Generals Barclay de Tolly and Bagration with respect to this system—On being informed of the arrival of the French, Alexander orders to retreat upon the Dwina to the camp of Drissa, and to send Prince Bagration with the second Russian army to the Dnieper—Entrance of the French into Wilna—Storms encountered during the march upon Wilna—Arrival—Many of the troops pursue from the very commencement of the campaign a system of plunder—The attending the march, and the supply of provisions, induce Napoleon to determine upon a halt at Wilna—Inconspicuous this halt—During this halt Napoleon sends Marshal Davout to his right to pursue Prince Bagration, separated from the principal Russian army—Reorganization of the Lithuanian government—The formation of a new erection of ovens, and establishment of a police upon the routes—Interview between Napoleon and M. de Caulincourt—Operations of Marshal Davout on the right of Napoleon—Dangerous position of various Russian columns separated from the main body of their army—Bold march of General Davout upon Minak—Finding himself in the presence of Prince Bagration, many times more numerous than his own, Marshal Davout demands reinforcements—entertaining the project of throwing himself upon Barclay de Tolly with the largest portion of his forces, he refers to Marshal Davout the necessary succour, and believes that he aids him sufficiently by urging Jerome's junction with him—March of King Jerome from Grodno to Neswiz—His involuntary delays—Napoleon, dissatisfied with his proceedings, places him under the orders of Marshal Davout, and, hurt at this measure, he quits the camp of many days, during which Bagration succeeds in saving himself—Marshal Davout hastens in pursuit of the army of Mohilev—Bagration, although vanquished, succeeds in retreating beyond the Dnieper—Napoleon, having his commissariat, and left at Wilna a large portion of his artillery and provisions, determines to march against the Russian army under Barclay de Tolly—Insurrection of Poland—Reception of the Polish deputies—Napoleon's regard to them and its reasons—Departure of Napoleon for Glogowko—He determines, after having thrown Jerome upon Bagration, to advance himself against Barclay de Tolly by a movement from left to right, in order to strip the Russians and turn them—March of all the corps of the French army in the direction of Polotsk—The Russians in the camp of Drissa—Opposition of the staff to the plan of campaign attributed to General, and constraint exercised with regard to the Emperor Alexander to oblige him to quit the army—The Emperor determines to proceed to Moscow—Barclay de Tolly evacuates the camp of Drissa, and proceeds to Witepsk, behind the Dwina, with the intention of joining Bagration—Napoleon is eager to reach Witepsk before him—A series of combats in front of and behind Ostrowno—Audacious boldness of the French army and obstinacy of the Russians—At one moment there are hopes of a battle, but the Russians steal away to take up a position between Witepsk and Smolensk and to rally Prince Bagration—Disastrous consequences of the excessive heat and fatigue anticipated at Smolensk, and despairing of preventing the union of Bagration with Barclay de Tolly, determine to make a fresh halt of fifteen days for the purpose of rallying the stragglers, bringing up the convoys of provisions, and awaiting the diminution of the intense heat—His establishments and cantonments around Witepsk—His right respect to his army, already reduced from 400,000 to 200,000 since the passage of the Niemen—Operations of the left wing—Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot directed to carry out operations on the Dwina; have respectively blockaded Riga and to capture Polotsk—For the purpose of affording some repose to the Bavarians, destroyed by the French, and of reinforcing Marshal Oudinot, Napoleon sends the former to Polotsk—Operations on the right bank of the Dnieper, after having been rejoined by Marshal Davout and a portion of the troops of King Jerome, intrusts the duty of the Saxons, and the Prince of Schwarzenberg with the Austrians, the duty of guarding the rear of the Dnieper, and of keeping in check the Russian General Tormasoff, who occupied Volhynia with his army—After having made these arrangements and granted some repose to his troops, Napoleon recommences operations against the great Russian army composed of the united troops of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration—March of the French troops from left to right, in front of the enemy's army, with the object of passing the Dnieper below the town, turning the Russians, and driving them back on the Dwina—In the mean time the Emperor, alarmed by Napoleon's movements and perceiving the danger of Smolensk, falls back for the purpose of saving this town—March of the French troops upon Smolensk—Brilliant combat of Krasnoe—Arrival of the French army—Immense assemblage of men around this unfortunate town—Attack and capture of Smolensk by the French—Retreat of the Russians upon Dorogobouge—Marshal Ney encounters a portion of the Russian rear-guard at the battle of Valoutina—Death of General Gudin—Napoleon's chagrin at the successive failure of his operations he had ever devised—Grave question whether it would be better to halt at Smolensk for the purpose of waiting for reinforcements or to march forward for the purpose of preventing the political dangers which would result from a prolonged war—Whilst he is deliberating on this point, Napoleon hears that General St. Cyr, who had replaced Oudinot, who had been wounded, gained, on the 18th of August, a victory over the army of Wittgenstein at the battle of Schwarzenberg and Reynier had gained another victory at Gorodieczna on the 12th of August—The Russian army, that Marshals Davout and Murat, sent in pursuit of the main Russian army, had found on beyond Dorogobouge, and apparently willing to engage—On receipt of this last news, Napoleon departs from Smolensk with the remainder of the army, for the purpose of terminating the campaign by a great battle—His

arrival at Dorogobouze—Retreat of the Russian army—Its march upon Wiasma—Napoleon determines to march in pursuit—Operations which he orders on his wings and in his rear during his projected march—The 9th corps, under Marshal Victor, is brought from Berlin to Wilna to cover the rear of the army; the 11th, under Marshal Angere, replaces the 9th at Berlin—March of the main army upon Wiasma—Aspect of Russia—Numerous conflagrations caused by the Russians along the whole line of the route from Smolensk to Moscow—Excitement of public feeling in Russia, and aversion to the plan of retreating and devastating the country before the French army—Unpopularity of Barclay de Tolly, accused of being the author or executor of this system, and despatch of old General Kutusoff to replace him—Character of General Kutusoff, and his arrival at the army—Although inclined to the defensive system, he resolves to engage the French troops before Moscow—March of the French army from Wiasma upon Ghjat—Some days of bad weather make Napoleon hesitate between the project of a retreat and that of pursuing the Russian army—The return of fine weather induces him, in opposition to the advice of his principal officers, to continue his onward march—Arrival on the vast plain of Borodino on the 5th of September—Capture of the redoubt of Schwardino on the evening of the 5th of September—Preparation for a great battle—Marshal Davout proposes to turn the Russian army by his left—Motives which decide the rejection of this proposition—Plan of a direct attack, consisting in seizing by main force the redoubts by which the Russian troops were supported—Military spirit of the French; religious spirit of the Russians—Memorable battle of Moskowa on the 7th of September, 1812—About sixty thousand men *hors de combat* on the side of the Russians, and thirty thousand on the side of the French—Horrible spectacle—Reasons why the battle, although very disastrous for the Russians and completely lost by them, was, nevertheless, not decisive—The Russians retreat upon Moscow—The French pursue them—Council of war held by the Russian generals to consider whether they should again engage the French troops, or should abandon Moscow to them—Kutusoff determines to evacuate Moscow and to retreat—Despair of the Governor Rostophin and his secret preparations for burning the city—Arrival of the French before Moscow—Superb aspect of this capital, and enthusiasm of our soldiers on beholding the heights of Warneiewo—Entry into Moscow on the 14th of September—Silence and solitude—Some appearances of fire on the night of the 15th—Terrible conflagration in Moscow—Napoleon compelled to withdraw from the Kremlin to the Chateau of Petrowakowis—His chagrin at the destruction of Moscow—After five days, the fire is suppressed—Aspect of Moscow after the fire—Four-fifths of the city destroyed—Immense quantity of provisions found in the cellars, and the formation of magazines for the use of the army—Ideas which filled Napoleon's mind at Moscow—He perceives the danger of stopping there, and desires, by means of an oblique march to the north, to join Marshals Victor, St. Cyr, and Macdonald, in advance of the Dwina, so as to resolve the twofold problem of approaching Poland and of threatening St. Petersburg—Unfavourable reception of this profound conception by his lieutenants—An objection to it founded on the state of the army, now reduced to a hundred thousand men—Whilst Napoleon is hesitating, he finds that the Russian army has taken up a position on his right flank, in the direction of the Kaluga route—Murat is sent in pursuit of it—The Russians established at Taroutino—Napoleon, in an embarrassed position, sends General Lauriston to Kutusoff, to endeavour to negotiate—Finesse of Kutusoff, who feigns to agree to these overtures, and acceptance of a tacit armistice.

THE NIEMEN was crossed on the 24th of June, without any opposition on the part of the Russians, and every circumstance proclaimed that the same motives which had prevented them from offering any resistance in the environs of Kowno had also had a similar effect with regard to the other portions of their frontier. Having no doubt but that Marshal Macdonald on his left, directed to effect the passage of the Niemen near Tilsit, and that Prince Eugene on his right, directed to cross it in the neighbourhood of Prenn, had met with the same facility in the execution of their orders, Napoleon was only anxious to advance upon Wilna, in order to seize the capital of Lithuania, and to place himself between the two hostile armies in such a manner as to prevent their future union. However, before quitting Kowno, he was anxious, whilst his corps should march upon Wilna, to devote his attention to various points which his rare forethought never neglected. To secure his line of communication when he should advance had always been one of his first cares, and it was a subject of more than ordinary importance when such immense and difficult tracts of country had to be traversed, through the midst of a hostile cavalry the most perfectly suited to harass the march of an invading army.

With this view he had the materials of the bridges which had been thrown across the river above Kowno replaced on the wagons, and consigned to the train of Marshal Davout, and directed the indefatigable General Eblé to construct, at Kowno itself, a bridge upon piles, so as to secure an uninterrupted passage across the Niemen. At the same time he ordered him to construct a similar one across the Wilna, in order to render the communications of the army in every way secure. The country afforded an abundant supply of wood for the construction of these works, and the engineer-corps was well provided with all the other necessary materials, such as iron-work, cordage, and tools. In the next place, Napoleon took care to surround Kowno with defensive works, that the vast mass of material there collected might be secured

from the enemy's attack. When these objects had received sufficient attention, he bestowed a care equally zealous on the construction of hospitals, bakeries, magazines for all sorts of stores, and of boats suitable for the navigation of the Wilna as far as Wilna, and gave orders with the object of arranging that, by a single transit, the convoys which had come from Dantzic by the Vistula, the Frische-Haff, the Pregel, the Deime, the Canal de Frederic, and the Niemen, should ascend from Kowno as far as Wilna. Unfortunately, the Wilna, much shallower than the Niemen, and having a much more sinuous course, afforded a means of transport scarcely less difficult than that by land. It was estimated that not less than twenty days would be occupied in effecting the passage of the Wilna from Kowno to Wilna, and this was almost the time occupied in the journey from Dantzic to Kowno.

Whilst bestowing his usual zealous attention upon these various objects, Napoleon set his troops in motion. The reports received respecting the enemy's position (reports which would have been unintelligible to any one but Napoleon) represented the army of Barclay de Tolly as forming a species of semicircle around Wilna, and connected by a chain of Cossacks with that of Bagration, which was much lower on our right, in the environs of Grodno. According to these reports, the army of Barclay de Tolly, which was more particularly opposed to the main body of our troops, was distributed around us in the following manner. Between Tilsit and Kowno, towards Rosiena, and consequently on our left, was said to be stationed the Wittgenstein corps, supposed to number some twenty and odd thousand men, whilst the Bagowonh corps, which, including the Ouvaroff corps of cavalry, amounted to nineteen thousand men, was at Wilkomir; and at Wilna itself was encamped the Imperial Guard, with the reserves, amounting altogether, inclusive of the heavy cavalry, under General Korff, to twenty-four thousand men. Moreover, in front of us, on the Wilna route, but somewhat to our right, were spread other troops, of which the number was



unknown, but which could not be inferior to that of the detachments already enumerated. These were Touczkoff's corps, encamped at Nowoi-Troki, numbering about nineteen thousand troops, that of Schouvaloff, encamped at Olkeniki, and numbering about fourteen thousand, and finally, on the extreme right, that of Doctoroff, containing about twenty thousand troops, posted at Lida, and connected, by eight thousand Cossacks, with the army of Prince Bagration. This distribution of the 130,000 troops under Barclay de Tolly was but imperfectly known, but the fact of its distribution in a semicircle around Wilna, in masses somewhat stronger on our left and front than on our right, and connected by Cossacks with the troops under Bagration, was sufficiently certain to enable Napoleon to order the march of his army upon Wilna with sufficient knowledge of the state of existing circumstances.

Marshal Macdonald, on our extreme left, succeeded in crossing without difficulty the Niemen at Tilsit. He had under his command 11,000 Poles and 17,000 Prussians, and received orders to advance upon Rosiena, without precipitation, in such a manner as to cover the navigation of the Niemen, and to invade Courland in proportion as the Russians should fall back upon the Dwina. Napoleon directed Marshal Oudinot's corps, numbering 36,000 men, upon Janowo, and commanded the marshal to pass the Wilia for the purpose of advancing upon Wilkomir. It was probable that this corps would encounter that of Wittgenstein, which would traverse Wilkomir in its retreat from Rosiena, and Napoleon reinforced it, therefore, with a division of cuirassiers belonging to the third corps of the cavalry of reserve. He was anxious, also, to transport beyond the Wilia, but at a point somewhat nearer Wilna, Ney's corps, which also consisted of 36,000 men; for Oudinot and Ney, marching parallel to each other, would be sufficiently strong to keep the enemy in check until aid could be afforded them, even if, contrary to all probability, they were to fall in with the main body of the Russian army. They would have nothing to fear, therefore, with respect to Wittgenstein or Bagowouth, either separate or united, and by acting in unison would be able to overwhelm them.

Having taken these almost superabundant precautions with respect to his left, Napoleon resolved to march directly upon Wilna, with Murat's 20,000 horse, Davout's 70,000 infantry, and the 36,000 veteran soldiers of the Guard; for, with 120,000 troops immediately at his command, he felt certain of being able to vanquish all obstacles, and, by piercing the Russian line towards Wilna, of entirely separating Barclay de Tolly from Bagration.

With respect to the enemy's troops posted on our right, although nothing certain was known with respect to them, it was considered that they were situated between Nowoi-Troki and Lida, forming Barclay de Tolly's left wing, and amounting at the most to no more than 40,000 men; and, as Prince Eugene would have 80,000 troops at his command in his projected passage of the Niemen at Prenn, he would have no difficulty in resisting them, should the Russians, contrary to their practice, take the offensive.

The execution of these orders, given on the day succeeding the passage of the Niemen, was

carried out, whilst Napoleon, established at Kowno, devoted himself to the various subjects demanding his attention which we have already mentioned,—only advancing with the troops in person when the advanced posts gave information of the presence of the enemy. On the 25th, Murat and Davout advanced, the one at the head of his cavalry, the other at the head of his infantry, as far as Zismary, after having traversed a difficult tract of country in which the Russians could easily have stopped their progress; for their course had lain in fact along the side of the wooded hills which separate the bed of the Wilia from that of the Niemen, confined between these hills and the steep banks of the Niemen, and having but little space, in case of an attack, in which to deploy. On the evening of the 25th, they halted at Zismary, in a far more favourable country, the angle formed by the Wilia and the Niemen being infinitely more open. On the following day, the 26th, they passed the night on the Jewe road, having met in their march but a few Cossacks, who fled at their approach, after having first set fire, when there was time, to the farms and chateaux. The weather remained clear and serene, but the villages were already only met with at distant intervals, and the opportunities of obtaining supplies had become very rare. The soldiers of Marshal Davout's corps, carrying their bread on their backs, and being accompanied by a troop of cattle, were well provided with provision; but they were somewhat fatigued with the length of their marches, and some of the younger of them, especially of the Illyrians and Dutch, remained on the road exhausted. The horses, especially, suffered much, and for want of oats were driven every evening to feed in the field on the green rye, which gratified whilst it failed to nourish them. The reserve-artillery and the wagons loaded with munitions and provisions were in the rear. Murat's cavalry, which, unfortunately, he wore out with useless movements, was already very much fatigued.

By the 27th, Jewe was reached, and, as this place is no more than a long day's journey from Wilna, Murat, in order to be able to reach this city early on the following day, advanced to Riconti, which is three or four leagues in advance of Jewe.

But neither the court of the Czar, nor his army, were to be found at Wilna. The passage of the Niemen, commenced on the morning of the 24th, was known on the evening of the same day at Wilna, whilst the Emperor Alexander was present at a ball given by General Benningesen.

The news of this event, brought by a domestic of Count Romanzoff's, was a source of considerable consternation, and added to the confusion which already existed in the staff. Wishing to have the advantage of much advice, Alexander had carried with him a crowd of personages of very various character, rank, and station. Independently of General Barclay de Tolly, who did not give his orders as general-in-chief of the army, but as minister of war, Alexander had with him General Benningesen, the Grand Duke Constantine, an old minister of war named Araktchejev, the ministers of police and the interior, MM. de Balachoff and Kotchoubey, and Prince Walkowski,—this last personage performing the functions of chief of the emperor's staff. To these Russians, who were for the most

part animated with violent sentiments, were added a number of foreigners who had fled to Alexander from the persecutions of Napoleon, or from his influence and his glory, which they detested. Among these were an officer of engineers named Michaux, of Piedmontese origin, and in high consideration with Alexander; a Swede, the Count of Armfeld, who had been compelled by the political events of Sweden to fly to Russia, a man of some mind, but nevertheless held in little esteem; an Italian named Paulucci, very imaginative and very petulant; several Germans, of whom may be more particularly mentioned the Baron de Stein, whom Napoleon had excluded from the Prussian government, who was the idol in Germany of all the enemies of France, and whose character presented a strange mixture of liberalism and aristocratic sentiment blended with the most ardent patriotism; an active, intelligent, and well-informed officer of the staff, ever eager to put himself forward, Colonel Walzogen; and, lastly, a Prussian general, Pfuhl, who was more a *savant* than a military man, who exercised great influence over Alexander, for which reason he was detested by all the *habitués* of the court, and who was regarded by some persons as possessed of superior genius, whilst others considered him as incapable of rendering the least real service, and only capable of influencing for a certain time by his very singularity of character the mobile and dreamy imagination of the Emperor Alexander.

It was in the midst of all these counsellors that Alexander, who had more mind than any of them, but was less capable than they of grasping and holding firmly an idea, had lived for many months, when Napoleon's cannon forced him from his wavering and compelled him to decide upon some plan for the campaign.

Among the various above-named personages two ideas had been constant subjects of debate. The men of impetuous spirit, and who, as is usually the case, were not the most enlightened, were averse to the plan of awaiting Napoleon's advance, and were desirous that the Russian armies should, on the contrary, be marched upon Old Prussia and Poland, for the purpose of ravaging these countries, which were either the allies or the accomplices of France, and that they should retreat only after having increased by two hundred leagues the desert in which it was hoped that Napoleon would be lost. Calm and sensible men, however, regarded this project as dangerous, and maintained, with reason, that to advance to meet Napoleon was to shorten for him the road over which he had to pass, to relieve him consequently from the most serious difficulties of the war, which were those arising from the immense distances he had to traverse, and to afford him on the very borders of his own territory the opportunity, which he so much desired, of fighting a new battle of Austerlitz, of Friedland, a battle which he would doubtless gain, and the result of which in his favour would decide the whole question, or at least place him in the ascendant during the remainder of the war. They added that, instead of diminishing the distances which Napoleon's troops had to traverse; it was absolutely necessary, on the other hand, to increase them by retreating before them, and leaving them to continue their mission unchecked, so that when they should have ad-

vanced into the very heart of Russia, and become exhausted by hunger and fatigue, it would be possible to overwhelm them and drive them back, half destroyed, across the Russian frontier. The inconvenience of this plan was, indeed, that instead of giving up Old Prussia and Poland to ravage it demanded the devastation of Russia itself; but, nevertheless, the prospect of almost certain success was an argument of such weight that no consideration deserved to be placed in the balance with it.

The controversy between the maintainers of these two sets of opinions which had commenced at St. Petersburg had not ceased at Wilna when the news that Napoleon had crossed the Niemen put an end to General Benning's ball. Alexander's intellect was of too high an order to permit him to hesitate respecting such a subject: indeed, to force Napoleon to endure the same species of campaign amidst the climate of Russia which Massena had been compelled to endure amidst that of the Peninsula was manifestly pointed out by existing circumstances as the proper course to pursue; and political reasons, moreover, left him no room for hesitation. Constantly anxious to obtain the sympathy of the Russian people, of Europe, and even of France, in his struggle with Napoleon, he had carefully abstained from any action which could have given him the appearance of being the aggressor, and in pursuance of this system, therefore, he determined to await the enemy's attack.

This course of conduct was very simple, and dictated by sound reason. But a desire had existed for the construction of an entire system of conducting the war, and General Pfuhl was the author of such a system, which he propounded to Alexander with an appearance of profundity which was well calculated to fascinate the Emperor's imagination.

Whenever a great man, drawing his inspiration not from theories but from circumstances, has performed great actions, it invariably happens that he is succeeded by imitators who substitute systems for the great deeds which have been the offspring of true genius. In the eighteenth century there was a general propensity to imitate the military manœuvres of Frederick, and after the battle of Leuthen to propound systems founded on the *ordre oblique*, to which was attributed all the Prussian monarch's success. In like manner, after the year 1800, and the campaigns of General Bonaparte, who had known how to manœuvre so skillfully on his adversary's wings and lines of communication, nothing was spoken of but turning the enemy; and at Austerlitz, accordingly, Alexander's advisers had endeavoured to turn Napoleon,—with what result we know. In 1810 a man of clear intelligence and decided character, Lord Wellington, aided by an extraordinarily-fortunate conjunction of circumstances, accomplished a brilliant campaign in Portugal, and his manœuvres were everywhere quoted throughout Europe as those which it would be henceforth necessary to follow. To fall back before the enemy, destroying every thing in the line of retreat, to withdraw into an impregnable camp, to remain there until the enemy should be exhausted, and then to sally forth to overwhelm him, composed, in the estimation of some persons, since Torres-Vedras, the whole science of

war; and of this new science General Pfuhl had constituted himself the chief master in the midst of the Russian staff. With the exception of the Czar, who found deep satisfaction in his pretended profundities, the general had worn out and disgusted every one with his dogmatism, his pretence, and his pride; but Alexander regarded him as an unappreciated genius, and intrusted him with the task of drawing up the plan of the impending war.

General Pfuhl, after having studied the map of Russia, had remarked (as indeed any one might at the first glance) that the long transverse line of the Dwina and the Dnieper forms, from the northwest to the southeast, a vast and excellent line of interior defence. He desired, therefore, that the Russian armies should fall back upon this line, form there a species of impregnable Torres-Vedras, and pursue then a course similar to that which had been pursued by the English and Spanish armies in Portugal. Having, moreover, in the course of his attentive study of the map of Russia, remarked at Drissa on the Dwina a place which seemed suitable for the establishment of an intrenched camp, he had proposed to form one at this place; and Alexander, adopting this proposition, had sent the engineer Michaux to trace out and superintend the execution of the works. In addition, also, to his camp of Drissa, General Pfuhl determined to effect a distribution of the Russian forces according to a system which he had deduced from the operations of Lord Wellington in Portugal; and accordingly he demanded two armies, a principal one and a secondary one,—the one, on the Dwina, falling back before the French and retreating from them into the camp at Drissa, the other, on the Dnieper, also falling back before the French, but destined to assail them in flank and rear when the time should come for the Russian troops to act on the offensive. In accordance with this plan, therefore, had been formed the two armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration.

To retreat before the French, and thus to induce them to plunge into the very depths of Russia, was certainly a most just idea, from which Alexander was in time to reap the greatest benefits, and which, at the time of which we speak, was generally entertained throughout Europe. But why should there be an intrenched camp, and, above all, why so near the frontier? Lord Wellington had taken care to provide an intrenched camp to preserve his troops from being driven into the sea; but the Russians already possessed an equivalent for an intrenched camp in all the space extending to the shore of the icy ocean. Moreover, to fix the point at which it was to be attempted to check the progress of the French on the Dwina was to attempt to check them at the very outset of their invasion, whilst still in full vigour and possession of all their resources, as the event proved, and to expose the camp to the danger of being carried by assault. And finally, admitting that operations could be successfully carried on against the enemy's flank, it would be a source of great danger to divide, from the very commencement of the campaign, the main body of the Russian forces; and it would have been much better to have left the troops returning from Asia to form this flank army, destined to harass the French, and perhaps to cut off their retreat. In the mean time

Alexander, who reserved to himself and a few German adepts the discussion of this plan, carried into execution its most important preliminary operations, advancing his troops, as we have seen, in two masses, the one resting on the Dwina, the other on the Dnieper, and directed, the first towards Wilna, the second towards Minsk.

There could be no objection to this arrangement of the troops, for it was very natural that the two principal bodies of the German troops should assemble behind these two rivers. But the more prudent members of the staff fully expected that these two armies were to be speedily united, and to fall back before the enemy, delaying to attack him until worn out and exhausted and enticed sufficiently far into the Russian territory. This was particularly the advice of Barclay de Tolly, a cold, firm, intelligent officer, a scion of a Scotch family established in Courland, and, on account of his foreign origin, regarded with little favour by the Russians, the fermentation of whose national passions made them regard all strangers with dislike. This advice, however, as we have already seen, was distasteful to many; for the men of impetuous character, whether Russians, Germans, Swedes, or Italians, detesting France, her revolution, and her glory, were excessively averse to the idea of granting to France the honour of seeing the Russian armies retreat before her troops, and declared that it would be far better to invade Prussia and Poland, to ravage a vast extent of territory, and afford Germany the opportunity she desired of throwing off Napoleon's yoke. This latter opinion was the one which was chiefly maintained at the head-quarters of Prince Bagration,—a prince of Georgian origin, courageous and skilful in the management of troops, but wanting in the talents of a commander-in-chief, and whose real wish at this time was to advance and make a furious attack upon the French. Jealous of Barclay, distrustful of the military *savants*, he favoured the expression among the persons around him of exclamations against the strangers who advised Alexander and endeavoured to persuade him, they declared, to adopt a timid course of action.

Alexander had thus advanced with his two armies, secretly believing, although he refrained as yet from declaring his opinion, that the safety of his kingdom would be found in the adoption of the plan propounded by General Pfuhl. As, however, he was unwilling as yet to announce his determination, he did not dare to nominate a commander-in-chief, since he could not do so without giving evident proof as to which of the systems he inclined; and he accordingly intrusted Barclay de Tolly with the duty of giving his orders, as minister of war; but the sudden apparition of Napoleon beyond the Niemen left him no longer at leisure to hesitate, and forced him to adopt some plan for the conduct of the campaign.

Alexander had been inclined to convocate a council of war, composed of councillors of all nations, and to submit to its consideration the plan propounded by General Pfuhl, not indeed by the general's own mouth, (for he was a man quite incapable of defending his system against adverse objections,) but by that of Colonel Walzogen, his usual interpreter, and a man whose mind was at once clear and subtle. Colonel Walzogen, however, had shown him that such a

course would but lead to the brink of a fresh chaos, and that it would be far better simply to select at once a commander-in-chief, and to confide to him the execution of the plan which should be selected. For such a post General Barclay de Tolly was manifestly the most fitted, both on account of his obedience, his firmness, his practical talents, and his position as minister of war. Besides, the approach of the enemy with a crushing mass of about two hundred thousand men, when Russia had but one hundred and thirty thousand with which to meet them, had to a great degree quelled the eagerness of the partisans of an offensive system of action; and there was no reason, therefore, to fear that a retrograde movement, which had become inevitable, would meet with any great degree of blame. Alexander, consequently, adopted the advice of Colonel Walzogen, the course pointed out by it being indeed the only one left open in the existing state of circumstances, and confided to General Barclay de Tolly, not as general-in-chief, but as minister of war, the conduct of the retreat of the principal army upon the Dwina, in the direction of the camp of Drissa. These arrangements having been made, he set forth with a crowd of his counsellors, following the road which leads to Drissa by Swenziany and Vildzouy.

It was by no means an easy task to effect, in the presence of Napoleon, whose movements were ordinarily as swift as lightning, the retreat of the six Russian corps which were posted around Wilna and composed the principal army.

As we have already said, the first of these corps, under the command of Count Wittgenstein, was at Rosiena, where it formed the Russian extreme right, and was opposed to the extreme left of the French. The second, under General Bagowouth, was at Janowo; the third, composed of the Russian guard and the reserves, was at Wilna; the fourth, under General Touczkoff, was between Kowno and Wilna, at Nowoi-Troki. For these four corps the retreat was easy, for they had to retire directly upon the Dwina, without being exposed to the danger of finding the French in their path; and no greater difficulty existed with regard to the heavy cavalry, which was distributed in two corps of reserve under Generals Ouvaroff and Korff, and posted in the rear. But the fifth corps, under Count Schouvaloff, and the sixth, under General Doctoroff, posted, the one at Olkeniki and the other at Lida, and forming the extreme left of the semicircle which the Russian forces described around Wilna, might, before they regained the Swenziany road, be stopped by the French, who were already on their march to Wilna. In the mean time the Hetman Platow, whose eight thousand Cossacks completed the one hundred and thirty thousand men of the army at the Dwina, was near Grodno.

General Barclay de Tolly hastened to order all the corps to fall back upon the Dwina, in the direction of the camp of Drissa, and directed the two which were the most unfavourably placed to conduct their retreat by turning around Wilna and keeping as far as possible from this city, so as to avoid falling in with the enemy. At the same time he himself, despising the counsellors who had displayed so much eagerness in flying from the enemy, affected to remain with his rear-guard, and slowly to re-

treat with it, disputing the ground with the enemy foot by foot. Meanwhile an order had been sent to Prince Bagration to march on the Dnieper, following as much as possible the course of the Minsk, in order to be in a position to join the principal army, when this junction should become necessary. The Hetman Platow, who was directed constantly to render his troops a link between those of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, was ordered to harass the French in flank and rear.

Before quitting Wilna, the Emperor Alexander, though regarding the war as inevitable, and resolved to maintain it energetically, determined to attempt a last measure which, whilst failing to put a stop to hostilities, would throw the responsibility of the consequences upon Napoleon. Learning that M. de Lauriston had founded the demand for his passports on the demand made by Prince Kourakin for his, and on the pretence that a condition had been attempted to be imposed on the French relative to the evacuation of Prussia, he took pains to answer these two objections so as to place his adversary entirely in the wrong. He directed, therefore, M. de Balachoff, minister of police, a man of spirit and tact, to carry to Napoleon a message expressing his, Alexander's, extreme surprise at Napoleon's sudden rupture of the peace between the two nations without any previous declaration of war; declaring Prince Kourakin's demand for his passports as a most insufficient reason, since the prince had not been authorized to take the course he had, and that the pretended condition of the evacuation of Prussia could not fairly be a serious cause of complaint, since it had been proposed, not as a necessary preliminary to negotiation, but only as a consequence, to be promised and certain, of any pacific arrangement which might be made. Alexander even authorized M. de Balachoff to declare that this evacuation of Prussia was so little an absolute condition, that if the French desired to halt on the Niemen he would consent to negotiate immediately, on the basis indicated in the course of the various preceding communications. These orders having been given, Alexander set out on the 26th of June, at the same time addressing a spirited proclamation to his people, in which he pledged himself solemnly never to treat with the enemy so long as he should remain on the Russian territory.

Whilst Alexander was in the act of departing, M. de Balachoff hastened to meet the French army, and found it *en route* for Wilna. He had at first some difficulty in obtaining the recognition of his character of aide-de-camp to the Russian Emperor; but, when this difficulty had been overcome, he was conducted to the presence of Murat, who, glittering with gold, and his head covered with plumes, galloped through the midst of his numerous squabrons.

Murat, facile, amiable, and indiscreet as usual, received M. de Balachoff most graciously, affected to deplore the renewal of the war, to regret his fair Neapolitan kingdom, to be perfectly free from any desire of obtaining that of Poland, and to display himself in the character of a reasonable servant of a most unreasonable master, whilst his manner was full of those gracious demonstrations for which he had a natural talent, notwithstanding his education had been much neglected. He then sent M. de

Balachoff to the infantry advanced posts, which were behind those of the cavalry, and there M. de Balachoff, being presented to Marshal Davout, was received with coldness, reserve, and silence. Having expressed a desire to be permitted to proceed immediately to the presence of the Emperor, the marshal declined to permit him to do so, alleging his orders, and retaining the envoy in a species of imprisonment until a communication should have been received from head-quarters. On the following morning a message arrived that M. de Balachoff was to be detained, until the French should have entered Wilna, the interview he desired with Napoleon.

On the morning of the same day (the 28th) the cavalry under General Bruyère arrived at the gates of Wilna, and encountered there a large detachment of the Russian cavalry, supported by infantry and some pieces of artillery. The charge of the opposed troops was desperate, but the enemy's advanced guard, after having resisted for some moments, withdrew into the city, at the same time burning the bridges across the Wilia and setting fire to magazines of stores within the town. Marshal Davout, who had followed Murat's cavalry at a league's distance, entered with it into Wilna, where the Lithuanians, although they had submitted to the Russians for forty years, received the French with joy, and hastened to aid them in repairing the bridge across the Wilia. By the aid of some boats the communication between the two banks of the stream was speedily re-established, and immediate pursuit was made of the Russians, who retreated rapidly but in good order.

Thus the capital of Lithuania was taken almost without a blow, and after only four days of hostilities; and Napoleon entered it in the midst of the assembled crowds of the inhabitants, who gradually caught a spirit of enthusiasm from contact with our soldiers, especially the Polish soldiers, and the remembrance of that liberty which they had formerly enjoyed, but which the most aged of them alone had actually known. The Lithuanian nobles who were the partisans of Russia had already fled, and those which were not had awaited the approach of our troops, and readily assisted in the creation of new means for the administration of the country in the interest of the French army, which was at that moment the interest of Poland also. At the same time their zeal was checked by the terrible fear that this attempt to effect the reconstitution of Poland would not be a genuine one, and that in less than a month the Russian couriers would re-enter Wilna, bearing orders of sequestration and exile.

The first service required at the hands of the inhabitants was the preparation of bread for our soldiers, who had arrived famished for the want, not of meat, which they had had in abundance, but of bread, of which they had had scarcely the least supply. Grain was not scarce, but the Russians had taken pains to destroy in every direction flour, mills, and oats, being well aware that the mere possession of corn would not supply the enemy with bread, and that the French could not support for any time without oats the immense number of horses which followed the army. Napoleon now ordered that the masons who accompanied the French armies should be immediately employed in the con-

struction of bakeries; and in the mean time those already existing in the town were seized for the use of the troops, but they could only furnish thirty thousand rations a day, whilst a hundred thousand were required immediately, and this number would be increased in the course of a few days to two hundred thousand.

Whilst Napoleon was devoting his attention to these preliminary matters, the various corps of the army were executing their prescribed movements without any misadventures beyond the inconveniences which were to be expected as the result of over-fatigue and unfavourable weather. Marshal Ney, as we have already seen, had passed the Wilia nearer Wilna than Marshal Oudinot, namely, in the environs of Riconti, and had marched in the direction of Maliatouy, perceiving in the distance Bagowouth's corps, which was at first at Wilkomir, but which, in accordance with the retrograde movement made by the Russian corps, had marched from this point in the direction of Swenziany and Drissa. Ney, however, only fell in with the rear-guard, which, composed of Cosacks, was eager in devastating with fire every thing which lay in the path of the French troops; but they had not always time to complete this operation, and were compelled, fortunately, to leave some resources at our disposal. In the mean time, Marshal Oudinot, having passed the Wilia below, at Janowo, for the purpose of marching upon Wilkomir, had encountered there the troops commanded by Wittgenstein, who had marched from Rosiena to Wilkomir, and who on the morning of the 28th, at the moment when the main body of the French army was entering Wilna, being in position at Deweltowo, at the head of twenty-four thousand men, displayed to Marshal Oudinot a line of about twenty thousand infantry slowly retreating under cover of a numerous artillery and a numerous body of cavalry. But the Russian general had encountered in Marshal Oudinot a man who would not allow himself to be braved with impunity; and, although the latter had at his immediate command only his light cavalry, foot-artillery, Verdier's infantry-division, and Doumère's cuirassiers, he did not hesitate to attack the Russians, and, having speedily driven their cavalry behind the lines of their infantry, he attacked the latter with Verdier's division, and forced it to retreat with a loss in killed and wounded of about four hundred men.

The troops under Marshal Oudinot were as fatigued as those under Marshal Ney, worn out by the marches on their way to the Niemen, as well as by those which they had made since they had passed it. They were in want of bread, salt, and spirits, and utterly disgusted with a diet which consisted of meat without salt, and a little flour mixed with water. At the same time the horses were very much enfeebled by the want of oats. A great number of soldiers remaining in the rear were in a manner lost, for there were but few inhabitants of whom they could ask their way, and those few did not speak Polish.

Such was the situation of affairs on our left and on the other side of the Wilia; and matters were almost in the same state in our centre, on the direct route from Kowno to Wilna, which the last divisions of Marshal Davout's corps were now traversing, followed by the Imperial

Guard. On our right Prince Eugene's corps was altogether backward, for this prince, having had to traverse, not Old Prussia, as had Marshals Davout, Oudinot, and Ney, but Poland, had crossed with difficulty, at the cost of great efforts and great privations, the sterile and shifting sands of the districts across which lay his route, and had only reached the Niemen on the very day when the main body of the army entered Wilna. In passing the Niemen at Prenn, Eugene would debouch upon Nowoi-Troki and Olkeniky,—points occupied by the corps of Touczkoff and Schouvaloff, which together numbered no more than thirty-four thousand men, and were consequently quite incapable of holding in check the eighty thousand men of the army of Italy. The difficulties, therefore, which were to be feared by Prince Eugene did not arise from the operations of the enemy, but from natural obstacles on the route he had to traverse.

Up to this time, with the exception of some passing snows, the sky had been serene and the weather mild, but free from that excessive heat which is so often experienced in extreme climates, which are by turns deprived of the sun in winter, or oppressed with its ardour in summer. Poland, which in the winter of 1807 had presented so dreary a landscape, was now verdant, and with its vast forests offered to the eye a scenery which was sufficiently agreeable, although wanting in that genuine gayety which the presence of man and man's industry always throws over natural scenery. The roads were to a great degree dried by the sun's heat, and presented no insurmountable difficulties.

Suddenly, however, on the evening of the 28th, this favourable state of the weather vanished; the sky was covered with clouds, and a series of terrible storms enveloped almost the whole of Poland. The ground was loosened beneath the tread of the soldiers and horses; and, to add to the misfortune, the temperature changed as violently as the aspect of the heavens, becoming suddenly extremely cold. During the three days from the 29th of June to the 1st of July, the state of the weather was frightful, and the bivouacs extremely painful, for the soldiers had to sleep in a species of mud. Many of the younger men were attacked with dysentery, the result not only of the rapid change in the weather, but also of a diet almost exclusively of meat and frequently of pork. A portion of the divisions of Marshal Davout, which were still, on the 29th, on their march upon Wilna, and the whole of the guard which followed them, being completely without shelter, (for the few dwellings scattered about the country were scarcely sufficient to lodge the staffs,) had to endure the greatest sufferings. The troops of Marshals Ney and Oudinot suffered somewhat less, for the country which they traversed had been visited by neither French nor Russians; but on the right the sufferings endured by the corps of Prince Eugene, which was now crossing the Niemen, were much greater. The bridge had been thrown across the stream on the evening of the 29th, and a division had already crossed the Niemen, when a violent storm of mingled hail, rain, wind, and lightning, swept away the tents and threw the troops into a species of universal panic. It was impossible for the soldiers to lie down on the inundated soil; the passage across the stream was interrupted,

and, during forty-eight hours, one-half of the troops remained on one side of the stream and one-half on the other.

Prince Eugene's corps succeeded at length, however, in crossing the Niemen, and speedily advanced on Nowoi-Troki, although still in the state of disorder which had been produced by the sudden occurrence of bad weather. Napoleon had levied horses for his armies as for his conscripts, by thousands, in Switzerland, Italy, and Germany, without paying regard to their age; for, although he had given some wise recommendations on this point, the number he required had rendered it quite impossible to follow them. Many of these horses, therefore, harnessed too young, and without any previous training, to immense wagons, were compelled to draw them. The cold and wet nights of the 29th and 30th of June destroyed many thousands, being especially destructive to those of Prince Eugene's corps, and in two days the roads were covered with dead horses and abandoned wagons. If the men and officers of the baggage-train had been more experienced, they would have known how to remedy the misfortune to some extent by assembling in *pares* by the side of the roads the wagons which had lost their horses, leaving detachments to guard them, and carrying forward with the horses which still remained those stores of which there was the most immediate need. In Prince Eugene's corps, which contained many Italians and Bavarians, the disorder was extreme; and it also existed to a great extent in the rear of Marshal Davout's corps, among the Dutch and Hanseatic troops and the Spaniards of the first corps; and these latter, being foreigners, and little interested, therefore, in the honour of an army which was French, and feeling but slight enthusiasm for a cause which was not their own, were the first to disband themselves and to take advantage of the intricate character of the wooded country around to desert, and devote themselves to the pursuit of plunder, whilst even among our own troops there was some relaxation of discipline, but it existed only among those who, having been refractory conscripts, had been brought in by the columns mobile and forcibly compelled to serve. Between the Niemen and Wilna there were now from twenty-five to thirty thousand Bavarian, Italian, Wurtembergian, Hanseatic, Spanish, and French deserters, who pillaged equally the abandoned wagons, and the castles of the Lithuanian nobles. In the mean time Prince Eugene, whose corps had suffered most from these complicated evils, having arrived at Nowoi-Troki, on the right of Wilna, although very unwilling to cause Napoleon any annoyance, informed him of the state of affairs; whilst from the other generals proceeded similar reports.

Napoleon was not the man, however, to be terrified by such misadventures as these at the commencement of a campaign, for the successful conduct of which he had taken so many precautions; and he had, moreover, plucked a triumph in 1807 from the midst of a state of affairs which was very similar, although on a less scale. He had no doubt, therefore, that he would succeed in vanquishing the present difficulties, which he regarded as entirely local, but which sprang, unfortunately, from radical causes. In Portugal, Massena's soldiers had quitted the

ranks for the purpose of procuring sustenance; but they had not failed to return in the evening, for they were Frenchmen and veteran warriors. But a large proportion of the troops which composed the army with which Napoleon invaded Russia were neither Frenchmen nor veterans.

A halt of fifteen days at Wilna was the means by which Napoleon proposed to remedy the existing evils and to rally the stragglers; and more especially to bring up the long train of baggage-wagons, which stretched not only from Wilna to the Niemen, but from the Niemen to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Elbe. Such a halt would also afford the opportunity of arranging the affairs of Lithuania and establishing there a Polish government, of which there was so much need. There could be no doubt, indeed, that a delay of fifteen days could be fully employed by Napoleon in the arrangement of many important matters, but it was a question whether such a delay would not nullify Napoleon's excellent plan of dividing the Russian line. Would not such a halt enable Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, who were retreating upon the Dwina and the Dnieper respectively, to unite their troops beyond these two rivers? Again, would it not have been better, if such a halt were necessary, to have made it at Kowno, before the Niemen had been passed and the enemy put on the alert by the violation of the frontiers? and was it not better, on the other hand, now that the rash step had been taken, to follow out the bold course which had been adopted, and to march forward without delay, with the object of attacking the Russians and obtaining some decisive result before they should have had time to withdraw into the depths of their country? These were grave questions, but they appeared to be a source of no embarrassment to Napoleon; for, whilst he entertained the idea of rallying the stragglers, establishing an effective police in his rear, reorganizing the land-transport service, and creating a government for Lithuania, he by no means relinquished his plan of placing himself between the two principal Russian armies in such a manner as to isolate the one from the other during the remainder of the campaign.

The entrance of the troops into Wilna, which took place on the 29th of June, had scarcely been effected, when the reports of the light cavalry announced that many thousand Russian troops were on their march around Wilna, and were advancing in a curved line from our right to our left, doubtless with the purpose of joining Barclay de Tolly on the Dwina. In any case, there was an opportunity of intercepting these troops, since, even if Bagration were to be encountered, our troops would only have to meet the head of his corps, as it had to ascend northward the whole distance from Grodno to Wilna, and there would certainly be time to intercept its road. Napoleon resolved, therefore, whilst still opposing Barclay de Tolly with his left, to make a rapid march on his right with the purpose of intercepting Bagration, enveloping him if possible, or driving him into the marshes of Pinsk and thus paralyzing him for the rest of the campaign.

The description already given of the theatre of war will enable the reader to perceive what were the movements which Napoleon had to make for the execution of his proposed plan.

From the Rhine to the Niemen Napoleon's course had been northeast; after the passage of the Niemen it had taken an easterly direction, and retained it as far as Moscow. When the Niemen had been crossed and the course of the Wilia ascended as far as Wilna, our troops encountered the great transverse lines, of which we have already spoken, formed by the Dwina and the Dnieper, and had naturally advanced to the open space left by these streams at their birth between Witepsk and Smolensk; and in this movement the left wing had faced the Dwina, towards which were advancing the troops under Barclay de Tolly, and the right wing had faced the Dnieper, upon which Bagration was retreating. Napoleon's object being now, on the one hand, to halt so as to be enabled to rally the troops and baggage which had fallen into the rear, and on the other hand to pursue Bagration so energetically as to separate him from Barclay de Tolly, he determined to halt his left, which had but a short distance to traverse to reach the Dwina, whilst he endeavoured with his right to precede Bagration on the Dnieper.

Macdonald, who had at first been directed upon Rosiena, had been since ordered to proceed to the right upon Poniewiez, for the purpose of joining Oudinot, whilst the latter was in like manner ordered to take a direction to the right between Awanta and Widzouy, for the purpose of approaching close to Ney; and Ney himself was ordered to march towards Swenziany, close to Murat, who with all his cavalry was pursuing by Gloubokoe the Russian army on its retreat upon the Dwina. In the next place, these commanders, whose troops might have amounted altogether since the last march to about one hundred and seven or one hundred and eight thousand men, to remain in observation to mark the operations of the rest of the army, to rally their stragglers, to collect grain and to convert it into flour, to repair the mills which had been destroyed by the Russians, to construct ovens, to bring up their heavy artillery and baggage-trains, and to employ themselves, in short, in concentrating and reorganizing their strength, in guarding against the attacks of the enemy, and carefully watching his least movements.

For the purpose of connecting this immovable left with his right, which was to be very active, Napoleon ordered Murat to extend his cavalry from Gloubokoe to Wileika, at the same time arranging that it should be supported by one or two of the divisions of Marshal Davout which should first arrive in line; and, to still further strengthen this connection between the left and the right, he proposed to march upon the same point Prince Eugene's corps, which was now halting at Nowoi-Truki for the purpose of taking a little repose and reorganizing its disordered columns.

It was with Marshal Davout's corps, which was always in the best order and the most thoroughly provided for undertaking a march, that Napoleon resolved to make his projected movements on his right, against the troops which had been seen marching in a circular direction around Wilna, and which were, as we have already said, either the last troops of Barclay's corps, or the head of that of Bagration. On the 29th of June, therefore, the light cavalry of Davout's corps was put in motion under the

orders of Generals Pojol and Bordessoulle, the former taking the road from Ochmiana to Minsk, and the latter proceeding by the Lida road in the direction of Wiokowisk,—these being the two great routes which descended from Wilna towards Southern Lithuania, and on which might be met either the delayed detachments of Barclay's corps, or the whole of the army under Bagration.

On the evening of the 30th, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout, with Compans's division, to follow Pojol in the direction of Ochmiana,—at the same time marching Desaix's division on the Lida road, in the wake of General Bordessoulle, and holding Morand's division in readiness to follow Marshal Davout if necessary. He urged on the movements of Prince Eugene, who, having halted after the passage of the Niemen, and receiving contradictory reports, had feared to encounter danger by advancing too rapidly; for he proposed that the troops of this prince, ascending from Nowoi-Troki to Ochmiana, should also support, if needful, those of Marshal Davout, or take their place in the line of battle beside Murat, so as to form the centre of the army and connect the right with the left wing. At the same time Napoleon ordered the cavalry under General Grouchy, which belonged to Eugene's division, to aid that of Bordessoulle, and to place itself, if necessary, at the command of Marshal Davout, to whom also he gave the *cuirassiers de Valence*.

Marshal Davout, it must be observed, could not, with the two divisions Compans and Desaix, which were the only troops at his command on his departure from Wilna, envelop Bagration's army, which amounted to about sixty thousand men, and which some flying rumours had even raised to one hundred thousand; but there remained on the extreme right the twenty-five thousand men under King Jerome, which, debouching from Grodno and following Bagration in the rear, would assist in surrounding him or driving him into the Pinsk marshes.

By this combination of movements, therefore, retaining his troops of the left in observation on the Dwina, and hastily throwing a portion of his troops of the right on the Dnieper, whilst the centre, after having reposed at Nowoi-Troki, was preparing to place itself in line, Napoleon afforded to two-thirds of his army the time to rally, and prepared with only the remaining third to cut off Prince Bagration's retreat. In the mean time, whilst he entered with his usual ability into every administrative detail affecting the welfare of his troops, he also devoted his attention to Poland, which, indeed, demanded his earnest consideration, since he was now present there, appeared to have arrived for the sake of its interests, and since, moreover, the war could not have a successful or genuine result in the attainment of which the situation of Poland had not been duly considered.

At this moment, in fact, the greatest agitation prevailed at Warsaw, and, on the arrival of the news of the passage of the Niemen by four hundred thousand men under the great man of the age, the reconstitution of Poland was proclaimed, the concentration of all its provinces into a single state was decreed, and finally, one of those general confederations was determined on by which the Poles had formerly defended their soil and their independence. Since Na-

poleon was compelled, therefore, when advancing into the very heart of Russia, to raise the grave question respecting the reconstitution of Poland, whose territory he was traversing and whose aid he required, he would have acted judiciously, perhaps, had he adopted a decided course of action and attempted to effect its complete reconstitution. In this case, he would have placed at his disposal the whole body of the Polish army, to the number of seventy or eighty thousand men, have been able to form his right wing with it and marched it towards Volhynia and Podolia. A right wing thus formed would have guarded his flanks more faithfully than the Austrian troops, and have been better calculated to rouse Volhynia to his aid; and the adoption of this course would also have enabled him, instead of forming a separate government for Lithuania, to have immediately incorporated that territory with the general kingdom of Poland. He would thus have restored to Poland the sentiment of national existence, and would most probably have succeeded in exciting that national enthusiasm which was necessary to the accomplishment of his designs. But full of doubt, and unwilling to engage himself too far to the reconstitution of Poland before he knew whether the Poles would make any genuine exertion to second his efforts, he hesitated now, as he had hesitated at many other critical moments of this campaign, yielding to a prudence which was perfectly out of place in the rash path on which he had entered, and which arose from his unwillingness to take a step which would alienate Austria and make him appear to have resolved on war with Russia to the death. Having already divided the Polish army into several detachments, he renounced the idea of annexing Lithuania to Poland, and gave it a separate administration. And in the adoption of this course he was influenced by an administrative reason of the most powerful nature. He was in the midst of Lithuania, about to carry on a campaign on its territory, and would probably have to occupy a position within it during one or two years: and to have confided, therefore, its administration to a government situated more than a hundred leagues distant, and from the newness of its creation only partly acknowledged and partly efficacious, would have been to renounce the power of drawing from the resources of this province that aid which he needed, and which he was sure to obtain were its administration in his own hands.

Napoleon gave, therefore, to Lithuania a distinct and independent government, and thus offered a severe menace against Russia, while he still refrained from any action which might be regarded as a declaration of implacable hostility. He formed a commission of seven members selected from the most considerable of the Lithuanian nobles, whom Russia had been unable to gain, or had neglected to attach to her interests; and, persisting in connecting Poland with Saxony, he selected as a member of this commission, and at the same time governor of the province, Count Hogenlopp, a Saxon officer, whom he had made his aide-de-camp. He divided Lithuania into four secondary governments,—namely, Wilna, Grodno, Minsk, and Bialystok,—each of which was to be governed by a commission consisting of three members,



and an intendant, who was to be subordinate to the governor-general. Executive agents were moreover established in each district, under the title of *sous-préfets*. The government of Lithuania, thus organised, was charged with the care of the public property, with the collection of the taxes, the levying of troops, the maintenance and re-establishment of order throughout the country, the erection of magazines and hospitals, and, in short, with the duty of contributing that most efficacious means towards the reconstitution of Poland which consisted in energetically aiding the French army. At the same time, this Lithuanian government was authorized to join the great Polish confederation decreed at Warsaw.

The first act of the new government was to organize a public force; and it voted the creation of four regiments of infantry and five of cavalry, which were to number altogether twelve thousand men, and the cost of the first establishment of which could not be less than four millions of francs,—a sum which the new government had no means of obtaining save from Napoleon, who refused to advance more than four hundred thousand francs. The colonels were chosen from among the great land-proprietors who had formerly served and were attracted by the honours of high military rank, but Prince Poniatowski was required to supply the officers of a lower grade: the Lithuanian population, although already somewhat accustomed, as we have before said, to the Russian yoke, was nevertheless not without considerable enthusiasm for the cause of national liberty, whilst the nobles never ceased to dread the return of the Russians and the decrees of exile and confiscation with which it would be accompanied. The rural population feared pillage and devastation. The inhabitants of the towns, with the exception of the Jews, were perfectly well disposed, but scanty in numbers, and much distressed; and all, whether poor or rich, had been equally ruined by the continental blockade and the sojourn of the Russian troops. Moreover, Napoleon and his subordinates only spoke to the Lithuanians with much reserve respecting Lithuanian independence, whilst they insisted with much vehemence on the subject of the sacrifices which it was necessary that Lithuania should make. These causes diminished the national zeal without destroying it, and much increased the difficulty attending the raising the new regiments.

Besides regiments of the line, the Lithuanian government also raised national guards and *gardes-chasse*, a species of mounted national guards, whose purpose was to keep the country in order, and who were of effectual service as guides to the French cavalry sent in pursuit of bandits and marauders, who had unfortunately become very numerous, amounting to twenty-five or thirty thousand, and increased rather than lessened by the forced marches made by many of the corps of the French army. In fact, so great had this evil become that one whole regiment of the first corps, the 83d *léger*, (a Dutch regiment,) had, notwithstanding the good discipline enforced by Marshal Davout, almost entirely disbanded itself, and pitilessly pillaged the canton of Lida, one of the most fertile in the country.

Another great inconvenience which had to be

removed consisted in the dead bodies of men and horses which covered the roads, unburied, and infecting the air. In populous countries the inhabitants, for the sake of their own safety, hasten to bury the corpses of the dead; but in a country so thinly populated that the villages were five or six leagues distant from each other, this was a subject which was entirely neglected, and Napoleon was compelled, therefore, to make it one of the subjects to be attended to by the columns of cavalry sent to succour the country.

Napoleon also established from Königsberg to Wilna a series of military posts, comprising a commandant, a magazine of stores, a little hospital, relays of horses, and a patrol charged with the maintenance of the security of the road and the interment of the dead.

Whilst occupied with these various cares, Napoleon had devoted his attention to a matter which was still more urgent,—the supply of provisions and the conveyance of stores. One of his first steps in this matter was to order the masons who accompanied the troops to construct at Wilna ovens capable of providing a hundred thousand rations a day; and, as it unfortunately happened that bricks, which were the only available material in a country where stone was so rare, could only be procured at some distance from Wilna, and the artillery-horses were too exhausted to perform the labour of this conveyance, Napoleon did not hesitate to require that the horses drawing the baggage-wagons of the staff should be devoted to this service; and each day he went in person to see how the works proceeded.

The construction of ovens, however, was not the only difficulty which had to be overcome before subsistence for the troops could be secured at Wilna. Grain, indeed, was sufficiently abundant for the Russians had not always time to destroy it; but they had taken particular pains to destroy the mills, and it was necessary to repair them before the grain in our possession could be converted into flour. In the mean time, Napoleon took care to create great magazines at Kowno, at Wilna, and at all the towns which fell into his possession, determining to make Lithuania contribute large quantities of all sorts of grain and forage.

The intervention of Napoleon's active will was also demanded to procure the supply of the means of transport necessary to the execution of these various plans. The first convoys, under the direction of Colonel Baste, had succeeded, to Napoleon's great delight, in traversing the distance from Dantzic to Kowno; but there still remained to be traversed the sinuous course of the Wilia from Kowno to Wilna, which would occupy twenty days, although it was a fifth or sixth shorter than the distance from Dantzic to Kowno, which had occupied no longer. Napoleon therefore determined to attempt to abridge this navigation, and, if he could not succeed in that, to renounce it for a great land-transport enterprise, which he proposed to intrust to a company of Polish Jews.

The new organization of the baggage-train had not succeeded as well as had been expected, and there had been lost between the Elbe and the Niemen one-half of the wagons, a third of the horses, and a fourth of the men. Napoleon gave orders, therefore, that the want of horses should be supplied by oxen, and the horses of

the country; but these orders were, unfortunately, more easily given than executed, for it was a very difficult matter to procure yokes with which to harness the oxen, iron with which to shoe them, and herds to drive them.

In the mean time, actual experience rendered Napoleon more conscious of the difficulties attending the march of 600,000 men into a distant country; but it did not, as yet, diminish his sense of power. Within the space of a few days he had, in fact, obtained possession of Lithuania and cut in two the Russian army; and, in spite of the obstacles arising from the nature of the ground which had to be traversed, the climate, and the long distances to be passed over, he hoped that this skilful manœuvre would have results worthy of his policy and his glory. Whilst, therefore, he received Alexander's envoy, M. de Balachoff, with perfect politeness, he resolved to reject the propositions of which he was the bearer. And, indeed, neither Alexander nor Napoleon could now spare time for negotiations, and the questions between them had reached a state in which it could only be resolved by the sword. The passage of the Niemen had rendered it beneath the dignity of either emperor to negotiate; and, moreover, Napoleon could not in the month of July—when scarcely three months remained for active operations—grant time for discussion, which might be employed by the Russians in throwing upon the Vistula the troops engaged in the Turkish war, or in uniting the troops under Bagration with those of Barclay de Tolly. To have refrained from commencing the war would doubtless have been the best course, but, when it had been once commenced, it was impossible to halt at Wilna.

Napoleon received M. de Balachoff at first with much politeness, and listened to him with gracious attention when he declared his master's astonishment at finding his territory invaded without any previous declaration of war, on the twofold and disingenuous pretext of the demand made for his passports by Prince Kourakin, and that the evacuation of the Prussian territory had been demanded as an indispensable preliminary to all negotiations. Napoleon listened to all that was advanced by the envoy with the patience of a man who is perfectly reliant on his strength and is thoroughly determined on his course of action; but he replied that it was now too late to enter upon negotiations, and that it was impossible that he should recross the Niemen. He repeated his usual arguments,—that he had only armed in reply to armaments previously made by Russia, and that through the whole course of his preparations for war he had remained willing to negotiate,—and complained that the demand made for his passports by M. de Kourakin, and the attempt to impose upon the French a dishonourable preliminary condition, and the refusal of M. de Lauriston's demand for the honour of an interview with the Emperor Alexander, had destroyed the last chance of an amicable arrangement of the differences between the two nations, and induced him, Napoleon, to carry the French army beyond the Niemen.

M. de Balachoff was not sufficiently well acquainted with the actual facts to attempt to reply to these assertions by the utterance of the simple truth, and contented himself, therefore, with repeating that his master was earnestly

desirous for peace, and, being free as yet from any engagement with other powers, was always ready to conclude it on the conditions which had, since 1807, rendered the relations between the two countries so entirely satisfactory. "You are free as yet, I believe," said Napoleon, in reply to these assertions, "from any alliance with the English; but the union will speedily take place: a single courier will suffice to bring about a good understanding between you, and tie the knots of a new alliance. Your Emperor has long displayed a leaning towards England, and I have long observed it. But, oh, how glorious would have been his reign had he only consented to remain on good terms with me! I had given him Finland, and the promise I had made to him of Moldavia and Wallachia was speedily about to be realized, when suddenly he placed himself amidst the ranks of my enemies, turning against me the arms which he had intended to employ against the Turks, and gaining only the certainty that he will never possess either Moldavia or Wallachia. . . . It is even said," added Napoleon, in the manner of an interrogation, "that you have signed a peace with the Turks, the terms of which do not grant you these provinces?" M. de Balachoff replied in the affirmative; and, under the influence of deep but concealed emotion, Napoleon continued:—"Your master does not possess, then, those fine provinces which he might so readily have added to his empire, and which would have extended it in the course of a single reign from the Gulf of Bothnia to the mouths of the Danube! An alliance with me would have been more fruitful in great results than the reign of Catharine the Great, and would have enabled Russia to share with me the glory of vanquishing the English, already reduced to the last extremities. And ah, how glorious in that case would Alexander's reign have been! But he has preferred to ally himself with my enemies, and to associate himself with a Stein, an Arnfeld, a Wintzingerode, and a Benningesen! The first, a fugitive from his country; the second, an intriguing debauchee; the third, a rebellious French subject; and the fourth, although possessed of rather greater military qualifications than the others, still very incapable, having shown himself thoroughly incompetent in 1807, and inevitably recalling to his master's mind the most horrible recollections. Barclay de Tolly, indeed, is said to be possessed of higher talents than these men, but it is difficult to believe it after having witnessed the first movements of your troops. Bagration is your only true soldier, and is, in fact, experienced, keen-sighted, and decided in action. . . . But what course can your master pursue in the midst of this mob which will compromise him and lay upon him the blame of all their own errors? A sovereign should never be present with his army, save when acting as its general, but should, on the contrary, keep at such a distance as to leave the responsible general at liberty to pursue his own measures. You perceive what have been the results of your operations during the eight days which the campaign has now lasted. You have lost Wilna, your army has been cut in two and chased from the Polish provinces. Your troops murmur at these things, and have good reason to do so. Again, I know the exact amount of your strength. I have taken an exact account

of your battalions as of my own, and I know that you have only two hundred thousand men with which to oppose me, who come at the head of three times as many. As for your allies, the Turks will be of no use to you, for they are good for nothing, and they have shown that this is so in signing a peace with you; and the Swedes, on their side, the destined to be at the will of extravagant men. They have got rid of one foolish king and taken another still more foolish; and, indeed, it is necessary to be a fool before one can be at the same time a Swede and a Russian ally. And what, at the most, do all your allies amount to? What can they do for you? And how great is the difference between them and my allies the Poles, who are eighty thousand strong, fight for me with ardour, and will speedily form an army of two hundred thousand men! I am about to snatch from you the Polish provinces; I will deprive the kinsmen of your family of all that remains in their possession in Germany, and send them back to you discredited and kingless. If Prussia become involved with you, I will blot her from the map of Germany and give you a sworn enemy in her place. I will drive you back beyond the Dvina and the Dnieper, and re-establish against you a barrier which Europe has blindly and culpably permitted to be broken down. These are the things which you will have gained by deserting my alliance, in the place of the glorious reign your master might have enjoyed by remaining faithful to it."

M. de Balachoff, who could scarcely restrain his indignation whilst listening to these words, nevertheless answered respectfully, that, whilst fully recognising the bravery of the French armies and the skill with which their movements were conducted, Russia did not yet despair of the result of the struggle in which she was engaged with them; that she was determined to make a most energetic, a desperate resistance, and that there could be little doubt that God would favour her exertions in a war in which she had justice on her side and which she had unwillingly engaged in. And here the conversation, recurring to the point at which it had been commenced, was abruptly broken off, and Napoleon quitted M. de Balachoff to mount his horse, after having invited him to dine with him.

At his table the Emperor Napoleon behaved towards M. de Balachoff with much kindness, but at the same time treated him with a familiarity which was somewhat distressing, and frequently compelled the envoy to defend his sovereign and his nation. At length, in the course of conversation, Napoleon spoke of the large number of convents to be found in Poland and Russia, and declared that they were melancholy symptoms of a low state of civilization; and M. de Balachoff replied that every country has its peculiar institutions, and that what is very suitable for one is ill adapted to another. But when Napoleon persisted that the prosperity of convents was not so much a question of place as time, and that they were wholly unsuited to the present age, M. de Balachoff, hardly pushed, replied that indeed the religious spirit had disappeared from almost the whole of Europe, but that it still existed in two countries,—Spain and Russia. This was an allusion to the resistance he encountered in the Peninsula, and to the resistance he might possibly meet with

elsewhere, which somewhat disconcerted Napoleon, (although he was usually as ready in conversation as in war,) and he was at a loss for an answer. All the sensible persons who were present at this interview much regretted the tone adopted towards the Russian envoy, and Napoleon himself became at length so far sensible of its injudicious nature, that, at the conclusion of the repast, he took M. de Balachoff aside, and addressed him in a more serious and worthy manner, declaring that he was ready to halt and to negotiate, on condition that he should be permitted to retain possession of Lithuania, at least during the negotiations; and that he was ready to make peace on condition that Russia should sincerely and unreservedly co-operate with him against England; but that it would be simple folly for him, under any other circumstances, to halt, and lose the two months which still remained to him for the execution of the plans from which he hoped to obtain such great results. At the same time, he assured M. de Balachoff of his personal regard for the Emperor Alexander, and dismissed him with the utmost graciousness.

This prudent course, however, was adopted too late, and M. de Balachoff had to relate a great deal which could not but wound Alexander most deeply and convert a political quarrel into a personal one. Napoleon was subsequently to experience that this was the case; and, indeed, although most capable of pleasing when he took the trouble to do so, the possession of supreme power had rendered him so irritable and incapable of bearing contradiction, that he could no longer safely attempt to hold diplomatic interviews. His famous conversation with Lord Whitworth, in 1803, shows that this was a fault of long standing; but his conduct during his interviews with Prince Kourakin and M. de Balachoff shows that this fault had very greatly increased under the influence of uninterrupted success.

Whilst Napoleon was at Wilna, occupied with the numerous cares which we have enumerated, the Russian and French armies continued their movements. The six corps of infantry and the two corps of reserve-cavalry of General Barclay de Tolly, which were marching upon the Dvina, were the most advanced, and, opposite our left, were pursuing a direct course, whilst the others, situated on our right, and having to execute a circular movement around Wilna, were compelled to use the utmost expedition to avoid being cut off by Marshal Davout. The outcry against the plans attributed to General Pfuhl, and the division of the Russian troops into two armies, had increased in violence among the Russian staff; and, as General Pfuhl could only meet it with outbursts of chagrin or an assumption of the dissatisfied silence of an unrecognised genius, the Emperor Alexander had been compelled to yield to the spirit of opposition which had arisen against his views, and to send directions to Prince Bagration to march in all haste upon Minsk, so as to be in a position to join the principal army as soon as it should be considered necessary.

The three corps of Barclay de Tolly, which were situated on our left, those under Wittgenstein and Bagowouth and the Guard, which had originally been at Rosiena, at Wilkomir, and at Wilna, had withdrawn in the direction of Drissa

without encountering any obstacle, and followed only by Marshals Macdonald, Oudinot, and Ney. The corps of Touczkoff and Schouvaloff, posted at Nowoi-Troki and Olkeniky respectively, and both, as regarded us, on the right of the Wilna, having commenced their march on the 27th of June, on the eve of the day of our entrance into Wilna, had had time to retreat and to escape from the pursuit of our troops,—with the exception, however, of the rear-guard of Schouvaloff's corps, which, having been unable to pass in time the Ochmiana route, which was that followed by Marshal Davout, had remained between Davout's corps and the Niemen, wandering here and there, and endeavouring to join the Hetman Platow in order to escape with him to Bagration. Finally, the sixth corps under General Doctoroff, and the second of General Korff's cavalry, which were advanced farther than the others on the right, being posted at Lida, and had a longer circuit to traverse so as to reach the other side of Wilna, had commenced their march immediately on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, and proceeded without pause to Ochmiana and Smorgoni. On the 29th they passed the Wilna route at Minsk, on the 30th arrived at Donachewo, and on the 1st of July resumed their march to join the great army under Barclay de Tolly.

Such was the state of affairs on the 1st of July: when there only remained on our right some detachments of Doctoroff's corps, the rear-guard of Schouvaloff's corps, and the eight or ten thousand Cossacks under the Hetman Platow; all of which had only the one course open to them,—namely, to fall back upon Bagration, following the course of the Niemen.

In the mean time, Marshal Davout, having advanced on the 2d and 3d of July as far as Volosjin, half-way from Wilna to Minsk, by sitting, as his experience well enabled him, the reports received from prisoners, country-people, and *curfs*, perceived very clearly that a corps of the enemy (that under Doctoroff) had escaped him on his left, and that on his right rear-guards of infantry and cavalry, cut off from the several corps, wandered among the forests, in which it might be possible to enclose and take them, by means of advancing upon Bagration; of whose force Marshal Davout had no certain information, but supposed it, as was really the case, to amount to about sixty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were infantry.

In so thickly-wooded a country, so great a master of defensive tactics as Marshal Davout did not fear to meet forty thousand Russian infantry, with the twenty thousand at his disposal, consisting of the division Compans, which were under his own immediate command on the Ochmiana route, and the division Desaix, which was on the Lida route, and which he could at any time bring to his side by a transverse movement. In addition to these twenty thousand infantry, he had ten thousand cavalry, consisting of the hussars and chasseurs of Generals Pajol and Borlessoulle, the Valencian cuirassiers detached from the corps of Nansouty, and Grouchy's entire corps, temporarily separated from Prince Eugene's troops, and thrown by Napoleon in the direction of Grodno, for the purpose of establishing a communication with King Jerome. But, in such a country as that in which he now had to operate, Marshal Davout would certainly

have preferred three or four thousand infantry to the most splendid cavalry.

Marshal Davout advanced, therefore, upon Minsk, without any fear of Bagration, and even determined, on the contrary, to interrupt his march, and prevent him from gaining the Dnieper, although he could not indulge in the idea that he should be able to envelop and take him with so few troops. To interrupt his march, however, was a matter of great importance, since it would force him to re-descend towards the marshes of Pinsk, and there would be a chance, should King Jerome, who had succeeded in passing the Niemen at Grodno, advance rapidly with his seventy-five thousand men, of making prisoners of the second Russian army. Marshal Davout informed Napoleon of the circumstances of his position, and of his resolution to advance straight to Minsk, and demanded such support as he could afford him. At the same time he wrote to King Jerome to hasten his advance in the direction of Iwé or Volosjin, points at which it would effect the junction from which such happy results were to be expected.

The brave marshal advanced on the 3d, 4th, and 5th of July from Volosjin towards Minsk: but, perceiving that as he approached the latter the dangers which surrounded him increased, as did also the distance which separated him from his reinforcements, he multiplied his reconnoissances, relaxed his march, and halted a day and a half between Volosjin and Minsk, for the purpose of bringing up the division Desaix and Grouchy's cavalry, that he might enter Minsk at the head of his united forces.

The demands for assistance sent to Napoleon by Marshal Davout were extremely reasonable; for with two additional divisions the latter would have been able to have marched straight forward, without anxiety respecting his junction with King Jerome, to have advanced uninterruptedly to Minsk, from Minsk to the Beresina, from the Beresina to the Dnieper, and have been able thus to cut off Prince Bagration, who, by the simultaneous arrival of King Jerome, would have been completely surrounded, and probably have endured the same fate as that suffered by General Mack at Wilna. To have secured these advantages, however, it was necessary that Marshal Davout should have made rapid marches, and have been sufficiently strong to have dispensed with those precautions which render rapid marches impossible.

Napoleon, whose attention was, however, unfortunately, occupied by too many combinations, neglected these considerations, and, considering that the junction of Marshal Davout with the King of Westphalia was certain and would as certainly result in the envelopment or overthrow of Bagration's troops, devoted his attention to a combination worthy of his gigantic intellect, and which, forcing Barclay de Tolly to succumb, whilst Bagration was vanquished by Davout and Jerome, would at once put an end to the whole war. Halting ten days at Wilna for the purpose of rallying his troops and reorganizing his baggage-train, he planned to set out on the 9th of July, directing his march upon the Dwina, and, whilst Oudinot and Ney should occupy the attention of Barclay de Tolly with about sixty thousand men, to manoeuvre behind them, advancing to the right with Davout's three re-

maining divisions, the Guard, the troops under Paulow Eugene, and Murat's cavalry, with the purpose of suddenly crossing the Dwina on the enemy's left and surrounding the great Russian army in the Drissa camp,—cutting off simultaneously the St. Petersburg and Moscow routes, and leaving to the Russians no alternative but to lay down their arms. No wiser nor more formidable plan could have been devised to meet the Russians' indefinite plan of retreat, and, considering Napoleon's skill in manoeuvring in front of the enemy, all the chances of success were in his favour.

The forces at Napoleon's disposal for the execution of this plan were almost two hundred thousand of his best troops, and therefore, should he employ sixty thousand to mask his movement, he would have one hundred and forty thousand remaining with whom to cross the Dwina on the left of Barclay de Tolly, to surround and to destroy him.

Napoleon's only fault in forming this plan was that he attempted to accomplish too many purposes at once. In the mean time, being unwilling to weaken the three first divisions of the first corps, the divisions Morand, Friant, and Gudin, which he held in higher estimation than even the Guard itself, but also anxious to give Marshal Davout such a reinforcement as would enable him to maintain his position until King Jerome should have joined him, he detached from the Guard the division Claparède, composed of the famous regiments of the Vistula, and the *Lanciers rouges* under General Colbert. Simultaneously with the despatch of this reinforcement, which only amounted to about six thousand men, but was valuable on account of the excellence of the troops of which it was composed, Napoleon sent to urge King Jerome to conduct his marches with as much energy as possible, and at the same time made preparations to commence on the 9th or 10th of July the decisive operations which he meditated against Barclay de Tolly.

Marshal Davout, whose troops, including the reinforcements, amounted to twenty-four thousand infantry and eleven thousand cavalry, and who knew that he was supported on his left by the presence of Prince Eugene, no longer felt any anxiety as to the Russian troops which he might meet in his advance. Marching eastward, with a slight deviation to the south, he had the Niemen (which, after flowing northward from Grodno to Kowno, suddenly, above Grodno, takes an entirely different direction, flowing from east to west) on his right, and was separated by the numerous sinuosities of its course from Prince Bagration and King Jerome. Having about thirty-five thousand troops at his command, he did not hesitate to advance, and entered Minsk on the evening of the 8th of July with a simple advanced guard; obtaining possession by means of the rapidity of his march—which left the Cossacks no time to destroy them—of large quantities of most serviceable stores, and finding in the city considerable zeal for Polish independence.

These circumstances were of the greatest advantage to Marshal Davout, whose corps had marched without halting from Kowno to Wilna, from Wilna to Minsk, without having had two whole days of repose since the 24th of June, and which had fallen into a state of the greatest

disorder, a third of the troops having fallen out of the ranks, the horses being exhausted, and the 33d leger, a Dutch regiment, having disbanded and devoted itself to pillage. The marshal took immediate measures to remedy this state of things, addressed the troops, distributed prizes and rewards to those who deserved them, threatened to disband the 33d should it not behave better in future, and had shot a certain number of men who had pillaged shops in Minsk. He procured ten days' rations from the flour which he found in the town, provided the horses with oats, placed his troops in proper order to undertake new marches, and, after having been only two days in the town, was in a position to have continued his operations, had not his position become one of greater uncertainty, and rendered it necessary that he should obtain more precise information before advancing any farther. When once he had arrived at Minsk, it was open to him to have reached, by a slight farther advance, the Beresina, and, by inclining a little to the right, to have arrived under the walls of Bobruisk, a strong place commanding the passage of that river, or, by advancing straight forward, to have reached the banks of the Dnieper at Mohilev. Which of these courses it would be the best to pursue depended upon the movements which should have been made by Prince Bagration, who, according to the confused rumours which could be collected, appeared to have advanced as far as the Niemen, towards Nikolajef, and then, after having rallied the troops of Dorokoff and Platow, to have retreated towards the little town of Neswij, on the road from Grodno to Bobruisk, which was naturally the road to be followed by the army of the Dnieper. In this state of circumstances a junction with King Jerome would enable our troops to stop Bagration at Bobruisk itself; and, should this prince be checked by Davout at the passage of the Beresina, whilst Jerome should assail him in the rear, he might be surrounded in such a manner that he would only be able to retreat into the Pinsk marshes. By advancing, on the other hand, as far as the Dnieper, to intercept his march at Mohilev, the uncertainty of success increased with the distance; since, indeed, the circle within which it would then be attempted to surround him would be increased, and there would be left open more points for his escape. Marshal Davout determined, therefore, to halt a day or two for the purpose of obtaining information, and making preparations for his march upon Ighoumen, a point at which he would be equally near to Mohilev and Bobruisk.

In the mean time, as is usual with persons who wait, Marshal Davout was excessively irritated at the slowness of King Jerome's movements, forgetting in his own embarrassments the embarrassments which might have surrounded the path of the latter, to whose movements at and since the passage of the Niemen we may now direct our attention.

The Polish and Westphalian troops, preceded by the cavalry-corps of General Latour-Maubourg, having set out from the environs of Pultusk, and been compelled to follow the Ostrolenka and Goniondz route, for the purpose of reaching Grodno, across a country so poor that they had to carry with them every thing they required, and along roads on which the convey-

ance of heavy burdens was a matter of the greatest labour, had had extreme difficulty in reaching the Niemen about the latter end of June. At the same time General Reynier with the Saxons had advanced on the right to debouch by Bialystok, and the Prince of Schwarzenberg with about thirty thousand Austrians had arrived from Galicia at Brezecz-Litowsky.

Pressed by the reiterated orders of Napoleon, King Jerome, who had placed at the head of his column the excellent troops under Prince Poniatowski, had sacrificed many horses and left many stragglers behind him in pursuit of his object of reaching Grodno as speedily as possible. On the 28th of June the Polish light horse, animated with the utmost fury against the Russians, had reached this town, immediately drove back Platow's Cossacks, and made preparations for effecting the passage of the river, aided by the inhabitants, whom the presence of their compatriots and the news of the reconstitution of Poland had filled with enthusiasm. On the following day they had crossed the river, and, without taking any repose, had proceeded by the Lida route in conformity with the orders of the staff-general, which directed them to form a junction with Prince Eugene, who, as we have already seen, had effected the passage of the stream at Prenn.

On the following day, the 30th of June, King Jerome arrived, and immediately devoted his attention to making preparations for provisioning his troops, who were much harassed and had not been able to bring up their baggage-train since the great storm of the 29th of June, which had burst over almost the whole of Poland, had rendered the roads impracticable and slain many of the horses. Refusing to allow his exertions to be interrupted by the demonstrations of joy and homage which the inhabitants, delighted at the news of the independence of Poland and the presence of a brother of Napoleon, lavished upon him, he made the greatest exertions to procure the bread-rations for his troops, of which they stood in so much need.

In the mean time the most unjust and humiliating letters arrived from Napoleon, accusing Jerome of dilatoriness, want of zeal, and indulgence in pleasure. It is true that King Jerome, who was not able to discern by experience, like that of Marshal Davout, the real state of affairs through the midst of popular rumours, had marched with a certain degree of apprehension of what he might encounter; but he had been most completely obedient to his brother's orders, losing not a single day or hour, and constantly urging General Reynier, who advanced parallel with him by Bialystok and Slonim, to join as speedily as possible the principal column. Prince Bagration, however, was six or seven marches in advance, and it was not easy to come up with him. The Russian general, in fact, having set out on the 28th of June from Wolkowisk in accordance with the first order directing him to regain the banks of the Dnieper, had received, *en route*, a second, which had directed him to draw near Borelay de Tolly in his movement of retreat, and he had then marched upon Nikolajef, in order to cross the Niemen there, and to perform that circular movement around Wilna which had saved Doctoroff. At this place he had met with Dorokoff and Platow, and, learning from them that Davout was on their track,

had, instead of ascending northward, descended to the south, with the purpose of marching by Nowogrodek, Mir, and Neswij, upon Bobruisk. At Neswij he halted two days to refresh his troops, which were worn out with fatigue and the extreme heat of the weather; but as he was, nevertheless, quite ready to resume his march on the 10th of July, it was necessary that Jerome should arrive there by that time, if he was to come up with him; and this was an impossibility, since the distance from Grodno to Neswij, through Nowogrodek, was almost fifty-six leagues; and the King of Westphalia, should he even march seven leagues a day during eight days, (which would be excessive toil for such roads and in the midst of the heats of July,) could not arrive at Neswij before the 12th.

Harassed by his brother's letters, the King of Westphalia arrived at Nowogrodek on the 10th of July, and was then fourteen leagues from Bagration, who was at Neswij, and twenty from Davout, who was at Minsk. As he had advanced, the less enormous had become the proportions ascribed to Bagration's army, which was now said to amount only to sixty thousand men; but this was still a very large force to have to meet with the forty-five thousand Polish and Westphalian troops who alone were at his command, the Saxons being too far off to be of immediate service.

On the same day—the 10th of July—King Jerome's light cavalry, having advanced beyond Nowogrodek, on the Mir route, fell in with Prince Bagration's rear-guard, consisting of six thousand Cossacks, two thousand regular cavalry, and two thousand light infantry. The ardour of our cavalry, consisting of chasseurs and Polish lancers, could not be restrained, and, although only amounting to three thousand men, boldly engaged ten thousand of the enemy's troops, sustaining forty charges and losing five hundred of their number.

Such had been King Jerome's proceedings up to the 11th of July. In the mean time, Marshal Davout, between whom and Jerome there had been no communications, from the fact of their making their reconnaissances in different directions, and who had been at Minsk since the 5th of July, became filled with an impatience which he expressed to Napoleon; and the latter in his turn, losing all mastery over his temper, sent an order to his brother to place himself under the commands of Marshal Davout as soon as the junction between them should have taken place.—a measure which, amounting only to the subjection of a young prince to an old, experienced warrior, would have been very natural at the commencement of the campaign, but which, adopted suddenly and as a punishment, would very probably produce most disastrous misunderstandings, and prevent the attainment of the results which it was intended to insure.

In fact, without any change of command, had his generals acted in zealous concert with each other, Napoleon's combinations might have been thoroughly executed; for Jerome, who on the 13th reached Neswij, from whence he could easily arrive at Bobruisk on the 17th, learning that Bagration, who was on the road to Bobruisk, could not reach it before the 16th, and would then require two days in which to effect the passage of the Beresina with all his material, and that Davout, whose advanced guard was near

could reach Bobruisk in three days, in case, Marshal Davout debouching upon the left of the Beresina with thirty-thousand troops, and Jerome presenting himself on the right bank with forty-five thousand. It would be very possible to inflict a most severe blow on Bagration's army,—becoming united with these circumstances, King Jerome communicated them to Marshal Davout, and he ordered him to march upon Bobruisk, as the means of obtaining the most splendid results.

When Davout—who had remained at Minsk on the 12th, not daring to set out on the following day for Ighoumen. At the same time, anxious that the troops which were about to effect a junction should the more certainly act in concert, and not being wholly displeased to see to subordinate position a young prince whom he had been more than once discomfited during his sojourn on the Elbe, he communicated to him Napoleon's appointment of himself to the supreme command of the forces. They should have effected a junction, and, by adopting the position of commander-in-chief, ordered Jerome to march by Neswij and upon Bobruisk, whilst he himself should be thither by Ighoumen. In the same letter he pointed out some cross-routes, by which light cavalry might form a link between several corps.

The marshal's letter reached Jerome on the 13th of July, and filled him with the most violent indignation; for he regarded this subjection to the command of the 1st corps as a species of humiliation, and the most profound humiliation, and, yielding to these feelings, he resolved to oppose Napoleon's will, but to resign his command,—a resolution which was, unfortunately, the most disastrous for his brother's cause, which he could possibly have taken. He communicated the chief of his staff, General D'Armentières, the command of his troops until the junction with Marshal Davout should have been effected, and retired towards Mir and Nowogrado, to await there the commands of the Emperor, and intending to return to his states if they not be in conformity with his ideas of his own dignity.

An officer bearing information of this resolution of the young prince reached Marshal Davout on the 15th, at Ighoumen; and the marshal failed on this occasion to act with his usual energy, for, instead of using the command which he had seized somewhat prematurely—the vigour demanded by circumstances, he was frightened at the idea of having offended a brother to the Emperor, and wrote to him earnestly persuading him to remain at the head of the Polish and Westphalian troops. King Jerome, Davout's, superior command, degrading that the adoption of this course was necessary for the Emperor's welfare. In the meantime, keeping his eye on Bobruisk, he also noted his observations beyond it, watching the course of events on the other side of the river, and making himself certain that the Emperor was not preparing to cross it, in which he would have hastened to advance upon Minsk. He had already sent Grouchy's cavalry to Borisow to seize this town, its bridge &c. IV.—11

across the Beresina, and its magazines; but they had only succeeded in securing the bridge. He had also thrown several bridges across the Beresina, especially in the neighbourhood of Iakutzoy, and had marched his forces thither, so as to be at the same time nearer to both Bobruisk and Mohilev.

When Davout's letter arrived at Neswij, King Jerome was no longer there, and he did not receive it until the 17th, on the Nowogrodek road: he then sent a reply, which was a repetition of his previously-expressed resolution, and which could not reach the marshal until the 18th or 19th. And thus Napoleon's grand combination was rendered abortive, for it was necessary for its accomplishment that both Davout's and Jerome's troops should be under Bobruisk on the 17th, and that was no longer possible. All that could now be done, the opportunity of stopping and surrounding Bagration on the Beresina having been lost, was to outstrip him in the march upon the Dnieper, with the object of effecting the occupation of Mohilev. But the great results which were to be expected from the former measure were no longer to be hoped. Had Prince Bagration been checked on the Beresina, the only retreat open to him would have been in the direction of Mozyr and the Pinsk marshes, where he might have been readily assailed, surrounded, and taken. By being checked on the Dnieper, he would be prevented, indeed, from passing by Mohilev, but he would be able to descend upon Staroi-Bychow, and, even if he should be checked in this latter direction, he would still be in a position to descend upon Rogaczew.

In the mean time Marshal Davout, having received certain information respecting some of the enemy's movements beyond the Beresina, resolved, without waiting for Jerome's reply, to give up the plan of a combined movement upon Bobruisk, and to march upon Mohilev, in order to secure, at least, some of the expected results. Having marched on the 16th some of his troops by Iakutzoy, beyond the Beresina, he himself, on the 17th, followed with the remainder of his *corps d'armée*, and advanced, by Pogost on the Dnieper, in the direction of Mohilev. He received on his road the letters by which King Jerome announced his definitive resolution, and he at once took upon himself the direction of the troops which had thus come under his command,—ordering the Westphalians to proceed by Ouzda, Dukora, and Borisow to Orscha, that they might have a position on the Dnieper between himself and the grand army, which he knew to be on its march towards the Upper Dwina; and, as this movement could not be completed until the lapse of eight or ten days, directing Grouchy's cavalry upon Orscha, so as to establish the connection with the grand army as soon as possible. At the same time he marched the Polish corps, on which he chiefly relied, towards Mohilev, by Ouzda, Dukora, and Ighoumen; for, if he could bring up this corps in time, he would have at his command some fifty and odd thousand men,—a force quite sufficient to vanquish the troops under Bagration. Latour-Maubourg's cavalry he devoted to the task of investing Bobruisk, whilst they should at the same time retain a position on the Beresina and maintain a connection with Mohilev. The Saxons, and, to the right of the Saxons, the

Austrians, remained to be disposed of, and we shall find that they were employed in conformity with Napoleon's orders.

Thus, of the combination of movements which Napoleon had devised for the purpose of encircling and capturing Bagration's troops, there only remained the chance of checking them at Mohilev, compelling them to pass the Dnieper below it, and thus delaying, but by no means rendering altogether impossible, his junction with Barclay de Tolly.

When Napoleon became informed of the frustration of his scheme, he was excessively irritated against both Marshal Davout and King Jerome, and especially against the latter,—his accusation against Davout being that he assumed the command of the two armies before the junction between them had been actually effected, and that he had not exercised the command thus assumed with sufficient vigour; whilst he reproached King Jerome with having lost him the results which should have been derived from one of his best manœuvres.

Although he could no longer hope for the success of his manœuvres against the army of the Dnieper, he still confidently expected that Marshal Davout would drive Bagration upon the Dnieper below Mohilev at least; and that the second Russian army would be compelled to make a long détour, and thus be prevented from assisting the army under Barclay de Tolly. He ordered Marshal Davout, therefore, firmly to maintain his position at Mohilev, and directed the Prince of Schwarzenberg to draw near the grand army with the Austrian corps, traversing Lithuania from south to north by Froujany, Slonim, and Minsk, replacing them with the Saxons on the upper course of the Bug, the frontier of Volhynia, and the grand duchy of Warsaw.

These measures having been taken, he directed his attention to his other measure, which was even more important than that of which we have just narrated the failure, since, if he should succeed in advancing with the greater portion of his forces in front of the camp of Drissa, in out stripping Barclay de Tolly, and in cutting him off from both Moscow and St. Petersburg, he would render impossible the execution of the project conceived by the Russians of an indefinite retreat, or at least reduce them to attempting its execution with mere disorganized wrecks of armies.

With regard to this grand movement, the halt made at Wilna was much to be regretted; but it had, nevertheless, been absolutely necessary for the purpose of checking desertion, bringing up the artillery which remained in the rear, reorganizing the baggage-train, preparing provisions, and bringing up the pontoon-equipages; and every hour of the eighteen days during which it lasted was zealously devoted to the preparations required by these important matters. In the mean time, news arrived at Wilna from all parts of the world, leaving no doubt on the one hand that the Turks had concluded peace with Russia, and that Bernadotte had also given in his adhesion to the same power. This news, which could not but lead Napoleon to expect the arrival, on his right, of the Russian armies of Tormasoff and Tchitchakoff, and the probable descent of Swedish troops on his rear, was, however, counterbalanced by favourable news

from England and America, which announced the assassination of Mr. Perceval, a total change in British policy, and the certainty of a declaration of war between Great Britain and America. But Napoleon very properly allowed himself to be but little affected by news which did not immediately relate to the scene of action, and determined to trust the fortune of the war to the grand operations which he was about to undertake. He had already sent forward the light cavalry of the Guard, under General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, to prepare the way for the remainder of the army, and had followed it with the Young Guard under Martin, the Old Guard under Lefebvre; directing the first to proceed to Lowaritsky, Michailisky, the second by Swenziany and Postavy, and both to make for Gloubokoe, where Napoleon intended to fix his head-quarters in front of the Dwina, between Drissa and Polotsk. In the rear of these troops he had despatched the Guard's artillery-reserve, which he regarded as particularly serviceable in actual battle, and recommended that it should be slowly carried forward so that the horses might not be worn out. On the same point, also, but somewhat to the left, and behind Murat, he directed the three divisions Morant, Friant, and Gudin, which he had kept under his own immediate command, for the execution of the more difficult part of his manœuvre, which could be close to the enemy, at the point where it would be necessary to turn them for the purpose of surrounding them. At the same time, he had caused Ney, Oudinot, and Macdonald, to execute a movement from left to right,—carrying Ney from Maliatoui to Widsoun, Oudinot from Avants to Binchononi, and Macdonald from Rosiens to Poinwieri; whilst on his right he had set Prince Eugene's troops in motion from Novot-Troli to Ochmiana, Smorgoni, and Wileika, intending that they should form his right wing and communicate with Marshal Davout by means of Grouchy's cavalry.

Before leaving Wilna, Napoleon made every arrangement for the due administration of all parts of the service during his absence, and resolved to leave there the Duke of Bassano, with authority to carry on not only diplomatic but also administrative and military correspondence, to communicate to each chief of a corps what it might be suitable that he should know, and even to give orders with respect to all matters relating to the victualling of the army.

At the same time he concluded an agreement with the Polish Jews for the establishment of a transport-service from Kowno to Wilna; for the navigation of the Wilia had been found to be perfectly impracticable, and it had been resolved to employ a land-transport service instead. And, finally, desiring that the army of reserve should make a movement corresponding to that which was about to be made by the army of the field, he ordered Marshal Victor, who commanded the 9th corps at Berlin, to advance upon Dantzic, and Marshal Augereau, who commanded the 11th corps, composed of fourth battalions and regiments of refractory recruits, to replace the Duke of Belluna at Berlin,—directing that these latter troops should be replaced on the frontiers of France by the cohorts whose organization he had ordered before quitting Paris. Wilna itself, which now contained ovens capable of furnishing a hundred thousand



tions, hospitals capable of receiving six thousand patients, and officers ready to recruit or organize the stragglers who might be brought by the columns mobile, he arranged should be garrisoned by a garrison mobile, consisting of troops on their march, of whom there would morally be present there not less than twenty thousand.

Napoleon resolved to set out on the night of the 16th of July; but before his departure he could not fail to receive the representations of the Polish Diet, of which there had been an extraordinary assembly at Warsaw. It will be remembered that M. de Pradt, Archbishop of Kalisz, was sent to Warsaw, in the place of L. de Talleyrand, for the purpose of exciting and directing Polish enthusiasm. He was a man quite incapable of judicious action in the midst of a popular commotion, and finding himself, on arriving at his post, in the midst of a population intensely excited by the idea of the speedy reconstitution of their kingdom, quite ready to fight, but ruined by the continental blockade, distrustful of Napoleon, and far from confident in the success of his war against Russia, divided by a thousand different counsels, and turbulent and agitated as usual, he was surprised and disconcerted, and knew not how to act in the midst of the chaos in which he was immersed. In the mean time, passion led the diet to adopt the idea of a general Diet, to be assembled immediately, and which, according to ancient usage, should proclaim, besides the reconstitution of Poland, the confederation of all its provinces, and a levy *en masse* of the population, against Russia. The poor King of Saxony, on whose head had fallen the Polish crown, had previously provided the ministers of the grand duchy with the necessary powers, and they gave in their cordial adhesion to the revocation of the Diet; and it was, accordingly, immediately assembled,—its first acts being the election as president of Adam Czartoryski, an aristocrat, and formerly marshal of one of the ancient Diets; the proclamation, in the midst of immense enthusiasm, of the re-establishment of Poland, the confederation of all its provinces, the insurrection of those which were still under foreign yoke, and the despatch of envoys to Napoleon to persuade him to declare, with his sovereign lips, "Poland is re-established."

The Diet had separated after having appointed a commission intrusted with the duty of representing it, and, in some degree, the office of a national sovereignty, whilst the ministers of the grand duchy should fill that of the executive power,—an arrangement of which one of the difficulties was that each of these bodies desired to exercise its own authority and that of the others also. But this was not the greatest of the inconveniences resulting from it. In the mean time it was necessary, without loss of time, to direct their ardour towards those two essential objects, the levy of troops and the propagation of the insurrection in Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia; and if the Abbé de Pradt now had any at his command, extensive authority to act, and a genius for such undertakings as that which he was now engaged, he might have succeeded in extracting, from the fermenting elements around him, an organized force capable of raising Volhynia and Podolia, whilst Napoleon

was organizing Lithuania, already raised by his presence. But Napoleon had neither given him money nor extended authority of action, and his operations had been limited to assisting the Poles in drawing up the manifesto which announced the re-establishment of the Polish kingdom, and which, when drawn up, was sent to Napoleon by the hands of a deputation, which was also charged to endeavour to persuade him to make some solemn declaration of adhesion to the step which had been taken.

The deputation arrived at Wilna shortly before Napoleon's departure, and greatly annoyed him, seeing he was very unwilling to be forced to any decided engagement, which might render the negotiation of peace with Russia too difficult. For, although at a distance he had regarded the war as one which might be easily conducted, he now entertained just views respecting it, and was anxious that it should remain such a war that a battle gained might conclude it with *éclat*. He knew very well that, were he to propose the reconstitution of the kingdom of Poland as one of the essential ends of the war, it would be necessary to reduce Russia to the last extremity; and he replied, therefore, to the Polish deputies in ambiguous terms, which were attended with all the usual inconveniences of ambiguous replies, being too clear for Russia and too obscure for Poland.

"Gentlemen," he said, in reply to the address of the deputation,—"Gentlemen, deputies of the confederation of Poland, I have listened with much interest to all that you have just addressed to me! Poles, I should have thought and acted in your place as you have done; I should have acted as you have acted in the assembly at Warsaw. The love of country is the first virtue of civilized humanity.

"In my position I have many interests to conciliate, many duties to fulfil. Had I reigned in the time of the first, the second, or the third division of Poland, I would have armed all my people in your support. As soon as victory enabled me to restore your ancient laws to your capital and a portion of your provinces, I eagerly seized the opportunity.

"I love your nation. During sixteen years I have been accustomed to see its soldiers fighting by my side, on the battle-fields of Italy and Spain.

"I applaud all that you have done; I sanction the efforts which you have made; all that I can do to second them I will do.

"If your efforts be unanimous, you may well hope to succeed in compelling your enemies to recognise your rights; but in these distant and vast countries it is on the unanimous efforts of their peoples alone that such hopes of success can be founded.

"I addressed you in the same terms on my first appearance in Poland. I must add, that I have guaranteed to the Emperor of Austria the integrity of his states, and that I cannot authorize any manœuvre or movement tending to disturb him in the peaceable possession of what remains to him of the Polish provinces. But let Lithuania, Samogitia, Witepsk, Polotsk, Mohilev, Volhynia, the Ukraine, and Podolia, be animated with the same spirit which I have found to exist in Great Poland, and Providence will crown with success the sanctity of your cause, and will recompense you for that devotion

to your country which renders you so interesting and has given you so many claims upon my esteem and protection,—upon which, in all circumstances, you may always rely.”

This address had no particularly unfavourable effect on the Polish deputies, for they were previously aware that Napoleon entertained the sentiments which it expressed; but its effect at Wilna, in spite of the enthusiasm caused by the presence of the victorious French troops, was most disastrous. “How can Napoleon,” said the Lithuanians, “demand that we should lavish our blood and our resources in his service, when he is unwilling on his part to declare the reconstitution of the kingdom of Poland? And what withholds him from this course? Prussia is at his feet; Austria is dependent on his will, and might readily, moreover, be recompensed by Illyria; and Russia is already flying before his armies. Is it the truth that he is not willing to restore us to existence as a nation? Is it the truth that he has come here only to gain a victory over the Russians, intending then to retreat without having effected any thing with regard to us, save having added half a million of Poles to the grand duchy and exposed the greater number of us to exile and sequestration?” To these doubts it was replied that Napoleon was in a delicate position; that it was absolutely necessary that he should act with caution, but that it was easy to see through his caution; that his real intention was to reconstitute Poland, should he be seriously aided; that it was necessary, therefore, for the Polish people to rise *en masse*, and furnish him with the means of accomplishing the undertaking upon which he had entered. But the party which held these latter opinions was by far the least numerous, and the large body of people made Napoleon's caution an excuse for want of energy, avarice, and selfish calculations.

Napoleon set out from Wilna on the evening of the 16th, after a sojourn there of eighteen days. On the morning of the 18th he arrived at Gloubokoe, a little town constructed of wood, and, having taken up his quarters in its principal building,—a large convent,—hastened, as was his wont, to prepare an establishment which might serve as a general dépôt for the use of the troops.

In the mean time the various corps continued their movements, and defiled successively in front of the Drissa camp, as though they were about to attack it,—being under orders, however, to make no such attempt. Murat, having halted for a few days in advance of Swenziany, at Opsa, with the cavalry under Generals Nanauty and Munbrun, and Marshal Davout's three divisions, had defiled before the Drissa camp, and taken up a position opposite Polotsk, near to Gloubokoe, and at Napoleon's immediate disposal. During this march, General Sebastiani had permitted himself to be surprised by the Russian cavalry, which, having crossed the Dwina to observe our movements, took advantage of some carelessness on our side, to attack General St. Geniès, who defended himself most valiantly, but was taken prisoner with some hundreds of his men. On receipt of information of this appearance of the Russian cavalry, however, our cavalry hastened up, threw themselves on the enemy, took General Kou-

nieff, who commanded them, and forced them to repossess the Dwina.

Ney followed Murat, executing a similar movement, and placing himself on the left of the divisions Morand, Friant, and Gudin. The wet and the want of proper food had caused much loss among the younger soldiers by dysentery, and there were reasons to fear that this complaint would become contagious.

After Ney marched Oudinot, who, defiling within sight of Dunabourg, where the Russians had constructed a strong *tête de pont* on the Dwina, could not refrain, in spite of Napoleon's recommendations to the contrary, from assailing the work, which the Russians abandoned. This incident had no ulterior consequences, and Marshal Oudinot took up a position, in his turn, on the left of Ney. All three corps were thus assembled within a space of a few leagues, some of them having passed the Drissa camp, in front of which they had defiled, whilst the others remained opposite to it, and all were at the immediate command of Napoleon, who was at Gloubokoe with his guard. Marshal MacDonald alone retained a position at some distance on our left, between Poniewiez and Jakobstadt, covering Samogitia and the course of the Niemen, which our convoys followed on their way to Kowno.

The movements which had been ordered on Napoleon's right had been executed with equal punctuality. Prince Eugene occupied this portion of the line forming the link of connection with Marshal Davout on the Dnieper, and, after having rallied his troops and baggage-train at Nowoi-Troki, he had followed the Minak route as far as Smorgoni, from which point he had marched upon Wileika, from whence he had continued his route by Dolghinow as far as Beresina, at which place there is a canal called the Lepel Canal, which unites the Beresina, which is a tributary of the Dnieper, with the Oula, which is a tributary of the Dwina, and which may be regarded, therefore, as the connecting-link between the Black Sea and the Baltic. On the 21st he would reach Kowno, and would have but a few steps to take to reach the Dwina, at a place between Oula and Beschenkowicz, where it may be easily forded.

A force of almost 200,000 men were thus posted within a space of a few leagues, and at Napoleon's immediate command; and, as this was a force quite sufficient to overwhelm Bagration's army, he made immediate preparations to cross the Dwina on his left, to turn and surround him, according to his previously-formal plan. Every thing as yet had proceeded according to his wishes, and he only awaited the arrival of his heavy artillery, which would probably arrive about the 22d or 23d of July, to execute his grand designs. In the mean time he devoted himself with his usual activity to preparations conducive to the welfare of his army.

Whilst Napoleon was thus employed in conducting his own movements, Marshal Davout continued to conduct the operations committed to his charge, the object of which was to check Bagration at Mohilev, preventing him from effecting the passage of the Dnieper at this point, forcing him to descend lower down, and to execute a long détour to rejoin, beyond the Dnieper

he Dwina, the great army under Barclay de Tolly. The success of this manoeuvre was due to that of Napoleon himself, and, had Marshal Davout had the whole of Jerome's army at his command, he might not only have defeated but even overwhelmed Bagration's army; but, unfortunately, King Jerome's troops were six or eight marches distant, and he was at Mohilev, whither he had hastened at the same speed for the purpose of barring Bagration's road, with only the divisions Compans, Claparède, and a division of cuirassiers.

The remainder of his cavalry had extended themselves to the left for the purpose of forming a line of communication with Prince Bagration, and to the right for the purpose of supporting the Polish and Westphalian troops respectively on their march.

At the same time Prince Bagration, having crossed the Beresina at Bobruisk, without being overwhelmed by the united armies of Jerome and Jerome, considered himself in safety; for he had the strong fortress in his rear as a protection against Jerome, and he intended to reach the Dnieper at Mohilev, without encountering any obstacle. On the evening of the 21st, in fact, he approached this place, with sixty thousand effective troops at his command.

Marshal Davout, as we have already said, was at Mohilev with the divisions Compans, Claparède, and Claparède. His forces, reduced by the fatigue of their march, were still further weakened by the withdrawal of detachments; he was compelled to place at numerous points, and the effective force at his command was much reduced to meet the sixty thousand troops of the enemy amounted only to twenty-two thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry.

On the evening of the 21st a skirmish took place between one of our advanced posts, consisting of a squadron of Bordessoulle's light cavalry and Platow's Cossacks, announced the approach of the army of the Dnieper; and on the following morning Marshal Davout, accompanied by General Haxo, made a careful reconnaissance of the field of battle. The Staroi-Buchow road, on which had taken place the action of the previous evening, was also identical with the Bobruisk road, which, after having proceeded directly from the Beresina to the Dnieper, crossed almost at right angles towards Staroi-Buchow, and followed the right bank of the river as far as Mohilev. The marshal and General Haxo, setting out from Mohilev, descended this road, which, bordered by a double row of birch-trees, like all the roads of the country, extended between the Dnieper which was on its left, and a streamlet, named the Mischowska, on its right. After having advanced between the Mischowska and the Dnieper three leagues, they saw that the Mischowska suddenly turned to the left towards the river, at a point at which was situated a mill, the Fatowa mill, and which was provided with a mill-dam. The Mischowska thus cut the road passing under a bridge on which was a building called the Auberge de Saltanowka, using itself in the Dnieper. The space of ground which was thus circumscribed at once presented itself to Marshal Davout and General Haxo as most suitable for a battle-field, and as a position on which there would be the greatest

chance of holding the enemy in check, whatever might be their numbers or determination. Ordering such works, therefore, at the bridge and the mill as would prevent the enemy from crossing the Mischowska, and intrusting the defence of these two posts to the defence of five battalions of the 85th of the line, under General Friederichs, (the 108th being posted in the rear under General Dessaix, as a reserve,) and a portion of his artillery, Marshal Davout proceeded towards Mohilev for the purpose of observing whether the enemy would endeavour to cross the Mischowska on his right, which would have rendered useless any resistance at the Saltanowka bridge and the Fatowa mill; and, having advanced in that direction about a league, he reached a place on the bank of the Mischowska at the little village of Seletz, at which the enemy might have crossed it. Marshal Davout, therefore, posted at this spot one of the four regiments of the division, and, a little in the rear, a reserve of two other regiments of the division Compans,—the 57th and 111th of the line,—together with Valence's cuirassiers. Finally, as an additional precaution, he ranged the Polish division Claparède behind the division Compans, to form a line of communication between Mohilev and the troops on the Staroi-Buchow route; and directed General Pajol with his light cavalry and the 25th of the line (the 4th regiment of the division Compans) to watch the Ighoumen route by Pogost, as it was possible that a portion of the Russian army might attempt to advance by it to turn our position at Mohilev.

On the following day, the 23d of July, as soon as morning dawned, Prince Bagration, after having left the 8th corps on the Bobruisk route, as a protection against the possible but improbable pursuit of King Jerome, advanced the 7th corps against the Saltanowka bridge and the Fatowa mill, with orders to take them at any cost.

The division Kolioubakin attacked the Saltanowka bridge and the division Paskiewitch the Fatowa mill. At first the contest was carried on on both sides merely by the sharpshooters and the artillery; but after some time, the Russians finding that they suffered greater loss than they inflicted, the division Kolioubakin advanced against the Saltanowka bridge, and was driven back with great loss, and compelled to retire into shelter.

Marshal Davout, who had been attracted to the scene of action by the sound of the cannon, finding matters proceeding well in front, now withdrew to the rear, to the village of Seletz, to discover whether he were threatened on this side with an attack in flank.

Having become convinced that there was no imminent danger on this side, he carried the 61st, which had been posted at the village of Seletz, a little more forward, and at the same time advanced to a similar extent the 57th and 111th, and the cuirassiers; for he perceived that the enemy's great effort would be directed against the front of his position.

The Russians were, in fact, at this moment making a great and last effort. The division Kolioubakin, debouching *en masse* by the high-road, advanced in close column upon the Saltanowka bridge, and the division Paskiewitch, deploying uncovered in front of the Fatowa mill,

advanced to the edge of the mill-dam in spite of the well-directed fire of our artillery. General Friederichs, however, with the 86th, received the division Kolioubakin with so furious a fire of musketry that, after having advanced boldly towards the bridge, it hesitated for a moment, and then beat a hasty retreat. In the mean time the division Paskiewitch, finding in the stream a less insurmountable obstacle, attempted to cross it by passing over the dike which retained the water for the mill; and the 108th, perceiving this, advanced under the command of an officer brave even to rashness, and drove them back at the point of the bayonet. Unfortunately, however, instead of remaining contented with the advantage thus gained, their commander led them in their turn across the obstacle which had been so furiously disputed, and debouched in the midst of the open ground which extended beyond, where they found themselves exposed to a circle of the enemy's fire, and, being attacked by the bayonet, they were driven back across the stream, with a serious loss in killed and wounded and leaving a hundred of their number in the hands of the Russians.

At this moment the marshal arrived from the rear, and immediately rallied the battalion which had just returned in disorder, causing it to execute some manoeuvres under fire for the purpose of restoring it to confidence. He then brought the whole of his artillery, and directing it against the division Paskiewitch once more forced it to retire into shelter. And thus from the Fatowa mill to the Saltanowka bridge the Russians had exhausted themselves in useless efforts, and lost their troops in the proportion of three or four to one of ours.

Nevertheless the division Paskiewitch attempted to ascend on our right, following the Mischowska as far as the village of Seletz, and succeeded in advancing in front of the village, when some of its skirmishers even ventured to cross the stream. The troops, however, who made this rash attempt were speedily driven back by the voltigeurs of the 61st, and the whole regiment, throwing itself beyond the Mischowska, attacked the Russians and compelled them to evacuate this portion of the field. In the mean time General Friederichs in our front, between the Fatowa mill and the Saltanowka bridge, had crossed the stream with some companies of picked men, had turned the open space in which the Russians had deployed in front of the mill, assailed them unexpectedly in the rear, driven them back with great slaughter at the bayonet's point, and thus cleared the front of the field of battle of the enemy.

Our troops now assumed the offensive, advanced *en masse* along the great Staroi-Bychow road, and, after having pursued the Russians about a league, perceived on the open space of ground Prince Bagration in position with his whole army. And on this new battle-field the contest would have been as disastrous to us as it had been for the Russians on the brink of the Mischowska; but the intrepid Compans, who was as prudent as brave, checked the ardour of his troops, and retreated, unpursued by the enemy; for Prince Bagration, terrified at the loss, amounting to about four thousand in killed and wounded, which he had suffered on the banks of the Mischowska, and informed that

Marshal Davout would speedily receive reinforcements, considered that he ought to retreat upon Staroi-Bychow, for the purpose of passing the Dnieper, and then advancing upon Micislaw.

Thus terminated this glorious combat, in which the twenty-eight thousand men of the first corps had checked the sixty thousand troops under Bagration. Had Prince Bagration been better acquainted with the ground on which the battle was fought, he might have executed a dangerous attack on Marshal Davout's widely-extended right with Borosdin's corps; but it would have had to encounter, and could not have easily vanquished, the infantry of Generals Compans and Claparède, and the cuirassiers of General Valence. We must also add that had Prince Poniatowski been able to appear, during this battle of the 23d, by Iakzityc, on the rear or flank of Prince Bagration's army, he might have inflicted upon it, even although the opportunity at Bobruisk had failed, a most serious disaster.

Marshal Davout employed the day succeeding that of the battle in bringing in his wounded and obtaining information respecting the Poles and Westphalians,—being unwilling to leave before their arrival the species of intrenched camp which he had found so useful,—and at the same time made every preparation for ascending the course of the Dnieper as far as Orscha, in order to approach Napoleon, who, as we have said above, awaited at Gloubokó the propitious moment for turning, by Polotsk and Witepsk, the Russian army under Barclay de Tolly. To prevent Prince Bagration from joining the principal army would be henceforth impossible, for it would not be practicable to follow him indefinitely beyond the Dnieper; but this junction had been delayed for a time, and the success, although falling far short of that which had been at first hoped for, was sufficient for the accomplishment of Napoleon's chief design.

Napoleon's profound calculations had determined him to choose the 22d or 23d on which to execute his great manoeuvre. He was at Gloubokó, having on his right, towards Kamen, Prince Eugene, in his front, towards Ouchatch, Murat's cavalry and the three divisions Morand, Friant, Gudin, and on his left Ney and Oudinot, opposite the Drissa camp. The Imperial Guard was posted at Gloubokó itself. And thus Napoleon had one hundred and ninety thousand men at his immediate command, ready to cross the Dwina on the left of Barclay de Tolly: whilst the success of Marshal Davout was strongly conducive to the execution of the designs he had in view. But at this moment a singular revolution took place in the Russian staff.

Barclay de Tolly had, as we have seen, fallen back upon the Drissa camp, and by this manoeuvre had excited a strong feeling of disapprobation,—the lower ranks of the army being indignant at the idea of retreating before the French troops at all, and those of a superior grade, who could comprehend the wisdom of a plan of indefinite retreat, regarding the establishment of the Drissa camp as perfectly irreconcilable with common sense. And, indeed, the establishment of a camp on the Dwina, on the very path of the French troops, and at the

commencement, we might say, of their course, when their strength and resources must be still unimpaired, was scarcely in accordance with reason, since, even if he did not force it, he would be able to turn it, or to take advantage of the forced immobility of the principal army to penetrate by his right the opening which separates the sources of the Dwina from those of the Dnieper, and to divide for the remainder of the campaign the long line of the Russian armies. Moreover, the Drissa camp was constructed in such a manner as to offer but very slight means of security. The plan generally pursued when it is intended to defend a river is to cover the troops charged with the defence with the river itself; but here the camp had been placed in front of the river, and was covered by it only in the rear and on the sides; for, at the instance of General Pfuhl, the Russian engineers had selected a deep curve, formed by the Dwina at Drissa, for the position of the camp, and defended its front by two lines of defence, extending from one bend of the river to the other,—four bridges being provided for the retreat of the army should it be compelled to evacuate its position.

Although the camp was calculated to oppose great obstacles to the impetuosity of the French, it was at the same time well calculated to assist Napoleon's manœuvre, which consisted in turning the Russians' position and thus surrounding the troops under Barclay de Tolly. If, in fact, Napoleon had had time to pass the Dwina and thus advance on the rear of the Russian army, it cannot readily be imagined how it would have been able to defile by the above-mentioned four bridges, in the presence of two hundred thousand French soldiers.

In the mean time, a universal cry of indignation arose throughout the Russian army against the plan of the campaign as described by General Pfuhl, and this was succeeded by expressions of disapprobation of the presence of the Emperor in the army, which introduced, it was said, the spirit of courts and the intrigues of courtiers where military operations should be the only care. Alexander could not, it was declared, himself command, and that, even if he could, he was unwilling to do so, and that by his presence he prevented any one else from properly commanding, on account of the deference which was naturally paid to his advice, and that the fear of incurring his blame, or that of his favourites, would always, as long as he was present, hinder the most resolute general from adopting any decided course of action. A strange spectacle was thus presented by this Czar, the perfect type in modern Europe of absolute sovereignty, who was thus dependent on his principal courtiers, and almost driven from his army by a species of *émancipation* in his court! Such is the profound illusion of despotism. Our powers of command can only really extend so far as we are capable of conceiving and accomplishing our wishes; rank is really, as far as power is concerned, a thing of naught; and the most absolute monarch is frequently but the valet of a valet, who knows that of which his master is ignorant. Genius alone can really command, because it has powers of comprehension and will; and even genius is dependent on wise counsels, for it cannot of itself see every thing, and if, blinded by pride, it rejects counsel,

it speedily falls into folly, and from folly into ruin.

The Russian military aristocracy, which, by turns threatening or supporting Alexander, had led him step by step to resist French domination, was not willing, now that it had forced him into war, to allow him to dictate to them as to the manner in which it was to be conducted. Violent and desperate, it was prepared to sacrifice the whole wealth and the whole blood of the nation in support of the contest, and was determined not to permit an Emperor who was doubtless patriotic, but at the same time gentle, humane, and changeable, to check its patriotic fury.

In their excitement the chief persons of this military aristocracy determined to adopt a plan which would have the effect of compelling Alexander to resign the system propounded by General Pfuhl and the position at the Drissa camp, and induce him to ascend the Dwina as far as Witepsk, where it would be possible to effect a junction with Bagration's army by Smolensk; and they resolved, when these points should have been once gained, that they would take a step further, and invite Alexander to quit the army, adopting the respectful and even flattering pretext that the direction of the war was not the principal task of government; that the care of providing means for its maintenance was a still higher duty; that one or two armies in the rear of that which was in the field were absolutely necessary; that these could only be obtained from the patriotism of the country; that Alexander, at that moment an object of national adoration, would be capable of obtaining all that he desired; that he should proceed in person, therefore, to the principal cities, Witepsk, Smolensk, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, to convoke all classes of the people, the noblesse, the clergy, and the bourgeoisie, and demand of them their utmost sacrifices; that he would thus perform a service both more urgent and more useful than any which he could perform by remaining with the army; that it was the duty of his generals to die on their country's soil in its defence, and his to seek for others of her children who would be ready soon to perish in their turn. And to the honour of this imperious and devoted aristocracy, which had violently freed itself, twelve years before, from the rule of a mad prince, and which was now removing from the army an Emperor whose presence detracted from its efficacy, we ought to recognise the fact that, in thus acting, its sole object was that it might with greater freedom pour out its own blood, and that of the armies, in the national defence.

The former minister of war, Arakchejev, a man of ordinary capacity but considerable energy, and Balachoff, the minister of police, dared to present to Alexander an address in writing recommending his immediate departure for Moscow, for the reasons just stated; and the Generals Bagowouth and Ostermann besought Alexander, with an energy which exceeded simple entreaty, to order the abandonment of the Drissa camp, and to direct a movement from right to left upon Witepsk, for the purpose of frustrating, by effecting a junction with Prince Bagration, the manœuvre which they began to suspect Napoleon was about to attempt.

Moved by these representations, Alexander

summoned a council of war, which included not only his own staff but that also of Barclay de Tolly, together with Arakhtcheief, the engineer Michaux, and Colonel Walzogen, General Pfuhl's confidant. Having first given a general view of the scheme which he had adopted for the conduct of the campaign, Alexander intrusted its justification in detail to Colonel Walzogen, who, however, after attempting to defend by arguments more or less specious the position which had been chosen for the Drissa camp, yielded to the general feeling of the council, and admitted that it was necessary to quit this camp immediately, and to advance upon Witepsk, whence it would be possible to afford support to Bagration. This view, in entire conformity with the general desire, met with no opposition, and was unanimously adopted.

But, although General Pfuhl's ridiculous attempt to seek at Drissa what Lord Wellington had found at Torres-Vedras was thus abandoned, Alexander by no means abandoned the essential part of his plan, which consisted in a retreat into the interior of the country, and which, indeed, was approved of by all persons of sagacity. He confided, therefore, the execution of this idea to General Barclay de Tolly, refraining from giving him the title of commander-in-chief, that he might not hurt Bagration's vanity, and leaving him in the position of minister of war, which naturally placed all the generals at his orders. Having made this arrangement, he yielded to the suggestion which had been made to him, and left head-quarters, taking with him all the troublesome counsellors from whom Barclay de Tolly and the army were equally anxious to be freed. General Pfuhl departed for St. Petersburg with Arakhtcheief, Armfeld, and others; and the Italian Paulucci, at first disgraced for his frankness, was appointed Governor of Riga.

Barclay de Tolly, who now remained at the head of the army, with the position of minister of war, was of all the Russian generals the most capable of directing its operations judiciously. Skilful, thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of his profession, cool and resolute, the sole inconvenience attending his command was that he inspired his subordinates with a bitter feeling of jealousy, which his acknowledged superiority could not quench, and that he was responsible in the eyes of the army for a system of retreat which, however judicious, deeply wounded its pride. For the moment he adhered thoroughly to the idea of evacuating the Drissa camp, following the course of the Dwina as far as Witepsk, and taking up a position opposite Smolensk, where it was hoped that Bagration would speedily arrive by ascending the course of the Dnieper, for the purpose of affording support to the latter, by advancing into the space between the sources of the Dwina and those of the Dnieper, as circumstances might render necessary. This movement, although closing against us the Moscow route, would leave that of St. Petersburg open, and therefore, for the purpose of closing it as much as possible, he resolved to leave in position on the Lower Dwina, between Polotsk and Riga, the corps under Wittgenstein, who, with twenty-five thousand men, speedily to be reinforced by the troops from Finland and the reserves from the North of the empire, would cover the important

place Riga, and threaten the left flank of the French, whilst the army of the Danube, should it return from Turkey in time, might threaten their right flank.

These arrangements having been made, Barclay de Tolly commenced his march on the 19th of July, and ascended the Dwina, the infantry being on the right bank, whilst the cavalry were on the left, on which side they were more than once exposed to engagements with our troops, but were always able to cross the river, which at this period of the year, above Polotsk, was always fordable. The rear-guard consisted of the troops under General Doctoroff. The whole army after its separation from Wittgenstein's corps amounted to ninety thousand men, preceded thus on its march along the two banks of the Dwina on the 20th, 21st, and 22d of July, keeping at a sufficient distance from the French, who, on their part, had resolved, for the better execution of their manœuvre, not to approach the enemy too closely.

Napoleon speedily perceived, in spite of the efforts made by the Russian cavalry to cover the movement, that Barclay de Tolly was ascending the Dwina towards Witepsk, for the purpose of supporting Bagration, who, on his side, was probably ascending the Dnieper as far as Smolensk; and this manœuvre of the enemy rather encouraged him in the prosecution of his grand design. Had the Russians retired from the Drissa camp for the purpose of plunging into the depths of Russia, he might have despaired of overtaking them; but, as Barclay de Tolly was ascending the Dwina and Bagration was ascending the Dnieper, each by a similar movement, it was always possible for him to interpose between them in pursuance of his original plan. Marshal Davout, after having compelled Prince Bagration to descend the Dnieper, would reach Smolensk before him, and Napoleon himself had but to ascend the Dwina, making a vigorous movement on his right, to find an opportunity of accomplishing at Witepsk what he had not been able to accomplish at Polotsk.—namely, the passage of the Dwina on the left of Barclay de Tolly, for the purpose of overlapping him and taking him in reverse.

In the mean time Prince Eugene was on the 22d of July at Kamen; Murat, with the cavalry and the three detached divisions of the 1st corps, on the left of Prince Eugene; whilst Ney and Oudinot were behind these, and the Guard followed by Gloubokoe. Napoleon marched all this mass of troops on Beschenkowicz, —at the same time ordering Marshal Oudinot to cross the Dwina at Polotsk, to drive back any of the enemy's troops he might there meet with, and then remained at the head of about one hundred and fifty thousand men, having Marshal Davout on his right, at the head of his own three divisions and the troops which had composed Jerome's corps.

Prince Eugene crossed the Oula on the 23d, and advanced with some light troops upon Beschenkowicz, a little town situated on the banks of the Dwina, where it was possible to observe the movements of the Russian troops on the other side of the stream. At the same time on the right bank, which was the one occupied by our troops, the Russian cavalry rear-guard displayed itself in the direction of Witepsk, and fell back, defending itself with more than usual ob-

stinacy, and giving rise to hopes on our side that the Russians would at length, as was so ardently desired, join battle. Napoleon ordered Prince Eugene, who had been only able to reach Beschenkowicz with an advanced guard, to bring up the whole of his corps on the following day, the 24th, together with the Nansouty cavalry, and to throw a bridge across the Dwina, for the purpose of making a reconnoissance on the other side. In the mean time, he had himself quitted Gloubooké, and was half a march in the rear of Prince Eugene,—having caused the whole of the army to execute a general movement of a similar character.

On the 24th Prince Eugene marched his corps to Beschenkowicz, and, whilst General Nansouty's light cavalry was passing this place, advanced along the Ostrowno road, spread his voltigeurs along the Dwina to drive back the Russian troops which were observed on the other side, and brought up his artillery to keep them at a still greater distance. The pontoneers attached to this corps threw themselves boldly into the stream, for the purpose of constructing a bridge, and within a few hours completed it; but the Bavarian cavalry, impatient to effect the passage, dashed into the stream, and hastened to sweep the opposite bank, eliciting the approbation of the whole army by the precision and rapidity of their manoeuvres.

Towards the middle of the afternoon a great tumult of horses announced the approach of Napoleon. The Italian troops, which had not yet seen him, received him with tremendous acclamations, which he only acknowledged, however, by a brief salute, so deeply engrossed were his thoughts by the plan with which they were occupied. He descended hastily from his horse for the purpose of addressing some observations to the chief of the pontoneers, and then, remounting, traversed the bridge at a gallop, and, following the Bavarian cavalry, proceeded some distance on the left bank of the Dwina for the purpose of observing the Russians on their march.

After having gone about two or three leagues, he returned, convinced that the whole Russian army had defiled upon Witepsk, and resolving to advance in this direction still more boldly and swiftly than before, for the purpose of placing himself, by force should it be necessary, between Witepsk and Smolensk, between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. He ordered, therefore, Prince Eugene and General Nansouty to advance on the following day, the 25th, upon Ostrowno,—at the same time directing Murat to precede them with the cavalry.

On the same day, General Barclay de Tolly, desiring to retard the progress of the French by disputing the ground with them foot by foot, had posted in advance of Ostrowno the 4th corps with a brigade of dragoons, the hussars of the Guard, the hussars of Towny, and a battery of horse-artillery.

General Piré, at the head of the 8th hussars and the 16th horse-chasseurs, advancing by the Ostrowno road, discovered, at the top of a slight ascent, the Russian light cavalry escorting the horse-artillery, and, in spite of a vigorous fire of grape which was immediately opened on our troops by the enemy, throwing himself upon the Russian cavalry, put to flight the regiment which occupied the middle of the road, charged that which was posted on the plain on the right,

returned upon that which was posted on the plain to the left, and, having defeated each in turn, threw himself on the Russian artillery, sabreing the gunners and taking eight cannon.

Scarcely had our troops ascended the slight eminence above mentioned, when they perceived, in the plain beyond, the whole of the 4th corps, (Ostermann's, supported on one side by the Dwina and on the other by wooded hills.

Murat immediately made arrangements for meeting the enemy. On his left, towards the Dwina, he arranged his regiments of cuirassiers in three lines; in the centre he deployed the 8th leger, to reply to the fire of the Russian infantry, and supported them with a portion of the cavalry under General Bruyère. On his right he arranged the remainder of this cavalry, which consisted of the 6th Polish lancers, the 10th Polish hussars, and a regiment of Prussian Uhlans, and sent a message to Prince Eugene to advance as speedily as possible with Delzon's division of infantry.

These arrangements had not been completed, when the Ingrian dragoons advanced to charge his extreme right, and were met by the Poles, who, inspired with fury at the sight of the Russians, executed a movement from front to right, and precipitated themselves on the enemy, throwing them into disorder, slaying a great number, and taking two or three hundred prisoners. In the mean time, the two battalions deployed from the 8th leger occupied the middle of the field of battle and protected our cavalry against the fire of the Russian infantry. To free himself from them, General Ostermann sent against them three detached battalions from his left. Murat immediately charged these battalions with some squadrons, and forced them to fall back; and then, no longer daring to attack our cavalry in front, Ostermann advanced under cover of a wood; many other battalions on our right had also pushed forward, two on our left, with the same design. Murat, who up to this time had only the cavalry at his disposal, threw against the battalions which presented themselves on the right the lancers, the Polish hussars, and the Prussian Uhlans, which, charging the enemy at full gallop, forced them to retreat in disorder. On the opposite wing, the 9th lancers, supported by a regiment of cuirassiers, with equal vigour broke the Russian battalions which had been sent against our left, and compelled them also to retreat.

This struggle between the French cavalry and the whole of the Russian infantry had endured for many hours, when at length the division Delzons arrived, and the sight of its serried lines induced Ostermann to retreat upon Ostrowno, having lost eight pieces of cannon, seven or eight hundred prisoners, and from twelve to fifteen hundred in killed or wounded. The loss on the side of our cavalry, which had distinguished itself during the day by the vigour, rapidity, and skill of its movements, was, at the most, about three or four hundred.

This combat showed that the Russians intended to dispute our advance, and perhaps to give us battle; and nothing could be more in accordance with the views of Napoleon, who, persisting in his resolution to prevent the junction of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, and more especially to outstrip the former, could desire nothing more than a battle, since he would

then most probably be able to procure immediately all the results which he expected from a skilful manœuvre. He ordered, therefore, Prince Eugene and Murat to march their troops *en masse* upon Ostrowno, on the following day, and even to pass this point, for the purpose of approaching Witepsk as closely as possible.

On the following day, accordingly, Murat and Ney, having well concerted their movements, marched forward their troops in close company, and, having in this manner traversed Ostrowno in the morning, at two leagues' distance beyond it found the enemy ranged behind a great ravine, in strong masses of infantry and cavalry. The field of battle presented the same characteristics as those of the preceding days. Ascending the valley from the Dwina, there were on our right hills covered with wood, in the centre a great road bordered with birch-trees and crossed with ravines, over which were thrown little bridges, and on the left the Dwina, pursuing a sinuous route and at this season frequently fordable.

Reaching towards eight o'clock the brink of the ravine behind which the enemy was established, our troops encountered the Russian tirailleurs, and the cavalry was obliged to fall back, leaving to the infantry the care of forcing the obstacle. As soon as General Delzons had arrived in front of the ravine which checked our advance, he directed the 92d of the line on the thick woods on our right, together with a battalion of voltigeurs of the 106th, at the same time sending a Croatian regiment supported by the 84th of the line on the left, and keeping the remainder of the 106th in the centre in reserve. The artillery was placed in position by General d'Anthouard, in such a manner as to cover by its fire the attack which was about to be made by the infantry.

Whilst the troops on the right proceeded to ascend the wooded heights under a vigorous fire, those on the left, conducted by General Huard, succeeded in crossing the ravine and establishing themselves on a plateau which had been evacuated by the enemy. This movement was followed by the troops in the centre; and the 8th léger, the artillery, and the cavalry, proceeded successively to occupy the plateau which the enemy had abandoned. Whilst the troops forming the left and composed of the Croatian regiment and the 84th pursued their own success without taking into consideration the fortunes of their comrades on the opposite wing, and had advanced a considerable distance, the latter failed to make a progress equally rapid, had exhausted itself in vain efforts to penetrate into the thickness of the wood, which was defended by numerous infantry. Our right wing was thus held in check, whilst our centre was considerably advanced, and our left still more so; and the Russian General Konownitsyn, perceiving this state of affairs, directed against our left and centre the whole of his reserves, and led them vigorously to the attack; whereupon the Croatian regiment and the 84th, which had not expected this sudden assault, finding themselves taken in flank, were speedily driven back, and were about to be hurled into the ravine, leaving our artillery in the hands of the enemy, when Murat, at the head of the Polish lancers, hurling himself with the rapidity of lightning upon the Russian column, scattered

the first battalion and strewed the ground with slain. At the same moment an officer named Ricardo, at the head of a company of the 8th léger, advanced to the rescue of our cannon, which the enemy were about to seize; whilst the 106th, which had hitherto been held in reserve, also advanced to the support of the 84th and the Croats. These combined efforts checked the Russians, carried our left in advance, and sustained our centre, whilst Murat, Eugene, and Junot (commander of the army of Italy under Eugene) hastened to the right, where General Roussel, at the head of the 92d of the line and the voltigeurs of the 106th, had the greatest difficulty in overcoming the double obstacle presented by the heights and the woods.

Perceiving other deep columns (those of Ostermann) beyond the troops of Konownitsyn, on ground which became more and more broken, Murat and Eugene now hesitated, although victorious, to advance their troops too far, as they did not know whether it would suit Napoleon's plans to bring on a general engagement. But suddenly they were relieved from their embarrassment by the approach of Napoleon, who appeared with his staff, and, having cast a glance over the field of battle, gave orders to pursue the enemy until evening.

This second combat cost us twelve hundred in killed and wounded, including the brave General Roussel, who was killed,—the loss on the side of the Russians amounting to about two thousand.

Napoleon passed the night of this day in the midst of the advanced guard, resolving to place himself at dawn at the head of his troops, for each new step rendered the position of the army more perilous, and might be productive of the gravest consequences. He had ordered the detached divisions of the first corps, the Guard, and Marshal Ney, to join the head of the army with the greatest possible despatch, that he might be in a position to give battle should the enemy be disposed to accept it, and had left the Bavarians, exhausted with fatigue, in the rear at Beschenkowicz, to cover the communications with Polotsk, the post assigned to Oudinot, and with Wilna, the central point of all our resources and all our communications.

On the following morning, at daybreak, Napoleon, followed by Prince Eugene and King Murat, went forward for the purpose of personally inspecting the movements of the troops. Witepsk was now at no great distance, and its steeples were already visible on our left, on the bank of the Dwina, at the foot of a hill. A ravine, the bridge across which had been burned, separated us from the enemy, and at some distance beyond it, on a rather extensive plain, were visible a numerous Russian rear-guard, composed of cavalry and light infantry, preparing to dispute its passage, whilst beyond a little river which ran at the bottom of this plain, joining the Dwina near Witepsk, was the Russian army itself, in order of battle, and apparently amounting to ninety or a hundred thousand men. The adoption of this position by the enemy seemed to intimate that they were determined to give us battle to prevent us interposing to frustrate their intended junction with Bagration, and from penetrating into the open space which separated the Dwina from the Dnieper; and Napoleon,



therefore, immediately sent off aides-de-camp after aides-de-camp to hasten the approach of the remainder of the army. During the delay necessarily occasioned by the reconstruction of the bridge over the ravine, and the defiling of the troops across it, Napoleon took up a position a little to the left, in the rear, on an eminence from whence he could survey at a glance the whole extent of the field of battle. The weather was superb, full of sunshine, and excessively warm. The army of Italy formed, as usual, the head of our column, in company with General Nansouty's cavalry. Delson's division, which had been in action the previous evening, now gave way to the division of General Broussier, who hastened to repair the bridge, which he speedily rendered fit for the passage of the troops. The 16th cavalry-chasseurs of the brigade Piré were the first to pass the ravine, followed by three hundred voltigeurs of the 9th of the line, and, defiling by the left at the foot of the eminence on which Napoleon had taken up his position, advanced into the plain, whilst Broussier's regiments were crossing the bridge in their turn, and, proceeding a little too much to the left, the 16th was attacked by the Cossacks of the Imperial Russian Guard, and, in spite of a most gallant defence, was compelled to give way after having suffered severe loss. At the same moment, the greater portion of the Russian cavalry was set in motion, and, being thrown upon our left, seemed to swallow up the three hundred voltigeurs of the 9th, who, however, checked the numerous charges of the enemy with a well-sustained fire. Still pursuing their movement in advance, however, the latter almost reached the foot of the eminence occupied by Napoleon, and attacked the squares which the troops of Broussier's division had formed as soon as they had crossed the ravine. But the first of these squares, formed by the 58d of the line, received them with the *aplomb* of veteran troops of Italy, and, having repulsed their charge, advanced unbroken, and disengaged the chasseurs and the three hundred voltigeurs, who had remained, as it were, drowned in the midst of a flood of assailants. The action took place in the sight of the whole army, and it was filled with joy as it beheld the little group of voltigeurs emerging in safety from the midst of the frightful mêlée in which it had been involved; whilst Napoleon, who had observed the whole affair, crossed the ravine, and, riding in front of the brave voltigeurs, exclaimed, "Who are you, my friends?" "Voltigeurs of the 9th of the line, and all of us children of Paris," was the reply. "Ah! you are brave men, and all deserve the Cross of the Legion of Honour," rejoined the Emperor; and he went forward to the squares of Broussier's division, which had advanced into the plain and pursued with the fire of its artillery the numerous cavalry of General Pahlen. As Nansouty's cavalry and Delson's division also speedily came up, on the centre and the right respectively, the Russians, considering that it would be imprudent to attempt to hold their ground against such forces, had repassed the little river, the Loutcheza, and drawn up their troops there in battle-array behind it; and, had all his troops been now at his command, Napoleon would have seized the opportunity of giving battle while the moment seemed to offer. As, however, the troops at his

immediate disposal were insufficient for the purpose, he resolved to employ the remainder of the day in reconnoissances and in concentrating his troops. In the mean time our soldiers longed for the decisive contest, however bloody it might be. They were worn out, indeed, with a march which had no result, which had been pursued under a heat which had reached twenty-seven degrees Réaumur, and during which they had had only the very scantiest supply of brandy, scarcely any bread, and had been compelled to eat their meat without salt. Their ranks, also, had been much thinned by fatigue; the combats in which they had just been engaged had deprived them of three thousand men in killed and wounded, and the departure of the Bavarians had been a loss of fifteen thousand more. Nevertheless, the remaining troops, consisting of Nansouty's and Montbrun's cavalry, the army of Italy, the three divisions of the first corps, the troops under Ney, and the Guard, still amounting to one hundred and twenty-five thousand men,—all excellent soldiers,—were more than sufficient for the army of Barclay de Tolly.

The determination of Barclay de Tolly to give battle was, indeed, most daring, and was the result of a more powerful consideration than the bitter complaints of his troops, which were indignant at their continued retreat. Had he withdrawn a step farther in the rear, the communication between Witepsk and Smolensk would have been intercepted, and Bagration, whom he had arranged to meet at Babinowicz, would have been checked in his march, probably caught between the troops of Davout and Bagration, and consequently destroyed. He resolved, therefore, whatever might be the consequences, to fight a desperate battle behind the little river Loutcheza, although the withdrawal of Wittgenstein's corps, the protracted marches, and the three days' contest in which they had just engaged, had reduced his troops to ninety thousand men, whilst the French amounted to one hundred and twenty-five thousand. His resolution was desperate, but the occasion was one of those in which desperate resolutions save empires.

He had employed the whole day in preparations, when an officer suddenly arrived bearing the most urgent reasons to induce him to change his plan. The officer was one of Bagration's aides-de-camp, and brought information of the battle of Mohilev, and its consequences, which were that Bagration, forced by Davout to pass the Dnieper much lower than Mohilev, was compelled to make a long détour for the purpose of joining Barclay de Tolly in the opening which separates the sources of the two rivers, and could only, at most, hope to join the latter at Smolensk. Such was the information brought by Bagration's aide-de-camp, and it showed that, whilst a further retrograde movement would by no means render impossible the junction of the two armies behind the line of the Dnieper and the Dwina, it would be utterly useless to fight a dangerous battle for an object the attainment of which would not be jeopardized by the continuance of the retreat. Relieved, therefore, of the immense responsibility which he had been nearly forced to incur, he resolved to continue his retreat the same night; and accordingly, late on the night of the 27th,

when fatigue had begun to relax the vigilance of the French, the whole of his army resumed its march with the most remarkable unity of action, silence, and precision. The watch-fires were left burning, and the Count Pahlen's rear-guard remained on the banks of the Loutcheza, the more completely to deceive the enemy. The army retreated in three columns, that of the right, composed of the 6th and 5th corps, (Docotoroff's and the guard,) marching by the Roudnia route upon Smolensk, that of the centre, consisting of the third corps, Touczkoff's,) proceeding by Kolycki upon Porecié, and that of the left, composed of the 2d and 4th corps, (Bagowouth's and Ostermann's,) making for the same point by Janowierz.

Porecié, towards which two of the Russian columns were thus directing their march, was situated behind a little marshy and wooded stream, the Kasplia, which, crossing the space of eighteen or twenty leagues which lies between the sources of the Dnieper and those of the Dwina, closes, so to speak, the gates of Muscovy. By taking up a position, therefore, with the bulk of his forces at Porecié, behind a region of wood and marsh, and protected by the sinuous and muddy stream of the Kasplia, and free to march upon Sourage, on the banks of the Dwina, or upon Smolensk, on the banks of the Dnieper, Barclay de Tolly would be in a position to await for some days the junction with Bagration, whilst at the same time covering both the Moscow and St. Petersburg roads; and, indeed, the promptitude with which he formed and the precision with which he executed this plan are in the highest degree creditable to the military judgment and skill of Barclay de Tolly, and prove that, had he been less interfered with, he would have been able to conduct with prudence the operations of this serious and difficult war.

On the morning of the 28th of July, Napoleon, surrounded by his lieutenants, rode to the bank of the Loutcheza, where he hoped to find a new Friedland, and, above all things, that peace which he had so lightly abandoned, and which he now regretted; but his quick eye soon discovered, through the skillful manœuvres of the brilliant rear-guard conducted by Count Pahlen, that the Russians had retreated to await a battle. Ignorant of the motives which had regulated Barclay de Tolly's actions, he might well have thought that the retreat was intended as a method of enticing the French to a pursuit which should fatigue and exhaust them; but this opinion was rather that of his lieutenants, officers, and soldiers, than his own, and he immediately gave orders that the troops, in spite of the heat, which was at twenty-seven or twenty-eight degrees Reaumur, and the fatigues of the preceding days, should hasten forward at their utmost speed, to endeavour to overtake at least some portion of the fugitive army. But Count Pahlen's cavalry, although never avoiding the charge of ours, always ended by retreating and yielding the disputed ground.

Our troops had scarcely commenced their march, when they perceived upon the left, on the Dwina, the city of Witepsk, the capital of White Russia, containing about twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and a place of some trade. One of our detachments entered it without difficulty, chasing before it the bands of Cossacks

which, like ill-omened birds, never retreated without having filled the places through which they passed with unsightly ruin. On this occasion, however, they had only destroyed the principal magazines and the mills, not having had sufficient time to fire the town. But the inhabitants, with the exception of a few priests and merchants, had fled at our approach, terrified by the exaggerated reports which prevailed respecting the atrocities committed by our troops in Poland, and which had no foundation, in fact, as respected the army itself, although too true with respect to isolated bands of pillagers.

Having spent a few minutes in Witepsk and given some indispensable orders, Napoleon hastened to place himself again at the head of his columns, whose path was now strewn with men and horses, overpowered by the heat and the exhaustion resulting from the want of proper nourishment. Our troops continued their march for many leagues on the traces of the Russian army, without meeting a single man from whom any information could be obtained; and it was not until the close of the day that they came up with some Russians, who had been unable to sustain the rapidity of the march, and from the information given by these, and the glimpses which were occasionally obtained of the distant columns, it was presumed that the enemy was retreating partly upon Smolensk, and partly between Smolensk and Sourage, with the intention of effecting a junction with Bagration. The exact information which Napoleon had hitherto received of the movements of the enemy afforded him all the necessary data for forming an opinion of the projects of the enemy, and at the close of the day, halting at a little place named Haponowtschina, he held a short conference with Murat and Eugene, in which he agreed with them that, as he was so much in advance of us, it would be useless to attempt to prevent the junction of Barclay de Tolly with Bagration, and that a continuance of the pursuit would only oblige these generals to effect their junction ten or fifteen leagues farther back. He agreed, therefore, to halt, to afford his troops a few days of repose, to rally the stragglers, and to store in magazines the resources of the country which the Russians had not had time to destroy, and, having adopted this resolution, returned to Witepsk.

Thus had Napoleon's combinations at the opening of this campaign, which were the most brilliant he had ever conceived, been baffled; although he had vanquished the enemy in every encounter, inflicted a loss upon him of about fifteen thousand in killed, wounded, or prisoners, and deprived him of his best provinces, such as Lithuania and Courland. Some errors in the execution of his plans had, doubtless, contributed to their want of success,—such as having crossed the Niemen too hastily, and not having passed at Kowno, before the alarm had been given to the enemy, the time which it had been necessary to devote at Wilna to bringing up the stragglers and baggage; such as having relied too securely on the junction of King Jerome with Marshal Davout, and of having too much relied, in short, on men and the elements. But, independently of these faults, his success in itself was a great proof of the imprudence of this war, which he attempted to carry on with

soldiers forcibly enlisted from various countries and compelled to march through immense tracts too barren and too thinly inhabited to supply the necessities which it was impossible for them to carry with them. At the same time we must remark that, had Napoleon, when he had once been so imprudent as to commence the war, been more imprudent still, and marched straight forward without halting at Wilna to rally his troops and convoys, he might have left many more stragglers in the rear, but he would probably in this case have been enabled to have overwhelmed Barclay de Tolly on the one side and Bagration on the other, and to have struck those terrible blows which would have brought about peace, or at least have given a lustre to this first campaign which would have rendered it unnecessary for him to seek in the depths of Russia those brilliant results which were necessary to preserve his prestige. But we may observe here, as we must observe hereafter, that forming plans too rashly and executing them with too much hesitation were the fatal errors which caused Napoleon's failure in this war; that, in fact, if we might venture to say so, had he been more blind he might have succeeded better. It must be added that, although his health remained unaffected, he seemed to be less active, being more frequently in his carriage than on his horse, either because the heat, or increasing stoutness, had somewhat reduced his physical (not mental) energy; because the vastness of the undertaking on which he had entered began somewhat to frighten him and thus deprive his will of its natural strength and ardour; or because, let us say, if we share the superstitions common to humanity, that fortune, inconstant or fatigued, ceased to second his designs.

Napoleon's inexhaustible military genius was not yet, however, at the end of its resources, and the one hundred and forty thousand men who would be at Barclay de Tolly's command after the junction of the two armies of the Dwina and the Dnieper could not be invincible before the two hundred and twenty-five thousand who would be at Napoleon's disposal when he should have rallied the troops under Marshal Davout. At the same time, Lithuania and Courland had already been acquired, and the superiority of the French troops over those of the enemy brilliantly maintained.

Napoleon now installed himself in the palace of the Governor of Witepsk, with his military court,—distributing the corps of his army around him in such a manner as to guard against surprise, obtain provisions, and be able to concentrate them immediately on the points on which it might be necessary to act. At Witepsk itself he posted the Imperial Guard; somewhat in advance, at Sourage, a little town situated above Witepsk, on the Dwina, Prince Eugene; a little to the right, towards Roudnia, in the midst of the space between the Dwina and the Dnieper, Marshal Ney; and in advance of the latter, at all the points at which an enemy might possibly approach, the entire mass of his cavalry. He encamped behind Ney, between Witepsk and Babinowiczi, the three divisions of the first corps, which awaited with impatience the moment in which they should meet the severe but paternal chief under whom they had been accustomed to serve.

Marshal Davout had, in fact, ascended the Dnieper after the battle of Mohilev, and was now established at Orscha, where he guarded the Dnieper, as at Witepsk Napoleon watched the Dwina. He had extended Grouchy's cavalry on his left, so as to form a link of connection in the direction of Babinowiczi with the main army, and had thrown the light cavalry of Pajol and Bordessoulle on his right, that it might follow and watch beyond the Dnieper the army of Prince Bagration, who was making a great détour by Micielaw with the view of effecting a junction with Barclay de Tolly towards Smolensk. The Polish and Westphalian troops, which were much exhausted, he had placed at Mohilev, and between Mohilev and Orscha respectively. In the mean time, General Latour-Maubourg slowly retired with his exhausted cavalry from Bobruisk upon Mohilev, watching the detached troops of the Russian General Tormasoff; and Reynier, at the head of the Saxon troops destined to guard the grand duchy, met the Austrians, who were on their march towards the grand army.

Napoleon was established, therefore, on the Upper Dwina with the Guard and Prince Eugene's troops, having between the Dwina and the Dnieper Murat, Ney, and the three first divisions of Marshal Davout, whilst on the Dnieper itself were the remaining divisions of this marshal's corps, together with the Westphalians and Poles; and he determined, while thus occupying a position free from liability to attack, to employ himself in supplying the necessities of his soldiers, and to recompose each corps according to its original formation, giving to Prince Eugene Grouchy's cavalry and the Bavarians, to General Montbrun the cuirassiers of General Valence, which had been temporarily lent to Marshal Davout, to restore to the latter his three first divisions of infantry, and, in addition, to place under his command the Westphalians, the Poles, and the reserve-cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg.

According to his custom, Napoleon ordered that the resources of the country should be immediately employed to afford the troops that subsistence which they had wanted during their march, and to provide also a reserve of provisions sufficient to last them eight or ten days. As the surrounding country was tolerably well cultivated, and the Russians had not been able to destroy all the magazines, our troops were able to procure a certain amount of provisions; and Napoleon ordered the establishment of magazines, particularly at Witepsk and Orscha, where he determined to place his two principal *points d'appui* on the Dwina and the Dnieper. At the same time, as there was a great want of hospital-accommodation, not only for our wounded, but also for the Russian wounded left in our hands, whom the good and skilful surgeon Larrey, a true hero of humanity, most carefully attended, in order that the enemy might, in turn, bestow some care upon their wounded prisoners, Napoleon took advantage of Davout's presence at Orscha to have prepared at Orscha, and also at Borisow and Minsk, hospitals capable of receiving twelve thousand patients.

The chiefs of corps had spoken with so much earnestness to him respecting the extent to which the ranks of the army had been thinned by the sufferings attending their march, that,

as soon as he had resolved upon a halt at Witepsk, he ordered, for the purpose of learning the real extent of the evil, that a detailed inspection should be made of every corps, from the extreme left to the extreme right, from Marshal Macdonald towards Riga, to General Reynier towards Brezecs, a line of more than two hundred leagues in extent; and the following were the sad results which it made known. Marshal Macdonald, who had under his command the Prussian and Polish troops, which had marched fifty leagues at the most, and had had to endure but few privations, had only lost six thousand out of thirty thousand. Marshal Oudinot, whose corps, with the division of Doumere's cuirassiers, which had been detached from Grouchy's cavalry-corps, numbered thirty-eight thousand combatants at the passage of the Niemen, had no more than twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men at Polotsk,—a terrible diminution, which he attributed to the prevalence of desertion among the foreign troops, such as the Croatian, the Swiss, and the Portuguese,—the deserters among the French troops being only those of the last conscription. Marshal Ney, who was at the head of thirty-six thousand men at the commencement of operations, now declared that he had no more than twenty-two thousand capable of bearing arms,—the strangers in this case, Illyrians and Wurtembergians, being in this corps as in the others the chief cause of the diminution. Murat's cavalry, including the cavalry-reserves of General Nansouty and Montbrun, was reduced from twenty-two thousand horsemen to thirteen or fourteen thousand. The Imperial Guard itself, which had originally numbered thirty-seven thousand men, was now diminished to twenty-seven thousand,—this loss of ten thousand being chiefly due to the losses in the ranks of the young infantry and the light cavalry, which was constantly employed in the reconnaissances ordered by the Emperor himself, and to the extraordinary losses of the division Clapartède, which had possessed mere skeleton regiments on its withdrawal from Spain, and had been recruited with young Poles, who had almost to a man succumbed to the fatigues of the march or the temptation of desertion. The Old Guard was the only force which retained undiminished strength.

Prince Eugene's troops, which had been estimated at eighty thousand men at the passage of the Niemen, now numbered no more than forty-five thousand. A frightful dysentery had reduced the Bavarians from twenty-seven to thirteen thousand; and their ranks became each day so much thinner by the increase of sickness among them, that their corps had been considered unfit for active service, and had been left at Bessenkowitz. The Italian division was the corps which, next to the Bavarian, had suffered most severely from dysentery; and even the Italian Guard, which was composed of picked men, had not escaped. The excellent French divisions of Broussier and Delzons had suffered less, having lost only a fourth part of their twenty thousand,—two thousand in engagements with the enemy, and three thousand from sickness and fatigue,—and thus offering a very advantageous contrast to the Italian division Pino, which from eleven thousand had been reduced to five thousand. Marshal Davout's

corps had suffered less than the others, being composed of stronger materials, and, if it had had no Dutch, Hamburg, Illyrian, or Spanish troops in its ranks, would have suffered scarcely the loss of a sixteenth part of its effective strength. In consequence, however, of the presence of these troops and of refractory recruits in its regiments, its effective strength had been reduced from seventy-two thousand to about fifty-two thousand. Finally, Jerome's corps, which was composed of the Westphalians, Polish, and Saxon troops, together with Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, had lost eight thousand of its thirty thousand Poles, eight thousand of its eighteen thousand Westphalians, and four thousand of its seventeen thousand Saxons, whilst Latour-Maubourg's cavalry had been reduced from ten thousand to about six thousand.

Thus the army in the field, which at the passage of the Niemen had consisted of four hundred thousand men capable of bearing arms, and four hundred and twenty-five thousand including the artillery, engineer, and transport corps, now numbered no more than two hundred and fifty-five thousand. At the same time, it must be observed that there were one hundred and forty thousand men forming a second line between the Niemen and the Rhine, and from fifty to sixty thousand sick in the various hospitals in Germany and Poland,—from whom very serviceable reinforcements might very probably be drawn.

Leaving sixty thousand men under Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot on the Dwina, and twenty thousand under General Reynier on the Dnieper, Napoleon would be able therefore to advance with an army of one hundred and seventy-five thousand men,—a force which would speedily be increased by the thirty thousand Austrians of Prince Schwarzenberg, who were already on their march towards Minsk, and in the rear of which thirty thousand more might be marched from the one hundred and forty thousand men belched between the Niemen and the Rhine. But, although this was doubtless a force quite capable of inflicting decisive blows upon an enemy, it was no less a cruel misfortune, after having been in the field no more than a month, and having fought no great battle, to be reduced to such proportions.

We have already pointed out the causes of this marvellous diminution, and the last marches rendered them still more apparent. The army of Italy had marched from March to July six hundred leagues, and the army which set out from the Rhine five hundred. One hundred and fifty thousand horses had been employed in the transport of munitions and stores: but one-half had already perished from the want of food for themselves, and a considerable portion of our baggage-train had been necessarily abandoned on the roads. The privations resulting from this cause, added to the fatigue of long and continued marches, had prevented many even of those who were ardent soldiers from following their corps, and the foreign troops, who had little inclination for serving in our ranks, although they fought well when in action under our eyes, from a feeling of vanity, had not the least scruple, when they were fatigued or indisposed, in remaining in the rear, having in the forests of Poland a safe retreat. Some of these perished in the hospitals, and some became in-

gands; but the greater number passed through Germany, favoured by the inhabitants, and returned to their homes. Next to the foreigners the young soldiers and refractory troops were the most inclined to quit their ranks, and the regiments, in fact, at length only consisted of veteran soldiers, together with a few whom a military temperament had thoroughly associated with the spirit of the old troops. But it was the probable effect of the example of desertion thus offered which was more to be dreaded than the loss of one hundred and fifty thousand men which had already resulted from it, and Napoleon, feeling it to be so, took the most minute and profoundly-calculated precautions against the calamities which might arise from this cause.

As the *gendarmes d'élite*, consisting of about three or four hundred, which ordinarily exercised the functions of police in the rear of the army, appeared to be insufficient for this duty, notwithstanding that it was assisted by the columns mobile, Napoleon ordered that all the troops still remaining in the dépôts of the Guard should be sent from Paris to head-quarters. He created, moreover, (and by this measure showed his opinion of the bad state of the army,) two inspectors, who, under the titles of *aides-major-généraux* of infantry and cavalry, were to watch narrowly and constantly the condition of these two arms of the service, to learn the exact force of each regiment at the moment of each action, and to superintend, above all things, the little dépôts left by the army on its route. The two officers chosen by Napoleon for the fulfilment of these duties were excellently selected, whether we consider their vigilance or their acquaintance with the species of troops they would have to superintend, and were, for the infantry Count Labau, for the cavalry Count Durosnel. But, unfortunately, the multiplication of officials can no more of itself remedy abuses than the multiplication of physicians can of itself heal the sick; and Napoleon much more reasonably sought, during this halt at Witepsk, a remedy for the disorganized state of the army in bringing up the stragglers and convoys which had fallen in the rear, and collecting a fresh reserve of provisions. At the same time, in the hope of renewing the spirit of discipline among the troops, he determined to review them himself in the place of Witepsk, and had some of the surrounding houses pulled down for the purpose of rendering it sufficiently large for the purpose. He first inspected the various brigades of the Imperial Guard, examining them most minutely, and addressing the soldiers and officers in language calculated to arouse in their hearts the most noble sentiments. During one of these reviews he received General Friant in the character of colonel-commandant of the foot-grenadiers of the Guard,—a post which had become vacant by the death of General Dorsenne,—and, embracing the general, who was one of the most accomplished and valuable officers France possessed, said to him, “My dear Friant, you must not assume your new command until the end of the campaign, for these soldiers themselves know how to perform their duty, and you must remain with your division, where you may still render me important services. You are, in fact, one of those men whom I wish to place wherever I cannot be myself.”

In the mean time, the impossibility of coming up with the enemy was the general subject of bitter expressions of regret among generals, officers, and soldiers. “Still the cowards fly!” cried the soldiers; but the remarks of the officers on this subject were to the effect that the Russians desired to entice us on, until fatigue and exhaustion should have so reduced our numbers as to enable them to attack us at an advantage. This latter idea was also generally shared by the chiefs of the army, and it was generally asked, in the circle immediately surrounding Napoleon, whether it were not time to check the movement in advance, now that the army had reached the true border between Europe and Asia, to take up a solid position on the Dwina and the Dnieper, to fortify Witepsk and Smolensk, to take Riga on the left, to extend the right wing as far as Volhynia and Podolia, for the purpose of arousing those provinces to revolt, to organize an army and a government for Poland, and to prepare winter-cantonments in which the troops might wait, reorganized, well armed, and well fed, until the Russians should advance against them, prepared to give battle for the recovery of Poland.

There was considerable good sense in these ideas, but they elicited, nevertheless, very strong objections from Napoleon. In the first place, he said, cantonments were not so easily established as was implied; for the Dnieper and the Dwina, which now appeared to be a protecting frontier, would no longer be so when for a time obliterated, as within the space of three months they would be, by ice and snow; “and how then,” he asked, “could such positions as Dunaubourg, Polotak, Witepsk, Smolensk, Orscha, and Mohilev, distant from each other about thirty and forty leagues, and but slightly fortified, be defended against troops whom winter was so far from disabling that it rather facilitated their movements? How, again, could the French troops, naturally so active, and so accustomed, in the campaigns in which they had so lately been engaged, to rapid movements, be restrained during nine whole months, from the August of the current year to the June of the following year,—whilst, moreover, there could be no certain hope of their obtaining fit and sufficient food for so long an interval? And how,” he continued, “would it be possible to explain to Europe the close in August of a campaign which had begun in June? Would it not be generally regarded as a sign of weakness, and be the cause of hostile movements in the rear of the French army? And would not Spain immediately become fertile in sources of embarrassment, which, comparatively of little moment while the grand army was between the Elbe and the Rhine, would become very serious when it should be confined with its chief for an indefinite time between the Niemen and the Borysthènes?” Such were the objections addressed by Napoleon to those who considered a position on the Dnieper and the Dwina as a sufficient result of the campaign; and there were many other objections to the plea urged by the latter, of which he was well aware, but which he refrained from mentioning; for, if it were his nature to plunge into inextricable difficulties, he was most quick to discover those difficulties when he was once among them, and, if he denied their existence, it was not because he was

ignorant of them, but because he was averse to owning his errors, and because he calculated that by denying their truth he could in some degree diminish their reality. He knew, for example, although he was far from confessing it, that his popularity began to decline even in France, that a spirit of exasperation against him prevailed throughout Europe, and that among the troops, who formed his most faithful adherents, a certain degree of coldness and distrust towards him was the result of the fatigues to which he had exposed them.

Napoleon, however, by no means wholly discarded the idea of making the limits of Europe the limit also of his expedition, but he was willing only to put it into execution after having performed, as he hoped a halt of fifteen days would enable him to do, some brilliant action, which would permit him to pause on the confines of Muscovy, without exciting distrust of his power in France, or elsewhere. In the mean time, projecting new and decisive operations, he directed, in accordance with them, the movements of the corps which were not to share in the halt at Witopsk. We have seen above that he had ordered Marshal Oudinot to march upon the Count de Wittgenstein, to push him upon Sebej, on the St. Petersburg route by Pskow, in order to disengage the left of the grand army; that he had ordered Marshal Macdonald to support the movement of Marshal Oudinot, marching on the Lower Dwina, in order to take Dunabour and make preparations for the siege of Riga, which would secure not only the peaceable occupation of Courland, but probably the possession also of the two strong points of defence of Dunabour and Riga. We have also seen that in the direction of the Dnieper he had ordered General Reynier with the Saxons, Prince Schwarzenberg with the Austrians, to march to Brezecs or Kobrin, and Minsk, respectively, Reynier having to cover the grand duchy, and to rouse Volhynia to revolt.

Marshal Oudinot had successively defiled before Dunabour, Drissa, and Polotsk, and had finally passed the Dwina at Polotsk itself, having first, in accordance with Napoleon's orders, left his third division, composed of Swiss, Illyrians, and Dutch, under General Merle, at the Drissa camp, for the purpose of destroying its works; but the hands of these troops, enfeebled by exhaustion and unfurnished with tools, (for the engineer-material remained in the rear,) had been able to make but very little progress in this important work of demolition, when the marshal, finding himself far too weak before Wittgenstein's corps, which had been increased by the reinforcements of Prince Repuin to thirty thousand men, had recalled them to his corps. In order to conform to the order to push on to Sebej on the St. Petersburg route, he had advanced a portion of his light cavalry on the 28th of July upon the little river the Drissa, one of the tributaries of the Dwina, and had successively echeloned his first and second divisions with the cuirassiers between the Drissa and Polotsk. For the purpose of guarding against the Russian troops under Wittgenstein, posted beyond the Drissa, in a direction almost perpendicular to his left flank, he had posted at Lazowka the remainder of his light division and the foreign division of General Merle. On the 29th he had made a step in advance, having

crossed the Drissa at Sivotschina ford, carried his advanced guard near to Kliastitsoui, ranged his two chief divisions a little in the rear, and left the division Merle to guard the Sivotschina ford,—some detachments of cavalry and light infantry connecting it with Polotsk.

Such was Oudinot's position on the 29th of July, the second day of the entry of the grand army into Witopsk, and, on that day, determined cavalry-charges made by the enemy on the head and rear of his column left him in no doubt with respect to the offensive projects of the enemy. At the same time, two Russian officers who fell into our hands informed him that Count de Wittgenstein was marching diagonally towards him, with the intention of striking him a severe blow at Kliastitsoui; and with the intention of providing against this projected attack he advanced as far as the village and chateau of Iakoubow, situated at the entrance of a little plain surrounded by wood. On the morning of the 29th, Wittgenstein debouched on this plain and furiously attacked the village and chateau, which Oudinot on his part defended with the first brigade of Legrand's division, placing the 26th leger in Iakoubow itself, and posting the 56th of the line a little to the left, in connection with the wood, whilst he kept in reserve the second brigade commanded by General Maison. The contest was very desperate on each side, and at one moment the Russians had penetrated into the village of Iakoubow, and even into the court of the chateau; but two companies of the 26th, rushing upon them, drove them out at the bayonet's point, and, killing two or three hundred of them, took prisoners about as many more. In every direction our troops drove back the enemy; but the numerous and well-served artillery of the latter on the edge of the wood prevented the former from venturing to continue the combat there, Marshal Davout being unwilling to risk so difficult an attack whilst he was uncertain with respect to the course of events in the rear. The marshal feared, in fact,—and with good reason,—that, whilst resisting the enemy at the head of his column, he might be taken in reverse and cut off from Polotsk, where were deposited his artillery and material. Under these circumstances, he believed it would be wiser to retreat upon the Drissa, to recross it by the Sivotschina ford, and in that position to await the enemy.

Executing this retrograde movement on the 31st, Marshal Oudinot occupied a position on the evening of that day beyond the Sivotschina, having tirailleurs along the Drissa, the two divisions Legrand and Verdier at some distance in the rear, the cuirassiers in a position from whence they could support the infantry, and the division Merle in observation in the direction of Polotsk. Our tirailleurs were ordered, should the Russians pass the Drissa, to resist them only so much as might be necessary to entice them on, and to give immediate information at headquarters of their approach. On the night of the 31st of July, the Russians marched upon the Drissa, and on the following morning began imprudently to effect its passage. This was the moment for which Marshal Oudinot had waited, and he immediately threw upon them, in succession, the first and second divisions of the brigade Legrand.

As soon as our troops encountered the Rus-

sians they completely defeated them, killing or wounding about two thousand, and taking more than two thousand prisoners, together with a portion of their artillery. The division Verdier was sent in pursuit of the flying enemy, and, crossing the Drissa, permitted its ardour to carry it too far, and thus, whilst making many prisoners, unfortunately left some of its own men in the hands of the enemy when it became necessary to repass the Drissa. In spite, however, of the trivial advantage thus obtained by the Russians, the events of the day could not but be to them a most serious check; and Marshal Oudinot, being convinced that they would prevent the Russians for some time from venturing to attack him, and considering himself not sufficiently strong with twenty-four thousand exhausted troops, withdrew from the Dwina, resolved to return to Polotsk, where were his munitions and stores, and where he could await in safety until the cessation of the extreme heat, which had compelled Napoleon himself to halt at Witepsk. The only disadvantage attending this place was, that by withdrawing to Polotsk from the position he then occupied, five or six leagues in advance of it, he resigned the moral effect of the success he had obtained.

In the mean time Marshal Macdonald, with the Polish division Grandjean, and the seventeen thousand Prussians which had been placed under his command, had advanced upon the Dwina and obtained possession of Courland by means of a rapid march. The Russians, retreating, had been taken in flank by the Prussians, and, having suffered a severe blow at the hands of the latter, had precipitately fallen back upon Riga, resigning to us Mitau and the whole of Courland. It is a fact worthy of remark, that the Prussians, who detested us and were unwilling soldiers in our cause, were yet so excited by our presence that they fought almost as well for us as they could have fought against us. And we must add, that, whilst the troops furnished by the small allied states, such as Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Westphalia, were much thinned by desertion, the Prussian and Austrian troops were retained in their ranks by true military spirit, and did not desert from us until they abandoned us *en masse*, in accordance with a change in their national policy.

Marshal Macdonald undertook the blockade of Riga with the Prussian troops, and at the same time with the Polish division Grandjean approached Dunabourg, which the Russians, being unwilling to scatter their forces, very speedily yielded, and thereby much simplified the task which the marshal had to perform; but it was still a task which would most probably occupy a considerable time, and possibly the whole campaign. He had been compelled to leave in the neighbourhood of Tilsit and Memel for the purpose of guarding the navigation of the Niemen and the Kurische-Haff, and in the environs of Mitau for the purpose of guarding Courland, five thousand men of the Prussian corps, and he had therefore been able to retain only ten thousand before Riga, the works of which were very extensive, and which contained a garrison of fifteen thousand men. The Polish division Grandjean, which was the other force at his command, was reduced from twelve thousand men to eight thousand, and was the only force he had with which to watch the space be-

tween Riga and Polotsk,—about seventy leagues in extent.

He hastened to send information, couched in sensible but somewhat ironical terms, of the situation in which he was placed, and to declare that unless he received a considerable reinforcement he could not succeed either in the capture of Riga or in maintaining relations with Oudinot's corps. The most simple proposition he could have made, considering his position, would have been that a junction should be effected between his own corps and that of Marshal Oudinot, since Wittgenstein's corps could then, doubtless, have been vanquished, and the Niemen consequently protected from the enemy's approach; and although, in this case, Riga could not have been even besieged, much less taken, still, we should have obtained a decided superiority on the left wing of our line of operations. Instead, however, of proposing this junction of the two corps, which was possible and even necessary, but which would have required on his part rare disinterestedness, (for he would then have been under Oudinot's command,) he demanded a reinforcement which there was no possibility of his obtaining.

In the mean time, on the other extremity of the vast theatre of the war, a hundred and fifty leagues to the southeast, towards the upper course of the Bug, certain events were occurring which could not fail to produce certain changes in Napoleon's plans: General Reynier had retreated with the Saxons from Neswij to Slonim, and from Slonim to Provjany, for the purpose of covering the grand duchy, and subsequently invading Volhynia, whilst Prince Schwarzenberg had marched with the Austrian army from Provjany to Slonim and Neswij, on his way to the head-quarters of the French army, in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor of Austria, who was unwilling that his troops should be commanded by any one but Napoleon himself, and much to the dissatisfaction of Napoleon, who was unwilling to trust the defence of his rear to an Austrian army.

At this same moment, which was that also of Napoleon's entrance into Witepsk, the Russian General Tormasoff commenced his march to threaten, as he had been ordered, the right flank of the French, which was a task Bagration could no longer perform, since he had to join the grand army, and at the head of forty thousand men he had marched boldly towards the upper course of the Bug, whilst Admiral Tchitchakoff, engaged in vast plans on the side of Turkey, was either to execute them or to descend upon Poland. As a precaution against the attempts which might be made by the Austrians assembled in Galicia against his rear, he had spread about twelve thousand men from Bobruisk to Mozyr and from Mozyr to Kiew, with Prince Bagration on one side and Admiral Tchitchakoff on the other; for, although the Court of Vienna had assured the government at St. Petersburg that its exertions in favour of France would be confined to the providing the contingent of thirty thousand men under Prince Schwarzenberg, General Tormasoff was unwilling to advance without taking precautions against the possible results of Austrian policy. Having left, therefore, in his rear, the force above mentioned, he advanced with about twenty-eight thousand men upon the Upper Bug, threatening

the grand duchy, which General Reynier had to defend with about twelve or thirteen thousand Saxons, and, being informed by the Jews, who on every occasion betrayed the cause of Poland, of the presence of a Saxon detachment which was (unfortunately, unsupported) at Kobrin, he determined to signalize his approach by its destruction, and, on the 27th of July, effected this object, compelling it to yield after a fierce struggle, and thus inflicting a loss upon the Saxons of two thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The moral effects of this misfortune were more disastrous than the actual loss incurred by it, and produced a most unfortunate impression at Warsaw; for the wretched Poles, who had entertained with so much ardour the project of a general insurrection, on learning that the Russian troops were so near them, immediately began to tremble at the idea of exile and sequestration, and many of them set the dangerous example of collecting the most precious portion of their property and passing to the left bank of the Vistula. Much as they had rejoiced in the war which Napoleon was waging against Russia, they now reproached him with having imprudently advanced beyond the Dwina and the Dnieper and left them unprotected. They complained, also, on this occasion, of the cold tone of his reply to their address at Wilna, imputing to its reserve their own want of zeal, and forgetting that it was for them to excite, by the manifestation of enthusiasm on their side, the enthusiasm of Napoleon on their behalf.

In the midst of the complaints which now arose in Warsaw, and the demands for instant succour which he could not afford, M. de Pradt possessed no greater presence of mind than he had displayed during the excitement attending the meeting of the diet, and had recourse to the only measure which had suggested itself to his mind, and which was to write to M. de Bassano and General Reynier, requiring the despatch of troops from Warsaw. General Reynier, who had to fulfil a task very different from the defence of Warsaw, having to make head against thirty thousand Russians with eleven thousand Saxons, replied to the prelate-ambassador to this effect, and, by an urgent letter, entreated Prince Schwarzenberg to fall back in order to aid him to repulse the enemy, and to defer the continuance of his march towards the French head-quarters until the Russians should have been checked and such a position occupied by our troops behind the Pinsk marches as would prevent their advance. Prince Schwarzenberg replied that he perceived the danger of the situation, and that, notwithstanding the orders which he had received, he would fall back in order to afford him support. In the mean time, M. de Bassano replied somewhat ironically to M. de Pradt's expressions of terror, and, being unable to take any measures with respect to them, forwarded all the demands for aid to head-quarters.

Napoleon was extremely annoyed by the news of these events, and especially irritated against the persons who had permitted themselves to be so easily terrified. He approved thoroughly of the determination taken by Prince Schwarzenberg to fall back upon Provjany for the purpose of affording support to General Reynier, and

placed the latter under the Austrian commander's orders. He directed Prince Schwarzenberg to march boldly, with the forty thousand men he would now have at his disposal, against Tormasoff, who had no more than thirty thousand, and not to desist from attacking him until he should have driven him into Volhynia,—at the same time promising that as soon as this task should have been accomplished he would recall him to head-quarters, in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor of Austria, to whom he wrote for a reinforcement for the Austrian corps, and to request that the Austrian corps, which was at this time in Galicia, might be authorized to assume a threatening attitude on the side of Volhynia, which would act as a restraint upon General Tormasoff's movements; but, as he had but little expectation of being successful in this application, he insisted more particularly on a reinforcement of seven or eight thousand men for Prince Schwarzenberg.

These measures were perfectly sufficient to hold Tormasoff's corps in check, and even to render it perfectly harmless unless Admiral Tchitchakoff should speedily double its strength. As, however, it was necessary that he should maintain communications with the Austrians and Saxons under Schwarzenberg, which would be, at least a hundred leagues distant from Orscha, the point on which rested the right of the grand army, Napoleon consented to deprive himself of one of Prince Poniatowski's divisions that it might remain in cantonments between Minsk and Mohilev to secure us against sudden attacks from the Cossacks, and be connected by means of cavalry-posts with the left of the Austrian corps.

Our right was thus, for the moment at least, rendered safe; but, with respect to the left, Napoleon took measures which were less efficacious, although apparently sufficient. Neglecting to take into account the state of his troops, he blamed Marshal Oudinot's retrograde march upon Polotsk, and endeavoured to prove to the marshal, by very ingenious calculations founded on documents taken from the Russians, that Count Wittgenstein could not have more than thirty thousand troops, of very indifferent quality, at his command, and could not, therefore, be a source of terror to twenty thousand French veterans, and ordered him to march boldly against the enemy for the purpose of driving him far back upon the St. Petersburg route. That the marshal might have no grounds for objecting to these orders, he resolved to send him the Bavarian corps, which was—as were all the troops furnished by the allies—very effective in action, although much weakened by fatigue, sickness, and desertion. Napoleon continued to consider the corps as numbering fifteen or sixteen thousand men, although it really numbered only thirteen thousand, and estimated that the troops at Marshal Oudinot's disposal would be raised by this reinforcement to forty thousand men, a force which he hoped would be quite sufficient to free him from Wittgenstein on his left, whilst the junction of Prince Schwarzenberg and General Reynier would, he calculated, relieve him from the presence of Tormasoff on his right. But, whilst making these arrangements, Napoleon fully expected that the movements he was about to execute with the main army would reduce to insignificance



science any events which might occur on his wings. Believing that Marshal Oudinot would be able to drive back Wittgenstein upon Sebej and Pakow, he also concluded that Marshal Macdonald would immediately afterwards be able to concentrate his whole corps upon Riga, and to commence its siege.

In the mean time, Napoleon had not ceased to keep a careful watch on his rear, the command of which had been intrusted to Marshal Victor and Marshal Augereau,—the former being posted in the direction of Königsberg, and the latter in that of Berlin.

He had made great exertions to procure for Marshal Victor twenty-five thousand infantry, three or four thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, and had entertained the idea of speedily summoning him to Wilna, that he might, if circumstances rendered it necessary, be ready to afford assistance to Marshal Macdonald, Marshal Oudinot, or Prince Schwarzenberg. At the same time he was equally engaged in the organization of the fourth battalions, the regiments of refractory recruits intended to be placed under Marshal Augereau's command, the cohorts of the National Guards which were to replace on the frontiers of the empire the troops carried to Berlin, and the Lithuanian regiments, which he desired to raise to the number of twelve thousand men. The ten days, therefore, that Napoleon had already spent at Witepsk had not been lost, and had, besides enabling his troops to pass a season of extreme heat under shelter, afforded him the opportunity of bringing up a large portion of the artillery which had fallen into the rear, and of collecting thirteen hundred baggage-wagons at Witepsk, and between that place and Kowno,—a number sufficient for the transport of provisions for two hundred thousand men for ten or twelve days; whilst it in like manner afforded Prince Eugene, Ney, and Davout, the opportunity of collecting a store of provisions sufficient for six or seven days' consumption, in addition to the troops' daily subsistence.

Every preparation having been made for the execution of the new movement from which Napoleon hoped to obtain some decisive result, he resolved upon the adoption of that plan of action which appeared to him to be at this time the only practicable one, and the conception of which was quite worthy of his genius. Although he had failed to prevent the junction of the armies of Prince Bagration and Barclay de Tolly, it still remained possible to turn them, take them in reverse, and thus render it impossible for them to avoid meeting our troops in a decisive action and under the most disadvantageous circumstances. Napoleon resolved, therefore, to take advantage of the tract of wood and marsh which separated him from the Russians, and to effect a clandestine movement in front of them from left to right, similar to that which he had proposed to execute in front of the Drissa camp, to proceed from the banks of the Dwina to those of the Dnieper, from Witepsk to Rassaana, to cross the Dnieper, to ascend it rapidly as far as Smolensk, to surprise this town, (which was in an undefended state,) and to debouch from hence suddenly with the entire mass of his forces upon the left of the Russians, who would thus find themselves outflanked and turned. And then, should fortune

smile upon him as she had so often smiled, he might be able to execute against Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united the plans he had formerly directed against Barclay alone, and probably force Russia to accept terms of peace, which would leave her completely humbled and the sceptre of the world in his hands.

An inconvenience, however, attending this movement, consisted in the fact that, although well covered by the wooded, marshy nature of the country, it would be of great length, for the right of the army, which was under Marshal Davout at Rassaana, would have to march thirty leagues to reach Smolensk, and the left, which was with Prince Eugene at Sourage, would have to accomplish almost as long a journey to replace Marshal Davout at Rassaana, and it would only be after the completion of their movements that our troops would even have begun to approach the enemy's left. It was quite possible, indeed, to shorten this route considerably, by resigning the capture of Smolensk, and turning at a point closer to the enemy, whom it was intended to envelop; but to adopt this plan of action would only be to exchange one plan of action for another, to exchange, in fact, the difficulty of surprising the Russians for the difficulty of overwhelming their left, at this moment formed by the valiant Bagration, so suddenly and so victoriously as to prevent the remainder of the army from escaping us. Before finally forming his resolution, Napoleon consulted Marshal Davout, as the most capable of advising him on this important subject, and the best qualified, moreover, by the position he occupied, to appreciate the relative position of the two armies, and, after having heard his views on the subject, finally decided upon the more protracted movement, which consisted in crossing the Dwina, ascending its left bank, taking Smolensk, and suddenly debouching on the left of the Russian army, thus surprised and outflanked.

Having resolved upon the execution of this excellent and extensive manœuvre, Napoleon ordered every preparation to be made for the departure of the troops on the 10th or 11th of August. Marshal Davout was to rally his three divisions, Morand, Friant, and Gudin, to unite them with the divisions Desaix and Compans, the Poles, and the Westphalians, and to hold himself in readiness to cover, together with Grouchy's cavalry, the *debouches* of Rassaana and Liady, near which it was decided that the army should pass the Dnieper. The cavalry of Montbrun and Nansouty, under Murat, and the corps of Marshal Ney, were to proceed by Liosna and Lioubowicz to Liady and Rassaana, and to cross the Dnieper close to Marshal Davout, whom they would thus reinforce with thirty-six thousand men. Finally, Prince Eugene and the Guard, departing from Sourage and Witepsk respectively, to pass by Babynowicz and Rassaana, would increase by fifty-five thousand men—the Guard numbering twenty-five thousand and Prince Eugene's troops thirty thousand—that portion of the French army which was capable of being marched forward, and which, with Legour-Maubourg's five or six thousand horse, numbered one hundred and seventy-five thousand.

Napoleon left at Witepsk, for the purpose of guarding so important a point on the Dwina,

and still more as a protection for his magazines and hospitals there, about six or seven thousand troops, who were speedily to join the main army, being replaced at Witepsk by others, so that there might be there, as at Wilna, a garrison mobile.

In the mean time, the Russians were making preparations for the execution of a plan which was less well concerted than Napoleon's, and less likely to succeed. Prince Bagration had united with the principal army, by Smolensk, the forty-five thousand men who remained of his force, and thus raised to one hundred and thirty-five thousand or one hundred and forty thousand men the main army under Barclay de Tolly. A portion of Alexander's plan for the campaign still remained in force, and was that which proposed that the Russian troops should retreat before the French army, watching to take advantage of any errors which it might commit. Such errors the enemy now supposed that they saw in the apparent dispersion of our cantonments, which, extending from Sourage, by Witepsk, Liöna, and Babinowicz, to Doubrowna, were to their eyes spread over a space of thirty leagues, since they were ignorant that behind the tract of wooded and marshy country which separated them from our troops were posted Murat with his fourteen thousand horse, and Ney with twenty-two thousand infantry, all admirable troops, and capable of being joined within the space of a few hours by the thirty thousand men of the divisions Morand, Friant, and Gudin,—since they were ignorant, moreover, that the twenty-five thousand troops of Prince Eugene and the thirty thousand of the Guard could be received in flank, and since such troops and such generals, posted with such skill, could not be easily surprised or routed by an unexpected attack on one of their cantonments.

Although the Russian generals, who formed rather a military oligarchy than a staff subject to a single commander-in-chief, were forced to perceive the wisdom of retreating before the French troops until they should have been sufficiently exhausted, they did so very unwillingly, and were ever eager to find some favourable opportunity for a battle. Prince Bagration's natural ardour placed him at the head of those who were eager for an engagement with the enemy; and generally, throughout the army, those who still insisted on the wisdom of a continued retreat were accused of cowardice. Barclay de Tolly feigned to bear the insults which were heaped upon him on this account with indifference; but in reality he felt them deeply. On the 5th of August, however, he called a council of war, at which were present, besides the two generals-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, the Grand Duke Constantine, General Yermoloff and Colonel Toll, the former chief of the staff, and the latter quartermaster-general of the first army, the Count de St. Priest, chief of the staff of the second, and Colonel Walzogen, the most prominent representative of the system of retreat. Colonel Toll urged, with the enthusiasm which was natural to him, and with the success always obtained by those who speak in accordance with the prevailing tendency of men's minds, the expediency of acting on the offensive; and it was in vain that Barclay de Tolly and Walzogen set forth the ad-

vantages of a retreat which would entice the French into the depths of Russia and enable the Russian armies to attack them when so exhausted as to render them an easy conquest. The members of the council either could not or would not see the force of this reasoning, and they very openly displayed to Barclay de Tolly, who was a foreigner in name, and to Colonel Walzogen, who was a foreigner both in name and reality, the distrust with which this advice was received, and immediately resolved, against all reason, that an offensive plan of action should be immediately adopted. It is seldom that men can retain their good sense when exposed to the influence of a dominant idea. Before the war, the tendency to imitation had inclined every one to the adoption of a plan of retreat similar to that executed by Lord Wellington in Portugal; and now, since the commencement of actual hostilities, the patriotic spirit had rendered the same minds eager for battles. Barclay de Tolly yielded to the prevailing opinion; and it was at length resolved to attack the enemy on the 7th of August, in three columns; two of these columns, composed of troops of the main army, advancing by the Upper Kasplia upon Inkowa, against Murat's cantonments, which were supposed to present the feeblest points in the midst of the French line, and the third column, composed of troops of the second army, advancing under Prince Bagration from Smolensk upon Nadwa, to second the efforts of the two others.

On the 7th, the troops commenced their march in conformity with the plan which had been adopted, and on the 8th, a strong advance-guard, consisting of Platow's Cossacks and Paklen's cavalry, approached Inkowo, where General Sebastiani was cantoned with Montbrun's light cavalry and a battalion of the 24th léger belonging to Ney's corps. General Sebastiani, who was endowed with more political than military sagacity, had permitted the enemy to approach, only sending word to his chief, General Montbrun, that his advanced posts had been so much contracted since the evening that he feared he might find it difficult to provide his troops with rations. On receiving this intimation, Montbrun had immediately hastened up to behold twelve thousand of the enemy's cavalry pouring down upon the three thousand of General Sebastiani. The battalions of the 24th, led by an energetic officer, held the enemy in check for a considerable time, and Generals Montbrun and Sebastiani charged them more than forty times in the course of the day; but at length, after having lost between four and five hundred men, including an entire company of the 24th, they succeeded in gaining Marshal Ney's cantonment, where they were effectually protected from the enemy, who accordingly halted, convinced by this attempt that, if some of the French outposts were not at this moment on their guard, it would nevertheless be impossible to surprise the main army. They perceived even on the side of Porcisié—opposite the cantonments of Prince Eugene—signs of extreme vigilance, and considerable masses of troops, which induced Barclay de Tolly to believe that the French had changed their position and had fallen back on their left, to turn the right of the Russians in the direction of the sources of the Dwina, and to cut them off from the road to St. Petersburg. Seized with this

fear, Barclay de Tolly, who was advancing with extreme unwillingness, sent a general order from one wing to the other, prescribing a retrograde movement to his two principal columns, which they immediately obeyed, that they might execute a strong reconnoissance on his right. And it was fortunate that he took this measure; for had he continued to advance he would have been attacked by one hundred and twenty thousand men approaching from the Dwina, thus driven upon the fifty-five thousand who guarded the Dnieper, and most probably have been utterly overthrown between them. In the mean time, Bagration remained in advance of Smolensk, in the direction of Nadwa.

The information of these movements of the enemy reached head-quarters on the 9th of August, and were somewhat difficult of explanation; but Napoleon was so eager to meet the Russian troops in battle that he was indifferent to the circumstances under which he might do so. Having Murat and Ney on his right, and somewhat in advance towards Liosna, the divisions Morand, Friant, and Gudin, in the rear, and being himself in a position to advance with Prince Eugene's troops and the Guard, he was confident of being able to overwhelm the Russians, and, driving them to the Dnieper, to throw them by thousands into the hands of Davout. He ordered the whole army to be on the alert, and seemed to await the development of the enemy's designs before undertaking his grand manœuvre. But, the 9th and 10th of August having passed without any visible decided movements on the part of the Russians, he supposed that the recent movements which had attracted his attention had been mere changes of cantonments, and he put his army in motion on the 11th and 12th of August. On the morning of the 11th, the corps of Murat, Ney, and Eugene, the three divisions Morand, Friant, and Gudin, commenced their march, preceded by General Eblé with the pontoon-equipage. Murat and Ney defiled behind the woods and marshes which extend from Liosna to Lioubowiczi, and reached the bank of the Dnieper opposite Liady. Prince Eugene followed Murat and Ney at the distance of a day's march, by Sourage, Ianowicz, Liosna, and Lioubowicz; and the divisions Morand, Friant, and Gudin advanced by Babinowicz to Rassasna, where they crossed the Dnieper by four bridges which had previously been thrown across it. The Guard had followed them. During the evening and night of the 13th, the whole army effected the passage of the Dnieper, and on the morning of the 14th one hundred and seventy-five thousand troops were assembled on its farther bank, full of confidence, with Napoleon at their head, and believing that they were marching to obtain an immediate and decisive triumph. Never had so many men, horses, and cannon been really assembled at the same point; for when historians speak of an army of a hundred thousand men (and it is but seldom) it would be a mistake to suppose that a hundred thousand were actually present under arms, the truth being, in all probability, that the real number was no more than a moiety of the supposed one. The enormous crowd of men, animals, and wagons, actually present, was indeed extraordinary, and at first appeared to be involved in inextricable confusion, which soon,

however, yielded before the spirit of order breathed through the entire mass by the governing mind which directed it. The sun had dried the roads, and the army advanced across immense plains covered with heavy crops, along a broad road, bordered by four rows of birch-trees, and under a sun of unobscured brilliancy, but less intensely warm than it had latterly been. In the mean time, whilst the troops were ascending the left bank of the Dnieper and executing one of the most brilliant movements that had ever been accomplished, and advancing to turn the left of the Russian forces, they were seeking us on their right.

On the morning of the 14th, Murat, with the cavalry of Generals Nansouty and Montbrun, preceded by that of General Grouchy, marched upon Krasnoé. Ney followed with his light infantry; and every thing proceeded in this direction as well as could be desired. Napoleon had ordered a movement in advance, ascending the Dnieper in the direction of Smolensk.

A little in advance of Krasnoé the enemy first became visible,—the troops which were then seen being those of the division Névérofskoi, numbering five or six thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred cavalry, and placed by Prince Bagration in observation at Krasnoé, for the purpose of protecting Smolensk against the possible attempts of Marshal Davout. Situated on the left of the Dnieper, whilst Bagration and the whole Russian army were on the right, it was a position of considerable danger, and, being attacked by Bordesouille's and Grouchy's light cavalry, was driven into Krasnoé, whence it was again driven at the bayonet's point by some companies of the 24th léger under Ney. Still pursuing the enemy, our troops were stopped by a river, the bridge across which had been broken; but, although the artillery was compelled to halt, the cavalry turned to the left, and, traversing the bank of the ravine, found a place at which they were able to cross it, and immediately set out in pursuit of the Russian troops, which, formed by General Névérofskoi into a compact square, were hastening forward along a road leading to Smolensk, and bordered by birch-trees, of which they made skilful use as a defence against the attacks of our cavalry. Taking advantage of our want of artillery, the enemy overwhelmed us with the fire of its own at every halt; but, on the other hand, whenever the nature of the ground compelled the Russians to break the square for the purpose of defiling, our squadrons seized the opportunity to charge, and, penetrating it, took both men and cannon. Nevertheless, constantly reforming as soon as the obstacle had been passed, this body of Russian infantry retreated, defending their colours and artillery against the incessant attacks of a swarm of cavalry, and reached the town of Korytnia, having inflicted upon us a loss of four or five hundred cavalry in killed and wounded, and having themselves suffered a loss of eight pieces of cannon, seven or eight hundred killed, and a thousand prisoners.

Our advanced guard halted in front of Korytnia, the main army not having yet passed Krasnoé. Marshal Davout had restored the Polish division Claparède to the Guard, Valence's cuirassiers to Nansouty, and had reserved the command of his three divisions of infantry, Morand, Friant, and Gudin, which were delighted

to find themselves once more under their old leader. The Polish troops commanded by Poniatowski, and the Westphalians, whom Napoleon had intrusted to General Junot, were placed under the direct orders of head-quarters, and posted at the head of the army, towards its extreme right, and Grouchy's cavalry accompanied the advanced guard of Murat and Ney, until Prince Eugene, who had the longest march to make, should have rejoined the main body.

On the 15th, it was desired, even in these remote districts, to celebrate the fête of Napoleon, at least by some salvos of artillery. All the marshals, surrounded by their staffs, approached the Emperor to tender him their homage, and at the same moment were heard the reports of the cannon fired in his honour. Napoleon complained that gunpowder, at that moment so precious, should be wasted, and the marshals replied that the powder used had been taken from the Russians at Krasnoé: he smiled at this answer, and willingly received the *ciras* of the troops, as a sign of their warlike ardour. Alas! neither he nor his troops then suspected to what terrible disasters they were to be exposed three months later on the ground they now occupied.

On the following day, the 16th of August, the advanced guard was ordered to march upon Smolensk, which it was hoped on our side might be surprised, for, Névrouffskoi's division, of which a third had been taken or destroyed, being the only troops yet encountered, it was supposed that this city would be but slightly guarded, and consequently fall into our hands within the space of a few hours. Upon arriving, however, on the hills which overlook Smolensk, it was discovered that the hope of surprising it was a vain one, since a numerous body of troops posted on the other side of the Dnieper, on which river this city stood, were then seen entering within its walls. These troops were those of the 7th, Bagration's corps, which Bagration, on perceiving our movement, had directed thither in all haste, whilst he himself, advancing by forced marches along the right bank of the Dnieper, hastened to the succour of the ancient city of Smolensk, situated on the frontiers of Muscovy, and dear to the Russians, who had disputed its possession with the Poles for many ages.

Ney had scarcely approached a ravine which separated him from the town, when he was attacked by an ambuscade of several hundred Cossacks, received a ball in the collar of his coat, and was only with much difficulty disengaged by the light cavalry of the 8d corps. Having perceived on his left that a portion of the enceinte of Smolensk was closed by a pentagonal citadel of earth, he attempted to take it with the 46th of the line; but this regiment, being received by a furious fire, was compelled to withdraw from the attack, with the loss of three or four hundred men; and upon this Ney, who was ignorant on what point the city was susceptible of attack on this side, and who was unwilling to expose himself to the risk of any serious reverse in the absence of Napoleon, determined to await his arrival. Gradually the remainder of the 8d corps arrived, and posted itself in line on the heights above the city. Ney took up a position on the left, and near the Dnieper, with his infantry, whilst Grouchy's cavalry debouched on the right, and advanced towards a large body of Russian cavalry, which,

having shown a disposition to attack our troops, was charged at full gallop by our 7th of dragoons and driven back upon the town.

Towards the middle of the day, Napoleon himself came up, and Ney communicated to him the result of his observations on the defences of the city before them.

Smolensk, as we have already said, is on the Dnieper, at the foot of two ranges of hills, which contract its current. The old town, which is much the more important portion, is on the left bank,—the one by which our troops had reached it,—and the new town, called the faubourg of St. Petersburg, is situated on the right bank,—the side on which were posted the Russian troops. A bridge unites these two portions of the city. The old town is surrounded by a brick wall about fifteen feet in thickness, twenty-five in height, and flanked at intervals with great towers. A fosse, with a road *couvert* and *glacis*, preceded and protected this wall, but the whole was very badly traced, and executed long before the rise of the modern system of fortification. In front of and around the old town were large faubourgs,—one named Krasnoé, on the Krasnoé route, touching on the Dnieper; another in the centre, named Micislav, from the Micislav road, which runs into it; another still more to the centre, named Koslawi, from a similar reason; a fourth, to the right, called the Nikolskoïé; a fifth and last, named the Razzen-ska, forming the extremity of the semicircle and abutting on the Dnieper. From the heights on which the army had taken up its position the old town could be beheld, its enceinte flanked with towers, its streets winding and inclined towards the river, its noble and antique Byzantine cathedral, the bridge connecting the two banks of the Dnieper, and the new town dotting the sides of the opposite range of hills, whilst numerous bodies of Russian soldiers could be seen hastening up by the right bank of the river to defend a city which was almost as dear to them as Moscow. Napoleon, therefore, could no longer hope to surprise Smolensk, and he consoled himself by the hope that the whole Russian army would debouch for the purpose of giving him battle; for a great victory gained under the walls of this city, followed by the consequences which he well knew how to extract from all his victories, would be sufficiently in accordance with his plans.

In fact, Prince Bagration, who was ascending in all haste the right bank of the Dnieper by a movement parallel to that of our troops, and Barclay de Tolly, who was approaching by a transverse route which led from the Dwina to the Dnieper, began to appear on the heights opposite to those which we occupied; for each of these generals, having become acquainted with Napoleon's designs, was advancing with the utmost eagerness to the defence of the ancient Russian city, and resolved—although to give battle to the French in such a position was the height of imprudence—not to endure the shame of yielding it without a struggle. The adoption of this resolution was hastily agreed on throughout the Russian army, and the task of executing the various measures which had to be performed adopted without discussion. And of these tasks there were two of pre-eminent importance, the first and most apparent of which consisted in the defence of Smolensk; but as it

was possible that, whilst defending Smolensk, Napoleon—his attack on that city being only a feigned one—might pass the Dnieper at some point above it and turn the Russian army, thus exposing it to that serious disaster to which it had been unconsciously exposed since the commencement of the campaign, it was agreed that Prince Bagration should take up a position with the second army above Smolensk on the banks of the Dnieper, to watch the fords, whilst Barclay de Tolly defended the city itself. Prince Bagration, accordingly, immediately proceeded to take up a position with forty thousand men behind the little river Kolodnia, a tributary of the Dnieper; and General Raëffskoi, who had guarded Smolensk with the 4th corps during the 15th and the morning of the 16th, now withdrew, resigning it to the troops of Barclay de Tolly, who confided its defence to the 6th corps under General Doctoroff, together with the division Konownitsyn, and the *débris* of the division Névéroffskoi, which was the division which had fought at Krasnoé, and posted the remainder of his army on the other side of the Dnieper, in the new town, and on the hills above it. And thus—the French, to the number of one hundred and forty thousand men, occupying the heights of the left bank of the Dnieper, and the Russians, to the number of one hundred and twenty-nine thousand, occupying those of the right bank—was presented by each army to the other the most interesting and extraordinary spectacle.

The Russians having at length halted, it was impossible for Napoleon to retreat, or to allow them the advantage of having disputed with them the possession of such a place as Smolensk. He might, doubtless, have ascended the Dnieper, having been able most probably to ford it above Smolensk, and to have executed, a little higher, his grand manœuvre. But, on the one hand, he had not time to reconnoitre the stream and to render himself certain that it would be easy to effect its passage, and, on the other, he could not but hesitate to attempt such an operation in the presence of the enemy, the more especially as he would thus leave in the hands of the Russians the bridge of Smolensk, by which they would be able to debouch at any instant and cut off his line of communication. To seize Smolensk by means of the most vigorous measures was, therefore, the only mode of proceeding suited to his position, or agreeable to his character, and the only one capable of preserving to him that reputation for success in warfare which was now, more than ever, necessary to his welfare.

Napoleon lost no time in placing his troops in line. On the left, against the Dnieper, opposite the faubourg of Krasnoé, he posted the three divisions of Marshal Ney; in the centre, opposite the Micielaw and the Roslawi faubourgs, the five divisions of Davout; on the right, in front of the Nikolskoïé and Raczenska faubourgs, the Polish troops under Poniatowski; and finally, on the extreme right, on a plateau bordering the Dnieper, the mass of the French cavalry. In the rear, and at the centre of the vast semicircle, he posted the Imperial Guard; and on the heights, in positions from which it could overwhelm with a plunging fire the unhappy city, he made the best possible disposition of his artillery.

Prince Eugene's corps was still three or four leagues in the rear at Korytnia, and Junot, who had been directed to advance with the Westphalians to support the Poles, had fallen into error with respect to the route; but the presence of these two detachments, which numbered together forty thousand men, was not necessary to enable the French army to overwhelm the enemy before it. The whole of the latter part of the 16th of August was thus employed, therefore, both by French and Russians, in taking up their relative positions, and passed without the occurrence of any serious encounter between them,—with the exception that the French artillery directed an incessant fire against the city, in which it committed great ravages and slew many of the troops with which it was overcrowded.

On the morning of the following day, the 17th, Napoleon, mounting his horse at an early hour, proceeded—accompanied by his lieutenants—to traverse the semicircle of heights on which he was encamped, and distinctly saw the thirty thousand men of the divisions of Doctoroff, Konownitsyn, and Névéroffskoi, taking up their positions in the city and the faubourgs, whilst the remainder of the two Russian armies remained immovable on their heights. Among the events which Napoleon had considered to be possible, but very improbable, was, that the Russians, in possession of Smolensk, and able at will to pass and repass the Dnieper, under the shelter of strong walls, should go forth to offer him battle for the purpose of saving a city which they so highly valued. There was, in fact, beside Smolensk, on our right, a plateau in an excellent position and surrounded by a ravine, on which Napoleon planned to deploy his cavalry; but, as he considered it was quite possible that this very position might tempt the Russians to occupy it, and as nothing would have been more in accordance with his plans than the commission of such a fault by them, he had taken care to leave it unoccupied and to withhold his cavalry in the rear, in the hope of thus enticing them to advance. But to advance beyond the Dnieper, to give battle to the French in such a manner that, if beaten, they would have that river behind them, would have been so great an error that it could scarcely be hoped they would commit it; and they were, moreover, not so anxious to encounter our troops in battle as they were to die in defence of Smolensk.

Napoleon, however, allowed ten or twelve hours to elapse before taking any decided measures, as he was anxious to leave open to the last the opportunity for a general action; and, in the mean time, many reflections were made in his hearing respecting the difficulty of taking Smolensk by assault, whilst defended by thirty thousand Russians. To these remarks he made no reply, but brooded over the idea which had occurred to him of the possibility of crossing the Dnieper above Smolensk and debouching unexpectedly on the left of the Russians, by which he would secure the complete execution of his grand manœuvre. To attempt, however, such an operation as this without imprudence, it was absolutely necessary that it should be conducted with the utmost celerity, and that the river should be fordable, since, if it should be necessary to throw bridges across it in the

presence of the enemy, the Russians would infallibly oppose insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of such bridges, or would debouch by Smolensk on our flank and our rear, to cut off our line of communications, or would again retreat and escape us, leaving us certainly in the possession of Smolensk, but still depriving us of the opportunity of meeting them in battle. The whole success of such a manœuvre as the one alluded to depended, in fact, on the answer to the question whether the river were fordable at any point near the position occupied by the French troops. For to proceed any considerable distance up the stream, and leave the enemy at liberty to debouch from Smolensk on our rear, would have been in the highest degree imprudent. Carefully taking all these considerations into account, Napoleon sent a detachment of cavalry to the bank of the river, for the purpose of seeking for a ford; but, although the river appeared to be far from deep at this portion of its course, either because the reconnaissance was badly executed, or because it was not carried sufficiently high, no practicable ford was discovered; and the only measure that remained open, therefore, was to obtain possession of Smolensk by a vigorous assault. And on this measure, in spite of all objections, Napoleon resolved; for to hesitate in the presence of the enemy after having come so far to meet them, and to be timid of expending troops in actual conflict after having been so lavish of their lives on the march, would have been as unworthy of his genius as unsuited to the existing state of affairs. Between ten and eleven o'clock in the forenoon, therefore, he gave the signal for the commencement of the attack, and each portion of the troops advanced against the enemy in an order relative to the positions which they respectively occupied. On the right, the cavalry was thrown upon the plateau which had been left vacant, and which extended to the Dnieper; and the squadrons of General Bruyère, driving back a brigade of Russian dragoons, protected the establishment of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon, which Napoleon had ordered to be formed on the very bank of the river, to bombard the town, to enfilade the bridge connecting its two portions, and to command, also, the opposite bank, on which the Russians were drawn up in order of battle. When this battery opened fire, the artillery of the enemy attempted to reply, but was speedily reduced to silence.

During the execution of these preliminary operations on our extreme right, Prince Poniatowski, advancing with his infantry between the right and the centre, boldly attacked the faubourgs of Raczenska and Nikolskoïé, which were defended by the division Nevéroffski, and succeeded with his brave troops in pushing on throughout their whole extent. In the centre Marshal Davout drove in the Russian advanced posts, in the faubourgs of Roslawl and Micislav, and commenced a violent fire of artillery against the faubourgs and the town, which were in this quarter defended by the divisions Konowitsyn and Kaptséwitch. On the left, Ney, advancing with two divisions, and leaving a third in reserve, entered the Krasnoé faubourg, occupied by the division Likhaczéff, which he drove back even to the fosses of the city.

The principal attack was to be executed by Marshal Davout, against the Micislav and Ros-

lawl faubourgs; and his first operation was to seize, with the division Morand, a great road which separated these two faubourgs and, descending to the town, ran on to the Malakofskia gate,—his purpose being to isolate these two faubourgs from each other, and thus to facilitate the attack which he was about to direct against them in front. The 13th léger, led by General Dalton, and supported by the 30th of the line, crossed bayonets with the Russian troops which were in advance of the road, and drove them back with irresistible vigour even to the walls of the city. At the same moment, and a little to the left, the division Gudin, conducted by its general and Marshal Davout in person, made an equally-vigorous attack on the Micislav faubourg, and, driving back the division Kaptséwitch, by which it was defended, entered it, driving the enemy from street to street, and thus reaching the edge of the fosse, at the very moment when the division Morand arrived there by its side by the great road. On the right, the division Friant had with less difficulty obtained possession of the Roslawl faubourg, and had arrived, as had the other three divisions, in front of the enceinte, when the whole three divisions might have been destroyed, had the old walls been provided with embrasures for artillery. Some shot and bullets did indeed reach their ranks from the towers: but the loss on the side of the Russians was far the greatest; for, driven at the bayonet's point into the fosses of the town, and then exposed to a point-blank fire, their only means of entrance into Smolensk was by a few openings in the walls.

In spite of the successes thus obtained by our troops, the Russians, whom Barclay de Tolly had reinforced with the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, attempted to resume the offensive, and to execute desperate sorties by the Nikolskoïé and Malakofskia gates, which Prince Poniatowski and Marshal Davout, who occupied positions in front of these gates, had some difficulty in repelling.

When these sorties had been effectually repulsed, all the available artillery was directed against the enceinte of the town; but the balls, burying themselves in the old brick walls, produced comparatively but little damage: they were thrown over the walls into the midst of the city, and, being fired as they were from many hundreds of pieces of cannon, committed great ravages among the buildings, and strewed the streets and public places with hundreds of dead.

After six hours of fierce conflict, the enceinte, which we could not force, and which the Russians would not cross, remained between and separated the combatants. And Marshal Davout, whom Napoleon had directed to take the city at any cost, made preparations for executing this command on the following morning, after he should have overwhelmed the town with projectiles during the night.

In accordance with information received from General Haxo, who had reconnoitred the town under a terrible fire, Marshal Davout resolved to direct the assault upon an apparently accessible point, situated towards our right, between the position of the 1st corps and that of Prince Poniatowski. There was an old breach at this point, called the Sigismonda breach, which had never been repaired, and was now only closed by an epaulement in earth, and, General Haxo

having declared the position susceptible to attack, Marshal Davout granted to General Friant the honour of conducting his division to the assault on the following morning.

A terrible spectacle filled the night. The Russians, determining at length to sacrifice the city so dear to their hearts and in defence of which they had expended so much blood, now united their efforts with ours in its destruction, and purposely filled it with those conflagrations which we involuntarily caused by our cannonade. Through the midst of the darkness suddenly poured forth torrents of flame and smoke, presenting to the eyes of the army encamped on the heights a spectacle which deeply affected them, and which much resembled an eruption of Vesuvius in a fine night of summer. It was a spectacle which prefigured the fury which should signalize the war of which it was one of the incidents, and, whilst it failed to inspire fear, it could not but excite emotion. Our artillery added fresh flames to the fire, and rendered the city untenable by the enemy.

In truth, the blood which they had shed in the defence of Smolensk had satisfied the sentiments of honour, duty, and piety which had inspired its defenders; and now Barclay de Tolly, who had sacrificed for a moment the dictates of his reason to sentiment, resumed the course pointed out by his calculations, and ordered Doctoroff, Névéroffskoi, and Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg to evacuate Smolensk,—an order which they obeyed after having so thoroughly fired it as to leave in our hands a mere calcined ruin. At daybreak our troops entered the city, disputing its possession with the flames, and endeavouring to save some portion of it from their ravages. Our loss in the attack had been six or seven thousand, and that of the Russians, according to the most exact calculations, twelve or thirteen thousand.

A great portion of the city, including the principal 'magazines, was found destroyed by the fire, and the loss, especially of colonial produce, was immense. The Russians had themselves been the chief authors of this damage; but the merit of the sacrifice thus made was much diminished by the fact that the troops and their leaders had destroyed property belonging to the poor merchants, and had thus satisfied their fury at the expense of others. The inhabitants had for the most part fled, and those whom want of time or means to fly had retained in the city were assembled in the principal church, an old, and in Russia renowned, Byzantine Basilica. Crowded within its walls, women, old men, and children, filled with terror, embraced its altars, bathed in tears. Fortunately, our cannon had failed to injure the venerable edifice, and had spared us the chagrin of being the authors of useless profanation. The wretched group was comforted by assurances of safety, and conducted to such of the houses as had escaped destruction. The streets presented a hideous spectacle, covered as they were with dead and wounded Russians, and these latter the excellent Dr. Larrey caused to be collected almost simultaneously with our own wounded, in accordance with the kind dictates of his heart, and in pursuance of his noble policy of tending the wounded of the enemy, that they might thus be induced to bestow a similar care upon ours. Unfortunately, national

fury, excited against us to the highest pitch, rendered his calculations vain.

Our army, in spite of the excitement which was the natural result of the desperate conflict with the enemy, and victorious success, experienced a painful emotion on its entrance into Smolensk. In former times, in the course of our long career of victory, when our troops had entered conquered towns, the inhabitants, after a short period of terror, usually became reassured by the gentle conduct of the French soldiers, and returned to their dwellings, which remained undestroyed, and all the comforts of which they hastened to share with their conquerors. We met with no conflagrations in our conquests then but those which we had involuntarily caused by our cannonade. But in this last campaign, on the other hand, especially since we had crossed the Muscovite frontier, solitude and flames had on every side surrounded our march; and, if a few of the inhabitants here and there awaited our approach, their countenances were filled with expressions of terror and hate. The Jews even, who had been so numerous in Poland, and whose greediness had rendered them so serviceable, were no longer to be found beyond the Polish frontier, and were no longer ready to press upon us their timely but disgusting hospitality. As they gazed upon those flames, this solitude, those corpses lying in the streets, the French soldiers began to understand that they were not engaged in a war similar to those in which they had had so much experience, and in the course of which their heroism and humanity had disarmed the rancour of the enemy. They perceived that the present struggle was a far more serious one than any of those in which they had been previously engaged; but they still experienced transports of enthusiasm at the sight of Napoleon, still believed that they were executing a marvellous expedition surpassing all those of antiquity.

Napoleon traversed the town and the faubourgs on horseback, and then took up a position in one of the towers which flanked the enceinte on the side of the Dnieper and from which could be seen all that was passing beyond the river. He saw that the Russians were still in possession of the new town, but preparing to evacuate it, and only anxious to defend it until the evacuation could be accomplished. To secure the passage of the Dnieper was therefore the task of the immediate moment, and, in accordance with Napoleon's orders, General Eblé took immediate measures for throwing bridges across it,—employing for this purpose his own pontooneers and the troops of Marshal Ney.

In the mean time, although victorious, Napoleon experienced in the very midst of the fruit of his victory, the city which his soldiers had taken by assault, a feeling of sad foreboding; for he had just failed in accomplishing the third of the grand manœuvres which he had planned for this campaign. He had failed to overtake Bagration at Bobruisk, he had in vain attempted to outflank Barclay de Tolly between Polotsk and Witepsk, and now, after having executed a most bold and skilful movement for the purpose of turning the united armies of Bagration and Barclay, he had been stopped in his course by Smolensk, and, although it had yielded to his arms, had been forced by it to lose the 16th,

17th, and 18th of August. From this moment, the hope of debouching beyond the Dnieper in time to outflank the enemy's left could no longer be reasonably indulged in, for it would be impossible to effect the passage of the river until the Russians had gained at least a day's march in advance, and had been able to precede us on the St. Petersburg or Moscow routes; and Napoleon retired, therefore, into the dwelling which had been reserved for him in Smolensk, avenging himself for his disappointment by furiously blaming the Russian generals for having, as he said, uselessly sacrificed twelve thousand men; and, indeed, had not the Russian generals had good reason for the course they had pursued, the adoption of it would have been unjustifiable, but the truth was, that in endeavouring to defend Smolensk against us they had yielded to the pressure of irresistible public feeling, and, by delaying us two days before this city, had, in fact, saved themselves from one of the most dangerous combinations ever formed by their terrible adversary.

Those severe judges who after his fall became as harsh towards Napoleon as Fortune herself attributed the ill success of his combinations to his own errors, and the circumstances above narrated will have shown that such blame is more or less well founded. We have seen, in fact, that when planning to surround Prince Bagration, or at least to isolate him during the remainder of the campaign, Napoleon had not sufficiently taken into consideration the difficulties which the nature of the country and the distances to be traversed opposed to the junction of King Jerome with Marshal Davout; that he had behaved, also, with too much roughness to his younger brother, and had placed too few troops at the disposal of the marshal. To a certain extent, therefore, the failure of his first combination is attributable to himself. In the case of the project of defiling before the Drissa camp and suddenly crossing the Dwina, between Pelotsk and Witepsk, for the purpose of outflanking Barclay de Tolly and taking him in reverse, Napoleon's plan had been successfully carried out, and he is here only open to blame on account of the fact that by urging war against them he had taught the art of war to his enemies, and had thus enabled them to perceive the danger in which they had been placed by his combinations, and to escape from it whilst inflicting upon him the greatest possible amount of injury. Finally, with respect to his last project, it has been said that Napoleon should have paused before arriving at the Dnieper, have ascended this river by the right bank instead of the left, and turned the Russians by Nadwa. But it is well known that he calculated all the chances of this movement with Marshal Davout, and that it was only after mature reflection that he resolved to march by the left bank, which was the one unoccupied by the Russians; and, indeed, the state of affairs which we know to have been actually existing at the time shows that he was right in adopting this resolution, for, had he adopted the contrary course, he would have found Bagration in a state of desperation at Nadwa, would most probably have drawn the Russians *en masse* on their left, and incurred the risk of being drawn by them into the Dnieper. Again, it has been said that, instead of attempting to turn the

Russians by their left, he should have made it his object to turn them by their right,—namely, by Witepsk and Sourage, ascending the Dwina, descending upon the Russians by their right, and driving them upon the Dnieper. But a glance at the map will prove that Napoleon's calculations were better than those of his censors, for by throwing the Russians back upon the Dnieper he would have thrown them back upon the Smolensk bridge, which they would have been able to pass without difficulty, and from whence they might have readily regained the interior of the Empire by the southern provinces, which were the most fertile and offered the vastest field for a continued retreat.

On the other hand, by turning them by the left, and throwing them back upon the Dwina, he drove them into an angle formed by the Dwina and the sea, and took a step towards completely surrounding them. And the cause of the failure of this project is not to be found in any error of his military genius, but in the energy displayed by the Russians at Smolensk; and, if we blame him, we must blame his adoption of a policy which led him to brave unknown regions and men driven to despair; both of which are calculated, in the very nature of things, to offer invincible opposition to any foreign attack.

Whilst Napoleon within the walls of Smolensk was devoting his attention to the necessities of his army, and his pontooneers were busily engaged, in spite of the vigorous fire of the enemy's tirailleurs, in throwing bridges across the river, the Russian generals were taking measures for securing their retreat; and it was necessary that they should hasten it, since the Moscow route, proceeding for some leagues along the right bank of the Dnieper, might at once be barred against them, should the French be successful in any of their numerous attempts to discover a ford. But, on the other hand, if a resolution to comply with a popular inclination might be adopted without hesitation, a determination to act in a manner entirely opposed to it required some time for consideration, and it was not until the evening of the 18th, when our bridges were finished, that Barclay de Tolly, who by every retrograde step deeply wounded the national pride of his troops, resolved to resign the new town to the French. Having resolved upon this measure, he ordered Bagration to advance, to seize the most important points on the Moscow route, and make preparations to follow with the main army. The Moscow route runs directly east, after having crossed the opening of twenty leagues, already alluded to, which exists between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and thus twice encounters the sinuosities of the Dnieper, first at Salowiewo, which is a day's march from Smolensk, and secondly at Dorogobouge, which is two days' march from the same place. At Salowiewo it crosses from the right bank of the Dnieper, the one occupied by the Russians, to the left bank, which was that occupied by the French; and thus was presented an opportunity to the latter of cutting off the retreating army. At Dorogobouge the Moscow route encounters the Dnieper for the last time, and there, behind the Ouja, a little river falling into the Dnieper, was a position the preoccupation of which could not fail to be useful to the Russians. Barclay



de Tolly ordered, therefore, Bagration to advance with the utmost expedition upon Dorogobouge, and resolved to march himself to Salowiewo, setting out on the evening of the 18th, and marching all the night for the purpose of arriving there in time. But this retreat, which could be easily effected by Bagration, who was much in advance, was a matter of considerable difficulty for Barclay de Tolly, who was still at Smolensk, and who, in pursuing the Moscow road, would have to pass for two leagues so close to the Dnieper that he would be constantly exposed to an irruption of the French.

To avoid this danger, Barclay de Tolly conceived the idea of taking the cross-roads, which would place him out of reach of attack, and conduct him back to the main road at a distance of three or four leagues farther on, near a place called Loubino, and, in pursuance of this plan, divided into two columns the troops which were under his own personal command. The one, composed of the 5th and 6th corps, under General Doctoroff, the 2d and 8d cavalry-corps, the whole of the artillery-reserve, and the baggage, was to make the longest détour, and to proceed to Salowiewo by Zikolino. The second, composed of the 2d, 8d, and 4th corps, and the 1st cavalry-corps, under the command of Lieutenant-General Touczkoff, was to make a less long détour and to proceed to Loubino by Krakhotkino and Gorbounowo. At the same time, as Barclay de Tolly, who had sent forward only four Cossack regiments under General Karpof, by the direct route, feared that there would not be a sufficient force for the occupation of the position Loubino, by which the cross-roads rejoined the main road, he despatched three more regiments of Cossacks, the Elisabethgrade husars, the Revel regiment, the 20th and the 21st Chasseurs, in the same direction. Having made these arrangements, he set his whole army in motion during the night of the 18th, leaving before Smolensk a rear-guard under General Korff.

Towards the close of the 18th of August the French had made great progress in the establishment of their bridges, and on the night of the same day began to pass across them to the other side of the Dnieper. On the following morning Ney and Davout had effected the passage with their corps, and, entering into action with the rear-guard of General Korff, at once succeeded in driving it back. When our troops arrived on the heights of the left bank, two routes were open before them,—the one running direct north, and leading, by Porecié and the Dwina, in the direction of St. Petersburg, and the other running eastward, following the course of the Dnieper, and leading, by Salowiewo and Dorogobouge, in the direction of Moscow. On each of these routes a Russian rear-guard was visible, as would naturally be the case, since the bulk of Barclay de Tolly's army, about to pursue its march by the cross-roads, would follow for the moment the St. Petersburg route, and General Karpof's detachment, on the contrary, being despatched by the shortest road to seize the débouche of Loubino, would simply follow the Moscow route. In a state of some uncertainty Ney hastened to attack the detachment of the enemy to which he was nearest, and which was the one on the St. Petersburg route, and, coming up with it at a place called Gédéonowo, suc-

ceeded in driving it back a considerable distance; whereupon General Barclay de Tolly, terrified at the excessive propinquity of the French, and the possibility of their intercepting the cross-roads along which he intended to march the two columns of his troops, immediately hastened up, and ordered Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg to defend this point at any cost, in order to afford time to the troops yet in the rear to defile; and, accordingly, the Russians, regarding the defence of the contested position as necessary to their safety, defended it with an energy far exceeding that with which the French attacked it, and the Russians remained, therefore, in the possession of Gédéonowo.

In the mean time, Napoleon, who had been watching the movements of the enemy both towards the north and the east, concluded that they were conducting their retreat in the direction of Moscow, and withdrew, therefore, Marshal Ney from the St. Petersburg route, on which he was furiously attacking the enemy, and sent him to the Moscow road, assuring him that if he were sufficiently quick in his movements he would obtain some brilliant triumph before the end of the day. He despatched, also, in the same direction, a portion of the troops of Marshal Davout, that they might support those of Ney if there should be need, but left the remainder on the St. Petersburg route, that he might have the means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the state of affairs in each direction, and then re-entered Smolensk, where a thousand cares demanded his attention, to await the result of the reconnaissances which his lieutenants were about to execute.

Marshal Ney followed with his three divisions the Russian divisions charged with the task of occupying the Loubino position, and drove them from two plateaux, on which they successively attempted to resist our troops, to a last post which they determined to defend at any cost. Beyond this position, in fact, was the débouche of Loubino, and they could not make any further retrograde movement without allowing this débouche, by which Barclay de Tolly's second column was to regain the main road, to fall into the hands of the French. The nature of the ground was favourable to the Russians, who had taken up a position behind a muddy streamlet, and flanked by a range of elevations covered with clumps of trees and thick brushwood. Barclay de Tolly had brought up to this spot the head of the second column, consisting of eight pieces of artillery, many regiments of grenadiers, and some cavalry, and, posting the chasseurs on the brink of the streamlet and in the brushwood, the grenadiers on the right and left of the opening made by the passage of the road through the range of elevations, and a strong detachment across it, sent officers to demand the assistance of all the troops which might be sufficiently near to afford it.

Marshal Ney arrived in the course of the afternoon before this third position, and resolved to take it. But to effect this object was a matter of considerable difficulty, since it would be necessary to force the road, which descended somewhat to the right into a species of marsh, then crossed the streamlet by a bridge now destroyed by the Russians, and finally rose, through the midst of thickets filled with the enemy's tirailleurs, across the range of elevations on

which were posted both troops and artillery. As considerable reinforcements, therefore, were necessary to enable him to effect his object, he drove in the Russian advanced posts beyond the streamlet, hastened to re-establish the little bridge, and sent a demand to Napoleon for more troops.

During the progress of these events, Murat had executed reconnaissances in various directions, and now arrived with some cavalry-regiments on the Moscow route, and was ready to join Ney. Junot, who had been directed, in consequence of his position during the preceding days, to pass the Dnieper above Smolensk, had crossed it at Prouditchewo, and now found himself on the flank of the enemy. Of the five divisions of Marshal Davout, two were on their march upon the Moscow route, and one,—that of General Gudin,—arriving at about five o'clock in the afternoon at the little bridge which was being re-established across the streamlet, immediately prepared to attack the Russian position. But during the interval which had occurred before the arrival of reinforcements the Russians had received important additional strength, almost the whole of Barclay de Tolly's second column having come up, with the exception of Bagowouth's corps, which had been delayed by the combat of Gédéonowo. The 3d and 4th corps—those of Touczkoff and Ostermann—had been immediately carried into line, and posted in the rear, on the right and left of the road, as soon as it reached Loubino; whilst the cavalry was posted far upon the left, opposite Prouditchewo, the point at which Junot had passed the Dnieper. And thus the position had become a most difficult one to carry, since it was defended by about forty thousand men and a formidable artillery.

Ney had, in fact, at his actual disposal only the two divisions of infantry Razout and Ledru, reduced to twelve thousand men by the recent engagements, and the division Gudin, which after the capture of Smolensk numbered no more than eight thousand bayonets. Murat's three thousand cavalry were far to the right, endeavouring to traverse the marshes extending along the Dnieper, for the purpose of debouching on the left of the Russians, and Junot's ten thousand Westphalians were so extended amidst the marshes that it was very doubtful whether they could be brought up to take part in the principal action.

These difficulties, however, did not check the exertions of Ney or Gudin; and the latter prepared to seize with his division at any price the species of *coupe-gorge* which extended beyond the little bridge. To effect this, it was necessary to plunge into the marsh, to cross the bridge under the fire of the tirailleurs who filled the brushwood, to ascend the road across a gorge crowned with artillery on either side, and finally to debouch on a plateau upon which the Russian troops were drawn up in dense masses. General Gudin formed his division into columns for the attack, whilst Marshal Ney prepared to support him with the division Ledru; the division Razout proceeding to engage the enemy's attention on the left, and Murat advancing with his cavalry to seek a passage across the marshes.

As soon as the signal had been given, Gudin's columns of infantry defiled across the bridge, uttering cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and, un-

checked by the fire of the enemy's tirailleurs and artillery, to which they were exposed, succeeded in reaching the opposite bank. Ascending the elevated ground, they encountered a troop of grenadiers, whom they repulsed at the point of the bayonet, and then succeeded in debouching on the plateau. Fresh battalions of the enemy, however, advanced against them, and compelled them to fall back. The brave Gudin led them again to the charge, and a terrible *mêlée* took place between the stream and the foot of the rising ground, in the midst of which Gudin was struck by a ball which broke his thigh, and, falling into the arms of his officers, he transferred his command to General Gérard. Once more our troops threw themselves on the enemy, and, ascending the elevated ground a second time, appeared on the plateau. Ney supported them with the division Ledru, and they seemed to be masters of the position, until fresh Russian troops were seen advancing upon it and gave rise to fears that it would once more be torn from our hands.

In the mean time Murat, who had hastened towards the right for the purpose of endeavouring to outflank the position, found Junot beyond the Dnieper awaiting orders, which did not reach him, and in default of which he committed the error of not making the necessary movements. Murat urged him to attack in reverse the long elevated position which Ney and Gérard were attacking in front; but, unfortunately, the effects of the excessive heat, and the wound which he had received in his head in Portugal, had deprived Junot of his usual energy, and, in spite of the exhortations of Murat, whose cavalry could not supply, on such ground, the place of infantry, he made but feeble and dilatory attempts to cross the marshes which separated him from the enemy, endeavouring to form a passage by throwing fascines into the mud.

At its principal point, however, this desperate struggle was coming to an end. Barclay de Tolly, desiring to make one last effort, had directed the brave Konownitsyn division against the divisions Gudin and Ledru, for the purpose of driving them from the plateau which they occupied, and the latter, yielding for a moment before the violence of the enemy's attack, had returned to the charge, and, throwing themselves upon the Russian infantry with the utmost fury, had succeeded in completely routing them. At ten o'clock in the evening three divisions remained masters of the *deboûche*. The division Razout joined them, and Murat, having passed all obstacles, in his turn deployed upon the plateau and completely cleared it of the Russian troops.

This terrible combat, which has been called the battle of Valoutina and is one of the most bloody of the age, cost the Russians six or seven thousand men, and the French as many; and we must go back to Hallobrunn, Eylau, Eylau, Eylau, and Essling, to find its parallel. Unfortunately, its result, since it was no longer possible to prevent the Russians from effecting the passage of the Dnieper at Solowiewo, could be of no other advantage to us than to prove the superiority of our arms.

When Napoleon was informed of the details of this action, he was surprised at its serious character, and deeply affected at having missed so

excellent an opportunity of seizing an entire column of the Russian army, which would have given to the capture of Smolensk the importance of a great victory, and relieved him of the necessity of seeking any further triumph. At the sight of the field of battle, which he visited at three o'clock on the morning of the following day, the 20th, he was astonished at the energy with which his troops must have fought, and of which the number and positions of the corpses, as well as the nature of the ground, afforded means of judging. As he ascended to the plateau and carried his observations towards the light, he was excessively irritated against Junot, whose dilatoriness had contributed to save the Russians, and as those about him failed to inform him that the road which he had to traverse was a very marshy and difficult one, and as he failed to remind himself that he had left Junot without orders, he resolved, in the first moments of his anger, to supersede him in the command of the Westphalians by General Rapp. Returning to the midst of the blood-stained bivouacs of the division Gudin, he had the troops formed into a circle, and distributed among them rewards for their courage, at the same time expressing the deepest regret for the brave General Gudin, who was dying. This illustrious general, indeed, who had for many years shared with Generals Morand and Friant the glory acquired by Marshal Davout, was, for his heroic courage, his goodness of heart, and his cultivated mind, an object of esteem with his officers and of affection with the troops; and his death was regarded throughout the whole army as a common loss.

On his returning from Smolensk, Napoleon could not refrain from indulging in the most gloomy reflections; for throughout this campaign, which he regarded as the most important he had ever entered upon, which he intended, should it be successful, to be the last, and for which he had made such vast preparations, his genius had never in a single instance been seconded by fortune. Bagration, separated from Barclay de Tolly by his skilful combination, had finally succeeded in effecting a junction with him; and, in spite of his well-formed plans to outflank and turn the latter, these two generals had now regained the Moscow route. In every encounter, indeed, his arms had been victorious over those of the enemy; and he had obtained triumphs at Deweltowo, Mohilev, Ostrowno, Polotsk, Inkowo, Krasnoe, Smolensk, and Valoutina. The loss suffered by the enemy's troops in these encounters was threefold that suffered by his own forces; and moreover, without fighting any great battle, he had effected movements which secured the conquest of the whole of ancient Poland, with the single exception of Volhynia. Nevertheless, accustomed as he had been to strike blows in warfare of such a nature as could not fail to appeal forcibly to the imaginations of mankind, he appeared to have been unsuccessful in supporting during this campaign the prestige of his power. Napoleon was more conscious of this than he was willing to allow, and he felt it bitterly. At the same time he did not fail to perceive that, although he had forced the Russians to retreat, and left them no alternative, they had themselves formed a plan to retreat before him and thus carry the war into the interior of Russia.

Nevertheless, when any of his staff, to whom these tactics of the enemy were equally manifest, ventured to press them on his attention, he persisted in denying their existence, as men frequently deny the existence of a danger which they fear, and unhesitatingly affirmed that the Russians retreated because they were beaten and driven back, and that the movements which were affirmed to be the result of their tactics were in reality the simple effect of their inability to resist the pressure of the French arms.

But his real opinions were not altogether, or were but very slightly, in accordance with these declarations; and perceiving, as he did, the manner in which the ranks of his army had become thinned, even since the arrival at Witepsk, rather by the effects of the march than the enemy's force, he became awake to the danger which would be incurred by carrying the war any farther into the interior of the enemy's country. At the same time he asked himself, as he had already asked himself at Witepsk, what would be the reflections and what the actions of the Prussians, Austrians, Germans, Dutch, and Italians, should they behold him halting before obstacles to which they would attribute whatever character they chose, which they would declare to be invincible, and which they would not fail to assert would be as invincible during the next year as they were this. Would there not be herein, he asked himself, a source of extreme danger to an empire composed, as was his, of elements so discordant and so rebellious? Moreover, would it be so easy to establish, to defend and provision that line of cantonments which he was so constantly urged to form from Bobruisk to Riga, over a line three hundred leagues in extent, on the Dwina and the Dnieper? Would these rivers, filled up with snow as they would be from the last days of October to the beginning of April, be a sufficient frontier? How would his troops, who were now for the first time infected with the contagious malady of desertion, endure in a state of inactivity eight months of painful and wearisome winter? Who would be able, under such circumstances, if he himself did not remain among them, to maintain discipline and to preserve confidence amidst their ranks? And if he should remain amidst these cantonments, how would it be possible for him to govern from the midst of so difficult a position the course of affairs at Rome and Cadix?

These were serious considerations, which are too little taken into account by those persons who blame Napoleon for not having terminated this first campaign at Smolensk, and which prove that the dangers attending this war were inherent in its very nature, rather than the effect of one or another method of conducting it. They caused Napoleon deep and painful reflections, and were the result of circumstances which demanded the adoption of some immediate plan of action. Nevertheless, although it was necessary to take some decided course without delay, there was little doubt that certain circumstances, which would be speedily apparent, must to a great degree determine what this course must be; namely, the attitude which the enemy should adopt beyond Smolensk, the disposition he should manifest either to encounter our troops or to retreat before them, and the situation of the generals left on the wings of

the main army, of Marshal Oudinot at Polotsk, of Prince Schwarzenberg and General Reynier at Brezecs. Should the enemy display an inclination to give us battle, it would be necessary to encounter them at once. Should Marshal Oudinot, the Prince of Schwarzenberg, and General Reynier, have been vanquished, it would be necessary to proceed to their aid; should they have been victorious, the main army would be more free to advance.

As the lapse of three or four days would suffice to afford him certain information on these points, Napoleon resolved to halt for that time at Smolensk, taking in the mean time those preliminary measures which would be necessary should he eventually resolve to advance farther into the country. Accordingly, he ordered Murat and Marshal Davout—the two most dissimilar men in the whole army, and acting as useful checks the one on the other—to follow the enemy with two corps of cavalry and five divisions of infantry respectively, and to discover as accurately as possible the plans of the Russian generals. As Marshal Ney's troops, which had formed the advanced guard since the departure from Witpsk, had need of repose, and the marshal himself was too energetic for the conduct of the intended operations, Napoleon ordered him, after his divisions should have rested one or two days, to follow Murat and Davout, but at some distance, and at the same time sent Prince Eugene a little to the left of the main army, in the direction of Doukhowtchina, for the purpose of sweeping the country between the Dnieper and the Dwina and learning what might be on this side the intended movements of the enemy.

The information, in fact, which arrived every moment from both right and left, from both Brezecs and Polotsk, was of a very satisfactory character, and was generally to the following effect:—General Reynier had fallen back upon Slonim for the purpose of meeting Prince Schwarzenberg, who had been ordered, as we have already seen, to retrace his steps towards the Bug, and to effect a junction with the Saxons for the purpose of driving General Tormasoff into Volhynia. The intended junction between the Saxons and Austrians had been effected on the 8d of August, and the united troops had moved upon Prosjany and Kobrin, where had occurred the unfortunate incident of the surprise of the Saxon detachment by the Russian General Tormasoff. As General Reynier's troops were reduced to eleven thousand, and Prince Schwarzenberg's to twenty-five thousand, their allied forces numbered no more than thirty-six thousand men; but as those of General Tormasoff, who had been obliged to leave troops at Mozyr to guard his rear, numbered scarcely so many, the latter had not failed to retreat before the French, and hastened to return towards Kobrin and Pinsk, for the purpose of covering the Bug, the Pripiet, and the celebrated marshes of that part of the country.

Pursuing the retreating enemy with considerable activity, the Austrians and Saxons arrived, on the 11th of August, at a place named Gorodeczna, at some leagues' distance from Kobrin, and found the Russians established there in a strong position which they were evidently determined to defend. At Gorodeczna the Kobrin road ascended somewhat elevated ground, at

the foot of which ran a stream, of which the banks were somewhat marshy, and to effect the passage of which would necessarily be a matter of difficulty; and it was on this elevated ground that General Tormasoff was now posted with thirty-six thousand infantry and sixty pieces of cannon. Perceiving the difficulty of carrying such a position by an attack in front, Schwarzenberg and Reynier sought on their right for some passage which would enable them to outflank the enemy's right, and at a village named Podoubié found a position which afforded the opportunity of outflanking the Russian left; but the passage would have to be effected not only across a marsh-bordered stream, but at a point over which the enemy kept a careful watch. A little beyond this place, however, on the declivity of the elevated ground which it was intended to seize, was a wood which was unoccupied by the enemy, and through which ran a road which joined a league farther the main Kobrin road.

General Reynier, who was a skilful officer and able tactician, had speedily discovered the enemy's error, and proposed to take advantage of it by penetrating below Podoubié—the wood which the Russians had neglected to occupy—and thus turning their position. Prince Schwarzenberg at once assented to the plan, and gave Reynier an Austrian division, as well as a large portion of his cavalry, that he might have ample means for the execution of the proposed manœuvre. It was agreed, also, that on the morning of the following day, the 12th of August, the prince should make a serious attack on Gorodeczna in front with the bulk of his forces, for the purpose of occupying the attention of the Russians on this side, whilst Reynier should make a vigorous effort to turn them on their left.

Every thing having been thus arranged, Reynier penetrated during the night into the wood in question, established himself within it, and, as soon as it was day, suddenly debouched into a little plain into which merged the elevated ground occupied by the enemy, who, having soon perceived the movement made by the Saxons, had left a portion of his troops at Gorodeczna to resist the attack of Prince Schwarzenberg in front, and had thrown the remainder on their left flank, for the purpose of meeting the troops of General Reynier. And on this double line did the opposed troops contend during the whole of the 12th.

Although both Austrians and Saxons fought in their respective positions with the utmost valour, the conflict of the day would have had no result, had not Prince Schwarzenberg directed an attack against the intermediate point at Podoubié, which was nearer the Russian left flank. At this spot, however, Colloredo's Austrian regiment, together with the Saxon chasseurs, plunging through the marsh, climbed the rising ground at the very moment when the conflict between Reynier's troops and the enemy was at its height. Their appearance filled the latter with dismay, and General Reynier, seizing the opportunity to attack them still more vigorously, succeeded in gaining ground on their left, and at the same time threw the whole of his cavalry on his extreme right on the enemy's rear, by this means threatening the great Kobrin road. As soon as the Russians perceived

this movement, they met our cavalry with their own, but, after some fighting, considered that it would be imprudent to attempt any longer to defend a position so difficult to maintain, and retreated under cover of the night, having lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about four thousand men,—a loss more than double that suffered by their opponents.

Had proper advantage been taken of the results of this day's conflict, it might have enabled our troops to drive the Russians into Volhynia, to have even pursued them thither, and at least to have prevented them from returning, if their force had not been doubled by the arrival of the troops from Turkey. Its immediate effect would be to appease the terrors of the Poles, and to cover our right flank; and the news of it was so gratifying to Napoleon that he sent a gift of five hundred thousand francs (the second of that amount) to the Austrian army, together with a large number of decorations, and wrote to Vienna to request that the bâton of marshal might be bestowed upon Schwarzenberg. At the same time it was impossible that he should not perceive that this portion of his forces had been reduced by the late battle to thirty-two or thirty-three thousand men, and he besought his father-in-law to increase it by three thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry, which, with reinforcements which he had demanded at Warsaw, would raise the number of Prince Schwarzenberg's army to forty-five thousand men, and be sufficient, he considered, to free Volhynia from the Russian yoke.

This event necessarily diverted Napoleon from the intention which he had entertained of summoning Prince Schwarzenberg to the main army: for to have caused Prince Schwarzenberg to have traversed one hundred and twenty leagues for the purpose of arriving at Smolensk, and Prince Poniatowski to have accomplished as long a march from Smolensk to Kobrin, would have been to paralyze these two corps for more than a month at the most critical moment of the campaign, and to have deprived them, moreover, of a fourth or fifth of their effective strength by the fatigues of the march. And, although he could not flatter himself that the Austrians would be very active propagators of the Polish insurrection in Volhynia, their conduct during the campaign enabled him with some degree of confidence to confide to their honour the defence of the French right and rear.

In the mean time, the course of events had been no less favourable on our left, on the side of the Dwina. Marshal Oudinot had, as we have seen, after the checks inflicted by him on the Count Wittgenstein on the 24th of July and the 1st of August, retreated upon Polotsk, for the purpose of affording his troops some repose, a position which they might readily defend, and the advantage of being able to gather forage under the protection of the Dwina. Napoleon, however, fearing some unfavourable moral effect from these retrograde movements, and indulging in exaggerated ideas of the resources possessed by his lieutenants, had addressed reproaches to Marshal Oudinot, declaring that by retreating after a victory he had placed himself in the position of one who had been vanquished,—which was doubtless to some extent the truth; but it was no less true that Marshal Oudinot's troops were worn out, reduced from

thirty-eight thousand men to twenty thousand by the fatigues of the march, the heat and desertion, and that they were in absolute need of some repose. Moreover, the Bavarians, whom Napoleon had sent to reinforce Marshal Oudinot, were no less in need of an opportunity to recover from the effects of the heat, fatigue, and dysentery, which had reduced them to thirteen thousand men and rendered them totally unfit for active operations in the field.

However, after some days of repose, Marshal Oudinot, who was constantly being urged on to active operations by Napoleon, considered that he ought to resume the offensive against Wittgenstein, and moved to the left from Polotsk upon the Drissa, towards Vaïentsouï, some leagues below the Sivotchina, where he had inflicted so severe a blow on the Russians some time previously. Failing to find them behind the Drissa, he had crossed this river and moved upon Svoiana, behind which were encamped the troops of Count Wittgenstein, which had been increased by reinforcements to a number equal to that of the French, who now amounted, with the Bavarians, to thirty-two or thirty-three thousand men. But it is necessary to add that the Russian troops were in a much better state than ours, although inferior as soldiers, and were entirely Russian, whilst of Marshal Oudinot's corps scarcely half were French.

Conscious that his corps, which numerically amounted to thirty-two or thirty-three thousand men, had no more than twenty-five thousand really effective troops, and placing but little reliance on the allied troops, Oudinot would not have resumed the offensive had he not felt too deeply the reproaches directed against him by Napoleon. During many days he remained on the bank of the Svoiana, in front of the Russian camp, harassing the enemy with his light troops, and endeavouring to force them into repeating the fault which they had already committed on the Drissa at the Sivotchina ford; but the Russians took care not to permit themselves to be caught a second time in a similar snare, and several days passed over without any other result than the useless loss of several hundreds of men from ambuscades.

However, Marshal Oudinot, who had taken up an advanced position to the left of Polotsk, and had descended the Drissa as far as Vaïentsouï, feared, with some reason, that he might be turned towards his right by the route from Polotsk to Sebej, which was unfurnished with troops. He repassed the Drissa therefore, and proceeded to establish himself between Lazowka and Biéloé, in front of the vast forest of Gumzéléva, which covers Polotsk; and resolving, since his troops had been still further reduced by their later marches, and he had an exaggerated idea of the enemy's force, that he would approach still nearer to Polotsk, lest he should be cut off from this city, he accordingly established himself behind the river Polota, a little river which runs, covered with hills, farms, and all kinds of buildings, through plains and cultivated fields, and turns round Polotsk, falling into the Dwina somewhat below it.

Established in this position on the 16th of August, he convoked a council of war, for the purpose of discussing the question whether it would be better to engage the enemy or to repass the Polots and the Dwina, in order to attain

a position protected by those two rivers, and in which he might confine his operations to disputing with the enemy the much larger course of the Dwina. General St. Cyr, who formed one of the council in his character of commander of the Bavarian army, maintained that it would be useless to engage the enemy and incur the loss which must necessarily arise from such a measure in case the enemy had failed to follow our troops; but that if, on the contrary, the Russians had followed in our track, it would be necessary to check them by a vigorous combat, for the purpose of proving that the reason of the retreat was not timidity, but the desire of obtaining a more convenient position. At this moment, however, the sound of cannon put an end to all deliberations, and induced every one to run to arms to resist the Russians, who were attempting to cross the Polota. A French and a Bavarian division posted in advance of the Polota received the Russians with considerable energy, and repulsed them vigorously on its bank, until the approach of night put an end to this preliminary contest. On the following day, Marshal Oudinot, who never failed to exaggerate the Russian force, and considered his position to be a very insecure one, felt much uncertainty with regard to the course which he ought to take. And, indeed, the position which he occupied was not a particularly favourable one, for, whilst it was covered in front by a little river, the Polota, there was behind it the larger river Dwina, which was at this part crossed by no other available bridge but that of Polotsk, and presented, therefore, but a very insufficient means of retreat in case of a repulse. As is too often the case in such situations, the marshal decided to adopt a medium course of action, resolving to defend vigorously, with a portion of his troops, the position he then occupied, and to convey the other portion, with the artillery and baggage, across to the left bank of the Dwina.

Having taken this resolution, he ordered that the banks of the Polota should be vigorously defended, whilst the remainder of the army should traverse Polotsk and cross the Dwina; and the defence was executed accordingly with a vigour which effectually prevented the Russians from advancing a single step; but, unfortunately, the marshal himself, whose rare courage led him to expose himself too frequently to danger, was severely wounded, and compelled to resign the command to General St. Cyr, who, although wounded himself, immediately assumed it.

The general called together the chief officers to consult with them respecting the best course to pursue for the purpose of escaping from a situation which was exceedingly complicated. As energetic as he was prudent, he explained the inconveniences attending a purely defensive attitude, and showed the danger which existed that the enemy might attack them on both sides of the Dwina, and proposed that on the following day, whilst apparently continuing the retreat, advantage should be taken of the covered ground on which the battle had taken place to repass secretly the Dwina and the Polota with the greater portion of the troops, to inflict upon them, if possible, a severe blow, and then to fall back, under cover of this success, behind Polotsk and the Dwina. The objec-

tion that the soldiers were too much exhausted by marching and fighting to meet the enemy having been overruled by the general's declaration that four hours would be sufficient to enable him to inflict upon the Russians a serious check, it was resolved to devote the morning to repose, and to encounter the enemy in a new and final conflict in the afternoon of the following day.

On the 18th of August, accordingly, General St. Cyr proceeded to carry out his proposed plan, leaving his artillery and baggage on the left bank of the Dwina, whither Marshal Oudinot had already sent them, and even moving them along the Oula road, as though he were approaching the grand army, and taking advantage of this feigned movement to concentrate around Polotsk Verdier's division and Doumerc's cuirassiers. Towards the middle of the day he suddenly transported his troops to the right of the Dwina, moved them between this river and the Polota, and ordered the attack.

The Bavarian and French troops were in the ravine of the Polota, the Bavarians on the right, the two French divisions Legrand and Verdier in the centre, and a moiety of General Merle's Swiss division on the left with Doumerc's cuirassiers. The other moiety of Merle's division was on the hither side of the Polota, to hold in check any of the enemy's troops which might attempt to cross this river on the extreme right, and to debouch from the forest of Gumsdélva on our rear.

The Russians on their side were posted beyond the Polota in a semicircle around our position, and very close to our advanced posts, that they might be ready to throw themselves upon us as soon as we should beat a retreat, as they expected us to do as soon as they perceived the movement of our artillery on the left of the Dwina. At a given signal the whole of our artillery, Bavarian as well as French, suddenly advanced, to the number of sixty pieces, and overwhelmed with missiles the surprised and disconcerted Russians. Their cavalry were not on their horses, and but a portion of their infantry in their ranks, and our divisions, seizing this moment of their confusion to advance to the attack, forced them to fall back in great disorder, leaving the fields and marshes covered with their wounded and their cannon, which they were equally unable to carry off. As soon as they had reached their second line, however, they halted, and, presenting to our troops a more determined front, renewed the combat, which now became furious and desperate. Two hours, however, had scarcely elapsed, when the enemy was repulsed at all points and obliged to resign to us the field of battle, covered with their dead and their artillery.

We were completely victorious along the entire front of the two armies; the enemy was driven back to the edge of the forest; and, had our troops been less fatigued, we should have been able by pursuing them into the forest to have taken many prisoners and cannon. Our soldiers were, however, thoroughly exhausted, and paused on the edge of the forest, after a brilliant victory, of which the trophies were one thousand five hundred prisoners, fourteen pieces of cannon, a large quantity of caissons, and three thousand of the enemy slain. Our own loss was less than a thousand men.

The principal advantage of this victory to ourselves was that it forced Count Wittgenstein to fall back, deprived him of any inclination to act on the offensive, at least for some time, and enabled us to halt tranquilly in advance of Polotsk without fear of losing our foragers, however far they might extend their researches. Its sole regret—and it was a regret universally felt—was that which was inspired by the death of the brave and aged Bavarian General Dero, who was slain during the action.

This victory, which was known at Smolensk on the 19th of August, the day succeeding that on which that city had been entered by our troops, was a source of extreme satisfaction to Napoleon, and caused him to be just, at length, with regard to General St. Cyr, whose energetic determination had regained for us on the Dwina the prestige of victory. He sent a marshal's bâton to the general, numerous rewards to the French and Bavarian troops, which had equally distinguished themselves, and granted donations to the widows and orphans of the Bavarian officers fully equal to those granted to the widows and orphans of French officers. He ordered, also, particular honours to be paid to the memory of General Dero, the loss of whom and of General Gudin were at present the greatest losses which the army had suffered. How soon, alas! was it to suffer losses far greater, or, at least, far more numerous!

These two victories of Gorodeczna and Polotsk, which were obtained on the 12th and 18th of August respectively, seemed to guarantee the security of our flanks, and to enable us to advance still farther should there appear any hope of obtaining a decisive victory on the Moscow route. This was Napoleon's own view; and, calculating that the Austrians and Saxons would be sufficiently strong to hold Tormasoff in check on his right, and that the French and Bavarians would be equally able to stop Wittgenstein on his left, without taking into account Marshal Macdonald, who had been left between Polotsk and Riga, he could see no cause in the position of his wings which should induce him to halt if there should appear any opportunity, by making a forward movement, either of concluding the war or of obtaining glory. The only source of misfortune that could be foreseen was in the probable return of Admiral Tchitchakoff, whose troops would become available by the establishment of peace between the Russians and Turks; but, as the 9th corps, under Marshal Victor, would afford, by its advance from Tilsit to Wilna, a resource against almost every imaginable accident, Napoleon, in forming his final resolutions, had only to take into account the relative positions of the grand army under his own personal command, and the grand Russian army under the command of Barclay de Tolly and now on its retreat upon the Moscow route. In this direction his thoughts were constantly turned, sometimes inclining to the plan of halting at Smolensk for the purpose of reorganizing Poland and preparing winter quarters for his troops, at the cost of exciting all the ideas which could not fail to spread throughout Europe respecting a mode of action so opposite to his character, and sometimes determining that it was absolutely necessary to plunge into the depths of Russia, for the purpose of striking, before the end of the season, a blow of too

decisive a nature to be resisted by a character so fickle as that of the Emperor Alexander. In the mean time, he received those reports from his two generals of the advanced guard which could not fail to afford him reasons for deciding to adopt the one or the other of these two courses of action.

Murat and Davout were following, in fact, with their cavalry and infantry respectively, the grand Russian army, which was retreating by the Moscow route. They had entered Solowiewo after some skirmishes with the enemy's rear-guard, and, leaving to others the care of preserving this post, had hastened on to Dorogobouge, the last point at which the Moscow route encounters the sinuosities of the Dnieper. The reports sent by the two commanders were as various as their characters. The brilliant but inconsiderate valour of Murat, prodigal of his cavalry, had come into collision with the firm and calm temperament of Marshal Davout, who was most averse to making any useless sacrifice of either the lives or strength of his troops, and who, by advancing less quickly than others, reaped the advantage of never having to retrace his steps. They had not advanced in company more than a few days before bitter altercations had arisen between them, and this spirit of dissension was fully displayed in the reports which they presented to the Emperor.

The Russian troops, of which the retreat was conducted by Barclay de Tolly, had retired with firmness and good order,—retreating by échelons, placing cannon and tirailleurs at all points at which it was possible to hold our cavalry in check, and defending them by these means until the arrival of our infantry, when the troops which had halted fell back behind other échelons equally well posted. There was nothing in this method of proceeding which evinced anxiety or difficulty, and, indeed, it displayed, on the contrary, a system of resistance which would increase in firmness until the moment when the enemy should consider that they had a favourable opportunity for meeting us in a general engagement. Murat, however, observing but very superficially what was passing before him, and only considering this successive abandonment of positions which they had occupied, asserted that the Russian troops were demoralized, and that it would only be necessary for our troops to come up with them by a series of rapid marches to obtain over them an easy triumph. Marshal Davout stoutly maintained, on the contrary, that he had never seen a retreat better conducted, or one which left less opportunity for obtaining a victory by simply galloping in the enemy's track. He considered that we should soon have to engage them in some position chosen by themselves; and that we should, consequently, take care to lead our forces up to it in the best possible order. But, however opposite were the opinions of the two generals of our advanced guard on most points, they were unanimous in supposing that we should soon encounter the enemy in a pitched battle.

As they approached Dorogobouge, our troops perceived the Russians drawn up in battle-array behind a little river named Ouja, which fell into the Dnieper on our left at a place called Ouswiat, and in such attitude and numbers as seemed to show the imminence of a general

engagement. The little river which we had to cross in order to reach them was no serious obstacle, although its banks were muddy and difficult; and, moreover, it was hoped that by ascending a little to the right we should be able to turn the Russians, and probably succeed in driving them into the angle formed by the Ouja with the Dnieper. There was a good opportunity, therefore, at this point, of encountering the enemy in a grand and decisive engagement, and on the evening of the 22d a report to this effect was sent to Napoleon from our advanced guard, which had left Smolensk on the 20th; whilst the Polish army, which marched at two leagues on our right, proceeded to take up a position towards the sources of the Ouja,—the point by which it was hoped we might succeed in turning the enemy.

The conjectures of the generals of our advanced guard were in accordance with the actual state of affairs. The judicious and intrepid Barclay de Tolly, after having courageously borne the disparaging remarks of which he was the object, had at length given way before the taunts levelled against him from all ranks of his army; for, when it was urged upon him that there was great danger of the rapid demoralization of troops among which contempt for their leaders began to be so widely spread, he determined to abandon his plan of a retreat into the interior of Russia, and to encounter our troops immediately in a desperate battle. He sent, therefore, the quartermaster-general, Colonel Toll, to select a field of battle, and the colonel had chosen the position which presented itself behind the Ouja in front of Dorogobouge. Arriving there on the 22d, Barclay de Tolly altered the position of the second army, commanded by Bagration, and posted it on his left, at the very point at which our generals considered it possible to turn the Russian line.

Napoleon received the report of the generals of his advanced guard some hours after it had been despatched, (for, although the space to be traversed had occupied the troops of the advanced guard three days, it was only a journey of ten or twelve hours to a courier,) and as soon as he had received it hastened to quit Smolensk, for the purpose of hastening that decisive and important event which he considered absolutely necessary to support him in the position in which he found himself placed. The single fact of his departing from Smolensk, several days' march, with all his forces, would of itself, in great measure, decide the grave question which at this time so deeply occupied his attention; but the reasons which urged him to seek this battle even at the distance of some marches were so powerful that he could not hesitate to do so; and on the 24th, accordingly, he set out with the Guard. At the same time, although he still remained undecided whether to winter in Poland or to march on to Moscow, he made all his preparations as though he had decided upon the latter measure, for he could not but foresee that circumstances might constrain him to adopt it, and he was unwilling to move a step in advance without having taken in his rear precautions worthy of his foresight.

He had already devoted some days at Smolensk to the arrangement of those military establishments which he never failed to form on his route, and which were not, unfortunately,

always finished at his departure. He left there a division of his Young Guard under General Delaborde, to remain until the detachments still in the rear should come up to garrison the important city, and summoned thither those which he had left at Witepsk, where they would be replaced by others. He changed the route of the army, and, instead of causing it to pass by the points which he had himself traversed,—namely, Gloubokoé, Ouchatsch, Beschenkowicz, and Witepsk,—determined that it should pass by Smorgoni, Minsk, Borisow, Orscha, since this line of route was the shorter.

He added to the Polish division Dombrowski, which had been detached from the corps of Poniatowski and posted at Mohilev for the purpose of connecting the grand army with the Austro-Saxon corps, a brigade of light cavalry, that it might be able to extend its surveillance to a greater distance, and more fitted to watch our new base of operations. To Marshals St. Cyr and Macdonald, who guarded the Dwina, and to Prince Schwarzenberg, who guarded the Lower Dnieper, he wrote informing them that he was about to advance for the purpose of engaging the enemy in a decisive battle, and desiring them to be careful to protect the flank of the grand army whilst it should be engaged in the attempt to inflict a mortal blow on the Russian army; and, finally, he commanded the Duke of Belluna to prepare to proceed to Wilna, since from that central point the 9th corps would be the resource of that one of our generals who should be left to fight the one or other of our wings.

Having sent forward the Guard on the morning of the 24th and ordered Ney, who followed Davout, to approach close to the head of the army, and Prince Eugene, who had advanced upon the left by Doukhowtchina, to march upon Dorogobouge, he himself set out towards evening, and continued his journey through the night, that he might reach at sunrise the place where he hoped to engage the enemy, which was the object of his most ardent wishes.

On his arrival, however, he found that the probability of a decisive engagement, at least for the present, had almost entirely vanished, the fact being that, after a single glance at the position of which he was to occupy the part most difficult to defend, Prince Bagration had declared it to be a most ill-chosen one, insulting Colonel Toll when he attempted to justify his selection. The battle, therefore, was now postponed by the desire of the very persons who had been most eager in demanding it, and Barclay de Tolly had consequently broken up his camp and rapidly passed through Dorogobouge on his way to Wiasna, where, it was said, there could be found a position in every way much more advantageous.

The acute discernment of Napoleon and the great experience of Davout did not fail to convince them that these halts of the Russian troops, followed by sudden retreats, were not the result of irresolution, but rather the hesitation of an army determined to fight, but anxious to encounter its enemies on a field of battle which should afford them the greatest possible advantages; and they clearly perceived that within two or three days the Russians would be ready to encounter the French troops in that pitched battle for which the latter had so frequently



offered them the opportunity. This being the state of affairs, Napoleon, as he had already passed the three stages between Smolensk and Dorogobouge, did not hesitate to advance still farther over the three which separated Dorogobouge from Wiasma, where it was probable that he would at length come up with the Russian army. Nevertheless, as he was not the man to deceive himself respecting the consequences of his actions, he foresaw that the adoption of this measure would very possibly compel him to proceed to Moscow; since it would be scarcely possible, should he gain a great victory at some marches distant from Moscow, to pause and renounce the immense *éclat* of leading the French troops into this distant capital of the Czars. Setting out from Smolensk without having come to any fixed determination, he formed his final resolution at Dorogobouge, and on the 26th gave orders which seemed to have been framed in accordance with the necessities of a march which should only terminate at Moscow.

Although, on the eve of his departure from Smolensk, Napoleon had devoted his attention to his base of operations, it occupied his thoughts still more deeply now that he was about to advance so great a distance into the country.

This base had at first been at Dantzic and Thorn, then at Königsberg and Kowno, and subsequently at Wilna, successively changing its position in accordance with the progress of the extraordinary march of the French troops across Poland and Russia; and it was evident that its new position should be at Smolensk,—this city being the connecting-link between the Dwina and the Dnieper, and connecting them also with Wilna and Kowno. Napoleon resolved, therefore, to summon to Smolensk, immediately, the corps of Marshal Victor, consisting of about thirty thousand men, that it might remain there to be ready to support either Marshal St. Cyr or Prince Schwarzenberg in case either of these two should encounter any reverse. At the same time, Napoleon considered that it was far more probable that these commanders would obtain great successes, rather than suffer any reverse, even so great as being reduced to the defensive; he regarded the corps under Marshal Victor's command as destined, in fact, to face the Russian troops which might return from Turkey. As he was unwilling, however, that this corps should be scattered in small garrisons, he had already marched upon Wilna various Saxon, Polish, Westphalian, and Hanseatic regiments, which had hitherto remained at Dantzic and Königsberg, and he now ordered that they all should be marched to Minsk and Smolensk, for the purpose of providing at these places such garrisons and detachments as might be necessary. As a substitute for these troops at Dantzic he had previously summoned thither one of Marshal Augereau's divisions, commanded by General Lagrange, and he now determined to move this division itself to Smolensk, that it might from thence reinforce the various corps of the grand army, supply the vacancies which might be caused in the ranks by future battles, and in the mean time mark out the route. This division was to be replaced at Dantzic by another of Marshal Augereau's divisions,—that of General Heudelet; and, as the marshal would be entirely deprived of the division which was to be sent to Smolensk, Napoleon resolved to

recompense him for its loss by ordering General Grenier, whom, in his distrust of the court of Naples, he had posted at the head of a corps composed of excellent French troops and foreign troops in the service of France, between Rome and Naples, to march with his French troops, which would form a division of fifteen thousand of the best soldiers in Italy, with the utmost speed consistent with prudence, upon Augsburg. By this measure the corps of Marshal Augereau would receive a larger number of troops than it had lost, and Napoleon considered, holding Murat as he did under his own hand, and having no reason to fear his fickleness, that the Neapolitan army, together with the regiments of Isenberg and Latour-d'Auvergne, would be sufficient protection for the South of Italy.

Thus, with a corps of fifty thousand men between Berlin and Dantzic, with strong garrisons at Dantzic, Königsberg, Memel, Kowno, Wilna, and Witepsk, with the two corps of Marshals Macdonald and St. Cyr on the Dwina, with that of Prince Schwarzenberg on the Dnieper, with an excellent Polish division at Mohilev, to connect Prince Schwarzenberg's corps with the grand army, with the corps of the Duke of Belluna at Smolensk, perfectly ready to succour either of his wings which might be in peril, or to follow his own march to Moscow, and, finally, with a continual succession of battalions serving as garrisons in all the towns on the route, until they should continue their march for the purpose of recruiting the grand army,—with all these resources at his disposal, we say, Napoleon was able to persuade himself that he was safe, and thought not of comparing his own position with that of Charles XII.

The vast measures which he had taken were certainly worthy of his keen foresight, and seemed to be such as must secure him against all accidents; but yet one of them was the subject of much disapproval on the part of his lieutenants, too timidly expressed, and, unfortunately, justified by the event. This measure was that which consisted in leaving divided into two corps the troops destined to guard the Dwina. The corps of Marshal St. Cyr, now composed of twenty thousand French and ten thousand Bavarian troops, would have been sufficient perhaps, under a very enterprising general and with proper provisions, to have vanquished Wittgenstein's corps; but when reduced, as it was, to twenty-four thousand men, by the necessary absence of numerous foraging-parties, and situated at great distances from his *appui*, in the midst of unknown regions, we cannot be surprised that, even under the command of so able a general as Marshal St. Cyr, it should have effected no decisive operation. Marshal Macdonald, with twenty-four thousand men at the most, situated between Riga and Dunabourg, could neither take the former place nor maintain communications with Marshal St. Cyr. But had these two corps united, in accordance with Marshal Macdonald's proposition, they might have overwhelmed Wittgenstein, have advanced beyond the Dwina, have established themselves at Sebej, have thus forced Wittgenstein to fall back upon Pskow, and have gained on this side a decided superiority over the enemy. It is true that Courland would have been exposed to the incursions of the garrison of Duna-

bourg, and that it would have been impossible in this case to have besieged Riga, to the possession of which Napoleon attached so much importance. But if we had occupied Tilsit in force, and had well guarded the course of the Niemen as far as Kowno, the incursions of the Cossacks into Courland could not have had very important results; and with regard to the siege of Riga, it was very improbable that a corps of less than twenty-four thousand men, compelled to disperse a third of its effective strength in detachments, would be capable of executing an operation of such difficulty.

With the exception of this measure, which was the result of Napoleon's fatal desire to attain too many objects at once, the numerous plans which Napoleon now carried out were well suited to the existing state of affairs. Perceiving the difficulty of securing the preservation of the line of communications between the grand army and its rear, through a line infested with bands of Cossacks, he ordered the governors of Minsk, Borisow, Orscha, and Smolensk to furnish, from their several garrisons, each of a series of little citadels which he had constructed along the line of communication, with a hundred infantry, fifteen cavalry, and two pieces of cannon,—by this means securing the uninterrupted transmission of information and orders. And further, as he intended, should the loss of a great battle and the capture of Moscow fail to bring Alexander to submission, to return to winter in Poland, he made arrangements for procuring either by means of money or requisitions a quantity of provisions more than sufficient for the supply of his army during a year. And it was very possible that this vast amount of food and provender might be raised in Poland, especially by the employment of the treasury which Napoleon now had at his disposal, consisting partly of a great sum in money, and partly of a still larger sum in false paper roubles which he had forged in Paris without scruple, considering himself justified by the example of the coalitionists, who at another period filled France with forged assignats.

All these precautions having been taken, Napoleon moved his troops from Dorogobouge in the following order. Murat, with the light cavalry of Marshals Davout and Ney, the cavalry of reserve of Generals Nansouty and Monbrun, with a considerable force of artillery *attache*, formed the advanced guard; in immediate succession followed Marshal Davout, having one of his divisions always ready to support the cavalry. After Davout marched Ney, and after Ney the Guard. On the right, Prince Poniatowski's corps, and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, at two or three leagues' distance from the grand route, endeavoured to outstrip the enemy and to obtain information. Prince Eugene occupied a similar position on the left, also endeavouring to outstrip the Russian troops, and preceded by the cavalry of General Grouchy.

The quartier-general followed, with the parks of artillery, the engineers, and a thousand wagons laden with provisions for the Guard, which Napoleon was unwilling to accustom to habits of pillage, and for the general supply of the army on the day on which the troops might be concentrated to engage the enemy in battle. With the exception of Davout's corps, the troops of which had eight days' provisions on their

backs, besides a reserve sufficient for three or four days conveyed by wagons, the other troops were to procure their subsistence from the districts through which they might pass. It had been found, in fact, that the villages were less completely dismantled than had been at first supposed, and that on the lateral routes especially, where the Russians had not time to complete their work of destruction, there still remained a large quantity of provisions. The army was freed from a large portion of its baggage-train, and even from the bulkier portion of its post-toon-equipages, since the rivers on this central plateau which separate the Baltic from the Black Sea are almost all close to their source, and consequently neither rapid nor deep. With respect to the constitution of the army itself,—as it had lost about fifteen thousand men in engagements with the enemy, about fourteen thousand by the fatigues of the march, and had left a division of the Guard at Smolensk, an Italian division and General Pajol's light cavalry in observation on the Witepsk route, it was now reduced from one hundred and seventy-five thousand to about one hundred and forty-five thousand men, but these were all most excellent troops. The weather was perfectly serene, and the line of march lay along a large and fine road bordered with many rows of birch-trees, traversing green plains; and, although the generals were desponding, the troops themselves superstitiously trusted to the guidance of the Emperor's star. The rumour had already spread that they were on their way to Moscow! . . . "To Moscow!" cried the soldiers; "To Moscow!" And they followed Napoleon as in old times the Macedonian soldiers had followed Alexander to Babylon.

On the 28th the army reached Wiasma, a pretty town, well inhabited, and traversed by a river, the bridges across which had been broken. The Russians had set fire to it, in accordance with the plan they had adopted, before quitting it, but had had too little time to effect this object completely, and our soldiers were, therefore, able to save some of its houses, together with a portion of the provisions which it contained; but unfortunately, although they did not hesitate to throw themselves into the midst of the flames to check the extension of the devastation, they found it a matter of great difficulty to do so, on account of the circumstance that the greater portion of the habitations were constructed of wood: and, when their exertions had been repaid by a certain degree of success, their own carelessness with regard to the fires at which they cooked their rations was the cause of the renewed spread of the conflagration.

According to the information received by the advanced guard, and which was, indeed, true, our army should have found the Russians at Wiasma ready to engage in that terrible conflict on which they had at length resolved, and which they had determined to accept as soon as they should have found a position in which they could advantageously engage our troops. But the fact was that the Russians had considered that there was no such position in the neighbourhood of Wiasma, and had determined, therefore, to take up their ground at Czarewo-Zaimisch, situated two days' march beyond Wiasma. It seemed to be, and was, the case, that, as soon as Barclay de Tolly had resolved upon a battle

in compliance with the wishes of Bagration and his party, the latter became excessively fastidious with respect to the position in which they should engage us. And we may observe in this another of those many circumstances which concurred to induce the continuance of that system of retreat which tended to draw us into the depths of Russia.

In the mean time, Napoleon, being convinced that the enemy intended, sooner or later, to risk a battle with our troops, was little troubled by the fact of having to follow them one or two marches farther, for the purpose of affording them the opportunity, and resolved, therefore, to follow them along the Ghjat road. But sad presentiments began to fill the minds of all the persons who surrounded him. Every day the army was further diminished by some hundreds of men and horses, lost in foraging-expeditions or overwhelmed by fatigue; and at length Berthier, with extreme reserve, ventured to make some representations to the Emperor relative to the danger of pushing the expeditions on which he was engaged too far, and of attempting to accomplish it in a single campaign instead of two. But Napoleon, who was perfectly aware of all that could be said on the subject, and who was irritated at hearing from another the expression of thoughts which oppressed his own soul, received the major-general's representations very coolly, and replied to them with the reproach with which he usually met any similar objections. "And you too, you are also one of those who would fain hang back?" he began, and then continued in an insulting strain, comparing him to an old woman, telling him that he might return, if he pleased, to Paris, and that he could very well dispense with his services. Berthier, much humbled by the answer, replied in accents of extreme distress, and, retiring to his quarters, refrained during several days from taking his meals, as he usually did, at the Emperor's table.

Another incident, equally to be regretted, took place at the same time. We have seen above that a spirit of great dissension existed between Davout and Murat, whilst commanding together the advanced guard; and at length, when they had reached Wiasma, Davout, irritated at the prodigal manner in which Murat expended his cavalry, refused to grant him his infantry, being unwilling to see it treated as Murat had treated the horse. In spite of Murat's claims as a king and brother-in-law of the Emperor, Davout persisted in his refusal, before the whole army forbidding General Compans to obey the King of Naples; and it is difficult to say to what extent the quarrel might have grown, had it not been appeased by the presence of Napoleon, who, whilst he considered Davout to be in the right, felt hurt at the little respect shown by the marshal to one so nearly allied to the Imperial family, and, accordingly, inflicted on him a public rebuke, by deciding that the division Compans should obey Murat's orders as long as it formed a portion of the advanced guard.

On the 31st, the French army set out from Wiasma for Ghjat, hoping to find the Russians at Caserewo-Zaimitché; but, on arriving there, they found that the enemy had again retreated, as at Wiasma and Dorogobouge. Still, it was resolved on our side to continue the pursuit;

and, indeed, all the stragglers whom our army met unanimously declared that the Russians intended to give us battle, and only awaited reinforcements, which were expected from the centre of the empire. In the course of the day (the 31st) the light cavalry took prisoner a Cossack belonging to the corps of Platow, whom, as he appeared very intelligent, the Emperor conversed with personally through an interpreter.

The Cossack, ignorant of his interrogator's rank, discoursed freely on the affairs of the war; boasted of the services of the Cossacks, who, he declared, had saved the Russian army from being vanquished; affirmed that a great battle would take place very shortly, and that the French would have no chance of being victorious in it, unless it took place within three days; and added that the French were commanded, it was said, by a general named Bonaparte, who usually vanquished all his enemies, but who would probably be less fortunate in the approaching contest with the Russian army, which was about to receive immense reinforcements, &c. Napoleon was much interested by this conversation, smiling at many of the young Cossack's replies, and at length, wishing to see what effect the knowledge of his presence would have upon this child of the Don, directed the interpreter to inform him that General Bonaparte was the person with whom he had been discoursing. Scarcely had the interpreter given him this information, when the Cossack, as though overwhelmed with astonishment, became suddenly dumb, and kept his eyes immovably fixed on the warrior whose name had reached even him across the steppes of the East. All his loquacity had vanished and given place to a sentiment of genuine and silent admiration. Napoleon gave him a present, and permitted him once more to go, free as a bird that returns to the fields of its birth.

In the course of the day, the advanced guard reached Ghjat,—a little town tolerably well stored with provisions, especially grain, a quantity of which our soldiers were able to rescue from the flames. On the following day, the 1st of September, our head-quarters were established there. A sudden fall of rain had converted the dust of the Muscovite plains into a thick mud, and Napoleon, fearing the loss of men and horses should he attempt to advance through it, determined to halt at Ghjat during two or three days. As he had determined to follow the Russians to Moscow, he felt certain of meeting them, and considered it wise, therefore, to advance in such a manner as would enable him to do so with an undiminished and unexhausted army. He ordered, consequently, all the generals to review and inspect minutely the soldiers under their command, to provide them with two or three days' provisions, and to endeavour to inspire them as much as possible with an enthusiastic expectation of the great impending struggle. But there was, in truth, little need of this latter measure, for our troops were ardently desirous for the event which they believed would put an end to their fatigues and be one of the most glorious of their glorious lives.

The moment when the battle was to take place had, indeed, at length arrived, and the Russians had resolved no longer to decline it;

nor would they have done so at Czarewo-Zaimitché, had not a fresh delay been rendered necessary by a change which had taken place in the army, and which had its origin at St. Petersburg, in the very bosom of the Russian court.

When Alexander was driven, as to a certain extent he was, from his army, he had retired to Moscow, to fulfil there the office which had been represented to him as the one most suited to his dignity and most conducive to the defence of the empire,—namely, that of exciting the enthusiasm and the efforts of his people against the French. Upon his arrival at Moscow he had convoked the corps of the *noblesse* and merchants, for the purpose of demanding of them some genuine proof of their devotion to their prince and country. The Governor Rostopschin had been charged with the superintendence of these convocations, and had experienced but little difficulty in inflaming spirits which the approach of Alexander towards the capital already filled with patriotic ardour; but at the sight of Alexander himself, coming to demand the support of the nation against a foreign invader, their excitement had burst forth in sobs and cries of affection. The *noblesse* had voted a levy of one man in ten on their domains, and the commercial body had voted considerable subsidies,—the several supplies being together capable of furnishing, it was said, a militia-force of twenty-four thousand men for the government of Moscow. And similar levies, independently of those which the Emperor had ordered to be raised in the Imperial domains, were to be raised in all the governments which were not occupied by the enemy.

After he had received these testimonies of ardent and sincere patriotism, Alexander had returned to St. Petersburg for the purpose of taking all the measures necessary for carrying out this species of levy *en masse*, and to preside over the general direction of the military operations. The *noblesse* which was at this moment resident in the capital was composed of old Russians, whom their age forced to live far from camps, and who were delighted with having Alexander in the centre of his empire, to a certain degree in their own hands, far from the violent impressions of the battle-field, and far, especially, from the seductive powers of Napoleon, one interview with whom at the advanced posts after a battle would, they feared, lead the Emperor anew into the toils of the policy of Tilsit. MM. Arakhtcheief, Armfeld, Stein, and all the Russian or German councillors who since the departure from Wilna had gone to attend Alexander at St. Petersburg, surrounded him, held him, as it were, besieged, and permitted him to take no resolution which was not in accordance with their own passions; and in the prosecution of this plan they had derived considerable assistance from the presence of Lord Cathcart, the general who had commanded the British army before Copenhagen, and who had represented England at St. Petersburg since the conclusion of peace between that power and the Russian court.

This peace had been concluded immediately after the commencement of hostilities with France, but not before, as Alexander had promised to M. de Lauriston; and had been negotiated by M. de Suchtelen on the part of Russia,

and Mr. Thornton, the English agent who had been sent to Sweden, and stipulated for the concurrence of the whole strength of each empire in the prosecution of the new war. Lord Cathcart had arrived immediately after the peace had been signed, and he concurred with the German councillors and the Prince-Royal of Sweden, that success could only be obtained in the war by perseverance, that two or three battles would doubtless be lost, but that a single victory would suffice to destroy the French, advanced, as they were, into the interior of the empire. Alexander, who was wounded to the heart by the haughty manner in which Napoleon had behaved towards him during the last three years, and at the open indifference with which he had received the overtures of peace made by the Russian court, was determined to carry on the war, now that it had been begun, to the utmost extent, trusting in the efficacy of his system of a continued retreat. At the same time, the pursuance of this system was necessarily attended by some humiliation and considerable loss, since not only the towns of Smolensk, Wiasma, and Ghjat, had fallen a prey to these ruinous tactics, but also all the chateaux and villages situate on the French route, through a space of twelve or fifteen leagues. And in addition to these ill consequences was the fact that the generals who conducted the retreat were called cowards or traitors who did not dare to face the French in battle, and who preferred to oppose them rather with a devastated country than with their lives.

Alexander having ceased to be responsible for the conduct of the war since his departure from the army, all the odium of the subsequent military events had fallen upon the unfortunate Barclay de Tolly. To have lost Wilna, Witepek, and Smolensk, without a battle, to be in retreat, on the road to Moscow, to have given up the heart of the empire to the enemy without having first immolated thousands of men, was, according to the popular notion, a treasonable crime: and the masses, as they pronounced the name of Barclay de Tolly, which was not Russian, declared that they were not surprised at so many reverses, since all the foreigners who were in the service of Russia betrayed her. The cry of popular passion, swelled by the voices of those who reviled him, spread not only throughout the army, but throughout the whole country, denouncing Barclay de Tolly as the author of the catastrophe at Smolensk. And yet what could the unfortunate general have done? Nothing, as we have seen. He had sacrificed twelve thousand Russians in attempting to save this place; and if he had committed any error, it was in having attempted to defend a town not capable of being seriously defended.

Barclay de Tolly was consequently a lost man: for even the persons who were thoroughly aware of the truth, perceiving as they did the outrageous fury of which he was the object, and the insubordination which was spreading throughout the army from this cause, advised that he should be sacrificed. In the midst of this excitement one name was in every one's mouth, and it was that of General Kutusoff, that old one-eyed soldier, whom Admiral Tchitchakoff had replaced on the Danube, who had previously lost the battle of Austerlitz, and who nevertheless had become, by virtue of his thoroughly Russian

name and his having been a pupil of Suwarow's, the favourite of public opinion. It must be added, that Kutusoff had restored the fortunes of Russia in the last campaign against the Turks,—and that although seventy years of age, so perfectly worn out by war and pleasure as to be scarcely capable of holding himself on his horse, thoroughly corrupt, false, perfidious, and a liar, he was possessed of consummate prudence, and had the art to make himself the idol of the party which was ardent for the plan of engaging the enemy, whilst he was himself the decided partisan of the system of retreat. And no man could be more capable than he was of gaining the mastery over men's minds, of directing them as he chose, of ruling them by affecting passions which he had not, and of opposing Napoleon by patience, the only arm with which he could be successfully fought. Providence, which had prepared an adversary for him in the extremities of the Peninsula,—a man of resolute will and keen intellect, firm as the rocks of Torres-Vedras, Lord Wellington,—had also prepared an adversary for him in the depths of Russia, in the person of a man who had not that inflexibility of character which was absolutely necessary at the extremities of the Peninsula, where there was no more room to fall back, but who was astute and patient, as flexible as the space in which he would have to plunge, who knew both how to resist and to yield, and who was capable, not indeed of vanquishing Napoleon, but of deceiving him, and of thus defeating him. It is not with equals but with inferiors Providence opposes the genius which it has resolved to punish, as though it desired thus to render the punishment more severe.

Old General Kutusoff was therefore the second adversary who was about to stop Napoleon at the other extremity of the European continent, and it must be acknowledged that popular passion had seldom less erred than in pointing out Kutusoff as the man to be selected by their Emperor. But when we speak of the popular passion we do not wish to intimate that the populace of St. Petersburg attempted to compel the Emperor to accept their selection of his generals, but that the passions which rule a court even may have a popular character, and do have such a character when wise and foolish, young and old, men and women, all concur in demanding something of which they know only the name, being alike ignorant of its real qualities and unfurnished with genuine reasons for desiring it. With such a popular passion, then, were the most aristocratic circles of the capital inspired when they demanded the appointment of Kutusoff, who, since his return from Turkey, had very hypocritically placed himself at the head of the St. Petersburg militia, thus obtruding himself upon public notice. Alexander had no confidence in him, considering him to be wanting in firmness and skill on the battle-field; and, indeed, Kutusoff's sole merit as a warrior was (and it was a very great one) that he was profoundly skilful in giving the general direction to the conduct of a war. Overwhelmed, however, by public opinion, Alexander determined to select Kutusoff as commander-in-chief of the united armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly, leaving these two generals in command of their respective troops. General Benningsen, who

had followed Alexander to St. Petersburg, and whose character, in spite of some disadvantageous recollection attached to it, would have satisfied the popular leaning of the moment had he borne a Russian name, was nominated Kutusoff's chief of the staff.

As soon as he had received his appointment, Kutusoff set out for the army, and it was his arrival at Czarewo-Zaimitché which had prevented the Russians from meeting the French troops in battle. Colonel Toll, who remained quarter-master-general, had found in the environs of Mojaisk, twenty-five leagues distant from Moscow, at a place named Borodino, a position which offered as many advantages to an army acting on the defensive as it could hope to find in the species of country in which the campaign was being carried on, and General Kutusoff, who, although disapproving of actually encountering the enemy, was willing to fight one battle that it might afford him the opportunity of declining many others, had adopted the ground selected by Colonel Toll, had proceeded in person to Borodino, and ordered such field-works as would add the defences of art to those of nature. The army, which had been much weakened, not only by the contests at Smolensk and Valoutina, but also by its incessant marches, from which, although very well provided, it had suffered almost as much as the French troops, was now reinforced by fifteen thousand men from the reserve and dépôt battalions and ten thousand of the Moscow militia, now numbered one hundred and forty thousand men, and, posted at Borodino behind earth-in-trenchments, awaited Napoleon, under its old General Kutusoff, who, being forced to commit a fault, took care, with prudent resignation, to render it as innocuous as possible.

A general acquaintance with the above facts had persuaded Napoleon that he should encounter beyond Ghjat the Russian army prepared to meet his troops in battle. But at this very moment he found himself checked for a time by the weather, which during the 1st, 2d, and 3d of September was terribly adverse, turning the roads, which had hitherto been tolerably good, into quagmires. The horses died by thousands of fatigue and inanition; the cavalry was gradually disappearing; and there was great reason to fear that there would be no means of carrying forward the artillery, the absence of which would have rendered it impossible to engage in any great battle. At the same time, the bivouacs, cold and wretched, were in the highest degree injurious to the health of the men. Napoleon attributed the evil to error on the part of his lieutenants, and severely rebuked Marshal Ney, who lost some hundreds of his troops each day. His corps had been reduced to subsist on such provisions as it could gather on its march, and had been as much weakened by the exertions rendered necessary by this state of destitution as it might have been by a bloody battle. Ney had revenged himself for the rebuke he had received, by recounting the sufferings endured by his troops in their too protracted marches, and declaring that to continue the movement in advance would be to expose the army to perish. Murat, who was partly to blame for the evils complained of, confirmed Ney's statement, and Berthier who, did not dare to repeat his repre-

sentations, supported it by a sullen silence. Napoleon was strongly moved by these assertions, and replied to them, "Ah, well, if the weather have not changed by to-morrow we will halt," which was equivalent to saying that he should have considered the bad season to have commenced, and would have returned to Smolensk. And never would Fortune, who threw a fog over his fleet to enable it to escape from Nelson when he went to Egypt, who granted him the little road by which he turned the fort of Bard, who granted him the sun of Austerlitz,—never would Fortune, we say, have more manifestly favoured him than she would have now, had she now sent him three or four days of bad weather. But Fortune no longer favoured him so much as to oppose his wishes on this occasion for his own advantage; and on the morning of the 4th of September there arose a radiant sun and a lively breeze, such as would most probably dry the roads within the space of a few hours. "The lot is cast!" cried Napoleon: "let us advance! Let us march to meet the Russians!" and he ordered Murat and Davout to set forward about noon, when the roads would have been in some degree dried, directing their movement upon Gridnewa, which was half-way from Ghjat to Borodino. The remainder of the army was ordered to follow the movement made by the advanced guard.

Obedient to destiny, the army set out and proceeded to pass the night at Gridnewa. On the following day, the 5th of September, it resumed its march, and advanced towards the plain of Borodino, a place destined to become as famous as Zama, Pharsalia, or Actium. On the line of march stood a celebrated abbey, that of Kolotzkoi, a great building flanked with towers, the roofs of which, being formed of coloured tiles, contrasted vividly with the sombre hues of the surrounding landscape. During many days the troops had been advancing along the elevated plateaux which separated the waters of the Baltic from those of the Black Sea and the Caspian, and, on setting out from Ghjat, began to descend the slopes from which the Moskwa on the left, and the Protwa on the right, flow by the Oka into the Volga, by the Volga into the Caspian Sea. The landscape appeared to sink towards the horizon, and to be covered with thick forests, whilst a sky half veiled with light autumnal clouds served to increase its sad and savage aspect. All the villages were either burned or deserted, and there remained only a few monks at the abbey of Kolotzkoi. Our army left this abbey on the left, and continued its march along the course of a little river now half dried up, called the Kolocza, flowing direct east,—the direction which had been constantly pursued by our troops since the passage of the Niemen. The cavalry rear-guards, after a certain amount of resistance on the part of the enemy, which had been speedily overcome, threw themselves upon the right of the Kolocza, and hastened to take up a position at the foot of a fortified mamelon, where there was a large detachment of about fifteen thousand men of all arms.

Napoleon paused to consider this plain, on which was to be decided the fate of the world. The Kolocza flowed right in front of us, traversing a bed which was by turns either muddy or almost dried up, until, having arrived at the

village of Borodino, it turned to the left, passing for more than a league through hills considerably escarped, and at length, after a thousand windings, losing itself in the Moskwa. The hills on our left, at the foot of which passed the Kolocza, appeared to be covered with the Russian army, which also extended over the chain of hills on the right of the river, this latter portion of its line being much the weaker, since the hills here were much less escarped, and protected at the foot by simple ravines instead of the course of the river; and, although the most considerable works had been constructed at this point, they were not such as would offer any invincible obstacle to the attack of our troops.

The first work which opposed the advance of our troops to the right of the Kolocza was a redoubt, more advanced than the others, constructed on a mamelon towards which the Russian rear-guard had fallen back; and Napoleon considered that it would be necessary to gain immediate possession of it, in order to be able to establish himself at his leisure on this portion of the plain and uninterruptedly make his preparations for the impending battle. He ordered, therefore, Murat and Compans, whose cavalry and infantry were at his immediate disposal, to carry this redoubt, which was called the Schwarzdino redoubt, from a neighbouring village of that name. Murat with his cavalry, and Compans with his infantry, had already passed the Kolocza, and were now on the right of the plain, and towards nightfall Murat forced the Russian cavalry to fall back, and thus cleared the ground for the advance of our infantry. On an elevation in front of the redoubt General Compans posted some pieces of cannon and a body of tirailleurs, and after a vigorous cannonade deployed the 57th and 61st of the line to the right, the 25th and 111th to the left, personally directing the former two regiments, and intrusting the latter two to General Dupellia. Our troops advanced with the utmost energy and firmness across a little ravine which lay between them and the redoubt, and, having reached the farther side, exchanged with the Russian infantry during several minutes a fire of musketry of the most murderous description. General Compans rightly considered that a charge at the bayonet's point could not have such deadly effects, and gave the signal for the charge; but in the midst of the clamour and the smoke it was not well understood, and galloping, therefore, to the head of the 57th, which was the regiment nearest to the redoubt, he conducted it himself with fixed bayonets against the grenadiers of Woronzoff and Mecklenburg, whom it speedily drove back in disorder. The example thus set by the 57th was followed by the 61st, which was at its side; and, as the 25th and 111th had been equally successful on our left, the redoubt was outflanked by this double movement, and fell into our hands,—the Russian artillerymen being almost to a man slain on their pieces.

But the 111th, having advanced too far to our left, was suddenly charged by Douka's cuirassiers and placed in some peril. It formed into a square and checked with a storm of musketry the charge of its brave assailants. A Spanish infantry-regiment (that of Joseph Napoleon) which belonged to the division Compans courageously hastened to the succour of its

comrades, but found that the 111th had been sufficient for its own defence, although it had lost the two small cannon belonging to the regiment, having been unable to carry them off when falling back to form in square.

This short but glorious struggle, in which we lost four or five thousand men and the Russians seven or eight thousand, having left us masters of the whole of the plain on the right of the Kolocza, Napoleon hastened to place his army in position there, intending that those troops only which had not yet arrived should remain on the left of the Kolocza. The position which during two days the Russians had occupied on the heights of Borodino, the defensive works which they had constructed, and the reports of prisoners, all concurred in showing that at length was to be fought that battle which the French desired because they hoped that it would be the means of their obtaining some decisive triumph, and the Russians desired because they were ashamed of continually retreating and weary of devastating their country. Believing, therefore, that there could be no doubt that this battle was at length about to take place, Napoleon determined to halt for a day, for the purpose of rallying the troops which had not yet come up, and of having time deliberately to reconnoitre the ground, and bivouacked his troops from right to left of the vast plain which they occupied.

On the morning of the following day, the 1st, the sun shone once more on thousands of helmets, bayonets, and pieces of cannon, on the heights of Borodino, and our army had the satisfaction of perceiving that the Russians were still in position, and evidently determined to fight. Napoleon, who had bivouacked on the left of the Kolocza, in the midst of his guard, proceeded, at a very early hour, surrounded by his marshals, to reconnoitre the ground on which he was about to measure his strength with the Russians.

After a most careful reconnoissance of the position occupied by the enemy, Napoleon was confirmed in the opinion he had formed at a single glance,—that, the left of this position being greatly escarped, and protected by the deep bed of the Kolocza, the attack should be directed against its right, where the heights were less precipitous and defended by ravines without depth and without water. The great Moscow road, which we had followed, passing at first along the left of the Kolocza, continued upon the right of this river to Borodino, and, rising on the Gorki plateau, traversed the chain of hills on its way to Mojaïsk. This portion of the position, which was its centre, was as impregnable as that on the left, and it was only at some distance from Borodino and towards the right of the Kolocza that the ground presented any facilities for an attack. The first elevation on the right of the Borodino was covered with thick brushwood at its foot, and was terminated at its summit by a sort of tolerably-large plateau, which was crowned by a redoubt the sides of which were prolonged in curtains, and the embrasures of which were filled with twenty-one pieces of cannon of great calibre, and which was to be named, in the memorable battle which was about to take place, the great redoubt. Still more to our right there was another elevation, separated from the first by a little ravine

called the Séménéffskoïé ravine, from a neighbouring village of that name, which, less large but steeper than the first, was surmounted by two rows of artillery and a third placed *en retour* and turned towards the ravine of Séménéffskoïé. The village of Séménéffskoïé, situated at the commencement of the ravine which separated the two elevations, and previously burned by the Russians, was surrounded by an elevation of earth and armed with cannon. Still more to the right were woods extending far into the distance and traversed by the old Moscow road, which rejoined the new road by the village of Outitza. It would have been possible to turn on this side the position of the Russians; but the woods were dense and little known, and a movement of this sort would have rendered necessary a long *détour*.

Having concluded this inspection, Napoleon resolved to leave but a small portion of his forces on the left of the Kolocza, to execute a vigorous attack on the centre of the enemy's position, towards Borodino, by the new Moscow road, in order to draw off the enemy's attention, but to direct his principal effort towards the right of the Kolocza, against the two elevations crowned by the great redoubt and three pieces of cannon, and at the same time to advance across the woods, upon the old Moscow road, the corps of Prince Poniatowski, which had always formed the extreme right of the French army,—his intention being to direct such a force upon this point as must cause the Russians serious alarm, and might perform even more effectual services should circumstances favour.

Whilst Napoleon was making these dispositions, Marshal Davout, who had executed an accurate reconnoissance by plunging into the woods, and had thus become convinced of the possibility of turning the Russian position, offered to Napoleon to execute, with his five divisions, the *détour* which would lead across the woods to the old Moscow road, and promised that, should he set out in the night, he would be at eight o'clock on the following morning on the Russian flank with forty thousand men, and, attacking them in the centre, drive them pell-mell into the angle formed by the Kolocza with the Moscow; from which position, although the bed of the Kolocza was in several places dry, and the Moscow was fordable, it would necessarily be extremely difficult for them to escape, and from which they certainly could not carry off a cannon.

The proposition was an enticing one, and the success it offered very probable, for the Russian position—which was almost impregnable towards its left and centre, and well defended on its left by the redoubts—could only be readily attacked towards its extreme left, by the woods of Outitza, which could not be considered impentable, since a man so exact as Marshal Davout was willing to engage to traverse them in the course of a single night. To Napoleon, however, it seemed that the *détour* would be too long; that it would have to be executed across woods extremely thick and obscure; that by the execution of such a movement the army would be separated during some hours into two parts at some distance from each other; that even the success of such a manœuvre would have a very disadvantageous result, since the Russians, on

finding themselves turned, would very probably retreat, and once more deprive us of the much-desired opportunity of encountering them in battle; and that, moreover, the proposed manœuvre could be executed much nearer and with much less hazard by passing between the redoubts and the extremities of the woods with two or three of Marshal Davout's divisions, risking in the depths of the woods only Prince Poniatowski's corps, and thus obtaining all the advantages of the proposed operation without any of its inconveniences.

Prince Eugene, who since the departure from Smolensk had always formed the left of the army, was alone directed to operate on the left of the Kolocza; and he, even, was instructed to act on this side with the smaller portion of his forces. He was ordered to leave his light cavalry and the Italian Guard before that portion of the heights which their escarpment and the Kolocza rendered inaccessible, and to execute, with the French division Delzons, a vigorous attack on Borodino, to gain possession of it, to cross the Kolocza bridge, but to refrain from executing any movements on the other side of the river, and to establish at Borodino itself a strong battery which should take in flank the great Russian redoubt. With the French division Broussier, and two of the divisions of Marshal Davout, which were placed under his command for the day, and the divisions Morand and Gudin, he was to attack the great redoubt and to carry it at any cost. Marshal Ney, with the two French divisions Ledru and Razout, the Wurtemberg division Marchand, and Junot's Westphalians, was to attack in front the second elevation and the three lines of artillery which Marshal Davout was ordered to attack in flank by the border of the wood with the divisions Compans and Desaix. Finally, Prince Poniatowski, thrown as a forlorn hope into the midst of the woods, was to endeavour to turn the Russian position, debouching by the old Moscow road upon Outitza.

The three cavalry-corps Nansouty, Montbrun, and Latour-Maubourg were directed to take up positions, the first behind Marshal Davout, the second behind Marshal Ney, and the third in reserve. The division Friant and the whole of the Imperial Guard were posted in the rear and in reserve, to be employed according as circumstances should render necessary. For the purpose of returning the fire of the Russian redoubts, Napoleon ordered the construction of the batteries covered with earthen epaulements, in front of the three lines of artillery, the great redoubt, and Borodino, and armed them with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon. That the enemy might not become acquainted with the secret of his plan of attack, Napoleon determined to pass the 6th in the same position which he had occupied during the 5th, and to draw up his troops in order of battle on the 7th at daybreak. To facilitate communications between the two sides of the river, Generals Eblé and Chasseloup had constructed upon the Kolocza five or six *points de chevaux*, which would afford a passage across the river at the principal points without the necessity of passing through its muddy and broken bed. The actual strength of the army was now about one hundred and twenty-seven thousand men, all of whom were animated with the utmost ardour and confidence,

and it was provided with five hundred and eighty cannon.

The Russian army had, in the mean time, made preparations for an obstinate resistance, and had resolved not to yield up the position which it occupied until almost annihilated. General Kutusoff, who had received the title of Prince in reward for the services which he had recently rendered in Turkey, had General Benningsen for the chief of his staff and Colonel Toll for his quartermaster-general,—the latter of whom for the most part not only executed but suggested his plan of operations. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration continued to command under his orders the armies of the Dwina and the Dnieper respectively, and were equally resolved to die, should it be necessary, in support of the Russian arms,—the one being inspired with indignation at the manner in which he had been treated, and the other by patriotic ardour and hatred of the French. All the officers were filled with a spirit of equal devotion; and, in fact, the Russian aristocracy was as much engaged in this war as the Russian state, and was ready to shed its blood to satisfy the passionate sentiments which governed it.

The Russians were drawn up in the following order. On the extreme right, opposite our left, behind Borodino, the point which was least exposed to attack, were posted the 2d corps, Bagowouth's, and the 4th, Ostermann's, under the command of General Miloradovitch. Behind these were the 1st cavalry-corps of General Ouvaroff, the second of General Korff, and, a little farther to the extreme right, Platow's Cossacks, watching the banks of the Kolocza as far as its junction with the Moscow. The regiments of the foot-chasseurs, of the guard, and Bagowouth's and Ostermann's corps, guarded the Borodino. In the centre was the 6th corps, General Doctoroff's, resting its right on the top of the Gorki plateau, behind Borodino, and its left on the great redoubt. Behind Doctoroff's corps was ranged the 3d cavalry, under the orders of Baron de Kreutz, who replaced Count Pahlen, at this time ill. Here ended the line of the first army and the command of General Barclay de Tolly.

In immediate succession to the first army was the second army, under the command of Prince Bagration. The 7th corps, under Raefski, rested its right on the great redoubt, its left on the ruins of the village of Sémenéffskoïé. The 8th, under Borosdin, had its right bent back, on account of the curve of the Russian line around Sémenéffskoïé, and its left established near the three lines of artillery which were guarded by the 27th division, under Nivinskoi, placed for this day under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff, together with the 4th cavalry-corps of General Siewers. Numerous battalions of foot-chasseurs filled the thickets and the wood. The militia, which had recently arrived from Moscow, together with some Cossacks, was posted at Outitza. Finally, at some distance behind the centre, in the environs of Psarewo, was placed the reserve, consisting of the guard, the 3d corps, Touczkoff's, and an immense artillery of heavy calibre.

The Russian army consisted altogether of about one hundred and forty thousand men, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand were regular troops, the remainder being Cossacks



and Moscow militia. The principal body of the Russian force was on their right, opposite our left, and the best portion on their left, opposite our right,—the part of their line against which Napoleon had resolved to make his principal effort; and, although Napoleon had not divulged his designs, the proceedings he had already taken had sufficiently served to point out to the Russians the danger which threatened their left, towards Sémeneffskoïé, the three lines of artillery, and the Outitza wood. But when representations to this effect were made to Kutusoff, who, as has been already remarked, was more fit to conduct a campaign than to fight a great battle, he failed to perceive their force, and obstinately retained the corps of Ostermann and Bagowouth in the positions they then occupied, because he still saw the bulk of the French army on the new Moscow road, and only detached the 3d corps from the reserve to post it at Outitza. These were the sole arrangements he had made for the battle; but the energy of his army, the firmness of Barclay de Tolly, and the patriotic courage of Bagration, were well calculated to supply the place of what he had left undone.

By a species of mutual consent, the 6th had been allowed to pass by without even the discharge of a musket. It was the portentous calm which precedes great tempests. The French troops passed the day in repose, indulging in their bivouacs in the cheerful discourse so usual with French soldiers, who are, perhaps, the gayest and the bravest of any in the world. None of them doubted they were about to obtain a great victory, and to enter Moscow under their invincible and fortunate general. The love of glory was the passion with which their souls were fired.

Feelings of a very different tone filled the hearts of the Russians. Gloomy, exasperated, resolved to fight to the death, having no hope but in God, they were on their knees in the midst of a thousand flambeaux, before a miraculous image of the Madonna of Smolensk, saved, it was said, on the wings of angels from the conflagration of that unfortunate city, and now carried in procession by the Greek priests through the bivouacs of the camp of Borodino, whilst old General Kutusoff,—who, so far from believing in the miraculous image, believed scarcely in God, so manifest in the Universe,—uncovered, and, with eyes bent to the ground, accompanied the procession in the midst of his staff.

In the mean time, Napoleon under his tent completed his arrangements, and heard, with a singular mixture of raillery and humour, the account given him of the battle of Salamanca by Colonel Fabvier, who had just arrived. When the colonel had concluded his account he dismissed him, saying that he would repair on the morrow on the banks of the Moscowa the faults committed at Arapiles. M. de Bossuet, prefect of the palace, also arrived at the camp on this day, bringing the portrait of the King of Rome, painted by the famous artist, Gerard. Napoleon passed for a moment with emotion at his son's likeness, then had it replaced in its case, cast a final glance on the enemy's position to assure himself that the Russians had no intention to retreat, perceived with the utmost satisfaction that their camp displayed no sign of the adop-

tion of such a measure, and then entered his tent to take a brief repose.

An absolute calm, a profound silence, reigned over the plain which was on the morrow to be the theatre of a scene the most horrible and stupendous. The laughter of the French troops and the pious hymns of the Russians had at length given place to the stillness of slumber. On each side the soldiers slept around huge fires, which had been lighted to protect them from the chill of the night and the damp arising from a shower of small rain, which had fallen during the evening.

At three o'clock in the morning the French troops began to take their arms, and to take advantage of the mist to pass over to the right of the Kolocza, and to assume their appointed stations,—Prince Eugene opposite Borodino and the great redoubt, Ney and Davout in front of the second hill, the cavalry behind them, Friant and the Guard in reserve in the centre, Poniatowski far upon the right, crossing the wood. Whilst our troops were taking up these positions in silence, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy, the artillerymen of the great batteries, with which it was intended to meet the fire of the Russian works, were at their guns waiting Napoleon's signal to open fire. Napoleon himself had taken up a position at a very early hour in the morning at the Schwardino redoubt, at a point where he would be able to observe all that took place, and at the same time be in some degree sheltered from the Russian bullets. Murat, glowing with ardour and embroidery, wearing a tunic of green velvet, a plumed cap, and yellow boots, and presenting an object for ridicule did not his heroism forbid it, galloped in front of his cavalry, radiant with confidence and inspiring his troops with the same spirit by means of his martial bearing. Clouds obscured the heavens, and the sun, rising opposite to us and beyond the Russian lines, announced its approach only by a ruddy line along the horizon, but speedily displaying its whole disk as a ball of red-hot iron. Napoleon, who watched it rise in the midst of his lieutenants, exclaimed, "Behold the sun of Austerlitz!" Alas, yes! but veiled in clouds!

Napoleon had prepared a short and energetic proclamation, to be addressed to the soldiers at the moment previous to the commencement of the battle; and the captains of each company, the commanders of each squadron, forming their troops into a semicircle, read out to them in a loud voice these words of their Emperor, which were enthusiastically received.

This address having been read, and the troops having taken up their respective positions, about half-past five o'clock the report of a cannon on the right was the signal, at which the most terrible uproar succeeded the previous unbroken stillness, and a long trail of fire and smoke instantly portrayed in fearful outlines the positions of the opposed armies. Whilst one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon directed their fire against the Russian works, whilst Davout and Ney on the right advanced with their infantry, Prince Eugene had sent the divisions Morand and Gudin across the Kolocza against the great redoubt, leaving the division Broussier on the bank of this little river in reserve, and with the division Delzons advancing towards Borodino, where the Kolocza turned to the left and covered

the Russian right up to its junction with the Moskwa,—the intention being that Prince Eugene should commence the action by attacking Borodino, in order to persuade the enemy that we were desirous of debouching by the great Moscow road, called the New Road.

Prince Eugene advanced, therefore, with the division Delzons upon the village of Borodino, which was defended by three battalions of chasseurs of the Imperial Russian Guard. General Plauzonne, at the head of the 106th of the line, penetrated into the interior of the village, whilst the other regiments of the division pressed forward on the right and left. The 106th drove the Russians out of the village, drove them beyond it, and, following with the utmost vigour, crossed the Kulocza in spite of the instructions of Napoleon, who had desired only to feign and not in reality to debouch by the great Moscow road. Two regiments of Russian chasseurs, the 19th and 20th, which were posted at this point, opened a terrible fire on the companies of the 106th which had crossed the river, and completely overwhelmed them, taking or slaying all the men who had not time to fly. The brave General Plauzonne himself received a mortal wound. But the 92d, hearing the perilous position of the 106th, hastened to its aid, rallied it, and established it firmly in possession of Borodino,—a position which remained in our hands throughout the battle.

This first portion of Napoleon's plan having been thus executed, Prince Eugene was to await the capture, by Davout and Ney, of the three lines of artillery which covered the Russian left, upon which he was to attack, with the divisions Morand and Gudin, the great redoubt of the centre.

Marshal Davout, in fact, preceded by thirty pieces of cannon, had advanced at the head of the divisions Compans and Desaix along the wood, the depths of which were being traversed by the troops under Poniatowski. He had approached that one of the three lines of artillery which was most to the right, and had formed the division into columns of attack, leaving the division Desaix in reserve for the purpose of guarding his right flank and his rear. Scarcely had the division Compans found itself within reach of the enemy when it was suddenly overwhelmed by a terrific fire from the three lines of artillery and the lines of Woronzoff's grenadiers. Its brave general and almost all its officers were struck down, and, although still undaunted, its troops paused for a moment from want of leaders. The marshal perceived their indecision, and, learning its cause, hastened up to replace General Compans, and threw the 57th on the right flèche. This regiment entered with fixed bayonets and slew the Russian artillerymen at their guns, but at the same moment a bullet struck Marshal Davout's horse, inflicting a severe contusion on the marshal himself and depriving him of consciousness.

As soon as he was informed of this circumstance, Napoleon sent an order of immediate attack to Marshal Ney,—at the same time despatching Murat to replace Marshal Davout, and his aide-de-camp Kopp to take the place of General Compans. Murat—who was of a most excellent disposition—hastened to the assistance of the marshal, who was his enemy, but found the latter somewhat recovered, and persisting,

in spite of frightful suffering, in remaining at the head of his soldiers,—information of which Murat instantly sent to Napoleon, who received it with the utmost satisfaction. At the same moment Ney, with the division Ledru in front, the Wurtemberg division in the rear, and the division Razout on the left, advanced upon the right flèche, possession of which had been obtained by the 57th, and which was with difficulty held by that regiment against Woronzoff's grenadiers. Ney himself entered the position at the head of the 24th léger, and, audacious and invulnerable, threw himself into the midst of the *mêlée* as though he had been a captain of grenadiers. At the same moment, Névrouffskoi came up with his brave division to the assistance of Woronzoff's grenadiers, and the united troops threw themselves together upon the disputed work; but Ney, advancing the division Marchand, and debouching with it right and left, succeeded in repulsing them, and at the same time sent the division Razout against the flèche on the right.

At the commencement of the battle, Prince Bagration, who was opposed to the two Marshals Ney and Davout, perceiving that he was threatened by formidable forces, had withdrawn some battalions from the 7th corps, which was posted between Séménoffskoié and the great redoubt, had advanced the Mecklenburg grenadiers, the Douka cuirassiers, and the 4th regiment of Siewer's cavalry, and sent for the division Konownitsyn, which formed a portion of Touczkoff's, which was directed upon Ouitza. At the same time he had immediately sent information of what was taking place on his side to Kutusoff, for the purpose of warning the commander-in-chief to send him reinforcements.

The disputed works themselves were too narrow to serve as battle-fields, and the combat was fought on the right, the left, and in front. Ney occupied the line of artillery to the right with the divisions Ledru and Compans, and being unable to support the line of artillery to the left, which had been captured by the division Razout, the troops of the latter had been driven out by the reinforced Russian troops, when, fortunately, Murat, who had been sent to this point by Napoleon for the purpose of determining the proper moment at which the cavalry should take part in the action, galloped up, followed by the light cavalry of General Bruyère. At the sight of our soldiers in retreat and almost routed, he flung himself from his horse, rallied them, and led them forward, directed a close and destructive fire upon the enemy, and then, having first cleared the ground with Bruyère's light cavalry, entered the work, sword in hand, at the head of Razout's soldiers, who slew the Russian artillerymen at their guns and permanently established themselves in the position. In the mean time, Ney, who had at his disposal only the light Wurtemberg cavalry of General Beurman, threw it upon the lines of Névrouffskoi and Woronzoff and compelled them to fall back.

By means of these vigorous measures our troops succeeded in retrieving their position on these two points. Murat, assuming in concert with Ney the direction of the battle on this side, ordered General Nansouty to climb the slopes covered with brushwood and to take up a position on the right of the works which we had

not carried; for there was beyond a sort of plain slightly inclined towards the Russians, on which the cavalry could be of great service. Davout, in spite of his determination to remain in the midst of the battle, was unable to aid them, Ney took the command of the divisions Compans and Desaix, and, adding to them the Westphalians, who were behind, endeavoured to support Prince Poniatowski, whose artillery was now crossing the Outitza wood.

Our troops thus gained ground by extending themselves to the right; and, being masters of the heights, they had the advantage of being able to direct against the Russians a plunging fire. The Russians replied by a fire which was as well directed but very vigorous, and the cannonade on this point speedily became tremendous; whilst Ney on the right, and Murat on the left, continuing their movement in advance, approached the Séménéffskoïé ravine, and passed the third line of artillery, which formed the *retour en arrière*, and naturally, therefore, fell into our hands. But in this position they found themselves suddenly exposed to the enemy's fire from the Séménéffskoïé village, and to that of the Raefskoi corps, which occupied the other side of the ravine and extended from Séménéffskoïé village to the great doubt.

Murat's troops suffered considerable loss from the enemy's fire in this quarter, and their commander, having no infantry at his disposal, and receiving that the Séménéffskoïé ravine was in this direction but of slight depth, ordered Latour-Maubourg to cross it with his cavalry, to charge the Russian infantry, to take possession of its cannon, and then to return should their position be found untenable. And to assist his perilous manœuvre he collected all the artillery usually attached to the cavalry, and ranged it along the brink of the river in such manner as to cover the advance of our squadrons with his fire.

Latour-Maubourg, in obedience to Murat's signal, descended with the Saxon and Westphalian cuirassiers into the ravine, ascended the opposite side, attacked the Russian infantry, broke two of its squares, and forced it to fall back; but, having achieved this success, was forced to retreat from a position in which he would be exposed without support to the attack of the whole Russian army.

Whilst these events were taking place on the right in advance of the three *flèches*, Prince Eugene on the left, having very early carried the two divisions Morand and Gudin across the Kolocza, had subsequently directed the division Morand against the great redoubt, and left—the division Gudin at the foot of the work, with the object of husbanding his resources. The division Morand had ascended the elevated ground on which the great redoubt was constructed, and had supported with admirable coolness the fire of eighty pieces of cannon; and when, advancing through a cloud of smoke, it had arrived close to the redoubt itself, General Bonamy, at the head of the 30th of the line, had thrown himself upon it and driven out the Russians at the point of the bayonet. The whole division had then, debouching to the right and left, repulsed the division Paskiewitch of Raefskoi's corps, which had thus found itself driven back on the one side by Morand's infantry and on

the other by the cuirassiers of Latour-Maubourg.

At this moment the battle might have been gained with immense results, although it was scarcely ten o'clock in the morning, had we directed a vigorous effort against the Séménéffskoïé village, passing in force the ravine which had been crossed by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and which Raefskoi's broken corps was quite incapable of defending, penetrating the enemy's line with a torrent of troops, advancing to Gorki behind Borodino, and thus enclosing the centre and the right of the Russian army in the angle formed by the Kolocza and Moskowa. But although Murat and Ney, occupying positions on the brink of the Séménéffskoïé ravine, burned with impatience to snatch the advantages which they perceived might be obtained within a single half-hour, this half-hour was allowed to slip by unused; for, unfortunately, Napoleon was at Schwardino, where he was able to obtain the best view of the progress of the battle. Murat and Ney sent General Belliard to him with a request for all the reinforcements he could possibly afford them, and declaring that, if left free to act, they would obtain a greater triumph for him than any he had hitherto reaped. But Napoleon, oppressed with a severe cold, was less sanguine than his lieutenants, less certain that the victory might be easily gained, and considered that to make use of his reserves at ten o'clock in the morning would be very premature. He sent towards Séménéffskoïé, however, the division Friant, which was the only reserve remaining at his disposal, with the exception of the Guard.

In the mean time Kutusoff, who was at table a little in the rear of the field of battle whilst Barclay and Bagration were exposing themselves in the midst of the most deadly fire, was on his side besieged with the most urgent requests that he would fill up with his reserves the gap made in the Russian line, and in compliance with reiterated demands had detached from the guard, which was posted at Psarewo, the regiments of Lithuania and Ismailow, the Astrakan cuirassiers, those of the Empress and Emperor, together with a strong reserve of artillery, and had sent them towards Séménéffskoïé. He had also determined to withdraw Bagowouth's corps from the extreme right, and had advanced one of the two divisions of which it was composed—that commanded by Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg—towards Séménéffskoïé, and the other, commanded by Olsouffef, towards Outitza, for the purpose of aiding Touczkoff to resist the attack of Prince Poniatowski. And finally, in compliance with the solicitations of Platow and Ouvaroff, who, posted at the extreme right of the Russian army, on the heights protected by the Kolocza, perceived our left to be much weakened, and were anxious to take advantage of the fact, he had given them permission to cross the Kolocza with their cavalry, and to make a diversion which could scarcely fail of having considerable effect, since it would be altogether unexpected by the French.

In the mean time, Barclay and Bagration had resolved to recover at any price the great redoubt and the three *flèches*; and Barclay, at the same moment Yermoloff, the chief of his staff, and the young Kutsaïoff, commander of

his artillery, had hastened up to rally Raefskoi's broken corps, and, borrowing from Doctoroff, who was posted in the neighbourhood, the division Likatcheff, had marched upon the great redoubt, which had fallen into the hands of Morand's division, whose general had unfortunately been severely wounded, and which now found itself almost without guidance. The 30th of the line occupied the redoubt, and was deprived of the support of the two other regiments of the division, which had been left on the right and left and much too far in the rear. At the same time, the division Gudin was in a ravine on the right, the division Broussier on the left on the back of the Kolocz, and equally inactive by the error of Prince Eugene, who had neither the experience nor the zealous energy necessary in decisive moments. Seeing this state of affairs, therefore, Yermoloff and Kutaisoff marched at the head of the Ouja regiment and Raefskoi's infantry, and, advancing upon the 30th, overwhelmed it by force of numbers. At the same moment, they attacked with cavalry the two other regiments of Morand's division posted on each side of the great redoubt, and were about to drive them to the foot of the elevated ground, when Prince Eugene, arriving at the head of Gudin's division, checked their advance, and compelled them to be content with the capture of the great redoubt.

In the mean time, Barclay, having hastened up with Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, had found the redoubt retaken, and posted the prince between the redoubt and the Sémenefskoié village to fill up the void left by the almost totally destroyed corps of Raefskoi, and then calmly remained in a position upon which the French were pouring the most destructive fire, feeling a sort of pleasure in thus nobly disproving the despicable calumnies of his ungrateful countrymen.

Bagration, on his side, having received the Konownitsyn division detached from Touczkoff's corps, together with the foot and cavalry regiments of the guard, had sworn to die or to recover the three *écluses* situated on his left and on his right: He had to encounter the troops under Murat and Ney, who had Latour-Maubourg and Friant on the left, the divisions Razout, Ledru, and Marchand in the centre, and on the right the divisions Compans and Desaix, the Nansouty cuirassiers, and the Westphalian infantry; and the combat in this quarter speedily became one of the most terrible description, exceeding in fury any combats our troops had ever beheld, until at length, desiring to terminate the battle on this point, Murat and Ney ordered a great movement of cavalry, which was accordingly made by the St. Germain and Valence cuirassiers on the right, and by those of Generals Vathier and Do France on the left. A portion of the Russian cavalry was broken; but the other, consisting of the Lithuanian and Ismailow regiments, resisted the shock, and the *mêlée* became murderous, the victims being as numerous as illustrious. Montbrun—the heroic Montbrun, the most brilliant of our cavalry-officers—fell, slain by a bullet. Rapp, who commanded the division Compans, received five wounds; and General Desaix, who left his own troops for the purpose of replacing him, was struck down in his turn. There remained only generals of brigade to take the command of divi-

sions. But in the midst of this carnage Murat and Ney, always in front and under the heaviest fire, continued, as though they had been invulnerable, untouched. A man of rare excellence, Friant, the model of all warlike virtues, the only one of the old chiefs of Davout's corps who had not been touched, (for Davout himself had been placed *hors de combat*, Morand was dangerously wounded, and Gudin died at Valoutina,) was at length struck down in his turn, and carried to the same ambulance at which lay his own son. The command of his division devolved upon a young Dutchman, General Vandenberg, a courageous man, but wanting in experience, and who was eager, therefore, to resign this honour to Galichet, the chief of the staff. Murat came up at the moment when the latter had assumed the command, and, whilst they were speaking together, a bullet passed between them, interrupting the discourse. "Not a very safe position this," said Murat, smiling. "But we will remain in it, nevertheless," replied the intrepid Galichet. At the same moment the Russian cuirassiers poured down *en masse*, and the division had scarcely time to form into two squares connected by a line of artillery. Murat took the command of one of them and Galichet of the other, and during a quarter of an hour they received, with the most imperturbable sang-froid, the furious charges of the Russian cavalry! "Soldiers of Friant," cried Murat, "you are heroes!" "Vive Murat! Vive the King of Naples!" replied the soldiers.

It was thus that we occupied, in default of possessing more forces, this portion of the field of battle which extended from Sémenefskoié to the Outitza wood. Suddenly an illustrious victim fell on the side of the Russians. Bagration was mortally wounded, and carried off the field amidst cries of grief from his troops, with whom he was almost an object of idolatry. Raefskoi was summoned to take the command of the second Russian army, which was now without a leader; but he could not quit the remnant of the 7th corps, which continued to occupy, together with Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, the interval between the grand redoubt and Sémenefskoié; and General Doctoroff was then summoned to replace Bagration.

At this same moment the Russians became aware that Poniatowski, after having traversed the wood, had seized the heights of Outitza from Touczkoff, who had been deprived of the division Konownitsyn, without having been joined as yet by that of Olsouffief; and that Touczkoff, the eldest of the three brothers, had been killed. In the anxiety caused by this information, and in answer to importunate demands for it, the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg had been immediately despatched from the position which it had hitherto occupied, under a terrible fire of artillery, in the space between Sémenefskoié and the great redoubt. And this important space, therefore, which the Russians had made such desperate endeavours to hold against us, was now almost open before us. By directing the whole of the Imperial Guard upon this point, we might have penetrated to the centre of the Russian army.

Ney and Murat sent to propose, for the second time, this manœuvre to Napoleon, who, finding the state of the battle ripe for such a measure, assented to their representations, and gave the

orders for its execution. He ordered of the division Claparède and the 4th, and, quitting Schwardino, placed his head. But suddenly a terrible charge on the left of the army, beyond which our troops displayed in that the signs of having been routed. At Napoleon checked the advance of the 4th, galloping up to learn what had happened, after some time discovered that the 1st Cavalry and Ouvaroff had crossed the river weakened left, and, whilst Platow's baggage, Ouvaroff had fallen upon Delons. Unable to obtain communication with respect to what had taken place in that direction, and, being unwilling to rely entirely on his reserve, Napoleon ordered Murat all that remained of the Guard, advanced the division so that it might be ready to take a charge to the right towards Sémenefskoié, the left towards Borodino, and himself, at the head of the infantry of the progress of events on the left of

at moment of this sudden irruption by the viceroy had left the centre, going to the left bank of the Kolocza, and with the utmost speed to Borodino, found his regiments already formed and steadfastly awaiting the enemy's attack. The sight of the numerous Russian light cavalry of General Oruano, resist Ouvaroff's eight regiments of cavalry, successively fell back in good order, our infantry, from before which, useless evolutions, which cost them dear men, the Russian cavalry retired Kolocza.

his attempt on the part of the enemy but nevertheless had cost us more than had interrupted the movement of the 4th, afforded time to Kutusoff, who at perceived the necessity of the measure, transferred the corps to the centre from where it had been uselessly posted on the left. The Russian general had now moved the whole Russian Imperial Guard to the Sémenefskoié gap in his line, forcing this gap in the enemy's line filled up, Ney and Murat had not room for scornful remarks on the absent who was occupied with cares of which ignorant.

who had sent Marshal Bessières to Ney, and who learned from him that the centre was again reinforced, and measures proposed by Ney and Murat were capable of execution. (Bessières that they never had been,) now since Eugene to do the only thing ordered to him at the moment calculated for the struggle, and which was to retreat beyond the centre. At the moment he ordered Murat, who had at his disposal an immense quantity of artillery, to with grape the strong columns of the French were advancing, and to be prepared with his cavalry at the decisive mo-

decisive moment was now, at length. On the one side Murat had ranged his artillery, along the Sémenefskoié ravine,

the mass of artillery at his disposal, and behind it the three cavalry-corps of Generals Montbrun, Latour-Maubourg, and Grouchy, awaiting the order to pass the ravine and to charge the lines of the Russian infantry. On the other side Prince Eugene, concentrating on the right of the great redoubt the divisions Morand and Gudin, had moved upon its left the division Broussier, which was entirely fresh and eager to signalize itself in its turn. It was now about three o'clock in the afternoon, and the terrible conflict of the opposed armies had lasted about nine hours. Murat and Ney hurled the fire of two hundred pieces of cannon against the Russian centre. The whole of Doctoroff's corps had been sent behind the redoubt, and, although it suffered much, suffered less than Ostermann's corps, which had been posted uncovered between the redoubt itself and Sémenefskoié. Considering, at length, that the enemy's line had been sufficiently shattered by our cannon, Murat determined to renew those cavalry-charges which had so well succeeded in the morning under Latour-Maubourg. He gave the signal, and Caulaincourt, at the head of the 2d cavalry-corps, passing the ravine, debouched beyond it, and having overwhelmed, with the assistance of General Defrance, who had followed him with two regiments of carabineers, some remains of Rasnitskoi's corps which were still upon this part of the field, together with the cavalry of Korff and the Baron de Kreutz, he passed the great redoubt at full gallop, and then, perceiving behind him Likatcheff's infantry, which guarded the great redoubt, he fell upon it by a sudden movement to the left and sabred it at the head of the 5th cuirassiers,—when, unhappily, he was struck dead. In the mean time Prince Eugene, who was on the left, put himself at the head of the 9th of the line, and, having addressed them in a few animated words, rushed with them up the elevation, took advantage of the tumult of the combat and the denseness of the smoke to escalate the parapets of the redoubt, and crossed them at the moment when the 5th cuirassiers were sabreing the infantry of the division Likatcheff. Throwing themselves upon the division with fixed bayonets, they took some and slew a large number of its troops, and then proceeded to take part in the desperate cavalry-combat which was being waged between the Russian horse-guards and our cuirassiers, and which resulted in the former being forced to retreat behind their infantry.

In the mean time, posted as it was in advance of the great redoubt, the 9th suffered cruelly; and at length the divisions Morand and Gudin, which remained on the right, afforded it their support, advancing beyond the redoubt whilst Murat and Ney, forming an angle with them, gradually gained ground, and passed the Sémenefskoié ravine, carrying forward their right. Our whole army thus occupied a position in which it enveloped in an angle of fire the Russian army, now terribly thinned, and the troops of the latter slowly retired upon the border of the Psarewo wood, where they supported with the utmost firmness the concentrated fire of three hundred pieces of cannon which the French directed against them, whilst awaiting the execution of the decisive movement.

At this period the victory was certainly in our hands, for we had entire possession of the

field of battle. On the extreme right, beyond the wood, Prince Poniatowski, after a desperate contest, had succeeded in establishing himself beyond Outitza, on the old Moscow road. On the extreme left, Delzons had uninterrupted possession of Borodino, and at the essential point—namely, between the two elevations which had fallen into our hands—the Russian army was held in check, driven back upon the border of the wood, and falling before the fire of three hundred cannon. There still remained, however, three hours of daylight, and, although we had no longer an opportunity such as had been twice offered to us during the day, of executing a decisive manœuvre, we might still, by attacking the Russian army a last time, advancing the right reinforced with a mass of fresh troops, have driven back the Russian army towards the Moskowa, and inflicted upon it a blow sufficiently terrible, probably, to overcome Alexander's already wavering constancy. But the execution of such a measure as this would have required the whole of the Imperial Guard, which numbered eighteen thousand men, infantry and cavalry, who had not yet been engaged. There remained on the left, in the division Delzons, at the centre, in the divisions Broussier, Morand, and Gudin, and on the right, in the division Desaix, troops which, although they had already taken part in the battle, were still quite capable of taking part in any great decisive movement. And now Napoleon, whom the height of the sun above the horizon urged to decisive action as much as the urgent instances of his lieutenants, mounted his horse to make a personal inspection of the field of battle. A severe cold from which he suffered at the time was a source of great annoyance to him, but was not of a nature to paralyze his powerful intellect. At the same time, the horrors of this terrible battle, which was unexampled even in his experience, had in some degree shaken him. Almost every instant of the day had brought him information of the fall of some one or other of his principal officers. Plauzonne, Monthron, Caulaincourt, Romet, Chastel, Lambert, Compère, Bessières, Dumas, Canouville, were slain; Marshal Davout, Generals Morand, Friant, Compans, Rapp, Belliard, Nansouty, Grouchy, St. Germain, Bruyère, Pajol, Defrance, Bonamy, Teste, and Guilleminot, had fallen severely wounded. The determined manner, moreover, in which the Russians had fought, although not unexpected, had been such as could not fail to inspire serious reflections, for, to the honour of human nature be it said, there is something in the fierce spirit of patriotism even when vanquished which in some degree awes the holdest aggressor. And thus Napoleon, as he surveyed the enemy's lines, remained in a state of irresolution, which was so unusual to him that those who were about him accounted for it by declaring that it resulted from ill-health. Galloping along the line of positions which had been seized by his troops, he beheld the Russians, drawn back indeed, but remaining firm in solid masses; and, although their position was such that a final shock directed against them obliquely might have thrown them into disorder in the direction of the Moskowa, he could not be quite certain that despair might not be able to triumph even over the eighteen thousand men of his Guard: and to neglect, at that distance from his base of

operations, to preserve unbroken the sole corps which remained to him intact, appeared to him a species of rashness from which no advantages could result equivalent to its manifest dangers. Turning to his principal officers, he said, "I will not destroy my Guard. At a distance of eight hundred leagues from France, it would be scarcely wise to risk our last remaining reserve." And doubtless he was right; but in justifying this resolution he condemned, in fact, his attempt to carry on such a war, and, for the second or third time since the passage of the Niemen, expiated, by an excess of prudence which was unusual with him, the error of his rashness. Passing the great Moscow road, and approaching Borodino, Gorki's troops became visible in the only advanced position which still remained in the hands of the Russians. And Napoleon considered for a moment whether he should carry it, but determined in the negative, as the result could not be worth its cost.

At the bottom of the field of battle the Russians, drawn up in close masses, presented a wide mark for our cannon, and seemed to defy us. "Since they are still anxious for it," said Napoleon, with the cruel jocosity of the battle-field, "let them have it!" And during many hours the Russian masses persisted in remaining in line under the fire of nearly four hundred cannon directed against them by the French, who on their side suffered losses, but certainly not a sixth part so great as those which they inflicted.

At length the sun sank on this terrible scene, which is without a parallel in the annals of humanity. The cannonade gradually subsided, and the opposed forces, thoroughly exhausted, permitted themselves to indulge in some repose. Our generals withdrew their divisions far enough to be out of reach of the enemy's fire, and posted at the foot of the heights which had fallen into our hands, being perfectly convinced that the Russians would not attempt to recapture them. Napoleon, victorious, entered his tent in the midst of his lieutenants, some of whom were full of discontent at what he had left undone, whilst the others declared that he had been wise to remain satisfied with the result which he had obtained,—that the Russians were, in fact, destroyed, and the gates of Moscow were open to the French army. But none of that manifestation of joy and admiration which had burst forth at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland, was heard this evening in the conqueror's tent.

That night the French and Russian armies slept side by side on the battle-field, and at daybreak awoke to a horrible scene, which sufficiently manifested the terrible sacrifice of human life which had taken place on the previous day. Ninety thousand men—a number of human beings equivalent to the population of a great city—covered the battle-field, dead or wounded. From fifteen to twenty thousand horses stretched on the ground or wandering about, uttering the most frightful cries, from three to four hundred gun-carriages, and an infinite amount of every species of ruin, completed a spectacle which smote the heart, especially in the neighbourhood of the ravines, whither a species of instinct had led the wounded to seek shelter from fresh wounds. And there they lay in heaps without distinction of nation.

Happily,—if indeed the spirit of patriotism permits us to make use of an expression which in this case almost inhuman,—happily, our side in this mournful spectacle was less than that of the enemy; for, whilst we had about ten or ten thousand killed and about twenty twenty-one thousand wounded,—altogether thirty thousand men placed *hors de combat*,—the loss of the Russians amounted, according to their own admission, to no less than sixty thousand. This battle we had taken lives where in former battles, by skilful manœuvres, we had taken prisoners. Among our losses (and the numbers would appear incredible were they not attested by authentic documents) were forty-seven generals and thirty-seven colonels, killed and wounded, and the Russians had lost about as many,—a convincing proof of the energy displayed by the leaders on either side, and of the quarters at which the troops had fought. After this frightful duel, our army numbered, according to account the Italian division Pino, and the division Delaborde of the Young Guard, which arrived after the battle, about one hundred thousand men; whilst the Russians, on the other side, could not have placed in line as many as fifty thousand. But they were in their own country, and we were eight hundred leagues from home! They were engaged in a war to which they had been forced, and we were engaged in a war into which we had been plunged by spirit of ambition. And at every step we were in advance, when the giddiness of Fortune left no room for reflection, we blamed in our most hearts the chief whose dazzling fortunes were following.

Kutusoff, as complete a liar as he was a Russian, finding that his army was not to be wholly destroyed, had the audacity to write to his master, declaring that he had resisted during a whole day the assaults of the French army; that he had slain as many of his foes as he had lost of his own troops, and that if he retired from the field of battle it was not because he was beaten, but because he desired to make the first movement, for the purpose of covering Moscow. He knew more perfectly than any other man in the world how far to lie to flatter human passions, and especially the passions of an unenlightened people, and whilst, therefore, he refrained from declaring that he had been victorious, he dared to write almost equivalent falsehoods. He sent word to Count Rostopschin, who was destined speedily to obtain a terrible immortality, that he had fought a bloody battle in defence of Moscow, that he was far from having lost it, that he was about to fight others, that he could promise that the enemy should not enter the sacred city, but that it was absolutely necessary that he (Rostopschin) should furnish him with all the men capable of bearing arms, especially the Moscow militia, which had been promised to him, to the amount of eighty thousand men, but of whom he had only received fifteen thousand. On the morning of the 8th of September he gave the order for the retreat of his army, directing that Mojaïsk should be disputed sufficiently long for the removal of the provisions, munitions, and such of the wounded as could bear it, and intrusting the command of the rear-guard to General Miloradovitch.

Napoleon, who had not the same reasons for making use of dissimulation, since he was de-

cidedly victorious, was nevertheless in some degree embarrassed with respect to the terms in which he should describe his triumph. He had formerly been able to announce, in return for the loss of some thousands of his troops, the capture of thirty or forty thousand prisoners, some hundreds of cannon, and flags. But on this occasion he had taken neither prisoners, flags, nor cannon, (with the exception of a small number of pieces of artillery found in the redoubts.) At the same time, sixty thousand of the enemy lay dead or dying upon the battlefield. Selecting, in accordance with his custom, a name for this battle, which the Russians called the battle of Borodino, calculated to touch the imagination, he styled it the battle of the Moskowa, from the river of that name flowing at about a league's distance from the battlefield, and traversing Moscow in its course.

Anxious to reap the fruits of his victory, Napoleon directed Murat upon Mojaïsk with two divisions of cuirassiers, several divisions of light cavalry, and one of the infantry-divisions of Marshal Davout, who followed with his four other divisions, being himself conveyed in a carriage, as he was unable to maintain his seat on his horse. At the same time Prince Poniatowski was directed, as he had been during the whole march, upon the right of the grand route, by the Wereja road, and Prince Eugene upon the left, by the Kouza road. Napoleon himself, with Ney's corps and the Guard, remained one day longer on the field of battle, for the purpose of executing the measures demanded alike by humanity and the interests of the army. And the first of these was the conversion of the Kolotzkoi Abbey into a hospital for such of the wounded as were too ill to be transported any distance,—it being arranged that the others should be conveyed to Mojaïsk as soon as it should be in our hands. For the cure of the horses and the repair of the cannon, which were but slightly injured, Napoleon established a cavalry and artillery dépôt in the villages surrounding the Kolotzkoi Abbey, and determined that Junot with the Westphalians should remain in this position to guard and to procure for the unhappy wounded soldiers the provisions they were unable to obtain for themselves.

Having taken these first and indispensable measures, Napoleon sent orders to Smolensk for the immediate despatch of an immense fresh supply of ammunition, and ordered a new movement in advance to be made by all the French or allied corps which remained at the various stations of Smolensk, Minsk, Wilna, Kowno, and Koenigsberg.

The army had continued, in the mean time, its forward movement, and Murat had arrived on the evening of the 8th in front of Mojaïsk, a town of some importance, which the French were anxious to capture undestroyed. As they drew nearer Moscow the country appeared to increase in richness, but also displayed signs of a more determined destruction on the part of the enemy. There were at the same time more flourishing villages and more columns of flame. The Russians, for the purpose of securing time to effect the removal of certain portions of their wounded and *materiel*, had posted, in advance of a marshy ravine, a strong rear-guard of infantry and cavalry, and resolved to defend the position against the French troops. The posi-

tion might have been turned; but, as our forces failed to perceive, on account of the darkness of the night, the point at which they might have succeeded, it was resolved to avoid the confusion of a midnight encounter with the enemy, and to bivouac within cannon-range of the Russians.

On the following day the French forced their way into Mojaïsk, where they found some wounded Russians, whom they consigned to the care of their surgeons, and also provisions and buildings for a second hospital, which was a fortunate circumstance, as that of Kolotzkoi was far from being sufficient for our necessities. Napoleon resolved to remain at Mojaïsk for the cure of his own indisposition,—intending to rejoin the army as soon as it should have arrived at the gates of Moscow, that he might accompany it on its entrance, or direct its movements should it have to fight another battle.

The Russians continued their retreat, and the French their pursuit. Prince Eugene, having taken the lateral route on the left, seized Kouza, a pretty little town, abounding in resources, just before the furious peasants had time to destroy it, and made a day's halt here, collecting provisions for the use of the grand army. On the lateral route on the right, Prince Poniatowski was equally successful in obtaining the means of subsistence, since he left the enemy no time to fulfil the dictates of their rage.

The principal column under Murat arrived at Krimskoïé on the 10th of September. The leader of the Russian rear-guard, Miloradovitch, wishing to take advantage of a good position which he had observed near the marshy sources of the Nara, posted his light infantry and artillery behind a muddy tract of ground, covered with thick brushwood, the only means of approach to which was by the great road, which he took care to occupy in force. The whole day was passed by the opposed troops in a struggle around this position, and many men were lost on both sides; but at nightfall the Russians were forced to retreat, leaving behind them nearly two thousand killed and wounded.

On the 11th the French reached Koubinskoïé, on the 12th Mamonovo, and on the 13th Worobiewo, the position immediately before Moscow, at the very gates of which the Russian army had established itself towards the Dorogomilow barrier. The Moskowa, on entering Moscow, where it describes numerous windings, forms a very concave arc, open on the side of the Smolensk road; and against this the Russian army leaned back, supporting its right on the village of Fili and its left at the top of Worobiewo, tracing in a certain measure the chord of the arc described by the Moskowa,—its only opening for retreat being a bridge leading across the Moskowa to the interior of the Dorogomilow faubourg. This was scarcely a safe position in which to give battle to an enemy; and of this Kutusoff was perfectly conscious, being also thoroughly convinced of the impossibility of checking the advance of the French upon Moscow. But, still faithful to his system of constantly flattering popular passion, because he believed that it might be more easily directed by means of flattery than by opposition, he had constantly written to Rostopschin, the Governor of Moscow, that he was to defend it to the utmost. There was considerable astonishment in

Moscow, therefore, when the real state of the Russian army was discovered, and it took up a position so near to the town that there remained no space for the execution of the movements which an engagement would render necessary. And, although Kutusoff had resolved to save his army rather than the capital, he called a council of war, that he might share the responsibility he was about to incur with his lieutenants. In spite of the cunning and coldness of his nature, he could not but be agitated as he heard the cries of rage which arose around him, and the voice, a thousand times repeated, rather to perish under the ruins of Moscow than abandon it to the French,—a vow dictated by feelings very similar to those which might lead a man rather to stab his cherished spouse in his very arms than yield her up to the outrages of others. But Kutusoff knew that Russia would not necessarily be lost because Moscow might fall into the hands of the French, and that, on the other hand, it would be lost if the grand army should be destroyed. At the same time, he would have been glad to throw the odium of measures which he knew to be necessary upon others, and he summoned, to the memorable council which now assembled on the Worobiewo height, Generals Benningsen, Barclay de Tolly, Doctoff, Ostermann, Konownitsyn, and Yermoloff. Colonel Toll assisted at it as quartermaster-general. Barclay de Tolly, with his usual simplicity and practical experience, declared the position then occupied to be untenable, affirmed that the preservation of the capital was of but slight importance in comparison with the preservation of the army, and advised that it should evacuate Moscow, retreating by the Wladimir road, by which means new tracts of territory would be added to those which the French army had already had to traverse, and the Russian army would not only be left in communication with St. Petersburg, but be able, at the right moment, to resume the offensive. Benningsen, who was perfectly capable of appreciating this advice, but who was unwilling to incur the odium of supporting it, maintained that the Russian army should defend to the utmost the sacred city of Moscow; and Konownitsyn, yielding in like manner to popular opinion, also supported the plan of making an obstinate resistance, but with the provision that they should leave the position in which they were then encamped, and find another by advancing towards the enemy. Generals Ostermann and Yermoloff were of the same opinion, and, indeed, it was the expression of the courage of despair. But Colonel Toll, on the other hand, proposed that the army should retreat, advancing immediately to the right upon the Kolotza road, by which means it would be able to take up a position at once threatening to the enemy's communications and in direct relation to the richest provinces of the South. As is generally the case under such circumstances, this council of war was agitated, confused, and filled with opposite counsels.

Kutusoff had already, however, determined upon his course of action; and we must confess that it was worthy of a great captain. Of all the various counsels which had been given, none had been thoroughly good, although most possessed certain recommendations. To have fought a battle for the sake of Moscow would have been utterly unwise. To have defended



it against the enemy as Saragossa had been defended, barricading the streets and arousing the whole of its population to the aid of the army, would have certainly been to have involved its destruction; for it was not built of stone, like Saragossa, but of wood, and it could not in this case but have perished by the flames. The only means, in fact, in the power of the Russians of preserving Moscow from the grasp of the French was by effecting its destruction; but such an idea as this had not yet been entertained, for no one desired the destruction of this capital, and its capture by the French was not regarded as equivalent to its being destroyed.

To retreat, then, appeared the only course open to the Russian army. To fall back upon Wladimir, as Barclay de Tolly proposed, would have been to push the system of retreat too far, and would have involved the loss of communications with the South of the empire, which was far richer in resources of every kind than the North. Thus the only line of retreat which could wisely be adopted was upon the right of Moscow, (the right as regarded us,) which would lead the Russian army upon the communications of the French, and place it in direct communication with the South provinces and the army returning from Turkey. But to have marched immediately in this direction, as was proposed by Colonel Toll, would have been to have excited the French to instant pursuit, and to have revealed the plan of the system of retreat, which, now that the French had been enticed so far, consisted in manœuvring upon their flanks with the purpose of attacking them when they should have been sufficiently enfeebled. A much better mode of action was to retreat across Moscow itself, to leave this city in the hands of the French, to take advantage of the time during which they would certainly be employed in seizing upon this rich prey, to defile tranquilly before them, and then, turning round Moscow, to take upon their flank that threatening position which Colonel Toll advised should be taken immediately and without the intervention of any manœuvres. This was the plan drawn by the old Russian general from all the various counsels which he had received,—drawn from them with a sagacity as profound as it was fatal to the French, and which, fatal as it was to us, cannot but demand the admiration of posterity.

It was accordingly determined that the Russian army should retreat during the night of the 18th of September, the rear-guard avoiding combats with the French, in order that Moscow, which the Russians were anxious to save, and which they believed that they were saving by leaving it in the hands of the French, might not be set on fire by the howitzers; and that the retreat should be by the Riazan road, from which it would be easy, by means of a slight detour, to return some days later to the Kalouga road, on which it would subsequently be necessary to operate.

We must now return to Rostopschin, the governor of Moscow, a Russian full of savage passions concealed under polished manners, and inspired with a spirit of patriotism so furious that it had become fanaticism. He hated us as a Russian; he hated us as a member of the European aristocracy. He would have willingly sacrificed the city could he at the same time

have destroyed twenty or thirty thousand Frenchmen; and he considered that, after having destroyed all the villages, there could be no honourable reason for sparing Moscow. As no proposal, however, had been made that the army should barricade itself within the city and defend it to the last, he could only in silence brood over the idea which he cherished in the depths of his exasperated spirit. The futility of the hopes which had been kept up by General Kutsoff had profoundly irritated him against the general, and he expressed himself to him with extreme bitterness; but there was no time for recrimination: it was necessary to make immediate preparations for the evacuation of the city. In the excess of his hatred, Rostopschin was anxious that there should not be a single Russian left to adorn the triumph of the French; and, using his authority as governor, he ordered all the inhabitants of Moscow to depart immediately, taking with them whatever they could, and he threatened the infliction of the most severe chastisements on those who should not have quitted by the morrow. Moreover, such atrocious calumnies had been spread abroad with respect to the conduct of the French troops, that this was no occasion for the use of threats to induce the Russians to fly from before them. Nor was Rostopschin anxious only to leave the enemy a city without inhabitants. He was anxious, without calculating the consequences of such a measure, to leave them, instead of a luxurious home, a heap of cinders, among which they would be able to find no means of supporting existence, which should be a testimony of the terrible hatred with which they had inspired the Russian heart, which should be a declaration of war to the death. But to have breathed such a project to any one would have been to render its execution impossible. The gentle spirit of Alexander would have revolted at such a proposal; the generals would have shrunk from the responsibility of sharing such a secret; and to have submitted such a design to the inhabitants would have been to excite them more furiously against the author of it than even against the French. But, although he was thus forced to keep his purpose profoundly secret, he had accumulated, under the pretence of fabricating an infernal machine against the French, an immense quantity of inflammable materials in one of his gardens; and, when the hour for the evacuation had arrived, he selected as executors of his project those infamous persons who possessed nothing but the prisons in which their crimes had procured them an asylum, and who possessed an innate taste for the work of destruction. To these criminals he committed the task, when the evacuation should have been completed, of secretly and thoroughly firing the city, assuring them that by thus ravaging their country they would be performing for her the most useful of services. At the same time, in order that the French might have no means of checking the conflagration, he had all the pumps destroyed. On the morning of the 14th he followed the army from the city, taking with him none of his wealth, and consoling himself for its loss by the idea of the terrible surprise he had prepared for the French.

During the evening and night of the 18th and a portion of the 14th of September, the Russian

army defiled across the city of Moscow, and, stopping at the Moskowa bridge, which was the only one remaining at this point, they accumulated in the Dorogomilow faubourg in such a manner as to show very plainly how great a disaster might have been the result of a retreat across Moscow after a defeat. The disorder throughout the unhappy capital was at its height. The wealthy, whether nobles or merchants, had withdrawn to their most distant estates; and the remainder of the inhabitants, submitting to the odious edict imposed upon them, and filled also with the idea that the French would fire the town, quitted their dwellings in a state of despair, carrying with them their most precious possessions in carriages or on their shoulders. Knowing not whither to go, or how they should be able to procure the means of subsistence, the bulk of the population, uttering the most frightful lamentations, mechanically followed the army. Some of the inhabitants, however, had declined to take part in this flight, preferring to remain in the city with the victorious French (whose real mode of acting they had become better acquainted with than their compatriots) rather than follow in the track of an army of whose line of march or proposed movements they were utterly ignorant. Among these latter were many merchants, of various nations, and especially of our own, who had no fear of the French, but for whom the moment of the evacuation was one of the most frightful terror, for they suddenly learned that, as the Russian troops left the city with the authorities, three thousand abandoned wretches would be let loose to indulge in unrestrained pillage. With trembling impatience, therefore, these unhappy inhabitants awaited in their houses the arrival of the army which was to replace the one departing.

In the mean-time, Miloradovitch, perceiving that the evacuation of the city would occupy some hours, proposed to the French advanced guard that all hostilities should be suspended while it was taking place, as well for the sake of those who were about to enter as of those who were departing, since an attack would necessarily call forth a desperate defence, and consequently cause the entire destruction of the city. An officer was despatched to Murat with this proposal.

With rapid steps the French army advanced towards the heights whence they hoped to perceive at length the great city of Moscow; and, if the Russians were filled with the utmost sadness, the hearts of the French were equally inspired with feelings of joy and triumph, and the most brilliant illusions. Reduced from four hundred and twenty thousand (which was its number at the passage of the Niemen) to one hundred thousand, and utterly exhausted, our army forgot all its troubles on its approach to the brilliant capital of Muscovy. There were many officers and soldiers in its ranks who had been at the Pyrenees, to the banks of the Jordan, to Rome, Milan, Madrid, Vienna, and Berlin, and who trembled with emotion at the idea that they were about to visit also Moscow, the most powerful metropolis of the East. Doubtless, the hope of finding there repose, abundance, and probably peace, contributed to their feelings of satisfaction on the occasion; but Imagination, the empress of all hearts, and es-

pecially of those of soldiers,—Imagination, we say, was strongly excited within them at the idea of entering Moscow, after having entered all the other capitals of Europe with the exception of London, protected by the sea. Whilst Prince Eugene advanced on the left of the army, and Prince Poniatowski on its right, the bulk of the army, with Murat at its head, Davout and Ney in the centre, and the Guard in the rear, followed the great Smolensk road. Napoleon was in the midst of his troops, who, as they gazed upon him and drew near to Moscow, forgot the days of discontent, and uttered loud shouts in honour of his glory and their own.

The proposal submitted by Miloradovitch was readily accepted, for the French had no desire to destroy Moscow, and it was agreed that not a shot should be fired during the evacuation, on condition that the Russian army should continue to defile across the city without a moment's halt.

At length, having reached the summit of a hill, the army beheld beneath it an immense city, brilliant with a thousand colours, crowned with a multitude of domes gleaming in the sunlight, and altogether, with its mingled Gothic and Byzantine aspect, realizing what is told in Oriental tales of the marvels of Asia. Monasteries flanked with towers formed its girdle, and in its centre, on an eminence, arose a strong citadel, a species of capitol, where, side by side, stood temples reared to God and imperial palaces; where above embattled walls arose majestic domes, bearing the emblem which is the epitome of the whole of Russian history and Russian ambition,—the Cross above the reversed Crescent. This citadel was the Kremlin, the ancient dwelling-place of the Czars.

At the magic sight, their imaginations and their love of glory alike excited, the soldiers cried out together, "Moscow! Moscow!" Nor was Napoleon less deeply moved by it. Arrived at that point of his greatness from which he was to descend so rapidly to ruin, he experienced a species of intoxication, forgot all the reproaches which his good sense—which is the conqueror's only conscience—had addressed to him during the last two months, and believed that he had performed an act of great and fortunate rashness, justified by the event, in having dared to march from Paris to Smolensk, from Smolensk to Moscow. And his lieutenants in like manner forgot the discontent they had so frequently experienced during the progress of the campaign, and bestowed upon him their congratulations which they had failed to express after the battle of Borodino.

Murat was ordered to march with rapidity for the purpose of preventing any disorder. General Dumas was sent forward to communicate with the authorities and to conduct them to the feet of the conqueror; and M. Dumas was ordered to go on to prepare provisions and bivouacs for the troops. When Murat reached the Moskowa bridge, he found a Russian rear-guard, which was retreating; and, having inquired who was the commanding officer, he held out his hand to the white-haired old warrior who was pointed out to him, and the latter took it with *empressment*. So readily subsides even national hatred before true valour. The Russian rear-guard defiled rapidly to yield the ground to our advanced guard, and the King of

Naples, followed by his staff and a detachment of cavalry, plunged into the streets of Moscow, and, traversing by turns the humblest quarters and the wealthiest, perceived everywhere the most profound solitude, and seemed to have entered a city of the dead. Suddenly a few persons made their appearance, Frenchmen, who had been established in Moscow, and who begged, in the name of Heaven, for protection from the brigands who had been left in possession of the city. They were received with much kindness, and attempting, although in vain, to dissipate their fears, the French troops accompanied them to the Kremlin, where they were immediately fired upon by the bandits whom Rostopschin's furious patriotism had let loose. Many of them were sabred by our soldiers, and the Kremlin was immediately freed from their presence. But the information which was now obtained—that the whole population of the city had fled—saddened the exultation of the commanders of our advanced guard, who had flattered themselves that they would have had the pleasure of surprising the inhabitants by their kindness.

The information sent to Napoleon of the actual state of affairs deeply afflicted him. He had waited during the whole afternoon the arrival of the keys of the city, and the prayers of a submissive population for that mercy which he was always ready to accord to the vanquished. This disappointment, so immediately succeeding to a moment of triumph, was, so to speak, the dawn of ill fortune. Being unwilling to enter during the night a city which an implacable enemy had but just left, and which might very possibly contain many ambushes, Napoleon paused in the Dorogomilow faubourg, sending forward detachments of cavalry to take possession of the gates and to act as police. Eugene on the left guarded the gate on the St. Petersburg road; whilst Davout, in the centre, guarded the Smolensk gate, by which the bulk of our army would enter, and extended his troops on his right as far as that of Toula. The cavalry, which had passed through the city, was to guard the gates on the north and east, opposite to those by which we were about to enter. From our ignorance of the city, however, many means of egress were left open, and twelve or fifteen thousand stragglers of the Russian army were thus enabled to make their escape. There remained, indeed, fifteen thousand wounded, whom the Russians recommended to our humanity; but to Russian humanity should they rather have recommended them, for they perished by other hands than ours.

On the morning of the 15th September, Napoleon entered Moscow, at the head of his invincible legions, but passed through a deserted city, and his soldiers were now, for the first time on entering a capital, the sole witnesses of their own glory. Their feelings on the occasion were sad ones. As soon as Napoleon had reached the Kremlin, he hastened to ascend the lofty tower of the great Ivan, and to survey from its elevation the magnificent city he had conquered. The Moskowa flowed at his feet, traversing the capital with numerous windings. Thousands of black-plumaged birds, crows and ravens,—as numerous in those regions as are the pigeons in Venice around the palaces and churches,—gave to the great city a singular aspect, which con-

trasted strongly with the splendour of its brilliant colours. A sullen silence, broken only by the tramp of the cavalry, had replaced that populous life which during the very previous evening had rendered the city one of the most animated in the world.

The army was distributed through the various quarters of Moscow, Prince Eugene occupying the northwest quarter, Marshal Davout the southwest, and Prince Poniatowski the southeast. Marshal Ney, who had traversed Moscow from west to east, established his troops in the district comprised between the Riazan and Wladimir roads; and the Guard was naturally posted at the Kremlin and in its environs. The houses were full of provisions of every kind, and the first necessities of the troops were readily satisfied. The superior officers were received at the gates of palaces by numerous servants in livery, eager in offering a brilliant hospitality; for the owners of these palaces, perfectly unaware that Moscow was about to perish, had taken great pains, although they fully shared the national hatred against the French, to procure protectors for their rich dwellings by receiving into them French officers. And with extreme delight the latter plunged into the midst of a luxury fraught with all those signs of sensuousness which form so strange but frequent a contrast with ardent popular devotion and savage military energy in nations which have suddenly arisen from a barbarous state to a civilized one; for the first lesson which men learn from those who have learned how to live, is how to live pleasantly.

From their splendid lodgings, the officers of the French army wandered with equal delight through the midst of the city, which resembled a Tartar camp sown with Italian palaces. They contemplated with wonder the numerous towns of which the capital is composed, and which are placed in concentric circles, the one within the other. First, in the very centre, on an eminence on the bank of the Moskowa, was the Kremlin, surrounded with ancient towers and filled with gilded churches; at the foot of the Kremlin, and under its protection, as it were, was the Old Town, called the Chinese Town, in allusion to the old and genuine Russian commerce,—that of the East; then, surrounding these, was a large, spacious town, thronged with palaces, which was called the White Town; and finally, encircling the whole, there was the Earth Town, as it was called, consisting of a mixture of groves and villages, and new and imposing edifices, and surrounded by an earthen epaulement. And, of all these four towns, prominent features were many hundreds of churches, surmounted by domes fashioned, as in the East, to the form of immense turbans, and bell-towers, which manifested that Russia had had intercourse of old with Persia and Turkey: for it is a singular circumstance, that, whilst religions oppose each other, they nevertheless imitate each other in matters of art. A few days before, Moscow had contained a population of three hundred thousand souls, of whom scarcely a sixth part now remained, and of these the greater number were concealed in their houses or prostrated at the foot of the altars. The streets were deserts, and only echoed with the footsteps of our soldiers.

Although they had become sole possessors of

the deputed city, our troops, always sociable, were distressed that there were none whom they might astonish by their gentleness after having terrified them by their boldness. But, although the solitude of the city was a source of great vexation to them, they had no suspicion of any approaching catastrophe, for the Russian army, which alone had hitherto devastated their country, had departed, and there appeared to be no fear of fire.

The French army hoped, therefore, to enjoy comfort in Moscow, to obtain, probably, peace by means of its possession, and at least good winter-cantonments in case the war should be prolonged. But, on the afternoon they had entered, columns of flame arose from a vast building containing vast quantities of spirits, and, just as our soldiers had almost succeeded in mastering the fire in this spot, a violent conflagration suddenly burst forth in a collection of buildings called the Bazaar, situated to the northeast of the Kremlin, and containing the richest magazines, abounding in stores of the exquisite tissues of India and Persia, the rarities of Europe, colonial produce, and precious wines. The troops of the Guard immediately hastened up and attempted to subdue the flames; but their energetic efforts were unfortunately unsuccessful, and the immense riches of the establishment fell a prey to the fire, with the exception of some portions which our men were able to snatch from the devouring element. This fresh accident was again attributed to natural causes, and considered as easily explicable in the tumult of an evacuation.

During the night of the 15th of September, however, a sudden change came over the scene; for then, as though every species of misfortune were to fall at the same moment on the ancient Muscovite capital, the equinoctial gales suddenly arose with the extreme violence usual to the season and in countries where wide-spread plains offer no resistance to the storm. This wind, blowing first from the east, carried the fire to the west into the streets comprised between the Iwer and Smolensk routes, which were the most beautiful and the richest in all Moscow. Within some hours the fire, spreading with frightful rapidity, and throwing out long arrows of flame, spread to the other westward quarters. And soon rockets were observed in the air, and wretches were seized in the act of spreading the conflagration. Interrogated under threat of instant death, they revealed the frightful secret,—the order given by Count Rostopshin for the burning of the city of Moscow as though it had been a simple village on the Moscow route. This information filled the whole army with consternation. Napoleon ordered that military commissions should be formed in each quarter of the city for the purpose of judging, shooting, and hanging incendiaries taken in the act, and that all the available troops should be employed in extinguishing the flames. Immediate recourse was had to the pumps, but it was found they had been removed; and this latter circumstance would have proved, if indeed any doubt on the matter had remained, the terrible determination with which Moscow had been given to the flames.

In the mean time, the wind, increasing in violence every moment, rendered the efforts of the whole army ineffectual, and, suddenly changing,

with the abruptness peculiar to equinoctial gales, from the east to the northwest, it carried the torrent of flame into quarters which the hands of the incendiaries had not yet been able to fire. And after having blown during some hours from the northwest, the wind once more changed its direction, and blew from the southwest, as though it had a cruel pleasure in spreading ruin and death over the unhappy city, or, rather, over our army. By this change of the wind to the southwest the Kremlin was placed in extreme peril. More than four hundred ammunition-wagons were in the court of the Kremlin, and the arsenal contained some four hundred thousand pounds of powder. There was imminent danger, therefore, that Napoleon, with his Guard, and the palace of the Czars, might be blown up into the air.

The officers who surrounded him, and the artillerymen, who knew that his death would be their own, thronged about him with entreaties that he would retire from so dangerous a position. The peril was most threatening; and even the old artillerymen of the Guard, although accustomed to such cannonades as that of Borodino, almost lost their *sang-froid*. General Lariboisière at length approached Napoleon, and, with the authority he had by virtue of his age and his devotion, entreated that the troops might be permitted to save themselves without having their embarrassment increased by the excitement caused by the presence of their Emperor. Several officers, moreover, who had been sent into the adjacent quarters to make inquiries, reported that it was scarcely possible to traverse the burning streets, and that to depart immediately was the only means of escaping from being buried under the ruins of the doomed city.

Napoleon, therefore, followed by some of his lieutenants, descended from the Kremlin to the quay of the Moskowa, where he found his horses ready for him, and had much difficulty in threading the streets, which, towards the northwest, (in which direction he proceeded,) were already in flames. The terrified army set out from Moscow. The divisions of Prince Eugene and Marshal Ney fell back upon the Zwenigard and St. Petersburg roads, those of Marshal Davout fell back upon the Smolensk route, and, with the exception of the Guard, which was left around the Kremlin to dispute its possession with the flames, our troops drew back in horror from before the fire, which, after flaming up to heaven, darted back towards them as though it wished to devour them. The few inhabitants who had remained in Moscow, and had hitherto lain concealed in their dwellings, now fled, carrying away such of their possessions as they valued most highly, uttering lamentable cries of distress, and, in many instances, falling victims to the brigands whom Rostopshin had let loose, and who now exulted in the midst of the conflagration, as the genius of evil in the midst of chaos.

Napoleon took up his quarters at the *château* of Petrowskoïé, a league's distance from Moscow on the St. Petersburg route, in the centre of the cantonments of the troops under Prince Eugene, awaiting there the subsidence of the conflagration, which had now reached such a height that it was beyond human power either to increase or extinguish it.

As a final misfortune, the wind changed on the following day from southwest to direct west, and then the torrents of flame were carried towards the eastern quarters of the city, the streets Messnitskaia and Bassmanaia, and the summer palace. As the conflagration reached its terrible height, frightful crashes were heard every moment,—roofs crushing inward, and stately façades crumbling headlong into the streets as their supports became consumed in the flames. The sky was scarcely visible through the thick cloud of smoke which overshadowed it, and the sun was only apparent as a blood-red globe. For three successive days—the 16th, the 17th, and the 18th of September—this terrific scene continued, and in unabated intensity.

At length, after having devoured four-fifths of the city, the fire ceased, gradually quenched by the rain, which, as is usually the case, succeeded the violence of the equinoctial gales. As the flames subsided, only the spectre, as it were, of what had once been a magnificent city, was visible; and, indeed, the Kremlin, and about a fifth part of the city, were alone saved,—their preservation being chiefly due to the exertions of the Imperial Guard.

As the inhabitants of Moscow themselves entered the ruins, seeking what property still remained in them undestroyed, it was scarcely possible to prevent our soldiers from acting in the same manner, and accordingly, searching among the crumbling edifices, they speedily penetrated to the cellars and found there quantities of provisions still in great part uninjured by the fire, and in an abundance which was due to the custom prevailing in the country, on account of the length of the winters, of storing provisions for many months. In many of the houses, also, which the fire had injured sufficiently to render their pillage excusable without actually destroying them, were found the most exquisite articles of luxury, furs, and plate, which latter spoil the troops, in their impudence, preferred to either food or clothing, and superb porcelain, which in their ignorance they despised or idly destroyed.

It was a lamentable and grotesque spectacle which was now presented, as the crowd of our troops and the inhabitants of the city thronged the smoking embers of the splendid city, laughing at the singular costumes in which they had robed themselves, bearing in their hands articles of the utmost value, selling them for the most insignificant prices to those capable of appreciating their value, or dashing them to pieces in pure wantonness. And this wild and melancholy scene, in which intoxication was also a great element, (for quantities of liquors had been discovered in the cellars,) was rendered still more sad by the return of the unfortunate inhabitants who had fled at the moment of the evacuation or the breaking out of the fire, and who now returned, for the most part, to weep over the ruins of their dwellings, or to dispute with an unbridled mob the fragments still remaining of their possessions. Their only shelter the huts they could construct of the ruins which lay around them, their only beds the cinders of their former dwellings, they had no other food but what they might be able to beg from our troops. Thus, gradually and mournfully, the population of Moscow returned; and with them came back, equally in search of their former

habitations, and uttering the most dismal croakings, the clouds of crows and ravens whom the flames had driven away. And of this horrible scene the chiefest horror of all remains to be told: the Russians had left fifteen thousand wounded in Moscow, and, incapable of escaping, they had perished, victims of Rostopschin's barbarous patriotism.

On the 19th of September, deeply saddened by the terrible events which had taken place, Napoleon re-entered Moscow. He had continued his march as far as this city, in spite of all the objections urged by his genius against the adoption of such a plan, in the hope of finding peace there, as he had found it at Vienna and at Berlin: but what could be expected of a people capable of committing so terrible an act and giving so cruel a proof of implacable hatred? On each of those burned palaces, of which there remained but the blackened walls, Napoleon seemed to see written, in words of blood and fire, "No peace! war to the death!"

Napoleon's feelings during this terrible conflagration were the bitterest and most sombre he had ever experienced in the course of his life. He had never hitherto lost his confidence in his own good fortune,—neither at Arcola, on the bridge which he could not cross, nor at St. Jean d'Acre, at the moment when the eighth assault had been repulsed, nor at Marengo, nor at Eylau, nor at Essling. But now for the first time he seemed to perceive the possibility that he might be the subject of some great disaster.

However, without permitting himself to be overwhelmed by the consideration of what might possibly be the consequences of the conflagration of Moscow, he employed himself in giving orders which were demanded equally by humanity and the interests of his army. He issued the most stringent commands for the suppression of pillage, and with some difficulty the prevalent disorder was suppressed, and regular searches established throughout the town for the discovery of its resources. The city was partitioned out between the various corps of the army almost as on the day of its arrival, each having its *tête de colonne* at the Kremlin, and its chief bulk in that portion of the city at which it had made its entry,—Prince Eugene's troops being between the St. Petersburg and Smolensk gates, Marshal Davout's between those of Smolensk and Kalouga, Prince Poniatowski's towards the Toulga gate, the cavalry beyond it, in pursuit of the enemy, Marshal Ney's eastward between the Riazan and Wladimir gates, and the Guard in the centre, at the Kremlin. The houses which had escaped the conflagration were reserved for the officers, and the great buildings were converted into magazines, to which the troops each day conveyed what they found in the city, so that there might be a reserve of provisions for the use of the army, whether it continued in Moscow or departed from it.

But, although sufficient bread and salted provisions were procured in this manner for the consumption of the army during many months, fresh provisions could not be provided without cattle, which, again, could not exist without forage, and on this subject, as well as with respect to the absolute necessity of forage for the artillery and cavalry horses, there was felt the greatest anxiety. Napoleon hoped to sup-

ply the necessity,—first by extending his advanced posts ten or fifteen leagues from Moscow, and thus embracing a space sufficiently large to contain vegetables and forage in the requisite quantities, and, in the second place, by gaining over the peasants to his service by means of good pay. Paper roubles being the money which was current in Russia, and the French army-chest containing a large quantity of them, fabricated in a manner which has already been described, but of which there was then no suspicion, he caused it to be announced that all provisions, and especially forage, brought into Moscow, would be paid for, and directed that those peasants who answered to the appeal should receive ample protection. He also paid the army in these paper roubles, at the same time arranging, however, that those officers who desired to send their pay to France should be able to exchange this paper for genuine money at the government treasuries.

At the same time he afforded succour to all those whom the conflagration had deprived of their homes, preferring, however, to give them money that they might procure provisions for themselves, rather than supply strangers, who were at the same time enemies, from those magazines of which it was so absolutely necessary to be careful. The French inhabitants of Moscow were treated as our own troops, and the educated persons among them were charged with the establishment of a provisional municipal administration.

Beneath the walls of the Kremlin was a vast building which had attracted Napoleon's notice from his first entrance into Moscow, and was a foundling-hospital, from which most of the children had been conveyed, but which, on account of the great difficulty of conveying infants of tender years, still contained, on our entrance into Moscow, some children of four or five years of age, who, grouped around the venerable governor of the hospital, General Toutelmine, awaited our approach with tears and trembling. As soon as Napoleon was informed of the circumstance he sent a guard thither, which watched over the noble institution both before and during the conflagration. On his return to Moscow he visited the hospital on foot, and was received at the gate by General Toutelmine, surrounded by his pupils, who threw themselves at Napoleon's feet, kissing his hands, and catching hold of the skirts of his coat, eager to thank him for having preserved their lives. "Surely," said Napoleon to the old general,—"surely your children did not suppose that my troops would have devoured them?—that we French were as barbarous as the men who govern you?—as absurd as the Governor of Moscow? For what purpose are all these ruins? For what purpose are such savage deeds performed,—deeds which must cost Russia more than she could possibly have suffered from the most disastrous war? A thousand millions would not pay for the loss suffered in the destruction of Moscow alone. If, in place of yielding to this madness, you had spared your capital, I would have been as careful of it as of Paris itself; and I would have written to your sovereign proposing to him equitable and moderate conditions of peace, and this terrible war would have been almost at an end. But, as it is, the course of

destruction must still continue, for I am far from the period of my departure from the Russian territory, and God alone knows what this war must still cost humanity." General Toutelmine, who detested, in common with all the inhabitants of Moscow, the deed which Rostopschin had executed, acknowledged the justice of Napoleon's observations, expressed his regret that Napoleon's disposition towards Russia was not better understood, and seemed to intimate that, if it were properly understood at St. Petersburg, affairs would speedily wear a very different complexion. Napoleon seized the occasion, which, indeed, he had taken pains to bring about, and when General Toutelmine, in answer to his permission to him to ask for whatever he might desire for the children under his charge, requested leave to inform the Empress, who was the patroness of the hospital, that his pupils were safe, Napoleon invited him to write, promising to take care that his letter reached its destination. "May I mention," said the old general, "the tone of the observations which your majesty has addressed to me?" "Yes," replied Napoleon: "say that if the enemies who are interested in fomenting quarrels between us should cease to interfere between the Emperor Alexander and myself, peace would be soon concluded between us."

Toutelmine's letter was immediately written, and was on its way to St. Petersburg before the end of the day. Almost at the same time, Napoleon held an interview with a Russian, apparently of some distinction, who had remained at Moscow, and who, less blinded by passion than were most of his compatriots, deeply deplored the atrocious fury of Rostopschin. In conversation with this person, Napoleon declared, as he had previously declared to General Toutelmine, that he had desired to carry on a political war, and not a social and destructive one; that Lithuania might have been the theatre of such a war, in lieu of Muscovy itself: that then one or two battles might have decided the dispute, and a treaty, consisting of very easy conditions, have re-established the alliance between France and Russia, and not the dependence of the latter upon the former, as had been asserted for the purpose of exciting national fury. But instead of this plan having been adopted, he said, every attempt had been made on the part of Russia to give an atrocious character to the war, worthy of the negroes of St. Domingo, whilst Count Rostopschin, wishing to play the Roman, had displayed all the characteristics of a barbarian.

M. de Jakowleff, the Russian to whom Napoleon expressed these sentiments, disputed none of Napoleon's assertions; for, having before his eyes, as he had, the horrible sufferings endured by the wretched inhabitants of Moscow, he was indignant with Rostopschin, and considered that such a war should be concluded as soon as possible, or, at least, conducted on a different plan. He urged upon Napoleon, as General Toutelmine had done, that he should make his pacific inclinations known at St. Petersburg; and Napoleon, who desired nothing better, proposed to M. de Jakowleff that he should himself be the bearer to St. Petersburg of a written declaration of the sentiments he had just heard expressed. M. de Jakowleff accepted the mission with the utmost

alacrity, and set out with a letter for Alexander, couched in terms which were at once courteous and haughty.

The inconvenience attending these overtures was, doubtless, that they displayed in some degree the embarrassments into which we had already fallen; but, on the other hand, it was certain that the Russian emperor would be pre-empted by his pride, which had been deeply wounded, from taking the initiative.

In the mean time, General Sebastiani, who had replaced Murat at the head of the advanced guard, was compelled to acknowledge that he had been deceived by the Russians as effectually as at Borodino. In fact, whilst following Kutusoff's army at first along the Wladimir route, and afterwards by that of Riazan, he had crossed the Moskowa at about eight or nine leagues from Moscow in pursuit of the Russians, and, seeing always before him parties of Cossacks and troops of regular cavalry, he had proceeded in a southeasterly direction as far as Bronitey, a distance of twenty leagues at least, constantly mistaking the shadow for the reality. But, having arrived at that point, he perceived that he had fallen into error, the enemy not being in front of him, and he frankly sent word to Moscow that he knew not where to find them. At the same time information was received that two squadrons escorting ammunition-wagons, and advancing upon Moscow by the Smolensk route, had been surprised by a cloud of Cossacks in the environs of Mojaïsk, and forced to surrender with their convoy. The alarm was speedily given along the whole route from Moscow to Smolensk, and a cry was already raised that the enemy had descended upon our line of communications and was from henceforth in a position to cut off our retreat.

On receiving this information, which reached Moscow during the 21st and 22d of September, Napoleon was excessively irritated against General Sebastiani, notwithstanding the esteem in which he held him, and ordered Murat to proceed immediately to the head of the advanced guard, taking with him Poniatowski's corps, although it was thoroughly fatigued and worn out, in order that, being accompanied by troops speaking the Slavonic tongue, he might the more easily discover the route of the Russian army. As the incursions of the Cossacks afforded reasons for believing that General Kutusoff had executed a flank-movement upon our right with the purpose of marching upon our rear by the Kalouga route, Napoleon directed Murat to proceed from southeast to south,—in other words, from the Riazan route to the Toulou route,—and to continue his march until he should receive information of Kutusoff. At the same time, being unwilling to leave the search for the Russian army in the hands of Murat alone, he despatched by the Kalouga gate, with orders to march upon Kalouga itself, Marshal Bessières with the lancers of the Guard, Grouchy's cavalry, the light cavalry, and the fourth division of Marshal Davout's infantry; and, finally, he threw back by the Smolensk route the dragoons of the Guard, a division of cuirassiers, and the division Broussier of Prince Eugene's corps. He was himself almost certain that Kutusoff would be found on the Kalouga route, being drawn into that direction by the double object of threatening our rear and placing himself in

communication with the richest provinces of the empire. But, although he was almost convinced that this was the case, he was nevertheless impatient to obtain positive information. He did not share the terrors of those who feared that we should be cut off, but he was resolved not to permit Kutusoff to take up a threatening position on our rear, and was determined to go forth from Moscow to fight a second battle if the Russian general should take up a position too close to our army and the line of its retreat. Marshal Davout, indeed, entreated Napoleon at once to combat and crush the enemy, and the Emperor was disposed to follow this advice, provided it could be executed without too protracted marches. He awaited, therefore, in a state of readiness for immediate departure, the arrival of information with respect to the new position which had been taken up by the Russian army.

We will now turn our attention to the plans formed by General Kutusoff and the movements executed by his army. The first intention of the Russian general on departing from Moscow had been to adopt a medium course between all those which had been proposed, taking up a position on the French flank, but refraining from turning too close to them, so as not to come too suddenly into contact with them. His first project, therefore, concerted with Alexander's aide-de-camp, the Piedmontese officer Michaud, had been to fall back behind the Oka, a rapid river which, rising in the South, and passing by Orel, Kalouga, and Riazan, receives a number of tributaries, the Moskowa being one of them, and falls into the Wolga at Nijney-Novogorod. But, whilst the adoption of this plan would have afforded the Russian army a well-covered position, and placed at its disposal all the resources of the Southern provinces, it would, at the same time, have left open a vast field to the French foragers, and have infinitely added to the discouragement of the Russian army, which had failed in its mission, since it had not been able to defend Moscow. This army, in fact, began to be overwhelmed with despondency, and Kutusoff, genuine Russian as he was, to be as unpopular with it as Barclay de Tolly.

Such was the state of affairs, when suddenly, during the terrible night of the 16th, the violent northwest wind carried to the Russian army, which was turning Moscow, the roaring and sombre glare of the flames of Moscow. The horrible spectacle, rising up from the horizon as the eruption of a volcano, drew the troops and the fugitive population of the city from their bivouacs, and, as they summoned each other to view this terrible disaster to themselves and their country, their rage reached its height. The real incendiary, Rostopschin, and Kutusoff, who was not intrusted with Rostopschin's secret, but suspected it, hastened to declare that the French troops had caused the conflagration; and this calumny spread among the people and the troops with incredible rapidity. On all sides arose cries of rage; immediate vengeance was desired, and the troops demanded to be led immediately against the enemy. And thus Rostopschin, whilst in burning Moscow he had deprived us of nothing, since there still remained in it sufficient roofs to shelter us, sufficient provisions to feed us, had nevertheless opened by this deed an immense gulf between the two

nations, excited against us the extreme national hatred of Russia, rendered negotiations impossible, and reanimated the energy of the Russian army, which the apparent uselessness of its efforts had begun to discourage.

This was not the moment, therefore, for falling back to any great distance from the French; and to have descended upon the Riazan route as far as the city of Kolomna would have been a course too apparently prudent, and uselessly so, for, occupied as it was in collecting the resources of Moscow, the French army was not in a position to follow and disturb that of Russia. Thus, when Kutusoff had reached by the Riazan route the bank of the Moskowa, he considered that he ought to commence at this point his projected flank-movement, giving a radius of ten leagues instead of thirty to the arc of the circle which he proposed to describe around Moscow from east to south.

Taking advantage of some communications which had passed between General Sebastiani and General Rneffskoi, for the purpose of avoiding useless conflicts, he had given orders that all the wishes of the French should be complied with, for the purpose of lulling their vigilance, and completely concealing from them the direction which the Russian army was about to pursue; and, on the 17th, whilst a cavalry rear-guard continued to pursue the Riazan route, and to draw in this same direction General Sebastiani, the bulk of his army, suddenly changing its direction, turned from the south-east to the southwest, and advanced behind the Pakra, a little river which, rising near the Smolensk route, pursued a circular course around Moscow, similar to that which the Russians wished to describe about it, and which would serve very suitably, therefore, as their line of defence. It was behind this river, then, and not behind the Oka, that Kutusoff took up his position, establishing himself, not precisely on the line of our communications, but beside it, and within a day's march of it.

Such was the situation of the Russian army when the corps of Murat and Bessières commenced their search for it.—Murat proceeding in a southeasterly direction, by the Riazan route, and Bessières a southerly one, by the Toul route. The error into which General Sebastiani had fallen was speedily discovered, and Murat, turning to the right and ascending the Pakra, had speedily found the enemy's track, whilst Bessières, turning somewhat from the south to the southwest, arrived at Desna, where he found the bulk of the Russian rear-guard, under the command of Miloradovitch. The French generals had been ordered to push the enemy with extreme vigour, and, consequently, marched resolutely upon them, Murat, who had crossed the Pakra on the traces of the Russian army, threatening, in his turn, to take it in flank.

At the sight of Murat beyond the Pakra, the courageous Benningen was eager to rush upon and overwhelm him. But Kutusoff, in addition to his jealousy of the proposer, had excellent reasons for declining this advice, for he was ignorant that Murat was present with only his cavalry and Poniatowski's infantry, and, considering it very probable that he was accompanied by the whole of the French army, was unwilling to hazard the chances of an uncertain

step at the moment when he was about to gather the fruits of the painful plan of campaign which he had adopted. From Kalouga he was about to receive considerable reinforcements of regular troops; from the Ukraine he expected the arrival of a superb division of veteran Cossacks; and the inclement season which was approaching would probably weaken the French army to as great an extent as the Russian army was about to be reinforced. Kutusoff was theoretically right, therefore, in resolving as he did to fall back upon the Kalouga route as far as would be necessary to enable him to avoid Murat.

Pursuing this course of action, Kutusoff at length arrived at Taroutino, behind the Nara, a river which, arising near the Smolensk route, in the environs of Krimskoïé, pursues a course around Moscow, but describing a more extended arc than the Pakra, and thus, instead of falling into the Moskowa, ending in the Oka. Its banks are escarped, especially the right bank, on which the Russians were established; and Kutusoff determined to take advantage of the natural strength of the position to establish there an almost impregnable camp, in which he would remain until his army had attained a strength which would enable it to attack the French at an advantage. Bessières and Murat, who had followed him thus far, now paused, not as though they had renounced the offensive, but as though they awaited fresh orders.

It was an important moment for Napoleon,—a moment which would probably decide not only the campaign, but his own fortunes; and he ceased not, therefore, to ponder in the recesses of the Kremlin on the course which he ought to pursue. To expose the army to fresh fatigue in pursuit of the Russians without the certainty of coming up with them appeared to Napoleon to be a plan perfectly inadmissible; and, as the month of September had passed by without the arrival of any reply to the overtures which had been sent to St. Petersburg, it was necessary either to make provision for the establishment of the army in Moscow, or to depart from that capital for the purpose of drawing near to his magazines, his reinforcements, and his communications with France, or rather Poland.

The idea of passing the winter at Moscow, at a distance of three hundred leagues from Wilna, three hundred from Dantzic, and seven hundred from Paris, with no certainty of being able to procure means of subsistence, and the probability of being blockaded not only by the country, but by the whole strength of the Russian forces, was utterly discountenanced by all save Napoleon, who considered that in a retrograde movement he would be acknowledging to the world that he had committed a great fault in marching thither, and that he despaired of obtaining that peace which he had marched thither to seek; and further, that to take such a step would be to lose to a great extent, and perhaps altogether, that prestige by means of which he was enabled to hold Europe in subjection, to keep France docile, and preserve the confidence of his troops and secure the fidelity of his allies.

It was not Napoleon's pride alone, therefore, which rendered him repugnant to the idea of making a retrograde movement, but his profound perception of his actual position. The check which his army had apparently received in the South, before Torres-Vedras, might be attributed



absence from the scene of the campaign should they encounter a similar check there, where he commanded in person at the head of his principal armies, it would be a sign that his career of victory had ended, and that Europe, which awaited but the slightest hope that he might be defeated, would rise unanimously against him, and submerge the modern Pharaoh in the waves of a European insurrection. Napoleon had good reason, therefore, to be so anxious to quit Moscow only as an enemy was executing a manœuvre, and not as an enemy who was beating a retreat. It was the purpose of the only plan that appeared worthy of adoption that which it embraced the four following conditions:—main and constant communication with the rear, the approach of the army to its provisions, equipments, and recruits; the preservation of the undiminished force of our arms; and, fourthly, continued negotiations for peace which had been attempted. These four conditions were embodied in a plan which his innate genius—strongly excited as it was by the dangers of his situation—had conceived, and which was worthy to be ranked with any other yet devised. This plan consisted in a retreat toward the North, which, in conjunction with an offensive movement carried by the Duke of Belluna upon St. Petersburg, presented the twofold advantage of reconducting Poland, and of leaving us at the same time in an attitude as menacing as ever, and equally as fully capable of negotiating. Napoleon had reserved, as we have already seen, the army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the Dnieper, and the army of Marshals MacDonald on the Dwina, the corps of the Duke of Belluna in the centre, which was to Smolensk ulterior orders. This corps numbered thirty thousand men, and could be increased to forty thousand by incorporating a portion of the Westphalian, Saxon, and Prussian corps which had not yet had time to join, and which were destined to recruit might easily be carried to the north by the St. Petersburg route through Veliki-Luki. By the junction of the army under Marshal St. Cyr, and a division of MacDonald's, it would number seventy thousand men at least, ready to advance upon the capital of Russia, the seat of government. The Prince of Wittgenstein could not fall back before them upon St. Petersburg. At the moment when the Duke of Oldenburg commenced his movement, Napoleon's Guard, Prince Eugene, and Marshal Ney could withdraw obliquely to the north, in the direction of Veliki-Luki, marching almost in the Smolensk route, and at a distance of about twelve or fifteen leagues, whilst the army, following with his corps the direct route to Smolensk, would cover our rear. Murat, stealing away from Kutusoff, would, on his right, would proceed to re-establish himself with Marshal Ney at Smolensk and Witepsk. After ten or twelve days' march, in accordance with this proposed plan, the army would be thus in the Duke of Belluna would be at Veliki-Luki, seventy thousand men threatening St.

Petersburg; Napoleon with seventy thousand at Veliki-Luki, ready to support him, or to join the thirty thousand men under Murat and Ney for the purpose of making head against Kutusoff by whatever route he might advance. By pursuing this route we should be taking a line of march untraversed by troops and consequently well provisioned; we should be driving the Russians in a direction they could not pursue without losing half their reinforcements, and, without having suffered any loss, either moral or physical, would retrieve the error of the march to Moscow by one of the boldest and most finely conceived marches which had ever been executed. At the same time there was every appearance that the winter-subistence of the troops would be easily procured, for the magazines established at Wilna might be readily transported, the roads in winter being easily traversed to Polotsk and Witepsk, and the immense quantity of cattle collected at Grodno would have no difficulty in arriving at Witepsk, since they would have to pass through a friendly country on their way to that place. And when the spring should have arrived, and Napoleon, having employed the whole winter in assembling new forces, should be ready to march with three hundred thousand men upon St. Petersburg, it was most probable that the simple menace of such a march would be the means of procuring peace; and, if it did not, we should be able to occupy St. Petersburg without danger of finding this second capital wrapped in a conflagration; for it was far less generally built of wood than Moscow, and Muscovite fanaticism, moreover, had not attained there to the same intensity.

Conceived and matured in the latter days of September and the commencement of October, this plan, than which Napoleon's genius had never conceived any thing more profound and admirable, might, by immediate departure, have been completely executed by the 15th of October, when the weather would most probably be still favourable, and when it was in fact extraordinarily fine. But all Napoleon's most excellent plans during this campaign were destined to be frustrated by his error of being advanced to so great a distance. Having already demanded so much of his soldiers and his lieutenants, and being unable, after having brought them so far, to offer them only the ruins of Moscow, he was compelled to be cautious in his treatment of them, and, in place of imperiously commanding them, as he had been wont, to endeavour to persuade them to look favourably on his projects. To troops among whom prevailed wide-spread lassitude and profound despondency, the result of the terrible spectacle of Moscow in ashes, and of secret dread of the fearful Russian winter, which within a month would be upon them, it was necessary not to speak as an imperious master justified in his commands of daily success, but as one who conciliates and consults, employing persuasions rather than orders. But, when Napoleon submitted his plan to each of his lieutenants in succession, they protested, without exception, against a fresh progress northwards, an attempt against the second capital of Russia.

Napoleon's plan did not propose, in fact, to capture the second Russian capital, but an oblique retrograde movement upon Poland, and the assumption of a position behind a corps which was, itself, not intended to advance against

St. Petersburg, but simply to menace it. This was an essential distinction, but it was one which restless and desponding minds were not fitted to entertain.

Compelled, therefore, to abandon, or at least to adjourn, the sole plan capable of extricating him from his embarrassment, Napoleon permitted his thoughts to entertain various plans which at first he had regarded as entirely inadmissible,—such as establishing the army in Moscow itself and passing the winter there, or of placing a garrison in Moscow and proceeding to take up his quarters in the rich province of Kalouga, from whence he would be able to extend his left to Toula and his right to Smolensk. But to all these projects there were grave objections, which rendered him most anxious now for that peace which he had foolishly sacrificed to his pretensions of universal dominion, and which he now, although victorious, longed for as ardently as if he had been vanquished.

In the midst of these perplexities, Napoleon conceived the idea of sending M. de Caulaincourt to St. Petersburg for the purpose of frankly opening a negotiation with the Emperor Alexander,—considering that, whatever might be the embarrassments of his position, the fact of his treating from Moscow in the attitude of a victor surrounded him with an air of power sufficient to justify such a step. But M. de Caulaincourt, who feared that the real difficulties of his position would be perceived through the disguise of this seeming power, and who feared, moreover, that he would not find at St. Petersburg the same favour which he had formerly enjoyed there, refused to undertake such a mission,—affirming, and with reason, that it would not succeed. Napoleon then turned to M. de Lauriston, whose modest good sense he had too much despised, and directed him to proceed to the camp of General Kutusoff, not for the purpose of negotiating peace, but of persuading the Russian generalissimo to give the war a less ferocious character; not that this species of war embarrassed the French, for it had not prevented them from procuring subsistence, as was apparent from the abundance they were then enjoying amidst the smoking ruins of Moscow, but because they saw with regret a character impressed upon the war which was simply political,—a revolting character of barbarity and irreconcilable hatred.

Should these representations be listened to, M. de Lauriston was directed to proceed further,—asserting that the war had arisen rather from a misunderstanding than from actual causes of enmity, and was the work of the enemies of the two countries, who had fomented war between them to serve the purposes of England. He was to declare that terms of peace could be easily arranged, and that, if Russia desired it, they would not be rigorous. And, finally, he was to exert him-self to the utmost to obtain at least a provisional armistice.

M. de Lauriston set out on the 4th of October, having previously sent forward a letter to General Kutusoff, announcing his desire for a personal interview with the general of the Russian army. On the same day he reached the enemy's camp. The prudent Russian general, surrounded by the most eager partisans of the war-policy, and the English agents,—by whom he was eagerly watched,—hesitated at first to grant a personal interview to M. de Lauriston, from the fear of

being compromised and called a traitor, as had been Barclay de Tolly. He sent, therefore, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Prince Walkonsky, to receive and entertain the French general at Benningsen's quarters. But M. de Lauriston, offended at this proceeding, refused to confer with Prince Walkonsky, and retired to Murat's head-quarters, declaring that he would only speak with the general-in-chief himself. This sudden rupture of relations somewhat disturbed the Russian staff; for the vehement national hatred against the French began to subside amidst the higher ranks of the army, and they were unwilling to render peace quite impossible. And even the persons opposed to peace regretted the manner in which M. de Lauriston had been treated, although for a different motive,—their fear that this offensive treatment might induce the French army to advance against them full of anger and determination before the Russian army had been reinforced or reorganized. The astute Benningsen, who united cunning with audacity, sought an interview with Murat, and, by feigning a desire for peace which was not real, enticed the latter into making similar protestations, which were but too apparently genuine. Similar interviews took place at the advanced posts between the officers of each army, and a species of armistice was thus established, the result of which was that it was agreed on the part of the Russians to receive M. de Lauriston at head-quarters.

Kutusoff received M. de Lauriston with much politeness, and held with him many and long interviews, in the course of which he declared that he had employed his utmost endeavours to preserve the character of the war, that of a regular war between civilized nations, but he had not been able to compel the Russian peasants to comply with his wishes, and he was not surprised that he had found it impossible to civilize in three months a people whom the French called barbarians. To M. de Lauriston's representations with respect to the burning of Moscow, he replied that he was far from accusing the French, and that he himself believed that this great sacrifice had been the result of Russian patriotism. In answer to the hints respecting the establishment of peace, or even an armistice, he represented himself as completely powerless to negotiate, and as being compelled to refer to the Emperor. He proposed, therefore, and the proposal was accepted, to send the aide-de-camp Walkonsky to St. Petersburg, to convey thither Napoleon's overtures, and to bring back a response. With regard to the armistice, it was agreed that, although the Russian general could not sign one, the advanced posts on either side should cease to carry on hostilities.

Although Napoleon had little expectation of peace after the conflagration of Moscow and the fruitless overtures which had been made through MM. Toutelmine and Jakowleff, he yet considered that it would be well to await the lapse of the ten or twelve days which it was said must pass before an answer could be received from St. Petersburg. Persons thoroughly acquainted with the climate of the country had assured him that the frost would not set in until the middle or end of November, and he could not suppose that by setting out on the 15th or 18th of October he would be setting out too late. In the mean time he made those prepa-



upon Minsk, hastens to reach the Berezina, in order to escape the danger of being surrounded.—Departure of the French army in three columns, and encounter with the Russian army at Krassnoe.—Three days of conflict around Krassnoe, and separation of Ney's corps.—Extraordinary march of this corps for the purpose of rejoining the army.—Napoleon's arrival at Orsha.—He learns that Tchitchakoff and Wittgenstein are about to effect a junction on the Berezina and to cut him off from every means of retreat.—He hastens to reach the bank of this river.—Various deliberation respecting the point at which to effect its passage.—At the moment when it appears impossible to find a suitable one, General Corbineaux arrives, pursued by the Russians, and discovers at Studinka a point at which it is possible to effect the passage of the Berezina.—All the efforts of the army directed upon this point.—Praiseworthy devotion displayed by General Eblé and the corps of pontonniers.—The army employs three days in effecting the passage of the Berezina, and during these three days combats with the enemy both in front and rear.—Napoleon's energy and manifestation of genius in this moment of peril.—Heroic struggle and terrible events at the bridge.—The army, miraculously saved, proceeds to Smorgoni.—Having arrived at this place, Napoleon, after deliberation on the advantages and disadvantages attending such a step, determines to quit the army clandestinely for the purpose of returning to Paris.—He sets out on the 3d of December, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt, Marshal Duroc, Count de Lobau, and General Lefebvre-Desnouettes.—After Napoleon's departure, its disorganization and the sudden havoc of the cold complete the destruction of the army.—Evacuation of Wilna, and arrival of the staffs at Koenigsberg without a soldier.—Characteristics and results of the campaign of 1812.—The real cause of its terrible disaster.

WHILST the course of events proceeded as above narrated at Moscow, the Emperor Alexander, having withdrawn to St. Petersburg, devoted his days and nights to the conduct of the war, although he had renounced the direction of the actual operations of the army on the field,—occupying himself with the general management of the campaign, with providing the necessary supplies, and extending the circle of his alliances.

As has been already narrated, he had refused to treat with the English until the moment of his final rupture with the French, but after the departure from Wilna and the return of Bala-choff he had no longer hesitated, and, the Prince-Royal of Sweden conducting the negotiation, on the 18th of July peace had been signed between Russia and Great Britain, on the simple and brief condition of an alliance offensive and defensive, in manner in which this condition was to be carried out being left to circumstances. Immediately after the signature of peace, Lord Cathcart had hastened to St. Petersburg to be the English representative there; and under the auspices of this ambassador had been arranged an interview, which was the object of the most eager desires of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, since it would afford him the opportunity of receiving the Imperial confidence, and the Imperial assurance that he should be maintained on the Swedish throne and be gratified by the acquisition of Norway. It greatly hurt Alexander's pride to hold an interview with such an ally as Bernadotte; but, as it was of great importance to him to secure the co-operation of the Swedish armies, he had consented to meet the Swedish prince-royal at Abo, the point of Finland nearest to the Swedish boundary; and on the 28th of August it had, accordingly, taken place there, in the presence of Lord Cathcart. Alexander took care on this occasion to make his Russian pride bend to the exigencies of the moment, and, as the reward for his condescension, persuaded the new prince to consent to all the arrangements which Russia desired. It was decided that the Russian corps at that time retained in Finland under pretence of assisting Sweden in obtaining Norway should be sent to the Dwina, and that the Swedish army should be reserved to be thrown upon some point on the French rear; that the whole strength of the allies, in short, should be employed in combatting Napoleon, this being the essential object of the war, and the most certain means of securing to the future King of Sweden the possession of Norway. These arrangements having been made, the prince-royal had then given advice to the Emperor Alexander which was as serviceable to him as injurious to

us, and was expressed in terms of the most bitter enmity. Napoleon, he said, was not the profound military genius he was generally supposed, but was merely an impetuous leader, who knew how to advance but not how to retreat, and might readily be vanquished by perseverance. After the Russians had lost one, two, or three battles, he continued, they would begin to fight drawn battles, and from doubtful engagements would proceed to victories.

Whilst Alexander was entering into these arrangements with Sweden, he had concluded peace with the Porte, on terms somewhat different from those which he had originally flattered himself that he would be able to obtain. After having successively desisted from his demands for Wallachia, for Moldavia as far as the Sereth, and finally for Moldavia altogether, he had finally persisted only in claiming Bessarabia, for the purpose of acquiring at least the mouths of the Danube, and, on the alliance of the Turks, indulging in the chimerical idea of inducing them to invade the Illyrian provinces, perhaps even Italy, in concert with a Russian army. The Turks, weary of the war, and weary also of their relations with the European powers, had imprudently consented to yield up Bessarabia, which a few days' patience would have secured to them, but had resolutely refused to enter into any species of alliance with Russia. The treaty of peace, already signed, remained uncompleted only from this cause; and Admiral Tchitchakoff, finding himself frustrated in the hope of invading the French Empire in company with the Turks, had devised the contrary plan of invading the Turkish Empire itself, and had proposed to Alexander to march directly upon Constantinople for the purpose of seizing it,—hoping that, habituated as the world then was to the overthrow of Italy, this magnificent conquest might be secured to Russia by the arrangements of the next peace. When this proposition was first submitted to Alexander it greatly excited him, and he was on the point of giving orders for carrying it into execution. But fearing, on reflection, that such an action might displease, and even alienate, not only his declared allies, England and Sweden, but even his secret allies, Prussia and Austria, by laying violent hands on Constantinople, considering the difficulty of marching upon this capital with, at the most, fifty thousand men, the imprudence which he would be committing in invading another country when the invader was actually in his own, and the great advantage which might result from moving these fifty thousand men, in conjunction with the thirty thousand under Tormasoff, upon the flanks of the French army, he had restrained his rash friend, Admiral

Tchitchakoff, recommending him to defer his designs upon Constantinople and to march immediately upon Volhynia.

Such were the political arrangements which had been made by Alexander with those able to assist him and with those possessing the power to injure him. On his return to St. Petersburg from the conference at Abo, he had received the news of the battle of Moskowa, and, having at first regarded it as a victory, had sent a marshal's bâton to Prince Kutusoff, together with one hundred thousand roubles for himself and five roubles for each soldier of the army, and ordered that thanksgivings should be offered up in all the churches of the empire. But he had speedily discovered the truth, and was indignant at the impudence of his commander-in-chief, although he did not dare to resent a lie which supported the spirits of his subjects. On receiving news of the capture of Moscow and the catastrophe which had overwhelmed it, he had experienced the most profound emotion; and the impression produced by this event had, indeed, been immense throughout the whole empire, especially in St. Petersburg, where it produced as much consternation as distress.

St. Petersburg, the artificial production of Peter the Great, the seat of government officials, of courtiers, of merchants, of foreigners, was not, as Moscow was, the very heart of Russia, at was rather its head. At first it had desired war, regarding it only as a means of obtaining the renewal of commercial relations with Great Britain; but, now that it had seen how long was the train it had brought with it of sacrifices and dangers, it was far less eager for hostilities. It began to complain of the evils of the system of indefinite retreat, to accuse the Russian generals of treason or of negligence, and the Emperor himself of weakness, and to seek relief from its terror in the use of the most bitter and violent language. General Pfuhl could not appear in the streets without running the risk of being insulted; whilst General Paulucci, who was generally regarded as the representative of opposite views, was received with the most cordial demonstrations of favour.

The idea that Napoleon would immediately march from Moscow to St. Petersburg universally prevailed, and preparations for departure were already commenced. In the mean time, the bolder spirits, who desired war to the death, did not hesitate to declare that if Alexander should weakly hesitate it would be necessary to depose him, and to summon to the throne the Grand Duchess Catharine, his sister, and wife of the Prince of Oldenburg, whose patrimony Napoleon had seized,—a princess of much beauty and spirit, reputed to be very hostile to the French, and residing at this period with her husband, governor of the provinces of Jwer, Jaroslaw, and Kostroma. The moderate party, on the other hand, was anxious that negotiations for peace should be at once entered upon, being terrified at the idea of seeing the French in St. Petersburg, the Emperor flying towards Finland or Archangel. The empress-mother, proud and hostile to the French as she was, had begun to grow timid, and to entertain a desire for peace, as well as the Grand Duke Constantine, who had quitted the army since the loss of Smolensk, and who was opposed to the plan of carrying on in Russia a war to the death, such

as the Spaniards had carried on against the French during the last four years. But the timid expostulations of the advocates for peace, among whom was now, strange to relate, M. Arakotcheff himself, formerly one of the most eager partisans of the war-party, were completely overpowered by the fury of those who demanded a war to the death.

In the mean time, Alexander, profoundly distressed by the destruction of Moscow, and by no means certain that he would be able to defend St. Petersburg, might have yielded to the dictates of his despondency had not his wounded pride supported him. To yield still further to the imperious ally of Tilsit and Erfurth, by whom he had been so disdainfully treated, was a humiliation to which his pride made death seem preferable; and he declared to his intimate associates that he and Napoleon could no longer reign together in Europe; that it was necessary that one or the other should retire from the world's stage. Weary of the chaos of discordant opinions which surrounded him, he had secretly taken the resolution never to yield, and proceeded to take measures which seemed proper to support such a resolution.

As the Russian fleet of Cronstadt would soon become enclosed in the ice, and thus become exposed to the danger of falling into the hands of the French, he determined upon the painful sacrifice of intrusting it to the English,—and, having informed Lord Cathcart of his fears respecting its safety, declared that he confided it to the honour and good faith of Great Britain. The English ambassador, delighted at such a proposal, promised that the deposit should be faithfully guarded, and that the Russian fleet should be received with the most cordial hospitality in the English ports. Alexander, accordingly, having stored in it his most valuable possessions, had the fleet moved towards the Great Belt, in order that it might be able to leave the Baltic at the first signal, under the protection of the British flag. At the same time, much property belonging to the crown, especially the state papers, was conveyed to Archangel.

These precautions having been taken, Alexander proceeded to carry out measures the probable effect of which would be either victory or defeat. He made arrangements with Sweden relative to the despatch to Livonia of the *corps d'armée* of General Steinghel, which had hitherto been retained at Finland, and, renouncing the attractive but dangerous plans of Admiral Tchitchakoff, ordered him to march upon Volhynia, to incorporate there with his own army the troops under General Tormasoff, and with the seventy thousand men who would thus be placed at his disposal to ascend the Dnieper for the purpose of concurring in a concentric movement, which had been planned, of the Russian armies on Napoleon's rear. Among the ideas suggested to him by General Pfuhl was one which had particularly struck Alexander, and was that of operating on the flanks and rear of the French army when it should have been enticed into the interior of the empire. And now that the French army was at Moscow was the time, if ever, to advance upon its line of communication; for the troops left in the rear had nowhere acquired a decided ascendancy, and if Count Wittgenstein, after receiving large reinforcements, could succeed in driving back Mar-

shal St. Cyr from the Dwina, and in advancing himself between Witepsk and Smolensk, whilst Admiral Tchitchakoff, leaving a corps to hold in check the Prince of Schwarzenberg, should ascend the Dnieper and the Beresina for the purpose of acting in concert with Wittgenstein, these two commanders might effect a junction on the Upper Beresina, and there meet the French troops as they returned from Moscow, exhausted by a long march and harassed by Kutusoff.

Induced to adopt this plan by his interviews with General Pfuhl, and encouraged to persevere in them by his aide-de-camp, Michaud, Alexander directed M. de Czernicheff to proceed in succession to Prince Kutusoff, Admiral Tchitchakoff, and Count Wittgenstein, for the purpose of inducing them to concur in its execution. And being occupied, therefore, in such views as these, it was not probable that Alexander would make a favourable answer to Napoleon's overtures, which caused him much satisfaction, as a proof of the embarrassments which the French had begun to experience in the midst of Moscow, and which presaged not only the safety but also the triumph of Russia. As, however, it was of importance to retain Napoleon in Moscow as long as possible, Alexander determined to delay his answer to those overtures, without allowing the enemy to suspect what would be its character.

In the mean time, Napoleon awaited the response to his overtures in the moral agitation of uncertainty, sometimes indulging in expectations of peace, but at length, when Alexander still continued silent long after he must have received the overtures made through MM. Toutelmine and Jakowleff, despairing of this result, and declaring that it was necessary to adopt decisive measures. The weather was extraordinarily fine, and equalled in clearness and mildness any autumn that had ever brooded in September on the plains of Fontainebleau and Compiègne. But in proportion to the present fineness of the weather would be the rapidity of the complete change which it must soon undergo, and the more necessary was it to make immediate preparations for the retreat. The troops of the army were thoroughly refreshed by the repose and the abundance which they had enjoyed, and were full of health and confidence; and it now numbered one hundred thousand effective soldiers of all arms actually present, and possessed six hundred pieces of cannon, well provided with ammunition. The whole state of the army was, indeed, thoroughly satisfactory, with the exception of its deficiency in the means of transport; for, whilst the men were strong and healthy, the horses, but very meagrely supplied with forage, were thin and feeble, and in a condition which was a source of the greatest anxiety.

On the 12th of October—a date at which it was impossible that any answer to the communication made to Kutusoff on the 5th should have arrived—Napoleon perceived that it was absolutely necessary to take some decided steps, and that he ought, if he intended to remain in Moscow, to drive back the Russians from their cantonment, and if he intended to depart to commence his retreat immediately, before the setting in of unfavourable weather. He had already ordered the departure of all the wounded

capable of being removed, and given directions that every thing should be in readiness at Smolensk to assist the progress of the army in whatever direction he might order. But still he hesitated, withheld by the reflection that the first backward step which he took would be the commencement of a series of painful and dangerous confessions,—confessions that he had advanced too far, that he was unable to maintain his position at that distance, that he had deceived himself, that he had failed to attain the object for the sake of which he had entered on the campaign. And what defections, what ideas of rebellion, would there be excited by the spectacle of Napoleon, hitherto invincible, compelled to retreat!

Shrinking from this danger, he constantly brooded over the idea of either passing the winter in Moscow, or of executing a movement which, while it conducted him nearer to his magazines, would have the appearance of being a manœuvre and not a retreat. The plan of passing the winter in Moscow was one of singular audacity, and was not without its partisans, the chief of whom was a man whose opinion deserved the greatest respect, and who was M. Daru, accompanying Napoleon as secretary of state, and in this character charged with all the details of the management of the army. This eminent administrator considered that it would be easier to feed the army in Moscow, and to secure its communications whilst it remained there, than to convey it safely and in good condition to Smolensk, by an unknown route should a new one be adopted, or a devastated one should it retrace the path by which it had advanced. The great difficulty was not how to find the means of subsistence,—for the army possessed, as has already been observed, great stores of corn, rice, vegetables, spirituous liquors, and salted provisions,—but how to provide forage for the horses, which were dying of inanition, and for whom it was found scarcely possible to provide food even at a season which was far from being the least favourable of the year. But, even if this difficulty could be overcome, there remained the no less serious difficulty of maintaining the communications between the posts on the route from Smolensk to Moscow, for which purpose it would be necessary to convert each post into a fortress, and to garrison them with forces which would necessarily amount in the aggregate to twelve or fifteen thousand men, without taking into consideration those which would be necessary at Dorogobouge, Wiasma, Ghjat, Mojaisk, and many other places of less importance, but which it would, nevertheless, be necessary to defend. And what would happen in Paris—what would take place in Europe—if, in spite of all the care which might be taken to keep open the communications, there should some day be no news of Napoleon, and if he should be separated from the Empire as Massena had been during the campaign in Portugal? And, finally, supposing that all these difficulties should be successfully overcome, what advantage, it was asked, would the French have gained by being at the commencement of the succeeding spring in Moscow? In Moscow, which was one hundred and eighty leagues from St. Petersburg,—one hundred and eighty leagues of the most difficult road, without taking into account the one hundred leagues be-

reen Smolensk and Moscow, and which would use the number of leagues to be traversed by the reinforcements which the grand army would require when about to march for St. Petersburg, to two hundred and eighty leagues; whilst, if it took up a position at Witepsk, the distance which would thus have to be traversed could only be one hundred and fifty leagues.

But although there were, therefore, such serious objections to the plan of passing the winter in Moscow, Napoleon was so averse to making a retrograde step that he would not entirely resign this plan, and, whilst he sent away the wounded so that they might not encumber his movements, he fortified the Kremlin and brought up reinforcements for the army.

In the mean time, Napoleon's real inclinations pointed towards the execution of that long-conceived manœuvre which, whilst it carried him towards Poland by an oblique march towards the north, would have placed him behind the Duke of Belluna at Veliki-Luki, and would have made him appear not as in retreat, it as accomplishing an offensive movement against St. Petersburg. But, unfortunately, each succeeding day found the army more adverse to any movement northward; and in the mean time, by the news from the South, it appeared that, whilst the French forces remained inert, Admiral Tchitchakoff, returning from Turkey after the signature of peace with the Turks, had traversed Podolia and Volhynia, and the neutrality of Galicia having been secured by secret agreement with Austria, had penetrated as far as the bank of the Styr for the purpose of reinforcing Tormasoff; and that even, having assumed the command of the detached forces, which numbered sixty thousand men, he had compelled Schwarzenberg and Sýmyer, whose combined troops amounted to more than thirty-six thousand, to fall back upon the Bug, and behind the Pinsk marshes, for the purpose of covering the grand duchy. An army was once more filled with alarm, and exclamations that Napoleon had abandoned Poland, and complaints that he had not incorporated Lithuania with it, were made excuses for taking no active steps towards either sending recruits or *matériel* to Prince Poniatowski.

This being the state of affairs, and a movement to the north, therefore, most objectionable, Napoleon devised a mixed combination, consisting in an advance upon the Taroutino camp, driving back Kutusoff either to the right or the left, then advancing upon Kalouga, drawing thither the forces under the Duke of Belluna by the Jelnia route, or, at least, a strong division already at Smolensk, and thus taking up his winter quarters at Kalouga, in the midst of a fertile country, in a somewhat less rigorous climate, in communication by his right with Smolensk and by his rear with Moscow. At the same time he proposed to guard the Kremlin by leaving there Marshal Mortier with four thousand men of the Young Guard, four thousand men of the dismounted cavalry converted into battalions of infantry, with six months' provisions, and to deposit there the heaviest portion of his *matériel*, his wounded, sick, and stragglers.

This plan, the execution of which would have been so far from bearing any resemblance to a retreat that it would, on the contrary, have

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carried the French army into new provinces, which were the finest and the most central of all Russia, was not the one which Napoleon preferred, but was the one which appeared the most suitable in the existing position of affairs. A slight frost having occurred on the 18th of October, whilst the weather still remained as fine as before, it was universally declared that the moment had come when it was necessary to decide. Napoleon assembled his marshals for the purpose of receiving their advice, and Prince Eugene, Major-General Berthier, Daru, the minister of state, Marshals Mortier, Davout, and Ney, obeyed his summons,—Murat and Bessières being absent, because compelled to be present before the Taroutino camp. The first question discussed by the council was the state of each corps, and the second, what plan of operations it would be most wise to adopt. The consideration of the state of the corps could not but be productive of sadness, for that of Marshal Davout was reduced from seventy-two thousand to twenty-nine or thirty thousand; that of Marshal Ney from thirty-nine thousand to ten or eleven thousand; whilst Prince Poniatowski's troops numbered no more than five thousand, the Westphalian two thousand, and the Guard, which had not been in action, twenty-two thousand. In fact, inclusive of the engineer and artillery troops, the army, which on its passage of the Niemen had numbered four hundred and twenty thousand men, and on its departure from Witepsk one hundred and seventy-five thousand, was now reduced to but little more than a hundred thousand. At the same time, however, the condition of the men was satisfactory, and they were full of courage, although rendered somewhat uneasy by the hazardous nature of the position which they occupied.

With respect to the plan of operations to be adopted there was much diversity of opinion,—Marshal Davout expressing himself strongly in favour of the Kalouga route, and intimating very plainly his opinion that the army had already delayed too long at Moscow, whilst Major-General Berthier, accustomed to make his opinions conform to those of Napoleon, and conscious of the preference of the Emperor for the northern route, proposed that the return should be upon Witepsk, the line of march lying laterally to the Smolensk route, by Woskresensk, Wolokolmsk, Zubkow, Bieloi. Marshal Mortier, loyal and submissive, concurred in this opinion, whilst Ney, on the contrary, giving way to his natural roughness and indocility, reiterated Marshal Davout's opinion that the army had already delayed too long at Moscow. Prince Eugene, too timid to maintain any opinion contrary to that of the staff as represented by Berthier, acquiesced in the views supported by the latter; and M. Daru, putting forward an independent opinion, declared that the army ought to remain at Moscow during the winter; since, he maintained, provisions of all sorts could be obtained then in sufficient abundance, and the adoption of this plan would relieve the army from the double inconvenience of a retreat, and a movement across districts which were either unknown or devastated, at an advanced period of the year.

When Napoleon sought the counsels of others he usually received them without remark, reserving his own opinion; and the perplexities

in which he was involved were sufficient cause for his silence on this occasion. He was most anxious to remain, but he perceived the difficulty there would be, should he adopt that measure, in obtaining provisions for the army and maintaining his communications, and, at the same time, the approach of the bad season and the appearance of Admiral Tchitchakoff upon the Lower Dnieper were forcible arguments against a movement northward, and in favour of the plan of marching upon Kalouga, establishing the army in winter-quarters in this rich province, leaving a garrison at the Kremlin, and posting the Duke of Belluna at Jelina, for the purpose of maintaining communications with Smolensk. This plan, therefore, was the one finally selected; but still the vague hope of receiving some answer from St. Petersburg, the difficulty attending the evacuation on account of the want of wagons, the fineness of the weather, and the natural repugnance to commence a retrograde movement, caused a further delay of four or five days, and the final orders were about to be given directing the march upon Kalouga, when on the 18th of October a sudden and serious occurrence caused the most unfortunate delay.

On the morning of the 18th, in fact, as Napoleon was reviewing Marshal Ney's corps, the firing of cannon was heard from the south, in the direction of the Kalouga route, and almost immediately afterwards information arrived that Murat, who had relied on the assurance given by the Russians that they would give him some hours' warning before commencing hostilities, had been surprised and attacked that morning by the whole Russian army, and, although he had extricated himself from his peril by means of courage and good fortune, that yet he had only succeeded in doing so with the loss of men and cannon.

Although Kutusoff, whose army was now raised by the arrival of reinforcements to eighty thousand infantry and regular cavalry and twenty thousand Cossacks, had determined to risk nothing against such an enemy as Napoleon, and only to attack him when he should have already been three parts vanquished by the climate, the position occupied by Murat was well calculated to induce him to break this resolution. Situated in the midst of a great plain, behind the Czerniczna ravine, Murat had his right covered by the deepest portion of this ravine which fell into the Nara, but his left was unprotected, since the ravine in that direction was not of sufficient depth to be a defence against an enemy's attacks. By taking advantage of a wood which extended between the two camps, and which would serve to screen its movements, the Russian army could easily debouch on Murat's left, turn him, cut him off from Woronowo, and might possibly succeed in destroying his corps, which comprised, besides Poniatowski's infantry, almost the whole French cavalry.

The ardent Colonel Toll had reconnoitred this position in concert with General Bennigsen, and induced Kutusoff to consent to the execution of a bold *coup de main*, the success of which would, he declared, so greatly enfeeble the French army that it would immediately sink into a great numerical inferiority to that of Russia. On the evening of the 17th of October,

therefore, General Orloff-Denisoff, with a great mass of cavalry and many regiments of foot-chasseurs, and General Bagowouth, with his whole infantry, received orders to advance secretly across the wood which lay between the two camps, and to debouch suddenly upon the French left, whilst the bulk of the Russian army marched directly upon Winkowo.

This manoeuvre had been executed during the night of the 17th, and on the morning of the 18th General Sebastiani had found himself suddenly attacked, and, being unprepared for such a movement on the part of the enemy, lost some pieces of cannon, several hundreds of men taken prisoners by the enemy, and a considerable quantity of baggage. But nevertheless, by means of prodigies of valour, in the course of which he dispersed Orloff-Denisoff's cavalry and sabred four battalions of infantry, and by means also of ill-judged tactics on the part of the Russians, Murat succeeded in falling back in safety upon Woronowo, as much a conqueror as vanquished, and in possession of the Moscow route. He had lost about fifteen hundred men, whilst the loss on the side of the Russians was about two thousand.

On receiving this information, Napoleon was excessively irritated on account of the carelessness of Murat and his lieutenants on the one hand, and the breach of good faith displayed by the Russians on the other.

At the same time he saw that the best means of chastising the latter would be to put into execution the proposed march upon the Kalouga route; and he accordingly immediately ordered Prince Eugene, Marshals Ney and Davout, and the Guard, to prepare during the afternoon of the 18th of October for departure on the following morning. Being unwilling to resign possession of Moscow, he directed Marshal Mortier to establish himself there with ten thousand men, and placed such of the wounded as were incapable of being removed in the foundling-hospital, under the care of the worthy General Toutainne. He gave orders also to General Janot to hold himself in readiness to quit Mojaïsk at any moment, for the purpose of marching upon Smolensk, to the governor of which place he wrote, directing him to throw upon Jelina a division which had been formed of the *troupe de marche* under General Baraguey-d'Hilliers, and ordered the Duke of Belluna to prepare to follow it. He took all those preliminary measures, in short, which would be necessary whether he should execute a simple movement upon Kalouga, retaining possession of Moscow, or a definitive retreat upon Witepsk and Smolensk.

On the morning of the 19th of October, the first day of this retreat which was to be ever memorable for the misery and the heroism by which it was to be signalized, the corps under Prince Eugene commanded the movement of the army, followed successively by those of Marshals Davout and Ney and the Imperial Guard. The cavalry under Murat, the Poles under Prince Poniatowski, a division of Marshal Davout's corps under General Fredericks, were at Woronowo, in front of the Russian rear-guard; and General Broussier's division of Prince Eugene's corps had for some days past occupied a position on the new Kalouga route, which passed between the old Kalouga route



(now followed by the bulk of the army) and that of Smolensk.

The rear of the retreating army presented a strange spectacle; for after the immense mass of ammunition which had been provided for the abundant supply of six hundred cannon, by which the army was accompanied, came a vast quantity of baggage, such as had never been seen in motion since the barbarous ages when, over the whole surface of Europe, entire populations were wont to displace themselves for the purpose of seeking new territories.

The wagons of the country, filled with prisoners and the spoils rescued from the flames of Moscow, followed each regiment, each battalion; and in the wake of the army moved a species of deplorable colony, composed of the French, Italian, and German families which had dared to remain with us in Moscow, but feared to await the return of the Russians, and had demanded permission to accompany us.

This strange and immense appendage to the army was a source of considerable anxiety and even alarm, for how, it was asked, would it be possible for the army to manoeuvre when burdened by such an encumbrance? and how, moreover, to resist the attacks of the Cossacks? Bound by these considerations, Napoleon was strongly inclined to give orders which would relieve the army from this source of embarrassment; but on reflection it occurred to him that the accidents which would occur on the line of march, and the daily consumption of provisions, would speedily reduce the mass of baggage to more moderate dimensions, and that it was unnecessary, therefore, to distress its proprietors by rigorous regulations.

The army occupied the whole of the 19th in effecting its departure from Moscow, and had not, at the most, proceeded on its march more than three or four leagues on that day; but on the following day, the 20th, the weather still continuing fine, it was enabled, by means of a forced march, to encamp between the Desna and the Pakra. Napoleon, who had remained at Moscow during the 19th for the purpose of superintending the evacuation, set out on the morning of the 20th, and, having speedily arrived at the château de Troitskoié, there formed a sudden resolution of the utmost importance. He had set out from Moscow, not with the idea of beating a retreat, but with the intention of punishing the enemy for the manner in which he had surprised our troops at Winkowo, of driving him back beyond Kalouga, and taking up a position in this city, communicating on the one hand with the troops marched from Smolensk upon Jelnia, and on the other with Marshal Mortier, who had been left at the Kremlin. But as soon as he had glanced at the enemy's position he modified his plan with the most admirable promptitude. The fact was that there were two routes by which he could reach Kalouga,—the one to the right, parallel to that of Smolensk, called the new route, passing by Scherapowo, Fominskoié, Borowski, and Malo-Jaroslawets, entirely free from the enemy, occupied by the division Broussier, and for the most part passing through countries which had not been devastated, the other, that which the French army was actually following, passing by

tino, in the possession of the Russians, who had established themselves upon it in a camp which had been carefully constructed; and the brilliant manoeuvre which Napoleon now suddenly devised was to avoid an engagement with the enemy, which would probably cost him twelve or fifteen thousand men, by secretly defiling in front of the Russian army, concealing the movement by making a sudden détour to the right, which would carry the army from the old Kalouga route to the new and place it out of danger of attack from the enemy. But whilst the adoption of this plan would enable the French army to recover its endangered communications, and conduct it to the most fertile district it could possibly find in these regions at this season, it would involve the necessity of definitely abandoning Moscow; for, should it adopt the plan of avoiding instead of engaging and vanquishing the Russians, and leave them between itself and Moscow, unvanquished and a hundred thousand strong, it would be unable to maintain Marshal Mortier in his position in the Kremlin, since it could not, in this case, send him aid. Napoleon, therefore, determining upon his line of action with all the promptitude of a great captain, immediately sent orders to Marshal Mortier to evacuate the Kremlin, to destroy it by means of mines which had been already prepared, and to rejoin the army by the Wereja route. At the same time he sent orders to Junot to evacuate Mojaïsk with the last columns of the wounded by the Smolensk route, which the army was about to cover by its presence on the new Kalouga route.

These orders having been despatched relative to the evacuation of Moscow, Napoleon devoted his attention to the movement from left to right, which he had determined that the army should execute for the purpose of proceeding from the old Kalouga route to the new. He planned that the army should make this movement by the road running from Gorki to Fominskoié by Ignatowo, and ordered Prince Eugene, a portion of whose cavalry and the division Broussier were already at Fominskoié, to make the first advance in this new direction, Marshal Davout to follow him, and the Guard to follow Davout. Marshal Ney, who remained at Gorki with his corps, with the Polish division Claparède and a portion of the light cavalry, was to replace Murat in front of Woronowo, to render himself conspicuous before the Russian advanced posts, and to make demonstrations in the neighbourhood of Podolsk, continuing this species of comedy until the evening of the 23d, so as to deceive the Russians as long as possible and thus allow time for the passage of our baggage, and then was to carry his own troops from the old Kalouga route to the new by forced marches, reaching Malo-Jaroslawetz by the 25th.

The chief obstacle to the successful execution of this brilliant manoeuvre consisted in the enormous bulk of the masses of men and baggage which would have to be moved. With such an army as Napoleon had commanded in Italy, or such a one as that led by General Moreau in Germany, such a movement as that which Napoleon had now devised would have been successfully executed and formed one of the most illustrious claims to glory of him who had conceived it; but the circumstances under

which Napoleon had to attempt it were such as to render its execution a matter of extreme difficulty.

Having in this strange manner, then, and in a sudden moment of inspiration, as it were, resolved to beat a retreat and to evacuate Moscow, Napoleon passed the day between Troitskoïé and Krasnoé-Pakra, for the purpose of personally assisting in ordering the defiling of the army, which continued to present a spectacle as extraordinary as it was a subject of anxiety, by reason of the burdens which encumbered its rear, and which at every ravine, at every little bridge, at every village, caused a deplorable delay, which gave ample intimation of the terrible consequences which might be expected to ensue when the army should be pursued by the enemy's innumerable light cavalry.

Prince Eugene's corps having been fatigued by the long march which it had executed on the 21st from Gorki to Fominskoïé, it had been permitted to halt during the 22d for the purpose of reposing and bringing up its baggage and being strengthened by the addition of Marshal Davout's five divisions, which would raise its force to fifty thousand of the best infantry in the world. On the same day Napoleon himself proceeded from Ignatowo, where he had passed the night of the 21st, to Fominskoïé, and carried Prince Poniatowski's troops somewhat more to the right, for the purpose of forming a closer communication with the Smolensk route, by which was to be effected the removal of the wounded and the *matériel* under the care of General Junot.

On the 23d Prince Eugene reached Barowsk, and but a step was wanting to complete the execution of the manoeuvre which Napoleon had planned on the evening of the 20th, for at Barowsk we were on the new Kalouga route. This little town was situated beyond a river named the Lougea, and by Napoleon's orders Prince Eugene sent forward General Delzons from Barowsk, which had been reached at an early hour, for the purpose of arriving at Malo-Jaroslawetz the same day.

In the mean time the Russian army remained with singular carelessness at its camp at Taroutino, perfectly unconscious of the humiliation which was being prepared for it, and supposing only that Napoleon intended to attack and carry Taroutino in revenge for the surprise at Winkowo. Nevertheless, the light troops of General Doctoroff having given intimation of the presence at Fominskoïé of Broussier's division, which had been during some days past in occupation of the new Kalouga route, Kutusoff imagined that the purpose of this division was to connect the main body of the French army, which was now distinctly visible on the old Kalouga route, with the troops which pursued the Smolensk route; and he resolved to seize it, considering it to be in a position very open to his attack. He intrusted the execution of the proposed measure to General Doctoroff; but the latter, having advanced as far as Aristowo on the 22d, believed that he had discovered before him something more considerable than a simple division; and as information, moreover, reached Kutusoff, on the morning of the 23d, that French troops had been observed executing a transverse movement from Krasnoé-Pakra to Fominskoïé, it became evident to the Russian general that

Napoleon had abandoned the old Kalouga route for the purpose of reaching the new and turning the Taroutino camp. To stop Napoleon at Barowsk was not, therefore, any longer possible; and the only chance which the Russians now had of barring his road was by advancing to Malo-Jaroslawetz, behind the Lougea. Kutusoff therefore ordered Doctoroff to proceed thither with the utmost despatch, and at the same time made the most strenuous exertions to assemble his army so as to be able to direct it, by way of Letachewa, upon Malo-Jaroslawetz, the possession of which it appeared probable would decide the campaign.

On the 24th, General Doctoroff, having passed the Protwa,—a little river into which fall the Lougea, below Malo-Jaroslawetz,—arrived at daybreak in front of Malo-Jaroslawetz itself, which is situated on the heights at the foot of which flows the Lougea, through a marshy channel. The French, coming from Moscow, had to cross the Lougea, then to climb the heights, and to maintain their ground in Malo-Jaroslawetz, whilst the Russians, marching by their left on the other side of the river, had to throw themselves into the town and to drive us out of it, hurling us from the heights into the bed of the Lougea beneath them. At five o'clock on the morning of the 24th of October, the Russians commenced the attack, bringing up eleven or twelve thousand men against the five or six thousand under Delzons, and by means of this superiority succeeding in compelling the latter to give way. The brave General Delzons fell, sword in hand, mortally wounded; and Prince Eugene, sending General Guilleminot, the chief of his staff, to replace him, hastened himself with the division Broussier to retrieve the fortune of the conflict, leaving in reserve on the other side of the Lougea the division Pino, together with the Italian Guard.

The division Broussier, penetrating into the town, chased Doctoroff's troops from street to street, and compelled them to fall back upon the plateau; but at this time the corps of General Raefskoi, preceding the Russian army, arrived at the town, and immediately took part in the furious struggle which the Russians were making to check the French in their desired retreat upon Kalouga. Nevertheless, the French, although now only ten or eleven thousand against twenty-four thousand enemies, and exposed to a furious fire of artillery, held their ground. The unhappy town, which was soon in flames, was taken and retaken no less than six times, and the combat was carried on in the midst of a conflagration which destroyed the wounded and calcined their corpses. At length, just as we were about to be finally driven back, the Italian division Pino, which had not hitherto engaged the enemy in this campaign, and which was most eager to distinguish itself, crossed the stream, and, climbing the heights, reached the plateau in spite of a furious fire, and, debouching on the left of the town, drove back the masses of the Russian infantry; but Raefskoi's corps speedily attacked it, and, in spite of its firmness, it was in great need of reinforcements, when the chasseurs of the Royal Italian Guard hastened up in their turn and supported it with the utmost valour; and Malo-Jaroslawetz, having been retaken for the seventh time by the French with the aid of the Italians, remained in our

tered with thousands of corpses and smouldering ruins.

Nothing drew on, however, it was by no means certain that the battle was over, or that the point would be left in our hands, masses of the Russian army were seen towards it at quick march. For, however, two of the divisions of the army arrived under the command of Marut, and with this reinforcement it was not that the French would be able to resist the attempts of the enemy; and, in fact, the perceiving the advance of reinforcement destroyed all hope of being able again to stand, and fell back somewhat less than a league in our hands the fearful battle which lay the corpses of four thousand dead Italians and six thousand Russians. On bivouacked a little in the rear of the army at the village of Gorodina, convinced of the success of the manoeuvre, which would be a successful had he attempted to execute the head of less considerable numbers, longer possible without fighting a desperate battle, which would probably add ten thousand to the immense encumbrances the army was already burdened. He spent the night deliberating on the favourable chances of a determined march towards the Lougea, and early on the morning of the next day moved to reconnoitre the position taken by the Russians. Setting out from the village of Gorodina, surrounded by his principal staff, he had reached the bank of the Lougea, about to cross it, when suddenly were tumultuous cries of a number of soldiers from a body of about four or five Cossacks, who had passed the Lougea with a display of that skill in the surprise which is so distinguishing of these indefatigable savages. The Platow and the whole Cossack nation instantly brooding over the idea of effecting the capture of Napoleon and taking him to Moscow, considering that hundreds of millions would not be too great a reward for the capture; and on this occasion, had but left them been acquainted with the opinion of him with respect to whom they had this dream of avidity, it might have been averted. Rushing right and left, they charged against the Imperial group, with light sword in hand in a close circle around Napoleon, who smiled at the misadventure, fortunately, the dragoons of the Imperial Guard perceived the danger, hastened to the command of the brave lieutenant, and, throwing themselves upon the invaders, rebuffed some and drove the remainder from the Lougea.

He then affected to consider this incident of no consequence, and continued the reconnaissance had commenced,—advancing close to the enemy's army, which Kutusoff had posted in a strong ravine, thus throwing upon the enemy should they venture upon an attack, the chance of fighting with the Lougea behind them. Having carefully and silently studied the position of the enemy's position, Napoleon passed the Lougea, and discussed with the staff in a farm of the village of Gorodina the plan of action which it would be most wise to adopt, and on the selection of which depended

the fate of the grand army, and, consequently, that of the Empire also.

He laid the question which had to be decided before the generals who were present, and permitted them to express their candid opinions upon it, for the serious state of affairs was incompatible with either reserve or flattery. Would it be better to persevere in the proposed line of march, and to fight another battle for the purpose of opening the way to Kalouga, or simply to fall back by the right upon Mojaïsk, in order to regain the grand Smolensk route? To the former plan there was the great objection that its adoption would compel the French army to fight a battle which would probably cost it twenty thousand men and reduce it to a dangerous equality with the Russian army, besides compelling it either to carry with it or to abandon some ten thousand wounded. But to adopt the latter plan would, on the other hand, render it necessary for the French troops to make a march of a hundred leagues across a country which the Russian and French armies had already converted into a desert. A great portion of the provisions brought from Moscow had been consumed in the seven days' march to Malo-Jaroslavetz, and the remainder would certainly be finished during the three days which must still elapse before the army could reach Mojaïsk. And thus, should this latter plan be adopted, there would have been uselessly wasted ten days' march and ten days' provisions, which, had the army made use of them simply in pursuing the Smolensk route, would have enabled it to advance a considerable distance towards this city, or at least to have reached Dorogobouge, where it would have found the convoys sent to meet it.

But, although it must ever be the subject of regret that this plan was not adopted, the French army could not and ought not to have ventured to put it into execution. The unanimous opinion of the council which now sat under the roof of an obscure Russian cottage was in favour of an immediate and direct retreat by Mojaïsk and the beaten Smolensk route; but Marshal Davout, whilst fully sharing in the opinion that it was absolutely necessary to renounce the attempt to force a path to Kalouga, nevertheless proposed the adoption of a line of march which still remained open, and which, lying between the new Kalouga route, occupied by Kutusoff, and the Smolensk route, filled with desolation, passed, by Medouin, Jouknow, and Jelnia, across a country which was undevastated and abounded in provisions.

This advice, however, was received very coldly by Davout's colleagues, who saw safety only in the line of march which led most directly to the Smolensk route, and which was that which lay by Mojaïsk; whilst Napoleon himself inclined neither to the opinion of Davout nor to that of his other lieutenants, still persisting in thinking that the best plan would be to give the enemy battle, to penetrate to Kalouga, and thus to establish himself victoriously in that fertile province, from which the Russians took so much pains to withhold us. The moral strength resulting from a victory would, Napoleon considered, compensate for the diminution in numbers which must necessarily be one of its consequences. At the same time, he could not consider with composure the idea of leaving behind him in agony on the battle-field some ten thousand wounded.

Perplexed, agitated, tormented by the opposite views which were presented to his consideration, he knew not on what course to decide, and in this moment of hesitation, with a familiarity which he sometimes permitted himself to display towards his lieutenants, taking hold of the ear of Count Lobau, the old General Monton, he demanded of him what he thought of the various courses of action which had been proposed. Count Lobau immediately replied that he considered it most advisable to depart as soon as possible, and by the shortest road, from a country in which the French army had already delayed too long; and the decided manner in which this opinion was expressed seemed to induce Napoleon to adopt the general opinion; but still he deferred making his final decision until the morrow.

In the mean time, Ney, having quitted Gorki during the night of the 23d, was at this time defiling behind the main body of the army, and was two days' march distant from its head. Rain had suddenly come down during the night of the 23d, and, softening the roads, had rendered the labour of the horses far beyond their strength. The bivouac was already cold, and every thing wore the same sad and sombre aspect.

On the 26th of October, at a very early hour, Napoleon reconnoitred the new position taken up by the Russians, and found them to be making, apparently, a retrograde movement, with the purpose, probably, of taking up a better position and one in which they might more advantageously defend the Kalouga route. In the mean time, Prince Poniatowski, having, unfortunately, attempted to advance along the Medouin road,—the intermediate route which had been pointed out by Marshal Davout,—had experienced there a check which was not likely to recommend the adoption of this line of march; and Napoleon at length resolved to execute a direct retreat by the Smolensk route, and gave the necessary orders for its execution.

The definitive movement in retreat commenced on the 26th of October; and from this moment a feeling of deep despondency prevailed over the whole army, for they could no longer deceive themselves by the idea in which they had hitherto indulged, that they were executing manœuvres and passing through fertile countries for the purpose of reaching more favourable climes; since it was, on the contrary, quite evident that the army was making a compulsory retreat by a route which had already been traversed and on which the troops could only expect to meet with misery.

On the 27th of October the army was on its march from Malo-Jaroslawetz upon Wercja, the Guard leading the way, Murat and Ney following the Guard, Eugene's corps being next in order, and Davout's bringing up the rear and consequently having to encounter the largest share of difficulties and dangers,—since it was embarrassed by the mass of baggage which the preceding corps left behind them in their haste to reach their bivouacs, to endure continually the fire of the enemy's artillery and the unceasing incursions of the Cossacks.

For the due performance of the harassing duties which thus fell upon the rear-guard it was necessary that the infantry should be assisted by a numerous body of cavalry; but, as Davout found, at the third march, that Grouchy's ca-

valry was so excessively fatigued that there was danger of its total destruction, he determined to perform the services required of the rear-guard with his infantry alone.

And now failure of the means of transport already began to strew the roads not only with baggage, but also with the wounded. For a few days the wounded had been carried on with the army by means of giving up all the baggage-wagons to their use, without exception even of those of the staff; but at every step it now became absolutely necessary to leave some behind from the want of means of transport; and Davout, who, stern and inflexible as he was, was distracted by this cruel necessity, stated his embarrassments to the staff,—which, occupying a position at the head of the army, gave too little attention to what was taking place in the rear. In the mean time, Napoleon, who had long been accustomed to intrust the execution of details to his lieutenants, who had at this time no great manœuvre to order, and was, moreover, profoundly humiliated by the retreat, which could no longer be dissimulated, began to remain perpetually in the midst of his staff, confining himself to the expression of blame directed against Davout's management of the rear-guard, declaring that he was too methodical and marched too slowly; and he added to the difficulties of the rear-guard, by ordering, in his irritation against the Russians, the destruction of the villages on the line of march, and thus, as he neglected to confine the performance of this duty to Davout's corps, deprived the rear-guard of food and shelter which it might otherwise have obtained.

Three painful days were thus employed in the march to Mojaïsk; but still the army was full of confidence, for the first difficulties of the retreat had fallen almost exclusively on the rear-guard. From Mojaïsk, seven or eight days' march would carry the army to Smolensk; and, as the weather, although cold, was still fine, the troops hoped to find at Smolensk repose, abundance, and good winter quarters.

Marshal Mortier had rejoined the army at Wercja, having, previous to his departure from Moscow, blown up the Kremlin and made an important capture, being that of M. de Wintzingerode, who was a Wurtembergian by birth, and who, having entered the Russian service, commanded a corps of partisans in the environs of Moscow. Believing that the French had departed, he had ventured into the city a little too soon, and had been taken prisoner with one of his aide-de-camps, a young man of the Narishkin family. When these two officers were brought before Napoleon, he received M. de Wintzingerode with great sternness, deciding that, as he was of the Confederation of the Rhine, he was therefore his—Napoleon's—subject, and consequently a rebel, and should be tried by a military commission that he might be treated according to the rigour of the law. He behaved with more gentleness towards the younger prisoner, simply expressing his surprise that a young man of noble family should condescend to serve under one of those mercenaries by which Russia was infested. But Napoleon's officers, who regretted, for the sake of his own dignity and that of the French army, the manner in which he had treated M. de Wintzingerode, showed this officer the utmost civility and kindness.

The army, having arrived on the Mojaïsk

heights, bivouacked on the field of the battle of Borodino, and could not but experience, as it gazed upon it once more, the most painful emotions. In a peopled country a field is soon freed from the signs of deadly strife; but in this instance, the inhabitants of Mojaïsk and the surrounding country having fled, there had been none to remove the fifty thousand corpses, the broken wagons, the dismounted cannon, the innumerable arms and pieces of armour with which the conflict had strewn the ground. The corpses were half devoured by beasts of prey, and swarms of carrion-birds, filling the air with sinister cries, obscured the heavens. The frost which had begun to prevail during the nights had fortunately checked the dangerous exhalations which would have otherwise proceeded from the corpses, but had rather increased than diminished the repulsiveness of their appearance. The reflections inspired by this spectacle were of the most sombre character. How many had been the victims, it was said, and how futile the results! From Wilna to Witepsk, from Witepsk to Smolensk, and still on to Wiasma and Ghjat, had the army hurried for the purpose of engaging the enemy in a decisive battle at Borodino: this battle had at length been fought, and the army had then marched on to Moscow to reap there the fruit of its victory, and had found there only a vast conflagration. From thence it had been forced to retreat without having forced the enemy to submission, to retreat without adequate resources, with the certainty of having to pass a painful winter in Poland, and with scarcely any hope of peace, since peace would scarcely be the result of a retreat which was evidently compulsory; and for such results as these had the earth been strewn with fifty thousand corpses!

Anxious that the troops should not be utterly overcome by so melancholy a spectacle, Napoleon ordered that each regiment should stay only during one night at Borodino. The army found there poor General Junot, who was suffering from his wound and still more from the contemptuous treatment he had received during the campaign, and whose troops were now reduced to little more than three thousand from the ten thousand they had numbered at Smolensk and the fifteen thousand they had numbered at the passage of the Niemen. Whilst the main army was at Moscow he had devoted himself to the care of the wounded in the Kolotskoi Abbey, and had conveyed as many as he was able to Smolensk. There still remained, however, two thousand to be transported thither, and Napoleon, still full of solicitude as he ever was with respect to the wounded, gave orders that every person, without exception, whether officer, canonier, or fugitive from Moscow, who possessed any species of vehicle, should undertake the conveyance of a certain number of the wounded. The surgeon Larrey, whose goodness of heart knew no bounds, had already hastened forward for the purpose of bestowing on the wounded in the Kolotskoi Abbey all the resources of his skill. He found there some Russian officers who owed their lives to his care; and, when they expressed the extreme gratitude they felt towards him, he demanded of them, as the sole recompense he would receive, that they would pledge their honour that when they should themselves be free they would bestow upon other unfortunates, who

might then be in their power, such care as they had themselves received from the surgeon-in-chief of the French army. They unanimously gave the required promise, and it is known to God alone whether they paid the debt contracted with the best of men.

The rear-guard quitted this frightful spot on the morning of the 31st, and passed the night of that day on the road leading to the little city of Ghjat. The night was extremely cold, and from this time the troops suffered bitterly from the lowness of the temperature. The enemy continued to follow us with regular cavalry, artillery, and swarms of Cossacks, under the command of the Hetman Platow. But we saw nothing more of the main body of the Russian army. General Kutusoff, since Malo-Jaroslawetz, had been as much perplexed as his adversary had been despondent; for, whilst his prudence made him very unwilling to fight murderous battles with an enemy whom exhaustion and the elements would of themselves sooner or later overcome, he was constantly urged by presumptuous and passionate youth, and the English officers present in his camp, to adopt more decisive measures. The day after the conflict at Malo-Jaroslawetz, whilst Napoleon had retreated upon Mojaïsk, he had himself retreated upon Kalouga, as far as a place named Gonzerowo, under pretence of covering the Medouin route, which he might have more securely covered by remaining at Malo-Jaroslawetz,—his real object being to avoid a battle.

As soon as he had been informed that Napoleon had reached Mojaïsk, he had determined to follow us; but, taking the most northerly road, leading to Witepsk, Woskresensk, Wolokolmak, and Bieloï, he had uselessly pursued us almost to Mojaïsk. Having perceived his error and retraced his steps, he had taken the Medouin and Jouknow route, which was parallel to that of Smolensk, and by this route, which was the one proposed by Marshal Davout, proceeded to flank the march of the French army, to harass it, and, if any favourable opportunity should offer, to inflict upon it some decided check.

After having passed the night between Borodino and Ghjat, Marshal Davout proceeded to Ghjat itself. Each succeeding day increased the difficulties attending the retreat, for each day the cold became more intense. He had retained no portion of Grouchy's cavalry, and consequently the infantry, having to fulfil all the services required of the rear-guard, had to perform the duties proper to the various arms of the service; and, veterans as they were, they did perform them,—sometimes checking the charge of the enemy's cavalry with their bayonets, sometimes rushing upon his artillery and taking possession of it, although they were soon forced to leave it on the road on account of the want of the means of transport, the same want gradually compelling us to destroy our own munitions and to abandon the wounded.

This latter necessity, which was much aggravated by the cruel selfishness of the owners of the wagons to which the wounded had been intrusted, these persons frequently under cover of the night casting the helpless wretches on the road, was a constant source of distress, and had a most disastrous effect on all but the veteran troops. Murmurs arose that devotion on the part of the soldier was an absurdity, and

large numbers of men, leaving their ranks under various pretexts, joined that daily-increasing and miscellaneous crowd which followed in the wake of the army, subsisting, as it could, and which increased to an immense degree the labours of the rear-guard.

On approaching Ghjat on the evening of the 31st of October, Marshal Davout had been anxious to send out columns of infantry, as he had no cavalry, to the right and the left, for the purpose of obtaining provisions for the 1st corps and the famished crowd which followed it; but the enemy's cavalry appeared in such force on our flank and rear that it was absolutely necessary to renounce this prudent intention and to trust to chance for the means of subsistence.

Quitting Ghjat on the 1st of November, the marshal knew that at the village of Czarewo-Zamitché would be found a difficult defile, at which would arise a great amount of confusion, since it would be necessary to cross a little stream bordered on each side by marshes which could only be passed by a single narrow path. Foreseeing this difficulty, Davout had written to Prince Eugene, entreating him to hasten his march, and promising, on his own part, to delay as long as possible; but, in spite of these precautions, Prince Eugene's corps had fallen into the greatest confusion at the passage of this defile, and the bridge had broken under the weight. For the purpose of relieving in some degree the mass which encumbered the route, it had been attempted to ford the stream with some of the artillery-wagons, and in some instances the attempt had succeeded, but in others the wagons had broken down, and thus, choking up the path, had raised the confusion to its height.

The 1st corps reached the spot shortly before nightfall, and a few minutes after its arrival a mass of the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by many cannon, came up and directed a vigorous fire as well upon the 1st corps as upon the column under Prince Eugene,—rendering it necessary for Davout and his generals, and the soldiers of the division Gerard, to pass the night, without either food or sleep, in checking and driving back the enemy, re-establishing the broken bridge, and throwing chevalets across the stream at various points.

On the following day, the 2d of November, at daybreak, Marshal Davout again urged Prince Eugene to advance with the utmost despatch, so that he might arrive at an early hour on the 3d at Wiasma, where Napoleon, who had been there since the 31st of October, waited with impatience the arrival of the rear-guard, and where there was reason to fear an encounter with the main body of the Russian army, debouching by the Jouknow route. At the close of the day Félérowkoïé, a place very little distant from Wiasma, had been reached; and it was agreed that Prince Eugene should set out from thence at three o'clock on the following morning. Unfortunately, Prince Eugene was not endowed with sufficient vigour to carry out this arrangement, and it was past six o'clock before his troops were in motion.

At the distance of a league and a half from Wiasma the enemy became suddenly visible on the left, and opened fire on the miscellaneous crowd which followed the army and was followed in turn by the extreme rear-guard. At every

discharge arose frightful shrieks from the helpless crowd, composed of unarmed soldiers, of sick and wounded men, of women and children. The 4th corps—that of Prince Eugene—urged it forward even with cruelty, and had just succeeded in defiling in its entirety, when, taking advantage of the interval between the two brigades of the division Delzons, a portion of the enemy's cavalry threw itself across and blocked up the road. A brigade of the division Delzons and the remainder of Poniatowski's troops were thus checked in their advance and thrown back upon the head of the 1st corps, the five divisions of which were advancing in good order under the command of Marshal Davout himself, and numbering fifteen thousand, to which they had been reduced from the twenty-eight thousand they numbered at Moscow, and the seventy-two thousand who filled their ranks at the passage of the Niemen.

The brave General Gerard, whose division formed the advanced guard, perceiving that the rear of the 4th corps had been surprised and thrown back, hastened forward, under a vigorous fire, to seize the enemy's cannon, and the Russian cavalry immediately fled before him. Behind this cavalry was drawn up in order of battle the infantry under Prince Eugene of Wartenberg; but, as the division Gerard immediately marched upon it, whilst Delzon's second brigade and the remainder of the Polish troops threatened to take it in flank, Miloradovitch, who commanded it, did not dare to hold his position, and withdrew to the left of the road, thus leaving it open.

Delzon's second brigade and the Polish troops, having been thus delivered by the 1st corps, hastened to enter Wiasma, which town it would have been advisable to traverse, if possible, without a conflict with the enemy; but, as fresh masses of the enemy were visible every moment flanking the route, and the bulk of the Russian army appeared in the direction of Jouknow, a combat was inevitable, and it became necessary to make the requisite preparations.

At the sound of the cannonade Marshal Ney had halted his corps at the moment it was leaving Wiasma, and, having proceeded in person to Davout and Eugene, had arranged with them that he should deploy in front of the Jouknow route for the purpose of checking Kutusoff, who, in fact, had arrived with the bulk of the Russian army, whilst Eugene posted the division Broussier between Wiasma and Davout's corps, and the latter took up a position on the left of the route, for the purpose of making head against Miloradovitch,—all the troops which were not required to be in line, together with the baggage and the stragglers, being directed to cross, as soon as possible, the river which divided Wiasma into two parts and was called by the same name, and to hasten to gain the Dergobouge route.

A little river, a tributary of the Wiasma, formed a natural defence around the city on the Jouknow side, and behind this little river Ney took up his position with the divisions Razout and Ledru, now reduced to six thousand men, whilst Broussier's troops formed the connecting-link between Wiasma and Davout's corps, which was drawn up in order of battle on the flank of the route, and possessed only forty serviceable pieces of cannon, although

had carried with it one hundred and twenty-

A furious cannonade was exchanged between opposed troops; but, the nature of the ground being so marshy as it was, the Russian general, Miloradovitch, dared not to attack the posing line of our veterans. As the night advanced, therefore, we retreated upon Wiasma, where a second contest awaited us, a portion of the town having been invaded by the enemy, and where considerable confusion was caused among our troops by the fact that there were only two bridges across the Wiasma, one in the town and the other beyond it.

The French troops that had now entered Wiasma found no provisions there, all the resources which it had contained having been already exhausted by the Guard and the various corps which had previously traversed it. In the dark and gloomy hours of the night, therefore, the troops had to plunge into a wood for shelter, lighting three huge fires, prepared a meal of horse-flesh. And now, the troops under Marshal Davout having during fifteen days defended the rear-guard, Napoleon determined to replace them by Ney's corps,—not because a sense of justice impelled him to give the former repose, but because, according to him, they had marched too slowly. In the midst of the Guard, which marched at the head of the army and consumed such provisions as could be procured in the country they traversed, leaving dead horses as the sole means of subsistence for those who followed, he saw nothing of the retreat, and wished to see nothing of it, for to have done so would have been to gaze too closely on the sequences of his own faults. Instead of taking an active part in the conduct of the retreat and bearing the brunt of the terrible evils which he was the author, he remained two miles in advance of the rear-guard, and, sometimes on horseback, sometimes on foot, but not frequently in a carriage, between Berthier, who was plunged in consternation, and Murat, who was almost annihilated by terror, he passed whole days without uttering a word, only rising at intervals from the abysses of gloomy reflections which he was sunk, to utter complaints of his lieutenants, as though he could still deceive any one by his blaming others than himself. When he received Marshal Davout, whom he had not conversed with since the departure from Jais-Jaroslawetz, it was with the most bitter reproaches; whilst the latter, who, although devoted to the obedience of the time, possessed a proud spirit which no authority could bend, defended with bitterness the honour of the 1st corps, asserting the merit, not of his own services, but of those of his glorious lieutenants. Napoleon listened to the marshal's defence in silence, but, up to the time of his departure from the army, refrained from holding any further intercourse with him. As Massena had been accused of being the cause of the misfortunes in the Peninsula, Davout was now accused of being the cause of those which had attended the retreat, which during fifteen days he had conducted with the most indefatigable vigilance, and the most unshrinking firmness.

On the 6th of November Napoleon arrived at Dorogobouge, Prince Eugene's corps reaching on the 6th, and the other corps on the 7th and 8th. The cold had for some time past been

very bitter, but not of a deadly intensity, but on the 9th a sudden and violent snow-storm cruelly increased the general misery. Except in the ranks of the rear-guard, which Davout had conducted with inflexible firmness, and which Ney now conducted with an energy which no suffering could subdue, the sentiment of duty began to be utterly neglected in the ranks of the army. All the wounded had been left behind, and certain of the allied troops, to whom had been intrusted the Russian prisoners, had relieved themselves of the charge by destroying them. Seized by that contagious selfishness which is ever so sad and striking a feature in great calamities, immense numbers of soldiers deserted from their ranks to seek the means of subsistence, and to increase the disorderly and unarmed crowd which followed the army, and which numbered at the departure from Dorogobouge about fifty thousand persons. More than ten thousand soldiers had already been left dead on the route; there remained scarcely fifty thousand under arms, and all the cavalry, with the exception of that of the Guard, was dismounted. But there remained only three more marches between the army and Smolensk, and there the army hoped to find magazines, provisions, clothing, shelter, reinforcements, and fortified walls. This hope supported the courage of the army, and "Smolensk! Smolensk!" was the universal cry.

But at Dorogobouge Napoleon received the most unfavourable news,—unfavourable with respect to the course of military operations on the wings, and unfavourable with respect to affairs in France, where the government had been audaciously attacked.

On the two wings of the army the plans of the enemy had been completely developed. Admiral Tchitchakoff, after having joined Tormasoff with about thirty thousand men, and assumed the command of the two armies, had commenced operations on the offensive against the Prince of Schwarzenberg and General Reynier, who commanded with much unity, but without much energy, the Austro-Saxon corps,—driving them before him from the line of the Sty to that of the Bug. At the same time the allied generals were scarcely to blame, for General Reynier could not be more enterprising than the Prince of Schwarzenberg, and the latter could scarcely have done more than he did. Had he received a reinforcement of ten thousand men he might have displayed greater hardihood; but the Austrian Government, resolved to observe the terms of the agreement it had made with Russia, was far from desirous of increasing the auxiliary corps with which it had furnished Napoleon, and would only consent to raising it to thirty thousand by a reinforcement of five or six thousand.

The allied generals were in a position which formed their usual asylum, behind the marshes of Pinsk, when Prince Schwarzenberg, having received information of the approach of these five or six thousand men by Zamosa, left General Reynier in position and proceeded to meet them. Having united these troops with his own, he returned to Reynier, who on his part awaited a reinforcement of twelve or thirteen thousand men, the division Durette, which he expected to arrive by way of Warsaw. In the mean time Admiral Tchitchakoff, in conformity

with the Emperor Alexander's instructions which had been sent to him by M. de Czernicheff, had left General Sacken with twenty-five thousand men in front of the allied generals, and had marched with thirty-five thousand upon the Upper Beresina, for the purpose of acting in concert with Count Wittgenstein, who had been directed to repulse Marshal St. Cyr from the banks of the Dwina and to advance to meet the army of Moldavia.

Whilst this was the condition of affairs on the right, that on the left—or, in other words, on the Lower and Upper Dwina—was still worse. Marshal Macdonald, after having remained during the months of September and October close to Dunabourg, with a Polish division of seven or eight thousand men for the twofold purpose (in pursuit of which he was entirely unsuccessful) of covering the siege of Riga and maintaining communications with Marshal St. Cyr, had withdrawn towards the Lower Dwina, for the purpose of supporting the Prussians against the troops of Finland, which had been carried to Livonia according to the arrangement made by Russia with Sweden, and, being from this moment thrown out of the radius of the operations of the grand army, found itself condemned to a long period of inaction.

At Polotsk itself the progress of affairs had been still more disastrous. The Finland troops embarked for Revel had landed in Livonia, marched upon Riga, seconded General Essen in the demonstrations which had recalled Marshal Macdonald to the Lower Dwina, and then ascended this river to the number of twelve thousand men, under the Count de Steinghel. Wittgenstein, reinforced by these troops and some militia, which raised the strength of his corps to forty-eight thousand men, had resolved to assume the offensive for the purpose of obliging Marshal St. Cyr to evacuate Polotsk and to act in concert with Admiral Tchitchakoff on the Upper Beresina. In conformity with the plan of operations sent to St. Petersburg, the Count de Steinghel was to cross the Dwina below Polotsk for the purpose of harassing the rear of Marshal St. Cyr and thus rendering more easy the execution of the direct operations which were in preparation against him. Marshal St. Cyr's whole force amounted only to twenty-two thousand men at the most, whilst that of the enemy against which he had to defend himself amounted to forty-five thousand, of whom thirty-three thousand were to attack him in front and twelve thousand to take him in reverse.

The city of Polotsk, situated, as we have already said, within the angle formed by the Polota and the Dwina towards their confluence, had been covered by defensive works of considerable strength. On the left, the Polota, which protected the front of the position, and the greater part of the town, was furnished with well-armed redoubts, whilst on the right, in the opening of the angle formed by the two rivers, earth-works had been thrown up. Behind the works on the Polota, which were the most easy to defend, Marshal St. Cyr had placed the Swiss and Croatian troops, and on the right, towards the opening of the angle, where it was most probable that the enemy's attack would be successful, the French divisions Legrand and Maison. The Bavarians were on this side of the Dwina with the cavalry. Many bridges

crossing the river offered a means of retreat to the army should it be necessary to fall back.

This was the position in which Marshal St. Cyr firmly awaited the two attacks with which he was threatened, and towards which the enemy advanced on the morning of the 18th.

In accordance with the advice of General Diebitch, a young, able, and zealous officer, destined at a later period to acquire great renown, Wittgenstein carried the best and larger portion of his troops upon our right towards the opening of the angle formed by the Polota and the Dwina, for the purpose of drawing our whole force towards this most accessible part of our position, and then seizing with the remainder of his troops the Polota, which would then be undefended.

The Russians, having debouched boldly on our right, advanced without hesitation towards that portion of the town which was unprotected by the Polota, and were vigorously encountered by the divisions Legrand and Maison, the latter of which, in a more exposed position than the former, maintained its ground with the utmost firmness, although assailed on every side, and at length succeeded in driving back the enemy to a considerable distance. The division Legrand acted with equal vigour, and the Russians were not only completely checked, but repulsed. In the mean time, Marshal St. Cyr had been sufficiently prudent not to leave his left unprotected, and when the remainder of the Russian troops, debouching in their turn, threw themselves upon the Polota redoubts, they were permitted to approach to the very foot of the works, and were overwhelmed by their fire. On this point, therefore, as on the other, in spite of some confusion caused by the over-eagerness of the Swiss troops, the army of Count Wittgenstein was repulsed with a loss of from three to four thousand men, our own loss being about half this number.

Had he not been threatened by an attack in the rear by the corps under the command of Count Steinghel, Marshal St. Cyr would have considered himself well established on the Dwina; but this corps, after having passed the Dwina, ascended the left bank for the purpose of effecting a junction under Polotsk with a portion of Wittgenstein's forces, and, in the presence of this danger of a double attack on both banks of the Dwina, Marshal St. Cyr considered that it would be wrong to persist in maintaining his position any longer, and evacuated Polotsk, therefore, during the night, with the intention of retreating in good order behind the Oula, (which the Lepel canal unites with the Beresina,) where he hoped to meet the Duke of Belluna.

The Duke of Belluna, in fact, after having long hesitated between Admiral Tchitchakoff, who came by the south, and Generals Wittgenstein and Steinghel, who came by the north, had been decided at length by what had taken place at Polotsk to hasten to the north, for the purpose of affording succour to Marshal St. Cyr. And as, unfortunately, the new arrangement which had changed the route of the army had posted him, not at Witpepsk, but at Smolensk, he had to traverse a very considerable space of ground to arrive at Lepel.

Thus, at the end of October, two armies, consisting respectively of thirty-five thousand



and forty-five thousand men, were on the point of effecting a junction on the Upper Beresina and closing the line of our retreat with eighty thousand men,—a state of things of which the danger could only be removed by the junction and victory of Marshals Oudinot and Victor.

A great addition to Napoleon's sources of anxiety consisted in the fact that the abundance which the army had hoped to find at Smolensk did not actually exist there; for the active-transport service which had been established by M. de Bassano from Kowno to Minsk by Wilna had been chiefly employed in the conveyance of spirituous liquors and munitions of war, as it was confidently believed that sufficient corn would be found in Lithuania; but, when an extensive requisition had been issued to the Lithuanian farmers for the corn which our commissariat required, they had made the want, either real or pretended, of wagons, a reason for neglecting to satisfy the demand.

In the mean time Napoleon received news from France which was of a still graver character; for France, which he had left so tranquil, so submissive, had been within the possibility of being torn from his grasp by an audacious maniac, whose easy success during a few hours proved how completely every thing at this period in France depended on a single life,—a life incessantly threatened not by poignards but by bullets.

There had been detained during many years in the prisons of the Conciergerie an old officer, General Malet, an ardent and sincere republican, formed, as were so many men of his time and birth, in the school of J. J. Rousseau, who had been made a general by the republic and could not pardon Napoleon for having destroyed it. The domination of a single idea renders a man mad or capable of extraordinary actions, and frequently produces both results simultaneously. The sole idea which filled the mind of General Malet was, that a ruler who was constantly making war would most probably one day be shot, and that, armed with news of this event, whether true or invented, he—General Malet—would easily seize the whole authority of the state, and compel the nation to accept another form of government, since the whole existing power lay in Napoleon himself alone. Completely governed by this idea, he never ceased to form plans for the purpose of surprising the authorities with fabricated news of Napoleon's proclaiming a new form of government, and inducing the nation, weary of despotism, silence, and war, to submit to it. Having at length, in 1807 and 1809, almost determined to put his plan into execution, he was betrayed to the police and placed in confinement in Paris. As a prisoner he still brooded over the same idea, and, being convinced that the moment when Napoleon was in Moscow was a most favourable time for putting his plan into execution, he proceeded to carry it out with incredible avidity.

In the *Maison de Santé*, near the *Porte St. Antoine*, in which he had been confined, he had formed an intimacy with a priest who was animated by sentiments similar to his own, and with his assistance he selected two young men, very innocent but very bold, and ignorant of his secret, whom he designed to employ as his *sides-de-camp*. By the assistance of these young

persons he procured uniforms and pistols, and on the evening of the 22d of October, the day on which Napoleon was manœuvring around *Malo-Jaroslavetz*, he escaped by a window from the place in which he had been confined, (the priest, his colleague, having already fled,) ran to the lodging where the two young men awaited him, dressed one of them as an aide-de-camp, clothed himself in the uniform of a general, told them that Napoleon had died at Moscow on the 7th of October, that the senate assembled that night had voted the re-establishment of the Republic, and then, displaying false orders which had been carefully prepared in his prison, proceeded to the *Popincourt* barrack, then occupied by the tenth cohort of the National Guard, commanded by an old officer of the Revolution, named *Soulier*, who had served and acquired honour in Spain. General Malet had this officer awakened, and then proceeded to his bedside, feigning to be General *Lamotte*, declaring that Napoleon was dead, slain at Moscow by a ball on the 7th of October; that the senate had secretly assembled, decided on the re-establishment of the Republic, and named General Malet commander of the public force in Paris; and that he, the speaker, had been sent to assume the command of the 10th legion to carry into execution certain orders on various points of the capital. This news was received by *Soulier* and the troops under his command, to whom he immediately communicated it, with extreme surprise, but without doubt, and the supposed commands were met by unhesitating obedience.

General Malet—the pretended General *Lamotte*—conducted the Legion to the *Force* before daybreak, sent for the governor, showed him an order of release for Generals *Lahorie* and *Guidal*, obtained their deliverance with the utmost ease, embraced them, declared the wonderful news, and, pretending to share the delight which it caused them, showed them the decree of the senate, and pointed out to them the manner in which they were to act. *Guidal* was to proceed to seize the minister of war, and *Lahorie* the minister of police, whilst he, Malet, seized General *Hulin*, governor of the fortifications. Malet then sent one of his young men to *Frochot*, the prefect of the *Seine*, with the pretended decrees of the senate and an order to prepare the *Hotel de Ville* for the sittings of the provisional government, and despatched the other to one of the regiments of the garrison, with orders to the colonel to seize all the barriers of Paris and to let no one either enter or depart.

The minister of police, having passed the night in sending off despatches, had given strict orders that he should on no account be disturbed: General *Lahorie*, therefore, having entered his hotel, burst open the door of his chamber, and, appearing before the surprised minister, with whom he had served and been on terms of friendship, exclaimed, "Surrender without resistance, for I love you and I am unwilling to injure you. The Emperor is dead, the Empire is abolished, and the senate has re-established the Republic." The Duke of *Revoig* replied that he must be mad; that a letter which had arrived the previous evening from the Emperor disproved the assertion, and that its author must be an impostor. Somewhat moved by the duke's assertions, although he still persisted in his own belief, *Lahorie* ran to consult with

Guidil, and, returning with him, repeated his assertions, commanded the minister to be silent, and sent him to the Conciergerie, to which place the prefect of police had already been sent by similar means.

Up to this point the plot had succeeded well, but the arrest of the minister of police had somewhat delayed that of the minister of war, and General Malet himself lost time in effecting that of General Hulin, the governor of the Place de Paris, whom he had surprised in bed, and to whom he had made the same assertions which had already met with so much success. General Hulin had received without hesitation the news of Napoleon's death, but was reluctant to believe that the Republic had been re-established by a decree of the senate, and demanded of General Malet the production of his orders, when the latter—more faithful to his plan than his accomplices had been—replied to General Hulin that he would show them to him in his cabinet, and, accompanying him thither, shot him down with a pistol. From the cabinet Malet proceeded to the chief of the staff, Droucet, repeated his tale, announced to him his elevation to the grade of general, and demanded of him the immediate surrender of the command of the fortress. But at this point of his undertaking his nerves began to give way: he hesitated, lost time, and encouraged by his manner an incredulity which he failed to overwhelm by an absolute affirmation of the truth of his assertions or another pistol-shot. Whilst he was conversing with Droucet, another officer of the fortress, named Laborde, came up, and, recognising Malet's features, at once surmised that he was conducting an audacious conspiracy, called to the spot an officer of police who was well acquainted with Malet and who perceived that he was one of the persons under his charge, and, demanding how and why he had quitted his prison, embarrassed and disconcerted him to such a degree that he lost all command over his troop; and, upon his attempting to use his arms, he was overpowered and placed under arrest in the presence of his soldiers, who began to think that they might have been deceived. Malet flattered himself that his accomplices would come to his succour; but, instead of them, a portion of the Imperial Guard soon afterwards came up and arrested those who had come to make arrests.

Within an hour the Duke of Rovigo and the prefect of police were set at liberty, and resumed the functions of their several affairs. In the mean time the prefect of the Seine, who had arrived from the country at daybreak, hearing on all sides the news of which the Hotel de Ville was full, had not doubted its truth, and had begun to arrange the apartment respecting which Malet had sent directions. In like manner the commander of the regiment which had been charged with the duty of taking possession of the barriers had obeyed the orders received, and had sent detachments to carry them into execution.

It was scarcely noon when the whole affair was over, every thing in its old position, the authorities, for a moment surprised, re-established in their functions; and Paris, becoming informed of this rapid series of events, passed from a feeling of alarm to one of intense amusement at the expense of a detested police which had been so

easily overpowered. And this feeling of amusement was again, in its turn, succeeded by one of terror at the existence of such a state of things as that which had permitted this affair to take place. In the mean time the police and the military authority, fearing that Napoleon would attribute the blame of this extraordinary adventure to one of them, were equally anxious for an examination into the facts of the case, each hoping that the result would be its own justification and the blame of the other. The fact was that although the police had not discovered and the military authorities had assisted in the execution of the plot, they were equally and entirely innocent; for on the one hand the police could not possibly have discovered what existed only in the head of a single man, and on the other it was perfectly natural that an inferior military authority should believe the occurrence of so probable a circumstance as the death of Napoleon. The government, composed of the ministers, the great dignitaries present in Paris, assembled under the presidency of the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, to determine upon what steps should be taken in respect to what had just occurred, and resolved upon the appointment of a military commission for the purpose of trying more than twenty accused persons. The result was that fourteen unhappy wretches were arrested, and within fifteen days judged and condemned, and twelve of them executed.

Such was the strange news which reached Napoleon at Drogobouge,—news which was of a nature to cause him great anxiety both with respect to his retreat and to the signs which it manifested of the ephemeral nature of his predigious power. But what he was most struck by was the complete forgetfulness of his men which was displayed by all those persons who were so ready to trust in and to obey himself. "What then!" he frequently exclaimed: "they hold in no account my son, my wife, the institutions of the Empire?" And every time that he gave utterance to this sad exclamation he relapsed into sombre reflections, of which the bitterness could only be judged by the sad expression of his countenance. With respect to the executions which had taken place in Paris, he expressed considerable dissatisfaction, saying, "These imbeciles, having permitted themselves to be surprised, endeavour to conciliate me by shooting people by dozens."

But Napoleon had little time to spare to the consideration of the ephemeral conspiracy which had taken place at Paris, for it was absolutely necessary that he should take immediate measures for preventing the concentration of all the enemy's forces on our rear,—a danger which was very imminent, and the reality of which would very probably reduce the French army to pass under the Caudine Forks, and even throw Napoleon himself into the hands of the Russian Emperor.

Napoleon sent orders to Schwarzenberg and Reynier to march as speedily as possible against Admiral Tchitchakoff, since the presence of this general on the Beresina, or, in other words, on the line of retreat of the French army, might have very disastrous results. To the Duke of Belluna he wrote directing him to join Marshal Oudinot immediately, that the two marshals might advance against Wittgenstein with their united forces, which would be much superior to

enemy both in number and quality, and, by ring him beyond the Dwina and gaining over a great battle, relieve the grand army itself of the necessity of fighting one. To Wilna sent directions that one of Marshal Augereau's divisions (General Loison's) should be sent from Königsberg. At the same time he commended M. de Bassano, who displayed at once the greatest administrative ability, to set upon the various depôts of the army—namely, Minsk, Borisow, Orscha, and Smolensk—all the resources which could be procured, and ordered the purchase of fifty thousand roubles in Germany and Poland.

Having despatched these orders, Napoleon set for Smolensk, urging Marshal Ney, who was covering the retreat, to delay the enemy as long as possible, and directing Prince Eugene to leave Smolensk route at Dorogobouge for that of Izkhowtchina, which he had already traversed, which it would be possible to procure a certain amount of provisions, and from whence it would be possible to secure the position at Witepsk, which was at this moment threatened by Wittgenstein.

Napoleon quitted Dorogobouge on the 6th of November, and the whole army followed on the 7th and 8th. The season in which the expedition had been commenced, and the belief that the army would have returned before the approach of the inclement weather, had led to neglect of warm clothing or ice-cramps, and unhappy soldiers marched wrapped up in a variety of clothing, which had been snatched from the flames of Moscow, and quite unable to protect themselves from the cold, only nine or ten degrees above zero; whilst at every elevation, rendered slippery by the ice, the artillery-horses, when doubled or trebled, failed to draw even the smallest size. The greater portion of the munitions had been abandoned almost at the commencement of the march, and now with shame and reluctance our soldiers found it absolutely necessary to leave their cannon to be used as trophies by the Russians. Day by day the wagons which accompanied the army diminished in number, for large numbers of the horses died each day, and of those which remained many were sabred by the soldiers that their flesh might provide the evening meal, which the troops prepared at the huge fires around which they bivouacked at night, and beside which they lay day after day, with scarcely a thought, dead and dying wretches, whom the snow speedily covered, and who lay there the victims of the most foolish of enterprises.

Whilst Napoleon marched upon Smolensk, Prince Eugene followed the Doukhowtchina route, and at the close of the first day's march the artillery and baggage were suddenly checked on a hill, up which the most strenuous efforts of the artillerymen could only raise the very heaviest cannon, and at the foot of which, consequently, the heaviest pieces had to be abandoned. On the following morning the troops resumed their march at an early hour for the sake of crossing the Vop, a river which in the month of August had been a mere brook, but which now rolled wide and deep and was full of ice. The pontooneers who accompanied Prince Eugene's troops had hastened forward, and had employed the night in the construction of a bridge,

which was, however, but partly completed, when a crowd of stragglers, coming up in the midst of a thick mist, attempted to cross it with so much eagerness that many were precipitated into the water and drowned. In the mean time some of the cavalry who still possessed their horses made a successful search for a ford, by which the transit of the river was at length accomplished by the main body of the troops; but, when it was attempted to convey the cannon across to the other bank, some of the pieces soon became fastened in the bed of the river, and thus obstructed the passage at the very moment when between three and four thousand Cossacks ran up, uttering the most savage cries, and, upon being checked by the fire of the rear-guard, threw a storm of bullets upon the terrified crowd of unarmed soldiers and fugitives from Moscow, who were still attempting to pass to the other bank of the river. At every instant the tumult increased, and it became necessary to resign the baggage, which was the sole source of subsistence to the fugitives, and which had up to this time afforded some resources to the officers.

This deplorable event, known in the history of the retreat as the disaster of Vop, and the prelude of another disaster of the same nature but a hundred times more horrible, retained the army of Italy beside the Vop until and during the night; and on the following day it resumed its march by the Doukhowtchina route, having lost all its baggage and all its artillery with the exception of seven or eight pieces; whilst a thousand unhappy wretches, struck by the enemy's bullets or drowned in the stream, had paid with their lives for this which we shall soon find to have been an entirely useless march.

In the course of the 10th of November Prince Eugene's troops arrived at Doukhowtchina, a little town of some wealth, in which the army of Italy had already passed the preceding August. The Cossacks now occupied it, but were speedily chased away; and in this town of Doukhowtchina, which, although deserted, still contained some resources, the unfortunate corps which had now reached it found a certain degree of repose, shelter, and abundance.

Some Poles, having been despatched in search of information of the general state of affairs, brought back news which almost convinced Prince Eugene and his staff that the city of Witepsk had been taken, and rendered them, therefore, unanimously of opinion that the wisest plan would be to rejoin the grand army by marching directly upon Smolensk. In order to gain a march, the corps set out during the night of the 11th, having first set fire to the poor wooden town which had afforded them so much succour, and, continuing their march during that night and a portion of the following day, closely pursued by the Cossacks, passed the night of the 12th under the shelter of a few villages, and, resuming their march on the following morning, about mid-day perceived from the hills which border the Dnieper, in the midst of plains gleaming with snow, the towers of Smolensk, which—ignorant of what, alas! was still to come—they regarded almost as the frontier of France.

During these same days, the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th of November, the grand army had continued its march by the Dorogobouge route

to Smolensk, strewing its path with the corpses of men and horses, and abandoned baggage, the troops consoling themselves with the idea that at Smolensk they would find repose, provisions, reinforcements, and victory. But whilst the head of the army pursued its march, having to contend only with the one great enemy,—the inclement weather,—the rear-guard, conducted by Marshal Ney, was engaged in perpetual encounters with the enemy's forces. At Dorogobouge Ney resolved to defend that town sufficiently long to enable the body of the army, with its *matériel* and the miscellaneous crowd which accompanied it, time to reach Smolensk. He accordingly remained two days at Dorogobouge, and then, as the Russians, having passed the Dnieper on his right, threatened to surround him, he withdrew towards the other passage of the Dnieper, at Solowiewo, when he again checked the enemy's advance. At some leagues from this place, on the Valoutina plateau, he had determined to take up a position and maintain it against the enemy; but, having reached the ground, he found it necessary to enter Smolensk, and accordingly did so, after having made every exertion to delay the enemy's pursuit.

Napoleon knew, as he entered Smolensk, that it did not contain the vast magazines which the army supposed to be there; but he hoped that the eight or ten days' provisions which actually were there would suffice to attract the disbanded soldiers to their standards, as he intended that provisions should only be distributed at the quarters of each regiment. Having entered Smolensk at the head of the Guard, he ordered that none others should be admitted,—an order which inspired a general feeling of despair and indignation, and of jealous dislike of the Guard, which had been of so little service throughout the campaign. These feelings were most bitterly and loudly expressed by the stragglers; but they were shared by the soldiers of the 1st corps, which had never for a single day been spared any labour or danger; and, in spite of their habits of discipline, they joined the unarmed crowd which blocked up the gates of Smolensk, and, making a violent entry into the streets of Smolensk, advanced towards the magazines, the keepers of which, directing the famished troops to proceed to the quarters of their respective regiments, assuring them that they should be supplied there with rations, were for a moment believed and obeyed. But when, after having wandered in every direction throughout the town, the soldiers could find no trace of the distribution of the rations which had been promised, they returned, uttering seditious cries, and, casting themselves upon the magazines, burst open the doors and pillaged them. "The magazines are being pillaged!" was a cry which created a general feeling of terror and despair and attracted every one to the spot in the hope of obtaining some share of the spoil. After some time, however, a certain degree of order was re-established, and a portion of the contents of the magazines were preserved for the corps of Prince Eugene and Marshal Ney, which now arrived, continually fighting with the enemy and checking their advance upon the town. There was no longer room for the illusion that the army would be able to find at Smolensk either food, clothing, shelter, or reinforcements; and it was evident, on the contrary, that it would

be absolutely necessary to set out on the following day, recommencing an interminable march, enduring every species of privations, and engaged in perpetual conflict with the enemy, with the cruel certainty that to receive a wound would be equivalent to becoming the prey of the wolves and the vultures. This was a prospect which threw the army into despair: and yet it knew not the worst.

In the mean time Napoleon had received news still more disastrous than that which had reached him at Dorogobouge. In the first place, General Baraguey d'Hilliers, having advanced in accordance with orders received from headquarters, with his division upon the Jelnia route, had fallen into the midst of the Russian army, and, having lost the brigade Augereau, consisting of two thousand men, returned to Smolensk, when Napoleon by an order of the day directed him to return to France, that his conduct might be made the subject of inquiry before a military commission. At the same moment Napoleon was informed that Tchitchakoff's army had made fresh progress, threatened Minsk and the immense magazines which it contained, and our line of retreat; that Prince Schwarzenberg, hesitating between the plan of following Tchitchakoff and the fear of leaving Sacken on his rear, was losing time in useless inactivity; that the Duke of Belluna (Marshal Victor) had found upon the Oula the 2d corps separated from the Bavarians and reduced by this separation to ten thousand men, his own forces amounting only to five thousand; and that the two Marshals Victor and Oudinot, entertaining exaggerated ideas of the forces at Wittgenstein's command, and fearing to give him battle with their united forces, numbering thirty-eight thousand men, had confined themselves to marches and counter-marches between Lepel and Sienna. The French general having neglected, therefore, to drive them by a prompt victory beyond the Dwina, Tchitchakoff and Wittgenstein advanced rapidly towards each other, with the purpose of effecting a junction on the Upper Beresina. And what would be the position of the wreck of the French army between Tchitchakoff and Wittgenstein in front and Kutusoff in its rear?

It was necessary, however, to adopt some decided measure, for it was absolutely impossible to remain at Smolensk, where there was not at the most more than seven or eight days' provisions. The French army would be compelled, therefore, to seek the means of subsistence elsewhere, in the midst of Poland, and beyond the Beresina, which the two Russian armies threatened to close against us; and, consequently, it could not with safety delay a single day at Smolensk.

Napoleon resolved to leave Smolensk on the 14th with the corps which had arrived there on the 9th, and to order that those which had successively entered on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th should resume their march on the 16th, 16th, and 17th. And in this instance Napoleon committed a fault little worthy of his genius, and only explicable by the false ideas which he had formed respecting the army under Kutusoff; and in fact, trusting to the terror with which he knew he was regarded by this Russian general, he supposed it most improbable that he should find him on his road from Smolensk to Minsk, and expected that at the most he would only

venture on some skirmishes with the rear-guard. Entertaining these ideas, therefore, he failed to take care to place the Dnieper between the Russian army and himself, or even to continue his retreat upon Minsk by the right bank of this river,—preferring to follow the beaten track on the left bank running from Smolensk to Orscha, by which he had come, and which was the shortest and best. And so convinced was he of the justice of the opinion which he had formed, that he did not even move the whole of his troops *en masse*, in which case he would still (alas that we should have to make such a statement!) have had thirty-six thousand men to oppose Kutusoff's fifty thousand; for, in his haste to pass the sixty leagues which intervened between Borisow on the Beresina, he thought that by making the troops which had arrived on the 9th set out on the 11th, and those that had arrived on the 10th, 11th, and 12th set out on the 15th, 16th, and 17th respectively, he would be allowing to each corps time to obtain some repose and a certain degree of reorganization before encountering the army of Moldavia,—the only hostile force which Napoleon at the moment took into consideration.

After having in some measure reorganized his army,—now consisting of about twelve thousand men under Davout, five thousand men under Ney, six thousand under Eugene, one thousand under Junot, who commanded the Westphalians, seven or eight hundred Poles under Prince Poniatowski, the eleven thousand to which the Guard, in spite of the care which had been bestowed upon its preservation, had been reduced, and the five hundred of the cavalry who alone remained mounted,—Napoleon for the second time ordered Prince Schwarzenberg to pursue Admiral Tchitchakoff with the utmost vigour, for the purpose of taking him in the rear before he should have time to attack the main body of the French army, and at the same time directed Marshals Oudinot and Victor to attack Wittgenstein without delay, for the purpose of driving him from the Beresina if it were not possible to throw him back beyond the Dwina. Having given these orders, he set out on the morning of the 14th with the Guard, preceded by the dismounted cavalry under General Sebastiani, and followed by a large portion of the encumbrances by which the army was attended. At the very moment of his departure he ordered that Marshal Ney should not set out until the various arrangements he had made relative to the departure of the army from Smolensk should have been completely carried out, and gave time for the execution of this order until the 17th,—a fatal resolution, which cost the lives of many of our best troops.

Napoleon having set out, as has been already stated, on the morning of the 14th, passed the night of that day at Koritnia, situated half-way between Smolensk and Krasnoé, and on the following day reached the last-named place, where he found General Sebastiani, who had advanced thither on the previous day with the dismounted cavalry, resisting the attacks of the enemy in a church in which they had driven him to take refuge. Napoleon released Sebastiani and his troops from their state of siege, but learned with painful surprise that Kutusoff, not content with merely harassing our march, was approaching Krasnoé with his whole force. And in fact the

Russian generalissimo, although he did not intend to bar the road of the French army completely and thus drive us to despair, had determined to inflict upon us some serious loss, and with this purpose had taken up a position in the defile of Krasnoé, situated half-way between Smolensk and Orscha, and consisting of a bridge crossing a ravine through which flows the Losmina, a river which falls into the Dnieper at two leagues' distance from Krasnoé. The route from Smolensk to Krasnoé lay over this bridge and ravine, and the enemy, therefore, having purposely permitted a portion of the French army to pass them, could, by blockading Krasnoé with a portion of their forces and occupying the bank of the ravine with the remainder, interrupt the passage of those of our columns which had not yet crossed it.

Napoleon passed the morning of the 16th in a state of great anxiety with respect to Prince Eugene's corps, which, having set out from Smolensk on the 15th with the intention of passing the night of that day at Koritnia, ought to appear before Krasnoé during the 16th; and, in fact, accompanied by a large number of disbanded soldiers and escorting almost all the parks of artillery belonging to the Guard and the 1st corps, it did reach the border of the Losmina ravine, and found there Miloradovitch's corps flanking the route with a portion of its troops and barring it with the remainder, at the same time beholding behind Miloradovitch's corps other columns of infantry and cavalry surrounding in dense masses the little city of Krasnoé. A single glance showed that the only practicable course which could be adopted was to force a passage through the enemy at the sword's point, and Prince Eugene did not hesitate a moment to adopt it. Placing the division Broussier on the left of the route, the division Delzons on the route itself, and the wrecks of the Italian, Polish, and Westphalian divisions in the rear, he made a vigorous attack upon the enemy, who, besides the advantages of their position, had at their command an immense number of well-posted cannon, with which they covered our troops with grape. Always heroic, the division Broussier advanced under this murderous fire towards the left of the route, resolved to take the enemy's batteries at the point of the bayonet; but, after having sustained and valiantly resisted the charge of a host of cavalry, and lost within the space of an hour between two and three thousand in killed and wounded, it was compelled to fall back and resign the attempt to pierce the wall of fire with which the Russians blocked up its path.

After having disdainfully dismissed an officer sent by Kutusoff to summon in respectful terms the prince to surrender, Eugene concerted with his generals a plan which appeared to offer some chance of success, and which consisted in leaving the division Broussier in line to feign another attack upon the left, against the heights which bordered the route, whilst the remainder of the troops gained the plain on the right, beside the Dnieper, and then clandestinely defiled towards Krasnoé under cover of the night, which at this period of the year commenced about four or five o'clock. This plan involved the destruction of the remainder of the division Broussier; but implicit reliance could be placed on the devotion of this heroic troop. Towards nightfall, therefore, Prince Eugene, having carried forward upon

the left the remnant of the unhappy division Broussier, so as to direct towards it the enemy's entire attention, led the remainder of his troops towards the Dnieper under cover of some elevated ground, and thus, after two hours' march, succeeded in reaching Krasnoé, having left upon the road two thousand in killed and wounded, and the remainder of Broussier's division, which could only be saved by the arrival of Marshals Davout and Ney.

Napoleon received his adopted son with a species of joy mingled with bitterness, and, being relieved of anxiety on his account, became completely absorbed in reflections on what might have been the fate of Davout and Ney, who still remained in the rear, and who, marching a day's march apart from each other, in accordance with the orders which he had given, would have to encounter the enemy separately and to suffer cruel losses before they could reach Krasnoé. But the more reason Napoleon found for regretting that he had not marched his troops from Smolensk *en masse* and taken the right bank of the Dnieper, the more resolved he was to await at Krasnoé the arrival of the two marshals, whatever might be the consequences, and to fight a battle, if necessary, for the purpose of reopening the route. He resolved now to devote wholly to the purpose of extricating his two lieutenants the Guard, which he had hitherto taken such pains to preserve, and thus to provide himself with the best possible reason for not having employed it at Borodino.

The plan which Napoleon proposed to follow was very simple, and consisted in advancing the Guard along the Smolensk route, which was that which would be pursued by Davout and Ney, and awaiting the appearance of the former of these marshals on a plateau behind Krasnoé, at the foot of which passed the Losmina ravine. This measure was duly executed; and, as the Russians had on the same evening taken up a position in Koutkovo, a village very close to Krasnoé, he had it carried at the bayonet's point by a regiment of the Young Guard, which took vengeance on the troops of Count Ojarowski for the losses which we had suffered during the day.

In the mean time Marshal Davout having personally visited during the night of the 18th, which his divisions passed at Koritnia, the spot where the four hundred men, who alone remained of the three thousand who had originally composed the unhappy division Broussier, lay upon the snow mingled in a confused heap with the dying and the dead, he promptly formed the resolution to save, sword in hand, not only his own corps, but this remnant of Prince Eugene's column also. As he had left one of his divisions—the 24—with Marshal Ney, for the purpose of reinforcing the rear-guard, he had only four of his five divisions, consisting of about nine or ten thousand men, at his command; but he did not for a moment doubt that with such a force as this, resolutely used, he could force a passage through any obstacle.

A little before daybreak he carried his four divisions in advance, formed in close column, and ordered them to charge the enemy at the bayonet's point and force a passage through the enemy's ranks in a hand-to-hand conflict. In the mean time Kutusoff, supposing that Napoleon was already *en route* for Orscha, had sent a portion of his forces under General Tormasoff for the

purpose of preventing his re-entry into Krasnoé, and had posted the remainder around Krasnoé itself, leaving only Miloradovitch and his troops along the Losmina ravine to bar the Smolensk route.

Marshal Davout's four divisions charged the troops under Miloradovitch, as they had been ordered; and as the latter, terrified at their impetuosity, withdrew from before them to the side of the route, they arrived almost uninjured at the border of the Losmina ravine, where they found the Young Guard, and posted themselves there in such a manner on the right and left of the ravine as to afford support to all the troops which had not yet arrived; and thus were saved the remnant of Broussier's division, and the parks of artillery which had hitherto been left in the rear.

Continual and powerful attacks on the part of the enemy, however, rendered it necessary to adopt some decided course; and, as General Tormasoff had commenced his movement around Krasnoé for the purpose of intercepting the Orscha route, Napoleon resolved not to persevere in the bold attempt to hold the enemy in check at Krasnoé at the risk of being cut off from Orscha—the only point open to the French at which they could effect the passage of the Dnieper—and thus forced to lay down his arms. To retreat would be in all probability to sacrifice Marshal Ney; and, as Napoleon, whilst extremely eager to reach Orscha, was at the same time very unwilling to give orders the execution of which must necessarily involve the abandonment of Ney, he issued equivocal commands which were alike unworthy of the integrity of his spirit and the vigour of his character, and which were startling manifestations of the horror of the position in which he had placed himself. By ordering the 1st corps to follow the other troops in their departure from Krasnoé, and at the same time directing it to await there as long as possible the arrival of Marshal Ney, he threw upon this heroic and well-disciplined corps the terrible responsibility of abandoning Marshal Ney.

Napoleon now departed in all haste by the Krasnoé route to Orscha, accompanied by his Guard, and under a terrible fire from the enemy's guns, but without meeting any invincible obstacle. As each French corps defiled along the road, Tormasoff's columns advanced, evidently with the intention of blocking up the road, which in the mean time they covered with their fire; and Marshal Mortier, who had to sustain whilst effecting his departure from Krasnoé frequent charges from the enemy's cavalry, perceiving the imminence of the danger, sent information of his departure to Marshal Davout, and urged him to follow him, declaring that he had not a moment to lose. The day was declining, the enemy overwhelmed Krasnoé with a complete storm of fire, and the confusion there was at its height. The five thousand men who were still under Marshal Davout's command demanded that they should not be condemned to a useless death or certain captivity, and their leader found it necessary to conform to the only command which circumstances permitted him to follow, and to depart from Krasnoé. As Ney had not set out from Smolensk until the morning of the 17th, he could not have reached Krasnoé before the evening of the 18th, and by waiting

his arrival until then Marshal Davout would, without saving Ney, have exposed his troops to captivity or death. He proceeded from Krasnoé, therefore, in the direction of Liady.

In the mean time Marshal Ney's corps and the division Ricard, which had also been intrusted to this marshal, having blown up the towers of Smolensk, hidden in the earth or thrown into the Dnieper all the cannon which they could not remove, and pushed forward as far as possible the crowd of disbanded soldiers, had departed from Smolensk on the morning of the 17th. Marshal Ney had set out from Smolensk expecting to find the enemy hovering on his rear and on his flanks, and prepared to make a vigorous resistance to his attacks, but by no means expecting to find his path closed by a hostile force as impassable as a wall of fire. Marshal Davout had sent him information from Koritnia, on the evening of the 16th, of the perils which he would probably encounter on the following day; but, as the enemy had shortly afterwards interposed between them, communication between the two marshals was no longer possible, which was a most unfortunate circumstance; for, had Ney received timely warning of the state of affairs, he might have left Smolensk by the right of the Dnieper, and by means of a night's march have probably reached Orscha before the Russians had time to become acquainted with their departure, and to cross the river on the ice, which was not in every part sufficiently solid to afford a passage. Being without any precise information, Marshal Ney set out on the 17th, in accordance with Napoleon's directions, reached Koritnia in the evening, and on the following day, the 18th, advanced upon Krasnoé.

The division Ricard arrived first in the presence of the enemy, and, marching boldly to the attack, was immediately overwhelmed by so terrible a fire from the Russian artillery posted on the bank of the Losmina ravine that it was compelled to pause and await the approach of Marshal Ney, who, as soon as he came up, lost no time in forming his troops into columns of attack, and, crossing the ravine under a terrible fire of musketry, drove the Russians at the point of the bayonet to the left of the route. But, although thus for a time successful, renewed charges on the part of the Russians, accompanied by the fire from a hundred pieces of cannon, again compelled them to give way, and to fall back upon the position from whence they had commenced the attack, reduced within the space of an hour from seven thousand men to four thousand. Against the whole of Kutusoff's army (and the whole of it was present) such a force as this could not hope for success; and Ney, renouncing the expectation of it, immediately formed a resolution of remaining out of reach of the enemy's fire until the close of the day, and then, under cover of the darkness, to cross the Dnieper and escape by the right bank; for, with his habitual confidence, he appeared to entertain no doubts that the ice was in such a state as to afford a passage for his troops; and, when one of his officers ventured to express some doubt on the subject, he had replied, roughly, that the passage would be effected across the ice, or in some way or other.

The Russians, having no suspicion of Marshal Ney's design, supposed, when they found him retreating out of the range of their fire, that he

and his troops must certainly become their prisoners in the course of the following day, and being willing to avoid a useless effusion of blood, sent to inform him of the desperate nature of his position, advising him to capitulate, and declaring that the valour of his troops should be acknowledged by the offer of such conditions only as were worthy of them. Ney, however, declined to give any answer to this message, and detained the messenger, lest he should, on his return, carry back some intimation of the course the French were about to pursue.

At nightfall, in accordance with his proposed plan, Ney carried his troops forward towards the Dnieper, and, having succeeded in gaining its bank, found it just sufficiently frozen to allow its passage to be effected by the exercise of great caution. The troops, having crossed the river, together with a few pieces of cannon and some baggage-wagons which had been carried over with considerable difficulty, proceeded along the bank of the river in the direction of Orscha. As they had to march fifteen leagues across an unknown country, not a moment was to be lost, and they continued their march constantly throughout the night until the noon of the following day, when they came to some villages and found a certain quantity of provisions, which, famished as they were, they instantly proceeded to devour. Scarcely had this repast terminated when a considerable number of Cossacks appeared, commanded by Platow himself, and towards the close of the day assailed the French in such masses that their road appeared to be cut off. However, they threw themselves into the woods which bordered the Dnieper, and defended themselves until nightfall. About one o'clock they rallied round a village where they found some provisions, and at two o'clock resumed their march towards Orscha.

Towards noon it was unfortunately necessary to traverse a considerable plain, on which Platow's troops, who appeared in still more considerable numbers than on the previous day, directed against our soldiers the fire from a very numerous artillery. Marshal Ney, however, immediately formed his troops into squares, and, supporting their failing hearts with his own undaunted energy, succeeded in repulsing the Cossacks, slaying many of them, and then led his troops to a village where they found both food and shelter. He had sent forward a Pole to Orscha to give information of his miraculous retreat, and to demand aid; and when his troops, who had resumed their march after taking some repose, were within a league of Orscha, they perceived with unspeakable consternation the approach of an armed force; but Ney, always confident, and relying on the message which he had sent by the Pole, did not hesitate to advance, and found the strange troops to be three thousand men advancing to his relief under Prince Eugene and Marshal Mortier.

And thus of six or seven thousand men Ney had brought back to the army twelve hundred at the most, and these almost dying from fatigue and utterly incapable of any active service. But at the same time he had saved the honour of the French armies, rescued for France his name, his person, and by the successes of his manœuvre forced from the enemy an expiation of the cruel success they had obtained during the last few days.

Napoleon himself was intensely rejoiced at Ney's return, for it spared him the humiliation of having it said throughout Europe that Ney was a prisoner in the hands of the Russians. But he had the wickedness to allow the odium of the abandonment of Marshal Ney to fall on Marshal Davout, and, either from anxiety to exonerate himself, or from the bitterness of spirit which the unfavourable state of affairs was so calculated to aggravate, he manifested with respect to Marshal Davout a degree of disapprobation which the general despondency, and the pleasure common to human nature of depreciating a hitherto-unstained renown, hastened to accredit and to propagate.

The total strength of the army at Orscha was now, at the most, twenty-four thousand armed men and twenty-five thousand stragglers,—the half of the numbers which had set out from Moscow, and the eighth part of the four hundred and twenty thousand men which had passed the Niemen. But at the same time, although the Russians had obtained great results, they had not obtained an equal amount of glory, for with fifty thousand or sixty thousand thoroughly-effective troops, an immense artillery, and a position such as that of Kraśnoé, they should have been able, if not to stop the whole army, at least to have taken the chief portion of it. As the case actually was, they had obtained no trophies but the corpses of the French soldiers who had fallen beneath the grape of their cannon, and crowds of stragglers whom wretchedness had deprived of their arms. Throughout these operations, in fact, the only real merit to be attributed to the Russians is in respect to the constant prudence of Generalissimo Kutusoff, who, relying on the effects of the winter and the climate, had resolved to expend as little blood as possible, and to obtain the most brilliant success without having incurred any corresponding risk. But, deserving of praise as this prudent conduct is, still, when we consider the decisive results which he might have obtained by more vigorous conduct, we can only regard it as the hesitation of a timid old man, who eventually took credit for results which were rather the work of fortune than of himself.

Finding himself at Orscha in a secure position and in possession of well-furnished magazines of provisions, Napoleon made a new attempt to rally his army, and, by means of a detachment of *gendarmes d'élite* which had recently arrived, to incorporate in its ranks the crowd of disbanded soldiers. But all such efforts were fruitless, for the men who had once thrown off the yoke of honour were not inclined to resume it. The moral contagion had extended even to the Guard, and Napoleon found it necessary to assemble it for the purpose of addressing it in person, and endeavouring to inspire it with its old feeling of duty, by declaring that it was the last asylum of French military honour, that to it especially belonged the obligation of giving the example of good discipline, and of thus saving the remainder of the army from the dissolution which threatened it; that if the Guard should fall away from the path of duty it would not have the excuse of want possessed by the other corps, since such resources as had been obtainable had always been reserved for its use; that he would employ the severest means to pre-

serve the discipline of his Guard, but that he hoped that it would be maintained rather by its old military virtues, and that from its devotion rather than its fear would be obtained the good example he desired it to display.

At Orscha, also, struck with the inconvenience occasioned to the army by the presence of long files of baggage, Napoleon commanded that all the baggage-wagons should be destroyed except those which contained the wounded or the fugitive families, or belonged to the artillery or engineer corps, and except one for himself and Murat, and one for each of the marshals. In his zeal for the preservation of the artillery, and in spite of the representations of General Eblé, he even ordered the destruction of the two pontoon-equipages which had been left at Orscha, permitting only, at General Eblé's urgent request, the transport of the materials necessary for a *pont de chevalet*. At this time were destroyed also Napoleon's military correspondence and a quantity of other precious papers.

The efforts, however, which were now made to bring the army into shape were as useless as all the previous attempts of the same nature. A prolonged period of repose, a secure position, abundance of resources, and association with troops in a good state of discipline, could have restored order to the ranks of the army. The prohibition to distribute provisions to any but those soldiers who should be present at the quarters of their regiments was disregarded after a few hours, to save the magazines not only from pillage, but also from the destruction with which they were menaced by the rapid approach of the enemy.

Whilst at Orscha, news reached Napoleon which was of a more disastrous character than any he had yet received, and which informed him that Schwarzenberg had been decidedly outflanked by Admiral Tchitchakoff on the Upper Beresina, the latter having marched, whilst Schwarzenberg was hesitating what course to pursue, by Slonim upon Minsk, to the abundant provisioning of which M. de Bassano's efforts had been principally directed, and compelled the three thousand troops under General Bronikowski to evacuate it,—thus snatching from our grasp one of the principal points on the Wina route, and one which contained provisions sufficient for a month's subsistence. After evacuating Minsk, General Bronikowski effected a junction with General Dombrowski, whose excellent Polish division had been left in the rear for the purpose of guarding the Dnieper; and the united troops, numbering four or five thousand, advanced to Borisow upon the Upper Beresina, for the purpose of defending the Borisow bridge, since, if this bridge on the Beresina were to fall into the hands of Tchitchakoff, the road would be entirely closed against the grand army, unless it were to ascend to the very sources of the Beresina; and even in this case it would be exposed to the danger of encountering Wittgenstein, whom the information which had now reached Napoleon pointed out to be a more formidable enemy than even Tchitchakoff.

Napoleon had expected that Marshals Oudinot and Victor, whom he supposed to be in command of forty thousand men, would have driven Wittgenstein and Steingel before them beyond the Dwina and then marched their forty thousand



sand victorious troops upon the Beresina; as he had also expected that Schwarzenberg and Reynier would on their side have marched thither the forty thousand men whom they commanded, after having vanquished Tchitchakoff. In this case eighty thousand men would have been available for the infliction of a severe blow on the Russians before the end of the campaign. But all Napoleon's calculations with respect to affairs on the side of the Dwina, as on the side of the Dnieper, were defeated; for the two marshals, having attacked, with the thirty-two thousand or thirty-three thousand men who alone were at their disposal, a strong position which had been taken up by Wittgenstein behind the Oula and near Smoliantzy, had lost two thousand men without succeeding in carrying it, and then, fearful of compromising a corps, which was Napoleon's last resource, awaited at Czeréia, at two marches on the right of the route pursued by Napoleon, some intimation of his definite intentions, which they had sent General Dode to learn.

Without criticizing what they had already done, Napoleon sent General Dode to the two marshals with orders to Marshal Oudinot to proceed immediately, by a transverse movement from right to left, from Czeréia to Borisow, for the purpose of supporting the Poles and aiding them to defend the bridge over the Beresina, and with orders to Marshal Victor to remain on the right, opposite Wittgenstein and Steinghel, for the purpose of holding them in check by inspiring them with the fear of a manœuvre of the grand army against them, and thus affording it time to reach the Beresina. Should these instructions be followed, (as it was to be presumed they would,) Tchitchakoff having been driven from Borisow by Oudinot, and Wittgenstein held in check by Victor, the grand army would be able to reach the Beresina in time to pass it, rallying Victor and Oudinot, to retake Minsk and its magazines, to rally Schwarzenberg, and thus to find itself ninety thousand strong, in a position to overwhelm one or two of the three Russian armies, and thus to terminate a campaign which had been brilliant up to the entrance into Moscow and calamitous since the departure from Malo-Jaroslawetz, but which was destined, perhaps, to become once more brilliant and even triumphant towards its conclusion.

On the 20th of November Napoleon advanced from Orscha to the château de Baronoui, proceeding from thence on the 21st to Kokanow, and marching from this place on the 22d for Bobr. The weather, although still very cold, had suddenly become less severe than it had been; but the change afforded no alleviation to the sufferings of the army, for the moisture which succeeded the snow and ice rendered the cold more penetrating, whilst it was almost impossible to drag the gun-carriages through the half-frozen mud.

Having reached Toloczin at noon on the 22d, Napoleon received there a despatch from Borisow, by which he learned that Generals Bronikowski and Dombrowski, after having defended with the utmost obstinacy the bridge which crossed the Beresina there, and lost between two thousand and three thousand men, had been obliged to retreat behind Borisow, and were then a march and a half in advance on the route

followed by the main body of the French army, which was now only a few leagues from the hostile force which might cut off its retreat across the Beresina, and was deprived of the only bridge by which it could cross that river. To construct a new bridge would be almost impossible with the insignificant amount of materials possessed by the army for such a purpose; and, moreover, there could be little doubt that whilst the French were attempting to cross the Beresina, they would be attacked on the left by Tchitchakoff, on the right by Wittgenstein, and in the rear by Kutusoff.

On receiving the despatch containing the information of this state of affairs, Napoleon descended from his horse, perused the despatch with feelings of emotion of which he permitted no trace to become apparent, advanced a few steps towards a bivouac-fire which had been lighted on the route, and, perceiving General Dode, who had returned from his mission to Marshals Oudinot and Victor, ordered him to approach, and as he came up said, gazing at him with a glance of which the expression was unequalled, "*They are there!*"—meaning that the Russians were at Borisow,—and then, entering a cottage and spreading out a map of Russia on its coarse table, proceeded to discuss with General Dode the method by which it would be possible to extricate the army from its perilous position. General Dode proposed the plan of ascending the course of the Beresina towards the point of its junction with the Oula, in the neighbourhood of Lepel, where it was very shallow and could be readily forded, and, having effected a junction with Victor and Oudinot, re-entering Wilna by the Gloubokoe route. To this proposition Napoleon objected the length of the détour which separated the army from Wilna, the danger there was that the Russians would have preceded its arrival there, and the imminent peril of encountering Wittgenstein. But, whilst General Dode was replying to these objections, Napoleon, paying no attention to the speaker, traced with his finger the course of the Beresina and the Dnieper, and, as his eyes fell on the spot marked as Pultowa, he started from the map, and, pacing up and down, exclaimed "Pultowa! Pultowa!" appearing to have forgotten the presence of General Dode, who watched in silence this singular scene, and contemplated with mingled grief and surprise the new Charles XII., who, both a hundred times greater and a hundred times more unfortunate than the original one, now at length acknowledged his consciousness of his destiny. At this point of the interview Murat entered the cottage with Prince Eugene, Berthier, and General Jomini, who, having been governor of the province during the campaign, had studied its localities, and was very capable, therefore, of giving advice on the present occasion. As soon as Napoleon perceived General Jomini he said to him, "It is just that when the fortunate become unfortunate their ill fortune should equal their good fortune." He then asked the general's advice, which was, that the army should attempt the passage of the Beresina a little above Borisow, and from thence make for the Smorzona route, which was the shortest to Wilna and the least devastated. The subsequent course of events showed that this was very sensible advice; but Napoleon, without disputing or even

appearing to have heard it, suddenly burst forth into a torrent of complaints, and, walking to and fro and speaking with extraordinary animation, declared that if the hearts of those around him were not smitten by such weak despondency he would ascend towards the Upper Beresina, attack Wittgenstein's army, compel it to yield, and re-enter Europe with a Russian army captive in his train. To this proposition General Jomini simply replied that the execution of such a manœuvre might be possible with a thoroughly effective and well-provisioned army, but certainly not with one thoroughly exhausted by long privations.

In the midst, however, of the observations made by those around him, and of the brilliant dreams in which his soul indulged, Napoleon determined upon the course which he would pursue with the utmost tact and discernment,—resolving to advance directly upon the Beresina, to send Oudinot to Borisow to snatch this position from the enemy's grasp, and, should this be impossible, to seek a passage in the environs. He sent suitable instructions to Oudinot, who had arrived on the right of the French army, and proceeded to Bobr for the purpose of personally superintending the execution of his proposed manœuvre.

And now fortune, as though weary of overwhelming him with so many evils, appeared to have resolved to save him by a miracle from the last humiliations. As has been already stated, Marshal St. Cyr, after the evacuation of Polotsk, had detached from the 2d corps General Wréde, for the purpose of opposing Steinghel, and this Bavarian general permitted himself to become isolated from the 2d corps, and remained in the environs of Gloubokoe, retaining with his other troops the light-cavalry division of General Corbineau, composed of the 7th and 20th chasseurs, and the 8th lancers. As the 2d corps, however, soon had reason to regret the absence of this division, it had set out, in accordance with directions which had been sent to it from Gloubokoe, on the 16th of November, and, having arrived close to Borisow, after encountering and successfully passing amidst the parties of troops which Admiral Tchitchakoff had thrown forward for the purpose of connecting his own army with that under Wittgenstein on the Upper Beresina, it had found, as the Russians were already at Borisow, that the only course open to it was to traverse the Beresina, and to join the grand army, to which, enfeebled as it was in its cavalry-arm, seven hundred cavalry would be an important addition. It had proceeded, therefore, along the right bank of the Beresina above Borisow, in search of a place at which it might be possible to cross to the other bank, and, having found a point at which the water was unusually shallow, opposite the village Studianka, three leagues above Borisow, had reached the other bank, and, proceeding as speedily as possible to Bobr, had there found Marshal Oudinot crossing the Smolensk route on his way to Borisow. General Corbineau had made his report to his marshal, and then rejoined the 2d corps, to which he belonged, whilst almost at the same moment Marshal Oudinot, throwing himself suddenly upon Borisow, had surprised there and surrounded Count Pahlen's advanced guard, taking five or six hundred prisoners and slaying or wounding an equal number, and had then hastened towards the bridge, which the

Russians, eager to fly, and despairing of being able to defend it, had burned.

Although, however, the bridge across the Borisow had been thus destroyed, the unexpected discovery of a ford made by General Corbineau afforded a ray of hope; and Napoleon, after having received from General Corbineau, in a personal interview, a minute account of its position, sent orders by the general to Oudinot to make immediate preparations for effecting the passage of the Beresina, by the Studianka ford, but at the same time enjoining the utmost secrecy, and the execution of such manœuvres below Borisow as might deceive Tchitchakoff and divert his attention from the point at which the French army was about to attempt the passage.

General Corbineau, quitting Napoleon on the 23d, lost no time in rejoining Marshal Oudinot, and the latter, proceeding on the following day—the 24th—to execute the orders he had received, took advantage of the night, and the wood which bordered the Beresina, to send General Corbineau secretly with all the available pontooneers to commence the works which would be necessary to enable the army to cross the Beresina by the Studianka passage. In the mean time, Napoleon, having proceeded on the 24th to Lochnitsa on the Borisow route, with the intention of reaching Borisow itself with the Guard on the following day, for the purpose of inducing the Russians to believe that he intended to cross the Beresina below instead of above that town, had sent orders to Marshal Davout, who since the battle of Krasnoé had again commanded the rear-guard, to hasten his movements, that the passage of the Beresina might be effected, if at all, with the utmost possible expedition, and, especially, had despatched General Eblé with the pontooneers and their material to Studianka, to complete the construction of the bridges which the pontooneers of the 2d corps had been only able to commence.

General Eblé set out on the evening of the 24th from Lochnitsa towards Borisow, with his four hundred men, followed by the able General Chasseloup, who still possessed some of hisappers, although quite unfurnished with material, and, marching throughout the whole night, reached Borisow at five o'clock on the morning of the 25th, and from thence, by a movement to the right, reached the bank of the Beresina at Studianka in the course of the afternoon, when General Eblé, addressing his troops, declared to them that the fate of the army was in their hands, inspired them with his own noble sentiments, and obtained from them the promise of the most absolute devotion,—a promise which bound them, although they had just marched during two days and two nights, and the cold had again become most intense, to remain in the water throughout the whole of the night and the following day, in the midst of enormous masses of ice, and exposed to the bullets of the enemy, without an hour of repose, and only taking time to snatch a morsel of the roughest food.

Napoleon, after having proceeded from Lochnitsa to Borisow, and slept at the *château de Storoï-Borisow*, galloped up to Studianka on the morning of the 26th with his lieutenants Murat, Berthier, Eugene, Caulaincourt, and Duroc, and watched the pontooneers fixing the bridge, without daring to urge to further exertions men who, at the exhortations of their worthy gen-

ral, were exerting to the utmost all their strength and intelligence. In the mean time, as it was a subject of the most anxious inquiry whether the French troops would have to encounter or not the Russian army at the moment when they were attempting the passage of the river, Marshal Oudinot's aide-de-camp, Jacqueminot, had with some difficulty crossed to the other bank and seized on an inferior officer of the Russian army, from whom it was learned that Tchitchakoff with the bulk of his forces was before Borisow, fully deceived by the pretended intentions of the French below that town, and that he had only a detachment of light troops at Studianka.

Whilst the bridges were still in progress, Corbinau, with his cavalry-brigade, taking behind them a certain number of voltigeurs, plunged into the Beresina, and, having surmounted the many difficulties presented by the passage of the river, ascended the opposite bank, and took up a position in the wood on its borders, Napoleon at the same time posting on the left bank forty pieces of cannon, which were to fire, if necessary, over the heads of our men, at the risk of striking them, the state of affairs rendering such an inconvenience unavoidable.

Working in the midst of the freezing water, with the utmost ardour, and without even complaining of the terrible hardships they were undergoing, the pontooneers rendered practicable one of the two bridges they were constructing an hour after noon, and the divisions Legrand and Maison, and Doumerc's cuirassiers of the 2d corps, and the remains of the division Dombrowski, amounting altogether to nine thousand men, immediately passed over it to the other bank, where they immediately engaged and put to flight some light-infantry troops which General Tchaplitz, who commanded Tchitchakoff's advanced guard, had moved upon this point, and established themselves in a position in which they would be able to cover the passage of our troops.

At four o'clock in the afternoon the second bridge was completed, and after the Guard had effected the passage it was attempted to accomplish that of the artillery; but, having been necessarily most hastily constructed, and with ill-prepared materials, it twice gave way under the weight to which it was now exposed, and was not fully established until six o'clock on the following morning.

In the mean time, the bridge which had been first completed, and which was on the right, having been devoted solely to the passage of those on foot and the infantry, had never ceased to be practicable, and during the night of the 27th of November almost all the unarmed crowd of stragglers reached the opposite bank by its means. The attraction of some farms and a certain amount of provisions, however, had retained a portion on the left bank of the river, and about ten or fifteen thousand men, distributing themselves around bivouac-fires, resolved not to leave the left bank that night for quarters which might be far less endurable, and thus, the bridge to the right being rendered useless, whilst that on the left was rendered impracticable by breaking down under the artillery, was lost (and it was a loss which was very soon to be bitterly regretted) the night of the 27th.

On the morning of the 27th Napoleon tra-

versed the bridges with his staff, and, having taken up his quarters in a little village named Zawnicko, on the right bank, behind the corps of Marshal Oudinot, remained on horseback during the whole day for the purpose of superintending in person the passage of the various detachments which still remained on the left bank. During the course of the day the 4th corps, (Prince Eugene's,) the 8d, (Marshal Ney's,) the 5th, (Prince Poniatowski's,) and the 8th, (the Westphalian,) accomplished the passage,—the two former numbering about two thousand each, and the two latter about five or six hundred each. Towards the close of the day came up the 1st corps, which since the departure from Krasnoé had resumed the position of rear-guard, and was now the only corps which preserved any appearance of discipline.

The 9th corps,—that of Marshal Victor,—after having slowly fallen back before Wittgenstein, had finally made a decided retrograde movement, for the purpose of covering the grand army, and had posted itself between Borisow and Studianka in such a manner as to protect these two positions; and Napoleon, considering it a matter of extreme importance to deceive Tchitchakoff with respect to the point at which the army was about to cross the Beresina, ordered Marshal Victor to leave at Borisow the French division Partouneaux, already reduced from twelve thousand men to four thousand, whilst he himself, with the Polish division Gerard and the German division Däendels, numbering altogether about nine thousand men and seven or eight hundred cavalry, covered Studianka. At the same time, making every attempt to resist the enemy's attack, he directed Marshal Davout, as soon as he should have effected the passage of the river, to advance on the Zembina route, which was also the Wilna route, to seize, before they should be occupied by the Cossacks, the many important defiles which occurred along it.

The 27th was thus employed in crossing the Beresina and preparing a desperate resistance; and on the same day a third accident occurred to the bridge on the left, which, although it was speedily repaired, caused considerable confusion among the number of wagons which were being hurried across it.

In the mean time, Tchitchakoff had been completely deceived with respect to the place at which we had determined to effect the passage of the Beresina; so completely, indeed, that, when General Tchaplitz informed him of the movements of the French army at Studianka, he regarded them as mere pretended operations designed to deceive him with respect to Napoleon's real intentions. When, however, information of the actual passage of the army reached him, he was at length undeceived, and determined to attack us violently on the right bank, on the 28th of November, in concert with the two other Russian armies posted on the left bank. The forces at his disposal were between thirty and thirty-two thousand, of whom ten or twelve thousand were cavalry, which would be by no means an advantageous arm on the species of ground on which the opposed forces would most probably meet.

In the mean time, Kutusoff, having halted at Kopys, on the Dnieper, to refresh and rally his troops, which were much exhausted, had con-

tented himself with sending beyond the Dnieper Platow, Miloradovitch, and Yermoloff, with an advanced guard of about ten thousand men; and these troops, having arrived at Lochnitza, were ready to co-operate with Tchitchakoff and Wittgenstein in the destruction of the French army. The position at this moment of Wittgenstein, who had followed Victor's corps together with Steinghel, was in the rear of Victor, between Borisow and Studianka; and, as his troops numbered thirty thousand, there were thus about seventy-two thousand Russian soldiers, without taking into account the thirty thousand remaining in the rear with Kutusoff, ready to attack the twelve or thirteen thousand under Victor, the nine thousand under Oudinot, and the seven or eight hundred of the Guard.

The terrible struggle commenced on the evening of the 27th. The unfortunate French division Partouneaux (the best of Victor's three) had to remain in front of Borisow during the whole of the 27th, in order to detain there and deceive Admiral Tchitchakoff. In this position it was separated from its corps by three leagues of wood and marsh, and was cut off, as was to be expected, from the other divisions of Victor's corps, employed in covering Studianka, by Miloradovitch's advanced guard, effecting on the Orscha route its junction with Wittgenstein and Steinghel. It was on the evening of the 27th that Partouneaux first perceived the perilous nature of his position, and found himself suddenly attacked on the Orscha route, and on the other side by Tchitchakoff's troops, which were attempting to cross the Beresina on the wrecks of the Borisow bridge,—the embarrassment of his position being immensely increased by the presence of many thousands of stragglers, who had accumulated about his troops with their baggage, believing that their passage across the Beresina was really to be effected below Borisow, and who, seeking refuge in their despair, with cries of anguish, amidst Partouneaux's troops, impeded their movements and increased the desolation of the scene. Partouneaux resolved, nevertheless, in spite of these adverse circumstances, to extricate himself from his perilous position, and attempted to cross the labyrinth of wood and marsh which separated him from Studianka; but he had only a force of four thousand men with which to contend with forty thousand, and after a most heroic contest he surrendered, or rather was taken prisoner, with two thousand men who alone remained to him. A battalion of three hundred men alone succeeded under shadow of the darkness in ascending the Beresina and gaining Studianka; whilst the stragglers, unable to escape, fell before the Cossack lances.

On the morning of the 28th the conflict commenced on the two banks of the Beresina,—on the right bank with those of our troops which had effected the passage, and on the left bank with those who covered it. The enemy's fire became terribly vehement, and on each bank thousands fell to die. Nevertheless, although the Russian generals had concerted among themselves measures calculated to drive the French troops on each bank of the Beresina into its waters, they were, fortunately, so intimidated by the presence of Napoleon and the grand army, that, though possessed of the advantage both in numbers and position, they acted

with extreme reserve, and did not display that vigour which must have completed our ruin.

Marshal Oudinot was engaged from an early hour of the morning with the troops of Tchaplitz and Pahlen, which were supported by the remainder of Tchitchakoff's forces and a detachment of Yermoloff's; and his generals, Maison, Legrand, and Dombrowski, by the exercise of as much skill as valour, had just succeeded in driving back Tchaplitz and Pahlen upon the bulk of Tchitchakoff's corps, when Oudinot himself was wounded and carried off the field. As General Legrand was also wounded, Napoleon sent Ney to replace Oudinot, and Ney immediately hastened up with the wreck of his corps, followed by the division Clapartède, and proceeded to support the divisions Maison and Legrand, and to aid them to drive back the head of Tchitchakoff's troops upon their *corps de bataille*. He ordered Doumerc to hold himself in readiness to charge towards the right, and arranged his infantry-column in such a manner as to be able to charge with them either on the centre or on the left, at the same time directing a violent cannonade against masses of Russian troops which were posted in the thickest part of the wood. Doumerc, impatient for action, perceiving on his right six or seven thousand veteran Russian infantry supported by a line of cavalry, charged them with the 7th cuirassiers, under Colonel Dubois, and, having thus broken the Russian square, hastened up with the 14th cuirassiers to prevent the enemy's line from reforming, whilst the fourth held the enemy's cavalry in check on the left, and the light cavalry held it in check on the right. The conclusion of this portion of the battle left us in possession of about two thousand prisoners, and had cost the enemy a further loss of one thousand in killed and wounded. In the mean time Ney had advanced his infantry against the enemy's line, and, compelling the Russians to retreat into the thickest portion of the wood, continued the pursuit to the extremity of the Stakow forest, half-way from Brill to Borisow, and there paused, concluding with a cannonade a battle which had resulted in a complete victory for us and had cost the enemy three thousand in killed and wounded, and as many prisoners.

In the mean time Marshal Victor, on the left bank of the Beresina, had to maintain his ground against forty thousand Russian troops, with nine or ten thousand soldiers whose movements were embarrassed by the presence of ten or twelve thousand stragglers. He had taken up a position, which was fortunately well calculated for defensive operations, on the side of a ravine which ended in the Beresina, and had posted there the Polish division Gerard, together with the German division and the Dutch division de Berg. By his right he covered Studianka and protected the bridges, and he was supported on his left by a wood which he had not sufficient forces to occupy, but in front of which he had posted the eight hundred cavalry which were still at his disposal under the command of General Fournier, whilst with twelve pieces of cannon he had established a dominant and murderous fire against the Russian troops, and thus held them in check.

At daybreak the Russian attack, which was directed by General Diebitch, the chief of Wittgenstein's staff, became very vehement, and,

after a vigorous cannonade, numerous squadrons of the enemy's cavalry attacked the French left, composed of Fournier's cavalry, but were repelled by the latter and even driven back beyond the ravine. At the same time the Russian infantry-chasseurs, attacking our right, had descended into the ravine, and, posting themselves in the brushwood, had afforded General Diebitch the opportunity of establishing there a strong battery, the fire of which was directed upon the bridges, towards which a mass of stragglers and baggage was proceeding in terrified haste.

Marshal Victor, fearing for the safety of this portion of his line, since the defence of the bridges was his chief duty, threw several columns of infantry against the Russian batteries, whilst the Imperial Guard, on the opposite bank of the Beresina, having perceived the peril, posted some pieces of cannon in such a manner as to answer those of the enemy. And thus for some hours was exchanged a torrent of projectiles between the two banks of the river, and close to the bridges, which received a portion of them, whilst a large number fell amidst the terrified crowd which was hastening with almost mad eagerness to cross to the other bank, and which now presented, in its agony, confusion, and despair, a spectacle which was in itself a fearful condemnation of this mad expedition.

When Victor, who displayed throughout the day the most devoted courage, perceived that there was some danger that his right would be broken, and imminent peril of a frightful catastrophe thus taking place towards the bridges, he resolved to make a furious attack towards the enemy's centre, and, throwing a column of infantry across the ravine, assailed and drove back the Russian line at the same moment that General Fournier, executing a final charge with his cavalry, thus supported the movement and rendered it decisive.

The Russian artillery, having been thus driven back, ceased to aggravate the disorder at the bridge by its fire; but General Diebitch, unwilling to consider himself vanquished, reformed his line, which was three times more numerous than ours, and, returning to the charge, drove the French troops once more beyond the ravine, when the approach of night separated the exhausted combatants, and the contest ended, leaving Fournier with scarcely three hundred of his seven or eight hundred horse, and Marshal Victor with scarcely five thousand of his eight or nine thousand infantry, the Russians having lost in the double contest waged on each side of the Beresina ten or eleven thousand men, without taking into account the three thousand men who had fallen into the hands of General Doumerc. But the Russian wounded were saved, whilst ours were necessarily abandoned, together with the stragglers, whom it was now useless to hope to be able to transport across the river in time to avoid the enemy.

The night brought with it a certain degree of calm in the place of the carnage and confusion which had marked the whole course of the day, and the French army could fairly indulge in the feeling of having obtained a glorious triumph; but it was nevertheless necessary that it should on the following day not so much retreat as fly, and from nine o'clock in the evening, until Marshal Victor's troops crossed the Beresina, taking

with them all their artillery and *matériel*, with the exception of two pieces of cannon. There still remained, however, several thousands of disbanded stragglers or fugitives on the left bank, who wished to defer their passage across the river until the morrow; and, as Napoleon had ordered that the bridges should be destroyed at daybreak, General Eblé, and several other officers, proceeded to their bivouacs, to entreat them to cross the river immediately, and to declare to them that the bridges were about to be destroyed. But all his efforts were in vain.

At daybreak on the following day, the 29th of November, General Eblé received orders to destroy the bridges at seven o'clock; but, being anxious to give every opportunity to the stragglers, who, convinced too late of their danger, now hastened to cross the river with the utmost eagerness, he delayed the execution of this order until nearly nine o'clock, when, the Russians being almost upon them, he was compelled with a heavy heart to set fire to the heaps of inflammable materials which had been placed under the bridges to facilitate their destruction. Immediately torrents of smoke and flame enveloped the two bridges, and the unhappy wretches who were upon them precipitated themselves into the stream to avoid being carried down with them in their fall. From the midst of the crowd which had not yet effected the passage arose a cry of bitter despair, accompanied by tears and convulsive gestures, the wounded and the women stretching out their arms towards their companions, who were making a desperate effort to reach the opposite bank, either by the burning bridges, or through the stream itself, to avoid a captivity less endurable than death. The Cossacks now galloped up, and, thrusting their lances into the midst of the crowd, slew some of the unfortunate wretches of which it was composed, and then drove the others—numbering from six to eight thousand, men, women, and children, disbanded soldiers or fugitives—towards the Russian army.

The French army retreated overwhelmed with a deep feeling of affliction caused by this spectacle; and no one was more bitterly distressed at it than the generous and intrepid Eblé, to the exertions of whom and his gallant pontooneers the fifty and odd thousand individuals, armed or unarmed, who had crossed the Beresina, owed both life and liberty.

Such was the immortal event at the passage of the Beresina, one of the most tragic to be found in history, and a fit completion of this terrible campaign.

It was now necessary that the army without a moment's loss of time should proceed by Zembin, Pletchenitz, Ilia, and Molodeczno, to rejoin the Wilna route; and on the 4th of December the head of the army had reached Smorgoni, whilst the rear-guard was at Molodeczno, where a violent and desperate encounter took place between it and a Russian force, consisting of Platow's cavalry and the division Tchaplitz, ending in the repulse of the latter, but leaving Ney's troops reduced to four or five hundred, and consequently insufficient for the service of the rear-guard, which was now intrusted to Marshal Victor, with the Bavarians under General Wrède.

Napoleon, having arrived at Smorgoni, considered that he had satisfied all the demands of

honour in remaining with the army up to the point where the Caudine Forks no longer threatened it, and resolved to return to Paris. M. Daru, indeed, to whom he communicated his intention by his own mouth, and M. de Bassano, to whom he sent information of it by letter, insisted strongly upon the necessity of his remaining with the army; but Napoleon disregarded their advice, being most strongly impressed by the sense of the danger he should incur should he find himself with a few worn-out troops incapable of any resistance at four hundred leagues' distance from the French frontier, the Germans on his rear being very disposed to revolt. What would be the result, he asked himself,—what would be the effect on the Empire,—should the Germans entertain the very evident idea that by preventing his return to France they would at one blow destroy the fabric of his power, and should they give effect to this idea by closing the Rhine route against him and the wrecks of his army? Exaggerating this peril with that vivacity of perception which was one of the distinguishing qualities of his mind, Napoleon was impatient to quit his army now that the passage of the Beresina had been miraculously effected and the claims upon his Imperial honour no longer demanded his presence at the head of his troops. Fearing that, as soon as his disasters became known, a thousand arms would be outstretched to bar his road, he was anxious to escape at once with Caulaincourt, Lobau, Duroc, and Lefebvre-Desnouettes, traversing Poland and Germany secretly, and to reach the Tuileries unexpected even by his wife.

But, although there were many reasons which urged the adoption of this course, there were many also of considerable weight which were of an opposite tendency. He was still at the head of twelve thousand armed troops, followed by forty thousand stragglers, who were quite capable, by the aid of a month or two of repose and proper resources, of being reconverted into disciplined troops, and, in the mean time, the twelve thousand troops who still preserved their arms would be joined between Molodeczno and Wilna by Wrède's six thousand Bavarians, at Wilna itself by Loison's nine thousand French troops, the two brigades of Poles and Germans under Franceschi and Coutard, numbering altogether about seven or eight thousand men, and, in addition to these organized corps, some squadrons and *bataillons de marche* numbering about four thousand, and six thousand Lithuanians. The junction of these various corps with the grand army would form a force capable of offering a considerable degree of resistance to the enemy, and numbering forty-five thousand well-armed and disciplined troops. At the same time there were, on the right, Schwarzenberg with twenty-five thousand Austrians, and Reynier with fifteen thousand French and Saxon troops; whilst Macdonald commanded on the left ten thousand Prussians, who would not dare to be untrue to the French army as long as it was true to itself, and six thousand Poles, who would be proof against every hostile influence. In the rear the division Heudelet of Augereau's corps reached Königsberg fifteen thousand strong, whilst Augereau himself was in command of an equal number, together with Grenier's corps, which had passed the Alps eighteen

thousand strong. Augereau would be able to hold Berlin with thirty thousand men, Heudelet to fill up the intervening space with fifteen thousand, and Napoleon would have the power of assembling around Wilna one hundred thousand, a force equal to that which was at the disposal of the Russians. Kutusoff's troops numbered only fifty thousand, Wittgenstein's twenty thousand, and Tchitchakoff's about as many, whilst Sacken, after the disastrous conflicts he had had with Schwarzenberg and Reynier, had now no more than ten thousand. Moreover, should the French army gain a battle before Wilna, the influence of such success would be sufficient to attract the thirty or forty thousand stragglers into its ranks, and it would be sufficiently strong to hold the Russians in check, to await reinforcements from France, and to procure resources from Poland.

But the moral sentiment was wanting to Napoleon's mind which would have caused him to prefer the loss of a throne to the abandonment of an army which he had led to disaster. Had his life only been in danger, Napoleon was a sufficiently good soldier to have remained without hesitation with an army which his own errors had compromised; but to be dethroned, and, which was far worse, to become a prisoner in the hands of the Germans, was a prospect which he could not bear to contemplate, and he formed the resolution at Smorgoni to return immediately to France.

Confiding the chief authority in his absence to the King of Naples, Napoleon left with him Major-General Berthier, hoping that the service would thus have a wise, laborious councillor, capable of restraining his impetuosity and of supplying his want of knowledge of details. Unfortunately, the major-general was completely demoralized and his health totally destroyed. He was anxious to set out with Napoleon, and the severest language was necessary to induce him to remain.

On the evening of the 6th of December, at Smorgoni, Napoleon assembled Murat, Ezerné, Berthier, and his marshals, and communicated to them his intention. They were greatly astonished and considerably agitated by this declaration, but did not dare to offer any opposition to the resolutions of their master, whom, although vanquished, they still feared: moreover, both his arguments and manner, which was on this occasion extraordinarily bland and persuasive, had considerable weight with them. He declared that he would speedily rejoin them at the head of a formidable army, and recommended them in the mean time to support each other and faithfully obey Murat. Having concluded his address, he embraced his hearers, and, throwing himself into a sledge, followed by M. de Caulaincourt, Marshal Duroc, Count Lobau, and General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, set out in the middle of the night, leaving his lieutenants acquiescent in, and almost persuaded of the wisdom of the step which he was taking, but at the same time overwhelmed with astonishment and almost with despair.

The greatest secrecy was to be observed until the morrow, in order that news of his departure might not precede him on the road which he was about to traverse in the strictest incognito. Before his departure he had issued the twenty-ninth bulletin, which subsequently became so

celebrated, in which, for the first time in the course of the retreat, he acknowledged that portion of the disasters suffered by the French army which could not be positively denied, attributing them to the inclemency of the weather, and relieving the account of his reverses by a description of the glorious and immortal passage of the Beresina.

When the army became informed of Napoleon's departure it fell into a species of stupefaction, for with him had vanished its last hope, and it mechanically continued its march, anxious to reach Wilna, as a month before it had been anxious to reach Smolensk. Each successive day brought an increase of its sufferings. On its departure from Molodeczno the cold had become still more intense, and had descended to thirty degrees Reaumur. Almost all the horses were dead, and the men daily dropped on the roads by hundreds. The troops marched huddled together, careless of their ranks, steeped in the silence of stupefaction and the depths of despair, saying nothing, regarding nothing. Smitten by the intense cold, those who were of feeble constitution lost, in succession, sight, hearing, and consciousness, and then fell, without power of motion, to die on the road and be trampled on by the crowd of those who followed.

And whilst the troops thus perished of cold on their march, they also perished in their bivouacs through the unrestrained enjoyment of warmth; for, too eagerly exposing their frozen limbs to the heat of the bivouac-fires, many of them brought upon their feet, and hands, and even faces, fatal gangrene. Many also perished by being burned to death, through their own carelessness, in farm-houses in which they passed the night.

At length this desolate crowd of beings, lean, exhausted, clothed in rags, and wearing over their uniforms all varieties of strange costume brought from Moscow, arrived on the 9th of December at the gates of Wilna, and experienced on the occasion, in hearts which appeared to have been deprived of all sensation, one last feeling of pleasure. "Wilna! Wilna!" It was a word which was identified in the minds of the troops with the ideas of repose, security, and abundance; and, in fact, although this city did not contain such resources as was generally supposed, it was capable of affording far more than what would supply the most pressing necessities of the army and enable it to reach the Niemen in good order. At the sight of the walls of the city, the crowd, forgetting that the largest gate would be but a very narrow entrance for such numbers, neglected to make the circuit of the walls in search of several gates, and, mechanically following the head of the column, accumulated about the gate which was towards Smolensk in a state of terrible confusion similar to that which had arisen at the bridges across the Beresina. When at length the troops had entered the town, this scene of confusion was repeated in its streets; for, as no attempt was made to supply the necessities of the soldiers or to preserve order among them, and the inhabitants, terrified at their wild appearance and clamorous cries, closed their shops and warehouses against them, even when they approached to purchase provisions, Wilna was speedily a sacked town.

The army reached Wilna during the 8th and 9th of December. Some days of repose were

necessary to our exhausted soldiers, and it might easily have been procured for them, had proper orders been given to Schwarzenberg and General Reynier, the former of whom, having received a reinforcement of six thousand men, had reached Slonim, whilst the latter had advanced towards Narew for the purpose of acting in concert with the division Durutte which came from Warsaw, and had inflicted a severe check upon the Russian General Sacken, whom he encountered upon his road. Schwarzenberg, receiving information of this event, had marched upon Sacken's flank, and, assailing him in his turn, had contributed to throw him back in disorder towards Volhynia. This success had cost the Russians some seven or eight thousand men, and had afforded Schwarzenberg and Reynier the security for their rear necessary before they could undertake any movement in advance; and, had they been informed of the real state of affairs, Schwarzenberg, probably Reynier also, would certainly have marched upon Wilna, which he might have reached before the 10th of December. But Napoleon had set out without giving any orders to this effect, and Schwarzenberg and Reynier lingered between Slonim and Neswij, uncertain what course to pursue, and unable to determine between the various contradictory reports which reached them from all sides. The result was, therefore, that Wilna was completely uncovered, and that there was no hope of making an effectual defence there against the three Russian corps which were advancing against it.

Each corps of the French army had fallen into complete dissolution under the influence of the cold and incessant fatigue; and at the gates of Wilna Victor had reached the conclusion of his duties as commander of the rear-guard by finding himself without a single soldier. The only troops remaining in their ranks were about three thousand in Loison's division, and about as many of the Imperial Guard. The generals, whether wounded or well, having no men to command, wandered hither and thither, and Murat, horrified at the responsibility which had fallen upon him, alarmed for the safety of his kingdom in the midst of the wide-spread ruin which had begun to take place, and receiving but little support from Berthier, who was both sick and paralyzed with fear, knew not what to do or to order.

The enemy, however, left him no time for hesitation. On the evening of the 9th, Platow appeared with his Cossacks before the gates of Wilna, and aggravated to the highest possible pitch the disorder which prevailed within it. There was no longer any rear-guard in existence, and General Loison, therefore, who alone had any troops at his disposal, hastened up with the nineteenth, and attempted to cover the town, whilst Ney and Lefebvre, running through the streets, cried to arms, and endeavoured to collect some of the armed soldiers for the purpose of conducting them to the ramparts. By these means the Cossacks were checked, but only for a time, and each man from this moment only thought how he might effect his own flight. Murat, the hero of the plains of the Moskowa, Murat, the invulnerable Murat, who seemed proof against every weapon, was among the first to fly, and set off on the night of the 10th, declaring that he was going to Kowno, where

it was to be attempted to assemble the army behind the Niemen. All who were capable of doing so fled in confusion, leaving to the enemy vast magazines of all kinds and some eighteen or twenty thousand wounded or exhausted men, many of the former of whom had been placed in the houses of the Polish Jews, and were thrown from the windows or murdered by these wretches as soon as the French army was in retreat.

As the ground from the gates of Wilna for about the distance of a league was covered with ice, it was difficult, and even impossible, for the horses to drag up the ascent the carts which bore the sick and wounded officers, the gun-carriages, or the chests of treasure; which latter M. de Bassano, unwilling to manifest by their removal the danger of the situation, had left at Wilna as long as possible. At the bottom of the hill, therefore, there ensued a scene of the most terrible confusion; and, after some hours of ineffectual exertion, it was found necessary to abandon the artillery, the trophies brought from Moscow, many of the sick and wounded, and to resign to the pillage of our own troops the greater portion of the treasure. As the night ended, the Cossacks hastened up to substitute their own pillage for that of the French, and to seize a booty such as had never before been offered to their avidity.

During the 10th, 11th, and 12th, the French troops traversed the twenty-six leagues which separated Wilna and Kowno; and in what destitution did they now repossess the Niemen, which six months ago they had crossed numbering four hundred thousand men and sixty thousand cavalry, twelve hundred pieces of cannon, and with incomparable *éclat*! All who had not been entirely deprived by the severity of the weather of all sense and feeling could not avoid making this bitter comparison, and felt their eyes fill with tears as they considered it. As the Niemen was frozen over and the Cossacks had already crossed it at a gallop, there could be no hope of defending Kowno, and it only remained to depart, having first emptied, or, to speak truly, pillaged, the magazines, which the activity of General Baste had filled with all the resources of Dantzic.

On the morning of the 12th of December Murat consulted with the marshals, Prince Berthier and M. D'Artois, on the course which it would be proper to adopt. The only troops which remained in their ranks were about two thousand men in Loison's division, and about one thousand five hundred in the Guard, of whom only some five hundred were capable of bearing a musket; and Murat, exasperated into hatred of Napoleon by a state of things which imperilled the safety of the crown possessed by the Bonaparte family, permitted himself to indulge in bitter complaint of Napoleon's ambition which had caused it. Davout, indeed, having a thorough dislike of the King of Naples, silenced him by observing that, if Napoleon was to find censors in the army, they should not be those of his lieutenants whom he had made kings, and that, under existing circumstances, the object in view should be to discover some means of safety, and not to sanction by evil example the want of discipline among the troops.

The defence of Kowno and the conduct of the conclusion of the retreat was unanimously intrusted to Marshal Ney; and, for the purpose

of affording the remains of the French army time to escape, he was to defend Kowno for forty-eight hours with the remains of the division Loison and some troops of the German Confederation, and then to fall back upon Königsberg, when he would be joined by Marshal Macdonald, who, on his side, retreated from Riga upon Tilsit. Marshal Ney demanded that in this last effort under the walls of Kowno he should be assisted by General Gérard, and this request was acceded to.

As soon as these plans had been arranged, the remains of the French army immediately departed for Königsberg, leaving Ney and Gérard at Kowno to attempt to hold in check the Cossacks, who appeared on the morning of the 13th by the Wilna route, in front of the bridge across the Niemen, upon which the German troops, after some hesitation, in spite of the remonstrances of Ney and Gérard, and although the Cossacks had been compelled to fall back by the fire of a detachment of the 29th, gradually disbanded, inducing by their example the soldiers of the 29th to do so likewise. Finding themselves therefore, on the evening of the 13th, with only five or six hundred men and eight or ten pieces of cannon, Ney and Gérard resolved to depart during the night. But at the point of departure from Kowno, a hill arose as at the commencement of the route from Wilna, and, covered as it was with ice, had caused a terrible scene of confusion, which was much increased by the fact that some Cossacks, having crossed the Niemen on the ice and ascended the opposite side of the hill, threatened to cut off the route; and at this new danger the five or six hundred men who still followed Ney and Gérard dispersed, each now seeking his own safety, and the latter, with a few officers who still remained with them, turning to the right, followed the course of the Niemen, and succeeded in gaining in safety the Gumbinnen route at Königsberg,—thus performing for France a last service, the only one in their power, since it was at least something in the immensity of this disaster to save two men such as these.

From this moment not a trace of any corps of the army remained, the disbanded soldiers continuing their retreat across the frozen plains of Poland, pursued by the Cossacks, who, after having advanced some leagues beyond the Niemen, recrossed it, since the Russian armies, triumphant, but exhausted and much reduced in numbers, did not intend to advance to the opposite bank.

There were at Königsberg about ten thousand individuals in the hospitals, of whom some were wounded but the greater number sick. Of these latter some had their limbs frozen, whilst others were suffering from a horrible species of pestilence, named by the doctors *fièvre de congélation*, and terribly contagious. The heroic Larrey, worn out with fatigue and suffering, had caught this fever and died of it. Heroism, of whatever species it may be, is the one consolation in the midst of great disasters, and this consolation for the disasters of the Russian campaign was granted to France in a measure which fully equalled those disasters. Amidst the crowd of those unhappy ones who expiated at Königsberg by their death either the ambition of Napoleon or their own intemperance, were some whom France must ever regret; and among these were



General Lariboisière and General Eblé,—the former of whom, borne down by fatigue, which he supported with rare fortitude in spite of his age, but inconsolable for the loss of a son slain before his own eyes at the battle of the Moskowa, died of the contagion prevailing at Königsberg, whilst the latter, who had succeeded him in the chief command of the artillery, had been himself smitten by a mortal disease at the Beresina, and expired two days after the chief whom he succeeded.

Many attempts have been made to reckon up the losses suffered by France and her allies in this Russian expedition, and, although such a calculation is as impossible as terrible, some idea of the truth may, nevertheless, be attained. The total force of the army intended to act from the Rhipé to the Niemen consisted of six hundred and twelve thousand men (with the Austrians, six hundred and forty-eight thousand) and one hundred and fifty thousand horses. Of these five hundred and thirty-three thousand had passed the Niemen, of whom there remained, under Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier, about forty thousand Austrians and Saxons, fifteen thousand Prussians and Poles under Marshal Macdonald, and some isolated troops, numbering about thirty or forty thousand. Of the remaining four hundred and thirty-eight thousand about one hundred thousand had fallen into the hands of the Russians; and according to this calculation, therefore, about three hundred and forty thousand would have perished: but this, happily, was not the case, for a certain number of men who had deserted their ranks at the commencement of the campaign had gradually rejoined their country across Poland and Germany. Nevertheless, it can be no exaggeration to say that in the course of the campaign about three hundred thousand men fell beneath the enemy's fire and the severities of cold and want.

What can we say of the expedition which caused this terrible loss? What judgment pass upon it which has not already been passed by the general good sense of the world?

It was an enterprise which under no circumstances, or under scarcely any, could have possibly succeeded: the most perfect system of execution could not have corrected its essential fault, and the errors which were committed, and which for the most part were natural results of its inherent principle, rendered its success entirely impracticable.

It was not an enterprise which political causes compelled Napoleon to execute, for by employing all his resources in carrying on the war in Spain he might have solved the European question, and by sacrificing some of his territorial acquisitions, which were more burdensome than useful, might have doubtless obtained a general peace. But, even supposing this to be an error, and that it was inevitable that Russia should enter into an alliance with England and make war with France, to invade Russia instead of awaiting her attack upon the Vistula was one of the greatest political faults recorded in history, and was the fruit of that impetuous element of Napoleon's character which rendered him at once both impatient and rash. Had Europe, indeed, been united, for the purpose of securing its independence, into a league against this vast empire, it might, by attacking it by

sea, or even by advancing against it methodically by land, have succeeded, since it would have had no reason to fear an attack on its rear, in obtaining a victory over her. But for Napoleon to march upon Moscow across Europe, secretly conspiring against him, and thus left full of hatred in his rear, was a proceeding of the rashest temerity; whilst, by awaiting Russia in Poland or Germany, he might have vanquished Russia and Germany by the same blow, had the latter constituted itself the ally of the former.

But, if this enterprise was unreasonable in its very principle, it was still more so considering the state of Napoleon's military resources in 1812. The greater number of the veterans of Austerlitz and Friedland were dead or were dying in Spain; and, although some of them remained in Davout's corps, and some old divisions of Ney, Oudinot, and Eugene, these corps were unfortunately immoderately swelled with young and refractory conscripts, and mingled, moreover, with allies who hated us, and who, although the sense on honour constrained them to fight well on the actual battle-field, deserted on the first opportunity. It would have been better to have had three hundred thousand soldiers, such as were those of Marshal Davout, than the six hundred thousand which were actually collected; for the difficulty of providing their subsistence would have been only one-half, and, being fed, they would have remained in their ranks. In 1807, with excellent troops, he had failed to reach the Niemen, and to attempt in 1812 to advance twice as far with troops only half as efficient was to insure some terrible disaster. At this period, indeed, the difficulties attending such an expedition were as great as possible, whilst the means for executing it were almost entirely wanting, for, after having aroused against himself the rage of the Spaniards, who consumed many of our best troops, to advance an immense distance through enraged Germany for the purpose of provoking the frenzied enmity of the Russians, and then, too, with an army composed of troops in a very imperfect state of discipline and consisting to a great extent of foreigners secretly hostile, was almost certain to invoke the most horrible of catastrophes.

The fault of this enterprise was so thoroughly essential to its very nature, that to inquire into the errors which were committed in its execution would be almost entirely useless, had not these errors themselves been the inevitable consequences of this principal fault.

Thus, it is true that Napoleon, entering Russia on the 24th of June, lost eighteen days at Wilna; that when he advanced Davout against Bagration he failed to provide him with sufficient forces, from his desire to reserve with himself a crushing force with which he might at once overwhelm Barclay de Tolly; that he lost twelve days at Witepsk; that when he set out from Witepsk for the purpose of turning the two Russian armies assembled at Smolensk, he, wrongly perhaps, hesitated to descend the Dnieper as far as Smolensk, by which course, probably, he might have obtained the desired result; that instead of stopping at Smolensk he permitted himself to be led on, by the desire of obtaining some brilliant result, in pursuit of the Russian army, into those depths in which his own was to perish; that at the great battle of Moskowa his hesitation to send his Guard into action was probably the

cause which prevented the complete destruction of the Russian army; that when he found it necessary to evacuate Moscow, and had devised a vast and skilful combination for the purpose of returning upon the Dwina by Veliki-Luki, he had not had sufficient firmness to overcome the opposition of his lieutenants; that his pride led him to remain at Moscow after he perceived that his position there was untenable; that he again wrongly yielded to the opinion of his lieutenants in resigning his plan of turning the Russian army at Malo-Jaroslawets, for the purpose of penetrating into the rich Kalouga province; that when the retreat was necessary he neglected to conduct it in person; that at Krasnoé, by moving the army in detachments instead of *en masse*, he had lost there the whole of Marshal Ney's corps, almost all the troops which remained to Prince Eugene, a portion of the Guard and of the troops under Davout; and finally, that, miraculously saved at the Beresina, he departed from the army, and thus neglected the opportunity of concentrating the remnants of his forces, and, with the force thus formed, of striking the Russians a blow which would have compensated for his disasters by a triumph. All this is perfectly true; but they form but a feeble opinion with respect to the great catastrophe, who do not perceive that the errors above recounted were not the result of any want of genius in Napoleon, but the natural consequences of the essential fault of the expedition itself. When he lost time at Wilna and Witepsk, awaiting the stragglers, his fault was not in waiting for them, but in having brought his troops so far; when he sent Davout against Bagration with an insufficient force, he relied upon being able to concentrate troops in a manner which the nature of the country rendered impossible, and for this error the nature of the expedition was chiefly to blame, as it also was for the error of his not stopping at Smolensk; for, if it was dangerous to advance to Moscow, it would have been no less dangerous to winter in Lithuania with frozen rivers alone for a frontier, and with Europe in the rear, full of hatred against him and beginning to doubt his invincibility. If at the Moskowa he did not make use of his Guard, it was because he found it necessary to act cautiously in an enterprise of which he began to perceive the folly; if he remained too long at Moscow, it was on account of the danger of exposing his embarrassments to Europe, always so ready to pass from a state of submission to one of revolt; if he paid too much

deference to the opinions of his lieutenants with respect to his projected movements upon Veliki-Luki and Kalouga, it was because he had already demanded too much of them, and dared no longer demand any thing of them but what was absolutely necessary; if in the retreat he displayed not that energy of which he had previously given so many proofs, it was because his energy was paralyzed by the excessive consciousness of his errors. And, finally, if he abandoned the army at Smorgoni, it was because he perceived too clearly, and even in an exaggerated aspect, the consequences of the disasters which he had suffered, and which he considered could only be repaired at Paris. All this was not the result of any want of strength in Napoleon's mind or character, as he was speedily to prove on numerous battlefields, but of the essential fault of this enterprise, or rather of that intemperate trait of Napoleon's character which hurried him into committing it.

At the same time, let us not impute this disastrous catastrophe solely to earthly accidents, but also to moral causes; for to do this is demanded of us by our reverence for Providence, our sovereign Judge, the supreme Disposer of our fortunes in this world as in the next. To no fault of mere detail should we attribute this catastrophe, and not even to the fault of entering upon the Russian expedition at all, but to the far greater fault of having attempted to control the affairs of the world in a manner contrary to the rights and affections of its peoples, and without regard either for the sentiments of those whom it was necessary to vanquish, or for the lives of those by whose aid this conquest would have to be effected,—to the intemperance, in short, of genius blinded by a spirit of ambition. It is neither truthful nor useful to depreciate Napoleon, for to do so is simply to depreciate human nature and human wisdom; but both truth and wisdom demand that he should be rightly judged and displayed in his true light to the universe, together with the real causes of his errors, that nations, monarchs, and warriors, may perceive by a notable example the consequences which result when genius bursts the bonds of self-restraint and permits itself to be carried away by the instigations of unlimited power. We need not wish to draw any other lesson from this terrible catastrophe. Still must be attributed to him who fell into this distress blindness that greatness which adds to the greatness of the lesson, and which at least affords to its victims the recompense of glory.

## BOOK XLVI.

## WASHINGTON AND SALAMANCA.

Events occurring in Europe during the Russian Expedition—Difficulties of England—General Desire of Peace—Assassination of Mr. Perceval—Negotiations with America—President Madison—Declaration of War with England—State of the War in the Peninsula—Capture of Salamanca—Passage of the Douro—Battle of Salamanca, July 22—Entry of Wellington into Madrid, August 12—Siege of Burgos—Return of Joseph to Madrid, November 2—Successful Retreat of Wellington into Portugal—General Joy of Europe at the Misfortunes of Napoleon.

WHILE the unparalleled catastrophe just described was occurring in the North of Europe, the distant shores of the Atlantic and the burning plains of Spain were the theatre of scenes less extraordinary, indeed, but of extreme importance, as were all those which flowed from the exorbitant policy of Napoleon, the folly of which they proved with equal force. By them was clearly demonstrated the truth of our assertion that if, instead of seeking to conquer Europe in the heart of Russia, Napoleon had confined himself to the theatre which, though difficult, had been selected by himself,—the Peninsula and the Atlantic,—by terminating the war in Spain and the continental blockade he would probably have constrained England to yield,—have disarmed all Europe at a blow, if not forever, at least for many years, and would thus have secured to himself the time (if enlightened by reason) to make those sacrifices of his greatness which might render his dominion permanent by rendering it supportable. Before, then, resuming the sequel of the fatal expedition to Russia, it is right to retrace the events of Spain and America during the year 1812, some of fatal import, others, though fortunate, of no avail, all the effects of the same cause,—the fickle and unregulated will of a vast but unbridled genius.

We have seen that when Napoleon, disgusted with the war in Spain at the very moment when perseverance might have overcome the errors which distinguished it, determined to carry his forces to the North, Great Britain was in a situation of the greatest difficulty. The success which our errors had accorded to Lord Wellington had, no doubt, restored some degree of her serenity; but every day were experienced in that country the severe restrictions imposed upon commerce, and with alarm was anticipated the issue of an extravagant financial system; and the danger which threatened the British army, should Napoleon act with decision against it, filled the mind with incessant apprehension. The commercial position had been in no degree improved. Enormous quantities of colonial produce, sugar, coffee, cotton, accumulated in the docks or in vessels which crowded the Tagus; an equal amount of manufactured goods in the hands of the manufacturers or of speculators, all conspiring to increase the amount of bills which the bank discounted with paper money at a loss of 20 or 25 per cent.; a continual fall of the exchange arising from this state of things, which could be checked only by a constant illegal export of bullion to such a degree that at Gravelines and Dunkirk alone the smugglers brought every

month several millions of guineas in gold; such for several years had been the commercial position of England. The public expenses, which were attaining the amount of 100 millions (2500 millions of francs) per annum against 90 millions of revenue, including an annual loan of 20 millions, gave some idea of her financial position. The scarcity which had afflicted us during this year had been equally severe in England, and bands of workmen who broke the machinery and sometimes killed the manufacturers, demanding bread with cries which could not have failed to alarm a Government less habituated to the clamour of a free people, and to which no wise and humane Government could be insensible, added the last feature to this distress occasioned by a long war, in the midst of wealth unparalleled at any earlier period of the world's history.

It is true that a hundred ships-of-war and two hundred frigates, carrying a victorious flag in every sea, an army small in number but valiant and well commanded, and a cabinet, the only one in Europe which had not submitted to the despotic will of Napoleon, made some amends to England for her sufferings. But every wise man knew that this situation concealed great dangers, that if the great genius whom they opposed should introduce some degree of prudence and consistency into his designs, he might, by continuing the continental blockade for a year or two more, reduce the commerce and finance of England to the last extremity, and close the tedious war in Spain by driving Wellington and his brave army into the sea,—a result which might have been infallibly secured by the personal presence of Napoleon in the Peninsula with 100,000 out of the 600,000 men lost in Russia. This was indistinctly perceived by every one, and expressed in characteristic ways. The opposition in Parliament in the language of party; the populace by outcries in the streets of London; some enlightened ministers in the English cabinet, and Marquis Wellesley, the brother of Lord Wellington,—a man equally clear-sighted and eloquent,—sharing this opinion, had left the ministry from dislike to the character of Mr. Perceval and his inflexible policy. But there is a routine in war no less than in peace when long continued, and both in England and in France it was found difficult to quit it, though the idea had been repeatedly entertained. The result, it is true, may seem to sanction the obstinate continuance in this course; but, with a little prudence on the part of Napoleon, it would have been otherwise.

The body of the nation were retained, it must

be confessed, by the honourable though partially interested sentiment of sympathy with the Spanish insurgents, and the desire of preventing Napoleon establishing his influence in the Peninsula. If Napoleon had made some sacrifice in this respect, or by a decisive victory had freed the honour of England from the claims of the Spaniards, peace would have been immediately accepted, with prodigious advantage to France. Only two men in England manifested an immovable resolution,—Mr. Perceval and Lord Wellington. The former—an able advocate, a man of honourable character but narrow and uncompromising mind, rendered distasteful to his colleagues by his obstinacy, and, in virtue of that defect or quality, the real head of the cabinet—refused to yield simply from pertinacity. Lord Wellington, from a regard to his own glory, daily growing in the Peninsula, and from a profound sagacity which enabled him to detect the commencement of disorder in the conduct of affairs in Spain,—the ordinary sign of the close of exorbitant ambition,—wished to persevere, and said that, without being secure of always maintaining his ground in the Peninsula, he thought that he could foresee the approaching fall of the vast empire of Napoleon. The prince-regent, who had held the government of the state for a year, hesitated between his old friends, the heads of the opposition, and the ministers, the old confidential advisers of his father. He had gradually become accustomed to the latter, and grown indifferent to the former; but he was aware of the danger of obstinately persevering in an interminable war, and also the danger of assigning suddenly power to the hands of men who had never conducted the present war, who even condemned it at the moment when, in order to bring it to a favourable termination, it might be necessary to continue it for a short time longer. In the midst of these perplexities he had vainly but earnestly endeavoured to effect a coalition between the Lords Grey and Grenville early in 1812. Suddenly an unforeseen event, which in any other circumstances would certainly have produced a change in the Government of England, removed from the scene the principal minister, by a strange crime which could be ascribed only to the madness of an individual. A man named Bellingham, a maniac, who fancied he had rendered some valuable service to his country in Russia, and incessantly demanded the reward, sometimes from the ambassador, Lord Gower, sometimes from the Government, and continually frequented the entrance to the Parliament-House to secure the interest of men in power, determined to kill one of those whose favour he had solicited in vain. The person whom he wished to sacrifice to his vengeance was Lord Gower. He met Mr. Perceval and shot him dead. He surrendered himself, acknowledged his act, and died with the tranquillity of a madman. Some political crime was at first suspected, but was soon disproved: the act, however, disclosed a certain degree of political feeling in the fierce cries of an exasperated populace, in their sympathy with a wretch who had struck an illustrious man, amenable to history but not to the poniard of the assassin.

If such an event had occurred before the war in Russia could have been foreseen, it would

probably have induced a change of system. But Mr. Perceval was killed on the 11th of May, at the very moment when Napoleon was marching towards the Niemen, and this war, which opened new prospects to the old policy of Mr. Pitt, did not allow any change of government. By confiding the office of foreign affairs to Lord Castlereagh, the prince-regent had manifested his resolution to persevere in the policy of Pitt and Perceval.

This was one lucky chance lost to Napoleon by the Russian war. He was about to see the loss of another equally to be deplored, which might arise from the war which threatened between England and America.

This war, always possible, and probable for more than a year, had just been declared.

If Napoleon, in subjecting the continental powers to the rigours of the continental blockade, was constrained to inflict upon them a cruel oppression, not less cruel was that inflicted by England on the maritime powers to secure her dominion of the seas. In order to compel all commercial nations to touch at London or Malta, there to receive license to sail, to pay tribute, and to take on board English merchandise, to compel them to recognize as blockaded, ports which had never been so, even by nominal forces, it was necessary to exercise an insufferable tyranny over the sea, no less hateful than that of Napoleon over the land. If Napoleon, under pretext of closing a portion of the sea-coast to British commerce, had seized it himself, as in the case of Holland, Oldenburg, and the Hanse Towns, England, unable to appropriate the ocean, had claimed rights quite equivalent to those of Napoleon, destined sooner or later to arouse the nations interested in the freedom of the seas.

This was one of those circumstances of which Napoleon might have availed himself, and which would have procured him allies, such as he gave to England by the rigour of the continental blockade, if he had known in any degree to await the advantages of time.

The greater part of the maritime powers of the Old World, absorbed in his immense empire, had disappeared. But beyond the Atlantic there remained one inaccessible to European arms, growing up in silence, daily acquiring a degree of strength which was suspected but not certainly known, namely, America,—a real Hercules in the cradle, which was destined to astonish the world by the first essay of its natural vigour. The reader will remember the attitude assumed towards America by England and France in respect of the maritime right, supported by the one, contested by the other, and both seemed to commit serious errors when their interest was so urgent to avoid them. But the errors of the British Government having surpassed even those of Napoleon, the balance was about to turn in favour of the latter, and the war would have been diverted from France against England,—a happy conjuncture, if any thing could be happy when all our resources were to be engulfed in the abyss of the North.

We have already seen how America, disgusted by the order of council which required them to touch at London or Malta to obtain license to sail, and which interdicted a vast extent of shore under pretence of actual blockade, had been almost equally offended by the demand

of Berlin and Milan which deprived of the privilege of its nation every vessel which submitted to the orders of the British Council, and how, equally indignant at each form of tyranny,—of which, however, one was the inevitable consequence of the other,—she had replied equally to both by the act of non-intercourse. It will be remembered that this act prohibited American sailors from frequenting the seas of Europe, but that many of these sailors, infringing the regulations of their country, had, under the temptation of great profits, submitted to the laws, the flag, and the sovereignty of England, and furnished that nation with false neutrals, of which Napoleon had made so many captures, and which he wished to induce all states, even Russia, to make their prey. It will be remembered that after less than two years of this regimen, America, weary of punishing herself in order to punish others, had at length changed her system, and declared herself ready to resume commercial relations with either of the two belligerent powers which should renounce all tyrannical dominion over the seas.

Napoleon had skillfully availed himself of this circumstance, and declared that from November 1, 1810, the decrees of Berlin and Milan should be repealed, as far as concerned America, if that state obtained for herself a repeal of the orders in council, or if, on failing to obtain it, she would openly assert her rights. This was a conditional declaration, incomplete in form, for Napoleon had not yet issued a decree; incomplete in its effects, for it did not immediately restore to the Americans all the rights of neutrality; but very sincere, and which he was resolved to follow up with serious results, on condition that the Americans should behave suitably towards us and towards themselves, i.e. that they should exact a revocation of the orders in council, or declare war against England. Napoleon, with unwonted regard to the dignity of others, had refrained from uttering the word, war with England, that he might not too openly dictate a line of conduct to America, and he had confined himself to the very general but sufficiently significant formula which we have mentioned, which imposed on America nothing more than the duty of asserting her rights.

America eagerly accepted the overture, and declared by an act of March 2, 1811, all her maritime relations with France to be renewed, and the act of non-intercourse continued in force towards England until that power should revoke the orders in council. At this report the British ministry, adhering to the orders in council rather from self-respect than from a sense of interest, had modified them in some of their features without abrogating their principle. Thus, they had ceased to require merchant-vessels to touch at London or Malta; they had restrained their system of blockade, and confined themselves to declaring blockaded the coasts of the French empire from the Elbe to St. Sebastian in the ocean, from Port Vendée to Cattaro in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, and the right to confiscate enemy's property in neutral vessels they had maintained entire, which was to retain entire almost all the maritime tyranny which England had arrogated to herself, for although the obligation to repair to London was repealed, and the paper blockade a little restricted, yet in reality the claim to

visit neutral vessels with any other view than to determine the nationality of the flag, and to search for enemy's property on board, the claim to interdict such and such a port not actually blockaded constituted in reality all the usurpations complained of, and which had led to the decrees of Berlin and Milan, in reprisal. If in point of right the violations of principle were equally flagrant, in point of fact they were equally inconvenient, for the right of visit exercised against the neutral flag would serve not only to seize in American vessels the silk, wine, and every article of their commerce with France, under the pretext of their being enemy's property, but it would give occasion to the intolerable vexation of pressing their sailors. The English, in fact, pretended to the right of following English sailors who had deserted from their country wherever they could be found. Consequently, after having searched the American vessels for every thing that could be considered French merchandise, they carried away American sailors under the pretext that because they spoke English they must be of their nation. The last vexation had become intolerable. Every vessel carrying French merchandise was stripped of it; every sailor speaking English was seized as a deserter; and several English frigates exercised these rights on the very shores of America, within sight of the indignant population. No doubt there may have been in America some deserters from the English navy, for in all countries at war some sailors will be found to desert lest they should be taken from the more lucrative occupation of the merchant-service. But, happily for national honour, these form the smaller part. But the number of sailors seized under a professedly legal claim amounted to more than 6000, which gave rise to the belief that at least double that number had been taken from the Americans on the ground of their being English. If then, to the right of search thus exercised, be added the blockade of the French empire, which then comprised the greater part of civilized Europe, it will be agreed that European commerce remained impossible to the Americans, and that to dispense with their touching at London or Malta for license, to restrain a little in their favour the general blockade, was virtually to leave undiminished the tyranny of the seas. An American might as well agree to touch at London, for by so doing he obtained a license to go whither he would, and to engage at least in British commerce, if deprived of all else.

The Americans knew too well the maritime rights and their own interests not to reject at once these intolerable demands, and to demonstrate the illusory character of the pretended modifications of the orders in council. The impressment of their sailors, which was obstinately carried on at the mouth of the Chesapeake and the Delaware by English frigates, the report of whose guns reached the shore, roused a unanimous cry, and led to the most vehement remonstrances. The whole of the year 1811, employed by Napoleon in carrying on a negligent war in the Peninsula and preparing a fatal war in Russia, had been occupied by the English and Americans with this species of contest, which had now reached the last extremity of violence. Lord Castlereagh maintained with incredible arrogance, and with sophistical obstinacy un-

worthy of England, that the modifications of the orders in council were considerable, even more so than those of Napoleon's Berlin and Milan decrees; that, in reality, these decrees had not been revoked; that America could not afford proof of their having been revoked; that the contrary was shown every day by the arrest of numerous American vessels by the French navy; that, finally, by demanding for a neutral flag the privilege of transporting what it might wish except articles contraband of war, they simply demanded the free circulation of French produce throughout the world, wines, silks, &c., and that in return the Americans had not obtained the free circulation of British produce. As to the pressing of sailors, Lord Castlereagh proved inflexible, and refused to relinquish the right on any consideration, saying that in respect of seafaring men, the most valuable of British possessions, England would seize her property wherever she could find it.

The Americans replied with justice that the modifications of the orders in council were of no effect, so long as the English reserved the right of search for enemy's property under a neutral flag and maintained a fictitious blockade; that the revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan was an act which concerned them alone, of the sincerity of which they were the only judges, since it applied to their commerce and not to that of any other: that, moreover, they had in their hands the official declaration of the French ministry, ready to be converted into a decree as soon as the condition required by France should be executed by America; that, in truth, certain arbitrary proceedings resulting from an unsettled situation, and especially from acts of violence on the part of Britain, were still to be regretted in the conduct of France; that it belonged to America to put an end to them, and that she would provide for this; that, in any case, the revocation of Napoleon's decrees regarded her, that she believed this, and that this was sufficient to make her demand a similar act on the part of England; that the reproach of not having obtained from France the free circulation of English goods was puerile and unworthy of any serious controversy; that, in fact, America, in demanding the right for the neutral vessel to take any cargo she pleased, did not demand the right of introducing the silks and wines of France into England, which would have been an impertinent pretence, but of carrying, over any part of the sea, silk and wine to those who wished to receive them; that this was the indisputable right of every neutral power, which ought not to suffer from a war in which it took no part; that this right America demanded and would obtain from France by the revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan; that in consequence she would be able, in the sight of the French flag, to carry in her vessels English cottons, and offer them to any nation which required them, but that she could not require of those countries, and of France in particular, that they should receive them, for the freedom of the flag was not the freedom of commerce, it was the privilege of carrying what they chose to one who required it, but not the power of introducing into the territory of another that which was not admissible; that to complain that American diplomacy had done no more, and had not

exacted from France the free introduction of English produce, was childishly unreasonable, and to regard this as a grievance was mere trifling.

As to the pressing of sailors, the Americans added, that though desertion was a crime which the English might unquestionably prosecute and punish in their own territory, they had no right to pursue it into a foreign territory; that on the sea, which was open to all, a vessel protected by its national flag was national territory; that this was a principle recognised by all nations, and therefore that to search for a sailor, whether English or otherwise, in an American vessel, was as intolerable as it would be for an English constable to seize an English criminal at Washington, and subject him to an English law or an English sentence; that it was no less than an actual violation of territory; and finally, that all the right of a government pursuing a criminal in a foreign soil amounted to a claim of extradition, which could be obtained only in virtue of special and reciprocal stipulations, called treaties of extradition.

These principles were so manifest that Lord Castlereagh and his colleagues were reduced to silence; and from the year 1811, war would have been declared by the United States with England, a circumstance greatly in our favour, if the acts of rigour, less severe indeed, but certainly very annoying, perpetrated by France, had not furnished the supporters of British influence in America and the zealous friends of peace with specious arguments against the war.

Napoleon had been unwilling to revoke his decrees immediately, and had confined himself to the promise to do so as soon as America should have accomplished something of important significance against England. The American act of March 2, 1811, which restored commercial relations with France, and continued their suspension with England, having become known through Europe, Napoleon replied to it by an act of April 28, 1811, revoking the decrees of Berlin and Milan as far as concerned America. This official act caused a lively sensation in the United States, and completely annihilated most of the English assertions. Unhappily, Napoleon partly destroyed this good effect by continuing certain exceptions to the absolute right of neutrals and imposing on American commerce certain very annoying restrictions.

In the first place, he refused to restore the American cargoes captured in Holland, because they were of great value, and, moreover, belonged to that class of Americans who had complied with the British requirements and for whom he had a greater dislike than even for the English. In support of this rigour, he assigned two valid reasons: first, that the proprietors of these cargoes, being in Europe contrary to the act of non-intercourse, were there in violation of the laws of their own country, and therefore ought to be considered deprived of national rights; secondly, that at the same period French vessels had been seized in America on account of the violation of the act of non-intercourse, and the seizure of French vessels warranted that of American. In point of fact, the French which had been seized were only three or four in number, while the Americans amounted to several hundreds. But in point of honour, said Napoleon, no estimate is made of numbers, and

thousand captured Americans would not one in his sight for the maltreatment of a single French subject in the ports of the Union. nevertheless, he had consented to restore those the Americans who had been seized since the declaration of Nov. 1, 1810, that is to say, since the offer made to America to revoke the decrees of Berlin and Milan on certain conditions.

As to the rights of neutrals, Napoleon, though storing them in favour of the Americans, had tained several exceptions. He completely renounced the right of searching for enemy's property under a neutral flag, and admitted that the flag protected the merchandise, the neutral vessel might carry any cargo into any port. He relinquished the right of inquiring whether an American vessel had touched at London or Malta, and likewise all the fictitious blockades, but he still claimed the right to seize an American found under English convoy, as if rendered an enemy by this association; and, since the English persisted in blockading the coasts of France, he continued to prohibit all access of any vessel to the shores of England, thereby not aiming at an American, but at the English, shores in general. Finally, having armies before Lisbon and Cadiz, he maintained that to carry flour to Lisbon and Cadiz was to violate an actual blockade, and therefore he had prohibited it. These strictions on the absolute right of neutrals are very feasible, but their actual value was at equal to the unfavourable effect they were calculated to produce in America.

As to commerce, Napoleon, ever careful while admitting the Americans into France to exclude English vessels and English produce, had conceived very minute precautions. First, he allowed only two points of departure, New York and New Orleans, and three points of arrival, Bordeaux, Nantes, and Havre. He had required every cargo, before leaving America, to be verified and inventoried by his consuls, that no change should be made during the passage in its value or character. He had further specified the articles which might be imported into France, had excluded sugar and coffee, whose origin is always doubtful, and in return had insisted to bind the Americans to export one-third of the value of the goods imported in wine and two-thirds in silk. Finally, he had subjected the articles imported from America to the famous tariff of August 5, 1810, which consisted in substituting a duty of 50 per cent. for the absolute prohibition of all foreign produce.

When the Americans, admitted to our ports, became alive to these impediments relative to the points of departure and arrival, to the nature of goods admissible, to the nature and proportion of those which they were required to take in exchange, they complained loudly of a commerce thus hampered, and unfortunately their complaints conveyed to the United States were forcibly re-echoed. Napoleon, in fact, for a trifling advantage, deprived himself of a very important political result, that of a declaration of war between America and England. While quite reasonably unwilling to allow English produce to be introduced into France in neutral vessels, he might have been quite sure that if war were once declared with England the Americans would not seek their articles of importation in British markets. Moreover, by requiring

accurate guarantees from consuls of known probity, he might have dispensed with the restriction to two points of departure and three of arrival, for this would render the blockade of our shores too easy to the English. As to the articles of merchandise, the greater part—such as wood, tobacco, flour—were so peculiar to the United States, and others—such as cotton—had such certain signs of their origin, that there was no ground to fear the substitution of English for American produce during the passage. As to sugar and coffee, as a certain quantity was absolutely required in France, and as Napoleon even allowed them to be brought from England by means of licenses, it would have been much more simple to have received them from the Americans, even were they to procure them from the English colonies. Finally, as to the obligation to purchase a certain proportion of wine and silk from France, it would have been better not to be too solicitous for Bordeaux and Lyons, which might be injured by too much anxiety for their welfare, and it would be enough to trust to the Americans to select those of our productions which they could import with the greatest advantage.

The point of highest interest, even in regard to the continental blockade, was to bring about war between America and England. At the cost even of some degree of evasion of our own demands, it would be well worth while to induce this war, for the English would immediately lose their commerce with America, which amounted in value to 200,000,000, a loss which nothing could compensate. Moreover, the suppression of the American flag as intermediate would occasion them another loss which would quite counterbalance any temporary sacrifice which we might impose upon ourselves in favour of America. When, for example, we obliged the Swedes, the Danes, and the Prussians to declare war with the English, they yielded to force, but their hostile efforts were merely feigned. But with the first gun fired between America and England would be excited a fierce national hatred,—the American flag would no longer be subservient to the British marine; and we may easily conceive the effect on England of the continental blockade, if the Americans had no longer lent their aid to infringe it by assisting England with their professedly neutral flag.

With the view of obtaining such a result, no sacrifice ought to have been deemed too great; and it was evident that, in order to effect it, the first necessary step was to silence every well-grounded complaint of the Americans against us, in order to turn their irritation exclusively against the English, and then to inspire them with the hope of an extensive commerce with France to compensate their loss of that with England. Unfortunately, from suspicion, pride, and obstinacy, Napoleon resisted the concessions they demanded, granted them only one by one, and often destroyed the effect even of these by unseasonable rigour. Thus, when in the American Congress the partisans of war mentioned the vessels seized by the English, or those on board of which had been exercised the right of impressment, the advocates of peace quoted in reply the American vessels seized by the French navy at the mouths of the Thames or the Tagus; and when the former party wished to display before their eyes the vast commerce

of the French empire in compensation for the loss of that with England, they quoted the two ports from which alone they would be allowed to leave America, the three at which they might touch in France, and the impediments and excessive tariffs to which they should be exposed.

The situation was still further complicated by the state of party feeling in that free country. Then, as well as formerly and more recently, North America was divided into federalists and democrats. The former, though previously eager for war with England in defence of the freedom of the American soil, after having secured that object, had reverted to a degree of predilection for the mother-country, and desired her commerce and political alliance, without any sense of shame or annoyance for their ingratitude towards France. Their interests and their opinions conspired to incline them in this direction. Established principally on the northeast coast of America, at Philadelphia, New York, or Boston, they were the old English merchants, the natural medium of commerce with England, and were anxious that America should consume the British produce which they imported rather than any other. As they produced neither cotton, nor sugar, nor tobacco, nor corn, nor wood, like the inhabitants of the interior, they were little concerned to find outlets for these articles, and troubled themselves only with the English commerce of which they were the agents. Such were their interests: their opinions may be explained with equal simplicity. Wealthy merchants, with the manners, tastes, and ideas of the wide commercial world from which they had issued, they maintained the reserved and rigid opinions of a commercial aristocracy, admired the prudent, modest, conservative policy of Washington, inclined to that of Mr. Pitt, and greatly resembled the leading merchants of London who had always been the great supporters of the illustrious English minister. In regard to America in particular, they desired a regular order of things, willingly supported the federal government, and wished to maintain peace with all. The France of Louis XVI. was little to their taste, that of the convention not at all, and that of Napoleon in a very small degree. They deplored the severe measures of England towards their commerce, but they preferred to endure them rather than go to war with that power; and they had no confidence in the government of Napoleon, which they considered to be at once revolutionary, despotic, ambitious, and in the highest degree opposed to the tranquillity of the world.

The democrats or republicans, as they were called in the period immediately succeeding the proclamation of the republic, were in interest and opinion directly opposed to the federalists. The greater part were colonists of the interior, scattered through Virginia, Carolina, Ohio, and Kentucky, districts rich in cotton, tobacco, sugar, cereals, woods of every kind, and they were interested in the commerce of France, who greatly needed their agricultural produce. With the tastes of our colonists in the Antilles rather than those of the English merchants, they preferred our produce to that of England; and with the *manners* of planters they combined the *opinions*, which were exorbitantly liberal. Eager, at an early period, to provoke the revolt against England, and to pursue with ardour the

independence of America, they had, contrary to the federalists, continued to hate England even after having triumphed over her, and wished to perfect the work of their independence by emancipating themselves from the commerce, the customs, and the alliance of the old metropolis. They naturally transferred to France the favourable disposition which they withheld from Great Britain, retained a lively remembrance of the services received from her, readily pardoned her revolutionary excesses, by which they had been less shocked than the federalists, and, though subjected to a temporary despotism, they always saw in her the active and enterprising nation which was destined to advance the progress of the human mind in all ages. Irritated to the highest degree by the outrages inflicted on their flag, they were impatient to avenge them: their ambition pointed to the conquest of Canada; and from these motives they urged a war with England, and trusted that France, in opening her ports to their commerce, should receive the agricultural produce of the South and West, and thus support their vehement and impassioned war-policy.

Whenever news from Europe brought intelligence of any excesses committed by the English, the democrats exulted; and whenever, on the contrary, it was learned that the French had seized some American vessel, the federalists declared that if they would be just they ought to declare war against both powers, and that, as it would be madness to do this, they ought to declare war against neither. The democrats replied, that none but men devoid of honour and patriotism would allow the imprisonment of their sailors, the violation of their flag, that the federalists wished to resume their old relation towards England; and the federalists replied to these insults by accusing the democrats of being firebrands in the service of France.

The chief of the executive power at this time was Mr. Madison, the friend and disciple of Jefferson, a moderate democrat, well informed and clear-sighted, disengaged from business, and capable of correcting, by his own judgment, the exaggerated opinions of his party. Sincerely convinced that America was much more interested in the French than the English alliance, that although willing to remain at peace in order to reap the immense advantages of neutrality, it was, nevertheless, necessary to maintain the rights of neutrality, he regarded a war with England, sooner or later, as inevitable; but he wished to be driven to it by the force of public opinion, to be seconded in it by France, and to receive from that country in the form of commercial advantages a due reward for the courage exhibited in the defence of maritime rights. Prudent, but fond of power, he was influenced by the only ambition hitherto known by the presidents of the Union, that of re-election, which would extend the period of his presidency from four years to eight, which had been already the reward of Washington and Jefferson, the limit of their moderate and patriotic desires. But, while he had before him the example of those two illustrious men, he had also that of Mr. John Adams, who, having in 1796 wished to provoke a war with France, had failed of his re-election, and had seen his office close at the end of four years. He therefore acted with great caution, and had assumed as mild



ter of foreign affairs Mr. Monroe, a democrat of his own class, accustomed like himself to business, by turns negotiating in England and in France, hoping one day to succeed Mr. Madison, as Mr. Madison had succeeded Mr. Jefferson. But, in calling Mr. Monroe to this post, Mr. Madison had passed over Mr. Smith, an eminent and violent democrat belonging to a powerful family, and he had to guard against not only federalists but extreme democrats, dissatisfied with his caution and circumspection.

A single despatch from Paris with a full and definite recognition of the rights of neutrals, and granting important commercial advantages, would have sufficed to cut short this struggle between the two parties which divided America. Unhappily, the close of 1811 was at hand,—Napoleon was wholly occupied with his projects against Russia, and his eager mind, however vast, was unable to entertain two projects at once. Zealous in 1810 for the continental blockade, he would have perceived in a war between America and England the opportunity of a thousand favourable combinations, and he would have used every effort to bring it about. At the end of 1811, on the contrary, full of the idea of terminating all his struggles at a blow in the North of Europe, he accorded only a divided attention to Mr. Barlow, the American minister and friend of President Madison, and sometimes kept him waiting for an audience for several weeks. In addition to this tendency to exclusive preoccupation common to ardent minds, Napoleon was also the subject of a species of political aversion, which made him anxious to obtain as much as possible from others at the smallest cost, a disposition which, from the fear of being the dupe of another, exposes one to be the dupe of one's self, for to grant nothing, or very little, is often the way to obtain nothing. Persevering, though with less ardour, in his system of a continental blockade, always afraid lest, if he made any change, he should open up channels for the English, and at the same time fearing to be the dupe of the Americans, he was unwilling to make any concession to them before they had actually declared war with England. He constantly repeated to Mr. Barlow, "Come to a decision: terminate your long hesitation, and you will obtain from me every advantage which you can desire." Meanwhile the French frigates destroyed every American vessel which brought corn to Lisbon or Cadiz, and our privateers fell upon those which endeavoured to penetrate the mouth of the Thames.

Thus it was that the war which might have been declared in 1811 was delayed, and that the whole of that year was spent in violent discussions between the parties which divided America. On the arrival of every vessel from Europe they eagerly repaired to M. Serurier, the French minister, to learn whether he had received any satisfactory news; and that diplomatist, whom Napoleon, after the affairs of Holland, had sent to Washington to urge the Americans to war, and who had conducted himself there with zeal and prudence, each time repeated the lesson sent to him from Paris, incessantly urging upon the Americans that whenever they should have relinquished their policy of tergiversation, they should receive the reward of their devotion to the cause of maritime rights. The American Congress was thus adjourned to 1812, without

having come to a decision, which was a great misfortune, for the war was calculated to give such efficacy to the continental blockade, and to cause such anxiety to the English, as might have instantly changed the policy of the British cabinet.

This state of things, however, could not be prolonged, and the year 1812 must terminate in a different manner from 1811. While France held back her commercial concessions and made occasional seizures of American vessels, England persisted in the absolute refusal of the right of neutrals, maintained her orders in council in all their rigour, and continued to visit American vessels on the shores of the United States, and to press sailors, the number of whom when known and published excited general indignation. It exceeded, as we have said, 6000, which supposed a much larger amount, for at least an equal number must have been unknown. The public exasperation was brought to a height by the declaration of the British ministry on the accession of the prince-regent to the full exercise of royal power. That prince, as we have seen, though called to the regency in 1811, had been obliged to submit to certain restrictions to his prerogative, of small importance in themselves, but which appeared to defer his definite instalment in power. Every one in England, as throughout Europe generally, had seemed to defer the determination of his real policy till the period of his full investment with royal power. The opposition in England had not despaired of seeing his return to his old friends; and the American Union, continually delaying the moment of a formidable war, flattered themselves that he would in some degree moderate that maritime absolutism which distinguished Mr. Pitt and his followers. But the restrictions on the authority of the Prince of Wales having been removed at the beginning of 1812, without occasioning any change in the policy of Great Britain, every ground of hope was withdrawn, and the Union at length determined no longer to put up with the annoyances of England, nor wait for the promised favours of Napoleon. A singular spectacle was thus presented by two nations: one, that of France, enjoying all the light of genius, the other, that of England, all the light of liberty, both blinded by passion, committing the same faults in regard to America; for it must unfortunately be allowed that free countries, as well as others, may become the victims of blindness and passion, only it may be said that liberty is the surest and promptest remedy to the blindness of passion.

The American Government, displeased with France, but indignant with England, prepared a series of military measures which plainly indicated the resolution to make war, and they carefully avoided intercourse with the French legation lest their determinations should be ascribed to our influence. They proposed to raise the standing army to 20,000 men, to admit voluntary enrolment to the extent of 50,000, to make a fleet of 12 ships and 17 frigates, and to create a loan of 11,000,000 dollars. (55,000,000 francs.) These measures were discussed with ardour, characterized by the peculiarities of each party. The federalists, wishing to augment the power of the central authority, and finding themselves compelled to war, favoured

the increase of the standing army and navy, but discouraged the enrolment of volunteers. On the other hand, the democrats, instinctively suspicious of the central authority, repugned the idea of a standing army, and understood only one kind of war, which consisted in rousing Canada by a crowd of volunteers and attaching that country to the American confederation. These opinions, which so well described the genius of the two parties, issued in a common vote in favour of projects submitted to the legislature, slightly modified in the sense of the federalists, for the Senate, where they had the greatest influence, raised the standing army from 20,000 to 35,000. To these measures was added a last one, the embargo, consisting in the prohibition for two months of the departure of all American vessels from the American ports, in order that the English might have few opportunities of making prizes. After these two months war was to be declared.

In the mean while, divers incidents furnished each party with arguments in support of their own views of peace or war. A spy having made some disclosures which might lead to the conclusion that certain federalists had held culpable relations with the English government of Canada, the federalists, though unjustly accused, were for a moment silenced. But very soon another incident restored their spirits,—so destined was America, before taking a final resolution, to struggle alternately against the errors of France and England. It was learned that some French frigates, cruising off Lisbon, had sunk several American vessels carrying flour to the English army. At this news the federalists roused themselves, declared that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had not been recalled, that the decree of April 28, 1811, was a fiction, and asked how any one could dare to propose war against England because she had not revoked the orders in council, when France had not revoked the decrees of Berlin and Milan.

It was necessary, however, to come to some solution, for the government of President Madison might find their influence compromised by this continual tergiversation. At length the public understood that, after all, it was not very strange that France should be unwilling to prevent neutral vessels from provisioning the armies of their enemies; and, without penetrating into the mystery of rights, they cooled on the subject of the event at Lisbon. They read the despatches of Mr. Barlow, announcing excellent dispositions on the part of France, which awaited for their exercise only an energetic resolution on the part of the United States against England. At length, in the middle of June, at the very time when Napoleon was marching from the Niemen to the Dwina, the grave question of war with England was proposed to the American Congress. The discussion was long and violent. Some extreme federalists exclaimed, that since they were determined to act the hero and to secure respect to their flag, they must not do so by halves, but declare war against each power. The proposal was ridiculous; for, on the eve of contending for maritime rights, it would have been strange to declare war with a power which, though sometimes violating these rights, carried on a vehement struggle in their support. The proposal was in the highest degree imprudent;

for in what ports could the American privateers have found a refuge and a market if they had been debarred from the shores of France? No account was made of the sallies of men who sought to decri an opinion by pushing it to an extreme, and war was voted by the American Congress with a majority of 79 to 37 in the chamber of Representatives, and of 19 to 13 in the Senate. The official declaration was dated June 19, 1812.

While the errors of England issued in this result, which might have proved so fatal to her, the British cabinet—enlightened when too late—at length revoked the orders of council, and Mr. Foster, when embarking in one of the ports of the Union, received the timely intelligence, which he transmitted to President Madison through a *chargé-d'affaires*.

But the democrats had hastened to commence hostilities, and at this moment America was deeply agitated by two acts of war of an opposite character,—the one exhilarating, the other the reverse. General Hull, at the head of 3000 men, imprudently hastening to cross the frontier of Canada, near Fort Detroit, and to bear insurrectionary proclamations to the Canadians, had been taken between Lakes Huron and Erie, surrounded by English troops, and constrained to lay down his arms; an event which deeply excited America, but which presaged little the result of the present war. But, at the same moment, the brother of General Hull, captain of the frigate Constitution, had obtained a triumph which excited the American feeling to the highest degree. Several English frigates had for a year insulted the shores of America, and insolently practised impressment at the entry of her ports. In particular the frigate *La Guerrière*, formerly of the French navy, had defied the American Commodore Rogers, who had sought her with a view to punish the insolence. Captain Hull, of the Constitution frigate, had met *La Guerrière*, and in 30 minutes dismantled her and forced her to surrender, with 300 men, after having killed or wounded about 50. The fire and the manœuvres of the American had been singularly precise. Her officers and sailors had displayed an intrepidity which announced the arrival on the sea of a new race of heroes. The enthusiasm excited by one of these events, and the vexation occasioned by the other, neutralized all efforts at reconciliation with the English.

Such were the events beyond the Atlantic during the tragical catastrophe of our army in Russia. Imagine the effect of such a declaration of war a year before, when England, without an ally in Europe, should have seen a new enemy arise beyond the sea; when the Americans, the sole violators of the continental blockade, should have become its ardent supporters; when it would have been impossible to reproach Russia with complaisance for them, and when war with her would have been without pretext; when it would have been possible to send 20,000 men, with a new Lafayette, in one of the numerous squadrons lying idle in our ports; when, lastly, our forces intact would have been able, by a final blow in Spain, to terminate the maritime war. But now, after the disaster at Moscow, the war between America and England was merely a piece of useless good fortune.

In Spain had occurred events of equal im-

owing from the same source, but not of the designation of useless good for; been almost uniformly unfavourable. remembered that the prudent commander the English forces in the Peninsula, by remaining there, the constancy of the insurrection, had successively in the important fortresses of Ciudad and Badajoz, and thus annulled the of two sanguinary campaigns. The his inflicting upon us this double affliction also be recalled. Whilst Napoleon, orders from a distance, in haste, and attention, advanced all our corps on Valencia, Lord Wellington, always aided by the inhabitants, had availed the opportunity to surprise Ciudad the face of the army of Portugal, been greatly weakened by the defeat to Valencia. Afterwards, when Napoleon the taking of Valencia, had hastily sent the French forces towards the the Peninsula, to secure his communication with France, and to draw towards the detachments which he required, Lord Wellington always on the alert, had rapidly moved the South of Portugal, had carried by storm, and had thus inflicted upon the South of Portugal an affront still more than that which the army of Portugal had received on the fall of Ciudad-Rodrigo. After this double check, Napoleon left leaving to Joseph the command of the French armies in Spain, after having taken from them the Poles, the Young Guard of the cadres of dragoons, and excellent officers, such as Generals Eblé, and Haxo. The twenty-four millions which Napoleon had promised to devote to the pay of the soldiers had not yet been transmitted for 1811; and in addition a month granted to Joseph to form a government, two and a half millions owing for 1811, and six millions. The only instruction given by Napoleon was to maintain his communication with France, and to take care that the French army in Portugal and Andalusia were always united to unite against Lord Wellington. The success of the war, then, depended which these two armies might give. But how could this be hoped for? Napoleon flattered himself that with a general command to be obeyed, and 300,000 excellent soldiers, Joseph must keep his ground, if he could do so. This simple result would have amazed him, especially with the hope cherished of terminating in Russia all wars of the world. Though he placed confidence in the military genius of Joseph, and on the prudence and great expedition of Marshal Jourdan, to whom at heart he did justice, though he loved him not, he numbered over this grave business, he now became singularly annoying. If Joseph and Jourdan had been aided, they might have accomplished what was expected of them, and even we shall see in the sequel how far it was arranged to secure a shadow of

obedience. The situation and strength of the different armies were as follows.

General Dorsenne, with 46,000 men, guarded Navarre, Guipuscoa, Biscay, Alava, and Old Castile as far as Burgos. In these were comprised the garrisons of Bayonne, St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Tolosa, Vittoria, Burgos, and other small intermediate posts. There did not remain 25,000 men capable of operating against Mina, who was laying waste and governing Navarre, against Longa, Campilo, Porlier, and Merino, who were traversing Guipuscoa, Biscay, Alava, as far as Burgos, held communication with the English, and, either separated or united, intercepted the roads to such an extent that a despatch frequently occupied two months in reaching Paris from Madrid. However, with 25,000 or even 20,000 active troops, a skilful general, if unable to destroy these bands, might at least have allowed them as little rest as they allowed the French army, and have greatly diminished their importance. But General Dorsenne, an old general of the Guard, though as brave as possible, and well adapted to war on a large scale under a good chief, possessed neither activity nor stratagem adequate to the pursuit and capture of adversaries of this nature. Haughty and unbending, he acknowledged no authority but that of Napoleon. Supported by his former instructions, which required the commandant of the northern provinces to occupy himself exclusively with their pacification unless the English exposed the army in Portugal to danger, aware that Napoleon thought of separating those provinces from the Spanish monarchy, and consequently feeling authorized to put them under a distinct administration, General Dorsenne was too well satisfied with his own special duty to submit readily to the supremacy of Joseph. And therefore, when the latter communicated to his lieutenants the orders of the Emperor appointing him commander-in-chief of the French armies in Spain, General Dorsenne replied that these orders did not concern him, for the mission intrusted to him was of a special character, the object and extent of which had been clearly defined to him in instructions from Paris, and which was scarcely reconcilable with all that might be prescribed to him from Madrid.

The remainder of Old Castile, the kingdom of Leon, the province of Salamanca, as far as the banks of the Tagus, were occupied by the army of Portugal. The task of that army was of great extent, for it was to act, in case of need, from Astorga to Badajoz, on a line of at least one hundred and fifty leagues. It was merely nominally the army of Portugal, for it had no longer any pretence to enter that kingdom, and its sole object was to make head against the English, especially if they should advance towards the north and attempt to throw themselves into Old Castile, and threaten our line of communication, as General Moore had done already and Lord Wellington might be tempted to do again. In this case Marshal Marmont, who commanded that army, was ordered resolutely to oppose the march of the English. General Dorsenne was to afford him aid, and Joseph was to send him from Madrid a portion of the army of the centre, and Marshal Soult, returning from Andalusia to Estremadura, was to reinforce him with 15,000 or 20,000 men by the bridge of Al-

maraz. If, on the contrary, Lord Wellington were to direct his movement towards Madrid by the Tagus, as he had previously attempted after the battle of Talavera, Marshal Marmont was to cross the Guadarrama, to descend by Avila upon the Tagus, and protect Madrid. Finally, if Lord Wellington should again threaten Lower Estremadura, which he had done after the first and second siege of Badajoz, Marshal Marmont was to pass the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, and present himself at Badajoz, a stretch of more than one hundred leagues, which that marshal had achieved the previous year in order to bring aid to Marshal Soult. Little expecting this last movement, and chiefly solicitous for our communications at a time when he was about to remove far from the centre of his empire, Napoleon had changed the ordinary position of Marshal Marmont from the Tagus to the Douro, from Placencia to Salamanca, which had so greatly facilitated Lord Wellington's capture of Badajoz. Napoleon rightly thought that the security of our position in Spain depended solely on the zeal with which the generals mentioned above should co-operate, and he had accordingly strongly urged this upon them. None could doubt of the zeal with which Marshal Marmont would aid Marshal Soult, from the experience of the last year; but could any equal zeal be expected in aid of Marshal Marmont from Marshal Soult, who had never shown any readiness to assist the army of Portugal? from General Dorsenne, who, boasting of his special mission, regarded himself as the sovereign of the North of Spain? and from the unhappy Joseph, the nominal king of the whole of Spain, but who had scarcely forces sufficient for the protection of Madrid and its environs? This it would be vain to expect; and yet this very Marshal Marmont, who was the least likely to receive assistance, was precisely the person most in need of it, for it was evident that Lord Wellington, henceforward master of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz,—the true gates from Portugal to Spain,—would enter by the former and not by the latter, for the latter led into Andalusia, where there was nothing of importance to be done and which it was dangerous to penetrate, while the former led into Castile, from which point he might take our armies in the rear and at one blow snatch Spain from our grasp. Lord Wellington, without having displayed those vast, profound, and bold conceptions which constitute genius, had exhibited such soundness and strength of judgment as left little doubt of the road he should adopt; and Napoleon, by all his instructions, proved that he had conjectured his course with perfect accuracy. But to face the British army, amounting now to 40,000 English actually present at their colours, and 20,000 Portuguese, who had been formed into good soldiers, i.e. 60,000 combatants, Marshal Marmont had 62,000 men, of excellent quality, it is true, and commanded by excellent generals of division, such as Bonnet, Foy, Clausel, and Taupin, but widely scattered. Napoleon, ever anxious for the northern provinces, had ordered Marshal Marmont to send General Bonnet into the Asturias, who should cross the mountains and take up his position in Oviedo, which at one stroke deprived the army of Portugal of 7000 men and of General Bonnet. There remained 45,000 men. Of these 1500 were required at Astorga,

500 at Zamora, 500 at Leon, 1000 at Valladolid, 1000 at Salamanca, 1500 to be distributed through the smaller stations, such as Benavente, Toro, Palencia, Avila, &c., and 2000 at least on the roads, which reduced the forces of Marshal Marmont to 37,000 combatants, even supposing him able to combine with sufficient promptness the divisions which were at Valladolid with those upon the Tagus. These were not adequate to resist 60,000 Anglo-Portuguese. Marshal Marmont had therefore sent to Napoleon his aid-de-camp, Colonel Jarret, to give him this account of his forces, to inform him that, if he were placed in danger, General Dorsenne, quite occupied with the northern bands, would find a thousand excuses for withholding his aid, altogether or till it should be too late; that Joseph would neither possess activity nor courage sufficient to deprive himself intentionally of 10,000 men, or at least of 6000, out of the 14,000 composing the army of the centre; that Marshal Soult would find in his distance from the army of Portugal more than sufficient reason for not quitting Andalusia; and that consequently he might himself be forced to yield, and in yielding to expose the frontier of France, before he could receive aid, and that unless he were intrusted with the supreme command of the two armies of the North and of Portugal he could not undertake the difficult duty of resisting the English, and he asked permission to leave Spain in order to make the campaign of Russia under the eyes of the Emperor himself. Napoleon had listened to Colonel Jarret, and appeared struck with what he had said, and promised to meet the difficulty, at the same time ridiculing the ambition of Marshal Marmont, who desired a command so superior to his talents; then, much more occupied with his own immediate designs than with the subject in hand, he replied to Colonel Jarret, "Marmont complains of distances and of the difficulty of procuring provisions; in Russia I shall encounter much greater distances and difficulties in supporting my soldiers: well, we must do as we can." He then left Colonel Jarret, promising to send him instructions. But as it would have been necessary to adopt very serious resolutions, to recall certain of his lieutenants not characterized by habitual devotion to the common cause, to change the distribution of his forces, and perhaps to evacuate important territories for the sake of concentration, he had left Paris, adhering to the general purpose of assigning the supreme command to Joseph and confident that he should himself put a final stroke to every thing in Russia.

Notwithstanding his just apprehensions, Marshal Marmont had remained at the head of the army of Portugal, carefully providing for the wants of his soldiers, endeavouring to put Salamanca into a state of defence, by converting large convents into citadels, endeavoring to remount his cavalry, to horse and repair his artillery, in no degree refusing to acknowledge the authority of Joseph, on the contrary sending to him his reports and the state of his troops, to a greater extent than even Joseph could have wished, for each of these reports ended with a demand for aid. One difficulty, however, relative to the provinces assigned to the support of the different armies existed between Marshal Marmont and King Joseph. Though there was

in the valley of the Tagus only one division, and all the rest of his army had been advanced northwards, Marshal Marmont wished to extend his foraging from Talavera to Alcantara, which greatly annoyed Joseph, who was reduced to the necessity of putting his civil servants on rations, and who consequently stood in need of all his resources. With the exception of this difficulty, Marshal Marmont and Joseph were on excellent terms.

Joseph, commanding the army of the centre, had 18,000 or 14,000 efficient men, among whom were found many remains of old corps, as always happens at head-quarters, and, besides, 2000 men belonging to Marshal Soult and constantly demanded by him. With this force, augmented by 8000 Spaniards, paid from his own resources, and whose fidelity was in exact proportion to the accuracy with which they received their pay, Joseph was to protect Madrid, and also the province of Toledo on the right and that of Guadalaxara on the left, to maintain in the rear his communication with the army of the North, and in front maintain relations with the army of Andalusia across La Mancha. It was necessary that he should extend one of his arms as far as Cuenca to communicate with the army of Aragon stationed at Valencia. If one of these points should cease to be well protected, Joseph would suddenly be separated from one of the most important provinces of his kingdom, and would lose the feeble resources on which he depended, which consisted in grain and forage collected at the period of harvest, and in imposts on the city of Madrid. At the present moment especially, being obliged, in order to satisfy the pressing demands of Marshal Marmont, to send grain into the province of Toledo, from whence he used to derive it, he had so greatly impoverished Madrid in respect of provisions that a pound of bread cost twenty-six or twenty-seven sous. The misery was therefore extreme, which was not calculated to gain over the Spaniards to the new power.

Andalusia, so prematurely invaded, was now in the hands of Marshal Soult, who commanded the best part of the French army. In fact, he had at his disposal 58,000 men, deducting the ineffective, as we have always done in enumerating the forces of the various corps. These troops were thus distributed: 12,000 before Cadiz to continue the semblance of a siege; 10,000 at Grenada for the defence of that province; 5000 at Arcos to patrol between Seville, Cadiz, and Tarifa; 16,000 in Estremadura, under Count d'Erlon, to keep an eye upon General Hill, who was established at Badajoz; finally, 2000 or 3000 cavalry towards Baeza to scour the defiles of the Sierra Morena. With the rest, about 18,000 or 14,000, Marshal Soult occupied Seville, and kept up the war against Ballesteros, who, having the English fleet at his command, descended sometimes to the right into the county of Niebla, sometimes to the left towards Tarifa.

In this rich country Marshal Soult could support his troops without any aid. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the recent orders of Napoleon to the different generals to reserve a part of the contributions for the war for the king, Marshal Soult had sent nothing to Joseph, on the ground that he could provide for nothing beyond the wants of his own army and the expenses of Cadiz, which, in fact, had required numerous collections of matériel, hitherto, unfortunately,

very unprofitable. The communications of Marshal Soult with head-quarters were literally annihilated. He had removed all the posts which enabled him to communicate with Madrid across La Mancha, on the pretence that it belonged to the army of the centre to defend La Mancha, and being little solicitous to maintain relations which amounted to nothing more than urgent demands for money and aid. Though Joseph had in reality become his commander-in-chief, Marshal Soult could assert that he knew nothing of it; for no despatch from Paris or Madrid had reached him.

This state of things showed the error of having entered Andalusia. If they were to extend prematurely into the South of Spain, every one may see that it should have been towards Valencia, for, besides the resources afforded by that province, Valencia insured the possession of Catalonia and Aragon, that is to say, the best part of the frontier of France, effected a communication with Madrid quite independent of the English, and secured to us one-half of the shores of Spain, in particular that part which borders the Mediterranean. But the conquest of Andalusia, to which Napoleon had allowed himself to be seduced almost against his own judgment, yielded none of the advantages which had been expected from it. Napoleon had thought that Cadiz would have been taken, after which they might have united with the army of Portugal, which was on the march to Lisbon. But the siege of Cadiz resulted in merely occupying a few redoubts which they could not fire, and founding large mortars at a great expense, which succeeded occasionally in throwing some bombs into the Cadiz roads, but scarcely ever into the town itself; the assistance to the army of Portugal had consisted, during the march of Massena upon the Tagus, in merely taking Badajoz for a short time, and afterwards in leaving Count d'Erlon with 16,000 men at Llerena, where he was more than one hundred leagues from Marshal Marmont. Better would it have been to employ this corps in the siege of Cadiz in order to attain at least one of the objects proposed, than to leave it in Estremadura, where it had not even helped to save Badajoz. As to the pecuniary aid expected from Andalusia, the value of it may be estimated from the circumstance that Marshal Soult demanded urgently his share in the twenty-four millions which Napoleon had determined to send in cash to Spain. A final advantage anticipated from the expedition into Andalusia, that of depriving the insurrection of its capital by taking Seville, issued in supplying it with one in the city of Cadiz, which was impregnable, and from whence the Spanish Cortes, imitating our constituent Assembly, proclaimed the great principles of 1789, equality in the sight of the law, individual liberty, liberty of the press, participation of the nation in its government, separation of powers, &c.—principles which, though Spain was hardly prepared to hear them proclaimed, made a powerful impression on the people.

Often had Napoleon bitterly complained of them having derived no other advantage from Andalusia and the 90,000 men who occupied it; but, at the distance from which he spoke, his reproaches and his counsels were lost in the void, and the error of having uselessly and unreasonably advanced towards the South remained, with all its consequences, unmitigated.

Finally, there remained the kingdom of Valencia and the vast establishment there formed by Marshal Suchet. Since the taking of Valencia, the great assemblage of forces which Napoleon had ordered in that direction had been dissolved in order to restore to each province its necessary contingent. General Reille had returned into Aragon with 14,000 men, to preserve Saragossa, Lerida, and Tortosa, to assist the army of the North against Mina, and that of the centre against the indefatigable Villa-Campa, Dura, and l'Empecinado, and finally to help, if necessary, the army of Catalonia. General Decaen, since the loss of the Isle of France, having returned to Europe with unblemished reputation, commanded the troops of Catalonia, under Marshal Suchet. He had 27,000 men to guard Figueres, Hostalrich, Barcelona, and to make demonstrations from time to time under Tarragona, the most important of Marshal Suchet's conquests, since it prevented the English from landing in the Northeast of Spain. The English, knowing the difficulty we experienced in provisioning the fortresses, endeavoured to cut off the communications by sea, while General Lacy endeavoured to do so by land, and they hoped thus to retake Tarragona by means of famine. Should we lose that fortress, Lacy, established with his army within its walls, reinforced by the English, provided with every thing by them, would become a most dangerous enemy, would threaten Tortosa, the road to Valencia, and render the evacuation of that last town almost inevitable. It therefore required all the activity of General Decaen and his able lieutenant, General Maurice-Mathieu, to discharge all the duties devolving on them, and the continual attention of Marshal Suchet, who, while guarding Valencia, was constantly on the watch to help, if necessary, the Generals Reille and Decaen. Marshal Suchet, in the three provinces of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia, had 58,000 men, reckoning those only who were actually under arms. Deducting 14,000 intrusted to General Reille, 27,000 indispensable to General Decaen, he retained 16,000 or 17,000 men to watch the long road which coats the Mediterranean from Tortosa to Valencia, to maintain a body of troops opposite Alicante, and to aid the troops of Joseph at Cuenca itself. The utmost that he could bring to bear on any threatened points, while occupying the important posts assigned to his protection, was a movable division of 7000 or 8000 men.

In the list of dangers which threatened the army of Aragon (the general name under which was designated the three armies of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia) we may include the appearance of the Anglo-Sicilian army, which had just been formed by Lord William Bentinck in Sicily. Lord William Bentinck, one of those simple, generous, and liberal Englishmen whose energies become conspicuous when their country's interests are at stake, had become virtually a king of Sicily. Much contradicted by the Bourbons, who, after having been deprived of Naples by the French, were now reduced to nothing in Sicily by the English and naturally were eager to shake off the yoke of their protectors, he had got rid of the king and queen, by forcing them to consign the royal power to a young prince, who thus became invested with the regency at an age when he ought himself to have been under a regent, and he had called to his aid

the Sicilian nation by giving them a constitution similar to that of England. Thus delivered from the court of Palermo, and no longer afraid of the attempts of Murat, who had been obliged to repair to Russia, Lord William had been able to dispose of one good English division in addition to a Sicilian division, which a good deal resembled the Portuguese army in organization, and promised to resemble it in value. This was a corps of about 12,000 men, who, being able, in virtue of the English fleets, to transport themselves to any spot, produced an effect greater than was warranted by their numerical force. Nor was this all. The English, perceiving the value of the Spanish soldiers, who were of so little service to them for want of organization, while the Portuguese soldiers, without being of more essential value, rendered them so much service, had proposed to do for one what they had done for the other,—viz., to take into their pay a certain number of Spaniards and place them under English officers. They employed for this purpose the Balearic Isles, of which they were masters, and the shore of Murcia, which almost wholly belonged to them. General Wittingham in the Balearics, and General Roche in the kingdom of Murcia, organized two Spanish legions, which were soon to furnish them with 12,000 good soldiers.

This is what was called the Anglo-Sicilian army, which, being able by turns to transport itself to General Lacy in Catalonia and to General O'Donnell in the kingdom of Murcia, had become a danger no longer imaginary, but real and even alarming.

Marshal Suchet, attentive to the difficulties of his position, had employed, in the most judicious manner, the 16,000 men reserved for the kingdom of Valencia. Having placed small but well-supplied garrisons at Tortosa, Peniscola, and Saguntum, and retained another small garrison at Valencia, which, with the depôts and the invalids, might be doubled in case of need, he had left under General Harispe about 5000 men opposite Alicante on the frontier of Murcia. Having reserved for himself an active division of 6000 or 7000 men, he was ready to march upon Tortosa or Alicante, or even towards Cuenca, in the direction of Madrid. Very acute and somewhat incredulous, he was not liable to groundless alarms, nor did he expose his troops to useless marches; and, when necessary to go to a distance of twenty or thirty leagues, he did not expose them to die of fatigue and want, because his able administration had secured well-provided magazines in all directions.

To this administration was due, at least, one-half of his success. The day after the taking of Valencia, that town, trembling at the remembrance of the massacre of the French, apprehended the entrance of a pitiless avenger within their walls; but, far from this, they had found a conqueror mild, calm, and skilful, who had laboured to restore the confidence of the inhabitants, and who had invited them, as at Saragossa, to share in the government of the country. Already inspiring confidence by his conduct in Aragon, he had successively restored the archbishop and the former municipal magistrates of the province, had formed a junta, determined in union with them the distribution of the impost, effected even useful reforms, and, without oppressing the country, had secured abundance to his troops. Napoleon had wished

at Valencia should atone in money for the much blood spilt in 1808, and he demanded a sum of fifty millions. Such a contribution in the midst of the disorders of war, imposed upon a small province, appeared to be excessive. It, in virtue of the administrative system of Marshal Suchet, they hoped to realize a considerable portion of it, and the whole, if they should end more than a year at Valencia. Already Marshal Soult had clothed, paid, and armed every one of his soldiers, filled his magazines, prepared reserve, and sent to Joseph a first remittance of five millions, with the promise of a larger sum in a short time. This was the only army in Spain that was so situated, and, accordingly, every member of it served with fidelity, loved his commander, and showed himself prepared for the greatest efforts.

The new authority imputed to Joseph had on become known at Valencia, in consequence of the perfect state of communication, and had proved not very agreeable to the marshal, who, though of a mild disposition, was not very willing that any one should disturb his just and agreeable reign. He could give money, and do so readily, but of soldiers he could not spare one, for the provinces under his protection were the only resource of the French armies, if, owing to any disaster in Castile or Estremadura, they should lose their communications with Aragon. He was therefore firmly resolved to refuse any withdrawal of his forces, and he had good excuse for so doing in the secret instructions of Napoleon remitted to him two years before, when he contemplated retaining the provinces on the Ebro, which authorized a merely formal deference to the staff at Madrid. But, with his usual moderation and his usual care to avoid augmenting the difficulties of his position by any difficulty of temper, he resolved to extricate himself, as he had already done, by rendering to Joseph all the service in his power, and, in particular, by pecuniary assistance, which at the time was the most valuable and most appreciated, by exhibiting outwardly the utmost deference to his authority, and by having recourse to his secret instructions only in the case of a demand being made upon him calculated to prove injurious to the provinces assigned to his care in behalf of the Empire. We shall see that this skilful line of conduct was well adapted to secure the end in view, without display and without any conflict of authority.

It must be confessed that the chief command entrusted to the King of Spain and his major-general, Marshal Jourdan, was of a very peculiar nature. Of five armies occupying Spain, that of the North flatly refused obedience; that of Portugal did not refuse it, but was submissive only to insure assistance; that of the centre, placed immediately under his orders, was absolutely submissive, but it was a mere nothing; that of Andalusia, the most considerable and the most impeded, was resolved not to obey, had hitherto been ignorant of the authority of Joseph and might feign ignorance for a long time; that of Aragon, finally, while studying the interests of Joseph and rendering him pecuniary aid, was unable to render him any other; and yet it was only from the aid which these different armies might be able to afford to each other, especially those of the North and of Andalusia to the army of Portugal, that we could

have expected the safety of our affairs in Spain! Marshal Jourdan, who united with a sound judgment great experience in command, and who only wanted youth, and a willingness to serve under an order of things which was very distasteful to him, to be truly useful, felt sensibly the evils of the situation and impressed the same conviction upon Joseph, to whom he presented a complete and striking report. But what could be done? The only resource was to write to Paris and receive after an interval of two months a reply equally long and insignificant from the Duke of Feltre, (M. Clarke,) a laborious but evasive minister, especially since Napoleon had left, and had no longer either the power or the inclination to occupy himself with the affairs of Spain. Nevertheless, Marshal Jourdan addressed to the minister of war the circumstantial report of their position which he had already presented to Joseph in order to reduce within just bounds the responsibility of the staff at Madrid, and then occupied himself with conjectures of the quarter from which danger should arise, and with impressing his convictions upon others.

The only really formidable enemy was the English army. Lord Wellington having taken Ciudad-Rodrigo in January and Badajoz in March, and having employed April and May in giving rest to his troops, proposed to act in June. As there were no more strongholds for him to conquer, his operations must be confined to an offensive march. To what part would this be directed? Would he advance by Badajoz into Andalusia, or by Ciudad-Rodrigo into Old Castile? Such was the question, and the solution was not difficult from the intimations received, especially to a man so discerning as Marshal Jourdan.

In fact, Badajoz being taken, Lord Wellington had moved to the heart of Portugal with the main body of his forces and had taken position at Fuente-Guinaldo, at some leagues from Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo, thus threatening Old Castile and the army of Portugal, to which the defence of that province had been intrusted. Even admitting the possibility of a feint, it was evident that he would not have transported the whole of his army from the South to the North to make it retrace its steps a month later. Feints are not carried so far as to exhaust soldiers with fatigue under an oppressive climate merely to produce a little confusion in the mind of the enemy. That which was really a feint was the presence of General Hill at Badajoz with some English and Portuguese troops, of whose number they endeavoured to give an exaggerated impression to support the idea of an enterprise against Andalusia. In addition to the presence of Lord Wellington at Fuente-Guinaldo, there were several striking indications of his design, such as the movements of troops in Beira, Tras-os-Montes, and Leon, immense magazines at Corunna, and numerous mule-equipages at Galicia. These preparations of every kind indicated indisputably some project against Old Castile. Independently of these reasons of detail, there was also a general reason which might be decisive to every reflecting mind, which was, that by going to the North Lord Wellington made himself master of our communication in one march, and, as we have said, might annihilate by one fortunate stroke

all our military establishment in Spain, while by going to the South he could attain no other result than to disturb the army of Andalusia, perhaps to put an end to the farce of the siege of Cadiz, but nothing more; all which objects, also, he might obtain much more surely by carrying on his operations in the North, for it would be necessary for us to evacuate Andalusia, La Mancha, and perhaps Madrid, when we should be threatened in Castile. The campaign of General Moore, which, even when opposed by Napoleon himself, had cost so little to the English, and had nearly procured them such great advantages, was a lesson never to be forgotten.

Accordingly, neither Marshal Jourdan nor Joseph were deceived, nor were they in the least degree in doubt of the true state of the case, the one enlightened by his experience, the other by his natural sagacity. At any rate, all doubt would have been removed by Marshal Marmont, whose attention was kept alive by the nearness of danger. Early in May he announced that the English were approaching him, and at the same time began his own preparations and urgently demanded succour. Joseph and Marshal Jourdan immediately saw what was to be done, and saw it with a soundness of judgment natural in Marshal Jourdan from his early and continuous devotion to a military career, but very creditable to Joseph, who was a stranger to the profession of arms. If on this occasion their combined authority had been respected, nothing would have been easier than to defeat the attempt of Lord Wellington, and even to derive from it a brilliant triumph, which would greatly have advanced our affairs in Spain, perhaps have counterbalanced in some degree our misfortunes in Russia, for a serious reverse in the Peninsula would have exerted a powerful influence upon the English, and in reality the English led the rest of Europe.

To effect this reverse it was merely necessary to bring together to the common defence the troops which were within reach, and these would more than suffice both in number and quality. The army of the North, though diminished and no longer retaining the 46,000 men which it comprised at the beginning of the campaign, had still 20,000 active troops. Had it been necessary to withdraw them for fifteen days and to leave Mina, Longa, Porlier, and Merino masters of our communications, we ought not to have hesitated. If the English were beaten, those bandits would have ceased to exist. However this be, they might at least have detached 10,000 men for some weeks, which is proved by the fact that the army of the North did so at a later period, though unseasonably: our communications would have been a little more difficult, but they were so already to an extent that the evil would not have been greatly increased. Joseph, who had 13,000 or 14,000 active troops, and 3000 Spaniards, could easily dismiss 10,000, (he actually despatched 13,000 when the time appeared suitable to him;) and this would have made a reinforcement of 20,000 men. Finally, nothing prevented the army of Andalusia from sending the entire corps of Count d'Erlon, or at least 10,000 men of the 16,000 of which it was composed. Five or six thousand would suffice Llerena to watch General Hill, and if that general had been guilty of the

very improbable imprudence of marching into Andalusia, Marshal Soult, with the 6000 men of Llerena and all that he could assemble at Seville, would have had 25,000 men to oppose to him, while General Hill had not half that number. It would therefore have been possible by taking moderate drafts from the armies of the North, the centre, and Andalusia, to secure to Marshal Marmont a reinforcement of 30,000 men, which would have raised his army to 70,000, and would have furnished him with the means of overwhelming Lord Wellington and almost driving him to the ocean. It is true that these 70,000 men would have required a general, and that Massena, who had been proclaimed to the army as fatigued, worn out, and supernuated, was no longer in Spain. But at least the 70,000 men were there, Marshal Marmont was not incapable of commanding them, and, in any case, Jourdan, the conqueror of Fleurus, if well obeyed, would, with such forces, have sufficed for the emergency. And Lord Wellington, if exposed to such a combination, would certainly have retired into Portugal, which would at least have silenced him for that campaign.

The means still existed, and it must be confessed that Jourdan and Joseph neglected nothing to put them in use. Once convinced that Lord Wellington was about to march upon Old Castile, and consequently against the army of Portugal, they wrote to the two generals who were in a condition to succour that army, to General Caffarelli, successor of General Dessenne, with the army of the North, and to Marshal Soult, head of the army of Andalusia, with whom they had at length come into communication. They intimated to both the danger which manifestly threatened Marshal Marmont, and enjoined General Caffarelli to direct a detachment of 10,000 men upon Salamanca, and Marshal Soult to reinforce considerably Count d'Erlon, to bring him nearer to the Tagus, to order him to keep his eye continually on the movements of General Hill, and if the latter should escape by the interior roads which Lord Wellington had secured to himself, in order to reinforce his commander-in-chief in the direction of Old Castile, to follow him, to cross the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, whilst he should pass it probably at that of Alcantara, and to bring to Marshal Marmont a reinforcement equal to that which General Hill should bring to Lord Wellington.

This order was, unfortunately, not the best that could have been given, and, if it had not subsequently been modified, it might have been considered absolutely unavailing to the army of Portugal. It was, in fact, conceived in the supposition that General Hill had considerable forces before Badajoz, that that general was then only in waiting, and that he would be recalled towards Fuente-Guinaldo when Lord Wellington should be ready to enter on the campaign. But this supposition was entirely erroneous. Instead of 30,000 men, General Hill had only 15,000, and among them scarcely an English division. He was posted there to conceal the designs of his chief by remaining motionless, and to occupy the attention of Marshal Soult, while Lord Wellington, who had concentrated seven English divisions and several Portuguese divisions at Fuente-Guinaldo, should



march upon Salamanca. To whatever extent Count d'Erlon might have been reinforced, if on the condition of remaining in presence of General Hill, who was never to change his position, he would have allowed Marshal Marmont to perish without succour. However, in war it is something even to conjecture the views of the enemy; to detect them completely and immediately is peculiar to men of superior genius. But Marshal Jourdan arrived at his conclusions slowly though surely. Were he on the spot, he would undoubtedly have soon discerned the truth; but being in ill health, and ill humour, and associated with a king who, though brave, was unwilling to leave Madrid, he had remained at the palace, and judging from a distance, had merely approximated the truth in his estimate of things. But he was soon undeceived, and moreover, for the first moment, the orders issued were sufficient, for they enjoined on each of those who were to engage in the impending struggle to hold himself in readiness. On Marshal Suchet, who was too distant and too destitute of troops to send any succour, was imposed a species of service which could occasion him no difficulty, that of bringing nearer the troops of General Reille from Navarre, in order that it might be more easy for the army of the North to furnish the detachment demanded of him, and to relieve the troops of the army of the centre at Cuenca, in order that it might be more concentrated or more disposable.

One may easily imagine how the orders of Joseph would be received, issued with firmness, indeed, but without the accent of absolute sway which belonged only to Napoleon. General Caffarelli, who commanded the army of the North, was honourable, devoted, and brave, as were all the Caffarelli, but mildly obstinate, timid not in heart but in mind, and very inferior in intelligence to that illustrious wooden-legged officer who had founded the fortune of that distinguished family. Of 46,000 men composing his army, nearly 10,000 had been lost in detachments sent to the army of Russia; and the indefatigable bandits of the Basque provinces caused him continual uneasiness for the posts in the interior and on the coast. Persisting, like General Dorsenne, in believing himself independent of the commander-in-chief, he did not actually refuse to assist Marshal Marmont; but he stated neither when nor how nor with what numbers he would come to his aid, and merely made promises which a little foresight would have shown to be unworthy of confidence even if sincere.

In Andalusia the orders of Joseph met with a still less satisfactory reception. Ever since Marshal Soult had been secured from the consequences of his Oporto campaign, he had hoped to be made the major-general of King Joseph. Massena having failed in Portugal, Marmont not being in a suitable position for such an office, and Napoleon himself being plunged into Russia, Marshal Soult thought that his hopes were now about to be realized. But Napoleon, little pleased with the operations of Andalusia, and unwilling to impose upon his brother a major-general whom he disliked, had selected Marshal Jourdan, who had accepted the office only from friendship for King Joseph. The displeasure of Marshal Soult was extreme, and in such a temper he was not likely to afford a

very willing ear to the demand of the army of Portugal, with which he was always at variance. Besides, he conjectured the designs of Lord Wellington quite differently from the staff at Madrid, and believed that, instead of thinking of Castile, that commander was exclusively occupied with Andalusia. He, consequently, replied to Joseph that the army of Portugal was again about to ruin every thing, that both the general and the whole army were deceived, that Lord Wellington was not preparing to march upon Salamanca and Marshal Marmont, but that he aimed only at Andalusia; that the person really requiring aid, therefore, was himself, for General Hill was merely the head of the grand British army about to bear down *en masse* upon Seville in order to deliver Cadiz, which was rendered certain by the language of the insurrectionary journals at Cadiz; that it was no doubt necessary to reinforce Count d'Erlon, but with a view to assist the army of Andalusia, not that of Portugal, which was not menaced at all.

It was indeed to ascribe strange thoughts to Lord Wellington to suppose that the desire to save Cadiz, which was not endangered, should lead him to act in Andalusia, and the journals of the Spanish insurrection were strange authorities to appeal to for the designs of the enemy. The last thing they would do would be to publish their designs, and even if they announced them openly they were not to be depended on. But, independently of all the information they had been able to gather, the true reason for not believing in any attempt upon Andalusia was that Lord Wellington had nothing to do there, while a single advantage in Castile would enable him to take all our armies in the rear. Marshal Soult was by no means of this opinion; he continued persuaded that General Hill had 80,000 men and that Lord Wellington was about to reinforce him with 20,000 more, and therefore that he was himself the only general requiring assistance. His reply was in accordance with these ideas.

Marshal Suchet, who was unwilling to enter into any controversy with the authority of Madrid, and of whom nothing was demanded that could compromise the provinces which he governed, did what was required. He brought up an Italian division of General Reille and relieved at Cuenca the troops of the army of the centre, though it was a serious inconvenience to him to extend his forces so far.

However, the danger became every moment more pressing and more manifest, and it was impossible to doubt the point of Lord Wellington's meditated attack. Joseph, always under the guidance of Marshal Jourdan, wrote to General Caffarelli that, although he professed to be independent of the staff at Madrid, he ought neither to forget his military duties which required him to assist a comrade in danger, nor his previous instructions which expressly enjoined him to succour the army of Portugal against the English, that this was now formally demanded of him, and he was positively informed that Lord Wellington was marching upon Salamanca and against the army of Portugal. As to the army of Andalusia, Joseph for a moment contemplated a resolution which would have saved Spain, and with Spain perhaps the Empire itself. He thought of ordering the evacuation of Andalusia, a province whose occupation

yielded few advantages and which engaged 90,000 men, of whom 80,000 would be sufficient to overthrow the English. In order to secure obedience to such a determination, it would have been necessary to deprive Marshal Soult of his command, as he would probably have refused to evacuate the province or would have effected the evacuation too late to be of any use to the army of Portugal. But the abandonment of a vast province, a very marked retrograde movement, and the deprivation of an illustrious marshal, were resolutions which Joseph had mind to conceive but not energy to execute. Instead of these resolutions, he acted as follows. Marshal Soult gave intimation of his resignation if any disagreeable orders should be given to him. Joseph sent him a confidential officer, a soldier of great intelligence, Colonel Desprez, with orders to observe carefully all that took place at the army of Andalusia, to show the marshal his error relatively to the design of the English, to convince him that Lord Wellington was marching towards Salamanca and not towards Seville, to renew, in consequence, the imperative order to send General Drouet d'Erlon to the Tagus without waiting to see what General Hill should do, and to announce to him that his first proposal to resign would be accepted. At the same time he sent the most detailed despatches to M. Clarke, the minister of war, to point out to him all the danger—we should say, all the ridiculous circumstances, were the subject not so serious—attendant on the situation of a king, commander-in-chief, disobeyed by all his generals, and unable to induce them to assist the one most imperilled, either in the name of duty, enlightened interest, or an authority which they disregarded.

While awaiting the result of these several steps, Joseph sent a first aid to Marshal Marmont. Since that marshal, by order of the Emperor, had quitted the valley of the Tagus to establish himself in the valley of the Douro, he had left one of his divisions, that of General Foy, on the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz. Marshal Marmont had thus acted because with justice he attached great importance to that bridge and to the numerous works with which he had surrounded it. Our active forces, destined to oppose the English, being, by a bad arrangement, divided into two parts, one in Andalusia, the other in Castile, this inconvenience could be met only by great facility of communication, so as to hasten rapidly from one to the other as Marshal Marmont had done after losing the battle of Albuera. The Tagus being the principal obstacle in the way, Marshal Marmont had there constructed a bridge, fortified works, and magazines. That which passed before us was, besides, a striking lesson, which it would have been unpardonable to neglect. They saw, in fact, on the side of the English, a single army and a single general passing alternately from north to south on a broad road, well kept, abundantly supplied with bridges and magazines, the movements on which were equally rapid and easy.

It was in consequence of this instructive lesson that Marshal Marmont, in passing from the Tagus to the Douro, had been unwilling to abandon the works of Almaraz and had left there the Foy division. But, though he had made every arrangement for bringing it promptly to himself across the Guadarrama, the transit

would occasion a loss of five or six days, a loss much to be regretted if they should be constrained to a rapid concentration by the sudden appearance of the enemy, and he entreated Joseph to relieve him from the duty of guarding the bridge of Almaraz. Joseph readily granted this favor, though it involved a new change in the position of the feeble army of the centre, and he sent thither the division of Armagnac.

Scarcely had it arrived there when a rash attempt, little in conformity with the character of the English army, indicated the plans of Lord Wellington for this campaign and the importance that he attached to preventing the army of Andalusia affording aid to the army of Portugal.

General Hill, by order of his chief, escaping the vigilance of the troops which Marshal Soult kept before him in Estremadura, quitted his post without being perceived, reached the Tagus with one division, ascended it secretly, and presented himself before the bridge of Almaraz on the 18th of May. This bridge was situated at the very foot of the mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana, and, after crossing it, the highroad of Estremadura passed over the mountains to the defile of Mirabete. Marshal Marmont had constructed on the summit of the defile a work which commanded the carriage-road and which consequently prohibited an enemy from Estremadura from bringing guns. He had also rendered this work sufficiently strong to demand the employment of heavy artillery. At the foot of the heights, on the border of the river, he had established two less considerable works forming *îlets de pont* on the left and right banks. A bridge of boats not constantly extended was used for crossing the river.

General Hill, who two years before had surprised General Girard in the environs at Arroyo del Molinos, and who was accustomed to that kind of expedition, having arrived almost unperceived within reach of the works at Mirabete, perceived that they were too strong to be taken by a coup de main, and proposed to send down by a cross-road a column of infantry which should endeavour to carry by escalade the *îlet de pont*, while the rest of the English troops should feign to attack Mirabete on the heights. This bold plan succeeded perfectly. The two works forming the *îlets de pont* on the two banks of the river which Marshal Marmont had less strongly fortified might be carried by escalade. The English placed their ladders upon the escarpments incompletely defended by masonry-work, and penetrated the *îlet de pont* of the left bank. The troops which guarded it, a mixture of men of every nation, were panic-struck, notwithstanding the able conduct of a Piedmontese officer, who was killed in his attempt to rally them: they took flight, and in attempting to throw themselves into some boats they were taken or drowned. The works on the left bank being taken, those on the right surrendered immediately. Thus the English sacked this little establishment, destroyed the works, burnt the boats, and retired very proud of an expedition which yielded them more honour than advantage, for, after all, they had merely overthrown for a time the means of passing the river. On hearing of this rash blow, General Foy, who was with his division on the march towards Castile, retraced his steps, and pursued the English, but

without overtaking them. They thus escaped after having effected a disagreeable but not irreparable loss, for the destruction of a bridge did not render the Tagus an invincible obstacle, and an army which should seasonably advance by the road of Estremadura would always find the means of crossing.

This event caused lively emotion at Madrid, for it disclosed the speedy entrance of Lord Wellington on the field, and his intention of cutting off all possible communication between the armies of Andalusia and Portugal. This indication ought to have influenced whichever of the two should be called upon to assist the other, and Joseph renewed his demands, but in vain, as we shall see.

Marshal Soult had received the visit of Colonel Desprez, had evinced his extreme displeasure at not having been made major-general to Joseph, had made no new proposal of resignation, which it had been plainly intimated to him would have been accepted if made, and continued to assert that danger threatened, not Castile, but Andalusia. It was impossible to correct his opinion in this respect, and Colonel Desprez, relinquishing the attempt, urged him to give some explanation of the execution of the orders relating to Count d'Erlon's corps. The marshal had reinforced that corps, as ordered by Joseph; but he openly asserted that he would give it no instructions which would deprive him of its service and send it into Castile to aid the army of Portugal. To the urgent arguments of Colonel Desprez, the marshal replied that, if he were deprived of any portion whatever of his forces, he would be unable to guard Andalusia, and he would yield obedience to only one order,—that to evacuate that province.

These interviews and obstinate refusals to obey lost much precious time, during which Lord Wellington prepared to march upon the army of Portugal. In fact, early in June, it was learned that he had raised his cantonments and was about to cross the Agueda to enter the province of Salamanca by the route of Ciudad-Rodrigo. At this report, General Caffarelli, whose reluctance to obey arose from a want of presence of mind in his difficult circumstances rather than from any decided ill-will, without further discussing the authority of the king, sent word to Marshals Marmont and Jourdan that he was about to march to the aid of the army of Portugal with a detachment of 10,000 men. To Marshal Soult, Joseph forwarded the order which he ought to have issued at the beginning, not to give Count d'Erlon instruction to follow the movements of General Hill, but immediately to detach 10,000 men to the Tagus, to evacuate whatever part of the territory was necessary for this measure, and finally, if unwilling to obey, to resign immediately his command to Count d'Erlon.

Trusting to the execution of so exact an order, to the promises of General Caffarelli, to his own ability to send some thousands of men to Marshal Marmont, and calculating that by all these steps he should raise the army of Portugal to nearly 70,000 men, he encouraged himself in the issue of the events preparing in Castile; he encouraged himself because, though possessed of good sense, of military talent and courage, he yet was destitute of that consuming ardour, that sleepless vigilance, of the true man of

action, who trusts merely to his own eyes, who confides in no promises before their fulfilment, and who gives no order without personally looking to its execution, a quality possessed by Napoleon in the highest degree, and to which in some measure he owed his prodigious success.

While on our side the most valuable time was lost in lamentable delay, Lord Wellington had put himself in motion to attempt an offensive march on Castile, the only part of Spain where, for the reasons we have assigned, he could act with advantage. Though sole commander, and belonging to the richest power in Europe, he was not quite satisfied with his situation, especially in respect to matériel. The pay was far in arrears in the army; money was very slow to arrive, because his Government was obliged to convert into specie at a loss of twenty-five per cent. at least the paper money which was circulating in England; and the Spaniards, though devoted to his cause, readily furnished him with information which he might use with advantage, gratis, but required prompt payment for their provisions. The muleteers who, with 6000 mules, transported the provisions of the English army, had not been paid for several months, and they began to complain bitterly. But, if they had refused their services for a single day, the English army would have perished, for without provisions every evening collected at the bivouacs, and without time to cook and consume them, Lord Wellington could not have retained a soldier in the ranks. Accordingly, he wrote incessantly to his Government that if they could give him those admirable French soldiers, as he called them, who dispensed with regular supplies, went in all directions to procure food for themselves, and then returned to their colours, made a soup hastily with what they had collected, and fought even if they had not been able to do so, he could maintain the war without money; but that if the English soldiers were subjected to such a trial, if they were allowed to quit their flag for the purpose of marauding, after a few days not one would return. Even he, therefore, complained of his troubles and difficulties. His army, though excellent, was far from what he could have wished. He had wished it to be more numerous, particularly in Spaniards. These last, who ought to have furnished him with 30,000 or 40,000 soldiers, had sent him a division of barely 10,000 men, badly disciplined, badly commanded, and capable of rendering none of those services which might be expected from the bravery and sobriety of the Spanish soldier. With the devotion of the Portuguese and Spanish nations, with the power of England after several campaigns, he had succeeded in combining on the Agueda, early in June, the following forces:—Seven divisions of English infantry, presenting about 35,000 or 36,000 men of proved firmness; (an eighth division was under General Hill in Estremadura;) 5000 or 6000 excellent cavalry, English and German; two brigades of Portuguese infantry, besides one Spanish division under General don Carlos d'Espagne. These auxiliaries, difficult to reckon, especially the Spaniards, on account of their very imperfect organization, might amount to 14,000 or 15,000 men; so that the army of Lord Wellington consisted of about 55,000 men. The guerillas, well adapted to the service of

light troops, added to his effective a force impossible to estimate, but actual. We perceive that with a little mutual understanding among our generals, with our brave soldiers, with 300,000 effective men, affording 230,000 combatants, it would have been easy, by suitable concentration, to oppose an overwhelming mass to his handful of English, resolute and well commanded, no doubt, but whose strength lay wholly in the wisdom of their chief and the disunion of our generals.

Lord Wellington was so well aware of this that he advanced in Castile not without trembling, if such a word may be applied to such a man. After the conquest of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz it was necessary to enter upon some enterprise, and this could be no other than an offensive march in Castile. His strong reason allowed no doubt on these points; but, reflecting that he was about to fall upon the rear of the French, between the armies of the North and of Portugal on one side and those of the centre and of Andalusia on the other, which might have overwhelmed him simply by each sending a detachment against him, he was seized with real fear,—not the fear of weak minds, but that of the strong and enlightened, who can fairly estimate the extent of danger without exaggerating it. If he gained sufficient courage to march to meet such dangers, the cause was, in the first place, that he was bound to attempt something under the pain of losing the most favourable opportunity,—that of the absence of Napoleon; and, next, that he reckoned on the miserable delays which he had long perceived, and which hitherto had prevented our generals from overwhelming him by the union of their forces. On one occasion he had seen this union effected with advantage,—viz., during the preceding year, when Marshal Marmont had marched into Estremadura,—a movement which made him fall at Badajoz after a loss of 6000 men. On the contrary, in the first three months of the present year, that concentration not having taken place, he had been able to take Badajoz and Ciudad-Rodrigo. He trusted to have the same good fortune on the present occasion from the same causes.

Resolved to advance, he nevertheless wrote to his Government that they must not expect great results, for it merely required the French to combine their forces to drive him back into Portugal. He therefore expressly demanded that the Anglo-Sicilian army should make a descent in the province of Murcia, or that of Catalonia, to prevent the army of Aragon from sending detachments to aid the army of the centre. He demanded that the English fleets cruising in the Bay of Biscay and communicating with the guerilla chiefs should feign a debarkation, to prevent General Caffarelli from going to the aid of Marshal Marmont. These precautions having been taken, he passed the Agueda early in June, and took the road to Salamanca, knowing, from certain intelligence due to the zeal of the Spaniards, that Marshal Marmont had been obliged to scatter his divisions in order to obtain provisions, and that no reinforcements had hitherto reached him. He hoped to find the French army divided, in no case amounting to more than 40,000 men, and probably ill provided with matériel. From these various motives, he hoped at least to cause them

to evacuate Salamanca and to drive them beyond the Douro, which would have been a good beginning to the campaign. He then proposed to act according to circumstances, which he had sufficient sang-froid to anticipate without anxiety, and sufficient presence of mind to turn to his own advantage.

Marshal Marmont, who was on his guard, though badly supplied with spies, soon became acquainted with the approach of the English army, and took measures to avoid a surprise. Having had time to assemble four or five divisions, owing to the return of the Foy division, he could present a respectable and somewhat imposing force. Though his whole army was not at his disposal before Salamanca, this was, first, because he had many points to occupy, and, secondly, because he had been obliged to extend himself over more than thirty leagues. Besides, having profited by the lessons of Napoleon, whose aide-de-camp he had been, he had employed the winter in recruiting his men, repairing his artillery matériel, recomposing, as far as possible, his equipages, and putting his posts in a state of defence. In defect of large magazines, which he had no means of creating, he had formed near each division a small dépôt of biscuit, which allowed him to manœuvre for a fortnight without anxiety for the subsistence of his men. He had converted into citadels three convents which commanded Salamanca and the passage of the Tormes. He had there placed a garrison of about 1000 men, and he might leave it without fear of seeing it fall into the hands of the enemy. The line of the Douro, which is behind Salamanca, and which, with its affluent, the Esia, protected at once Old Castile and the kingdom of Leon, was everywhere provided with well-occupied posts. Toro, Zamora, Benavente, and Astorga, promised a certain degree of resistance; and, in presence of a circumspect adversary, it was possible, by skilful manœuvres, to keep the field for some time without risking a decisive action.

Marshal Marmont, after these arrangements, raised his camp from Salamanca, left the city to itself, and went to encamp at some distance, in order to secure leisure to collect his divisions and to watch the designs of the enemy. That he did not immediately take refuge behind the Douro was because he was protected by the Tormes, and wished to remain in sight of Salamanca, in order to encourage the little garrison left in the three fortified convents.

Lord Wellington appeared before Salamanca on the 16th of June. Received by the inhabitants with joy, (which always burst forth between the departure of the French and the arrival of the English,) he devoted a day or two to reflection, well pleased to have acquired the honour of assuming the offensive without having incurred the risk. The inhabitants urged him to deliver them from the three fortified convents which commanded the city, and which might be the means of again admitting the French. These convents, when closely examined, seemed to require a regular attack. Lord Wellington resolved to employ in this operation ten or fifteen days, and did not regret the necessity, being unwilling to precipitate his movements in a country where each step in advance might lead to an abyss. He had brought with him

ces of heavy artillery, not very well. With these means he began the attack on the convents, and sent to Ciudad-Rodrigo for the matériel in which he was

position of these three convents was as follows. The principal and largest—that of St. Vincent, a large, square building, resembling a fortress, had been embattled, pierced with emplacements, and surrounded with rubbish formed into a rampart. On one side it commanded the river, which flows at the foot of Salamanca, the other, Salamanca itself. The two of San Gaetano and La Merced, situated below, and in the direction of, the river, formed a second tier of guns against it, and completely insured its possession.

Wellington opened the trenches before the convent of St. Vincent, outside the city. The convents of La Merced and San Gaetano were ordered to take by assault, and gave no effect. But the troops who guarded the posts, seconded by the commanding officer, Vincent, bravely repulsed the English several hundred men. Lord Wellington determined to await the arrival of the matériel from Ciudad-Rodrigo. The French army, collected at the disastrous leagues, in a good position, supplied the courage of our little garrisons and their resistance.

On the 26th and 27th of June, the artillery having arrived at the English camp, Wellington opened his batteries. The convents defended themselves with and directed a brisk fire against the But, the principal one—that of St. Vincent—having been set on fire by the howitzer, it became impossible to hold out longer; on the 28th, it was necessary to surrender the temporary citadels, by means of which

he hoped to retain Salamanca, or, at least, to secure the means of re-entering it. We lost about 1000 men, either disabled or killed; but the English lost at least an equal number, and we had gained twelve days of delay as advantageous to us as it was disastrous to the enemy. We ought, no doubt, to look well before we scatter our forces in garrisons destined to surrender one after another; but, when they occasion an obstacle to the enemy and gain valuable time, it is no cause for regret.

As to the operations of Marshal Marmont, that were possible; but, after Salamanca taken, it was not prudent in him to remain near the English army, and he passed on to Tordesillas, determined to dispute with energy. And the well-known circling of the English prevented the fear of any active offensive measures on their part. Wellington followed the army of France, and was about to trace the course of the river, which, at that season, was not very fordable, except in a very few places. That river, as we have said, was with good stations, such as those of Zamora, Toro, Zamora, and even Benavente, considering the Escla and the prolongation of the line of the Astorga, especially, possessed, besides the works which had already resisted both the French and the Spanish, an excellent garri-

son of 1500 men, resolved on its defence, and ought, by strongly supporting our right, greatly to annoy the English left. Lord Wellington, who arrived on the Douro on the 1st of July, remained there to allow time to the Spanish army of Galicia to take Astorga. This, he considered, would usefully employ fifteen or twenty days more, without too hastily involving him in the bold campaign on the rear of the French; but it must be confessed that it also allowed them time to assemble their forces for his destruction. They must, indeed, have been blinded by strange passions not to employ this interval in bringing together 70,000 men against the English army. Accordingly, while continuing in the course of the Douro, Lord Wellington never ceased to press upon the Anglo-Sicilian army, on one hand, to give ample occupation to Marshal Suchet, and upon the English naval forces cruising in the Bay of Biscay, on the other, to alarm General Caffarelli by the semblance of an extensive debarkation on the shores of the Asturias.

In this interval, Marshal Marmont, established behind the Douro, was occupied in concentrating the eight divisions of which the army of Portugal was formed. After having received the first of these divisions,—that of General Foy,—it remained for him to receive the 8th,—that of General Bonnet,—composed of good and numerous troops, well commanded, and retained on the confines of the Asturias to oppose the English and the companies of Portier. The Asturias were certainly well worth preserving, as Napoleon had urged when leaving for Russia, but they were as nothing compared with the present object of Marshal Marmont. He had, therefore, not hesitated to despatch an order to the 8th division to evacuate the Asturias, which had met General Bonnet on the road; for that officer, equally intelligent and intrepid, understanding that which had escaped so many of higher rank, judged every interest secondary to that of repelling the English. Deducting all that are lost or left in the rear during a rapid retreat, General Bonnet brought with him 6000 men, excellent in themselves and excellent in virtue of their commander. This addition gave great confidence to Marshal Marmont. It raised his infantry to 86,000 or 87,000 men. He was deficient in cavalry, which had been exhausted in clearing the roads of the guerillas. Anxious to remount it, Marshal Marmont had seized all the saddle-horses he could find in the country, and had thus collected about 1000 good horses, which raised the total of his cavalry to 3000 well-mounted, vigorous horsemen. With his artillery well served and consisting of about one hundred guns, he had about 42,000 soldiers, who, if reinforced by only 10,000 men, would become very superior to the English, and equal to make head against them, if commanded with any degree of prudence and good fortune.

No doubt they were not badly commanded by Marshal Marmont, but not perfectly. That marshal possessed certain qualities of a commander-in-chief, intelligence, science, courage, authority, but he did not possess all. Though in his tastes somewhat unfixed, he gave close attention to the business in hand, formed many combinations,—perhaps too many; for, in action, accuracy of ideas is better than great

abundance, which, without firm and ready judgment, rather dazzles than enlightens. Besides, that marshal had not the reputation of success. How shall we call that indefinable quality? Is it a superstition or a reality? Is it a favour of a capricious fate, granting to one and refusing to another those circumstances of cold, heat, rain, sunshine, and unexpected incidents, which often secure the success of very indifferent schemes and the failure of the more able? or is it not rather a well-proportioned assemblage of qualities, which, even without superior genius, inspires those firm and simple resolutions which save armies and empires? However this be, Marshal Marmont had not in the course of his career been esteemed fortunate: and yet he was confident in himself,—a remarkable feature, whether it was that courage supplied the place of good fortune, or that he had not recognised his destiny, as yet but partially revealed. Such, at this time, was the general of the French army; and any one who could have penetrated the future must have been rendered very anxious by seeing him opposed to a calm and resolute general, of consummate prudence, whose good fortune, whether chance or talent, had hitherto never failed.

Ought now Marshal Marmont, sheltered behind the Douro, to remain immovable? Undoubtedly, he would have done better to allow the initiative to his adversary, to dispute with him the passage of the Douro as long as possible, then to fall back systematically upon the army of the North, which would certainly have joined him, with good will or bad, when the enemy was close upon it. But he was young and vain, ignorant of the designs of fate, he possessed an army of tried bravery, over which the English had gained no ascendancy, which retired unwillingly, and he had just received news which destroyed his hopes of aid. On one side, General Caffarelli, after having announced a reinforcement of 10,000 men, now intimated the appearance of the English fleets between St. Ander and St. Sebastian, the probability of a speedy debarkation, and gave no further hint of the promised reinforcement. But, if we ought to hope little from those who promise, we ought to hope nothing from those who give no promise, or who, having formerly promised, do so no longer. At the same time, Joseph, in a letter dated June 30, which arrived July 12 at the head-quarters of the army of Portugal, communicated to him his efforts to bring the armies of the North and of Andalusia to his aid, without concealing the smallness of his chance of effecting it. To crown his disgrace, whether from not being ready or from not believing the right time to be come, Joseph did not say whether he could spare in his favour a detachment of the army of the centre. Marshal Marmont might, therefore, consider himself absolutely deserted. Certainly, if he could have counted on 10,000 or 12,000 men of the army of the centre, he would unquestionably have awaited that aid before undertaking any thing, for it is better to share the glory of a victory than to monopolize the disgrace of a defeat. From the army of Andalusia, which might have come to his succour, and which ought to have done so, if merely from gratitude, he expected absolutely nothing, and the last letters of Joseph only

confirmed a conviction which he had long entertained. The issue proved that he was not wrong.

Reduced to his own forces alone, comparing his army with that of Lord Wellington, which was not superior in number, reckoning only the English, remembering that the battles gained by the latter were due to their having been attacked in invincible positions, he thought that, with troops well habituated to war, he might manœuvre about them without compromising himself, make them abandon the line of the Douro, and bring them back to the frontier of Portugal without risking a battle; that he might even, while seeking to place himself on their line of communication in order to compel them to retrograde, occupy one of those defensive positions in which the advantage hitherto enjoyed by the English should be enjoyed by us. The French who so ably scaled positions almost inaccessible, such as those of Talavera and Busaco, would be still more formidable in defence than in attack, and the English much less fortunate in attack than they had been in defence. They were now almost sure of victory. There was, therefore, no temerity in wishing to manœuvre around the English, and, in case of meeting a good defensive position, in proposing to dispute the ground with them. To all these reasons for action was added another of great weight. The Spaniards of the army of Galicia were besieging Astorga, which had no more than fifteen days' provisions remaining. Would it be possible to elude the English army and to revictual that fortress? And, if this could not be done without danger, would they not be turned on the right by the loss of Astorga, and condemned henceforward to an indefinite retreat?

Such were the ideas with which Marshal Marmont left his asylum behind the Douro. He first attempted to recross that river in presence of the English army, and did so with equal skill and success. The banks of the Douro were so formed that the movements on one side could be seen from the other. Marshal Marmont pretended to send some columns by his right towards Toro, and, while he did all in his power to present this appearance, he prepared on his left, in the environs of Tordesillas, the means of really crossing the Douro on several bridges of piles. In the night of the 16th and 17th of July, while his prolonged right flank feigned a passage towards Toro, his left actually effected one above Tordesillas, and his centre followed. On the next day, profiting by the surprise and confusion of the English, he brought back his right, and found himself with his 42,000 men, perfectly intact, in full confidence and well supplied, beyond the Douro, with every appearance of offensive designs in the British army.

Lord Wellington was no more inclined than the marshal to hazard a battle, but he was resolved not to allow himself to be cut off from Ciudad-Rodrigo, where he kept his provisions and munitions of war, and which afforded him a good entrance in returning to Portugal. He therefore quickly raised his camp and retrograded towards Salamanca by the way he had come. Marshal Marmont had, therefore, succeeded in his design of throwing him back.

The way towards Salamanca passes by several tributaries of the Douro, first the Guaraná and

in the Tormès, on which Salamanca is situated. These were so many steps to dispute. Lord Wellington fell back from one to the other with prudence and caution. On the banks of the Guarena, General Clausel, a young lieutenant-general who already gave indications of the latest military talents, was in too great haste across, and occasioned himself to be driven back. But this was an unimportant loss, and in the evening of the 19th they spent along that all river, braving each other's guns in their fierceness to quench their thirst in its waters, the heat was suffocating.

During the night Marshal Marmont, ascending the Guarena by the left, crossed it at a point where it was only an insignificant stream, and found himself suddenly in presence of the English, surprised at being without any intervening obstacle. They accordingly immediately commenced a retreat. They marched at a good pace, with decision, their masses in close column protected by the light cavalry and artillery, using an extensive plateau. Our army kept at level with them, advancing on a parallel plateau that which they occupied, showing equal steadiness, much more care, and a degree of confidence in which even the general indulged to excess. The light artillery, skirting at a gallop the border of the plateau on which we marched, fired from time to time to fire upon the English, and then resumed the pursuit. The two divisions met at a village which each was naturally desirous of reaching the first. Our troops were the first to arrive, drove out several scouts, and had the pleasure of cannonading the enemy's army as it defiled within easy reach of our fire. We lost none, but killed several English. Since the passage of the Douro we had collected about 600 men, wounded or stragglers. On the evening of the 20th the English recrossed the river, and we slept on its banks.

On the 21st we crossed that river at one league and a half above Salamanca, and took up our position opposite the heights called the Arapiles, which the English were posted, and where it was not easy to reach them. Marshal Marmont was certainly a little too proud of his first advantages and of the marches he had effected in the presence of Lord Wellington; but he was resolved not to be guilty of any imprudence, nor to repeat the errors of his predecessor by recklessly attacking the English in places where there was no chance of subduing them. We encamped opposite to them after having secured a tolerably advantageous position separated from that of the enemy by a valley, and lying, to the right, on the village of Calvarossa; to the left, on a wood which he had taken care to secure. There was, therefore, nothing to fear, and he quietly slept amid his soldiers without any other design than to conceive a system of manœuvres which had hitherto proved perfectly successful.

On the following morning, July 22, Marshal Marmont rode out early to learn the designs of the enemy and to regulate his own accordingly. It was at rest on each side, and nothing indicated any project of Lord Wellington, unless, perhaps, to rectify his position and to connect himself a little more closely with Salamanca and the road to Ciudad-Rodrigo. A kind of line, not deep but wide, terminating at the woods near Salamanca, separated us from the

English, and rendered the situation of the two armies equally secure. The village of Calvarossa de Ariba, occupied by the Foy division, served as a pivot to our right. Our centre and left were supported by woods. Each could thus wait without any disadvantage, nor was either willing to engage with doubtful prospects. But Marshal Marmont, confident, as far as concerned manœuvres, in the sagacity of his army and in his own, planned a movement to the left with the view of outflanking a little the right of the English, and, consequently, threatening their communications with Ciudad-Rodrigo, and when they should decamp, either to approximate Salamanca or regain the road to Ciudad-Rodrigo, of attacking their rear-guard and cutting off a portion. This was feasible, but much too ambitious, and with Lord Wellington's arrangements, which it was easy to conjecture without knowing them, and which were made with the view of regaining Ciudad-Rodrigo as soon as possible, it would have been better to have made him a bridge of gold than to hazard movements which might force him to a battle.

But yet it would have been possible, with great prudence in the execution, to effect all these movements without very serious consequences. Leaving, therefore, his right under General Foy at the village of Calvarossa de Ariba, and, to render it still stronger, adding to it the division of General Ferey, Marshal Marmont caused his centre and left to defile behind that support along the woods before which he was posted, following always the border of the heights which he had occupied. Between the English and us, on our right, arose two hills, sadly celebrated, called the Arapiles. Of these the nearest to us was the highest, and from its summit might be cannonaded the smaller Arapile, which was in the possession of the English. It was, therefore, thought advisable to take the greater Arapile, as belonging to our position and consolidating the position of our right. The brave division of Bonnet, charged with this operation, without much difficulty drove out some light troops of the enemy who were there, and established a strong battery. It was a kind of pivot of great solidity round which the projected manœuvre might be effected. Accordingly, Marshal Marmont brought forward the rest of his divisions, the left in front, defiling in face of the English, and always leaving the valley between us and them. Thomières's division, forming his extreme left, advanced a little to threaten the English right: the divisions of Sarrut and Maucune were placed in the centre, the Clausel division in reserve, the Brenier division in the rear towards the baggage and park of artillery. These movements were executed with order, and at a considerable distance from the enemy, except that which gave us possession of the greater Arapile, and they seemed, at least for the moment, to involve no serious result.

While Marshal Marmont was thus engaged, Lord Wellington, who was observing the manœuvre manifestly directed against his communications, immediately formed his purpose, and ordered a manœuvre exactly corresponding to it, so as to advance his right as much as we advanced our left, and to be always ready to decamp whenever he might wish, without finding us in his way. Consequently, leaving his

left immovable before our right, which was also immovable, and giving it great strength, for it consisted of the light division under General Charles Alton, the first division under General Campbell, and a large amount of cavalry, he brought his centre opposite to ours, between the smaller Arapile and the village called after those hills, always on the border of the heights opposite to those which we occupied. This centre was formed of four English divisions, that is to say, of more than 20,000 excellent infantry. In the first line, and with the left on the minor Arapile, were the 4th division under General Cole, and the 5th under General Leith; in the second line, the 6th under General Clinton, and the 7th under General Hope. Lord Wellington brought his right to the village of Las Torres, opposite our left, and formed it of Bradford's Portuguese brigade and the Spanish division of Don Carlos. To these he added the 3d English division formerly under General Picton, which had been withdrawn from the banks of the Tormes, and all the rest of his cavalry, because on that side the ground, presenting a rapid declivity, was well adapted to the manœuvres of cavalry.

By these measures the English general had sufficiently guarded against the arrangements of his adversary without risking a battle, from which he was still averse. It was noon: the whole day would have been occupied in manœuvres of this kind, without great loss on either side, and certainly towards night Lord Wellington would have retreated towards Ciudad-Rodrigo, leaving Salamanca to us without a battle, when Marshal Marmont, by a fatal impatience not for battle but for manœuvres, attempted to take the rear-guard of his adversary, whom he believed ready to decamp. He, therefore, advanced his left still farther, composed, as we have said, of Thomières's division, to such an extent that it began to descend from the heights in front of the 3d English division, which was ordered to bar his way with a large body of cavalry. He brought his centre, composed of the Maucune and Sarrut divisions, still nearer the border of the valley which separated us from the English, supported these two divisions by General Clausel, brought near Brenier's division, without ordering any to attack the English, for, as we have just said, he had no other intention than to hamper their rear-guard on the retreat. But such movements, so near the enemy, require both dexterity and authority to insure exact obedience. Unhappily, Marshal Marmont did not possess these two qualities to warrant him in presenting so bold a front to such an adversary as Lord Wellington. General Maucune, commanding the division of the centre, which was the most in advance on the left, was an officer of tried courage and extreme boldness in the field. Believing the English to be in full retreat, he thought the moment come for throwing himself upon them. He, therefore, solicited the order for attack, and, without waiting for it, drove before him the enemy's tirailleurs, descended into the interval between the two armies, and engaged with the English divisions of the centre, those of Cole and Leith. At this sight, Lord Wellington, who was willing to retire, but not to fly, accepted their offer of battle, and ordered his centre to receive and repulse the attack of ours.

While General Maucune was guilty of this act of rashness, General Thomières, on the left, continuing to advance, also descended into the plain without being supported, and ran the risk of meeting in front Picton's infantry-division, and on his flanks a thick cloud of cavalry. They were, therefore, thus mingled on all sides, and were engaged along the whole front of the two armies, contrary to the intention of either general.

Unfortunately, General Clement's numerous and well-commanded division was still in the rear, and in no condition to furnish the aid required by our divisions thus imprudently engaged.

Marshal Marmont, who, from the greater Arapile, where he remained to direct these different movements, perceived through his telescope the errors which had been committed, mounted in haste to restrain the impatience of his lieutenants by his personal presence. But scarcely was he in the saddle when he was struck by a ball which broke his arm and penetrated his side. Certainly one might now believe in the doctrine of fate, and of an adverse fate. The unhappy marshal fell weltering in his blood, and had only time to name General Bonnet, the oldest of his divisional commanders, as his successor. His wound was so serious as to threaten speedy death. While they were in quest of General Bonnet on the right, towards the Arapiles, the battle, now become universal, continued to rage without any chief on our side. General Maucune urged the English with vigour, and drove them to the village of the Arapiles: General Sarrut supported him. But they were opposed to four divisions of the enemy, which, besides being four to two, were individually stronger than ours. After some success in the beginning, General Maucune, riddled by the formidable fire of the English, was obliged to fall back. But General Clausel arrived, took the place of Maucune's division, and drove back the English. Marshal Beresford, who was present at this part of the field, ordered his second line to form in force upon the first, so as to take Clausel's division in flank. At the same time Lord Wellington attacked the greater Arapile on the left with the Portuguese under General Pakenham, and on the right he poured down on the Thomières division, which had most imprudently descended into the plain, the infantry of Picton's division, and the whole body of his cavalry. Notwithstanding these redoubled efforts of the enemy, our army kept their ground. Bonnet's division, though deprived of their general, who had hastened to the centre to assume the command, stopped short the Portuguese under General Pakenham. The 120th regiment killed 800 of their men, and remained masters of the greater Arapile. General Clausel sustained with vigour the front attack of Clinton's division, but suffered severely from the flank fires of Leith's division. They fought at such a short distance that generals were wounded in every direction. On our side, General Bonnet was seriously hurt, and likewise General Clausel. On the English side, Marshal Beresford and Generals Cole and Leith were wounded more or less seriously. On our left, and on the English right, the battle was equally violent. Thomières's division was at



sailed in the middle of the plain by the enemy's cavalry, lost its commander, who was killed upon the field, and fell back in disorder. Brenier's division ran to its aid, but was carried away by the retrograde movement, and the brave 22d, anxious to maintain its ground, suffered severely. General Clausel, who had just replaced General Bonnet in command, and who, though wounded himself, refused to quit the field, thought it his duty to withdraw from this state of confusion, and not to risk every thing by further obstinacy. He gave the order for retreat, and directed it with great presence of mind towards the plateau, which we ought not to have left. He called thither Ferey's division, which had remained behind that of Foy, on the extreme right, and brought up Sarrut's division, which had been less engaged than the other divisions of the centre. Behind this solid support rallied in succession the divisions of Thomières and Brenier, which were in great danger at a considerable distance to our left, and those of Maucune and Clausel, violently engaged in the centre. Bonnet's division, which, placed on the greater Arapile, had covered the foot of the hill with the bodies of the enemy, also fell back in imposing order. The English then attempted in their turn to climb the heights on which we had fallen back. But all their efforts were frustrated by the divisions of Sarrut and Ferey. Unfortunately, General Ferey, commanding the 3d division, was mortally wounded. But the English having ceased to press forward, our divisions defiled in succession behind the Sarrut and Ferey divisions, then passed behind that of General Foy, which had remained immovable at Calvarossa de Ariba, and returned by the way which they had traversed in the morning with very different intentions from a battle and in the hope of a very different result. The whole English cavalry then fell upon Foy's division, which, not having been yet engaged, was ordered to cover the retreat. This division received in square the masses of English cavalry, killed many of their men, and retired in good order. Thus, towards night, they regained the banks of the Tormès, which they recrossed without being pursued.

Such was this fatal and undesigned battle, called the battle of Salamanca or of the Arapiles, which resulted in unforeseen consequences to the English army, for it procured for them an unhopd-for victory instead of an inevitable retreat, and was, as we shall see, the beginning of the ruin of our affairs in Spain. Certainly, here, if anywhere, we might be allowed to believe in the power of fortune, without denying the merits of Lord Wellington or the faults of Marshal Marmont, for the result was much disproportioned to the merit of the English general or the errors of the French. An unexpected engagement, three generals-in-chief wounded in succession, an unheard-of confusion after several days' bold and prosperous march, were surely blows of sufficient severity and undeserved. This battle is a remarkable proof that the moral effect of events in war is commonly superior to their material effect. While on our side Generals Thomières and Ferey had been killed, and Marshal Marmont and Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Maucune had been wounded, on the English side General le Marchant had

been killed, and Marshal Beresford and General Cole, Leith, and Cotton seriously wounded. Of our men, 5000 or 6000 were disabled, and of the English nearly as many. We had, it is true, abandoned nine guns, which, having been brought down from the heights into the plain and having lost their horses, it had been impossible to recover. The difference in the material results, therefore, had not been great, but the situation of the two armies had been greatly changed. We had no longer any chance of forcing the English to retrograde: from this time we must retrograde ourselves, with an army not, indeed, dejected, but much irritated by their long misfortunes, to which neither incomparable bravery nor resignation under the most cruel sufferings had availed, and which, sometimes from one cause, sometimes from another, and almost always from disunion among their generals, had been constantly sacrificed. It was necessary to bring them again behind the Douro, and perhaps still farther back, if we would restore the confidence and resolution to devote themselves afresh to a war which their good sense led them to detest and to commanders whom they accused for all their misfortunes. Lord Wellington, on the contrary, was able henceforward to keep the field in Castile and on the rear of the French, for there was nowhere any force capable of resisting him. The army of Portugal would be obliged to fall back before him until they should meet the army of the North, which would be a great distance; the army of the centre was much too weak to venture to approach; the army of Andalusia was beyond reach; and he had, hence, the choice of pursuing General Clausel, with a view to his total destruction, or of throwing himself upon Madrid, to enter that city in triumph. Such were the sad results of the indisposition of those who had not granted timely aid to the army of Portugal, and the imprudence of those who had engaged it in a useless battle.

Happily for that army, the command was assumed by one who was worthy of the office,—too late, indeed, but still not altogether uselessly. General Clausel was young, active in mind and body, not very scientific, it is true, but possessed of imperturbable sang-froid, by turns impetuous and self-controlled, with superior *coup d'œil* on the field, and, partly from light-heartedness, partly from vigour, supporting the anxieties of command, though as yet untried, as well as the most experienced generals. Esteemed by the soldiers for his valour, loved by them for his good nature, he was the only one capable of securing any degree of submission and patience under severe sufferings.

Having, wounded as he was, assumed the chief command from two generals, themselves wounded, in the midst of a rout, he appeared so little disturbed that he restored calmness and order to others. On July 23, he retreated to the Douro with all possible speed. The English attempting to pursue him with their cavalry, he received them in square, and inflicted some damage upon them. Unfortunately, one square of the 6th light, not being formed in sufficient time, suffered some loss. This was the only accident. He soon found himself behind the Douro, released from the English, but assailed by a cloud of guerillas, who, without

exposing us to any serious danger, murdered our wounded, the stragglers, and the foragers. Our provisions were exhausted, the soldiers having consumed during these few days of manœuvres the resources provided by Marshal Marmont. Irritated by the cruelties which they saw inflicted on their companions, the soldiers pillaged not only with avidity but with barbarity, little concerned at destroying an inhospitable country which they had been unable to keep and which they hoped never again to see. General Clausel had the greatest difficulty in restraining their excesses, and often found it impossible to maintain his authority. However, in virtue of his efforts, the army still presented an *ensemble* which Lord Wellington, with commendable prudence, was unwilling to encounter a second time.

At this moment arrived a part of the succour so urgently demanded, so vainly expected, and the improbability of whose arrival after long delay had contributed to draw Marshal Marmont into rash operations. On the first day of the retreat, General Clausel met about 1000 men whom General Caffarelli had at length sent, consisting of two regiments of cavalry and a detachment of horse-artillery. The ridicule was great, and would have deserved a severe rebuke if General Caffarelli could not have pleaded his own good intention and the trouble occasioned him by the appearance of English fleets on the coasts of Biscay. Brave, but without presence of mind, he had apprehended a formidable debarkation; and, instead of 10,000 men who had been promised, he had forwarded 1000. Another succour, decisive if it had arrived in time, was not met, but was announced in a despatch from Joseph at the moment of recrossing the Douro. This consisted of about 18,000 men, comprising almost the whole of the army of the centre, which Joseph, in despair, had determined to conduct in person to Salamanca, and which he had been even more slow in announcing than in setting in motion. He had left Madrid July 21, and, though late, it would not have been too late if he had intimated this movement three or four days earlier to Marshal Marmont. Unfortunately, he had not written till July 21, the day of his departure from Madrid, and it was impossible that Marshal Marmont should receive notice of the approaching succour on the 22d at Salamanca. Warned in time, that marshal would certainly have waited; and, though the number was not such as to insure success in so ill-judged an engagement as that of Salamanca, such a reinforcement might have determined Lord Wellington to decamp in haste, or it might have given rise to other combinations. At any rate, it would have been a strange misfortune which should have caused 55,000 such Frenchmen as those which composed the army of Portugal to be beaten by 40,000 Englishmen, even though augmented by 15,000 Spaniards and Portuguese.

Let us now examine how it came to pass that this succour, such as it was, arrived so late, or arrived at all. Joseph, as we have seen, had forwarded to Marshal Soult, not the order to place Count d'Erlon in opposition to General Hill with the view of following his course, but the more appropriate order to detach immediately 10,000 men to the Tagus, to send them to the army of Portugal, and either to dismiss

these 10,000 men or to resign his command. Joseph, moreover, had authorized Marshal Soult to restrict the extent of his sphere if he thought himself too much weakened to guard the whole of Andalusia. It seems that such an order admitted neither tergiversation nor refusal, and certainly it would have experienced none if it had emanated from a power capable of securing respect, i.e. from Napoleon himself. But it was not so. Marshal Soult, employing an argument previously adduced, said that he was prepared to obey, but only on the condition of the complete and immediate evacuation of Andalusia; for, with 10,000 men less than he then possessed, it would be impossible to keep his ground. This assertion was very questionable. The army of Andalusia, reckoning nearly 60,000 combatants out of 90,000 men, might easily guard Andalusia for a time with 50,000; 12,000 men would suffice for Grenada, 12,000 for Cadix, and, with 25,000 in the neighbourhood of Seville, it would be possible to guard against all contingencies for a few weeks,—to keep in check General Hill, who had no more than 15,000 men, and who was not thinking of quitting Badajoz. Marshal Soult had not left nearly as many when he went into Estremadura, either to besiege Badajoz or to fight the battle of Albuera. To this new kind of disguised refusal Marshal Soult added advice on the best plan of conducting the campaign against the English. "It is wished," he said, "to turn them from the North of the Peninsula. Well, there is a sure way of doing this,—viz., instead of weakening the army of Andalusia, to reinforce it by the whole army of the centre, perhaps even by that of Portugal; and Lord Wellington, in that case, alarmed for Lisbon, would be soon obliged to move from the north to the south."

But, in the first place, this line of conduct was expressly opposed to the instructions of Napoleon, who had given orders to sacrifice every thing to the maintenance of communication with France by the provinces of the North, and who, with that view, had himself rendered the army of the North independent of the army of Portugal, and brought the latter from the Tagus to the Douro, at the risk of isolating still more one of these armies from the other, though it so greatly concerned them to be united. But, independently of this violation of Napoleon's orders, imagine what would have been our condition in Spain if the North and the centre of the Peninsula had been given up to the English, Lord Wellington ruling from Vittoria to Baylen, and rousing all the population to insurrection by his presence, while our armies were confined to Andalusia.

Besides, Joseph did not require from Marshal Soult advice, but reinforcements for the army of Portugal. Seeing that he could not obtain them, he had deferred the pain of coming to any explanation with the commander of the army of Andalusia; and, learning every moment the increasing danger of Marshal Marmont, he at length determined to go himself to his aid. He might have been ready from the 17th of July; and, if he had set off then, he might have arrived at Salamanca in sufficient time. But Marshal Suchet having placed at his disposal the Italian division of Palombini, which it was possible to bring to Madrid, Joseph preferred operating with 12,000 or 13,000 men

rather than with 10,000, and for this reason had delayed till July 21. Reinforced by 3000 Italians, he had 18,000 men under his command. He determined to leave only 5000 between Madrid and Toledo, and to set off with the rest for the province of Salamanca. Even at this moment, he would still have been in time if he had hastened to warn Marshal Marmont. But he had not done so, nor did he intimate his departure and the commencement of his movement until the 21st.\* Reaching Villa-Castin on the 23d, he had only learned, through vague rumours, the fatal result of the battle of Salamanca on the 24th, and had remained at a distance from the English, that he might not risk a disaster. But he was unwilling to retrace his steps and immediately to recross the mountains of Guadarrama, in the design, if possible, of rendering some service to the army of Portugal. And this he did by his presence alone, which engaged the attention of Lord Wellington. Having communicated with General Clausel, and having learned that that general wished that the army of the centre should still remain some time in sight, in order to retard the march of Lord Wellington, he remained on the rear of the Guadarrama, and did not leave it till the army of Portugal had peaceably retired upon Burgos and his own danger obliged him to fall back upon Madrid. He returned to that capital much distressed, and expecting nothing but disasters from the deplorable situation which must ensue from the event of Salamanca. He returned on August 9 from an expedition which *might have been* so useful and *had been* so unavailing.

The part now to be taken was but too plainly indicated by the nature of things, and the rude shock just sustained. Since they had been beaten for want of timely union against the common enemy, it became still more evident that it was necessary to concentrate themselves as quickly as possible, and to make the English expiate the day of Salamanca by a grand battle with all the French forces in Spain. But such a concentration could only be procured by the immediate evacuation of Andalusia, a step much to be regretted, and which Joseph, though ordering it, greatly deplored, for the moral effect could not fail to be unfavourable, and it must afford considerable encouragement to the government of Cadiz. It must be added that certain proceedings with the malcontents of Cadiz, calculated to attach several persons of

importance to Joseph, would be interrupted and probably abandoned. In fact, the Cortes of Cadiz, while effecting some desirable reforms, though sometimes premature and exaggerated, had occasioned great divisions, and many persons, some weary of the war, others fearing a revolution in Spain similar to that which had occurred in France, said that it would be best to attach themselves to the government of Joseph, who would give peace and reform without revolution. It was partly to men who thus thought and spoke that we owed the submission of Aragon, Valencia, and Andalusia. The evacuation of this last province would dispel these first steps towards submission, and Joseph was not less averse from it than Marshal Soult. But to avoid the necessity of such a sacrifice we must have beaten the English, and, as this had not been done, the immediate and complete abandonment of Andalusia was the only way left to escape still greater misfortunes. Joseph, therefore, wrote to Marshal Soult a severe letter, in which he peremptorily required him (on pain of instantly resigning his command to Count d'Erlon) to quit Andalusia, that is to say, to evacuate the lines of Cadiz, Grenada, and Seville, to save all that he could, and to fall back upon La Mancha. The union to the army of the centre of 60,000 combatants, now under Marshal Soult, would enable him to preserve Madrid, and, by adding to it the army of Portugal, would supply the means of following Lord Wellington wherever he might be, and of giving him battle with almost certain prospect of a successful and decisive issue. On these conditions they need not abandon Madrid, which was of much greater consequence than to preserve Seville and Grenada. But they had Lord Wellington between them and the army of Portugal, free to choose between the pursuit of the vanquished army and the triumphant occupation of the capital, and it was not easy to determine which of these measures he would adopt. If he determined to march upon Madrid it was plain that it would be necessary to evacuate that capital, for Marshal Soult could not arrive in time to save it.

These sad doubts were soon removed by the movements of Lord Wellington. After having, for some days, pursued the army of Portugal, and having placed it beyond the scene of action, he stopped at the environs of Valladolid, and retraced his steps in the direction of Madrid. Though a great moral effect would, no doubt, be produced by occupying the capital of Spain, something better might perhaps have been done than to enter Madrid; and if Lord Wellington had continued to pursue the army of Portugal in the condition of fatigue, discouragement, and moral revolt in which it then was, it is doubtful whether General Clausel, with all his decision and vigour, could have preserved it from total destruction. The army of the North could have only advanced to fall in its turn, and the whole organized force between Madrid and Bayonne having been destroyed, the illustrious English commander would have had easy work with the rest, for it is little to be supposed that he would have anywhere met in combination the armies which occupied the South of the Peninsula. Beyond all doubt, in similar circumstances, Napoleon would have freed Spain from the French in two months. Such is the

\* Marshal Jourdan, always just and always true in his memoirs, (printed entire in the Memoirs of King Joseph, with a few trifling exceptions,) has not explained this singular omission, which was a real misfortune, for it occasioned Marshal Marmont not to await the arrival of the army of the centre, on which he did not reckon. And Marshal Jourdan, whose explanations are in other respects always complete, has frequently difficulty in justifying the slowness of the resolutions adopted,—a defect always attaching to the conduct of Joseph, in itself prudent. A much greater degree of ardour and vivacity than was possessed by the illustrious marshal was requisite to inspire Joseph with the necessary amount of impulse. This is the judgment passed by Napoleon on the whole affair when he was appeared with respect to the battle of Salamanca and had become more just towards his brother and the major-general. He approved their resolutions, but considered them dilatory. In the first moment of irritation he appeared much more severe, because he was ignorant of the facts, with which he was never perfectly acquainted. A little better informed, and somewhat calmed, at a later date, he confined himself to the reproach of dilatoriness; but this he never withdrew.

difference between genius and mere good sense; but good sense is redeemed by so many other advantages that we must take care how we bring any charge against it. And we must excuse weakness, which may occur in the most stable characters. Lord Wellington, reasonable as he was, concealed under a quiet reserve inordinate vanity. To enter Madrid in triumph was irresistibly attractive to him, and he resolved to occasion to Joseph the injury which must be the most sensibly felt, even though it might not be the most truly serious. From August 10, Lord Wellington openly directed his course to Madrid. When this march of the English army was known, Joseph was deeply affected by it, and deservedly so, for every plan that he could adopt would be painful. There would, perhaps, have been some advantage in falling back upon La Mancha if he could have hoped there to meet Marshal Soult returning from Seville, for, adding the army of the centre to that of Andalusia, he would have been in a condition to give battle to Lord Wellington, and to dispute Madrid with him. However, even in this case, it would have been a strange thing to give battle to a victorious army, having in the rear the South of Spain and the sea, *i.e.* an abyss, if beaten. This plan was, therefore, very dangerous, but it need not be seriously examined, for Marshal Soult could not be supposed to be already *en route*, and in full execution of the orders which had been transmitted to him. It was therefore necessary either to join Marshal Soult at Seville, or Marshal Suchet at Valencia. But between these two determinations there was no room to hesitate. Besides the fact of Seville being the most distant of the Spanish provinces, it was without any communication with France, while, at Valencia, an easy and safe connection might be kept up with the Pyrenees by Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, and Saragossa. They were also sure of finding there a rich country, submissive and well governed, and a friendly reception, for Joseph continued to be on excellent terms with Marshal Suchet. There was also a last reason, altogether decisive, which was, that the army of Andalusia might be brought to Valencia, and that it would have been madness to attempt to bring the army of Aragon to Seville, since, independently of the loss of Aragon and Catalonia, which would have resulted from such a movement, they would have been utterly separated from France.

With so wise a counsellor as Marshal Jourdan, King Joseph could not hesitate in such circumstances. He therefore took the way to the Tagus in the direction of Valencia, and, changing the orders previously issued to Marshal Soult, he required him to effect his retreat by Murcia to Valencia. But it was necessary to quit Madrid, and this was very distressing. In Spain, though so generally opposed to him, Joseph had found a number of Spaniards, some of them considerable by birth and fortune, who, either from a personal regard to his mild and attractive character, or from a desire to ward from their country the horrors of war, or from the conviction that all civilization in Spain had arisen from foreign dynasties, had joined his cause. There were, also, many functionaries of an inferior order who had remained in his service from the habit of obedience. This class, called the *afanceados*, were particularly numerous in

Madrid, and comprised not less than 10,000 individuals of every sex and age. How could he abandon these unhappy men to the ferocity of the Spaniards, a ferocity which equalled, it must be confessed, their patriotism, and which, showing mercy to neither sick nor wounded of our soldiers, would show still less compassion to their countrymen accused of treason? To desert them was to condemn them to death: to carry them during the month of August across the plains of La Mancha and the barren mountains of Cuenca was still to condemn them to death, but to death by misery. The alternative was cruel, and yet, as we always endeavour to shun the nearest danger, at the first rumour of evacuation all wished to set off. They collected what they could of carriages drawn by every kind of animal, and on August 10 they began their departure from Madrid, carried on at least 2000 vehicles, and escorted by the army of the centre. With this army they formed a body of about 24,000 persons, of whom the half were provided with arms and very few with food. Joseph offered them the only consolation in his power by sharing their misfortunes. Having arrived on the banks of the Tagus, near Aranjuez, he wished to know whether it was the whole Anglo-Portuguese army that was marching upon the capital, or merely a detachment of one or two divisions, for, in the latter case, he might have disputed the capital, or, at least, not have removed far from it, but have awaited in the neighbourhood the arrival of the army of Andalusia. General Treilhard, who commanded an excellent division of dragoons, was charged to reconnoitre the English army in order to discover the real state of things. This he did in the environs of Majadahonda, on the banks of the torrent of Guadarrama, with so much accuracy and vigour, that he overthrew the English rear-guard and carried off four hundred men and three guns. The reports of the English officers having left no doubt of the presence of Lord Wellington and all his army at the gates of Madrid, they at length determined to take the road of Ocana, Albacete, and Chinchilla, to Valencia. At Madrid they had left many sick and wounded. These they had collected at the Retiro, which had long been fortified against the guerillas and the people of Madrid, but not against the attacks of a regular army, and a garrison of 1200 men was placed there under Colonel Laffond. These 1200 men were sacrificed, for, through the negligence of the staff, they had not even ascertained whether the wells of the Retiro were supplied with water. But these 1200 men were to render an important service, that of delivering several thousand sick and wounded from the sword of the guerillas and consigning them to the English army, which, as became a civilized nation, treated the disarmed with respect and enforced the same treatment on the part of others.

They left the Tagus about August 15, during a stifling heat, and with very limited resources. The journey was unavoidably most distressing. Several hundred families, some in easy circumstances, but the greater part living at Madrid on their appointments, and on rations when money failed, having no longer this resource while on the journey, encumbered the roads or vehicles ill provided with beasts, and every evening begged from the soldiers some share in

their spoils. Everywhere the inhabitants were seen in flight, the granaries burned or emptied, and no one who could give a little bread or meat in exchange for money. Instead of inhabitants, they often met terrible guerillas, who killed without pity every one who was separated from the fugitive column. The day after, however fatigued or sick or famishing they might be, they must quit the spot where they had passed the night, if they would avoid being murdered in sight of the rear-guard. Such were the remains of the kingly state of Joseph, which had appeared so easy to be substituted for that of Charles IV., and which had already occasioned 600,000 Frenchmen to be sent to Spain, of whom scarcely 300,000 survived.

After some days of this painful retreat, many of the unhappy wretches sunk. A certain number, unable to follow any longer, went to conceal themselves in the villages to implore pity, too often in vain. Part of the Spanish troops composing the guard of King Joseph deserted, and they arrived at Chinchilla with greatly-diminished numbers. The fort so called was occupied by the enemy and barred their road. It was necessary to turn off with great difficulty and to rejoin the road several leagues farther on. At the confines of Valencia they met the advanced posts of Marshal Suchet, and those whose strength enabled them to continue this difficult journey had the satisfaction to find a country quiet, inhabited, rich, and friendly. Marshal Suchet, to whom this visit brought heavy charges, nevertheless received the royal visitor with respectful solicitude, and the fugitive multitude which followed him with a sense of fraternity. The marshal might well be proud to show to his countrymen such a specimen of a well-conducted war and well-administered conquest. He introduced King Joseph into Valencia, gave him a far better reception than he had ever met with at Madrid, and liberally bestowed upon all the abundance of his magazines. He had already sent more than five millions in cash to Madrid; he also paid the troops of the army of the centre, clothed those who required clothing, and furnished a home and provision to all the *afancesados*. These last were happy to see at Valencia countrymen subject to the new dynasty, for with them they found both an excuse for their attachment to Joseph, and sympathies for their misery. They had entered Valencia Sept. 1: they resolved there to await the arrival of the army of Andalusia in quietness and in some degree of comfort.

Though Marshal Soult was very unwilling to evacuate Andalusia, he could no longer refuse. Not having consented to weaken his position there for a few weeks in favour of the army of Portugal, he had lost the only means of maintaining himself there permanently. To remain longer would be to expose himself to the fate of General Dupont. To retire upon Valencia would be better for him than to retire upon La Mancha, for he would thus avoid the English army, of whose direction and force he was ignorant, and he would enter a friendly and quiet country, provided with resources of every kind. Accordingly, he was thinking of taking that road spontaneously, when he received the most recent orders of Joseph which demanded it, and obedience was, therefore, easy on this occasion.

However, it was not without much anxiety that he found himself about to appear before the King of Spain, and the two marshals, who were good judges of late events. His part in the misfortunes just experienced was by no means the least. No doubt, General Caffarelli had taken unnecessary alarm at the sight of some English sailors; King Joseph, after having done his best to oblige the French generals to afford each other mutual aid, had committed the error of leaving Madrid too late, and the still greater error of having announced his departure too late; Marshal Marmont had been guilty of manœuvring imprudently before a sagacious and resolute enemy, and had seriously compromised the army of Portugal; but how great a part had Marshal Soult in occasioning these misfortunes, who, in spite of repeated advice and the most striking intimations, persisted in believing that Lord Wellington would march upon Andalusia and not upon Castile; had refused all aid to the army of Portugal, from which he had received so many services; had not only refused to aid it, but had disobeyed a king, his commander-in-chief; had disobeyed without the excuse which, in some few instances, may justify disobedience, that of being in the right when the commander is in the wrong! It was somewhat perplexing to explain these acts to Joseph and the marshals, who had seen and known all. But there was a still more formidable tribunal than that which he was to find at Valencia, the tribunal of Napoleon, who had been silent on the affair of Oporto, but who could scarcely remain so on the recent events in Castile. How would he judge all that had transpired, especially if Spain, as was probable, should be lost through the confusion at Salamanca? The marshal had contrived a singular excuse for his disobedience. He had supposed that Joseph had given all the orders which he had refused to obey, in consequence of a secret understanding with Bernadotte, to whom he was related, with the English, and with the Russians, whose accomplice he had become, and, therefore, a traitor to France and to his brother! The reasons on which he founded this supposition were, that, according to the English journals, Bernadotte had taken several hundred Spaniards into his service, that the ambassador of Joseph had remained in Russia, that Moreau had arrived in Sweden from America, &c. Adding to all these facts the relationship of Joseph, who was brother-in-law to Bernadotte, he thought himself authorized to suppose that Joseph had entered into a conspiracy against France; that the first act of this conspiracy was the abandonment of Spain, and that the order to evacuate Andalusia was the first step in this criminal career. This wild conception once gaining possession of the suspicious mind of the marshal, it appeared to him his duty to express it to the Emperor, which he had done in a despatch addressed to the minister of war, which, for greater security, he had intrusted to the captain of a merchant-vessel, with orders to convey it to one of the French ports in the Mediterranean.

His despatch to the Emperor having been forwarded, Marshal Soult had sent a reply to King Joseph, and while continuing to urge upon him that, instead of endeavouring to concentrate himself in the provinces of the North, it would

have been better that all should have penetrated into the South, attracted the war to that quarter, and there repaired the fortune of the new dynasty, he added, nevertheless, that, in deference to the royal orders, he was about to collect his scattered troops, and to repair by Murcia into the kingdom of Valencia. In fact, after having destroyed or thrown into the sea the immense matériel so painfully amassed in the lines of Cadiz, after having formed a great convoy of ammunition, provisions, and baggage, the marshal, bringing with him all he could transport of his sick and wounded, and intrusting the rest to the humanity of the inhabitants of Seville, began his retreat on the 26th of August, and took the road for Murcia. The portion of his troops which was at Grenada would naturally be collected on the way. That portion which, under Count d'Erion, unprofitably occupied Estremadura, was to descend to the banks of the Guadalquivir, ascend that river by Cordova as far as Baeza, and join the main column at Huescar. Though this evacuation would be accomplished with less distress than that of Madrid, yet the season, the country, the multitude of persons, and the amount of property carried with them, rendered it very melancholy and painful. At length, near the end of September, the advanced guards of Marshal Soult's army perceived in the environs of Almanza those of Marshal Suchet, to their great joy, for, in these distant and unfavourable climates, the French, supposing themselves destined to perish to the last man, never met, even the most enured to suffering, without expressions of the most lively emotion.

During the month of September Joseph had received a vague report of the approach of Marshal Soult, and he impatiently awaited the detail of his march, and the explanation of his plans. Suddenly he learned that the captain of a merchant-vessel, bearing French despatches, had touched at Grao, (the port of Valencia,) and begged to be allowed to deliver what had been consigned to him, being briskly pursued by the English. Joseph hastened to receive the despatches and to open them, to gain from them any information concerning Andalusia, and was much surprised, on reading them, to find himself denounced by Marshal Soult as a traitor to his family and his country. His feelings may be more easily imagined than described. Joseph, by his resistance, by his pride as an elder brother, and especially by the freedom of speech allowed at Madrid, had displeased his brother to such an extent, that, even when in the right, he did not escape censure. Yet his devotion to his brother was unquestionable, and he was convinced of the truth that, after all, the brothers of Napoleon owed their fortunes to him, and, if they paid dear for them, they could only retain them by aiding him to save his own. If, then, treason were to enter the Bonaparte family, it certainly ought not to be through Joseph. He was indignant, and took no pains to conceal his indignation, but immediately despatched Colonel Desprez to Moscow, to remit to Napoleon this strange tissue of inventions, and to demand of him to be at once relieved from and avenged upon the commander of the army of Andalusia. The approaching interview with Marshal Soult, therefore, could not fail to be painful and stormy.

Joseph, impatient to see the marshal, and especially to have in his power the army of Andalusia, hastened to meet him, and appointed him a rendezvous at the frontier of Murcia, at Fuente de Higueras. He had with him Marshals Jourdan and Suchet. But at their desire, as they feared to be present at so painful an interview, he received Marshal Soult unattended, and surprised him disagreeably by proving that he had read the despatches intended for the Emperor. This discovery was attended with one advantage, by rendering the marshal more prompt in his obedience in order to rectify his error. This was the only thing which Joseph at the time demanded; and, after an animated discussion, he endeavoured, in a conference with the three marshals, to arrange a reasonable plan of the campaign, in order to avenge the triumph of the English by a combination of all the French forces. Although the evacuation of Andalusia might seem to have broken the chain which held Marshal Soult enslaved to an exclusive object, and that henceforward his judgment should be free, it was, nevertheless, impossible to extract from him an intelligible opinion suited to the occasion. Whether from embarrassment or from caprice, he refused to explain himself clearly on the plan to be pursued, and merely allowed it to be seen that, far from joining his army to the others, he intended that others should join theirs to his, and follow the direction which he should choose to give. Marshal Suchet seemed to be regulated principally by the desire of preserving Valencia. Marshal Jourdan, from good sense and impartiality, kept a middle course. Joseph, anxious to be extricated from this chaos, and to have the sentiments of each, addressed himself first to Marshal Soult, to learn his decision. Marshal Soult replied by demanding his orders, for his opinion he could only express in writing. This method was adopted, and on the next day each of the marshals presented a memoir to the king on the method of repairing the disaster of Salamanca.

Marshal Soult proposed to annex to the army of Andalusia which he had brought, all that of the centre, a part of that of Aragon, and to march with that body of forces across La Mancha to the Tagus and Madrid. Marshal Suchet, in his memoirs, brought strong objections against this plan. Of 18,000 or 14,000 efficient troops at his disposal, with which he was to keep his ground against the army of Murcia, which was at Alicante, and that of the Anglo-Sicilians, which threatened a descent upon Tarragona, he could not appropriate less than 6000 to the defence of Valencia and the principal posts of San Felipe and Saguntum. There remained to him, therefore, no more than 8000 men to join to the general army intended to march upon Madrid, and every thing led to the belief that, when these 8000 men should have left, they would no longer be able to preserve Valencia. Thus, for so trifling a reinforcement, they would risk the loss of Valencia, of the resources of that rich country, the advantage of keeping at a distance from Catalonia and Aragon the armies of Murcia and Sicily, and lastly, the only secure communications with France. Moreover, the combined army, marching on the Tagus, should meet Lord Wellington and all his forces behind that river, and should prove un-

in another battle, they would find in a real cul-de-sac, with the Tagus against them in front, and the kingdom inclosed against them behind, a frightmost remediless condition. No doubt, he roads to Madrid and Valencia there intermediate one, equally terminating renees, which passed by the province of Guadalupe to join Calatayud and Saragossa, in order to get possession of it, it necessary to have forced the Tagus high as Madrid. Unless they reached there were no roads into Aragon but were exceedingly bad, impracticable to filled with banditti invincible in their arms, and no resource remained but to Valencia.

It was, therefore, necessary every thing to guard against the at capital, and even with the whole of a Marshal Suchet was not sure of saving himself there, for the Anglo-Sicilian was an unknown force which, according to report, was of considerable strength. To keep 14,000 men in opposition to that is to that of Catalonia was no exaggeration, especially if it was necessary to them in succession from San Felipe to a distance of one hundred leagues.

presented by Marshal Suchet was, wholly conceived in the idea of pre-empting the kingdom of Valencia. Valencia, to him, was a capital, a source of revenue, the border of the Mediterranean, near of the Pyrenees. By maintaining of the Peninsula, they were secure of communications, and they remained in the of the provinces most valued by Napoleon which they could always set out to acquire the others. He consequently proposed to carry the combined armies of Valencia and the centre into the province of Guadalupe, there to force the Tagus, then to these two armies, to bring that of the Tagus to Cuenca, whence, in time, it might be the army of Aragon on the frontier kingdom of Valencia, to establish that of Valencia in the province of Guadalupe, at Calatayud, the head at Madrid, and in constant communication with the army of Portugal by the province of Soria. In the rear, the four principal armies, those of the centre, of Andalusia, and of the south, supported by each other, and having their rears in their rear, being always able to meet together in shorter time than the old march upon any one of them, to possess security Valencia, Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, Saragossa, Burgos, and the other provinces in which, by good fortune, they might live in abundance, their positions ought never to be forced : communications with France inter-

dis plan, excellent in its ulterior arrangement, did not exempt from the necessity of evacuation common to all, that of returning to Madrid there to force the line of the How should they effect this delicate task, to which Lord Wellington might oppose obstacles, if he were to act as Bonaparte had formerly done in Italy?

the difficulty to be surmounted, and the solution of it Marshal Jourdan applied

his mind. The statement of his opinion, a rare model of accuracy of view, exactness of assertion, and wonderful prudence, met every question, and would have deserved that its proposer should have been allowed to execute his own ideas, or at least to be understood, respected, and obeyed by those to whom the execution should be assigned.

Before all things it was necessary, in his opinion, to ascend by the Upper Tagus to Madrid, in order to join the army of Portugal, and, with the three combined armies of Portugal, the centre, and Andalusia, to march upon the English at the head of 80,000 or 90,000 men and one hundred and fifty guns. No doubt, if they had truly incurred the risk of meeting Lord Wellington posted with all his forces on the Tagus, Marshal Jourdan said that, far from exposing themselves to such a danger before having joined the army of Portugal, he would have preferred to pass by Valencia, Teruel, and Calatayud, i.e. to return to Aragon by a great detour to the rear, then from Calatayud to pass to Aranda, where, without running any risk, they should find themselves united to the army of Portugal, and in a condition to oppose 80,000 or 90,000 men to the English, the army of Valencia having been left intact. But that route was long, and, though well supplied with provisions, would disclose a great amount of timidity on our part, which was not desirable. Accordingly, Marshal Jourdan did not propose to follow it, judging that the chance of meeting Lord Wellington concentrated on the Upper Tagus was not sufficiently imminent to induce him to take so long a detour. Probably, he said, they would find the British general with two or three divisions guarding Madrid, and with the rest fighting in Castile against General Clausel. They would then, without great difficulty, force the line of the Tagus, which at that part was not a serious obstacle, they would join the army of Portugal, having taken due care to apprize them of this movement, and would re-enter Madrid with a decisive superiority of forces. But as he might possibly be deceived, and as the Tagus might be better guarded than was supposed, it was necessary to be able to return upon Valencia, there to find again an asylum from their sufferings, and the nucleus of all their communications with France. In order to this, it was necessary not to deprive Marshal Suchet of one of his battalions. Marshal Jourdan, therefore, advised that he should not be at all weakened, and that they should confine themselves to the union of the armies of the centre and of the South, which would give an amount of about 50,000 men and one hundred well-supplied guns, and would be sufficient to force the passage of the Tagus. Marshal Soult professed that after deducting his sick and disabled, and the veterans that he must leave at Valencia, he should have no more than 37,000 or 38,000 men, of whom 6000 were good cavalry. Yet he had more. After the losses occasioned by the evacuation, by resuming from the army of the centre some detachments belonging to him, he could combine 45,000 or 46,000 men of all arms and of the most excellent quality.\* The

\* Marshal Soult at Almanza, even after having taken from the feeble army of the centre the 2000 men whom he had long demanded, stated his numbers at 33,000 infantry

army of the centre, when a little reorganized, would reckon 10,000 or 11,000 men, also of good quality. Marshal Jourdan proposed to march these 56,000 men in two columns, one formed of the army of Andalusia, by the road of La Mancha, which passes by Chinchilla, San Clemente, Ocana, and Aranjuez; the other, formed of the army of the centre, by the road of Cuenca, which passes by Requena, Cuenca, Fuenti-Duena, admitting of intercommunication during the movement, and abutting on the Tagus, at the point where it was wished to cross it. Only the marshal, considering the column on the right (the army of the centre) to be too weak, proposed to add to it 6000 or 7000 men of the army of Andalusia, which would raise the one to 16,000 or 17,000 men and reduce the other to 39,000 or 40,000. He proposed, further, to give a good commander to the army of the centre, viz., Count d'Erlon, to subordinate the two commanders to the king, who should march alternately with the two columns, and to take the road immediately towards the much-desired point of the Upper Tagus. In this plan, Marshal Suchet was to continue, as formerly, to draw from his own supplies what was necessary for the troops

and 6000 cavalry, which would have made a total of 39,000 men, or 37,000 before the addition of the 2000 taken from Joseph. Marshal Jourdan, not to dispute about numbers, having first to discuss the plan, ascribed in his memoir 39,000 or 40,000 men to Marshal Soult, and founded his reasoning on this estimate. But the study of the documents shows that this number could not be exact. Marshal Soult's force in April, 1812, was about 58,000 or 57,000 men, deducting the non-combatants. I do not speak from the assertions of the minister of war, who always assigns numbers larger than those mentioned by the generals, because the tendency of those who pay is to increase the numbers, and the tendency of those who employ them is to diminish them; I speak from the numbers furnished by the chief of the staff of the army of Andalusia, on the 1st April, 1812, after the loss of Badajoz and its garrison. But there had occurred no serious action from the month of April to the month of August, 1812, in Andalusia, and it would be too serious an accusation of the administration of Marshal Soult to assert that while doing nothing he had lost 21,000 men, since of 58,000 only 37,000 remained. The number 37,000 at Almanza is manifestly incorrect. The marshal must have suffered losses on the road, no doubt; but even if he had lost 5000 or 6000 men, which would imply a great disorder on the march, there would remain a loss of 15,000 men to be accounted for. The number of sick and wounded left in the hospitals must have been great; but these are included among the non-combatants, already deducted from our present estimate. That Marshal Soult, then, reckoned more than 37,000 men at Almanza is plain from common sense. But the truth is a related plain by certain pieces not found in the memoirs of King Joseph. Marshal Suchet, in the memoirs presented to Joseph at the same time as those of Marshal Jourdan and Soult, discusses the strength of each corps according to the statements rendered; and Marshal Suchet, who was required to supply provisions, ought to know that strength better than Marshal Jourdan, who accepted on trust the numbers assigned during the discussion. But we see in this memoir that, with the 2000 men taken from the army of the centre, Marshal Soult had 45,000 men at his disposal at Almanza, which brings his number to 43,000, which is more probable. And to understand this estimate still better, which leaves a deficiency of 14,000 men from the estimate of April to be accounted for, it should be known that in the army of Andalusia there was a great number of engineers and heavy artillerymen, employed at the siege of Cadiz, who could not serve in the line and who were left at Valencia with the sick and wounded, and also that there were veterans ill adapted to a long march. But, even with this deduction, it is difficult to account for a deficiency of 4,000 men, and it must be supposed that during the evacuation, and under the influence of the heat, many men were lost even without being pursued. The smallest number, then, that can be assigned to the army of Andalusia is 45,000 or 46,000. We shall add that the accuracy of this estimate is rendered still more probable by the losses which were some time afterwards at Madrid, and at the second encounter at Salamanca. We have, therefore, admitted it,—after much examination, as usual.

about to enter on their march, and to keep at Valencia their encumbrances, that is to say, the wounded, fatigued, and sick, a service which he was ready to render with the utmost eagerness.

These views were so prudent and so appropriate that Joseph adopted them at once, both from conviction and from habitual confidence in the opinion of Marshal Jourdan. He ordered Marshal Soult to prepare to march from Almanza, where he was encamped, to Chinchilla, San Clemente, and Aranjuez, while the army of the centre, leaving La Huerta de Valencia by the defile of Las Cabrillas, should pass by Cuenca and reach the Tagus at Fuenti-Duena, sufficiently near Aranjuez to be supported by the army of Andalusia. He also ordered Marshal Soult to give up to the army of the centre General d'Erlon with 6000 men, and gave him intimation that Marshal Suchet would place at his disposal the necessary supplies in rice, biscuit, and brandy.

These measures greatly displeased Marshal Soult, for he thus came again under the immediate orders of the king and lost part of his forces. He accordingly advanced new objections, saying that Joseph had no right to deprive him of troops intrusted to him by the Emperor. But, Joseph at length assuming the tone of a master, and having signified to him the alternative of immediate obedience or resignation of his command into the hands of Count d'Erlon, he submitted, and, after requesting six days, occupied twelve in putting himself in motion, which was perhaps excusable, as he was obliged to collect all his *corps d'armée*, and to make the separation between those who were to remain at Valencia and those who were to march against the enemy.

They left, therefore, between the 18th and 20th of October, well provided with ammunition and food, in two columns, amounting to 56,000 men, leaving to Marshal Suchet all the encumbrances remaining from the evacuation of Madrid and Seville, all that was unfit for active service. They had no anxiety in leaving these precious deposits at Valencia, for they knew that they would be there in safety and beyond the reach of want. Marshal Suchet retained the whole of his army; and, that he might be able to communicate at any time with the king's troops by the shortest road, he set men to work upon the portion comprised between Banos and Requena. The army of the centre passed over it with their artillery.

The two columns thus advanced upon the Tagus at an equal parallel without meeting any serious obstacle. That of the centre, under Count d'Erlon, had to do with the bands of Villa-Campa, l'Empecinado, and Duraa, which had hastened to Madrid, and were obstructing all the region of the Upper Tagus, i.e. the two provinces of Guadalaxara and Cuenca. But they had no trouble in scattering them, the army of the centre having been prudently raised to about 16,000 men. The army of Andalusia had no difficulty to surmount the fortress of Chinchilla having opened its gates, and they reached the banks of the Tagus about the 27th or 28th of October, between Fuenti-Duena and Aranjuez, with the ability to concentrate themselves on either of these points.

The important question was to know whether



they should meet Lord Wellington before Madrid, resolved to defend his conquest,—which was possible, for his entry into Madrid had produced a lively sensation in Europe, and it was natural that he should not wish to leave it. This question well deserved the attention of Joseph and his major-general Jourdan, but happily all the intelligence they received was of an encouraging nature. The rumours received led to the belief that they had before them only General Hill with two or three divisions. The following statement will show what had taken place between the English and the army of Portugal since the journey of Joseph to Valencia and his junction with the army of Andalusia.

Lord Wellington had entered Madrid on the 12th of August, surrounded by all the Spanish chiefs, anxious to share his triumph. When we think of the situation in which they had so long been, having in the Peninsula only Carthage, Cadiz, and Lisbon, and being obliged to use their utmost efforts to avoid being driven into the sea, we can understand their delirium of joy and surprise. To the fatal Russian enterprise, the negligence of Napoleon with respect to the war in Spain, the want of authority in Joseph, and the fatal divisions among our generals, the Spaniards, and especially the British general, owed this unexpected success. At first much elated with his triumph, Lord Wellington soon found himself embarrassed by his auxiliaries, by their indiscreet or barbarous conduct, and had himself added to their errors by the ostentation with which he exercised his authority. It should have been his first care to restore confidence to the inhabitants of Madrid, many of whom had become accustomed and almost reconciled to the dominion of Joseph, to consider the past irrevocable, to forget some things, to tolerate and even to sanction some others. Don Carlos d'España and l'Empecinado became in a manner the masters of Madrid. They began by administering an oath of adherence to the Constitution of Cadiz, which had just been completed. Nothing was more natural, though that Constitution, combining generous principles and chimerical arrangements, was distasteful to a considerable part of the Spanish nation, little prepared for such institutions. But, in reality, it was not to the Constitution that Don Carlos and l'Empecinado wished to bind the Spaniards, but to the authority of the insurrectional Government of Cadiz. That being done, some account was to be given of the afrancesados, among whom were some distinguished persons, many functionaries, and several thousands of excellent soldiers. While Don Miguel de Alava, an officer of the Spanish army, frequently employed by Lord Wellington, a man of a truly noble heart,\* was uttering at the Hotel de Ville in Madrid an address equally humane and skilful, Don Carlos d'España and l'Empecinado were employing senseless language, calculated to reconcile no one, but, on the contrary, to wound every reasonable man. Joseph had caused some beautiful money to be coined with his own image, much more beautiful than the Spanish money, and quite as pure, being exactly similar in form and title to the French coin. Instead

of following the custom of all Governments, even the less liberal, which transmit the coinage of one to the other without effacing the image it may bear, they withdrew from circulation and imposed a loss upon the money bearing the likeness of Joseph. Then, instead of diligently bringing provisions to Madrid, in order to put a stop to the excessive dearness of bread, they lost time in gratifying the revenge of party spirit in a manner equally foolish and dangerous. The want was also extreme, as at the time when the arrival of provisions was intercepted by banditti. Finally, to these extravagances, which may appear very natural when we recall the character and education of the conquerors, Lord Wellington added the faults which spring from British pride. He had taken up his abode in the royal palace, which wounded the pride of the Spanish nation; and in taking the Retiro, which Colonel Lafond had surrendered from the want of drinkable water, he had destroyed an establishment on which the Spaniards set much value, the China manufactory, corresponding to the Sèvres manufactory in France and that of Meissen in Saxony. It was certainly not worth while to spend twenty days in errors and frivolity!

While Lord Wellington was behaving in this manner, General Clausel had rallied, reorganized, and reanimated the army of Portugal, and, though reduced to 25,000 men, had boldly brought it to the Douro, in presence of the English army, whose main body was posted on the banks of that river. He had everywhere driven back the advanced posts of the enemy, and had taken time to send General Foy with a division to collect the garrisons of Astorga, Benavente, Zamora, and Toro, scattered unprofitably over a line which they could no longer defend. General Foy had been too late to relieve the garrison of Astorga, which had been forced to surrender the day before to the Spanish army of Galicia, but he had saved the sick and wounded belonging to it, had collected the other small posts on the Douro and the Esla, and had then rejoined General Clausel.

Lord Wellington, seeing himself thus defied, had been obliged to leave Madrid, and to seek the young adversary who, with the wrecks of a beaten army, so haughtily placed himself before him. After having established General Hill at Madrid, he had set off for Old Castile, and, taking up the army of Galicia in the way, had marched upon Burgos with 50,000 men.

Constrained to make a new retrograde movement, General Clausel had left the banks of the Douro, had fallen back in succession upon Valladolid, Burgos, and Briviesca, and at length had halted at the Ebro. Before pursuing him farther, Lord Wellington, having entered Burgos, wished to take the castle which commanded that town, and without which the possession of the town was of little avail. He began the siege towards the end of September, nearly at the same time that Joseph was preparing to march upon Madrid.

The castle of Burgos was an old building dating from the dominion of the Moors, crowning a height at the foot of which is built the city of Burgos. Around this ancient encinte of Gothic walls had been formed two lines of intrenchments palisaded and fraised, which were armed with a powerful artillery. To this

\* Subsequently ambassador at Paris, after the death of Ferdinand VII. and during the regency of Queen Christina.

was added a horn-work on a height called St. Michel's, which commanded the position of the castle. General Dubreton occupied this temporary fortress with 2000 men. He was well supplied with ammunition and provision, and resolved on making a good defence.

Lord Wellington, scorning to attack such a fort *en règle*, and thinking that his soldiers, after having taken Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz by assault, would not fail before the imperfect fortification of the Castle of Burgos, assailed the horn-work of St. Michel. His troops boldly attacked the work in the night, between the 19th and 20th of September, but were checked at the foot of the intrenchment by the fire of a battalion of the 34th regiment of the line. Unfortunately, an English column, having in the dark crept round the enceinte of the work, took advantage of the entrance not being perfectly palisaded, and made their way in. The soldiers of the 34th then regained the fort over the bodies of the victorious column. Of the English more than 400 men were killed or wounded, while we had not lost 150.

Masters of the position of St. Michel, the English endeavoured to construct a battery to ruin the defences of the castle and to make the point of departure for their approaches. The vigorous resistance of the horn-work had taught them that this wretched fort could not be taken at a stroke. After having established a battery at St. Michel, they began to fire upon the castle, but their artillery, of small calibre, was speedily silenced by ours. The difficulty of transport had not allowed them to bring heavy cannon to the walls of Burgos, and they had only some sixteen-pounders, which the guerillas of the Alava and Biscay had received from the English squadron, and with difficulty drawn to Burgos.

Lord Wellington, perceiving it to be nearly impossible to open the breach by means of cannon, had again recourse to the assault during the night of the 22d and 23d of September. His columns, having applied the ladders to the first enceinte, were overthrown, and lost many men without any advantage. One of them, consisting of Portuguese, was partly destroyed by musketry before they had placed their foot on the enceinte.

It was necessary once more to have recourse to regular approaches, and, in defect of artillery, to employ the mine. Two small mines being ready, they set fire to the first on the night of September 29 and 30, and, immediately after the explosion, a column rushed to the assault, but it was repulsed as the others had been. On the 4th of October the second mine was ignited. The result of this was a large breach, while that occasioned by the explosion of the 29th had been enlarged by the artillery. The besiegers threw themselves upon the two breaches with fury, and carried them; but the garrison poured down upon them in turn, and repulsed one of the columns, without being able to prevent the other making a lodgment on one of the breaches. The English, having thus established themselves in the first enceinte, began their approaches towards the second, in the hope of gaining possession of it. But, on the 8th, the garrison effected a general sortie, threw down their works, drove them back beyond the first enceinte, and thus reduced them to the position they held at the beginning

of the siege. The garrison immediately repaired the breach by an intrenchment constructed in the rear, and resumed possession of all they had lost, excepting the horn-work of St. Michel. In this manner had twenty days and 2500 men been lost under the eyes of Lord Wellington, without having advanced a step. The English general, in vexation, was anxious to make a final effort, and, in anticipation, to use all imaginable means to open the first enceinte, which he had taken for a moment. He had received some artillery. He endeavoured to make a breach in one extremity, and to undermine the other near a church called St. Roman's.

Every thing being ready on the night of October 10, the besiegers set fire to the mine at St. Roman's,—a point at which the French did not expect to be attacked,—and immediately the English, Spanish, and Portuguese rushed upon the first enceinte, carrying ladders. Again they succeeded in capturing it, and rushed forward towards the second. But the brave garrison, sallying forth *en masse* from their covered way, received them with the bayonet, charged them with impetuosity, killed a great number, and, for the third time, threw them back beyond the enceinte they had conquered for a moment. The same occurred at the other extremity. The besieged closed the breach effected by the mine near St. Roman's Church, even threw down the church, which might prove useful to the enemy, and again presented a formidable front to the besiegers.

For more than thirty days had 2000 men, reduced by fire and fatigue to 1500, intrenched behind some works scarcely even strengthened by mason-work, and protected merely by a range of palisades, checked the course of 50,000 men by their heroic resistance. Eternal honour to those brave men, and to their commander, General Dubreton! They proved the value of well-defended fortresses in some cases; for, by resisting, they allowed time for the army of Portugal to reform itself in line, to the armies of the centre and of Andalusia to reach the Tagus, and to all to unite for the destruction of Lord Wellington.

In fact, General Clausel, who had regained the Ebro, had received from the dépôts established along the Pyrenees, as well as from the small garrisons of the frontier, about 10,000 recruits, and horses for his artillery and cavalry, which gave him about 35,000 combatants. General Caffarelli, whom we have seen neglect the principal danger for the secondary, alarmed by the bugbear of the English fleet, as Marshal Soult had been by that of General Hill, at length corrected his error, and contributed to the army of Portugal 10,000 men, who, if they had been sent prior to the battle of Salamanca, would have prevented many disasters. Unfortunately, General Clausel, at the moment of taking the head of these 45,000 combatants, had suffered so much from his recent wound as to be forced to leave the army. His place was supplied by General Souham, an old officer of the Republic, experienced and valiant, who now came to the aid of the intrepid garrison which for thirty-four days had defended the miserable fortifications of Burgos.

Lord Wellington, placed between the army of Portugal, which was advancing northward,

and the armies of the centre and of Andalusia, which were advancing southwards, was in one of those difficult but exciting situations from which General Bonaparte had extricated himself in former times by means of unparalleled triumphs. With less circumspection and greater activity, he would have been able, by concentrating his forces with the promptitude and exactness of the former general of the army of Italy, to render himself in turn stronger than either of the two armies which threatened him: to beat that of Portugal, then to fall upon Joseph's, overwhelm them successively, and remain finally master of Spain. But every one has his own peculiar genius; and it is childish to demand of one man what belongs to another. Lord Wellington, prudent and firm, but slow, with soldiers whom it was difficult to move rapidly or to rouse to enthusiasm, was not fitted to conquer Spain in one campaign, though destined to do so in several. This was enough to insure the triumph of the policy of his country and the misfortune of ours.

Seeing the army of Portugal approach, reinforced, he abandoned, in vexation, the walls of Burgos, which had cost him 8000 men and the prestige of victory, and which threatened to cost him Madrid. He maintained several combats with his rear-guard, in which General Maucune, who had so rashly begun the battle of Salamanca, killed many of his men, and after, in his turn, protecting himself behind the Douro, he sent orders to General Hill to join him at Salamanca if Madrid should appear no longer tenable in the presence of the approaching armies.

Such were the events which Joseph and Marshal Jourdan learned on their arrival at the Tagus. The wise foresight of Marshal Jourdan was thus justified, and Madrid was again to be open to the new king. On the 30th of October, the armies of the centre and of Andalusia forced that line of the Tagus on which they had feared to find 70,000 Spaniards, Portuguese, and English combined: they cut through the rear-guard of General Hill, and entered the capital of Spain November 2, astonished at the vicissitudes of fortune. Joseph was well received; for, after what they had seen, the inhabitants of Madrid, offended at the pride of the English and disgusted by the violence of the guerillas, began to think that this new dynasty, under a mild and prudent prince, was as profitable to them as degenerate Bourbons under guerilla chiefs. Joseph, exhibiting at this moment unwonted activity, after having remained forty-eight hours in Madrid, left it on the 4th to join the army of Portugal and to pursue Lord Wellington at the head of 80,000 men. What results might not be expected in revenge of Salamanca from such a combination of armies?

Joseph, with reason, reckoned on great results, and hoped that a battle with the forces at his disposal would send the English back to Portugal, and re-establish him, notwithstanding the evacuation of Andalusia, in the full possession of his former position. No doubt they began to experience some anxiety on the subject of the Russian expedition and the silence of the *Moniteur*, which contained no further bulletins of the grand army; but they were far from imagining the full extent of our disasters,

and, at the worst, merely augured difficulties such as followed the battle of Eylau, and which the battle of Friedland had triumphantly overcome. Joseph, therefore, expected no bad news from Paris, and hoped to find compensation for the misfortunes of Salamanca in the environs of Salamanca itself.

Arriving on the 6th of November beyond the Guadarrama with his faithful major-general, whose opinion had been so useful to him, he might have inclined to the left towards Penarranda, which would have put him on the track of Lord Wellington, but he preferred to incline to the right towards Arevalo, in order to rally to himself the army of Portugal and attack the English with the whole of his forces.

That which he desired was not long in being accomplished, for Lord Wellington, hastening to retire upon Salamanca, never attempted to prevent the junction of the armies of the North and South. In a short time the advanced guards met in the environs of the Douro, and the union of the three armies of Andalusia, of the centre, and of Portugal placed under Joseph's command 90,000 men and about one hundred and fifty guns, well horsed. This force would have been still more considerable if General Caffarelli had not hastily recalled the 10,000 men whom he had lent for a few days, to continue his struggles against the bands of Mina, Longa, Merino and Porlier. The army of Portugal, which had 35,000 men of its own, had lost some in the pursuit of Lord Wellington; the armies of the centre and of Andalusia, which, on leaving Valencia, reckoned about 50,000 men, had left some on the road and furnished a detachment for the garrison of Madrid; but all combined amounted to 85,000 combatants of the finest troops in the world, irritated at the success of the English, and exulting at the prospect of avenging it.

The ardour of their minds appeared in their countenances, and generals and soldiers vied with each other in zeal for revenge. Lord Wellington, separated from the Spanish army of Galicia, but reinforced by Hill's corps, had not, after the losses of the campaign, more than 60,000 men, of whom 40,000 were English, much less elated than the day after the victory of the Arapiles. But could they keep ground against 85,000 French, tolerably well commanded? No one thought so; and themselves no more than we.

Our three armies advanced upon the Tormes exactly by the same road by which Marshal Marmont had marched to the defeat at the Arapiles. They marched so as to turn the position of Salamanca, and to take vengeance on Lord Wellington by placing themselves on his line of communications. On the 11th of November, they formed themselves in line at some distance from the Tormes, the army of Andalusia to the left, that of the centre in the centre, that of Portugal to the right. Marshal Jourdan, in company with Joseph, went to the bank of the Tormes and saw Lord Wellington at the Arapiles, calmly awaiting the French, because, being confident in a position which he had already tried, and his retreat towards Ciudad-Rodrigo being always secure, he considered that he could always fall back in time. But he had committed an error which might have cost him dear, and which the *coup-d'œil*

of Marshal Jourdan—acute rather from practice than from nature—quickly detected.

The Tormès—which, though tolerably wide in winter, was still fordable in some parts—flowed before us across the little town of Alba de Tormès, situated to our left, and, after describing a semicircle, took its course to the right, towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington, not sufficiently anxious to put himself beyond the reach of our attempts, had left General Hill at Alba de Tormès, and occupied Salamanca with the main body of his army. Between the two was the position of Calvarossa de Ariba, which he had occupied with only a feeble detachment. General Hill's corps was three leagues distant from that of Lord Wellington, and the idea naturally suggested itself to place himself between the two, and to cut off, at least, the 15,000 men under General Hill.

The only difficulty was to know whether it would be possible quickly to cross the Tormès and to deploy on the other side before Lord Wellington should be able to recall his jeopardized right wing. The reconnoissances that had been effected removed all doubt. The Tormès, between Alba and Salamanca, was almost everywhere fordable. Beyond it, towards Calvarossa de Ariba, was a vast plain, which rose with a gradual slope towards Calvarossa, on which were situated the Arapiles. By sending forward all the cavalry,—amounting to more than 12,000 men in the three armies,—who would have covered the passage by deploying, our infantry-columns would have crossed the fords, invaded the plain, reached Calvarossa, and then, falling back upon Alba de Tormès, would infallibly have turned and surrounded General Hill. This plan, proposed on the spot to Joseph before all the generals, was universally regarded by them as incapable of failure, and they demanded its instant execution before the English could rectify their position. But Marshal Soult was not of this opinion. "It is not right," he said, "to attack the English in front;" which was true when they had taken up their position for battle, but which was not the case here, since the design was to surprise them in the march and cut off one of their corps which should be left in isolation. He thought it would be better to cross the Tormès above Alba, then to turn the position of Salamanca, and thus oblige the English to decamp. It was replied that this was precisely what was to be avoided; for, by ascending the Tormès to the left to cross it above Alba, they would compel General Hill to quit Alba, to fall back upon Calvarossa de Ariba, and then upon Salamanca; that they would thus do the English the favour of showing them their error and of bringing them all together around Salamanca; that if, in coming upon their line of communications with 85,000 men, they should oblige them to decamp, the result of this successful but costly concentration of forces would be very inconsiderable. Instead of a triumph, which they greatly needed, they should afford Lord Wellington the glory of safely extricating himself from one of the most difficult positions in which a general was ever placed.

The too modest Marshal Jourdan, who was not habitually positive,—for he perceived the truth, but adhered to his opinion with the feebleness of a dispirited man,—was on this occa-

sion unusually energetic, and affirmed that he was willing to assume the responsibility, and undertook to compromise neither the army nor his own glory. All the generals present, Souham, D'Erlon, and others, shared his opinion, and supported it both by their looks and their words. But, from regard to the position and grade of Marshal Soult, the decision of the question was postponed until a fresh reconnoissance should have been made of the upper course of the Tormès.

On the following day, Marshal Soult again brought forward his plan of passing the Tormès to the left, above Alba, where it had also been found to be fordable, and he forcibly urged his opinion. Joseph consulted Marshal Jourdan, who, with a condescension arising from his age and character, advised him to yield. To execute the plan which he had suggested against the will of the commander of the principal army appeared to him very dangerous, and though the English had not yet rectified their position, and the decisive blow might still be struck, and the temptation to attempt it was very strong, yet the least hazardous procedure seemed to be to comply with Marshal Soult. Thus was displayed by Joseph and Jourdan that fatal indecision which is often as fatal in accurate minds as obstinacy is in the erroneous, and which, after the negligence of Napoleon, and the detestable sentiments of certain commanders, was the principal cause of our reverses in Spain.

In order to devolve the whole responsibility on Marshal Soult, and to oblige him at least to use his utmost efforts in the execution of his own idea, the army of the centre was placed under his orders, and that of Portugal was assigned to Count D'Erlon. On the 13th, they crossed the Tormès above Alba, and advanced as far as Nuestra Señora de Retiro. The English with difficulty left Alba, and had even left a detachment in that city. They were seen to retire to the Arapiles, and there to muster. But it remained for them to decamp in the presence of 85,000 Frenchmen, and it was still possible to cut off a portion of their long column.

Marshal Soult had already under his command 50,000 men, in particular, all the cavalry, and from the following morning he might begin to advance. They urged the army of Portugal, whom the necessity of occupying Alba obliged to defer to the left in order to ascend the Tormès, to hasten their movement. On the next day, the 14th, the weather was very bad, and Fortune, disgusted with men who knew so little how to profit by her favours, seemed unwilling to second their efforts. Scarcely could they see the enemy before them. Yet through the fog they could perceive the English defiling from our right to left, in order to quit Salamanca and take the way for Ciudad-Rodrigo. Several explosions heard in the direction of Salamanca, by showing the voluntary destruction of part of the munitions of the enemy, sufficed to indicate a retreat already commenced. Joseph and Jourdan insisted, at least, on pouring down upon the English army with the cavalry, in order to cut off a portion. Marshal Soult, circumspect in the highest degree, alleging the darkness of the weather, wished, before advancing, to be joined by the whole army of Portugal, and would not even give his cavalry, and when the 85,000

Frenchmen were collected the English were out of reach, in full retreat upon the road to Ciudad-Rodrigo.

The confusion and irritation in the three armies were extreme. The state of the atmosphere, the slowness of the army of Portugal, which, forced to ascend above Alba, could not arrive more quickly, were the reasons assigned in excuse for this deplorable failure. They followed the English for a day or two, and, as the result of this formidable concentration of forces, they had about 3000 prisoners collected on the roads in the rear of the enemy, constrained to march with unusual celerity.

Joseph re-entered Madrid, and placed his three armies in cantonments,—the army of Portugal in Castile, that of the centre in the environs of Madrid, that of Andalusia on the Tagus, between Aranjuez and Talavera.

Such was the sad campaign of 1812 in Spain, which, after beginning with the loss of the fortresses of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, imprudently left unprotected, sometimes in order to take Valencia, sometimes to forward part of our troops to Russia, was for a moment interrupted, then resumed, and was signalized by the loss of the battle of Salamanca, due to the absence of Napoleon, to the insufficient authority of Joseph, to the want of co-operation among certain generals, to the slowness of Jourdan, and the temerity of Marmont; a campaign which ended in the departure from Madrid, the evacuation of Andalusia, in a combination of forces which, though tardy, might have avenged the easy success of Lord Wellington, if the condescension of Joseph and Jourdan, who discerned the right path but dared not to enforce its adoption, had not occasioned a last disgrace, that of seeing an army of 40,000 English escape from 85,000 French placed on their line of communication. Thus, in the year 1812, the English had taken from us the two important strongholds of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, had gained one decisive battle and for a moment deprived us of Madrid, had compelled us to evacuate Andalusia, had defied us as far as Burgos, and, by returning safe and sound from so bold a point, had exposed all the weakness of our situation in Spain, a weakness due to several deplorable causes, but all resolving themselves in one, the negligence of Napoleon, who, great as he was, did not possess the attribute of ubiquity, and, while unable to command rightly from Paris, was still less able to do so from Moscow; who, deciding at length to consign his authority to his brother, did not consign it entirely, from want of confidence, from prejudice, from some unaccountable whim! To wish to undertake every thing at once and be

everywhere at the same time, and then to divest the mind of duties it had been forced to neglect, such was the melancholy secret of this fatal war in Spain! After the crime that led to its committal, we can think of nothing worse than the negligence which caused its protracted continuance.

So many events occurring simultaneously, disastrous in the North, vexatious, at least, in the South, could not fail to produce a powerful emotion throughout Europe. What surprise and delight appeared among our numerous enemies! England, who, forgetting that her army had left Madrid, thought only of the honour of having entered it; who, after having restored Seville to the government of Cadiz, flattered herself that she had almost delivered the Peninsula from its invaders; who, after having much encouraged the resistance of the Emperor Alexander without being very sanguine of the result, was utterly astonished to learn that we had returned vanquished to the Niemen, and gave herself up to a delirious joy. Notwithstanding all the credulity of hatred, she scarcely dared to credit the news diffused through Europe, and, while publishing our misfortunes by the hundred voices of her journals, she scarcely believed even her own reports. Germany, stupefied at the sight she beheld, began to think that we were conquered, dared not believe that we were destroyed, allowed herself to hope it, as she saw defiling in succession our wandering, frozen, famished soldiers, expected always to see the skeleton of the grand army, and, not seeing it, began to think that there was truth in the declaration of Russian pride, that even that skeleton existed no more! Every day during that sad December, Germany felt hope arise within her, and with hope, courage, with courage, furious rage. All the secret societies formed within her bosom were in a state of excitement, and were preparing for a general revolution. But she still hesitated between hope and fear; she dared not surrender herself to the impetus of her passions, and awaited the turn of events with ardent curiosity. While the minds of men were thus agitated, Napoleon was clandestinely on his way to Paris, where he was to be received with the guilty joy of certain opponents of his government, the dejection of his flatterers, the astonishment and grief of ordinary men, the grief but not the astonishment of enlightened men. And yet our conquerors in the exultation of their pride, our enemies in the vehemence of their hatred, the citizens in the depth of their distress, fell far short of imagining the full extent of the evil. But this was, alas! soon to be revealed.

## BOOK XLVII.

## THE COHORTS.

RAPID journey of Napoleon—Sudden arrival at Paris, December 18—His reception of the Ministers and Deputies of the Senate and Council—The Malet Conspiracy—Plans for the regency of Maria Louisa—Projects for the levy of new troops—Arrival of Alexander at Wilna—Defection of General D'York—Marshal MacDonald—Evacuation of Königsberg—Murat retires to Posen, and leaves the command to Prince Eugene—Immense popularity of Alexander—Perplexities of the King of Prussia—Situation of the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich—Formation of cohorts—Discussions on Peace—Mediation of Austria—State of public opinion in France—Reorganization of the old army—Financial measures—Transactions with the Pope—Concordat of Fontainebleau—Progress of events in Germany—Insurrection of Hamburg—Views of Austria—Maria Louisa invested with the title of Regent—Departure of Napoleon for the army.

WHILST Europe, agitated at once by hope, by fear, and by hatred, was inquiring what had become of Napoleon, whether he had perished or had been saved, he was crossing in a sledge—accompanied by the Duke of Vicenza, the Grand Marshal Duroc, Count Lobau, General Lefevre-Desnouettes and the Mameluke Rustan—the vast plains of Lithuania, of Poland, and of Saxony, concealed by thick furs, for if his name had been imprudently uttered, or his countenance recognised, a tragical catastrophe would have instantly ensued. The man who had so greatly excited the admiration of nations, who was the object of their superstitious superstition, would not at that moment have escaped their fury. In two places only did he allow himself to be known, Warsaw and Dresden. At Warsaw, it was necessary to address a word to the Poles, in order to prevail upon them to make one last effort. The Duke of Vicenza repaired in his travelling-costume to the Archbishop of Malines, who was much moved by the news from Krasnoe and the Beresina, and little capable of restoring to the Poles the courage which he had lost himself. He almost forced the door of the archbishop, unwilling to be recognised by his servants, and appeared before him like an apparition, and filled him with surprise when he named himself and his companion, and conducted him to the modest hotel at which Napoleon had secretly alighted. M. de Pradt hastened to Napoleon, whom he found in a miserable retreat, where he could scarcely procure a fire, concealing the bitter suffering of his pride under an assumed gayety. What a difference between this moment and the time when, six months before, he so coolly dictated the most extraordinary instructions on the reconstitution of Poland and the rearrangement of Europe! Napoleon, finding in the strength of his will the means of surmounting his situation, affected to be neither moved, surprised, nor changed by it. "From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step," said he to the ambassador, with a forced smile, which proved the excess of his embarrassment by his attempt to conceal it, but also the vigour of his character; and he added, "Who has not experienced reverses? certainly none similar to mine, but these were of necessity proportioned to my fortune, and, moreover, they shall soon be repaired." He then boasted of his health, his personal strength, and began to repeat that he was made for extraordinary ad-

ventures; that he was in his element when the world was in confusion; that he could live in such circumstances, but that he was also able to restore order; that he would soon be again at the Vistula with 800,000 men, and would make the Russians pay for the success which they owed to nature, not to themselves. In all this it was easy to see that, though he suffered, the elasticity of his prodigious intelligence was neither destroyed nor weakened. He summoned the principal Polish ministers; urged the profoundest silence on the subject of his presence at Warsaw; endeavoured to raise their fallen courage; promised them not to abandon Poland; to reappear in a short time in the midst of her at the head of a powerful army; assured them that the Russians had suffered more than himself; that they could not repair their losses, while he could repair his in the twinkling of an eye, and that the fundamental proportion between the power of France and that of Russia would appear in three months, so as to restore all things to their proper place. After having endeavoured to restore some degree of confidence to the Polish ministers, he left, still unrecognised, travelled over the snow to Dresden, where he alighted at the house of his minister, M. de Serra, summoned the poor King of Saxony, terrified at this sudden change of fortune, assured him that he must not be alarmed at recent events, which merely presented one of the ever-shifting scenes of war, that in a few weeks he would return more formidable than ever, and would preserve to him that Poland, the old and cherished chimera of the Saxon princes, and left, with confidence almost restored, that crowned simpleton, accustomed to believe Napoleon but not to understand him. He enjoined secrecy, which he required still for forty-eight hours; seized a few moments to write to his father-in-law, announcing to him that he was returning safe and sound, full of health, serenity, and confidence; that things remained as stated in the 29th bulletin; that he was about to bring to the Vistula a formidable army; that he always reckoned upon the alliance of Austria, upon the speedy recruiting of the Austrian corps; and that he wished him to send to him at Paris a diplomatist of importance, (the ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg, being required in Galicia,) for he had to treat of great affairs. After having thus endeavoured to produce upon his father-in-law, by writing, the same impres-

sion which he sought to make by words upon those whom he met, he set off for Weimar. The sledge being no longer adapted to the places he was to traverse, he borrowed the carriage of his minister M. de St. Aignan, and went by posts to Paris. Having reached the Rhine, there was no further need of concealment, for though he might be an absolute, exacting, and even tyrannical sovereign to France, he was also her general, her defender, and he might exhibit himself to her without danger. That he might not occasion too great surprise, he caused himself to be preceded by an officer with a few lines for the *Moniteur*, saying that on December 5 he had assembled his generals at Smorgoni, had delegated the command to King Murat only so long as military operations were interrupted by the cold, that he had traversed Warsaw and Dresden, and that he was about to arrive in Paris to take in hand the affairs of the Empire.

This report was indispensably necessary, for while the celebrated 29th bulletin revealed a part of the truth, it was soon to receive a cruel comment in the private correspondence of the officers, and it was necessary to guard against this by the appearance of Napoleon at Paris, which was the only means of maintaining the minds of men in their ordinary state of calmness, submission, and sincere or affected devotion.

Napoleon followed close on the steps of the officer who was to announce his arrival. On December 18, at half-past 11 p.m., he entered the Tuileries, and took his wife by surprise, in so degree cooled towards him by this change of situation, but profoundly astonished, for in smiling herself to him she had supposed that she was marrying not only the favourite of Fortune, but, as it were, Fortune itself, who dispensed all worldly blessings with an inexhaustible hand. Napoleon tenderly embraced Maria-Louise, kept up the same farce with her as with others, repeating that the cold alone was the cause of this surprising disaster, which, it would be soon seen, could be easily rectified. He thus encouraged her as well as he could, without revealing even to her the agonies of his mortified pride.

On the next morning, the 19th, he received the ministers and grandees of the court. It was a great trial to hold the first interview with these submissive ministers, whom he had so disdainfully treated from the height of unexampled prosperity; but a resource had been afforded him by a melancholy chance, which the greater part of them had the baseness to allow him freely to employ, viz., the conspiracy of General Malet. They had been singularly taken unawares by that bold conspirator, so that several high-functionaries had allowed themselves to be thrown into prison, particularly the intelligent and intrepid minister of police, Rovigo; then they had denounced each other, and had shot a dozen unfortunate men when only one was guilty, without being very sure of having in this manner secured the indulgence of their absent master. Accordingly, they were uneasy at the reception they might meet, regarded with a mixture of compassion and contempt the unfortunate minister of police, who was esteemed the most guilty and the most censured of all, and scarcely giving a thought

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to the 500,000 men who had perished, and to the altered fortune of France, they were occupied only with the treatment they should themselves experience, so that Napoleon, who ought to have been called upon to render such deplorable accounts, presented himself as if he had merely to receive the accounts of others. This subserviency, expressed in almost every face, was of great assistance to him. He received the members of his court and government with extreme hauteur, maintaining a tranquil but severe aspect, appearing to expect explanations instead of affording them himself, treating foreign affairs as of minor consequence, and those of a domestic nature as of principal import, demanding some light upon these last,—in short, questioning others in order to avoid being questioned himself. "No doubt," he said, addressing sometimes one and sometimes another, "there had been evil, great evil, in this campaign: the French army had suffered, but not more than the Russian army." These were the ordinary chances of war, at which they ought not to be astonished, and they gave occasion to men of high temper to show the energy of their soul. In this view he ranged mankind into two classes, those who were equal to ordinary trials, and those who were above all trials, whatever they might be; professed to esteem the last only; poured forth a well-merited eulogium on Marshal Ney, in such a manner, however, that there seemed to be nothing to say in regard to the war, nothing in regard to himself, nothing in regard to any except those who had not the courage and health of Marshal Ney. Then, passing by the Russian expedition as a matter of secondary consequence, he demanded how they could allow themselves to be so easily surprised; how, if they believed him to be dead, they had not rallied round the Emperor and the King of Rome, the lawful sovereigns after himself; and how they could so readily suppose the present order of things to be abolished.

To these questions, reasonable but imprudent, for it is true that every one thought his death a very probable occurrence, and the fall of his throne its most natural consequence, none knew how to reply, and all seemed to acknowledge that there was something that needed explanation. No one dared to give him the true answer, that his empire was really without foundation, that by great prudence he might, indeed, give it the appearance of stability, which new dynasties seldom possess, but that his present conduct led men to believe that it might last during his life, but that even that was doubtful; that it was not astonishing that a bold man asserting him to have been killed by a bullet, and declaring his government at an end, should have everywhere met with men ready to believe and to obey. This is what might have been said to him, but which was not said, because none dared to do so, and because none fully understood it. But Napoleon, by urging the matter and keeping the minds of men too long fixed upon it, committed an error, for though he induced none to say so, yet by forcing them to reflect he induced all to think so.

To these urgent questions they replied by pointing out the minister of police, whom they seemed to indicate as the true culprit who

should expiate every thing, not merely the conspiracy of Malet, but perhaps even the Russian campaign. The Duke of Rovigo was present during the morning, completely isolated, no one daring to speak to him, and every one anticipating his disgrace. But Napoleon, after a general formal reception, conversed with each individually. He gave a long audience to the Duke of Rovigo, for whose courage, intelligence, and sincerity he had some respect. The Duke of Rovigo, bold and familiar, had something the character of those presumptuous servants, accustomed to entertain little fear for a master rather petulant than severe, and who are ever ready to utter useful but distasteful truths. Much injured by the ill-natured reports of M. Clarke, minister of war, who, from the fear lest he should be made to bear the blame of a conspiracy involving many military men, had ascribed it all to the police, and who was also liable to the charge of having committed him to the Conciergerie, he gave himself no anxiety, but, entering into details, he made the Emperor understand how, every thing having occurred in the brain of a madman who had communicated his secret to no one, the police could not have been aware of it; how this man, spreading abroad the very probable news of the death of Napoleon by violence, had met with general belief, which had suddenly been converted into an involuntary complicity; how some innocent officers, not supposing that they could have been deceived to such a degree, had lent their soldiers to so probable an imposture, and had become criminal without suspecting it; and finally, how those who had wished to establish the belief of a wide-spread conspiracy, in order to criminate the police, had needlessly sacrificed a dozen victims. This explanation, which was strictly true, greatly excused the Duke of Rovigo; it did not, indeed, save him from the ridicule still indulged on the subject of his arrest, for ridicule is as unreasoning as anger, but it justified him in the eyes of a master who was always just from his natural disposition when not rendered unjust by anger or design. But it was a serious accusation against those who had shot twelve unhappy men, when only three, or, more strictly speaking, only one was guilty, for Generals Lahorie and Guidal, really believing in the death of Napoleon, might be considered to have acted under the influence of an involuntary error. This was the opinion of Napoleon even at Smolensk, and he was confirmed in it by the statements of the Duke of Rovigo; but he took care to avoid blaming his ministers for an excess of zeal in such circumstances. He agreed with the Duke of Rovigo, that he alone had taken the correct view, adding, that his arrest in the presence of a satirical populace was to be regretted, plainly showed that he would not gratify that populace by disgracing him, and then, on the termination of this audience, astonished everybody by manifest marks of favour shown to the Duke of Rovigo, endeavouring to encourage a minister whom he could not easily replace, and whom he certainly would not have replaced by M. Fouché, at a time when fidelity was one of the most precious qualifications.

Left alone with Prince Cambacérès, a confidant of superior intelligence, in whose presence he experienced greater embarrassment than in

the presence of any other, he asked him what he had thought of the strange disaster in Russia, and if he had not been astonished by it. The arch-chancellor acknowledged that he had been greatly surprised, and indeed, though he had long suspected that so many wars must have a fatal termination, and had with great timidity endeavoured to express this to Napoleon, yet his foresight had never anticipated such an awful catastrophe. Napoleon ascribed every thing to the elements, to a sudden and extraordinary cold which had occurred earlier than usual, as if that species of accident ought not to have been anticipated by a genius such as his, and as if, even before the occurrence of the cold, his enterprise had not encountered insurmountable difficulties in respect to distance. A part of this tragedy he ascribed to the barbarous folly of Alexander, who, by burning his towns, had done himself more harm than his adversaries had desired; for Napoleon asserted that it was intended to impose on him only very acceptable terms of peace; as if Alexander ought to have regulated war by the calculation of his enemy, and have rendered it easy in order that he might be easily beaten himself, or as if, having by this sacrifice overthrown the giant who dominated Europe, and taken his place without, indeed, having usurped his glory, he ought to regret the burning of a few towns, or even of his capital! These were the poor excuses contrived by Napoleon; but as it was impossible that he should make no allusion to the Russian disaster in an interview with such a man as the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, he detailed the sufferings, of which he knew the importance, to a man who knew it as well as he. After saying this, Napoleon thanked Prince Cambacérès for the zeal he had displayed, and far from reproaching him, a magistrate commonly prudent and humane, with the useless death of so many victims, he returned to the subject which he wished to make the great question of the day, viz., the Malet conspiracy. He repeated the remark with a view that it should pass from him to all the great functionaries of the state, that there was need not only for brave soldiers, but for resolute magistrates, who should be ready to die in defence of the throne, as soldiers die in defence of their country. He then spoke of the personal dangers to which he had been exposed, and of those which he must still incur in order to re-establish his affairs; of the necessity of securing the succession of the crown to his son in the case of his being killed; of the means of so doing; of the advantage there would be in crowning by anticipation the heir-presumptive, which had often been done in the Western Empire; and finally, of presenting a grand spectacle to strike the imagination, and to impress their duty on the civil magistrates.

These considerations were a menace to an honourable and upright magistrate, who, unhappily, had furnished ample subjects for slander by his conduct during the brief success of General Malet's conspiracy. M. Prochot, prefect of the Seine, arriving from the country at the moment when the conspirators were entering the hotel de ville, and giving credence to their assertions, never supposing for a moment that they wished to lead him into error, had yielded implicit obedience to the



pretended decree of the Senate, and had ordered the principal hall of the hotel de ville to be prepared for the reception of the new government. No doubt he herein exhibited a degree of credulity as ridiculous as the arrest of the Duke of Rovigo, but which was explained, as the whole of this transaction, by the want of solidity in the Imperial establishment, and which, we repeat, ought to have been forgotten instead of being forced upon public attention. Napoleon, on the contrary, though he esteemed M. Frochot, and cherished no ill will towards him, resolved to make him the subject of the spectacle which he was preparing, and to which he wished to attract public attention, that it might not dwell upon the events in Russia. He determined that M. Frochot should be referred to the Council of State, and that all the principal bodies should be brought to the Tuileries to present solemn addresses, either on his return, or on the events of the day. This custom, so frequent afterwards, was at that time new. On the grand fête-days, they passed before Napoleon, addressing him in a few words, unwritten, and he replied in the same manner. These were simple visits, not solemnities. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, being previously instructed, indicated to the heads of all the different bodies the general purport of their addresses, and on Sunday, the 20th of December, the second day after his arrival, Napoleon received the Senate, the Council of State, and the principal branches of the administration.

It was M. de Lacépède, president of the Senate, who spoke in the name of that body. He was one of those *savans* who willingly place a practised pen at the service of a liberal government. Prince Cambacérès furnishing him with a basis of ideas, he was able in a short time to clothe them with those affected colours which he had learned to employ in the school of the mediocre imitators of Buffon. He began by congratulating Napoleon and France on his happy return, for the absence of the Emperor, relaxing the beneficent influence of his genius, was a national calamity. He then came to the subject of the day, not the campaign in Russia, but the Malet conspiracy. Some men, he said, whose previous crimes had been pardoned by the Emperor, had desired to throw France again into the anarchy from which his tutelary genius had delivered her; but their errors had been of short duration and their punishment prompt, and France, warned by this foolish attempt, had felt with new force her debt to the Napoleon dynasty, had promised inviolable fidelity to it, and the Senate, instituted for its preservation, was resolved to die in its defence.

From this language we may see that the fulsome vulgarities we have so often heard are nothing new, and that they are of little weight. But one passage of this speech deserves consideration: "In the beginning of our former dynasties," added the president of the Senate, "we have repeatedly seen the monarch order the French of every rank to bind themselves by a solemn oath to the heir of the throne, and sometimes, when the age of the young prince allowed it, a crown was placed upon his head, as the pledge of his future authority, and the symbol of the perpetuity of the government."

These words were evidently dictated by a higher authority, and they were the first indi-

cation of the project we have spoken of, which consisted in preparing beforehand, in case of sudden death, for the transmission of the Imperial crown to the son of Napoleon. The address of the Senate terminated with some words on the Russian expedition; on the elements, the sole cause of our misfortunes; on the barbarity of the Russians, who had burned their towns rather than surrender them to us; on the grief of the Emperor Napoleon, who had no wish for a war conducted on such principles, but who only desired an equitable arrangement; and, finally, on the bravery of the French, ready once more to rally round their flag and to conquer a glorious peace for their emperor.

Napoleon, seated on his throne, replied in a few words, which, though emanating from the same source, had a very different character from those of his wretched flatterers.

He said that he had certainly greatly at heart the glory and greatness of France, but above all he desired to promote her internal rest and prosperity. To save her from the distractions of anarchy had been, and should continue to be, the constant aim of his efforts. For this end he prayed for courageous magistrates as well as heroic soldiers. The most honourable death, he said, would be that of a soldier on the field, if that of a magistrate in defence of the sovereign, the throne, and the laws were not still more glorious. The cry of our fathers, "The king is dead; long live the king!" expressed the principal advantages of monarchy. Alluding to the wish expressed by the Senate, he said, "I think I have studied the spirit evinced by my people in different ages; I have reflected on what has been done at different epochs of our history; I will continue to do so."

As to the Russian expedition, the Imperial reply was very prudently intended not to embitter the quarrel with Alexander. "The war which I carry on," said Napoleon, "is a war of policy. I have undertaken it without animosity, and I would gladly have spared to Russia the evils she has inflicted on herself. I might have armed against her a part of her own population, by proclaiming liberty to the peasantry. . . . Many villages requested this of me, but I ever refused a measure which would have caused the death of thousands of families. . . . My army has suffered owing to the severity of the climate," &c. Then, thanking the Senate with considerable hauteur, he received the Council of State. That body could only repeat the words assigned to them, and they would not deserve to be recorded but for the answer of Napoleon. After having reiterated, in the appointed fashion, that certain miscreants had wished to plunge France in anarchy; that the crime had been promptly followed by just punishment; that France had on this occasion felt her ardour redouble for the dynasty to which she owed so much glory and happiness; and that, if the opportunity were given, she would rush as one man to the heir of the throne, to establish him and maintain him upon it; after these vulgar declarations, speaking of the war more at large than the Senate had done, the Council of State pretended to discover in the recent calamities something to transport them with joy and admiration, the

prodigious development of a noble character, which had never appeared greater than in these reverses, in which Fortune seemed desirous to prove to him her inconstancy. But this was a passing trial; France would rush simultaneously to his standards, the foreigner would compare his forces with ours, and a glorious peace would ensue. The Council of State had only their admiration, love, and fidelity to offer to the Emperor in exchange for all the benefits with which he loaded France, but these they hoped Napoleon would deign to accept, &c.

After an infuriated populace basely outraging vanquished princes, nothing can be seen more melancholy than these great bodies prostrating themselves at the feet of a power, bestowing upon it a degree of admiration which increases with its errors, speaking with ardour of their fidelity, already about to expire, and swearing to die in its cause when they are on the eve of hailing the accession of another. Happy are those countries whose established Constitutions spare them these humiliating spectacles!

The reply of Napoleon is still famous. It could not be mean, but it was as unreasonable as all that we have just recorded. He was touched, he said, by the sentiments of the Council of State. If France showed so much love for his son, (a singular assertion in the face of efforts made to induce France to think of him at all), it was because she was convinced of the advantage of monarchy. He then added these famous words: "It is to ideology, to those cloudy metaphysics which, by searching with subtlety into first causes, wishes to found on their basis the legislation of nations; it is to ideology that we must ascribe all the misfortunes of France. This it is which has given rise to the dominion of bloodthirsty men, which has proclaimed insurrection as if it were a duty, which has flattered the people by calling them to a sovereign power which they are unable to exercise, which has destroyed the sanctity and the respect of laws, by making them depend, not on the sacred principles of justice, but simply on the will of an assembly of men ignorant of laws, civil, criminal, administrative, political, and military. When called upon to regenerate a state, we must follow principles of a totally opposite character, and which the Council of State ought constantly to keep in view, and to this they should add a courage equal to any emergency, and, like the presidents Harlay and Molé, be ready to perish in defence of the sovereign, the throne, and the laws."

How strange the spectacle presented by this rage against philosophy, in the sight of the most intelligent nation in Europe! What! when he had madly risked the French army in Russia, and with it the Imperial throne, and, worst of all, the greatness of France; when he had grossly erred as to the necessity of this war and the means of supporting it, and had returned conquered and humbled, philosophy was in fault! was it philosophy, also, which at that moment held captive at Savona the unfortunate Pius VII., and which daily threw hundreds of priests into dungeons? And a man of prodigious intellect ventured to say these things before France and the world, in the face of events directly calculated to refute him! Such

is the effect of errors, especially of great ones! In addition to the other evils which they entail, they blunt the perception of those who commit them to such an extent that, in the agitation they produce, genius itself appears like an angry child who charges his errors on those who are least culpable, and who perhaps are the greatest sufferers from them.

But in all this Napoleon was not in earnest: it was an empty noise to drown, if possible, the awful crash of the Russian catastrophe; it was the predetermined sacrifice of an honourable magistrate, the victim rather of surprise than weakness, whose sacrifice was intended to divert public attention from more serious events. The Council of State was, in fact, assembled on the day following these puerile solemnities, and ordered to examine the conduct of M. Frochot. The judgment could not be doubtful, for, independently of the signal given in high quarters, M. Frochot was really liable to the charge of having so easily obeyed a strange order. He was, therefore, convicted in every section of the Council of State, (pronouncing their judgment successively with a tedious monotony of language and ideas,) not of treason, of which they strenuously declared him incapable, but of want of presence of mind, and Napoleon was petitioned to deprive him of his functions. This was, no doubt, right, at least for the sake of example, for M. Frochot had been much misled on that occasion. But in any other circumstances the Government, without consulting the Council of State, would have pronounced this deprivation by its own authority, without adding to it the humiliation of a solemn judgment. This would have been sufficient punishment, and exempt from cruelty. Napoleon regretted the cruelty, but it was necessary to occupy the eyes of the multitude, and to describe to them in striking colours, on a coarse canvas, a feeble magistrate, that they might not see depicted an insane Pharaoh losing his army and his crown amid the snows of Russia.

Let us leave these sad scenes, designed by Napoleon to turn from him the scrutiny of the watchful eyes, and let us follow him into other occupations more worthy of his genius and better calculated to repair his errors. It was necessary to renew his ruined army, to confirm his shaken power, and on this occasion his great powers were to find energetic employment and to display a final and prodigious brilliancy. Could they save him after they had compromised him by their own vastness? It is not probable, though possible, provided that a fortunate inconsistency should arrest him on the brink of the abyss. This was to be the last phase of his life, and certainly one of the most extraordinary.

Whilst apparently occupied with such matters as we have described, he was in reality engaged incessantly in much nobler work, and never did he show himself a more intelligent, inventive, and active administrator. However great he had esteemed the evil, he had only seen a part of it when he had left the army at Smolensk. He believed that he had lost many soldiers and officers, and much matériel, but to all this he perceived a remedy. Of five war-battalions for each regiment, he thought that the army, on rallying, would supply three, and that it would

suffice to send into France two cadres in every five, to fill them with conscripts ready drilled. He supposed that, although he had lost nearly all his cavalry, there ought to remain on foot 25,000 or 30,000 good horsemen, whom it would be easy to remount by purchasing horses in Poland, Germany, and France, which he had already ordered, and that then the dépôts would furnish him with the means of completing this remounted cavalry with trained horsemen. He knew that his artillery had lost many men, and almost the whole of the matériel, but he also knew that the arsenals of France were liberally provided, and could launch on all the roads from the Rhine to the Vistula a thousand guns on new carriages. France would supply them with horses from the excellent draught-horses in which she abounded. Thus Napoleon, though he suffered from his ill-regulated policy, yet in many things reaped the fruit of his singular foresight, for Providence, just towards every one, always apportions the result to his merits. Before marching for Moscow, he had ordered the levy of the conscription for 1813, which, having been appropriated to the cadres in October with remarkable accuracy, filled the dépôts with 140,000 men of three months' training, fit to recruit the cadres which should return to France. For nearly a year past Napoleon had formed a hundred cohorts of national guards, which, having been taken from the most vigorous classes of the population, in virtue of the regulation which embraced all healthy citizens, afforded a hundred fine battalions of full-grown and well-disciplined men. It is true that they were not legally bound to serve out of the country. But by inducing several of these battalions to ask the honour of joining the grand army, and by ratifying the wish by a decree of the Senate, he would add 100,000 men, of from twenty-two to twenty-seven years of age, possessed of a degree of physical strength not to be found generally in conscripts. Here, then, were 240,000 men all prepared, who in one month might be on the Rhine, in two months on the Oder, in three months on the Vistula. If, taking the worst view, (which Napoleon at this time believed he did,) there remained to him 150,000 French and 50,000 allies of the 600,000 of the grand army, he would still have 450,000 men in line, and 500,000 reckoning the contingents due by the allies,—a force abundantly sufficient to overwhelm the Russians, who had suffered nearly as much as ourselves during the winter, and who were less able to repair their losses. Awaiting the three months required for these preparations, there were on the spot, owing to the foresight of Napoleon, many resources prepared long ago, capable of actually arresting the enemy on the Niemen. He had taken care, as we have said, in marching from Smolensk to Moscow, to bring from Verona a fine corps of 15,000 or 18,000 men, taken from the old regiments of the army of Italy, who had crossed the Alps before the bad season. This corps was at Berlin, under General Grenier, and perfectly organized in every branch. Napoleon had also formed, under Marshal Augereau, a corps (the 11th) which was to occupy the line of the Elbe. One division of this corps, General Durutte's, had been sent to General Reynier on the Bug, and had half perished; another, under General

Loison, had been sent from Wilna to meet the grand army, and was entire when Napoleon left Smorgoni. There remained two wholly intact, the Heudelet and Lagrange divisions, already at Dantzic. These, in addition to the troops from Italy, gave a total of at least 45,000 men, quite fresh, on whom the retreating army might rely. When Napoleon left Smorgoni, the guard still mustered 7000 or 8000 men; Victor's corps was not destroyed, Loison's division had not been engaged, and there were returning from Moscow about 40,000 men, whose number ought to be daily increased by the accession of stragglers. There were, besides, on the left, Macdonald's corps, of 7000 or 8000 Poles and 15,000 Prussians, who had all served well and suffered little; on the right, 15,000 Saxons and French under Reynier, 25,000 Austrians under Schwarzenberg, who had also served well, notwithstanding the timidity of their chiefs. Finally, there was Poniatowski's corps, which had early been sent into cantonnements to recruit, and M. de Bassano, who had been charged on his return from Wilna to pass by Warsaw and Berlin, gave assurance that Poland was about to rise *en masse*, that Prussia swore to remain faithful to us, and was even disposed to augment her contingent on the condition of some pecuniary aid; that Prince Schwarzenberg wrote letters worthy of an honourable soldier, and that that prince, as well as all the Austrians whom he had seen, while ardently praying for a speedy peace, promised a firm fidelity to the alliance. Supposing, then, that there returned to Wilna only 40,000 men of those who had penetrated into the interior of Russia, by adding to them the 45,000 men who, under Augereau and Grenier, were guarding the Elbe, the 20,000 who, under Macdonald, were returning from Riga, the 40,000 who, under Reynier and Prince Schwarzenberg, were returning from the environs of Minsk, he might hope to muster at least 150,000 men, perhaps in a short time 200,000, by the gradual accession of stragglers, and to oppose them with advantage to the Russians, of whom certainly no more than 150,000 had escaped the severity of the winter. By adding to these 200,000 men the 240,000 who were to come from the dépôts on the Rhine in two or three months, and the new levies which France would not fail to send forth in time of danger, Napoleon was convinced that he would retain the Prussians and Austrians in his alliance, that he would drive the Russians beyond the Niemen, that he would regain a continental peace without any disproportioned sacrifice, perhaps even crown it with a maritime peace!

These hopes supported the ardour of Napoleon during the first days of his labour. But this was the picture of things as they were, or were supposed to be, when he quitted the army. Unhappily, from the 5th of December to the beginning of January, every thing had changed in the North, both in a military and political point of view. Napoleon had, in fact, hastened his fortune on so rapid a decline that every time he beheld it he found it frightfully descending towards the abyss.

After his departure, as we have already said, the army had fallen into the most fearful confusion. In consequence of the cold, which had attained an extraordinary intensity, and the

want of a recognised authority, all discipline had disappeared: every one, abandoned to his own despair, had fled as he could, and the handful of men, already so reduced, which had forced the passage of the Beresina, was completely dispersed. Victor's corps, which contained 7000 or 8000 men on the evening of his heroic defence of the bridges, had melted away in two days from the effect of its having acted as rearguard. Loison's division, comprising 10,000 men, who, though young, were well organized, had suffered nothing up to that time, but had become altogether disordered by having left Wilna to meet the grand army. The cold had killed one-half of them, and the rest had become scattered, so that there were not 2000 men in the ranks. The same thing had happened to the detachments forming the garrison of Wilna. The 4000 or 5000 Bavarians under General de Wrede, who, since the evacuation of Polotsk, had remained to the left of Wilna, had shared the common fate. Reynier's Saxons, and Schwarzenberg's Austrians, having remained in the neighbourhood of Minsk for want of exact orders, Wilna became exposed, and it had been necessary to evacuate it in disorder, without having even time to take the clothes and provisions with which the magazines of that city abounded. Murat, having lost the power of enforcing obedience, had fled from Wilna in the middle of the night, and had lost the army-treasure at the foot of the mountain on the outskirts of the city. At Kowno, collecting some officers and a marshal, with about 1000 soldiers, he had charged Ney and Gérard to dispute the Niemen for a time; but those two heroic men, being left almost alone, had been obliged to take refuge in Königsberg.

Such were the facts which had transpired since the departure of Napoleon, and which we have already related; disastrous events, due to distance, to cold, to want, to the destruction of all authority, and especially to that contagious tendency to fall out of the ranks, which, beginning with the cavalry without horses, and the infantry without guns, had daily increased, until at last it had become a sort of pestilential malady with which the whole body sent to aid the grand army had become immediately affected, and had perished without having saved it.

Other misfortunes awaited us at Königsberg. The inhabitants of that city, as of Prussia generally, indulged a violent hatred against us, which they dared not manifest because they had not ceased to fear us. They had been unable to dissemble their joy at the sight of our sad ruins, though they supposed them merely the forerunners of the body of the grand army weakened but not destroyed; but when they beheld Murat appear almost alone, the Guard reduced to a few hundred men, and these only a few wretched wanderers pursued over the frozen Niemen by the Cossacks, they could no longer repress either their joy or their pride. The peasants in retired places robbed those of our soldiers who had retained any money which they offered for bread, and sometimes even murdered them without pity. Even at Königsberg the inhabitants would have risen in insurrection, had they not been restrained by one of Augereau's four divisions, that of Heudelet, which happily had not gone beyond Old Prussia, and consisted of 7000 or 8000 men, very young,

indeed, but able to enforce respect. This was the first organized force which had been met since leaving Wilna. Not having left the town, like that of General Loison, to meet the grand army, they had not been exposed to suffering. This force protected the 12,000 sick or wounded who now, at the point of death, filled the hospitals, and the multitude of generals and other officers who had come, like Generals Lariboisière and Eblé, to die at Königsberg of the frost-fever. The inhabitants of that city, not daring to fall upon us at this time, hoped to do so on the first approach of the Russians, and, in the mean while, extorted from our miserable soldiers all their remaining money in return for the most trifling amount of clothing and provisions. Yet among these inhabitants of Old Prussia were found men of great humanity, who, notwithstanding a sincere patriotism, respected, in our persons, bravery in misfortune, and soothed the distress of their oppressors. "We do not blame you, Frenchmen," they said, "but your Emperor, who has sacrificed you, and who for fifteen years has oppressed every one, yourselves as well as us."

But very soon our calamities were to be increased by an event of great importance. Marshal Macdonald, with the Polish division of Grandjean, consisting of 7000 or 8000 excellent and faithful soldiers, followed at some distance by the auxiliary Prussian corps, had waited long and vainly at Riga orders to retreat, as Prince Schwarzenberg had, also in vain, awaited at Minsk orders to move to Wilna. Seeing, at length, the Russians advance from every quarter, a sure sign of our retreat, Marshal Macdonald had spontaneously made a movement towards Tilsit. The Prussians, commanded formally by a highly-respectable officer, General Grawert, but really by General d'York, an able officer, but full of pride, ambition, and hatred of the French, retired slowly after Marshal Macdonald. That marshal wished to quicken their pace in order to escape the enemy, who appeared to be at hand, but, under various pretexts, they refused to obey, to such a degree that he had become very suspicious of them, and with good reason, as the reader may judge.

The Russians, after the passage of the Beresina, had continued their movement. Wittgenstein, with the army of the Dwina, had directed himself towards Königsberg, with the view of intercepting Macdonald's corps, while Tchitchakoff, with the army of Moldavia, pursued our scattered remains to Kowno, and Kutusoff reposed the main army at Wilna. The Russians had suffered from the cold as severely as ourselves, but very little from want; and, sustained by joy at our misfortunes, and by the hope of our destruction, and kept to their colours by regular rations, they arrived with very little diminution in number, compact and full of ardour. Their whole body consisted, at most, of 100,000 men, instead of 300,000 which they reckoned at the beginning of the campaign. The Emperor Alexander, at the news of our disasters, had hastened to Wilna, had laden with well-merited rewards Marshal Kutusoff, whose prudence, now universally recognised, triumphed over all opposition, and had assumed the direction of events which were now to assume a political rather than military character. In fact, Alexander, knowing from conjectures not difficult

o form, and from certain indirect communications from Prussia, and even from Austria, that they would be gladly emancipated from an alliance adopted against their will, felt assured that, by judicious management, he could alienate Prussia, if not Austria, from France. Accordingly, with his usual subtlety and mildness of manner, he immediately adopted language he best adapted to the circumstances. He said that he had not come with the view of making conquests in Germany or even in Poland; he had come to assist the oppressed Germans, peoples and kings, citizens and nobles, Prussians and Austrians, Saxons and Bavarians, all whomsoever they might be, to shake off an odious yoke, and when that work was accomplished to render to every one his own, and merely to resume for himself that of which he had been unjustly deprived. Hence it was everywhere published in its name, that if the Prussians wished to regain their portion of Poland, he was ready to restore it to them, and that he merely kept it until they should come themselves to reassert the possession of what belonged to them. At Wilna, where he was at home, he proclaimed a general amnesty for all acts committed against Russian authority, and even spread abroad the report that if the Poles wished to regain a country he was ready to accord them one, by constituting Poland a separate kingdom, of which he would himself be the merciful, liberal, and fostering king. Alexander was sufficiently intelligent to understand the efficacy of such a policy, and sufficiently benevolent to be pleased with it, and if he had needed any foreign support in such a course, he would have found it abundantly in the Germans who surrounded him. The Prussian minister Stein, who was a refugee at his court, the celebrated author Kotzebue, and many other Germans, literary and military men, held the most liberal language, and urgently solicited Alexander to proclaim the independence of Germany, to march boldly forward, and, without taking account of any remains of the French, to press on rapidly towards the Vistula and the Oder, asserting that every territory delivered from the French was equivalent to an accession of ardent and enthusiastic allies. To this policy the only obstacle was found in the aged Kutusoff, whose circumspection, justified by the result, had become excessive, and some Russians, occupied simply with military considerations, who, struck with the exhaustion of their army, and fearing lest it should melt away like that of France, urged him to halt and to allow the Germans to emancipate themselves as they could, to treat with France, which could easily and advantageously be done at the time, and not uselessly prolong a war which, though prosperous in the interior of Russia, might become the reverse beyond her limits, especially against such a commander as Napoleon; and it is true that in a prudential aspect this language was perfectly well founded. But Alexander's imagination had suddenly become excited. Deeply wounded by the insults of Napoleon, deliriously elated by the idea of being his conqueror, he aspired to a still higher office, that of his destroyer, and the liberator of oppressed Europe. He persuaded himself that although it might then be possible to treat with Napoleon on equal terms, yet if he let slip the present opportunity of effecting his destruction, he

would soon reappear as a powerful tyrant, and the work of resistance must be begun afresh. On the contrary, that, by pursuing the success already gained, by gaining over the Governments and nations who were indignant at his yoke, by going still further, and addressing a direct appeal to France, now weary of her master, by allowing her a legitimate greatness which none could dispute, Napoleon might be withdrawn from the stage, and he himself should become the king of kings, the adored saviour of Europe. This ambition, supported by resentment, had seized the heart of Alexander, and he refused to stay his career. He had, therefore, authorized Stein and his countrymen to visit the Prussian provinces which had been reconquered, and to promise the approaching liberation of Germany.

General Diebitch, chief of the staff to Wittgenstein, surrounded by German officers, among whom was General Clausewitz, urged by their solicitations, which were unnecessary, for his own mind accorded with theirs, followed Marshal Macdonald step by step, in the hope of cutting off the Prussian corps. General d'York detested Marshal Macdonald, first as his commander, for he was jealous and discontented, and then as a Frenchman, for he at heart cherished all the sentiments of his countrymen. He had continual misunderstandings with the staff, incessantly complained of their not properly supplying his corps, nor granting them their fair proportion of French decorations and donations, and this humour, in itself without foundation, had greatly augmented his patriotic aversion for us. General Diebitch, warned by secret agents, had fomented these sentiments, and at length, when the catastrophe had occurred, had proposed to General d'York to pass over to the Russians under the pretence of a capitulation made necessary by circumstances. It was enough that that Prussian general should march slowly, should allow himself to be separated from Macdonald, and then to be surrounded, in order to give the appearance of a compulsory surrender. His corps should not be disarmed, but declared neuter, and should be the nucleus of the future Prussian army which was to concur with the Russians in the deliverance of Germany. General d'York, a good patriot, but not without a regard to his own interests, deliberated long, from the fear of compromising himself with his court, to which he secretly sent the communications he had received, thereby occasioning great embarrassment and obtaining no other reply than silence, still hesitated, but, slackening his pace, allowed himself to be surrounded, and at length, seduced by General Clausewitz, who had been despatched to him, formed his decision, and on December 30, yielding, as he said, to circumstances of an imperative character in a military point of view, signed a convention of neutrality for his *corps d'armée*, always subject to the ratification of his sovereign. It was easy to divine the meaning of this convention of neutrality, which amounted to the conjunction of the Prussian corps with the Russian army after a few days' delay. A detachment of the same corps, under General Massenbach, had followed Marshal Macdonald at a shorter interval and had reached Tilsit. On learning the convention that had been formed, General Massenbach assembled his officers, and found them enthusiastic

approvers of the act of General d'York, and unanimously determined to imitate him. During the night, he left Tilsit without saying a word, wrote a letter to Marshal Macdonald, in which, in respectful terms and under vain attempts at concealment, appeared the same passions which had led away General d'York, and then went to join that general. They mutually embraced in the Prussian corps, amid cries of enthusiasm, and claimed the merit of liberating Germany, a merit to which they were not altogether without title.

For myself, who write these sad details, I am a Frenchman warmly attached to the greatness of my country, and yet, in the name of the sentiments which I cherish, I cannot blame these German patriots, who, serving against their will a cause which they knew was not their own, reverted to what they believed to be the cause of their country, and which, unhappily, had become so by the errors of the commander placed at our head. It should be added, that they might have carried away Marshal Macdonald, but that, from respect to himself and his soldiers, as their recent companions in arms, they separated without any act that could aggravate the difficulty of his position.

The news of General d'York's defection fell like a thunderbolt on the whole of Germany. In a moment it spread from mouth to mouth. From the Vistula to the Rhine, General d'York was hailed as the saviour of Germany. Baron de Stein and his colleagues repaired to him, surrounded him with congratulations, declared that he should be placed at the head of all the portions of the Prussian army which they should be able to detach, urged him to march upon Tilsit, then upon Königsberg, there assemble the states of Old Prussia and proclaim the independence of their country, declare that their king, deprived of his liberty by the French, ought no longer to be obeyed, to behave, in a word, like the insurgents of Cadiz, who acted for the king, without the king, and notwithstanding the king. General d'York, thinking that he had done enough, was not willing to advance so rapidly. But, under the escort and protection of the Russians, he consented to take the road for Königsberg, and there to await the orders of the court of Prussia. He was there to find, not the orders of his king, but the orders of his country, roused like one man, and commanding in a tone more powerful than any government. He, therefore, advanced with the Russians, applauded and caressed by Alexander, whose policy received from this event a brilliant confirmation.

In the mean while, Murat, who had halted at Königsberg with a crowd of generals and officers without troops, some dying, some exasperated by their sufferings, indulged in language almost seditious. Even Marshal Ney, notwithstanding the heroism of his character, and the caresses he had received from Napoleon, unable longer to restrain himself, spoke openly against the imprudent commander who, he said, had precipitated the French army into an abyss. Murat, as we elsewhere related, allowed himself to be carried away almost to rebellion, until rebuked to silence by Marshal Davout, when he resumed command in name, but with-

out issuing any orders, for he was at a loss what to do. Berthier, confined to bed by repelled gout, and by vexation at the absence of Napoleon, knew not what further advice to give in circumstances so unparalleled. At this moment they learned the defection of the Prussian corps, and, on seeing the manifestation of feeling evoked by that event among the inhabitants of Königsberg, they hesitated no longer to quit that city, and to relinquish the line of the Niemen, which had ceased to be a line since that river had been frozen and the Russians crossed it at any point. To dispute the ground would merely have been to sacrifice our 10,000 or 12,000 sick, a number continually diminishing by death, but being restored by the fresh arrival of stragglers. These precious remains they might consign to the benevolence, or at least to the honour, of the Prussian nation. They left infirm officers and physicians to tend the sick, and funds to procure them food, for nothing more could be expected from the good-will of the Prussians than that their lives should be spared, and they ought to count themselves happy if they escaped the fury of the inhabitants of Königsberg. They then left this city, the capital of Old Prussia.

Marshal Ney was again charged to form the rear-guard with Heudelet's division and the 2000 men remaining of Loison's. He set off for Braunsberg, Elbing, and Thorn. As the cold had diminished and provisions were found, as our bands of stragglers had dropped off by degrees, and they had no more to fear desertion from the ranks, they were able to maintain some order in their march, preceded by the staffs without troops, which were in great haste to regain the Vistula.

They had quitted Königsberg in such haste, that they had given no attention to Marshal Macdonald, who was left at Tilsit, twenty leagues from Königsberg, surrounded by enemies, having with him only 7000 or 8000 Poles, faithful but exhausted. He urgently entreated them to wait for time, for, if combined, their forces would amount to 15,000 or 16,000 men, and they might have presented a respectable aspect. His letters, which were to seek Murat, already at Thorn, remained ineffectual. They thus marched on till January 15, each one considering only his own interests, the remains of the old army retiring by detachments of fifty or a hundred men, obliging the inhabitants to give them food when they were the stronger, dying of hunger or cold when they had neither strength to enforce nor money to purchase supplies, and the only two troops remaining organized (Grandjean's division, under Macdonald, and Heudelet's division, under Ney) marching at a distance of ten or fifteen leagues from each other.

Fortunately the Prussians, to whom we left a very tempting prey on quitting Königsberg, and the Russians, who were extremely exhausted, and whom Macdonald and Ney repeatedly handled somewhat roughly, did not pursue us with sufficient speed to surround us. Towards the middle of January they arrived on the Vistula, and threw themselves into the fortresses, which Napoleon had amply supplied with provision. General Rapp reached Danzig before the army. In that city there remained a collection of 5000 or 6000 men of all nations

a. Murat sent thither Grandjean's vision, that of General Heudelet, and named of Loison's. Rapp had thus and about 25,000 able men. He had a great quantity of grain and spirits. He made a great use of his cavalry in the isle of Nogath, many flocks and much forage, and then set himself up in the large works of Dantzic, himself to the last extremity. In compliance with the persevering counsel of General Davout, they assigned rallying-places to the different corps of the former army. The cadres of these corps were: severally to Dantzic, Thorn, Marienland and Marienburg. Every soldier who wanted bread or clothing was to be sent to his dépôt in these places. After a few days there were about 1500 men of the 1st, Davout's, and a similar proportion of the 2d, Oudinot's, the 3d, Ney's, and the 4th, Eugene's. Headquarters were fixed at Thorn. Remaining there two or three days, Murat thought that he could remain no longer. In Heudelet, Loison, and Grandjean having been thrown into the fortress of Dantzic, there remained only 10,000 disorganised troops to accompany the head-quarters, and a small quantity of flags which had been left there in order to save them. These troops comprised 1800 recruits who had been on the road, and who were destined to form a corps, 1200 picked Neapolitans, 4000 Russians, who had recently left their country to join the Bavarian army, and 3000 men of the Imperial Guard, who had gradually rallied during the siege of Königsberg, among whom were 1000 horsemen and twelve guns. General Murat, who commanded this assemblage, found himself too closely pressed in the neighbourhood of Thorn, had fallen upon the enemy, wanted energy, and taken from them the opportunity to retain such close proximity. In his hands these 10,000 men were not of great value, but they could not defend the fortress which was now frozen over, as were all the rivers of Poland and Prussia, and therefore formed a barrier against the enemy. They would they be unable to defend from Murat and those who accompanied him, Russians under Tchitchakoff, united with the Prussians under Wittgenstein, should attempt to enter it. Murat was, therefore, unwilling to remain longer on the Vistula, and he went to Posen, at an equal distance from Berlin and the Oder. Thus all Old Prussia and Poland were evacuated, and after they were occupied we had 10,000 men in the fortress, 10,000 men consisting of Neapolitans, Russians, and, at most, 4000 Frenchmen. Remained at Berlin, to restrain any outburst in Germany, the 18,000 men under General Giené, and the Lagrange division, the remainder of his four divisions which Marshal Marmont had retained with him. The event occurred to augment the efforts of the German nations. They had committed the error of leaving a garrison composed of Germans, at Pillau, a small fort which closed the entrance of the Vistula. This had been done contrary to the advice of Marshal Macdonald, who justly thought it illing to deprive himself of active

troops, unless in favour of places capable of defending themselves and containing a garrison in which the French preponderated. Pillau did not fulfil these conditions, and it had, in fact, surrendered amid the great applause of the Prussians, and to the great satisfaction of the English, who immediately entered the Frische-Haff with their ships-of-war. They quickly introduced their merchantmen, which had procured to the inhabitants of Old Prussia, besides the patriotic satisfaction of having been delivered from their conquerors, the material but very sensible satisfaction of renewing their long-interrupted commerce in colonial produce.

The news from our right, on the Upper Vistula, were not better than those from the left. General Reynier and Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing nothing more to be done at Minsk, had set off for Warsaw. Having in the Saxons good soldiers in whom he could confide, and in addition 5000 or 6000 Frenchmen of Durette's division, who would secure their fidelity, General Reynier wished to engage, but Prince Schwarzenberg strongly dissuaded him, assuring him that he would weaken himself to no purpose by carrying on the war during the winter, that he ought to retire upon Warsaw, to protect that capital, secure for himself comfortable quarters, and await the arrival of the forces which Napoleon would not fail to bring in the spring. While giving these counsels, Prince Schwarzenberg himself withdrew, and obliged Reynier to do the same, and received at his head-quarters Russian officers, whose attentions he accepted on the pretence of being unable to avoid them, spoke with them of an armistice, and without, indeed, absolutely betraying Napoleon, whose marriage he had negotiated, gave his whole attention to the means of sparing his own army, and then endeavoured to hold himself ready for the changes in policy which he foresaw would occur in the cabinet of Vienna. At the same time, he advised General Reynier and M. de Bassano, and indeed every one, to cultivate peace, which was the principal object of his desire, both as an Austrian and as one of the favourites of the court of France.

Thus, while on our left the Vistula was about to be crossed, notwithstanding our occupation of the forts, it was also to be passed on our right, even at Warsaw, in the presence of Prince Schwarzenberg, and at Posen we had, to meet the enemy, 10,000 men, Neapolitans, Bavarians, and French, without venturing to call to our aid the 28,000 soldiers of Grenier and Augereau, who were absolutely necessary at Berlin to keep Prussia in awe. The weak head of Murat could not long stand such a condition of things, however brave his heart. He did not fear the force of the enemy now any more than formerly, but he was consumed by the desire of reigning. A thousand sinister visions besieged his excited imagination. Sometimes he saw the people of Italy, roused by the priests and the English, revolting from the Julian Alps to the Straits of Messina and overthrowing the thrones of the Bonapartes in Italy; sometimes he fancied himself deserted by Napoleon himself, by whom he was only moderately loved, and who, if obliged to make sacrifices to secure peace, would consent to do this more readily in Lower than in Upper Italy, and more willingly in any part of Italy than in

France. As soon as these images took possession of his mind, he lost his sang-froid, and became anxious to leave, in order to save a crown which had been the object of such long desire, the reward for so much heroism. His suspicion had attained such a height that he had lost confidence even in his wife, and began to fear that she might conform to the policy of Napoleon, which was an additional motive to him to return to Naples. Tormented by these anxieties, and by the sad news which he received at every step, he suddenly summoned Prince Berthier, who, though half dead, remained major-general, and M. Daru, who was charged with only the matériel of the army, but whose weighty character and great prudence made his counsel indispensable in important circumstances. He communicated to them his design of leaving the army on the score of his health, which was a mere pretext, and resisted all the urgency of Prince Berthier and M. Daru, who by turns enforced upon him the interest of the army, his own glory, the anger of Napoleon, and the difficulty of finding a successor. To this last objection Murat replied by mentioning Prince Eugene and saying that he proposed to send him to Posen. In fact, he despatched a courier to him to Thorn, summoning him to head-quarters, without assigning a reason for so doing. The prince having arrived, he declared to him his resolution of leaving, and named him commander of the grand army until orders should be received from Napoleon. Prince Eugene, alarmed at the honour, both from modesty and indolence, was, however, the only one who could be chosen, for he had acquired much honour during the campaign in Russia, where he had exhibited remarkable bravery, some military skill, and real virtues. He was also a prince,—a consideration never neglected under a régime which had become as monarchical as that of Louis XIV. He urged Murat to remain, but ineffectually, and at length accepted with resignation a charge which he considered much beyond his capacity. He remained at Posen with the 10,000 men of various nations already mentioned, entreating General Reynier and Prince Schwarzenberg to keep their ground at Warsaw, which would protect his right, considering that to his left the Russians would remain some time before Thorn and Dantzic, and ordered General Grenier, with his 18,000 men, and Augereau, with the 9000 or 10,000 of the Lagrange division, to hold themselves ready to come to his aid, if necessary.

Such were the remains of the grand army: 25,000 men at Dantzic, 10,000 in the secondary fortresses of the Vistula, 10,000 of all nations at Posen with the head-quarters, some Saxons and French, governed at Warsaw by the movements of Prince Schwarzenberg, and, at Berlin, Grenier and Augereau, with 20,000 men, whom they were afraid to displace, in the fear of a general revolt in Germany,—a situation very far from that supposed by Napoleon, of 200,000 men still established on the Niemen, disputing with the Russians the possession of Königsberg, Kowno, and Grodno, while awaiting the arrival of 300,000 new soldiers. The necessity of personally organizing these 300,000 had called Napoleon to Paris, and his departure had occasioned the loss of 200,000 men whom he had

left upon the Niemen; so that it would have been necessary for him to be at the same time on the Niemen to save the one class and at Paris to organize the other. In quitting the Niemen he had been guilty of a military error, and had rendered himself chargeable with neglect of his companions in arms, whom he had precipitated into an abyss; by remaining there he would have left Germany in a state of insurrection between himself and Paris, he would not have seized the reins of his vast administration sufficiently near, and he would have committed at once a political and administrative error, so that, whatever he had done, he would have been a defaulter in some respect, he would have committed errors equally serious, and he would have exposed himself to deplorable insinuations, the just punishment of immense and irreparable errors.

And, at this moment, the political consequences of these errors were not less grave than the military. The head of the German exiles, Baron de Stein, was with General d'York at Königsberg, where he convoked the states of the province, procured a decree for arming the whole population and employing without reserve the pecuniary resources of the country. The universal enthusiasm responded to these propositions, and thousands of pamphlets, proclamations, and popular ballads inflamed the imagination of the Germans against us. Germany for several years had been inundated with secret societies, the principal of which, "The Union of Virtue," (*Tugend-Bund*), was universally diffused. Enthusiasm for the German fatherland, the conviction that, if combined in one association, it would be invincible, that, instead of being alternately the victim of the Northern and the Southern states, it would give the law to them all, and would constitute the first nation in the world; hence the necessity of uniting, of no longer considering themselves as Austrians, Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians, or Hamburgians, as princes, nobles, citizens, or peasants, as Lutherans or Catholics, but as Germans, ready to die for their country to the last man; the preference given to every thing of German origin in manufacture, customs, and literature; such were the ideas and sentiments which these societies laboured to diffuse, and which they had propagated with unheard-of success, for these ideas and sentiments were congenial to all classes of the German nation, and corresponded to the love of equality with some, the monarchic tendency of others, and the patriotism of all, sadly irritated by our dominion. These societies had brought from Königsberg to the extremities of Germany not only that powerful emotion which was natural, and which required not artificial means for its propagation, but even imperative order. Everywhere they called upon men to rush to arms, to devote their persons and their property to the state, to unite with the Emperor Alexander to deliver the kings who were enslaved to the French alliance, and to depose as unworthy those who refused such deliverance when in their power. "Long live Alexander! Long live the Cossacks!" were the cries which resounded on every side. Some young Germans, in their patriotic enthusiasm, even adopted the beard of the Cossacks, and even princes and nobles encouraged the excitement, which, not



withstanding a certain mixture of adherence to monarchy, was in itself essentially democratic, as in Spain, where the passion for liberty was equal to that for the captive king. They roused not merely national patriotism, not merely fidelity to dethroned or distressed princes, but the love of liberty, which Napoleon boasted of having restrained in France and throughout the world. Thus, what he condemned in his own country as ideology sprang, as it were, from the ground in every country of Europe to assail him! A singular lesson, which ought to have instructed all and was destined to profit no one; for these very nobles, princes, and priests who one day invoked liberty against Napoleon were soon, when Napoleon was overthrown, to refuse it to their own people.

This enthusiasm (which could be compared only to that which we had ourselves experienced in 1792 at the appearance of the Duke of Brunswick) was produced simultaneously at Berlin, notwithstanding the presence of our soldiers; at Dresden, Munich, and Vienna, notwithstanding our alliance; at Hamburg, Bremen, and Cassel, notwithstanding our immediate rule. At Berlin, though the Prussians dared not, in presence of Grenier's fine troops, display their feelings by acts or cries, yet they exhibited in their countenances the most insulting joy on the arrival of any news unfavourable to us, and refused every thing to our soldiers, even for ready money, unless, in some few instances, at exorbitant prices, when cupidity prevailed over emmity. And to have enforced requisitions payable by bills, as had frequently been done before, would have risked an instant revolt.

We may easily conceive the surprise, embarrassment, and perplexity of the unhappy King of Prussia and his principal minister, M. de Hardenberg. That good and wise king had during the whole course of his reign found himself constantly in positions the most inconsistent with an honourable and sensible man. He had been induced in 1806, against his own will and judgment, to oppose France, and thereby had almost lost his crown; for, certainly, to be deprived of two-thirds of his estates and to be retained in a condition of absolute dependence for the remaining third is nearly equivalent to a loss of the whole. Resolved no longer to fall into such an error, he had entered into the French alliance in 1812, even on his own solicitation, because, being abandoned by Austria and Russia after having been placed by them in the front of danger, he felt himself justified in securing his own safety by entering into paction with the strongest party. While acting in this manner, he wished, by an excess of precaution, to commend his conduct even to the Emperor Alexander, and had sent to him M. de Knesebeck, who, whether authorized or not, had urged excuses which amounted to duplicity towards France. We see, then, this king, who, thinking himself wiser in 1812 than he was in 1806, was again in error, and found himself condemned either to break his word with France—which would have been dangerous as well as wrong—or to fight for France, who oppressed him, against the friends who prepared to emancipate him. The excellent prince was wholly at a loss. Joy had been kindled in his heart at the prospect of escape from French domination, but it was em-

bittered by the shame of a fresh error in having become the ally of France, and the fear of being regarded as a traitor in leaving her. The violent and even menacing cry of his subjects might be construed into a restraint. But if again, as in 1806, his subjects should be mistaken, and if Napoleon should not be really subdued, but should appear in the spring as a conqueror on the Elbe and should put an end to this incorrigible Prussia and treat the nephew of Frederick the Great as he had treated the house of Hesse, could they make any complaint? Whether from a fear of Napoleon or an unwillingness to suppose himself deceived, Frederick William inclined to think that France was conquered only for a moment; and, with the usual indecision of an agitated mind driven from one sentiment to another, he at length yielded to the force of actual circumstances, i.e. to the presence of 80,000 Frenchmen at Berlin.

M. de Hardenberg, who had himself passed from hatred to France to alliance with her, was a prey to the same perplexities as the king, and to all those in addition which arose from his personal position. If events condemned the policy of a French alliance, the king was excused by weakness; but none such could be assigned in defence of M. de Hardenberg, whose conduct was imputed to ambition of the basest kind,—that which consents to bargain with the enemies of our country.

The first movement of Frederick William, on learning the defection of General d'York, was to decri his conduct. He both feared being compromised with France and also being accounted unfaithful, which would have been very painful to him, for he was really honourable, and was anxious to be so esteemed. He immediately sent for the French minister, M. de Saint Marsan, to whom he disclaimed with energy any participation in the conduct of General d'York. He swore that he was totally ignorant of the defection. M. de Saint Marsan, who was readily persuaded by the appearance of honesty in Frederick William, assured him that he was the last man in the world whose word he would doubt; and the king was thus charmed, soothed, and seduced by the flattery to which he was most accessible,—that of confidence in his honour. In his first enthusiasm he promised publicly to disown General d'York and to consign him to a court-martial. M. de Saint Marsan seized upon this promise as a trophy which he thought useful to oppose to the declamations of the enemies of France.

When this declaration became known the German patriots were much irritated, raged against the king, M. de Hardenberg, and the policy of the Prussian cabinet, and everywhere repeated that the king was not free, as our own emigrants had done in times past. His ministers said to him that he had perhaps gone too far, and, after having disavowed General d'York, he refused to publish the disavowal.

While the minds of men in Berlin were excited to the highest pitch, the French, who guarded that capital, and who had lost nothing of their self-confidence, responded to the language of German patriotism in language no less irritating, and in the highest degree imprudent. Though Augereau, who commanded at Berlin, showed himself on this occasion more than

usually reserved, some young officers said that the French would not allow themselves to be again duped by the Prussians; that they were on their guard; that on the first act of treason they would disarm the Prussian troops; that they would even carry the court to Potsdam, and put an end to a power in which no confidence could be placed. Such language as this, (which was but the result of the irritating language of the Prussians,) when repeated to the king, inspired him at first with terror, and subsequently suggested a species of refined policy. Hitherto, the thought of abandoning France had not presented itself to his mind; but that of becoming more independent of her, as events allowed, of assuming an intermediate position between her and her enemies, and thus of perhaps contributing to an advantageous peace,—a thought naturally arising from circumstances and fostered by the suggestions of Austria,—had taken full possession of him. The only way to realize it was for the king to leave the town of Berlin, which the Russians were approaching in their pursuit and the French in their retreat, to establish his court in Silesia, at Breslau, for example,—a plan which was by no means new, for it had been proposed the year before,—there to stipulate with the Russians and French for the neutrality of that province, and to await the course of events. It was necessary to profit by the opportunity to arm to a great extent,—a measure which ought to please the German patriots, who would hope to turn these armaments against the French, and would leave the French without ground of objection, for they had just required Prussia to double her contingent.

In order to meet these armaments without having recourse to new imposts, the king proposed to require Napoleon to pay for the supplies afforded to the French army. It had, indeed, been agreed in the last treaty of alliance that the expense of these supplies should be settled promptly, that the payment should be deducted from the 48,000,000 still due by Prussia, and that if the amount should exceed that sum the surplus should be paid in money. But the royal administrators reckoned the value of all supplies furnished to the French army at 94,000,000. There remained, therefore, 46,000,000 to be recovered, with which the Prussian army might be increased threefold, and raised from 42,000 men to 120,000, and, by uniting with Austria, urge upon both parties reasonable conditions of peace. France, from being a creditor having become a debtor, ought, in virtue of previous treaties, immediately to restore the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, and thus the king might find himself established in Silesia at the head of 120,000 men, levied without any expense to the country, supported by all the strongholds of the Oder, approved by the patriots who called on him to arise, free from the reproaches of France, to whom he offered to remain faithful if she would execute literally her engagements and restore to Prussia a suitable position. Thus, in the midst of his perplexities, the king, believing Napoleon to be still the stronger party, did not dream of betraying him, but hoped to secure from him better treatment than formerly, intended to exact this from him, and thus to contribute to a general pacification

which should leave himself independent and even aggrandized.

He had announced the mission to Paris of M. de Hatzfeldt, who had become, as we have said, a strong partisan of France in Prussia,—a mission whose principal object was to remove all suspicion of participation in the defection of General d'York. M. de Hatzfeldt was charged to lay before the French Government the following proposals: the transference of the Prussian court to Breslau to be beyond the theatre of hostilities; the extension of the Prussian armaments in favour of the French alliance; the reimbursement of the money due for the payment of these armaments; finally, the restitution of the fortresses of the Oder, in conformity with the treaties, and to tranquillise the public mind. M. de Hatzfeldt might be called upon for explanations in regard to a singular proposal which Napoleon on his return from Russia had indirectly addressed to the court of Prussia,—to unite itself closely to France by a family connection, as Austria had done, and to espouse the heir to the throne to a French princess, thereafter to be selected. Napoleon had implied that, in consideration for this alliance, he would restore to Prussia part of the territory and independence which she had lost. But the time was past when the courts of Europe could determine, in consideration of Napoleon's power, to form alliances with his family. M. de Hatzfeldt was, therefore, to avoid this subject carefully, and openly to declare that, if his proposals were rejected, Prussia would consider herself free from any engagement with France.

The court of Austria was in exactly the same perplexity; but, while her escape from it was facilitated by a greater amount of ability, it was not impeded so much by an impassioned public or by troublesome scruples. After having maintained four obstinate wars against France, and displayed a singular perseverance in hatred, her emperor had at length believed himself in error, and that it would be better to come to some understanding with France than obstinately continue to contend with her. The conduct of the different courts of Europe was calculated to remove from her all scruple on the subject, for Russia had accepted the French alliance of Tilsit, and had not annulled it in consequence of the events at Bayonne, and Prussia had exhibited only one regret, that of not being included in it. A high minister, M. de Metternich, had come from Paris after the battle of Wagram to advise his master to adopt the French alliance as the only true policy, and, moreover, to place his daughter as a security. The Emperor Francis, after having consulted his daughter, whom he was incapable of constraining, had consented to the proposal, and had become first the father-in-law and then the ally of his enemy. Was he then to be deceived again on this occasion, and his minister likewise? After having both recognised the inconveniences of a hostile policy, should they prove to have abandoned it only at the moment when it was about to be the true policy, and were they to become wise only when too late? These questions they might propose to themselves, as did the King of Prussia and M. de Hardenberg, on observing the course of events, but they were not the people to trouble them-

selves so much about them, because they were better fitted to extricate themselves from the difficulty. The Emperor Francis, a man of subtle genius, calm and somewhat satirical, and also a good father, whatever may be said, had seen in the Moscow catastrophe only an opportunity for inducing France to set a higher estimate on the Austrian alliance and to pay a higher price for it, and, if she were to refuse a fair price, of offering it elsewhere, without, however, going further than to impose on the belligerents a peace purely Germanic. His daughter, though a little less powerful, would still be sufficiently so, and Austria having become more powerful and Germany more independent, he would have fulfilled all his duties as a sovereign without failing in his duties as a father. In recent events, therefore, he saw no cause for affliction, but rather of secret joy, which would have been unmingled, if he had not been exposed to the sarcasms of those who blamed so ill-timed a marriage. M. de Metternich was occupied with other thoughts. Was he, by obstinately continuing in an error, if indeed his policy had been such, to perish in order to maintain his consistency? Such conduct is pursued in free countries, where every thing is done in the face of the world, and where one is constrained to maintain consistency. In absolute governments, on the contrary, where every thing occurs in silence and is judged by the result, it is not necessary to adopt such a course. M. de Metternich, who in 1810 had not made it a point of honour to oppose France to his own destruction, had no intention in 1818 of serving her to the same extremity. He had staked his greatness on a policy which seemed to him good, and was about to do so on another policy when that should appear good in its turn. He had also, in the interest of his country, a very sufficient reason for such conduct. By changing his plan, he saw the means not only of preserving his own position, but also of rendering to Austria a higher and to Germany a more independent position, and there was no room for hesitation. Much inferior motives have often led to a change of policy; but it was necessary carefully to avoid any imprudence, for although, according to the last news from Poland, Napoleon seemed to be more conquered than was at first believed, he was not destroyed; he might still inflict terrible blows, perhaps regain all his power, and cruelly punish unfaithful allies. It was, therefore, necessary to pass by a skilful transition which should insure the safety of Austria, the dignity of the Emperor Francis, and the credit of his minister. Without renouncing the alliance, to speak at once of peace, first for themselves and then for the rest of those engaged, particularly for France, was perfectly natural, explicable, and honourable, in reality as well as in appearance. While speaking ostensibly of this peace to France they might secretly stipulate the conditions first with Prussia, then with Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and all the oppressed German States. After having thus concerted this peace with Germany, to whom they should endeavour to restore her independence without disputing to France a greatness which nobody denied, they should arm with the greatest activity, which would be applauded in Prussia as well as in Austria, by the German patriots,

and supported by France herself, who had demanded an augmentation of contingents from all her allies, after which they would offer that peace to Russia, England, and France, and they would not hesitate to enforce it on any objecting party. One hundred thousand Prussians, two hundred thousand Austrians, one hundred thousand Saxons, Bavarians, Wurtembergians, Hessians, &c. were to decide the contest in favour of France, if she should accept the conditions accepted by Russia and England, or against her, if the refusal should come from her side. Provided they did not hasten too much, and that they took time to arm before declaring themselves, that they allowed the belligerents to exhaust themselves still more, if they were anxious for further slaughter, the later they should come forward the better; and not only would there thus be the means of attaining a patriotic result for Germany, but also of maintaining perfect consistency in their own conduct, for a peace which, while raising Germany, should in no degree really lower France, and would deduct nothing from her actual state, but some features of exorbitant greatness intolerable to her neighbours, might be proposed to her without any infringement of the alliance, and with so much the more foundation that in order to make her accept a peace of this nature it would be certainly necessary to threaten Russia and England with all the forces of the Germanic powers. If at length, after having behaved with so much moderation, Napoleon should refuse all reasonable arrangements, they would be free from all engagements with him, and might exhibit to him the sword of Austria without any cause for shame at their own conduct.

M. de Metternich perceived at once, and with singular political genius, the advantage he might derive from this situation, and he resolved, while saving his own fortune from an erroneous step, to repair that of Austria and of Germany, without failing in his obligations to France, of which he was the actual and avowed ally. Being in all points agreed with the Emperor Francis, who in this conduct saw alike consulted his interests as a sovereign, his duties as a father, and his honour as a man and a prince, he acted from the beginning with the promptitude, consistency, and firmness of a resolution the result of wise reflection. He instantly began the armaments of Austria: he then proceeded to form secret connections with Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, to speak to them all of a peace conceived in the interest of Germany, and at the same time to speak to France of an approaching peace sufficiently glorious, but urgent and indispensable to her as well as to all the other countries of Europe. In reply to the letter addressed by Napoleon from Dresden to the Emperor of Austria, M. de Metternich caused his father-in-law to write a friendly and paternal letter, advising peace without alternation, as father-in-law, friend, and ally. M. de Bubna, who had been sent to Paris in compliance with the request of Napoleon that there should be some one of importance at Paris to represent the Emperor Francis, was enjoined to profess the fidelity of Austria to the French alliance, but strongly to recommend peace, in the name of Europe, to whom it was necessary, and of France, to whom it was no less so; to

say that unless they took care they would perhaps soon find the whole world raised against Napoleon, in which case the struggle would be fearful; to say this in all friendliness, and without any assumption of authority, but in a tone of profound conviction, and which should at a later period authorize them to consider themselves freed from an ally who was deaf to all wise counsels. M. de Bubna was even positively charged to offer the intervention of Austria, with the assurance that no further appeal would be made to mediation with the different belligerent powers.

Such were the communications which, early in January, 1813, assailed all at once the mind of Napoleon. Instead of the imposing remains of the grand army collected on the Niemen, and there resisting the Russians from Grodno to Königsberg until they should be joined by 800,000 young soldiers, Napoleon beheld these remains almost destroyed, falling back upon the Oder without being able to stop at any point, closely pressed upon in front by the Russians, and urgently threatened on the rear by the Germans; he heard the enthusiastic cries of Germany ready to rise *en masse*, and he was surrounded by allies who, while formally professing fidelity, gave advice, intimated conditions, and not only gave reason to doubt of their own devotion, but seemed themselves to doubt that of France, exhausted by the loss of blood and weary of despotism.

Though he possessed the heart of a soldier who passes without dejection from prosperity to the reverse, Napoleon was deeply affected; but he resolved to nerve himself, and not to exhibit the agitations of his soul, which was alternately the subject of the most sinister presentiments and the blindest illusions.

After having yielded to the first movement of irritation against Murat, to whom he unjustly imputed the misfortunes of the retreat, to such a degree as for a time to have thought of ordering his arrest,\* he calmed himself, confirmed the nomination of Prince Eugene, whom he would have chosen himself had he been on the spot, and caused the change to be announced in the *Moniteur* in the following terms, very galling to Murat: "The King of Naples, being indisposed, has relinquished the command of the army, which he has placed in the hands of the viceroy. That prince is more accustomed to an extensive administration, and he enjoys the entire confidence of the Emperor."

Napoleon then prescribed, with his usual soundness of judgment, the arrangements required by circumstances. He expressed confidence in Prince Eugene in order to encourage him; he endeavoured to assure him that the Russians would never dare to advance when they saw 40,000 Frenchmen on their right in the fortresses of the Vistula, and on their left, around Warsaw, 40,000 Saxons and Austrians, still faithful though not very active. Though he was unwilling to fatigue or compromise by

premature movements the troops assembled at Berlin, he authorised Prince Eugene to bring nearer to himself the Lagrange division and General Grenier's corps, and said to him with truth that having in that case nearly 40,000 men, with the 10,000 who followed headquarters, he would certainly not be attacked by the Russians if he assumed a firm and decided attitude. And at most, he would only have to pass a month in this manner, for Napoleon, who had not lost a minute during twenty days that he had been in Paris, would be prepared to send to the Elbe a reinforcement of 60,000 men, which would raise the forces of Prince Eugene to 100,000 men, and would place him beyond the attack of any enemy whatever. Besides, the Russians, being obliged to leave at least 60,000 men before the fortresses of the Lower Vistula, and 40,000 under Warsaw, had not the means of advancing any important force for offensive measures. Posen and the Oder appeared, then, to be the extreme term of our fatal retreat.

The most urgent demand was for cavalry, of which the Russians had an immense force, regular and irregular, and they diffused terror in all directions by sending before them the Cossacks, who were feared because they were not known to be so little formidable that a small infantry-force was sufficient to put them to flight. Several thousand horsemen ought to have been immediately at command, and Prince Eugene had no more than 3000, whether in the remains of the Guard or in the cavalry which had come from Italy with General Grenier. Napoleon ordered General Bourcier, who was charged with the office of procuring horses in Germany and Poland, to pay ready money to any extent for horses, to take them by force when they were not to be bought, and then to remount the cavalry who had come from Russia on foot, and to forward, without delay, to Prince Eugene all that he should be able to equip. Napoleon also invited all the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, in the interest of their own states, which were exposed to the incursions of the Cossacks, to send him all their disposable cavalry, were it no more than a squadron of one hundred men. The King of Saxony had kept two regiments of cuirassiers, and two of hussars and chasseurs, forming a body of about 2400 excellent horsemen. Napoleon urgently requested them of him, to be sent to Posen. All these efforts were in a few days to procure 3000 or 4000 horsemen for Prince Eugene, who would thus have 6000 or 7000, with whom he might check the incursions of the enemy.

Napoleon recommended Prince Eugene, after having provided with strong garrisons the two principal forts on the Vistula, Thorn and Dantzic, to send back to the forts of the Oder the remains of the ancient corps, which had been first appointed to muster on the Vistula; immediately to provision Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau; for this purpose to employ money, and, after money, force; to carry on, for ten or fifteen leagues round, grain, cattle, and especially wood,—to procure which, they were even to cut down trees on the public promenades, not to disturb themselves about the Prussian authorities, with whom they would subsequently come to an understanding; then to occupy him-

\* The following document proves this almost incredible fact:—

"TO THE VICEROY.

"FONTAINEBLEAU, Jan. 23, 1813.

"I have received your letter of the 16th. I have already assured you that I see with pleasure the army in your hands. The conduct of the King [of Naples] appears to me extravagant, and such as almost to induce me to arrest him for the sake of example," &c.

self with the forts of the Elbe, destined to form a third line, namely, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, to arm and provision them; to collect into these places the matériel, and the public chests, the principal of which, that of Wilna, they had allowed to be taken from them, which had cost 10,000,000; to have in each place only such funds as were indispensable; to direct to the Rhine almost all the cadres of the grand army, since it was necessary to relinquish the hope of forming with the soldiers who had returned from Russia, not three, not two, but even one; to preserve one cadre of the battalion for every 600 men; to send back the rest, and especially that mass of generals without troops, who at head-quarters indulged in the most dangerous language, to keep to himself only Marshal Ney, to launch upon the first Russians who should present themselves; finally, to press on the reorganization of the Polish troops, to furnish them with the money they required, to encourage them, as to their fate, by announcing that, whatever should be the destiny of Poland, the Poles should be all in the pay of France, and should be Frenchmen if they could not be Poles.

These arrangements, which demanded immediate attention, having been thus made, he engaged in the formation of measures of a more fundamental character. These measures, though determined in his own mind from the first day, were, however, still the subject of some doubt in respect to their extent, because he had wished before declaring them, that circumstances should have been more fully developed. The melancholy condition of all the wrecks of the army, a retrograde movement which, instead of being arrested at Königsberg, Kowno, or Grodno, had not been arrested even at Posen, the defection of General d'York, the popular movement throughout Germany of which that defection had been the signal, were events of so grave a character, that it became proper and even urgent to address the French nation, to demand great efforts, and to urge the expression of their patriotic sentiments, in reply to the national excitement which had been suddenly kindled against them.

Napoleon had at command, as we have said, about 140,000 conscripts of 1813, levied in September, and now filling the dépôts. He had, in addition, a hundred battalions of cohorts, perfectly trained, consisting of grown-up men, but in respect of officers only provisionally supplied. Here was a first resource of 240,000 or 250,000 men, very important, and almost capable of being rendered immediately serviceable. Napoleon resolved to double the number at once, and to raise it to 800,000 men.

Owing to the facilities afforded by the institution of the National Guard, which had been divided into three bands, comprising citizens of from twenty to twenty-six years of age, those from twenty-six to forty, and those from forty to sixty, by drawing men from the first band, they had formed cohorts of unmarried men, less necessary than others to their families, but of mature strength. Napoleon resolved to procure about 100,000 moremen of this quality by falling back upon the classes of 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, and subjecting them to a new appeal. At the present day in France only the fourth or fifth part of each class is taken, in order to

avoid exhausting the population, and every class is free after having yielded its quota. At that time they took the third part, and then fell back upon the classes which had already furnished their contingent, and made a fresh selection of men of twenty-two, twenty-three, and twenty-four years of age, who were more mature in physical strength and stature than at twenty-one. It was by an appeal of this kind to the classes formerly exonerated that Napoleon expected to procure the additional 100,000 grown men whom he required, with whom he wished to recompose the special corps. But the last six classes having supplied men to the cohorts in virtue of the laws referring to the National Guard, he only addressed himself to the last four, those of 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812. Finally, he resolved immediately to enforce the conscription of 1814, which was to replace in the dépôts that of 1813, so that, when the active armies were completed, the dépôts would be still full. Thus, of 600,000 men whom he had at his disposal, 350,000 would immediately set off to form with those remaining on the Vistula and Oder,—a body of 450,000 fighting-men,—while he should retain in the dépôts 150,000 to guard the interior and the frontiers, without deducting any thing from the effective force of the armies in Spain. Napoleon also designed to secure an amount of voluntary offerings, which, beside their material value, should give the impression of a great national demonstration.

Of the 600,000 men of whom we have spoken, a legislative decree was requisite for only 350,000. In fact, the conscription of 1813 had been already voted and levied; the 100,000 men of the cohorts were already collected, but a vote of the Senate was necessary to authorize their employment beyond the frontiers; the 100,000 men who were to be taken from the last four classes, and the conscription of 1814, were to be demanded. A *Senatus-consultum* was prepared, embracing these different measures; to it was added a report by M. de Bassano, in which the defection of General d'York was related forcibly and at full length, and the movements in Germany were represented as anarchical agitations excited by the sovereigns at the instigation of England, and a comparison was drawn between the regular order maintained in France and the disorder imprudently favoured in Europe by princes of ancient origin, and, in short, an attempt was made to awaken, in addition to hatred of the foreigner, a great fear of revolutionary troubles, a fear which the conspiracy of General Malet had already diffused through France.

Before sending this *Senatus-consultum* to the Senate, Napoleon determined to convoke an extraordinary council, in which he should converse with some eminent personages on the condition of Europe, and the measures to be adopted in order to terminate the great struggle in which they were engaged. Little accustomed to consult even his own ministers, unless in a private manner on special objects, and exclusively reserving to himself the whole power of government, he had become a little more communicative since his misfortunes, and without being more inclined to follow the advice of others, he was inclined to present the semblance of so doing, in order to secure their co-

operation. Besides, he was resolved to act as a soldier, to lay aside the sovereign, of which he had made too great a display in the campaign of 1812, to be truly General Bonaparte, and thus to revert to those times when, working day and night, almost living on horseback, he obtained, at the price of infinite labour, the favours which fortune seemed to heap upon him. He was then resolved to expiate his errors by prodigies of application and energy, but, unhappily, he was not resolved to expiate them by moderation, for in order to save himself (which he might still do) it would have been necessary to disarm the world by two means—force and moderation. But of these two means he only allowed one, viz., force: not that he never thought of peace, which, on the contrary, he urgently and sincerely desired; but he wished first to conquer in order to regain his ascendancy, and then to dictate peace on his own conditions, superficially accommodated to circumstances, but not corresponding to the present state of public feeling, nor to the change which had occurred in the dispositions of Europe.

Since his return, the desire for speedy peace was unanimous in those who surrounded him. The arch-chancellor, with his wonted gravity and reserve, M. de Talleyrand, with an indifference sometimes real, sometimes affected, the Duke of Rovigo, with the boldness of one accustomed to give ready utterance to every sentiment, M. Mollien, with the chagrin of a financier in debt, and, among the high officers of the court, the Grand-Marshal Duroc, with his discreet wisdom, M. de Caulaincourt, with the firmness of a good citizen, insinuated, or openly declared, that peace was absolutely necessary, whether advantageous or otherwise, on the pain of destruction. M. de Caulaincourt, who, in these circumstances, behaved in a manner to deserve the eternal esteem of good men, was the boldest and most resolute in demanding peace. To all these arguments Napoleon replied that he also desired peace and perceived the necessity of it, but that it was necessary to gain it by a last grand effort,—which was perfectly true. He added that they must not too readily display their desire of peace, for if it were believed in Europe that the courage of France were shaken, every thing would be lost,—which was also true, but upon one condition, viz., that, while showing themselves ready to fight, they should not remove all hope from those who, for some concessions, were ready, like Austria, to unite with us in order to impose moderation on all.

Among the great personages around Napoleon who, emboldened by danger, perhaps, also, by the diminution of his prestige, began to express their opinion, one only, M. de Bassano, was as confident as if the events in Russia had never occurred. Napoleon, according to him, was invincible though conquered, would soon repair a misfortune which, after all, was merely a severe winter, would again place Europe at his feet, and dictate the conditions of a general peace. These vain words, the true value of which Napoleon well knew, were, nevertheless, pleasing to him, and he loved to hear it said that he was as powerful as ever, however little he believed it himself. Yet it would, perhaps, have been possible to provide him with a less

dangerous and more agreeable pleasure, by incessantly pressing upon him the urgent and absolute necessity of making sacrifices, and thus preparing for his wounded pride an excuse for yielding.

We repeat, that Napoleon did not repel the idea of negotiations: he merely disputed on the forms to be employed in opening them. A purely political question presented itself of great importance, which was warmly discussed around Napoleon, notwithstanding the habitual silence observed by those who approached him. Admitting the principle of negotiations, it remained to determine how they should be entered on,—whether they ought to comply with the views of Austria, by consenting to her assuming the part she seemed anxious to adopt, or whether, neglecting all mediation, more or less sincere and disinterested, they should go direct to the adverse party, i.e. to Russia, to come to an open understanding with her, and put an end to a useless and disastrous struggle. M. de Caulaincourt, accustomed to treat with the Russian court, full of the souvenirs of 1810 and 1811, struck with the efforts of the Emperor Alexander to avoid war, hoped, by presenting himself to that prince, to induce him to accept a peace honourable to each party; nor was it the desire to regain a great diplomatic employment, which he had voluntarily resigned, which made him thus speak, but his devotion to a dynasty to which he was attached, and to France, which he believed in danger. M. de Bassano was of a totally opposite opinion. Having many private connections with the court of Vienna since the marriage of Napoleon, he wished to negotiate through Austria, and thus to become the author of a peace universally desired, and which he himself desired, but in the same manner as Napoleon, i.e. on conditions which rendered it impossible. M. de Talleyrand, (who employed in ridiculing M. de Bassano the time which he no longer consecrated to the state, and whom Napoleon might have rendered useful to himself by calling him to the ministry,) by very plausible reasons and by dislike to M. de Bassano, was, contrary to his custom, opposed to Austria, and to the importance which it was proposed to assign to her.

It is true that the proceedings of the court of Vienna justified the fear that, in offering to assume the part of mediator, she might rapidly pass from that office to one of a more important character, and, after having modestly advised peace, might end by imposing it by force of arms. In her relations with France particularly, the mediation, which commenced in language the most friendly, and even paternal, was a very convenient method of passing from the condition of ally to that of arbiter, and, if neglected in that character, perhaps before long to that of enemy. Accordingly, the most prudent and able conduct was to allow her as little share as possible in the present conjuncture, to renounce her services, military and political, unless willing to pay the price of them, and to neglect her mediation and address Russia directly. But a difficulty almost insurmountable in the adoption of this course was found in the altered disposition of the Emperor Alexander. M. de Caulaincourt had left him timid, trembling at the idea of meeting Napoleon in the field, and ready to make the greatest sacrifices to avoid

to an extremity. But suddenly, raised by extraordinary events to the position of conqueror of Napoleon, elevated in the highest degree by such a novel situation, inflated with the hope of being the liberator of Europe, intoxicated by the applause of Germany, he had become inaccessible, and probably M. de Caulaincourt, if treated with personal regard, but without concession, would have been the last to endure with patience so total and sudden a change, and would have hastily broken off communications. Direct intercourse with Alexander was, therefore, almost impracticable, and hence there was no possible avenue to negotiations at through the mediation of Austria. In this point of view M. de Bassano was right; here he was deceived was in the manner of employing the good offices of the court of Vienna, and especially of rewarding them. In reality that court had no intention to destroy or to abuse France, first from fear, (for she stood always in fear of Napoleon,) and also from a sense of propriety, for the marriage was so recent not to be allowed some weight. But he wished to profit by the opportunity to improve the position of Austria and of Germany, which was very natural and legitimate. This was necessary to recognise and to admit, however disagreeable, because we had become exposed to such a humiliation by the commission of great errors, and because, in reality, the true interest of France was less compromised than the self-love of Napoleon, and, having made up our mind to this, it was right to enter frankly into communication with Vienna, to come to a clear understanding with her, and then to leave all in her hands, while we should win a few more great battles, which would give her an additional right to enforce reasonable terms on the allied powers, and would enable us to purchase her services at a less exorbitant price.

If unwilling to yield to circumstances, which, next to the Russian expedition, was the saddest of all errors, there was just one other course that might be pursued, viz., while affecting to maintain good terms with Austria, and listening to her counsels with apparent deference, to remain at a distance from her, not to endeavour to employ her, to demand of her no service, either diplomatic or military; for every demand of a diplomatic character authorized her to interfere in the conditions of peace, which would be one step towards dictating them, and every demand of a military character would authorize her to arm, which would be a step towards making war upon us.

It was therefore necessary either to address Bassano directly and immediately, if that were possible, or, if otherwise, to address Austria openly, cordially, and with full intention of rewarding her services, or, finally, if they had not the wisdom to do this, to employ her as little as possible, and not contribute to the increase of her importance and strength, which might soon be turned against ourselves. These were the only reasonable views in the present conjuncture.

These different questions of peace, of the method of negotiation, and of the extent of armaments, Napoleon wished to treat in a special council, which he summoned at the Tuilleries early in January, and which he com-

posed of thoroughly competent men. In a country where the ministers would have been responsible, that is to say, the real directors of affairs, it would have been right to admit only the ministers; in a country where he was the sole author of every determination, he selected from those around him the most experienced in the subjects which were to be treated. He wished if possible to derive some light from this council, but especially to test the pacific dispositions, and, when once a system should have been adopted, to secure perfect uniformity in will and language.

The persons summoned, principally on the designation of M. de Bassano, were, in addition to M. de Bassano himself, the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, Prince Talleyrand, M. de Caulaincourt, M. le Duc de Cadore, (de Champagny,) formerly ambassador and minister of foreign affairs, and, finally, the two principal clerks of that department, MM. de la Besnardière and d'Hauterive. Certainly it would have been difficult to combine more sagacity and a greater degree of true desire to save Napoleon and the State.

Napoleon, with calmness and gravity, briefly explained the situation and ordered the decrees to be presented to the Senate to be read, and then stated as follows the question which he wished to solve:—"I wish peace, but I do not fear war. Notwithstanding the losses occasioned to us by the severity of the climate, we have still great resources. Tranquillity prevails at home. The nation will not renounce her glory and her power. Abroad, Austria, Prussia, and Denmark give the strongest assurances of fidelity. Austria does not dream of breaking an alliance from which she expects the greatest advantages. The King of Prussia offers to reinforce his contingent, and has just brought General d'York before a court-martial. Russia requires peace. Though besieged by the intrigues of England, I do not think that she will persist in a struggle which must ultimately prove fatal to her.

"I have ordered a levy of 850,000 men," (making, as has been said, 500,000 with the conscription of 1813;) "the *Senatus-consult* has been prepared and will be presented to you. Another decree is prepared for the convocation of the legislative body, on which I have no further demands to make, but whose presence might be useful in the present conjuncture, and to whom it is possible that some legislative measures may be proposed. After having thus regulated the development of our forces, ought we to await proposals of peace, or to be the first to offer them? If we take the initiative, ought we to treat directly with Russia, or is it better to address ourselves to Austria and to demand her intervention? Such are the questions on which I ask you to throw light."

After this concise and firm exposition, every one expressed his own sentiments.

M. de Caulaincourt maintained, as a man thoroughly convinced and as a good citizen, the necessity of peace and the propriety of treating directly with Russia. He supported this opinion by considerations which ought to have great weight, as the life of a man who had lived at St. Petersburg so long and so highly respected. The wise Cambacérès, with his wonted instinctive prudence, inclining to

address at once the strongest party on whom every thing depended,—i.e. the Emperor of Russia,—and to terminate every thing with him on the best conditions possible, and having little confidence in Austria, who only offered her good offices in hopes of a high reward, agreed with M. de Caulaincourt, and urgently supported his proposal. M. de Talleyrand, in a few brief and sententious words, advised an immediate application to Russia, in order to secure peace in the speediest and most direct manner, and, in his opinion, at no higher price than if through the medium of Austria.

After these gentlemen, M. de Bassano expressed the contrary opinion at great length; and, supporting himself by the reports which he received every day, spoke with much reason of the difficulty of getting access to Russia, every approach to whom was closed; and, on the contrary, of the facility of treating through Austria, all the ways to whom were spontaneously opened; combining the illusions of a credulous mind with a correct opinion, he placed the most entire confidence in the disinterestedness of the court of Vienna in her attachment to the alliance; finally, in the love of the father-in-law to the son-in-law, and affirmed that in that quarter every thing would be easy and even certain, without indicating the price at which they might obtain the service of Austria, which was requisite in order to render his opinion complete, and which would have rendered it in the highest degree judicious.

M. de Champagny, modest and sensible, seeing great difficulties in treating with Russia and great facilities in treating with Austria, inclined to place confidence in the latter court, where he had for some time resided, and willing to pay for her services the price she might demand, agreed with M. de Bassano. M. d'Hauterive, whose opinion was predetermined, and M. de la Bernardière, a subtle and caustic mind, though willingly ridiculing the policy of M. de Bassano, but subject to him from interest, both pronounced themselves in favour of the opinion of the minister who was the chief of their department. There were therefore four voices against three in favour of the Austrian intervention.

In order that such a counsel should be of use, it would have been necessary to have taken a step farther in adopting the Austrian mediation as the only admissible plan, and have discussed the conditions on which the good offices of that court could be obtained, frankly to have stated these conditions and to have enforced their acceptance; for we shall soon see they were such as might be accepted, or else, if rejected, to have shown that it was necessary to behave with sufficient art to elude the intervention of Austria instead of seeking it, in order to diminish instead of exalting the part she was to play, to retard her determinations, and thus to have time to overcome the allies before she should throw herself on their side.

But Napoleon did not require that they should go so far, and, blinded by his desires, perceived, when too late, the error they were about to commit. What he saw very well was that at the present moment the only method of opening negotiations was through the court of Vienna. But he was unwilling to calculate the cost: he hoped to act upon his father-in-law through the

Empress, and thus to obtain from Austria services both diplomatic and military; and he persuaded himself that by giving her Illyria, which had been already promised in compensation for Galicia, and by giving it her on this occasion without any return, she would hold herself sufficiently rewarded. This was a fatal error, and one which was destined to be nearly as fatal as the Russian expedition. Besides, being desirous that the negotiations should be ostensibly carried on to satisfy the public mind, he thought it becoming his dignity to allow his father-in-law to negotiate without himself appearing in the transaction.

According to his custom in those rare and solemn political councils in which he did not express his own opinion, though he expressed it with force and imperiousness in the administrative councils, he thanked the members without explaining himself, and appeared, however, inclined to the opinion of the majority; which was to treat for peace through the intervention of Austria, at the same time to make a great display of forces, to present to the Senate the *Senatus-consultum* for the levy of 350,000 men, and to delay for some weeks the convocation of the legislative body, which at the present moment might too powerfully agitate the public mind.

This conduct was, in fact, immediately adopted, but modified by the errors inseparable from the character of Napoleon, and which the character of M. de Bassano was not calculated to correct. Napoleon, after having listened attentively to M. de Buzot, whom he had gained over to his interests by adroit flattery, wrote to his father-in-law in terms which, though affectionate and friendly, were not adapted to gain him over either by their subject or their form. He recounted his campaign of 1812, which, he said, had been much misrepresented at Vienna by ill-disposed persons, complained of these misrepresentations having been too readily received in the court of his father-in-law, and added, with truth, that the Russians had not once beaten him, that they had been everywhere beaten, that at the Beresina especially they had been crushed, that they had taken neither prisoners nor guns on the field, which was also true, but that the horses having died of cold, it had been necessary to abandon a large quantity of artillery-matériel, that the cavalry, being on foot, could not protect the soldiers who removed to a distance to find provisions, that he had thus lost guns and men, and that consequently the cold was the only cause of what he must call rather a miscalculation than a disaster. Napoleon then made an immense display of his armaments, menacing not only his enemies but to those of his allies who might be inclined to abandon him, which was addressed directly to Prussia, but indirectly to Austria, then concluded by saying that notwithstanding the certainty of throwing back the Russians on the Vistula during the spring, and from the Vistula on the Niemen, he desired peace, and would have offered it if he had terminated this campaign on the enemy's territory, but did not think it consistent with his dignity to offer it in the present state of affairs; he therefore accepted the intervention of Austria, and committed to the mission of Austrian plenipotentiaries to the belligerent courts. He added that, without de-



fining the conditions of this peace, there were certain bases that he could indicate at once, because he was resolved not to allow them to be imposed by others. He said that he would never consent to detach from the Empire what the Senatus-consult had declared part of the constitutional territory; and, therefore, Rome, Piedmont, Tuscany, Holland, and the Hanseatic departments were inviolable and inseparable from the Empire. Thus, Rome and Hamburg, whatever happened, were to have French prefects! He did not explain himself with regard to the duchy of Warsaw, did not say what he wished done with it, nor did he exclude the idea of granting some aggrandizement to Prussia, (which was essential to those who aimed at reconstituting Germany;) but he declared that he would not consent to any territorial aggrandizement to Russia, and would only allow her emancipation from the treaty of Tilsit, —i.e. from the obligations of the continental blockade. As to England, with whom it was not only desirable, but necessary, to treat,—for Russia could not separate herself from that power,—Napoleon confined himself to the letter written to Lord Castlereagh at the moment of leaving for Russia, in which he had laid down as the fundamental principle the *uti possidetis*. According to this principle, Spain was to remain in the possession of Joseph, because it was in his possession at that time; Portugal, which was not, was to belong to the house of Braganza; Naples, which he had conquered, to Murat; Sicily, which he had never occupied, to the Bourbons of Naples: a deplorable result; for, while obtaining on the Continent territories of which we had no need, we lost our colonies beyond the sea, which would then fall into the hands of the English. Certainly nothing could be imagined more imprudent than such a declaration. If we would assume a haughty aspect towards Europe, that she might not insult us in our depression, we should have merely assumed a haughty tone and language; but we ought not to have announced conditions which should render all negotiation impracticable, and which, by depriving Austria of all hope of bringing us to her plan of pacification, must decide her, at heart, to form her decision at once, and hence to precipitate her change of alliance, which we ought to have delayed as long as possible, even if we could have foreseen it and even consented to it.

The essential point at the present moment was, indeed, to divine the desires of Austria, and to satisfy her to such a degree as to attach her to ourselves, since, instead of any wish to remove her from the lists, there was great effort to attract her within them. She was little concerned about our retaining Spain, Holland, and even Naples, provided England could be induced to yield these points. She wished nothing better than to refuse all aggrandizement to Russia either in Turkey or Poland: for such questions as these she would certainly not make war. But the object in which she was really interested was the emancipation of Germany from the yoke which we had imposed upon her,—a yoke which was absolutely insupportable, since, besides the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, we had prefects at Hamburg and at Lubeck, and a French king at Cassel, and had reduced Prussia

to the lowest point. Certainly, Austria was not very sensibly affected for Prussia; but to leave that power in her present state of impotence appeared to her to relinquish one of the essential elements of the Germanic Confederation. She had no desire to resume the Imperial crown,—a burden more oppressive than glorious; but she wished to regain her own independence in that of Germany, to exercise the principal influence in Germany thus reconstituted, and for herself to recover Illyria, to obtain a better frontier on the Inn, to be finally relieved of the grand duchy of Warsaw, for she had little faith in the re-establishment of Poland, and in no case intended to purchase it at the price of Galicia. She had hitherto expressed none of these desires; but a very slight knowledge of her situation was sufficient to foresee them, and one must have been blinded by ambition to deprive her of hope in such important particulars, especially while supported by Russia and England, who would offer her, besides a complete change in Germany, the restitution of all that she desired in Italy, Bavaria, Suabia, the Tyrol, of all that had formerly constituted her glory and power, and of all that was now a source of regret and vexation.

If it were deemed possible, after the destruction of the grand army, and while one-half of our forces were engaged in Spain, to conquer the whole of Europe, including Austria, it would have been at least necessary, for the sake of the next campaign, to leave that power in doubt, and not to give her a powerful motive for accelerating her armaments and precipitating her determinations against us. The most simple dictate of policy was, therefore, by encouraging her hopes, to prevent her embracing the cause of our enemies.

To the ill-advised letter of Napoleon to his father-in-law M. de Bassano added another to M. de Metternich, repeating at much greater length and with even still greater arrogance what Napoleon had said with his wonted hauteur. The armaments of France were therein set forth with ridiculous exaggeration. Prussia, he said, had caused a little suspicion, and we were, therefore, arming 100,000 men and were levying 100 millions. If she should at length pronounce against us, our resources would be augmented by 200,000 men and 200 millions of money. Should a new enemy present themselves, this would be to levy 200,000 more men and 200 millions more money. And little doubt could remain as to the application of these resources; for, after Prussia, there was only Austria which could occasion their existence. We would extend our levies, he said, to 1,200,000 men, if necessary to maintain what he called the constitutional territory of the Empire and the glory of Napoleon. Men spoke, he continued, of the excitement against France! on the contrary, they ought to take care not to push so susceptible a nation to an extremity, ready to rise as one man against any who should detract from their greatness, and to throw themselves with full force upon combined Europe. In such a case, they should witness catastrophes very different indeed from those which had recently engaged their attention. Those who now existed only by the tolerance and generosity of France should be effaced from the map of Europe! M. de Met-

ternich had appeared to give advice: and, as we see, it was returned to him in a manner not calculated to induce a repetition. This strange diplomacy was concluded with expressions of personal respect for the Austrian minister which closely resembled the politeness of a superior to an inferior. In fine, Napoleon and his minister professed to accept the intervention of Austria, but on the terms stated,—i.e. on conditions extorted from Russia after the battle of Friedland, from Austria after Wagram, and they were now, unfortunately, treating after the scenes of Moscow! To gratify Austria, they adopted a measure in keeping with the whole procedure, which was to announce, with great pomp and as interesting family-news, the approaching coronation of the King of Rome, grandson of the Emperor Francis, and the accession of Maria-Louisa to the regency of France,—two projects which occupied the attention of Napoleon, and on which he had conversed with Prince Cambacérès. No doubt these news were totally devoid of interest to the Emperor Francis, and they were calculated in some degree to gratify him; for he loved his daughter, and could not be insensible to the advantage of seeing her in certain cases govern France. But to believe that a gratification of this nature could make him forget the state of Germany and Austria and twenty years of misfortunes, which it depended on him to repair in an instant, was to form a singular idea of Europe and of the means of extricating himself from the dangerous path in which he had become so rashly involved.

Napoleon had also come to an explanation with Prussia, to reply to her excuse for the defection of General d'York, and to the desire she evinced to establish herself in Silesia, and there to form an army with our money, and to avail herself of that asylum to change, like Austria, from an ally to a mediator, from a mediator to an enemy.

Although M. de Saint Marsan seemed not to despair of the court of Prussia if reasonable concessions were made to her, it was plain that very little could be expected of her, governed as she was by irresistible national passions, and that it was not necessary to exercise great self-restraint with respect to her in order to avoid any very serious result. It must be confessed that to consent to her forming armaments to be directed against ourselves, and to give her money, which, though perhaps due, would serve to maintain her threatened hostilities, and which, indeed, we did not possess, would imply absolute infatuation. To consent to her retiring to Silesia, there to treat with Russia, was to consign her to that power with our own hands, to which she was already but too well disposed. Any error, therefore, with regard to the court of Berlin was not much to be dreaded, for with her the evil was without remedy. Napoleon received M. de Krusemark, the ordinary representative of Prussia, and M. de Hatzfeldt, the special envoy, with civility, without relaxing from his customary hauteur, explained to them his recent campaign in his usual manner, which he daily did to those with whom he conversed: he then enlarged upon his vast armaments, on the prompt revenge he was about to take, and affirmed that before three months the Russians would be thrown back not merely behind the

Vistula but the Niemen and the Dnieper. He did not object to the retirement of the court of Prussia to Silesia, as it was natural that she should not wish to dwell in the midst of belligerent armies, but he could not allow her to hold direct communication with Russia on the neutralization of Silesia, in which he perceived an act of positive defection, for the first requirement of Russia would be the abandonment of the French alliance. He confessed himself bound by the last treaty of alliance to pay without delay the supplies furnished to his army: he declared, however, that, on a first examination, the amount appeared to him less than 94,000,000, the sum demanded by the Prussian Government, and even than 48,000,000, the sum due to France; that he would, nevertheless, consent to relieve Prussia from her engagements of 48,000,000; but that, before granting money to a power situated so near his enemies, it would be right to know the purpose to which it was to be applied. With respect to the strongholds of the Vistula and Oder, he reduced the Prussian diplomatists to a dilemma not easy to escape. If Prussia, said he, were his sincere ally, she ought not to regret seeing those places in his hands; if she were not, he ought not to restore them to her on any consideration; and, besides, the moment when about to undertake so active a war on the Vistula and Oder was not the time to deprive himself of positions which commanded those two rivers. Then, rising to more general reflections on the state of Prussia, he said that previous events which he could not control had prevented his doing for the house of Brandenburg what he had wished, which he now regretted; but it was not too late; that, the reconstitution of Poland being no longer probable, it was in Germany itself that an intermediate power must be created, able to resist Russia, and that power could be no other than Prussia: that this was his thought, and that he was ready to concur in its accomplishment; that if a reasonable peace were proposed, he was ready to reinforce Prussia in the direction of Poland, and even of Westphalia, if the pacification should be not merely continental but also maritime. To these insinuations Napoleon added expressions of esteem for the king, and gracious but dignified treatment of his representatives, but nothing positively satisfactory with regard to essentials.

At any other time, these half-overtures respecting the future which he designed for Prussia would have afforded great consolation to Frederick William; but at present, under the sway of excited public opinion and in opposition to magnificent promises made to him by Russia and England, these vague hopes were but weak bonds to unite him to us, especially while we refused him two things to which he attached great importance,—money, and the fortress on the Oder and Vistula. The king was economical in finance as he was prudent in policy. At the moment he wished to arm in order to be on a level with circumstances, and he wished to arm without expense. Moreover, he wished to be master in his own dominions, and this he thought he could never be while the French occupied at once Spandau, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, Thorn, and Danzig. These two refusals, therefore, could not but affect him

powerfully, and hasten his approximation to our enemies.

While Napoleon was thus explaining himself with our reputed German allies, he neglected nothing to make himself independent of them. He referred to the Senate the decrees we have mentioned, which, in addition to the conscription of 1813 already decreed, and even levied, added the right of disposing of the cohorts, the demand of 100,000 men from the last four classes, and the immediate levy of the conscription for 1814. It was impossible to refuse these measures. They were submissively voted by the Senate. They would have been voted with enthusiasm by a free assembly, and with the expression of sentiments most beneficial in their influence on the national mind. No one could doubt that the Government had been in the wrong, and had foolishly compromised a grandeur purchased at the cost of so much blood. But no man of judgment and patriotism could deny that, when the foreigner had been brought upon France, it was necessary to resist him and to repel him, even though on the condition of afterwards treating at the cost of great concessions, which France might make without weakening her power. These concessions should be made after victories which should restore not, indeed, the glory of our arms, which was already imperishable, but the prestige of invincibility which they had lost. Enlightened men, therefore, agreed that it would be right to make a final effort and then to conclude a peace. But the fate of enlightened men is to be seldom heard either by princes or people. The body of the nation, hitherto so abjectly submissive to Napoleon, were now disposed to censure and murmur, and, in a word, to be discontented at the new burdens with which they saw themselves threatened. The relatives of those young persons who were to become heroes on the field of battle bitterly complained, and in public places loudly raised their voices against repeated conscriptions, incessant wars, conquests so remote that even patriotism could scarcely take interest in them. These sentiments were felt with increased force in the lower classes, because the sufferings of the conscription were particularly severe upon them, while their defective political knowledge prevented them from perceiving the necessity of a great final effort. In the streets of Paris the utmost audacity prevailed, to an extent surprising under such a regime. A young man of twenty-two years of age, taken by the conscription, placed himself in the faubourg Saint Antoine, in the way of Napoleon, who had gone on horseback to visit that faubourg, and addressed him in the most offensive terms, notwithstanding the prestige which always surrounded his person. The crowd prevented his apprehension by the police. Frequently had young men, who were in reality malefactors, been delivered by the people from the police by exclaiming that they were conscripts dragged away by violence. One of them had been rescued by the market-women, who by themselves had succeeded in disarming the agents of public power, at that time not very numerous in that locality. The invalid soldiers, who required to go from their barracks to the military hospital, situated at the extremity of Paris, were obliged to traverse the whole city for the purpose. The

women had, on several occasions, surrounded them with expressions of sympathy and assiduity, and addressed them as the victims of Bonaparte,\* as he was usually called at any period of discontent, thus reducing him from emperor to general, and depriving him of a sceptre which he employed with so much cruelty.

These dispositions were still more marked in the country, though expressed with less noise, especially in those districts where the conscription had met with the greatest opposition, as in the West and South. We can easily understand how greatly the reports from Moscow would augment the dislike to military service,—a dislike not naturally prevalent in France, but rendered so by the continuity of the wars and the frightful effusion of blood. When once at their colours our conscripts became the gayest and most intrepid of soldiers; but, until then, they murmured, and their families loudly lamented. Especially along the Rhine, the recitals of soldiers returning from Russia produced the worst effect. Men belonging to the old cadres returning by Mentz were heard to say to the conscripts on their way to their corps, "Where are you going? To the army? Wait, then, till the Emperor conducts you there himself, and in the mean while return home,"†—an insolent allusion to the departure from Smorgoni, which many soldiers of the grand army had never forgiven to Napoleon.

To this discontent of the masses were added gloomy anticipations, unwonted terrors. Alarming reports were circulated, echoed from Moscow to Strasbourg and Mentz, to the effect that some marshals had been killed or captured, that others had lost their reason, were dying or dead. It was said that a bloody battle had been fought between the Imperial Guard and the army, and that ferocious barbarians were at hand, ready to pour down upon France. In Italy, where the marvellous is wont to mingle with the terrible, it was predicted that the whole Italian peninsula should be suddenly submerged and deluged by the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Among a superstitious people this absurd rumour caused an indescribable alarm.‡ The Italian priests, always unfriendly to us, though apparently submissive, contributed not a little to the propagation of these foolish apprehensions and to every possible form of excitement, especially in the country-parts.

In the departments of Old France these discontents and alarms never reached sedition, for, though the government was oppressive, it was still national; if it was hated, it was not as a foreign intrusion. But, between the Rhine and the Elbe, in Holland, Westphalia, Bremen, and Hamburg, the sight of the English fleets and the approach of the Russians occasioned tumults, and every moment caused an alarm of a general rising. In the grand duchy of Berg—an industrial department greatly incommoded by our commercial regime—they had chosen the moment of conscription to fall upon the presiding functionaries, to beat and drive away

\* I draw no imaginary pictures. I only relate what I have read in the bulletins of the Imperial police addressed to Napoleon.

† I borrow these details from military reports placed before Napoleon.

‡ I speak from the testimony of French authorities in Italy.

the gendarmes, and then rush to the houses of the custom-house officers and collectors, which they laid waste and demolished. At Hamburg, where the French authority was hated, both as foreign and as representing the continental blockade, on the occasion of the departure of a cohort they had surrounded it in tumult, prevented its removal, and ran upon the custom-house officers and collectors, abusing them and shouting, "Long live Alexander! Long live the Cossacks!" The French authorities would have been instantly expelled but for the aid of cavalry sent by the Danes, our allies and neighbours. Less audacity had been displayed at Amsterdam and Rotterdam; but, throughout Holland, the cry of "Long live Orange!" was frequently heard, and an insurrection at the approach of the enemy was highly probable.

However, when the enlightened classes of a country approve a measure, their support is extremely efficacious. In France, all those classes perceiving that it was necessary energetically to defend the country against a foreign enemy, though the Government had been still more in the wrong than they were, the levies were effected, and the high functionaries, sustained by a moral acquiescence which they had not always obtained, fulfilled their duty, though in heart full of sad and sinister forebodings. Napoleon called the demonstrations we have described the movement of the cannaille, which it was necessary to repress without pity and which would not be renewed if seasonably punished. At Paris he had made some arrests, which had imparted a little prudence to the loquacious frequenters of public places. But, in the duchy of Berg, he had ordered some of the seditious to be shot, and had sent several movable columns, who traversed the country and spread general terror. At Hamburg he had ordered six persons to be shot for violence offered to the French authorities.

These circumstances did not discourage Napoleon, nor deprive him of the hope of obtaining from France a national demonstration corresponding to the patriotic ardour of Germany, which might, in some degree, negative the widely-spread assertion that France was weary of his despotism, and foreign nations of his domination. He hoped to receive voluntary offers, through the cities and cantons, of men mounted and equipped to supply the losses of the cavalry, which had been very great during the last campaign. He deemed it sufficient to say a single word to a prefect, who would transmit it to one of the municipal councillors of his chief town, to induce an offer in a large city, which should be initiated throughout the empire. The city in all France which was the best situated to assume the initiative, the most populous, rich, and interested in public events, viz., Paris, was the first called upon, and began with a splendid offer. A member of the municipal council said that the city of Paris, situated the nearest to the seat of government, and, therefore, best aware of its wants, ought to set the example, and that since our enemies founded their hopes principally on the destruction of our cavalry, it was necessary to replace the 20,000 destroyed by a winter of unusual severity, with 40,000 well-mounted and well-armed horsemen; that if the allied monarchs flattered themselves that they were favoured by the public opinion

of their country, it was necessary to prove to them that the hero who had saved France from anarchy equally enjoyed the favour of his country, as well as her admiration, love, and unlimited devotion, and that no coalition should prevail against her. At the same time, this municipal councillor proposed to offer to the Emperor a regiment of five hundred horsemen, mounted and equipped. Scarcely was the proposal made when it was adopted, voted by acclamation, and carried to the Tuileries by a deputation. The account of this scene, inserted in the *Moniteur*, sufficed to arouse the patriotism of some, the interested zeal of others, and to stimulate every prefect who had not been anticipated by those under his jurisdiction. In some places situated beyond Old France there arose some objections, very timid, indeed, and instantly repressed by the prefects, who did not hesitate to exile the opposers into the interior of the Empire. But in all the departments comprised between the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees these offers met with no difficulty. The call of the prefects and their agents was responded to by the hearty assent of the country, for no sensible or patriotic citizen could object to such a proposition. It was unanimously believed that Napoleon was the author of our misfortunes, but that it was necessary to support him, because he alone was able to repel the formidable mass of enemies whom he had drawn upon France. To Paris succeeded the large towns, then the smaller, then the cantons, all contributing in proportion to their means and zeal. Lyons offered one hundred and twenty horsemen; Bordeaux, eighty; Strasbourg, one hundred; Rouen, Lille, and Nantes, fifty; Angers, forty-five; Amiens, Marcellin, Toulouse, thirty; Metz, Rennes, and Metz, twenty-five; Pau, Toulon, Bayonne, Caen, Besançon, Tours, Versailles, and Geneva, twenty; Nancy, Clermont, Dunkerque, Nîmes, and Aix, fifteen; the cities of St. Quentin, Orleans, La Mans, La Rochelle, Le Havre, Dijon, Cherbourg, Brest, Mâcon, Angoulême, Verlus, Poitiers, Perpignan, offered severally twelve, ten, or eight; those of St. Denis, Laon, Fontainebleau, Blois, Yvetot, Dieppe, Vendôme, Moulins, Périgueux, Niort, Meaux, Elbeuf, Quimper, Vannes, Abbeville, Langres, Libourne, Lunéville, Lisieux, Sens, Tarascon, Orange, Arles, Narbonne, Nevers, six, five, four, or three. Then came the series of small towns and cantons, whose deliberations daily filled several columns of the *Moniteur*. It may be observed that the foreign cities which had been united to the empire by violence, and which were, consequently, the worst disposed, almost all passed votes far beyond their zeal, evidently under the intimidation of the prefects or the influence of prudent men who endeavoured to obliterate the remembrance of some imprudent acts. Thus, Rome voted two hundred and forty horsemen; Genoa, eighty; Hamburg, one hundred; Amsterdam, one hundred; Rotterdam, fifty; the Hague, forty; Leyden, twenty-four; Utrecht, twenty; Dusseldorf, twelve.

The offers having been made, it was necessary to realize them, to find the man, the horse, and the equipment. For men, they applied to some horsemen returned from the service, to postillions, to forest-rangers, and at length to substitutes. But it was more difficult to procure

men than horses, because money could do nothing. A notice was sent from the minister of the interior to the prefects to pay principal attention to horses and equipment. It was then merely an affair of money. In order to obtain this, the prefects divided the necessary sums among the most important citizens, and sent to each of them a statement of his quota, which in some rich departments amounted to 1000, 800, or 600 francs each, which was scrupulously paid, notwithstanding some rare instances of opposition to a tax illegally levied. The prefects then proceeded in quest of horses, for which they gave a good price, and which they did not fail to find. The equipment was not a matter of difficulty in so industrious a country as France.

In a few days the offers amounted to 22,000 horses, 22,000 equipments, and 16,000 men. The horses were a most important assistance, especially considering the difficulty of procuring them at the time. Moreover, these offers could not fail to have a great moral effect; for, though the hand of authority was seen, it could not be overlooked or denied that the country heartily sympathized in the movement, under the idea of an energetic resistance to be followed by a speedy and honourable peace. The impetus was certainly not equal to that of Germany, enthusiastic to recover her liberty and national independence, while we were merely calmly convinced of the necessity of defending ourselves against an enemy imprudently attracted to France. But that which with us was at least to equal the energy of Germany was the energy of our soldiers, who, though leaving with grief the bosom of their afflicted families, when in presence of the enemy should hear no voice but that of honour, and should become the rivals in valour if not in experience of the bravest soldiers of the former army.

Once in possession of these immense supplies, Napoleon employed them with that prodigious genius for organization of which he had given so many proofs. Of the four principal resources at his command, amounting together to 500,000 men, two were already realized,—the conscription of 1813 and the cohorts. The third, that of 100,000 men drawn from the last four classes, might be obtained in February. As to the fourth, the conscription of 1814, it sufficed to obtain that in the course of the year, since it was intended only to replace in the depôts the conscription of 1813, which was to be wholly enrolled in the war-battalions. With these resources, Napoleon recomposed his army in the following manner.

After a momentary illusion in respect to what remained between the Vistula and the Oder, he was now perfectly aware that he could count on nothing but a few wrecks, consisting chiefly of cadres. He, therefore, ordered them to keep upon the Oder only one company-cadre for every one hundred men, and one battalion-cadre for every six hundred. All the rest were to be sent back to France. Even after this reduction, there was not enough to form a battalion for each regiment, though the regiments of the grand army at their departure reckoned five war-battalions each actually under their colours. This first battalion was intended to compose exclusively the garrison of the fortresses on the Oder. Those on the Vistula, as Dantzic and

Thorn, were already invested, and they had received whole divisions, such as those of Grandjean, Heudelet, and Loison. By collecting all the stragglers that might present themselves, it would still be difficult to form one battalion for every regiment. This battalion they reinforced by adding to it the infantry-companies which had been placed in garrison on board the vessels. The reader will, no doubt, remember that Napoleon had taken in the dépôt-battalions an infantry-company for each vessel. These were, in general, soldiers of three or four years' service. Being obliged to put forth all his resources, he ordered these companies to be sent on shore, and those which were on the Scheldt and Texel were immediately sent to the Oder, to be incorporated into the first battalions, called battalions of the forts on the Oder.

This first battalion having been almost reformed in each regiment, what remained of the cadres of the other battalions was collected and distributed partly into the interior of Germany, partly on the Rhine. The French regiments of the army of Russia were in number thirty-six,\* sixteen of which belonged to the corps of Davout, (the 1st,) six to the corps of Oudinot, (2d,) six to Ney's corps, (3d,) and eight to Prince Eugene's, (4th.) Napoleon determined that the first corps should be reorganized to sixteen regiments, and should remain under Marshal Davout, that the 2d and 3d corps, thrown into one corps of twelve regiments, should be reorganized and intrusted to Marshal Victor; that the 4th, that of Prince Eugene, should be reorganized in Bavaria. Consequently, the corps of Marshals Davout and Victor were to contain twenty-eight regiments. Napoleon ordered the cadres of the second battalions of these twenty-eight regiments to be retained at Erfurt, sent forward immediately General Doucet to command them, and from the depôts sent trained conscripts of 1813 in sufficient numbers to raise these twenty-eight battalions to eight hundred men each. The fortress of Erfurt was then a French possession, provided with an immense matériel, and as the cadre would employ in coming to Erfurt the time which the recruits would spend in reaching it, the reorganization would be accomplished half-way, and, therefore, in one-half shorter time, and at one-half the distance from the seat of war. Napoleon had sent funds to indemnify the officers who had lost every thing in Russia, to pay them their arrears, and to procure them some comforts. As soon as these battalions were put in condition, they were to join upon the Elbe, respectively Marshal Davout, and Marshal Victor. The cadres of the third, fourth, and fifth battalions were to recruit themselves on the Rhine with men from the four previous classes, who were stronger but not yet trained. Consequently these last battalions could not be

\* This number of thirty-six infantry-regiments will perhaps appear very inconsiderable compared to the total of the grand army, which, as we have said, amounted to 612,000 men without the Austrians. But this is readily explained when we remember that we are here speaking only of that portion of the grand army which penetrated into the interior of Russia, that there were five war-battalions to each regiment, which make one hundred and eighty battalions, i.e. 180,000 infantry, at the time of departure, that there remained, in addition to these thirty-six regiments, the Imperial Guard, the allies from every nation, Poles, Italians, Saxons, Bavarians, Westphalians, War-tembergians, Prussians, &c.

reorganized before three or four months. The plan of Napoleon was to send as soon as possible at least the third and fourth battalions to Marshals Davout and Victor. These marshals would then have three battalions for every regiment, and as they were perfectly acquainted with the war in the North, he proposed to send them again to the Vistula, where he hoped to be by the month of June. When crossing the Oder, they were to take their first battalions, which were shut up in the fortresses, and Marshal Davout would then have a corps of sixteen regiments of four battalions each, Marshal Victor a corps of twelve regiments likewise of four battalions, i.e. a total of one hundred and twelve battalions, representing the infantry of an army of 120,000 men. Meanwhile, Marshal Davout, with the sixteen second battalions reorganized at Erfurt, was to occupy the town of Hamburg, accustomed to yield to his authority; Marshal Victor, with the twelve destined to him, was to occupy the strong fort of Magdeburg; and both, thus established upon the Elbe, would be in position to protect the rear of Prince Eugene.

The cadres of the 4th corps, (Prince Eugene's,) being originally from Italy, were sent on the way to Augsburg, there to receive the recruits which were to come from the banks of the Po across the Tyrol and Bavaria. It was impossible, we see, to combine his resources with greater skill in the places and time which he could command.

The reorganization of the old corps having been thus secured, Napoleon occupied himself with the new corps, which he was obliged to form with all speed, for the necessity of arresting the Russians in their offensive march might require his presence at the Elbe by the month of March. The most available resource was that of the cohorts, consisting of one hundred battalions, which, from the foresight of Napoleon, had been organized for about nine months, and which united a high degree of training with great stability. They were composed of soldiers of from twenty-two to twenty-seven years of age, drawn from the first ban of the National Guard, unmarried men, of robust health, a little inclined to argue, but calculated to form a solid and intrepid infantry. They owed both these defects and their good qualities to their age, to a slight degree of discontent, and to their officers. In general these officers had been, since the institution of the Empire, put upon half-pay on account of age, wounds, or attachment to the Republic. Many were infirm, great talkers, and inclined to opposition. It was necessary to change one-half of them. The indocility of those who were capable of service was overlooked, because they might be useful, and their valour was unquestionable. Those who had been merely useful for the training of their troops, but who were not able to command them in the serious war which threatened, were replaced by officers in the Imperial Guard, in the returning cadres, and especially in the army of Spain, where the number of officers was becoming disproportioned to that of the men, and where the officers were all of a good quality, for that frightful war was an excellent school. Summoned in utmost haste, these officers were immediately to take the place of those who had been excluded from the cohorts.

Napoleon then distributed the cohorts into twenty-two regiments of four battalions each, each battalion having a company intended to remain as a depot. Good colonels were assigned to them, and they were despatched to the Rhine, towards Wesel and Mentz. The first twelve, formed into four divisions of three regiments each, composed the corps of the Elbe, and left immediately for Hamburg, to join Prince Eugene, bringing him a reinforcement of 40,000 excellent infantry. Prince Eugene, with such a reinforcement being able to oppose 80,000 men to the Russians, had nothing more to fear, for the enemy had by no means an equal force. The presence of these 40,000 men, coasting along Holland, crossing Hanover and the Hanseatic provinces, was to keep in check those agitated and disaffected provinces until the arrival of the twenty-eight battalions under Marshals Davout and Victor. Of this corps General Lauriston was appointed commander-in-chief. The marshals, either worn out with fatigue or disabled, were no longer equal to the charge. General Lauriston, a firm and intelligent man, who, while ambassador in Russia, had endeavoured to prevent the war, and during the war had behaved with great courage, well deserved this office. Napoleon forwarded him without delay, that he might devote all his care to his corps.

Napoleon then thought of forming two corps upon the Rhine. There remained to him ten regiments of cohorts, and he had likewise a considerable number of cadres, some left in the interior at the time of his departure for Russia, others drawn at different times from Spain. The latter had fused their men into the battalions intended to serve beyond the Pyrenees, and had then returned to France, consisting only of officers, subalterns, and a few select men. With these cadres he had the means of forming upwards of thirty regiments of two or three battalions each. They were speedily recruited from the conscripts of 1813, who were half trained, and whose training might be completed during the march. Unfortunately of these battalions, taken at random, there were seldom two of the same regiment. Whenever there were found two so situated, care was taken to bring them together to appear under the number of the regiment with its superior officers and flag. And from the other parts of the Empire, likewise, the attempt was made to bring battalions of the same regiments in order to make them serve together. This unfortunate dislocation of the corps was owing, as we have said, to the inordinate policy which scattered the forces of France over all Europe, and brought the different battalions of the same regiment to Illyria, Portugal, and Poland.

The isolated battalions were combined two or three together, under the form of provisional regiments,—a temporary organization, which was intended to have as short a period of existence as possible.

With eight of the remaining cohorts and part of the thirty and odd regiments whose formation we have described, Napoleon composed the first corps of the Rhine, distributed it into four divisions, and intrusted it to Marshal Ney, the hero of the Russian retreat, who for a moment had yielded to vexation when he saw the army deserted by its chief, but who, on learning

when at the Oder the flattering but just reward accorded to his services, (he had been created Prince of the Moskwa,) had regained his ardour, and merely asked to meet the Russians again in the field to make them expiate the success of the previous campaign. A fifth division, comprising the Germans of the allied princes, was to raise his corps to 50,000 men, or 60,000 including the artillery and cavalry. This corps was intended to strike the first and severest blows. It was to be formed at first at Mentz, then at Frankfort, Hanau, Würzburg, and begin its march a month after that of the Elbe, i.e. on the 15th of March. Marshal Ney, who had returned to Paris some days before, less to enjoy the rest of which his iron constitution had little need than to receive the investiture of his new title, was ordered to leave immediately and repair to the banks of the Rhine, to superintend the organization of the troops he was destined to command.

The second corps of the Rhine was composed of some of the provisional regiments, and the marine infantry, the creation of which was of long standing, and due to the vigilant forethought of Napoleon, who, well aware that he could never have too many resources for the work which he might undertake, devised a new organization whenever he had the opportunity, time, and means. At the time when he was dreaming of great maritime expeditions, conveyed in a hundred ships-of-the-line, and quitting the magnificent ports of the Empire from the Texel to Trieste he had formed a troop accustomed to the artillery and infantry service, and capable of engaging by sea or land. Of these artillery foot-soldiers he had about 20,000, who might furnish about 16,000 trained and vigorous soldiers, with all the confident spirit of the navy. Napoleon ordered their immediate departure for the banks of the Rhine, which would be much more gratifying to them than it was to remain idle in the arsenals or to be sent beyond sea to the unhealthy climates of our colonies.

Napoleon divided them into four regiments of four battalions each, and joined them to the second corps of the Rhine, along with some regiments which he had just hastily reformed. This corps, which was to be formed directly after the first, and to replace it at Mentz, might be ready in a month at latest, i.e. by April 15. It was to consist of four divisions, and about 40,000 infantry. Napoleon reserved it for Marshal Marmont, who had been conquered at Salamanca, and whose capacity as commander-in-chief had not been sanctioned by experience, but who might, nevertheless, with advantage hold a subordinate command. His wound, which at first seemed to threaten his life, now gave indications of a perfect cure. He was ordered to repair to Mentz as soon as his health allowed.

From the personnel and matériel of war long accumulated in Italy, Napoleon resolved to draw 40,000 or 50,000 men, who, by descending into Bavaria while he should himself debouche on Saxony, should complete the amount of forces he designed to concentrate on the Elbe. This duty he assigned to General Bertrand, the Governor of Illyria, who, without great skill in the handling of troops, being an engineer-officer, was well acquainted with the detail of their organization, and was an active and devoted

man, who would not lose an instant in the present urgent situation of the Empire.

Napoleon authorized him to take whatever remained of the military resources in Illyria, leaving there only some depôts and local militia, and to transport the rest to Friuli. The Illyrian provinces, if the Austrian alliance were retained, must inevitably revert to that power: if, on the contrary, it were not retained, they could not be disputed for twenty-four hours. It would therefore have been a very useless dispersion of our forces to have left any part beyond the Julian Alps. With the cadres taken from these provinces, and some regiments remaining in Lombardy, with some other regiments remaining in Piedmont, which had returned from Spain, and with two regiments of cohorts remaining out of twenty-two, there was sufficient to compose three good French divisions of twelve battalions each. The depôts of Italy being full of conscripts, these three divisions would be easily recruited. Finally, the strictly Italian army might also furnish one good division, which would raise to four divisions the corps which General Bertrand was to bring into Germany. Napoleon, who practised finesse even with that devoted servant, led him to hope that he should command the entire corps, in order to induce him to pay additional attention to its reorganization.

The infantry having been thus reconstituted with all possible promptness, it was necessary to occupy himself with those special arms which had suffered even more than the infantry. The reader will, no doubt, remember that whilst he summoned from Italy the corps of General Grenier, and was forming that of Marshal Augereau, Napoleon drew from France all the disposable companies of artillery, and ordered a company of gunners to be formed in each cohort. Owing to this precaution, the artillery could not be deficient in the personnel. In order to recompose the artillery of the army, he made use of the artillery-men who had returned from Russia, of forty-eight companies taken from the ports and arsenals, and of eighty companies formed in the cohorts. This afforded men sufficient to serve more than a thousand guns. The matériel lay almost wholly buried under the snows of Russia; but fortunately our arsenals both for land and sea were replenished. Field-carriages only were wanting. Napoleon caused these to be made in all quarters, even at Toulon, Brest, and Cherbourg. Those made in these ports would certainly arrive late, but on the banks of the Rhine they had the means of immediately mounting six hundred guns, which would suffice for the opening of the campaign.

The loss in horses had been greater than in carriages and men. Our retreat to the Oder had greatly diminished our supply of horses, but more in respect to saddle-horses than draught-horses. Napoleon hoped that General Bourcier, who was charged with all the purchases, and whose activity was stimulated by daily correspondence, would succeed in finding about 10,000 draught-horses in Low Germany. He ordered 15,000 to be procured in France by requisition for ready money. Requisition is a severe measure, not wholly free from the character of spoliation, for it deprives the owner of his property though unwilling to sell it; but the severity on this occasion was justified by the urgency of the

occasion, and much softened by the prompt payment. By these different means, and by immense manufactures of harness, Napoleon did not doubt that he could bring together six hundred guns, well furnished with horses, for the commencement of hostilities, that is to say, in April or May, and one thousand two months later.

The cavalry was, if possible, more important than the artillery, because of the prodigious amount of horse-soldiers at the disposal of the enemy, while our cavalry had been so utterly destroyed as to leave no elements of reorganization. In this branch, as in the artillery, all the horses had perished, and our grand army, which had crossed the Niemen with 60,000 horses, and had left 20,000 in reserve, had not brought back 3000, of which some had remained at Dantzic and others had been collected under Prince Eugene. The loss in men had been nearly as great. Napoleon had reckoned on 25,000 or 30,000 horsemen, who required nothing but new horses and equipments to render them as serviceable as ever. But, after correcting the first estimates, there was no reason to hope to save more than 11,000 or 12,000 from the abyss into which our army had sunk. The means of remounting them had much diminished since the loss of Poland, Old Prussia, Silesia, and Mecklenburg. There remained Hanover and Westphalia. 2000 or 3000 horses had been obtained from the evacuated countries, and it was presumed that 9000 or 10,000 more might be procured between the Elbe and the Rhine. With the 10,000 draught-horses for the artillery of which we have spoken, about 20,000 might be found in those countries. General Bourcier was occupied in purchasing horses, in urging on the manufacture of saddles, in collecting men who were returning exhausted, in clothing them, and preparing them, by a little repose, to resume their position in the line. It was with great difficulty that he succeeded, even by dint of force and money; for those provinces were very ill-affected. Though Napoleon had granted unlimited credit to General Bourcier, he had the greatest difficulty in making purchases, so greatly were all commercial relations disturbed at this crisis. Flattering himself that General Bourcier would be able to remount 13,000 or 14,000 men, and suspecting that so large a number would not return from Russia, he forwarded on foot 2000 or 3000 from the depôts of the Rhine. He immediately despatched from Paris Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani to place themselves at the head of the remounted cavalry in Hanover. He ordered them to form two corps, partly cuirassiers, partly chasseurs and hussars, and, as soon as they should have 6000 horsemen ready to march, to join Prince Eugene.

Napoleon thought that the depôts of cavalry, having received their portions of the conscriptions of 1812 and 1813, should be able to supply 10,000 trained horsemen. The Duke of Placenza was ordered to combine them in squadrons corresponding to the former regiments of the grand army, and, when formed, to conduct them to the corps of Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani, to fuse each detachment into the regiment to which it belonged, and thus wholly to reconstitute the regiments. These 10,000 horsemen, added to the 13,000 or 14,000 who should be remounted in Germany, ought to

procure 23,000 or 24,000 men, which would be a beginning of cavalry.

Horses for 10,000 men were not wanting in France, and the Duke of Placenza was ordered to organize them with all speed. There remained 3000 of the supplies of 1812: the past markets insured 7000 or 8000. Napoleon ordered a requisition of 15,000 horses for heavy cavalry, paying in ready money as for the draught-horses,—a rigorous measure, it is confessed, but justified by the circumstances. Voluntary gifts had furnished 22,000 horses adapted generally to light cavalry. There ought, therefore, to be in France the means of mounting 45,000 men, who, joined to those expected from Germany, would raise to nearly 60,000 the cavalry available for this campaign. The horses having been procured, and the men being found in the conscriptions of 1812 and 1813, it remained to find cadres. These could be found of excellent quality in Spain. Napoleon ordered to draw from that country a squadron-cadre for each regiment of cavalry, by taking the officers, subalterns, and select men, as he had done for the infantry. He ordered them also to be sent with all speed to the Rhine. These cadres, when filled up with men who should be found ready mounted and trained at the depôts, should compose a second body under the Duke of Padua, which should join that which should have left under the Duke of Placenza.

Napoleon, then, ought in Germany to have at first 13,000 or 14,000 horsemen, then 24,000 after the Duke of Placenza should have brought his reinforcement, and 40,000 by the addition of the force under the Duke of Padua. The rest were not to come till afterwards. Italy afforded resources for about 6000 horsemen, the half of whom were ready at the opening of the campaign, which should bring about 3000 to General Bertrand's *corps d'armée*.

To all these forces Napoleon resolved to add the Imperial Guard, formed on perfectly new proportions. That force had suffered severely in Russia, but still possessed, in Germany, France, and Spain, a considerable number of cadres. In Spain, particularly, there was an entire division of the Young Guard. Napoleon resolved to employ these various elements in the recomposition of that select troop. He held by the Old Guard, because of its fidelity,—a quality which might be called into trying exercise by coming events; he held by the Young Guard, because, by introducing none but picked men, it might speedily, in virtue of the *esprit de corps*, become equal in value to the best troops. Accordingly, he demanded from all the corps which had not suffered from the Moscow disaster, and particularly from those in Spain, a certain number of old soldiers to complete the Old Guard. From the conscription of the last four classes he selected strong young men to reconstitute the Young Guard, by fusing them into the cadres of fusiliers, tirailleurs, and chasseurs. He raised the number of battalions of the Guard, old and young, to thirty-three, that of the squadrons to thirty-three. To the same extent he augmented the reserve of artillery, of which he always made such great use on great occasions, and assigned to it nearly three hundred guns. For this last organization the marine artillery supplied him with excellent materials. The Imperial Guard would thus



present an army of reserve of 50,000 men on the rolls, and about 40,000 actually present in line.

The transports, though less necessary in Germany than in Russia, were always in the eyes of Napoleon of great value, by facilitating sudden concentrations and carrying after the army provisions for eight or ten days. He reorganized the baggage-battalions, and composed five in Germany with the remains of the fifteen which had made the Russian campaign, and six with the cadres which had remained in France. These eleven could convey about ten days' provision for 200,000 men, which was sufficient for the exigencies of one of those sanguinary battles by which the issue of great wars is generally determined. As to carriages, he had given up those which had become buried in the mud of Poland and the sand of Prussia, and confined himself to the old wagon slightly modified, and to a wagon *à la comtoise*, which had rendered valuable service by its lightness.

It was by means of these vast combinations that he hoped to arrest the coalition on the Elbe, if not upon the Oder, and to scatter the hordes with which it appeared to be intoxicated. Having about 50,000 men in garrison in the fortresses on the Vistula and Oder, and 40,000 active troops under Prince Eugene, he intended to reinforce this last with 40,000 men under General Lauriston, and thus collect 80,000 men on the Elbe, and there cut short the course of the enemy and prevent all invasion in Low Germany. With the two corps of the Rhine, the corps of Italy on its way through Bavaria, and the Imperial Guard, Napoleon would have about 200,000 men in Saxony by the month of April or May, to assist Prince Eugene, and to overwhelm, with nearly 300,000 men, the Russians, however reinforced by allies. There remained, as reserves, the old corps, which were going to be reorganized under Marshals Davout and Victor, the cadres arriving from Spain, the 160 dépôt-battalions destined to receive the conscription of 1814, and capable of furnishing 100,000 or 150,000 additional combatants. The new troops collected by Napoleon were young and inexperienced, but they were of a vigorous class of men in respect of age; the cadres were in a very high degree habituated to war, and impatient to re-establish the prestige of our arms. The principal difficulty was the want of time. But, in administration as in war, Napoleon possessed a marvellous aptitude for the improvement of the time at his command. In the same way that he could double the allowance for soldiers, he could double the work of the administrative departments, by tracing out their course, by himself deciding doubtful questions which were likely to impede them, by simultaneously executing operations which were commonly performed in succession, and especially by personally superintending every thing, by following up the execution of his orders, by despatching in all directions, as at the time of his youth and greatest ardour, a number of confidential officers, who, every evening before lying down, brought him an account of what they had seen, by reading, instead of causing to be read, their correspondence, and by demanding an account of the slightest delay in the execution of any of his orders, in order to reprimand his agents if the fault lay with them, or to overcome any

obstacle that might arise from the nature of things.

Never had Napoleon appeared younger, more active, or more patient, less of an emperor and more of a minister or general. He had for the present occasion renewed a practice which had previously been found very useful to him, that of placing at Mentz the aged Kellermann, (the Duke of Valmy,) with a superior authority over all the military divisions of the banks of the Rhine, from Strasbourg to Wesel. Marshal Kellermann, who retained, though old, great activity, and had great skill in the organization of troops, and large magazines and extensive credit at his command, of which he daily gave account to the Emperor, inspected the detachments sent from their dépôt to the places of meeting, almost all of whom passed through Mentz, assured himself, by personal inspection, of what they required in shoes, clothes, arms, and officers, supplied the want immediately, if possible, and, if otherwise, gave notice to the Emperor, who undertook to do so himself. It was by these incessant efforts that Napoleon succeeded in realizing those sudden creations, insufficient, it is true, however great, to repair the consequences of an inordinate policy, but sufficient to astonish the world, to add a new glory to that which we already possessed, and to force Europe to shed all her blood to subdue us. These details may, no doubt, appear dry, but it will be only to those who do not know, or are not inclined to learn, the method of accomplishing great results.

But these considerable forces, when collected, must be paid. While labouring day and night at the recomposition of the army, he was not less assiduous in his efforts to render the financial state of the Empire adequate to such vast armaments,—an arduous task when financial confidence had declined in proportion to political.

We have elsewhere explained how the budgets of the Empire, confined for several years to the sum of about 780 millions, (900 millions including the expense of collection,) had suddenly risen, in 1811, to 200 millions more, that is to say, to a total of 1100 millions. This sudden augmentation was owing to two causes; first, the union to France of Rome, Illyria, Holland, and the Hanseatic departments; secondly, the armaments for Russia. The addition of territory had increased the expense, but still more the receipts, for it had augmented the latter by 98 millions, the former by a much smaller sum. The armaments for Russia had merely added to the expense. They had been provided for by the ordinary and extraordinary produce of customs. The ordinary produce had been greatly augmented by the new manner of interpreting the continental blockade, consisting, as we have seen, in imposing an *ad valorem* duty of fifty per cent. on colonial produce, without inquiring into the source from which it was brought. The extraordinary produce resulting from seizures effected in Belgium, Holland, and the Hanseatic departments had amounted to 150 millions.

By these means had been met the demands of 1810, 1811, 1812. Yet some urgent deficiencies remained. The budget of 1811, fixed at first at 1100 millions, including the expense of collection, left a deficit of 46 millions, owing

to the scarcity which had cost the Treasury 20 millions, and to a diminution in the returns from the woods. The budget of 1812, estimated at 1150 millions, also showed a deficit of 37½ millions. It was therefore necessary to find 83 millions to meet the demands of those two periods; but, as the exactions had not been all actually advanced, an immediate payment of the whole was, fortunately, not requisite. As to the budget of 1813, as the war was waged on our frontiers and in the country of allies whose interest must be studied, we were obliged to maintain their troops at the expense of France. It was conjectured that this budget would not fall short of 1270 millions, and that there would be a deficit for that year of 149 millions, which, added to those of 1811 and 1812, gave a total deficit of 232 millions, which they knew not how to supply, for they never thought of recurring to a loan since the former bankruptcy.

We have said that the deficits of 1811 and 1812 were not yet very sensibly felt, because the exactions had not yet been made; but for 1813 the expenses for the beginning of the year were enormous, and far exceeded the realized receipts, which rendered the embarrassment extreme. M. Mollien, Chancellor of the Exchequer, a man of ingenious but cautious mind, fearing the effect upon his personal reputation of any appeal to irregular measures, was much disconcerted, and, by his scruples, increased the difficulties of Napoleon. The *caisse de service*, the creation of which was due to the administration of M. Mollien, and which had yielded great assistance, could no longer offer any facilities. The reader will no doubt remember that, before the establishment of that fund, the Treasury, when urgently pressed, sent the obligations of the receivers-general to be discounted, and almost always by the receivers-general themselves, who discounted them with the funds of the Treasury already in their hands. Since the formation of the *caisse de service*, all the funds of the receivers-general were immediately thrown into it, and, their obligations being no longer discounted, this species of stock-jobbing had ceased, and in its place was the *caisse de service*, continually fed by the contributions of the receivers-general, which issued bills for the daily claims, which bore interest, and were much valued in commerce. They were the Treasury-bills of that period.

This source had furnished 1200 millions for the beginning of 1813, and it was impossible to push its credit further. M. Mollien, being no more in the secret of Napoleon than the other ministers, and adopting the general belief of an immense treasure accumulated at the Tuileries, wished Napoleon to pour immediately one or two hundred millions into the Treasury, and often, in his vexation, accused him of a strange avarice, approaching to personal cupidity. But in this respect, as well as in war, was Napoleon admirable for foresight, order, and skill, and he did wonders to correct his policy by his administration. It should be added that he was equally admirable for disinterestedness, being covetous of nothing but the objects of ambition.

The secret of the treasure amassed at the Tuileries, which, under the present form of government, Napoleon was right not to display

even to his ministers, was this: it consisted of the balance from the *trésor extraordinaire* and in savings from the civil list.

The balance from the *trésor extraordinaire* was much reduced in consequence of donations lavished on soldiers who had served with merit, and of aid afforded to the war-budget. It will be remembered that, in order to maintain the balance of expenses and receipts of the State, Napoleon had often drawn upon the *trésor extraordinaire* for a portion of the expenses of the war. That fund, which had varied from 320 to 840 millions, amounted at the present moment to nearly 325 millions, but not in ready money. Of that sum 84 millions had been formerly lent to the department of finances; 9 or 10 millions laid out in bank-stocks, which Napoleon purchased from time to time to maintain their credit; 15 millions in different Treasury securities, which he also kept in his own hand to keep up their credit, as, for example, the bills of the sinking-fund; 12 millions had been lent to the cities of Paris and Bordeaux, and to several merchants; 7 millions secretly subscribed to the Saxon loan; 4 millions in the mercury-mines of Idria; and, finally, 135 millions due by Prussia, Austria, Westphalia, Saxony, and Bavaria. This last sum it was impossible to recover, for Prussia declared herself free from debt and even a creditor; Austria had been exonerated by the marriage and other circumstances; and the other German States, far from being able to supply money, were obliged to seek a loan from us. Hence, a sum of 267 millions, either locked up or due, was not actually realizable, but bore interest, and the product of which formed the annual revenue of the *domaine extraordinaire*. This revenue amounted to 13 or 14 millions, with which Napoleon conferred bounties and alms and sometimes adorned his capital. There remained, then, only 58 or 60 millions disposable,—an inconsiderable sum, but one which, if well employed, might be of great value.

After this treasure was the civil list, or private fortune of Napoleon, amassed by wonderful economy. He enjoyed a civil list of nearly 40 millions, viz., 25 for France, 4 for the produce of the crown forests, about 11 for the civil lists of Holland, Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, and Rome. But he had to keep up the palaces of France, the Hague, Amsterdam, Turin, Milan, Florence, and Rome, and this he did with a magnificence worthy of his greatness. He had sometimes bought as much as six millions' worth of diamonds, old or new, in the course of a year, to restore the value of the crown jewels. He maintained a military establishment of excessive splendour. And, consistently with his character, he spent large sums in literature, the arts and sciences, often with the addition of acts of benevolence, conferred with the greatest delicacy; and he introduced so great regularity into his accounts, that every thing was scrupulously entered, of which an example was seen in the first entry after stating the receipt of 25 millions of the civil list, which was, "For his Imperial and Royal Majesty, as member of the Institute, 1200 fr."\*

\* These details are directly derived from Napoleon's accounts.

For a long time Napoleon had derived only 29 millions from the civil list, and only during three or four years had it reached 40 millions. Since his elevation to the throne he had saved 185 millions, part of which he had placed in good security, either of the Treasury or of industrial works, to keep up their credit, as the bills of Mount Napoleon at Milan, the sinking-fund at Paris, the canals of Loing and of the South, &c. But of this treasure he had kept about 100 millions in cash in the cellars of the Tuileries, considering that in difficult circumstances the best resource was ready money. There remained to him nearly 60 millions from the *domaine extraordinaire*, 100 out of the 185 millions saved from the civil list, making a total of 160 millions in gold and silver in the Tuileries or in the chests of the *domaine extraordinaire*.

Such was the amount of bullion which induced some to say that he had 800, others 400, and some even 600, millions in the precious metals in the subterranean parts of his palace. He never gave any clear explanation himself, nor communicated to one treasurer the secret which belonged to another, but reserved to himself the state of his finances and his armies, leaving others to believe what they chose, and sometimes even encouraging the belief that he possessed a prodigious treasure. Next to his army, this was his principal resource. Only one would have been of still greater value, viz., political prudence; but, excepting that, he possessed all others. Unhappily, none could take its place!

If Napoleon, yielding to the urgent representations of his minister, had, at the first or even second difficulty, poured these 160 millions into the public treasury, he would have seen them disappear, and would have found himself without money, as a general without reserves on the field of battle. He was, therefore, prudently resolved not to strip himself of them unless from the most imperious necessity, proposing to employ a part to keep up the funds which the minister of finance must create sooner or later, and to save a considerable portion for urgent emergencies. At the same time, he used every means to justify his refusal to acknowledge the extent to which his extraordinary resources were restricted, and thus kept his secret to himself, and bore the somewhat severe insinuations of M. Mollien, allowing him and others to say what they chose, yielding to his natural impatience only when all things went well, but becoming mild and calm when things went ill, that he might not increase the troubles of his servants by the defects of his own character. Therefore, without explaining himself, he sought the means of procuring the 232 millions yet wanting to complete the budgets of 1811 and 1812, and to make up the whole of that of 1813.

On no account would he consent to increase the taxes, though an augmentation of the direct contributions, which would have been easily borne, might have produced the 150 millions required for 1813. The indirect taxes, restored by him, had succeeded well enough in a financial respect, but in a political view no better than usual. But the indirect taxes cannot be augmented at pleasure, and by raising the tariff we are by no means sure of raising the

result. He was unwilling again to oppress landed property, after having relieved it during his reign. He liked to be able to say that, in the midst of the greatest wars, the material condition of France had not been changed, that the army alone felt their influence, and that to it war was the ordinary and chosen lot, from which it derived glory, honour, promotion, and wealth. Such estimates men are wont to make when they are in the habit of speaking without fear of contradiction. The army which Napoleon said was so satisfied began to complain loudly, and the soldiers who had returned from the Niemen indulged in language which made it necessary to keep them apart from the new soldiers, to prevent the spread of discontent. Besides, the army could only be formed by drawing it from the bosom of the people, and levying that tax of blood which was then esteemed the most severe of all. Once at their colours, it is true, the sons of France readily become soldiers; but their parents were not so speedily reconciled, and in their breasts was gradually accumulated a frightful amount of hatred, which was destined to burst forth with a terrible explosion. Napoleon, then, indulged in a mere illusion in supposing that, since the money-taxes were not increased, the war would exercise no bad influence on the public mind; but it was his pleasure thus to think, and, therefore, he refused all such augmentation. M. Mollien, on the contrary, desiring his chests to be replenished by regular means, preferred such as were most certain and most speedy, and wished to increase the public taxes. But Napoleon would not hear of it, and some other resource must be devised.

A loan, which might perhaps have succeeded if the public had been earlier accustomed to that measure, was now impossible or at least very difficult; and it would indeed have been singular to have adopted that method in 1818 which had not been adopted in 1807 and 1808. The produce of the customs, which, with the draughts upon the *trésor extraordinaire*, had been the resource to cover the expense of the grand armament of 1812, was exhausted; for there were no longer, as in 1810 and 1811, large seizures to be made. However, the ordinary returns of the customs had been greatly increased, and had risen from 30 millions to 80, owing to the famous tariff of fifty per cent., which had become the principal instrument of the continental blockade. For the present year, as he could no longer expect peace from the distress of England, but only from the battles which might be fought in Germany, and as he wished to restore a little mercantile activity to Bordeaux, Nantes, Havre, and Marseilles, Napoleon had granted so great a quantity of licenses that commerce with England might seem to be renewed, and as to warrant the expectation of 100 millions from the ordinary customs. Thus the tables were turned; and whereas, two years before, Napoleon was torturing Europe to interdict all relation with England, it was now England herself, who, perceiving the advantage derived by her adversary from the licenses, laboured to render them inoperative.

Napoleon being unwilling to raise the taxes, direct or indirect, the public not being habituated to loans, and commercial seizures yield-

ing very little result, there remained the old method of alienating the national domains, so ruinously employed by our first revolutionary Assemblies, and so advantageously by Napoleon, because he made use of it slowly and by the medium of the sinking-fund. But even this method offered only very limited resources. Napoleon had restored to the emigrant-families a considerable portion of their estates. He was unwilling to assume the odious part of selling the estates which had not been alienated; for this would have been to continue confiscations, which it was the honour of his government to have terminated. The only alienations which he allowed without scruple were those of the church-lands. He did not shrink from them, nor did the public, because there was in their favour the abolition of mortmain. The immense benefits resulting from setting a price upon the church-lands were an unfailing answer to all the contradictions to which this kind of alienation was exposed. But of these lands scarcely any remained. The religious countries added to the Empire—such as the provinces of the Rhine, certain portions of Italy, and especially the Pontifical State—had supplied material for some sales, which the sinking-fund had effected with advantage; but the term was reached except for those of the Pontifical State, and these it had been necessary to suspend for a reason which we shall soon explain. Some years before, Napoleon had taken the endowment of the University and of the Senate, which were both derived from landed property, had replaced them by an annual sum, and had sold the properties arising from this arrangement by the customary intervention of the sinking-fund.

Was there still remaining any operation of this kind which might be tried, any property of mortmain to be seized, indemnifying the proprietors with an annuity? Such was the question, and it led to the discovery of the desired resource.

There remained, indeed, one species of property subject to mortmain which might be dispossessed and indemnified by an annuity, and that was the property of the communes. In almost all the departments, and in some more than others, the communes possessed considerable estates, which were badly administered. If it had been necessary to lay hands upon all these estates without distinction, the act would have been not merely unjust, but impracticable and very dangerous, for it might have led to seditions. But it was possible to make a distinction among them, to which they were well inclined. In the number of these properties were buildings for the service of the communes,—such as hotels de ville, schools, hospitals, churches, public squares, promenades, which no one thought of appropriating; this first exception was scarcely mentioned, being recognised as a matter of course. There were other properties which it was even more necessary to exempt, though the necessity might not be so obvious,—such as those enjoyed as common, and constituting one of the principal resources of the country-people,—such as common pasture-grounds, woods, and turf-pits. To seize these properties at a time when the conscription was driving the country-districts to despair would, in some provinces, risk the repetition of the scenes of La Vendée. These, therefore,

must necessarily be excepted: for to seize them would be both cruel and supremely imprudent.

There remained a third species of property,—the only one which could be made the object of a financial measure,—viz., the properties farmed by the communes, which represented merely an annual revenue in money, the sum of which they applied to their own purposes. As, after all, it was to the communes merely a question of a revenue which in some degree lightened the weight of their taxes, it was of little consequence whether it was derived from a contractor or from the State, the accuracy of payment being at least equally secure. The communes, indeed, would scarcely perceive the change, and the State would gain, besides, a present resource which was much wanted,—the advantage of turning to account considerable landed property which was very indifferently managed, as were all the estates subject to mortmain. The whole value of the estates in question was reckoned at 370 millions; while they only gave an annual return of 8 or 9 millions to the communes. Supposing them to be sold for 370 millions,—which did not appear extravagant,—there ought to remain, after deducting 232 millions required by the State, about 138 millions, which, in the present state of the public funds, (five per cent. at 75 francs,) ought to procure 9 millions of revenue to indemnify the communes. By these means the State would find the necessary resource without any sacrifice.

Thus viewed, the measure appeared to be simply advantageous, and there was no room to hesitate upon its adoption. But, in another point of view, it was liable to serious objections. In the first place, the right of property was in some degree affected, although in the present instance merely property of a collective character, which is more open to State measures than any other. Thus, the State may suppress a convent, a society, a commune, and in that case dispose of their property, while it cannot suppress an individual; and even when it deprives him of life in the name of the law, it claims no right to seize his property which falls to the natural heir. Secondly, there was a real though remote pecuniary loss occasioned to the communes; for, though at the moment they procured a more certain and easy revenue, they received a property which must daily fall in value by the mere change in the funds in exchange for landed property, which, on the contrary, always rises for the same reason. Thirdly, the municipal administrations were irritated, who, being accustomed to manage the communal domains, regarded them as their own property. And, fourthly, even with the greatest prudence the alienation could not fail to be difficult and slow; for it was necessary to make an inventory and valuation of the estates, to transfer them to the State, replace them by a proportional revenue, sell them and receive the price, which would require a long time, and, as the wants of the Treasury were immediate, it was necessary to anticipate the returns of the sale by an issue of paper.

Had these objections been clearly stated to an enlightened assembly, they would have made them pause; and, in any case, a new loan, even though it should reduce the five per cent. from

75 to 60 or even 50, would have been better, and would have procured less costly and more prompt resources than a sudden and considerable alienation of landed property. But these questions were then much less understood than they are now. They were not then so well aware of the loss incurred by disturbing property and the gain of paying dearly for capital, provided it is procured in a regular manner and that the public services are duly paid. The question was debated particularly between M. de Bassano, whose complaisance for Napoleon's ideas gave him admission to almost every discussion, and M. Mollien, who advanced incontestable truths with perhaps a little too much subtlety, became irritated with his antagonist without venturing to show it, and retired from the discussion dissatisfied but not subdued. Every day the struggle was renewed. M. de Bassano considered it like a miracle to procure all at once 370 millions, of which 232—the exact amount required by the Treasury—should be applied to the public service, and 138 should be left to indemnify those whose property had been seized, without cost to any one, not even to the State, which was to receive so large a sum. M. Mollien supported the right of property by pure but abstract theories which little affected his adversary, represented the extension given to bills on the sinking-fund as the creation of a large paper currency, pointed out the difficulties which would arise from this in all branches of his duty, and did so with vexation and irritation rather than with firmness. This struggle between a man facile and eloquent, who, though, too imperfectly understood the objections to be much influenced by them, and a man thoroughly convinced but unable to produce conviction, would have been interminable, if Napoleon, whose patience was exhausted, and who plainly saw the true and false of each side, had not said to M. Mollien, "All that is very well: I understand your objections and appreciate them; but before criticizing a plan we ought to find a substitute." The objection was, in fact, embarrassing. It was the cry of want uttered by him to whom the necessities of the State were more urgent than to any other, because he had a million soldiers to clothe, feed, and arm; while his own existence, greatness, and glory depended on the solution of the problem. If M. Mollien had been a man of greater decision, he would have immediately replied to Napoleon, "Propose a loan at five per cent. for 60 francs or even 50 if necessary; pay eight or ten per cent. or even more for the capital advanced; and this operation will cost less, will create less ill feeling, will sooner and better support your soldiers, than a paper currency which will be badly received and constantly refused." But M. Mollien did not dare to say that: perhaps at that period he did not even venture to think it; and Napoleon, pressed for money, not supposing a loan to be possible, and eager to procure estates for sale as the only resource at the time, seized them wherever they could be found. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, though more calm, was also governed by the sense of need, and, for the same motive as Napoleon, finally adopted the project so long discussed.

Consequently, it was agreed to appropriate

the communal estates which we have mentioned,—i.e. the estates which were farmed,—that they should be valued by a summary administrative process, replaced by an annuity which the State could easily advance as soon as it was created, and that they should then be transferred to the sinking-fund. To this fund had been commonly assigned the territorial sales, which were well executed, because slowly and in small quantities. While awaiting the payment, which was commonly at a distant date and by instalments, the fund issued paper bearing interest, which it gave to the State as a price of the properties to be sold, which it then gradually withdrew in proportion as it received the returns for the sales, and which retained its credit with the public because the amount was inconsiderable and the capital and interest had been paid with accuracy. This was the machinery which it was intended to develop, and which was actually developed, by decreeing that the sinking-fund should sell the new estates by auction, under the condition that the purchaser should pay down one-third of the price, another third in 1814, and another in 1815, and, in addition, the interest of the sums deferred at the rate of five per cent. In the mean while, the sinking-fund was immediately to create and remit to the Treasury bills for 232 millions, bearing interest, and successively payable in proportion as the price of the property sold was received. The Treasury was at liberty to use these bills as it thought fit, and to oblige the creditors of the State to receive them. At this point began the first vexation of M. Mollien,—a vexation which was as unintelligible to M. de Bassano as was the fury of Europe about to be let loose upon us. "Whom shall I oblige to receive this paper?" said the Treasurer. "All those to whom you are indebted," said Napoleon. "You owe to contractors for the war and the navy, to creditors of all kinds, 46 millions for 1811, 87 millions for 1812: pay these sums with the bills of the sinking-fund, and you will thus bring them into circulation. They will be at first refused; but when it is seen that the interest upon them is accurately paid, that they serve for the purchase of beautiful estates in no degree liable to the objections to which the former properties of the emigrants had been exposed, they will be sought after. They will be sold on the exchange, their credit will be maintained, and they will soon attain nearly the value of money." "If your majesty would take the whole risk," replied M. Mollien, timidly,—“i.e. if you would purchase the whole 232 millions with the great resources accumulated by your genius,—all would be easy.” “Yes, certainly, all would be then easy,” said Napoleon, carefully avoiding to state his reasons for not doing so. He had, in fact, at the utmost only two-thirds of that sum in his two treasuries, and he was justly unwilling to strip himself of all his ready money. But he promised to M. Mollien to maintain the credit of this new fund by taking a considerable number of the bills in his own name.

He resolved to take 60 or 70 millions at different times,—a very excellent investment, because it bore a certain interest, and the capital was also secure, but one which sensibly diminished the 160 millions of ready money which he possessed. But, in his present difficulties,

there was no room for hesitation, and he trusted that by purchasing a portion of this paper at the moment of its issue he would maintain its value almost at par. He promised M. Mollien to do so, in order to keep up his courage.

By these financial measures Napoleon prepared to maintain his last and most terrible wars. It was the last step in those alienations of landed property to which the French Revolution had had recourse to resist the attacks of Europe. Having no longer any nobles to proscriber, and being unwilling to do so if he had, and no more churches to dispossess, he took the property of the communes, the last proprietors of mortmain, and alienated them by means of paper credit, much better founded and restricted than the assignats, but recalling the painful remembrance of paper money, and introduced to the public at a most unfavourable time.

While doing every thing within the power of man to place himself in a condition to repel the enemies whom he had attracted to France, Napoleon felt also the need of making some attempt to regain the popularity which he perceived was daily withdrawn from his government. A very speedy peace alone could secure this; but peace, however desirable, was to be attained only after energetic efforts which should restore to us, not, indeed, our exorbitant sway in Europe, but the prestige of our military superiority, and such a result could be purchased only at the cost of much bloodshed. In default of peace, which, even with the greatest prudence, could not be immediately procured, he sought to gain the public mind by some source of moral satisfaction. Such a one he devised, which, if granted at a suitable time and without reserve, would have possessed great efficacy.

The most powerful cause of public dissatisfaction, after the war, was the quarrel with Rome and the captivity of the pope. To the partisans of the house of Bourbon, whose long-buried hopes had been revived by recent events, it afforded a powerful pretext to excite dislike to a tyrannical government, which, according to them, inflicted an oppression on the conscience. To the pious portion of the country, politically disinterested, but recalled to religion by the calamities of the time, it presented serious and severe cause of blame and even aversion. In general, the men and women who exhibit most inclination for religious observances are persons of an animated character, who feel impressed with the desire of actively promoting the triumph of their convictions: these are formidable enemies to a government which has been guilty of any real injury to religion. The authority of their morals, their zeal in propagating a grievance, a report, a hope, render them infinitely dangerous. Napoleon wished to disarm this respectable class, and at the same time to deprive the royalists of a pretext of injuring him in the name of religious worship, and to excite the hope of peace with Europe by the establishment of peace with the church.

Accordingly, he had determined to put an end to his differences with the pope by concluding as little as possible, but still sufficient to secure agreement. The pope, long detained at

Savona, was at that moment at Fontainebleau, really a captive, though apparently free and surrounded with all honour and respect. Napoleon, fearing lest, while he was in the heart of Russia, the English should carry Pius VII. from Savona, had ordered his translation to Fontainebleau during the summer of 1812. He had assigned to him the apartment which he had occupied during the joyous and brilliant period of the coronation,—a time already distant both to him and to Napoleon. He had been laden with honours, and a part of the civil and military establishment of the Emperor had been sent to him, that he might live in all the state of a sovereign. A detachment of the Imperial Guard of foot-grenadiers and horse-chasseurs were on duty with him, and Captain Lagorsee, the officer of select gendarmes who was appointed to take charge of him, had been invested with the uniform of chamberlain, and he had shown so much intelligence and tact as to have pleased the pope to such a degree as to be absolutely necessary to him. The surveillance was therefore concealed under the appearance of the greatest respect. He had retained, besides his physician and chaplain, some old confidential servants, and he was visited from time to time by the Cardinals de Bayane and Maury, by the Archbishop of Tours and the Bishop of Nantes. These eminent personages, whose conduct had been prescribed to them, without conversing on business with the pontiff, spoke to him sometimes of the sufferings of the church, of the means and prospect of terminating them, especially when the return of Napoleon to Paris should bring into personal intercourse two sovereigns who loved each other, and who by direct conversation would come to a mutual understanding much better than by the mediation of the most skillful negotiators. This was the only society allowed to him, and the only one which pleased him. He was permitted to celebrate the mass on Sundays in the grand chapel of the castle, and there to give his blessing to the faithful. But his translation had been so little spoken of, and the public mind, now fixed on Moscow, was so little directed to religious affairs, and the snares of the Imperial police were so greatly feared, that few people repaired to Fontainebleau on Sundays. The pope, therefore, lived in profound retirement, agreeable if it had not been constrained. Though the park was left at his disposal, he never left his apartments, from indolence and from design; he daily walked a little in the grand gallery of Henry II., then resumed his inaction without even reading, though he had the library of the castle in his reach, and seemed completely absorbed in his captivity.

No treatment, physical and moral, could have been devised better adapted to overcome his resistance, especially if Napoleon, by suddenly reappearing, should exert upon him the double influence of his power and his fascinating conversation. When returning from Moscow, subdued by nature if not by man, he would certainly have less influence, but still he would have enough, if judiciously employed, to determine Pius VII. to some arrangement. Besides, as he had at command all the means of access, he had allowed the pope to know nothing except such facts as it was impossible to conceal, and these explained in a manner the least dis-

creditable to our arms. And therefore, though Napoleon had suffered from a severe winter, he was no less a formidable potentate in the eyes of the pope,—a potentate from whom no one would be able to tear Italy in order to restore a part to the successor of St. Peter.

On the second day after his arrival at Paris he had written to the pope to express the pleasure he experienced in his being so near, his desire to visit him and to terminate speedily the difference which disturbed the church. To this letter he had added repeated journeys of MM. de Bayane, de Barral, and Duvoisin, in order to bring him to an agreement by concessions which could have been scarcely expected. In fact, the points in question no longer presented the same difficulties as formerly. The method of canonical institution had been agreed upon ever since the church, then so facile in regard to her essential prerogative, had granted that, after six months, every prelate should be constituted either by the pope, or, failing him, by the metropolitan of the ecclesiastical province. The temporal establishment of the sovereign pontiff was more difficult to determine. Pius VII., never having anticipated the fall of Napoleon, and, therefore, seeing no means of obliging him to restore the Roman States, was in a condition to consider the establishment of the papacy at Avignon, with a suitable allowance, as a sort of acceptable *pis aller*, which was not without precedent, which was at once an excuse and a consolation. But that which disgusted him, and seemed even worse than captivity itself, was the design ascribed to Napoleon, and with justice, of establishing the papacy at Paris under the hand of the French Emperor. If such a thing could have been done, Pius VII. would have appeared in his own eyes no more than the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the great church of the West would have been reduced to a level with the modern church of the East.

This disposition of mind presented a valuable ground of negotiation, for by yielding the point of an establishment at Paris, and consenting to one at Avignon, the pope might be brought to consent to the solution of what was deemed the most difficult question. There remained the arrangements relative to the property of the Roman Church, sold or to be sold, and to the sees called suburbans, because situated in the environs of Rome and invested with dignity from a remote antiquity. The pope set much by the retaining of these sees, and the power of nominating bishops of Velletri, Albano, Frascati, Palestrina, &c., for without the means of recompensing services it would have been impossible for him to maintain his government. To these points were added some others on which it was easy to come to agreement, if desirous of doing so, aided by the power of Napoleon.

When about to come to an understanding, Napoleon resolved to repair in person to Fontainebleau, in order thus to terminate the usual hesitation of the pope, and to obtain from him a formal act which might be offered to the public as a pledge of the peace of religion, and the forerunner, perhaps, of the peace of Europe.

Accordingly, on January 19, under the pretence of a hunting-party at Grosbois, he sud-

denly changed the direction and went to Fontainebleau, whither he had secretly sent his family. The pope was at that moment in conference with several bishops and cardinals. Already excited by the great affairs which for some days had engaged his attention, he was still more so when he learned the sudden arrival of Napoleon, whom he had not seen since his coronation, whom he at the same time desired and feared to see, for, while he hoped to exercise some influence over the author of the concordat, he feared still more that he should himself be subjected to that which Napoleon might employ. Without leaving him time for reflection, Napoleon hastened into his presence, embraced him in his arms, saluting him with the title of father! The pope returned his embrace and called him his son, and, without that day entering upon serious business, these two princes, so singularly associated by destiny for mutual pleasure and annoyance during their whole life, appeared perfectly happy to meet. Their countenances were irradiated with the hope of a prompt and complete reconciliation. The servants of the pope, commonly the most distressed, seemed to be enchanted by this spectacle.

On the following day Pius VII., accompanied by the cardinals and bishops who had been allowed access to him on this occasion, went in great ceremony to return the visit of the Emperor in his apartments. From those of the Emperor he repaired to those of the Empress, with whom he was not acquainted, for she was not the person whom he had crowned, and the throne which had seen so many vicissitudes did not now retain its former occupant. Like every one else, he found her kind, gentle, happy at her greatness, and he behaved to her, as always, with dignity, affection, and all the graces of old age, and, after having paid his visit, received hers in return, and in the midst of these movements seemed to regain a little animation, satisfaction, and hope.

But he could not be deceived on what was about to take place. The Emperor would never put himself out of his way merely to pay a visit at Fontainebleau. According to his usual custom, that active and imperious man was aiming at some great result, and was about to extort consent from the head of the church, and, what was more, to impose upon him some resolution! And what a resolution! To renounce the temporal power, to relinquish Rome for Avignon, to accept a magnificent hospitality, a gilded slavery, to become like the Patriarch of Constantinople in the West, with a few additional indications of wealth and dominion! And yet, if the pontiff would not consent to this, should he not find another Henry VIII., who, not from love, (for this was not Napoleon's weakness,) but from ambition, should inflict upon the church blows still more formidable than the spoliation of her temporal goods? Pius VII. was in heart subdued; but before coming to a resolution, before attaching to his pontificate a historic remembrance of this character, before consenting to be the Augustulus of Christian Rome, or to encounter all that might await religion from a prolonged struggle, an effort was required which was beyond the energy of his soul, an energy which was great when it was necessary to meet persecution by passive resist-

ance, but which was not equal to difficult emergencies demanding promptness and vigour. Never would he have come to a decision himself, whatever length of time were allowed, and if Napoleon were desirous of a result, he had done well in coming in person to force him, as it were, to sign by the seductive and dazzling force of his fascination.

The visits of ceremony having come to a close, those of business commenced. Napoleon was determined to display all his force of mind and power of fascination to charm the pope and to convince him that what he demanded was really the best thing that could be done. At first, as if casually, he explained all that he proposed to accomplish in the ensuing campaign, and professed himself confident of overwhelming his adversaries at the very outset. Although care had been taken not to allow the full account of Napoleon's situation to reach Fontainebleau, though it was well known throughout Europe, the pope was aware that, for the first time, he had not returned in triumph. But, seeing him so confidently assured of being able to silence the boasting of the Russians and Germans, it was difficult not to share in the same confidence in some degree, and, excepting the alteration in his appearance, (for, instead of being erect and thin, Napoleon was now slightly bent and inclining to corpulence,) the pope seemed to behold again the young and joyous Emperor of 1804. The same fire, the same nobleness, the same beauty of visage, appeared under features more fully developed.

After having persuaded Pius VII. that he was as powerful as ever, and that his will was equally irresistible, Napoleon deprived him of all hope of recovering Rome, and exhibited the irrevocable determination never to abandon the smallest part of Italy to any foreign influence. The head of the church, then, had only to choose between Paris and Avignon. He would do much better, said Napoleon, to select Paris. He would there be venerated, encompassed with every mark of respect, and would see the Emperor of the French ready to hold his stirrup, in imitation of the earlier emperors of Germany. He would have, also, the certainty of being free from further troubles, for, on the first difficulty, a few moments of confidential explanation between the two sovereigns would check every rising conflict. But, since he refused this, there remained only Avignon, a place already consecrated by having been long the residence of the popes. The orders were to be immediately given, and all should be soon arranged to afford him in that city the most sumptuous manner of life. He would there freely receive ambassadors from every power, who should enjoy at his court every diplomatic privilege and independence, even though they should represent states at variance with France, and who should be able to reach the new pontifical court by the sea and the Rhone, almost without touching the territory of the Empire. He should receive a revenue of two millions as indemnity for the estates which had been sold in the Roman States. All those which had not yet been sold, which were the greater part, should be restored, and should be administered by his agents. To gratify him, the suburban sees should be re-established, and he should nomi-

nate the bishops. He should have, besides, either in Italy or France, as he should choose, the power of nominating to ten dioceses, to enable him to recompense the servants of his government, without reckoning the nomination of cardinals, which should still belong to him. The prelates of the Roman States whose sees had been suppressed, who were still living, and who were a cause of great concern to the pope, should have the quality, title, and position of bishops *in partibus*, and should receive during their life, from the French Treasury, an allowance equal to the revenues of their former dioceses. They should form a new legion of high ecclesiastical dignitaries who should contribute to the splendour of the court of Avignon. The Roman archives, the grand office of the Penitentiary, the Datary, the Propaganda, &c. should be transported into the beautiful country of Vaucluse, and suitably established in the new pontifical Rome, which was to be wholly consecrated to its glorious destiny.

The pope, then, would have nothing to regret in point of wealth, state, independence, or power, for he would rule all religious questions according to his own mind, as freely as he formerly had done at Rome. He would lose merely the temporal power, the vain ambition of pontiffs, a serious danger to religion, which had always suffered from the quarrels of the temporal sovereigns of Rome with the princes of Christendom. In handling this subject, Napoleon exerted all his subtlety and logic to convince Pius VII. He laboured particularly to persuade him that the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers, and the abolition of the latter, was an inevitable revolution of the times, which in no degree concerned the influence and perpetuity of religion. How many things, during the last twenty years, which had now been seen or imagined before, had it been found necessary to allow because they had been accomplished! Louis XVI. and Marie-Antoinette upon the scaffold; Napoleon, a simple artillery officer, in the palace of the Tuileries, the husband of Maria Louisa, holding the sceptre of the West; the emperors of Germany reduced to the empire of Austria; the house of Bourbon excluded from all their thrones; the descendant of Frederick the Great reduced to the condition of an elector of Brandenburg; old ranks effaced; the people in every country, except where Napoleon restrained them, making demands, and almost imposing commands upon their sovereigns; and, in short, the whole aspect of the world changed: was not this extraordinary, and did it not speak a language as plain as it was unanswerable? Was not the temporal power of the popes one of these things manifestly destined to vanish as well as so many others? And ought they not to thank Heaven for having chosen, as the instrument of these revolutions, a man like Napoleon, born to the Catholic religion, retaining all its associations and revering it as the religion of his infancy, knowing its value to mankind, and resolved to defend and promote it? In this point of view, especially, Napoleon exhibited singular tact and produced a powerful impression on the pontiff. "Suppress," said he, "this vain difficulty between us of the temporal power, and you will see what we can effect for religion by mutual co-operation exonerated from these cares."



He then pointed out to him the church of Germany destroyed, deprived of its property by the avidity of the German princes, looking for re-establishment only to him; the church of Holland, and of the Hanseatic provinces, capable, not of being maintained, for they had ceased to exist for two centuries, but of being restored; a Catholic see, for example, about to be re-established at Hamburg; the church of Spain, the church of Italy, for the present destroyed and eagerly demanding a restorer; all this Christian world depending on the Emperor of the French, on his powerful will, and destined to spring into fresh existence or to sink into nothing at a word of his mouth! Well, he added, if reconciled to the pope, and restored to repose by the European peace which must occur before long, having no longer any vulgar interests of territory to dispute with the pope, questions scarcely worthy the attention of princes of the fourth order, and certainly below the head of the universal church and the head of the French Empire, he would apply himself to the task of conferring upon religion more benefits than had been conferred by Charlemagne. In sight of such a future, how could he hesitate or even discuss? Providence had chosen a mild, virtuous, and modest pontiff, to restore to religion the purity and disinterestedness of the apostles, and with their disinterestedness their influence over the souls of men, and himself, a warrior, accustomed to conquer earthly difficulties, in order to effect that revolution without religion being weakened by it, while, on the contrary, it would gain in moral power all that it might lose in material.

The excellent pope, to whom similar statements had often been made both orally and in writing, but who had never heard any one express them with the warmth, eloquence, and persuasion of Napoleon, was overcome, and said that many things had indeed been changed, and many further changes would yet occur, that probably the temporal power of the popes was one of the things destined to come to an end, but that with the aid of Napoleon it would have no effect in removing any of the supports of religion or any of its sources of influence. It was a sacrifice of a purely material character in the interest of religion, and therefore an act of disinterestedness and not of weakness, honourable and not disgraceful, to consent to the proposed arrangements. He thus pleaded for Napoleon in his own mind, and then, when it became necessary to decide, he fell into inextricable perplexity.

After three or four days of such intercourse, Napoleon led the pope to understand that an end must be put to the question, and as the pontiff was as much concerned in the manner as in the reality, he promised to invent a form which would in no wise arouse his scruples nor burden his memory. Napoleon immediately sent for one of his secretaries, and they proceeded to work forthwith. The great difficulty of Pius VII. was to acknowledge the possession of St. Peter's patrimony by any power whatever, and to make a formal resignation of it by accepting an establishment out of Italy. Napoleon cut this difficulty by agreeing that there should be no mention of the abandonment of Rome in the establishment at Avignon, but of the independent existence of the Holy Father,

and of the free exercise of his pontifical power in the bosom of the French Empire, as if in his own States. Consequently, they adopted the following form:—"His holiness shall exercise the pontificate in France and in the kingdom of Italy in the same manner and with the same forms as his predecessors." It was merely understood that this should be at Avignon and nowhere else. It was then added in formal terms that the pope should receive the ambassadors of Christian powers, invested with full diplomatic privileges; that he should recover the possession and administration of the property in the Roman States not already sold; that he should receive a revenue of two millions in compensation for the property already alienated; that he should nominate to all the suburban sees, and to the ten bishoprics subsequently to be named either in France or Italy; that the old titular bishops of the Roman State should retain their titles under the form of bishops *in partibus*, and should receive an allowance equal to the revenue of their see; that the pope should have near his person the different administrations composing the Roman chancery; that the Emperor and the pope should consult together on the creation of new Catholic sees either in the Hanseatic departments, (a clause on which the pope laid much stress in order to show forcibly what religion gained by this new concordat;) that, finally, the Emperor would receive into favour the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laymen compromised in the recent religious troubles. It was agreed that canonical institution should be granted to the bishops named by the crown in the form and time determined by the last brief of the pope, *i.e.* in six months from the nomination by the temporal authority, and that in default of any decree of the pontifical court beyond the stipulated period, the oldest prelate of the province should be able to confer the institution thus refused or delayed. To these last clauses, the pope insisted to add another, which had no character of a law or treaty, but which was a kind of excuse for himself, and was conceived in the following terms: "The Holy Father agrees to the above arrangements in consideration of the actual state of the church, and in the confidence that his Majesty will grant his powerful aid to the numerous wants of religion in the present day."

It was, finally, agreed that the present concordat, though possessing the force of a treaty, should not be published until it had been communicated to the cardinals, who had a right to be acquainted with it, as the natural and necessary advisers of the church.

Napoleon agreed to all that the pope proposed, admitted without reserve the alterations he suggested in the form, which were immediately introduced, and when all was agreed upon, both in French and Italian, each copy was sent for transcription, and on the same evening, January 25, the pontifical and Imperial courts being assembled, the pope and the Emperor signed this remarkable act, which annihilated the temporal power of the papacy, forever according to the mind of Napoleon and the pope, for a very short time according to the secret designs of Providence. The Emperor, surrounding Pius VII. with every expression of veneration, and loading him with congratulations of every kind, allowed him not a moment to re-

flect on what he had done, and intoxicated him with a cloud of incense. To testify his joy and the complete restoration of his good will, he immediately forwarded orders to deliver and to bring to Paris the cardinals in detention, known under the name of the black cardinals. He lavished honours and favours; he summoned to the Council of State the Bishop of Nantes, to whom he also gave the cross of officer of the legion of honour, and the grand cordon of the order of the Reunion; he named the Bishop of Treves councillor of state and officer of the legion of honour; he gave the grand cordon of the Reunion to Cardinal Maury and the Archbishop of Tours, the cross of officer of the legion of honour to Cardinals Doria and Ruffo, the decoration of the iron crown to the Archbishop of Edessa, seats in the Senate to Cardinal de Bayane and the Bishop of Evreux, a pension of 6000 francs to the pope's physician, and magnificent presents to all those who had contributed to the important act just concluded.

After having spent two days more at Fontainebleau, during which he constrained himself to exhibit his great satisfaction to the pope, he left for Paris on the 27th of January, with the conviction of having accomplished an act which might not, perhaps, be definitive, but which at the moment could not fail to produce a great effect. He hastened to publish in the official journals that a concordat had regulated the differences between the Empire and the church, and proclaimed orally without ordering it to be printed, that the pope was to be established at Avignon. He wrote to Holland, Turin, Milan, Florence, and Rome, to all his representatives, to announce this important arrangement, to instruct them in its details, to authorize them to divulge the import but not the text, and to do all that was necessary to restore tranquillity to troubled consciences.

This tranquillity was not to be of long duration, for it was easy to see that as soon as the ordinary counsellors of the pope should return to him they would endeavour to put his mind to the rack by reproaching him with the act he had signed, by showing him the serious consequences it involved, especially the unsuitableness of the occasion on the eve of a war that could not turn to the advantage of Napoleon. In fact, scarcely had the black cardinals been admitted to Fontainebleau, than the mind of the pope, so cheerful and calm for some days, again became melancholy and sad. The Cardinals di Pietro and others showed him that he had acted very imprudently in abrogating the temporal power of the papacy, thereby effecting by his own authority an immense revolution in the church, abandoning the patrimony of St. Peter, which did not strictly belong to him, and that without necessity, Napoleon being on the point of yielding; that he had been deceived as to the situation of Europe, and that he ought not to hold himself bound by such an act, obtained by surprise, if not by force. In a word, they endeavoured to inspire him with a thousand terrors, a thousand sentiments of remorse, and from the state of things drew a picture which could have been suggested only by the most violent passion, a picture which, unhappily, was soon to be verified by the error of Napoleon, but which at the moment every wise man would have deemed false or at least exaggerated, for,

although shaken in the opinion of the world, the French Empire still inspired fear in the bosom of its enemies.

These suggestions threw the unhappy Pius VII. into that state of agitation and despair in which we have repeatedly seen him, and in which he was wont to lose the affecting dignity of his character. But how could he escape from the difficulty? How could he deny or revoke a signature just given? Who would dare to advise him to do so? No one, not even the cardinals who, in virtue of the last concordat, had just recovered their liberty, their access to the pope, and the opportunity of disturbing his mind and heart. They would have feared to see the doors of the state prison closed upon themselves. It was, therefore, agreed by the pope and themselves to practise dissimulation, to make no change of arrangement, but to await the events which could not be distant. In fact, Avignon would not be ready within a year or two; before that time no official act could be demanded of the pope resulting from his recent engagements; the concordat need not be published: nothing, therefore, was necessary but silence and a little longer resignation to the recluse life of Fontainebleau, a gentle rejection, under various pretexts, of the pomp with which Napoleon wished to surround the papacy which had now become French, and as to the bulls of canonical institution so long demanded by the new prelates, it was sufficient to continue the conduct hitherto adopted of withholding without refusing them.

This plan having been adopted, the pope required a much larger share of self-command than he possessed to conceal what was passing in his mind. The able officer who guarded him under the name of chamberlain—Captain Legorsse—quickly perceived his uneasiness, and conjectured the cause when he saw the agitation of the unhappy pontiff always connected with the visits of those cardinals whose dissatisfaction was most marked. He gave intimation to Napoleon through the minister for worship, who was not much surprised, and exclaimed, when he learned the use that had been made of the newly-recovered liberty, "I believe we have acted too quickly." He soon received a sure indication, though disguised, of the secret resolutions of Pius VII. The august prisoner, detained since 1808 either at Savona or Fontainebleau, had never occupied himself with the finances of his family, for all his expenses were settled without his interference. However, as he might be induced to perform some acts of charity or liberality, money had been offered him on different occasions, which he had always refused, though presented in the most delicate manner. Having now resumed the character of sovereign, and having many services to recompense, and having the right to do so by means of the revenue regularly appropriated to him, he might accept money with propriety. Napoleon sent him agents from the Imperial treasury to place at his disposal such sums as he might require. He declined the offer with mildness and without affectation, as if the moment had not yet come for openly assuming the exercise of his new sovereignty.

Nothing more was needed to show the resolutions and designs of those who influenced

the pope. But Napoleon was as crafty as any among them. He perceived that they were unwilling to create any disturbance, and he was equally so. What concerned him was not that the affairs of the church should be arranged, but that they should appear to be so; and this would be the case for some time, at least in the eyes of the masses. It was everywhere published in the remotest provinces of the empire that a concordat had been signed between the pope and the Emperor; that the pontiff was free; that he was about to repair to the see where he was to exercise the pontifical power; that, in a word, all the religious difficulties were at an end. Some persons, better acquainted with Roman intrigue, replied that the rumour was false, and that the pope had consented to nothing. There were even some who dared to assert that Napoleon had used violence to Pius VII., but in vain, which afterwards gave occasion to certain writers to maintain that Napoleon had dragged the venerable old man along the ground by his gray hairs,—a scene scarcely credible in the Middle Ages. But the pious and simple multitude, ignorant of these pretended secrets, ran to the altars to return thanks for this new concordat, and began to hope, as did Napoleon, that this peace with heaven might procure peace on the earth.

It was now two months since Napoleon had returned to Paris, and we have seen that he had already vigorously set his hand to every thing,—diplomacy, war, finances, and public worship. It was now the time to open the legislative body,—a formality which had become so insignificant in his reign that few persons knew either the day of beginning or closing their labours. On this occasion, on the contrary, great interest was attached to the opening of the session, which was a striking symptom of the change that had taken place in the public mind. Without dreaming of again undertaking their own affairs, imprudently abandoned to a genius of vast extent, but wholly without restraint, the nation wished at least to know in what position they were, and were anxious to read the speech of the Emperor, if, as they supposed, he should open the session in person.

This Napoleon intended to do, in order to address France and Europe from his throne,—a throne shaken, indeed, but still the most exalted in the world. While he daily reckoned his resources and saw fresh means flowing into his powerful hands and formed his vast military combinations, he regained full self-confidence, and he wished the world to judge of the real state of his mind and the character of his purposes by the loftiness of his tone.

Consequently, on Sunday, February 14, he repaired to the legislative body to confer on them the unwonted honour of opening the session in person, and to lay before them the state of affairs in Europe. Surrounded by a magnificent cortège, he read the following speech, in which, unhappily, imprudence vied with splendour and vigour:—

“GENTLEMEN, DEPUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS  
TO THE LEGISLATIVE BODY:

“The war rekindled in the North of Europe presented a favourable opportunity to the designs of the English in the Peninsula. They have made great efforts, and all their hopes

have been deceived. Their army failed before the city of Burgos, and has been obliged to evacuate the whole territory of Spain with great loss.

“I myself entered Russia. The French arms have always been victorious, on the fields of Ostrowno, Polotsk, Mohilew, Smolensk, at the Moskowa, and Malo-Jaroslawetz. Nowhere have the Russian armies been able to stand before our eagles. Moscow has fallen into our hands.

“When the barriers of Russia had been forced and the impotence of her arms recognised, a swarm of Tartars turned their parricidal hands against the finest provinces of that vast empire which they had been called upon to defend. In a few weeks, regardless of the tears and despair of the unhappy Muscovites, they burned more than four thousand of their finest villages, more than fifty of their finest towns, glutting their old hatred under the pretext of retarding our march by surrounding us with a desert. We have triumphed over all these obstacles. Even the burning of Moscow, when in four days they have destroyed the labour and husbandry of forty generations, in no degree changed the prosperity of my affairs. . . . But the excessive and premature severity of the winter has brought upon my army a frightful calamity. In a few nights I beheld a total change. I have suffered great losses. They would have broken my heart if, in such circumstances, I could have been accessible to any other sentiments than the interest, the glory, and the future welfare of my people.

“At the sight of our calamities the joy of England was great, her hopes boundless. She offered our finest provinces as a reward for treason. She assigned as a condition of peace the dismemberment of this beautiful empire: this was, in other words, to declare perpetual war.

“The energy of my people in these grave circumstances, their attachment to the integrity of the empire, the love which they have exhibited to myself, have dissipated all these chimeras and restored our enemies to a juster appreciation of affairs.

“The misfortunes arising from the severity of the frost have led to the full display of the greatness and solidity of this empire, founded on the efforts and the love of fifty millions of citizens, and on the territorial resources of the finest countries in the world.

“It is with the most lively satisfaction that we have seen our people in the kingdom of Italy, and those of ancient Holland and the united departments, rivalling the ancient French and evincing their conviction that their only hope for the future lies in the consolidation and triumph of the Empire.

“The agents of England propagate among our neighbours the spirit of revolt against sovereigns. England wishes to see the whole continent a prey to civil war and to all the fury of anarchy, but Providence has destined her to be herself the first victim of anarchy and civil war.

“I have signed with the pope a concordat, which terminates all the unhappy differences with the church. The French dynasty now reigns, and will continue to reign, in Spain. I am satisfied with the conduct of all my allies. I will abandon none of them. I will maintain

the integrity of their states. The Russians will return to their frightful climate.

"I desire peace. It is necessary to the world. Four times since the rupture following the peace of Amiens have I made formal proposals towards it. I will never make any other than an honourable peace, conformable to the interest and to the greatness of my empire. My policy is not mysterious. I have made known the sacrifices to which I am willing to submit.

"So long as the present maritime war continues, my people must be prepared for every kind of sacrifice; for an ill-grounded peace will deprive us of every thing, even of hope, and every thing will be compromised, even the prosperity of our descendants.

"America has had recourse to arms to secure the respect of her flag. In this glorious struggle she is followed by the prayers of the world. If she terminates it by obliging the enemies of the continent to recognise the principle that the flag protects the cargo and that neutrals ought not to be bound by paper blockades, in conformity with the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht, America will have deserved well of all nations. Posterity will say that the Old World had lost its rights and the New World had regained them.

"My Minister of the Interior will inform you, in the statement of the situation of the Empire, of the prosperous state of agriculture, of manufactures, and of our internal commerce, as well as the continual increase of the population. In no age have the agriculture and manufactures of France attained a higher degree of prosperity.

"I have need of great resources to enable me to meet the expenses arising from present circumstances; but, owing to the different measures which will be proposed by my Minister of Finance, I shall not require to impose any new burden upon my people."

This speech, which was calculated to produce a powerful excitement, was received with the acclamations which are wont to greet any prince, whether great or ordinary, well-established or threatened, who presents himself to the view of the crowd. If it were allowed for a moment to forget that prudence is the first quality in the government of states, we might willingly admire at the head of a vast empire that indomitable pride and those conditions of peace so boldly but so imprudently stated to the world. Yet, when we recall the situation of Europe, the cries of insulted patriotism resounding from one extremity of the continent to the other, we regret that such lofty language should bring so many difficulties to those negotiations which alone could lead to peace and arrest the effusion of human blood. What, indeed, would England say of the declaration that the French dynasty still reigned, and would continue to reign, in Spain? What would be said by all those states interested in the partition of the grand duchy of Warsaw to the declaration that France would maintain the integrity of all her allies? What would be said, and, still more, what would be done, by Austria, to whom was assigned the office of effecting a reconciliation between the contending powers, if this task were rendered impossible?

Such were the perplexing questions suggested by this speech. But the public, ignorant of

cabinet-secrets, could not entertain them. The confidence of the Imperial language was calculated to tranquillize them, at least to a certain degree, and to impose upon Europe. This was the only politic element in this impolitic speech. Its effect may be judged by events.

It would be difficult to form an idea of the change wrought by a few days in Germany, already so excited. The King of Prussia, who had retired to Breslau in order to be more independent of us and even of his own subjects, was no longer master of his own determinations. Always convinced that the only means of escaping safe and sound from the chaos of actual events was to have many soldiers under arms, he had not waited for answers to the questions proposed at Paris before ordering new levies. He had published several edicts, —two in particular: one, to induce young men of family to serve as volunteers in the *chasseurs à cheval*, the other, to induce young men of all classes to serve in infantry-regiments as *chasseurs à pied*. Public opinion had revolted against the distinction which opened the ranks of the army to some and closed them to others, for all classes sought to contribute to what they called the emancipation of Germany. At this double appeal the excitement became almost delirious. From all sides men ran to M. de Goltz, the only Prussian minister remaining at Berlin, and eagerly demanded, as in a period of revolution, for whom and against whom the king demanded the aid of his subjects, adding that they were all ready in a certain case to rise as one man; nor was it difficult to divine that the case was that in which the king should wish to direct their devotion against Napoleon, the oppressor of Germany. M. de Goltz, who perfectly knew the state of matters and the suitable line of conduct and tone of language, had exhorted them, in reply, to trust in the wisdom and patriotism of their king, to confide to him the interests of their country, and to devote to him their energies, leaving him to decide on the manner in which they might be most usefully employed. While M. de Goltz spoke with this reserve, his eyes and countenance expressed what he dared not utter, and they left his presence to enroll their names in the army. And in every quarter the leaders of secret societies exhorted to arm, saying that the king, though hesitating at present, could not long remain so; that, sooner or later, he must be determined; and that the stronger he felt himself and the more surrounded by armed subjects the more would he incline to follow the dictate of his heart and devote himself to the liberation of Germany. Under these strong impulses, the young nobility had enrolled themselves in the *chasseurs à cheval*, the young citizens of the schools and in commerce in the *chasseurs à pied*. In a few days the universities and shops were vacant, and it was almost necessary to suspend the public courts. The nobility equipped themselves; voluntary gifts rendered obligatory by exactions upon the principal marshals, served to equip those who had no private resources. The arsenals of the state furnished arms. To complete the resemblance to the first days of our revolution, every one assumed a cockade, —the white and black. No one dared to omit this significant emblem for his hat, for he would have been

considered a lukewarm citizen or the enemy of his country.

The King of Prussia, learning at Breslau the enthusiasm of his subjects, which he also witnessed in Silesia, was at the same time glad and alarmed, glad to see himself at the head of a considerable force, alarmed at being pressed between the Russians and the French, obliged to declare for one or the other without yet knowing on which side would be found the independence and restoration of Prussia. The reply from Paris arriving in these circumstances found him in a spirit very little likely to receive it with patience. That excellent prince, like all inert and usually restrained characters, was at times so much the reverse as to be scarcely recognizable. He was indignant at the refusal of ninety-four millions expended for the French army, a sum of which he had great need, at the retention of the fortresses on the Oder and Vistula, which would have been so useful in enabling him to decide with greater safety between the French and the Russians, and, above all, at the prohibition to enter into direct communication with the Emperor Alexander. He, in fact, set much by a speedy personal intercourse with that monarch, first, because the Austrians who were authorized to interfere had already sent diplomatic agents to Wilna and to London; secondly, because he wished to avert the belligerent armies from Silesia; and, thirdly, because he saw at Königsberg Baron de Stein, General d'York, and the Russian agents governing the province, convoking the States, acting without him and eventually against him, assuming the airs of a sovereign, and behaving as if ready to detach themselves from the Prussian monarchy unless it should adhere to the coalition. Frederick William, in despair, wished to ask an account of these proceedings towards a friend, an ancient ally of whose misfortunes he had already been the cause, and whose cruel embarrassment at the present moment he ought readily to comprehend. The man whom he wished to send to Alexander was M. de Knesebeck, the same whom he had charged the year before to explain and justify at St. Petersburg his treaty of alliance with Napoleon, and who, whether authorized or not, had far exceeded the limits which it was necessary to observe in order to maintain his loyalty towards France. No doubt Frederick William might have despatched M. de Knesebeck secretly, but it would soon have been known: the leading people at Königsberg, in their joy, would not have failed to publish it, and the king would have infringed upon his alliance with Napoleon, and would consequently have been in a bad case if the campaign should be opened with another victory of Jena. Frederick William was, therefore, anxious to obtain, besides the restitution of his money and fortresses, authority to send an ostensible agent to Alexander.

The Prussian monarch, who presented the melancholy spectacle of an honourable king placed between his conscience and the interest of his crown, was at the present moment cruelly tormented by both. Though not very demonstrative in general, he on this occasion professed more anger than he really felt, saying that he could endure it no longer; that he was oppressed; that his incontestable claim was denied in the refusal of the ninety-four millions; that they had engaged to reimburse him in three

months, and that the supplies had been furnished more than six; that in retaining his forts, which had been given in pledge until he had acquitted his own part, they violated the treaties and his territory, since he no longer owed any thing; that, in contesting the right which belonged to every independent power of negotiating with a neighbouring state, they treated him like a dependent prince who had no longer freedom of action; that if they could afford him protection, if they had maintained themselves on the Niemen or the Vistula, there would have been some pretext for prohibiting all intercourse with Russia, but that, having lost the Niemen, and afterwards the Vistula, and being on the eve of losing the Oder, it was unjust and unreasonable to forbid negotiation, at least so far as to secure the neutrality of his royal residence.

After having given wide circulation to these reasons, so as to prepare an excuse for whatever should ensue, the king, without either public announcement or concealment, despatched M. de Knesebeck to the Russian head-quarters, and from that day he might be said to have exchanged one alliance for the other. He was not yet decided on the merit of his resolution: he knew not whether he were doing well or ill, whether he were not repeating the error of 1806, or whether his present movement were not like that which preceded the battle of Jena and might be followed by a similar reverse. So difficult is it sometimes to distinguish between the present and the past, which it in some degree resembles, and to discern in the present the new feature which Providence has concealed. But Frederick William saw the French retire step by step from the Niemen to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder, and the Russians advance in their rear, his subjects appeal to him with urgency; and, the question gradually resolving itself independently of him, and no longer expecting guidance from his reason which it could not afford, he looked for all guidance and determination to the progress of events. His heart as a citizen and a king was with the Germans, who uttered a thousand cries and raised a thousand arms in defence of the independence of Germany; and, if any thing still detained him, it was merely the fear of aggravating the slavery of his beloved Germany.

The secret of that royal heart was divined by the Prussians, and by them communicated to the Russians. M. de Knesebeck could only repeat it to Alexander. It was necessary to march forward, to force the French head-quarters to retrograde from Posen to Frankfort-on-the-Oder; also to march upon Warsaw, from Warsaw to Cracow, and Silesia, thus surrounded at the two extremities, would fall with her king into the hands of Alexander. Still more must be done: they must advance not only to the Oder, but to the Elbe, to free Berlin and Hamburg on the right and Dresden on the left, and they would thus deliver not only Prussia, which would rise as one man, but the Hanseatic provinces, Hanover, Westphalia, who only awaited the opportunity for insurrection, Saxony, who only asked to be emancipated from the adventurous career into which Napoleon had urged her, perhaps even Wurtemberg and Bavaria, and (which was of much greater importance) they would deliver Austria from the bonds in

which she was held by policy and relationship.

Military men of reflection, and in particular Prince Kutusoff, disapproved of so bold a movement, for it was impossible to leave behind them Dantzic and Thorn, which held about 30,000 men in garrison, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau, which had about 30,000 more, without at least blockading these places, and in that case they would be able to continue the campaign with only a small part of their forces. It was necessary, in fact, to leave on the right 40,000 men before the fortresses of the Lower Vistula, 20,000 or 30,000 on the left, before Warsaw and the Austrians, which would leave about 50,000 men to act offensively against the French, to whom they should perform the service of forcing them to concentrate by driving them upon the Elbe, so that they should weaken themselves in proportion as they reinforced their enemies. While invincible behind the Niemen, they should be much less so on the Vistula, still less so on the Oder, and on the Elbe incapable of gaining a victory. It was, therefore, foolish thus to expose themselves to the first bound of that irresistible lion against which, hitherto, they had obtained no success except by avoiding him.

These reasonings, little in accordance with policy, but strictly in accordance with military principles, received no welcome from the enthusiastic Germans, nor from the Russians, who shared their ardour; and it is true that there are times, though rare, when the dictates of passion are more worthy to be followed than those of reason. It was replied that the French were shut up in the strongholds and would not leave them; that the Prussians and 20,000 Russians would be sufficient to restrain them; that, on the left, the Poles were in a state of consternation, ready to receive from Alexander that restoration of their country which they no longer expected from France; that the Austrian soldiers every day drank with the Russian soldiers; that they willingly withdrew before the least body sent against them; that they would then have at least 80,000 men to send forward; that Prince Eugene had not 20,000; that the 25,000 or 30,000 French collected at Berlin were threatened on all sides, and had the greatest difficulty to retain their position; that the slightest demonstration would compel the French head-quarters to retrograde from Posen to Frankfort, from Frankfort to Berlin, from Berlin to Magdeburg, and that in that city thousands of Germans would unite to compel further retrogression; but that, without pretending to go so far, it was certain that by disengaging Posen and Warsaw, and taking one step more to disengage Berlin and Dresden, they would emancipate Prussia, gain 100,000 Prussians to their side immediately, and 200,000 in the course of some weeks; that this alliance, withdrawn from Napoleon and secured to Russia and England, would totally change the aspect of affairs in Europe, and set them in the way of effecting the last and most decisive political revolution,—that of detaching Austria from France and uniting her to the European coalition.

There was more truth in these assertions than was supposed even by their enthusiastic supporters, or by Alexander, to whom they were daily repeated. But so much truth was

not necessary to influence him: the noise and bustle which surrounded him, the unwonted fumes of glory which intoxicated him, the title of king of kings which from all sides greeted him, sufficed to determine him to advance. M. de Knesebeck had no great distance to travel in order to meet him, and he found him on his march to the Vistula. What had he to say to him? Nothing that Alexander did not already know, for it amounted to this,—that, after a few more steps, Prussia and her king would be at his service.

Alexander had employed the month of January in moving towards the Vistula by Sawalki, Willenberg, Mlawka, and Plock, keeping the road between Poland and Old Prussia. Remaining at Plock from the 5th of February to the 9th, he had left for Kalisch, having only a short distance to cross in order to be at Breslau with Frederick William. The Russian guards and the reserves, comprising about 18,000 men, had followed. At the same time Wittgenstein on the right, with the old army of the Dwina, preceded by several thousand Cossacks, advanced at the head of 34,000 men to Custrin and Berin, leaving in the rear the army of Moldavia to observe Dantzic and Thorn, with 16,000 men. To the left, Miloradovitch, Doctoroff, and Sacken, with 40,000 men, had taken their course for Warsaw, and were slowly following the Austrian body, which they knew to be little disposed to fight and very impatient to return to Galicia. The order was given to the two columns of the right and left to push forward, while the Emperor Alexander, leading the centre, should await the moment for entering Breslau to throw himself into the arms of the King of Prussia, and that the old army of Moldavia, at the head of which Barclay de Tolly had taken the place of Admiral Tchitchakoff, should keep an eye upon the garrisons of the Vistula.

Prince Eugene, having Thorn on the left and Warsaw on the right, and not daring to expose Berlin by summoning to himself Greater's troops, had no chance of keeping his ground at Posen. He would have had the means of doing so, if Prince Schwarzenberg had chosen to retire with Reynier and Poniatowski upon Kalisch. Receiving, then, a reinforcement of 50,000 men, and having no fear of weakening the little body which was guarding Berlin for the sake of some important result at Posen, he would have been able with 70,000 men to withstand the Russian centre, and, by arresting the centre, to arrest the wings. But Prince Schwarzenberg, who had orders not to engage any more since his court was openly adopting the policy of mediation, alleged to General Reynier and Prince Poniatowski his inability to fight, and the uselessness of doing so in regard to any future operations, and urged them to keep themselves in readiness to retrograde still further, for he could not remain at Warsaw. When invited to make for Kalisch, he replied that having at Cracow, i.e. in the direction of Galicia, his depôts, recruits, and magazines, it was impossible for him to take the road to Kalisch, but that he would protect those of his companions-in-arms who might feel it right to manoeuvre in that direction. Upon this declaration Reynier had left immediately for Kalisch, where he had, fortunately, anticipated the Russians, from

whose hands he had not escaped without several encounters with the rear-guard. Poniatowski, collecting in all haste about 15,000 Poles, and leaving a garrison at Modlin, had been unable to gain the Kalisch road in time, and had been constrained to follow Prince Schwarzenberg to Cracow, whither he had retired with the fugitive remains of the Polish Government.

Prince Eugene, informed of these different movements, had determined to quit Posen and to take the road for Frankfort-on-the-Oder by the highroad of Mezeritz. At the same time he had ordered the old Lagrange division, which formed part of the troops in charge of Berlin, to come to meet him as far as Frankfort. He had joined it with the 10,000 men of all arms that remained to him, who had been increased by the rallying of some soldiers of the Guard. Not considering the position at Frankfort much more tenable than that of Posen, he had resolved to go to Berlin, where he might with Grenier muster 40,000 men, and present a much better countenance than he had shown for the last month. During his march, the scouts of the Russian army, under Colonels Tettenborn and Czernicheff, had passed the Oder at Wrietzen, near Berlin, had surprised and almost wholly destroyed a regiment of Italian cavalry belonging to General Grenier's corps, and had diffused immoderate joy through Berlin.

General Grenier, who had then left Berlin with his two infantry-divisions, had repulsed the too venturesome scouts of Wittgenstein's army, and had re-entered that capital after a little moderating the joy of its inhabitants. By taking up a strong position before Berlin, and calling to himself General Lauriston's corps, a division of which was already at Magdeburg, and by exhibiting a firm resolution to engage, Prince Eugene would probably have arrested the Russians; but, fearing to provoke decisive events before the arrival of Napoleon, seeing himself surrounded by enemies with no more than 2500 cavalry, often exposed to lose his means of communication with Magdeburg for want of horse-soldiers, he resolved to take up his final position on the Elbe, where also General Reynier had been already obliged to fall back by the movement of the Russian centre. On the 4th of March he left Berlin, after sending his wounded, sick, and matériel to Magdeburg. Placed henceforward at the head of 40,000 men, he had no longer to fear any insult to his prudence or his arms.

On the next day he was on the Elbe, and terminated this long retreat, which began at Moscow on the 20th of October, and which had been distinguished by such strange and terrible disasters. Prince Eugene had nothing to reproach himself with since he had assumed the command, unless, perhaps, an excess of caution; and he had rendered incontestable service. All the marshals and generals without troops had left him, except Davout and Victor. He sent the former to Dresden with the Lagrange division to meet General Reynier, who was returning from Kalisch, and to defend the important points of Dresden and Torgau. He established himself at Wittenberg with the 10,000 men who had been long his only resource, and the troops of Grenier's corps, and summoned to Magdeburg the divisions of Lauriston's corps which were ready for active service. He would then

have 80,000 men upon the Elbe, and several strong places in good state of defence; nor could he be forced to relinquish this line.

The universal joy of Prussia at the evacuation of Berlin will be readily conceived. Long before that evacuation they had sent repeated emissaries to Frederick William,—first the fiery Baron de Stein, then a flippant Alsacian, Baron d'Anstett, whose natal land had long since become French, then an officer of high credit among the German patriots, General Scharnhorst,—and they had demonstrated by every argument, moral, political, and military, that it was necessary to join himself to Russia. They had told him that Napoleon was subdued; that he could not recommence the long series of his victories; that Europe, weary of his yoke, was about to rise as one man; that Austria only waited the signal from Prussia to declare herself; that Napoleon would not resist such a force of enemies; that France, exhausted and disgusted, would not furnish him with the means; that they would thus relieve the world of his odious dominion; that Russia, desiring no increase of territory, would restore the portion of the duchy of Warsaw which had belonged to Prussia, and in addition all those parts of his territory which she should reconquer, and promised not to lay down her arms until she should have aided Prussia to reconstitute herself entirely. It was this inducement especially that could decide Frederick William, for he feared that after the loss of a battle they would become discouraged, and would resign him, as at Tilsit, to the vengeance of Napoleon. By engaging not to abandon him, but to maintain the struggle to the last extremity, they advanced the motive best fitted to influence his resolution.

To all these reasons and promises, and to the enthusiasm of his subjects, he yielded, at the same time saying to those around him that it must not be a matter of excitement followed by sudden reaction as in 1806, but that, since they demanded war, he required them to persevere to the last man and the last crown. He therefore authorized M. de Hardenberg to sign on the 28th of February a treaty by which Russia engaged immediately to bring together 150,000 men, Prussia 80,000, (each power proposing to itself to bring a much larger force;) to employ them against France, until Prussia should receive a constitution more conformable to her antiquity and to the equilibrium of Europe; not to lay down their arms till this end should be attained; to use all their efforts to unite Austria to the common cause, and to make no treaty but by common consent. Russia, in particular, promised to employ her good offices with England to induce her to conclude a treaty of subsidy with Prussia.

While these engagements were being formed, neither the king nor M. de Hardenberg had dared to come to any open explanation with M. de St. Marsan, the French minister, and their embarrassment with him was obvious. At the moment when they were treating, the French army had already evacuated Posen and Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and were preparing to leave Berlin. It was therefore no longer to be feared, and there would have been little danger in openly declaring that they seized the opportunity of restoring the fortune of their country

Imprudently compromised at another period. But, on one side, M. de Hardenberg had sufficient penetration to know that he was about to act a part attended with great danger to his country, and the king had sufficient memory to convince him of the same, and until the French army should have repassed the Elbe they scarcely dared to confess what they had just done. M. de Hardenberg was so much moved, that on the 27th, the day before the signature of the treaty with Russia, he said to M. de St. Marsan, "Pray, do something in favour of Prussia, and you will save us from a cruel extremity." He was sincere in thus expressing himself; and, on the point of taking a step which must prove either very fortunate or very fatal to his country, he experienced the anxiety natural to a good citizen. The king, whose honourable character we are far from disputing, was still less open than his minister, and, employing a ruse little worthy of himself, pretended extreme irritation on the occasion of some recent proceedings ascribed to the French army, which were as follows: Napoleon had ordered payment of the whole, but the Prussians, taking unfair advantage of the state of things, had demanded of General Mathieu-Dumas, the intendant of the army, prices which could not be allowed. Patriotism warranted them to refuse us provisions, but it did not warrant their demanding three or four times their value. Napoleon had therefore annulled the bargains. He had also ordered the strongholds on the Oder to be provisioned as they could, by taking all that was within reach which could not be bought. The French governors of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau had not failed to do so, and for several leagues round had carried off the cattle, grain, wood, and every thing of which they stood in need. Finally, Prince Eugene had prevented, wherever his troops had power, levies *en masse*, which were an evident infraction of the treaties which connected Prussia with France and limited the extent of her armaments. Certainly, these facts were no very strong motives for breaking the alliance, viewed in connection with what had passed during twenty years of sanguinary wars, excited by Prussia herself very gratuitously in 1792, which she ought to have remembered. It would have been more simple and dignified to say that, having been long conquered and oppressed, they now seized the opportunity of relief. But let us be just, and acknowledge that against the oppressor the oppressed is justified in using craft. He loses his own dignity by so doing, but fails in his duty to none. On February 28, the day of signing the treaty with Russia, the king, affecting a degree of irritation which, if sincere, arose from the fear occasioned by the adoption of so serious a course, caused a note to be addressed to M. de St. Marsan, in which payment was peremptorily demanded, and an immediate explanation of the recent acts imputed to the French army. M. de St. Marsan being unable to reply himself, the note was sent to Paris by a special courier.

But it was no longer possible to conceal his proceedings, and the joy of the patriots who flocked to Breslau, and surrounded the king, congratulating him publicly on his conduct, left no room to doubt of the resolution that had been adopted. Besides, a series of perfectly

significant measures occurred to render the rupture with France almost official. A forced currency was given to state papers corresponding to our bills on the Treasury. The formation of a grand Prussian army in Silesia was decreed. The illustrious General Blücher, who had always manifested most honourable grief at the subjection of his country, was named commander-in-chief. General Scharnhorst, who had contributed more than any other to influence the king, was named chief of the staff. Finally, the trial of General d'York, which had never been begun, was reported to have terminated in his favour. He was declared innocent, and reinstated in the command of the troops whom he had induced to desert. The Prussian officers who, after the alliance with France, had carried into Russia the indignant patriotism, Generals Gneisenau and Clausewitz, were summoned, commissioned, and loaded with rewards.

After such manifestations, all self-restraint was unnecessary, and the interview between the two newly-allied sovereigns took place on the 15th of March. Alexander, accompanied by M. de Nesselrode and a crowd of generals, entered the capital of Silesia, and, amid the applause of the people and the acclamations of the army, threw himself into the arms of the friend who had been sacrificed at Tilsit and regained by the disaster of Moscow. The fiery and generous Baron de Stein, confined to bed by severe suffering, could not be present at the completion of his own work. The city was illuminated for three days, and the king had the precaution to protect the house of M. de St. Marsan by his own guard. During the stay of Alexander at Breslau, M. de Hardenberg, who had continued to observe towards M. de St. Marsan a gloomy but expressive silence, broke it by sending to him on the 17th of March the declaration of war with France, and, after lavishing upon him the expressions of personal regard, left him free to depart when and in what manner he might choose.

It is not necessary to affirm that this event, though foreseen, produced upon Germany and Europe an immense effect. The German patriots manifested more than ever their joy and hope. According to them, Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and all the princes who were called our slaves, would immediately imitate the conduct of Prussia and take part in the general coalition. In the desire to accelerate this result, Colonel Czernicheff and Tattenborn, leaving to Wittgenstein's corps the task of following the rear-guard of Prince Eugene to Magdeburg and Wittenberg, descended the Elbe with their Cossacks, to exhibit themselves in the neighbourhood of Hamburg, and to attempt, in concert with the English fleets, to relieve the French Hanseatics, who were French against their will and only demanded the opportunity of relinquishing that nationality. At the same time the advanced guards of the Russian army of the centre, which had crossed the Oder, were directed against Torgau and Dresden, to endeavour to determine Saxony, and to bring those means to bear upon her which had so well succeeded with Prussia.

Prince Eugene, anxious for Dresden, while falling back upon the Elbe, had inclined to the right instead of to the left, and had brought



to Wittenberg instead of Magdeburg. The consequence of this movement Hamburg was owing to the distance between Magdeburg, as it were, in the middle of the Elbe, and Hamburg, situated at a distance from the mouth of that river, the line of the Elbe from the mountains to the sea. Colonels Tettenborn and Niehoff, therefore, hastened with 9000 Cossacks, supported by some light troops towards Lubeck and Hamburg. The French on their side, had repaired an estate on the island of Heligoland, and had accumulated arms, ammunition, and every thing of war. Their flotillas occupied the mouth of the Elbe. This was more than sufficient to throw into fermentation the already restless minds of the people of Hamburg. General Morand—not the celebrated Morand of the corps, but an old general of the same name, but unhappily infirm—was at the time retiring with 2000 men from Pomerania to Hamburg. He was surprised, mortally wounded, and taken with part of his little command on the other side, General Lauriston, been sent to Magdeburg by Osnabruck, and Brunswick, was still forty leagues from that city. General Bourcier was in the midst of his cavalry-depôts. The Cossacks actually at Hamburg were not sufficient to arrest the Cossacks nor to restrain the French. The French authorities, who had been maltreated on the 24th of February, who had seen the custom-house officers in the midst of the indirect contributions, and the police, beaten, robbed, and expelled, till worse treatment, evacuated Hamburg, resigning the city to the municipal authorities.

They took their course for Bremen. The Cossacks of Tettenborn appeared in the midst of the general rejoicing, and delivered the keys of the city to convey the Emperor Alexander. The municipalities formed by the French gave no sign of opposition, and were replaced by the Prussians. A legion, called the Hamburg Legion, was immediately formed, composed of men willing to arm in favour of the German cause. It was equipped at the expense of the inhabitants of Hamburg, who in a few days filled up a liberal subscription for arms and provisions. A signal was given to the English near, which they promptly obeyed, and the ships loaded with sugar, coffee, and cotton, doubled the joy of their appearance, the pleasure of seeing the removal of a foreign authority was joined that of the continental blockade abolished and the ports of commerce reopened. The Hamburgers knew not to what sudden misfortune they exposed themselves by their demonstration.

On the Upper Elbe, in Saxony, and at Dresden, the same movement was occasioned by the appearance of the Russian and Prussian troops. The unfortunate Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, hitherto strongly attached to Napoleon, who had loaded him with favours and had offered Poland to him, began to feel that his ambition were not those to which he had adapted, but that his only congenial lot was found in repose, the love of his subjects, and the practice of religion. Accord-

ingly, while much regretting the loss of Poland, he was prepared to relinquish it provided he was allowed to retain his beloved Saxony as he had possessed it before he was burdened with the honours conferred on him by Napoleon. Since late events, without exhibiting less devotion to France, he had sought a counsellor to guide his weakness through this labyrinth of perplexities, and he thought that he could do nothing better than address himself to the Emperor of Austria,—that is to say, to the father-in-law and ally of Napoleon. M. de Metternich immediately urged him to unite himself to that party of German princes which he was labouring to form, whose design was to pacify Europe by interposing between Russia, England, and France, and by forcing them to accept a peace quite in the interests of Germany. They had justly said to Frederick Augustus that this was not to act treacherously towards France, but, on the contrary, to render her a service, and at the same time to discharge his duty as a good German, to endeavour to re-establish peace on the basis of Germany being made independent, strong, and respected. He had adopted this course without hesitation, and for this reason had evaded the remonstrances of the French minister, who from time to time demanded supplies, recruits, and cavalry. In order to escape these appeals, he had enforced his distress, the hostile inclinations of his subjects, and the impossibility of executing what was demanded in the prescribed time. His *corps d'armées* having returned to the Elbe under the command of General Reynier, he had cantoned it in Torgau, and there, under pretence of recruiting it, had placed it apart in a strong fortress, to await, in a kind of neutrality like that of Prince Schwarzenberg, the directions of the Austrian policy. His cavalry, composed of 1200 superb cuirassiers and 1200 excellent hussars and chasseurs, which Napoleon had imperiously demanded, he had positively refused. To inspire him with courage for such a refusal, he had required a greater fear than that which he entertained for Napoleon, and that was the fear of the Cossacks, whose presence, everywhere proclaimed, alarmed even the allies of the Russians. Expecting every moment to see the appearance of these Cossacks, so terrible at a distance, he had resolved to place himself in the midst of his cavalry and to go with his family to a safe place, leaving his infantry in Torgau and his estates to those who might successively gain possession of them. With such dispositions, the defection of Prussia and the approach of the Russian rear-guard were sufficient to determine his adoption of a plan of flight already long prepared. Notwithstanding the representations of the French minister, M. de Serra, who constrained himself to demonstrate to him the unsuitableness of his departure, and the danger of abandoning his subjects, who would inevitably surrender themselves to the prevalent passions and be guilty of acts towards France which would bring down speedy punishment on them and suffering upon himself, he set off, leaving Dresden in the hands of Marshal Davout, his most valuable and least transportable property in the fortress of Königstein, marching himself with his treasure, and his numerous family, with 8000 men of the cavalry and artillery. He might have retired to Bohemia, where

in a few hours he would have found himself on neutral ground, at the time inviolable by all the belligerent powers. This he did not venture to do, nor did the court of Austria wish it, lest it should prematurely discover the secret league which she sought to form. He repaired by Plauen and Hoff to Ratisbon, on the territory of the King of Bavaria, who was as much perplexed as himself. His intention was to remain in Bavaria, or to throw himself into Austria, as events might dictate. M. de Serra had invited him to France; but such a step would have ruined him in the eyes of the Germans, and would have been contrary to the plan of Austrian mediation: the invitation was, therefore, declined.

Scarcely had he left Dresden when the Russians appeared in the neighbourhood of that city. The Saxon infantry was shut up in Torgau, and had declared that they would not leave it to assist in the defence of the Elbe. Marshal Davout had for the defence of the upper course of the Elbe the French division of Durutte, the only remains of Reynier's corps since the Saxons had left it, in addition to several troops sent by Prince Eugene, and, finally, the second battalions of his corps which had just been reorganized at Erfurt. He hastened to Dresden in person, and took those measures which circumstances required, as an honourable but inexorable soldier, committing no unnecessary injury, but pitilessly ordering all that was necessary. He traversed the banks of the Elbe, destroying the mills, barges, and ferry-boats, notwithstanding the cries of the Saxon peasantry, and, having reached the fine stone bridge which unites the two divisions of Dresden, the old and new towns, he undermined two arches, and blew them up, regardless of the threats and clamours of the congregated inhabitants. He then placed himself at the head of his troops, to receive the Russians if they should attempt the passage.

These measures of defence were among the grievances most vehemently urged in all Germany. Coarse engravings representing the bridge of Dresden destroyed by the ferocious Davout, as he was called in the North, were circulated in large numbers through the town and country. "See," it was said, "how the French treat their most faithful allies, the Saxons, who have fought valiantly in their cause when the French themselves had thrown down their arms and fled."

This new excitement produced by the defection of Prussia was naturally perceived at Vienna, notwithstanding the distance and the usual tranquillity of that capital. The profound policy of M. de Metternich and of the Emperor Francis, though conjectured by some men of penetration, escaped the discernment of the more ardent members of the court, the army, and the people. They saw in it only a culpable tardiness in detaching himself from the French alliance, and in shaking off the fatal engagements formed in contracting the marriage of Maria Louisa with Napoleon. The violence of this part of the Austrian public was extreme. Among the most animated were the Empress herself, the Princess of Modena, and (which is still more astonishing) the Archduke Charles, commonly so prudent and so moderate in every thing in which France was

concerned. But that prince, alive to the emotion of German patriotism, and deeply wounded by his brother, the Emperor Francis, who had excluded him from all participation in affairs, readily seized every opportunity of blaming the Government, and on this occasion he was sincere, for he was one of those who would have preferred a more clear and open conduct. An expression of extraordinary boldness was ascribed to him,—viz., that, if the Emperor Francis had contracted a marriage which impeded his policy, he ought to abdicate, and to yield the crown to some member of the family whose actions were more uncontrolled.

The excitement was so great that M. de Metternich was in some fear for his personal safety, and the Government perceived itself constrained to arrest many persons of distinction, such as M. de Hormayer, one of the principal officers in the Austrian chancery, who had been employed in secret communication with the Tyrol. That which took place in Germany was agreeable neither to the Emperor nor to M. de Metternich. It by no means suited them to rouse public spirit to such an extent and to accept the yoke of the populace in exchange for that of Napoleon. Alexander appeared to them as imprudent prince, intoxicated by unwonted success, and Frederick William a weak prince, at present guided by his subjects as six years before he had been guided by his wife. Neither the Emperor nor M. de Metternich hesitated to express this judgment. And this impetuous, unreflecting manner of action was not in harmony with theirs. They wished to escape from the hands of Napoleon without falling into those of Alexander, and without the risk of again falling into them and incurring harder treatment than ever in consequence of a war foolishly undertaken and foolishly conducted. They were far from considering Napoleon as ruined: they expected to see him, as in 1806, pour down impetuously from the defiles of Thuringia and punish those who had so rashly exposed themselves to his blows. And if such a result were not certain, it was at least possible, and that reason alone appeared sufficient to them to forbid such hasty action, and especially any obligation before the Austrian army should be reconstituted, and to induce them to prefer the resource of a mediation by means of which the situation of Germany might be improved without the danger of a war with France.

In this point of view the Austrian cabinet considered the conduct of Prussia very hazardous, the German demonstrations very rash: and, in the same point of view, that court continually urged upon us prudent and moderate counsels, and entreated us, allowing that we should make one vigorous campaign, to aim at no other result from our future success than a speedy and equitable peace, of such a character as to be acceptable to all Europe.

It was accordingly with much regret that M. de Metternich saw in the report addressed to the Senate demanding new levies, and in the Imperial speech of February 14, the announcement of absolute determinations in regard to Spain, the Hanseatic departments, and the grand duchy of Warsaw, for this rendered impossible the mediation he had undertaken. He came to long and repeated explanations with

M. Otto, our minister at Vienna. Alluding to the Imperial speech, he said, "I must admire the high tone assumed by your Emperor, in which he displays his former genius; but it is necessary to think of consequences, which, in the present case, cannot be other than deplorable. How do you think I can negotiate with England when you say that the French dynasty reigns and will continue to reign in Spain? or with Russia and Prussia, when you say that the constitutional territories or those belonging to the allies, i.e. the Hanseatic cities and the grand duchy of Warsaw, shall remain sacred and inviolable? Never could I make such conditions acceptable to Europe. But peace is requisite alike to us and to you; for, even though you should gain victories, (and you will need to gain a great number in order to induce Europe to treat you with moderation,) you may possibly be exposed to the outbreak of public opinion not only through Europe, but even at home." On this occasion, without intimating the peace he himself wished, which it was easy to divine, M. de Metternich endeavoured to extract from M. Otto the secret of that which we desired. But the attempt was vain, for M. Otto was wholly uninformed. Unable to induce him to speak, M. de Metternich did not hesitate to do so himself, to prepare us for the conditions which Europe would accept, even supposing her to be conquered by us,—which he always admitted in argument. "Spain," said he, in terms alternately insinuating and frank, "will probably not be conceded to you by England, especially after the recent campaign. For us Germans, this condition is of small importance: it affects us only in as far as it affects England, from whom neither Russia nor Prussia would separate themselves in negotiation. You cannot possibly induce England to allow more than the union of Holland with France, nor that unless in consequence of several more victories; and this condition, like the preceding, only affects us in virtue of its bearing on British interests. But you will never induce England, Prussia, Russia, nor Germany to allow the final union of the Hanseatic provinces to the French empire. Why, then, be so resolute upon that point? Of what importance to you are countries situated so far from your real frontier, so little useful to your defence, so foreign from your commercial interests, in so little sympathy with your nation, so necessary to the constitution of an independent Germany? When you attached great importance to the continental blockade, you might adhere to the Hanseatic territories; but now this blockade is crumbling in every direction, it is abandoned by Russia and Prussia and daily infringed by yourselves. By maintaining it you will make the fortune of your Russian and Prussian enemies, for every thing will pass through their hands, and besides the supposition of general peace renounce the advantage of it: relinquish it then at once, and, while so doing, consent to restore those territories which can be of no use to you except in the view of this blockade. As to Prussia, you must be content to see her stronger and more extensive, a real intermediate state between Russia and the South of Europe, an intermediate state which it would be absurd now to look for in Poland, since you have not succeeded in re-establishing her, and whose

restoration is of more importance to us Germans than to you, since we are the near neighbours of Russia. Why, then, are you so positive in regard to the grand duchy of Warsaw, which can no longer be maintained, which Russia will never allow on her frontier, and which, moreover, is the only source from which Russia can be recomposed without the destruction of your kingdom of Westphalia? Why create insoluble difficulties, by uttering irrevocable determinations on this subject?" Passing to the Confederation of the Rhine, M. de Metternich continued as follows:—"To what good end is this singular institution which imposes burdens on you without any advantage, which is incompatible with the independence of Germany, and which is now irrevocably destroyed in the mind of the Germans? What! do you pertinaciously insist on the vain title of protector, which, though conceivable when applied to your illustrious and powerful master, would be ridiculous when applied to a child? While your Emperor possesses the frontiers which extend from Bâle to the Texel, with Strasbourg, Mentz, Coblenz, Cologne, Wesel, and Groningen for points of support, has he not sufficient influence over Germany, does he not sufficiently excite her fears? What would he more? He has no such great need to *seem* the first potentate on the continent: let him be satisfied with being so, and rather conceal than display the fact. You think, perhaps, that we wish to re-establish the ancient German confederation in order to resume the Imperial crown. You are deceived. We no longer dream of that vain and onerous title. We have only to choose, for every thing is offered to us, every thing," (by which words M. de Metternich left to be inferred numerous and secret communications with the allied parties;) "but we only wish for that which cannot be refused, and which you yourselves are ready to concede: we wish Germany independent and peace secured. Peace we eagerly desire. All nations demand it of us, and they would renounce and abandon us if we should impose upon them any sacrifices except in the view of obtaining it. You will tell us that you are strong and are about again to subdue your enemies. We know it, and reckon upon it; we even require it in order to obtain the peace, some conditions of which we have stated to you; but render that possible, and to that end do not show yourselves unreasonable, do not be the cause of interrupting the negotiations before they have been fairly entered upon."

These sincere and excellent counsels had been given in the mildest and least menacing forms, not dogmatically and once for all, but from time to time, as opportunity allowed. They showed clearly enough the kind of peace which Austria would accept, perhaps even enforce, and which might be summed up as follows: Spain restored to the Bourbons, the Hanse towns restored to Germany, the Confederation of the Rhine suppressed, the grand duchy of Warsaw divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and for Austria in particular a better frontier on the Inn, and the restoration of Illyria. Certainly, while France should retain the line of the Rhine in addition to Holland, the kingdom of Westphalia as an allied or rather vassal state, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome as departments of France, Lombardy and Naples as principalities

of the family, she would be the most powerful empire conceivable, more vast even than she ought to wish, for it was very doubtful whether the successors of its great founder would be able to retain it entire. Austria had good ground to say that it would be necessary to fight, and to fight with success, in order to obtain all these territories, especially Holland; but the relinquishment of Spain would probably have determined England in favour of peace; Italy would have been left to us if Austria had consented; and how much might have been yielded in regard to Westphalia is indicated by the fact that at Breslau the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia had refused to form engagements with the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, though he offered himself to the coalition with his hands full of money, his fortune having been secretly preserved by the devotion of a powerful financial house then rising in Europe, that of the brothers Rothschild.

And, indeed, whatever peace they were prepared to accept or to refuse, it was not right, as M. de Metternich very wisely observed, to give expression to absolute determinations, which would render impossible the opening of negotiations, which would even prevent the first attempt at Austrian mediation, and which would oblige the cabinet of Vienna at once to pronounce either for or against us, probably against us, which it did not yet declare, but which it was easy to guess, however little they had retained the freedom of judgment. Hence, in his frequent interviews with M. Otto, M. de Metternich urged him to allow the negotiators to meet with the assurance that if once brought together they would be led on further than was supposed, for the whole world longed for peace, and would so urgently demand it of the first congress that it could not be refused.

The justice of his counsels was proved at the very moment; for, on authority received from Paris, the cabinet of Vienna had sent M. de Wessenberg to London, and M. de Lebzelter to Kalisch, to offer, not their mediation, (a term modestly reserved for a later stage,) but their interposition between the two principal belligerents, in order to bring about a reconciliation with France, and a peace of which all the world stood in urgent need. M. de Wessenberg, after having passed by Hamburg, where the French police had behaved with considerable incivility, which afforded a new grievance to the German gazettes, had repaired to London, where he was received by Lord Castlereagh with great politeness, but privately, to avoid unnecessary excitement. While Lord Castlereagh expressed the liveliest satisfaction at seeing an Austrian agent in London, and the greatest eagerness to accept the interposition of the Emperor Francis, he said that M. de Wessenberg perhaps ought to know that his mission had been already neutralized, for the speech of the Emperor Napoleon, now known throughout Europe, left not the smallest doubt on his resolution to admit no reasonable condition, and that if he had not been already recalled to Vienna in consequence it must be owing to the difficulty of communication: that he would certainly soon be recalled, for there remained no means of negotiating: that he was free to remain in London if he pleased; that England would always be ready to treat on equitable bases, that neither

she nor her allies wished to dispute the greatness justly due to France for her efforts and protracted wars, but that they would never abandon the generous country of Spain to the usurpation of Napoleon. In a word, M. de Wessenberg had been received in a manner which confirmed the whole truth of M. de Metternich's counsels respecting the indispensable base of the future peace.

At Kalisch, in the camp of the Russians, they had deferred, on one pretence or another, to receive M. de Lebzelter, but had at length determined on receiving him after having secured time to put themselves in communication with the cabinet of London: they then welcomed him with great respect and assiduity, and assured him that they desired peace, and would gladly negotiate through the intervention of Austria, but that that court must perceive the impossibility of treating with the Emperor Napoleon after the declarations he had made: that she would herself soon perceive the impossibility of coming to an understanding with a man of such insatiable ambition; that she would then return to her natural and necessary union with Europe, when they would be glad to possess her as an ally, and would make her the arbiter of peace and war, and, in short, of every thing. After these declarations, they intimated to M. de Lebzelter that they would willingly retain him at Kalisch, in the undisguised hope of his being the representative not of an unfriendly or even mediating court, but of our allied and belligerent.

As soon as these despatches reached Vienna, M. de Metternich communicated them to the French ministers to be transmitted to the Emperor Napoleon, with the urgent request that he would take them into serious consideration, and intimate, without loss of time, to the Austrian cabinet the conduct to be adopted in such circumstances. M. de Metternich also announced that he had granted to Prince Schwarzenberg a short leave of absence, his *corps d'armée* having returned to the frontier of Galicia, and that that prince would repair to Paris to obtain frank explanations from the Emperor Napoleon, more satisfactory than those obtained by M. de Balmis: that Napoleon would no doubt condescend to speak to a man who had negotiated his marriage, who had been his obedient lieutenant during the recent war, and who was still his sincere admirer and partial friend.

Napoleon was little moved by the defection of Prussia, the agitation of Germany, or the communications of Austria, though so strikingly characterized by truth. While working day and night at the reorganization of his troops, seeing, after twenty years of sanguinary struggles, the great facility of deriving resources from France, so abundant in population and wealth, observing the military unskillfulness of his enemies, who had so good-naturedly come to the Elbe to meet his blows, and who committed in a military sense as many errors as he committed in a political, he had regained prodigious self-confidence, and took no account of what was passing in the vast theatre of Europe, which he had filled with scenes of such tragic import, and which he was proposing to fill with others still more tragic. He had always expected the defection of Prussia as inevitable from the time that he saw our head-quarters retire and

on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Rhine. For this reason, while somewhat entertained the hopes of Prussia, he had refused any sacrifice, pecuniary or political, to retain her. Only, being little accustomed to observe the changes in public opinion, he placed confidence in them, and least so guided by them, he was surprised at the readiness of Prussia in declaring against her. He had not supposed she would venture. He was, nevertheless, convinced that the King of Prussia, though sustained by popular enthusiasm, must tremble at the prospect of a future campaign, and he hoped soon to allay his fears. Estimating in his mind the power of the Prussian forces, he considered Prussia, reduced as she was in arms and population, could not yield more than 100,000 men to the coalition, of whom only a few could be immediately available; that her present state could not bring into the field more than 100,000 men, (all which was true;) and that himself, when he saw the Prussians advance upon the Upper Elbe with such forces, that in three weeks he would send them back to their homes more quickly than they had come from the field, already felt the joy of victory, in spite of his confidence, and he was persuaded that after one or two battles he would be able to reason, would regain the situation he was supposed to have lost, would secure peace, (which he really desired,) and would state its conditions not perfectly in accordance with his speech, in which he had taken the part of a good politician to appear inflexible than he intended to be, and only near to it, except as regarded the armistice, though too late, he had made up his mind to make great sacrifices.

When being alarmed at the defection of the nobles, he merely used it as an argument for raising additional troops. He was well satisfied with his levy of 100,000 men from the noble classes; this had procured for the guard, and for the reorganization of the corps of the grand army, a very fine material, to which he had been little accustomed. He had been in the habit of summing conscripts a year in advance, under the pretext of securing time for their training. Members of these anterior classes, though more discontented than others at the time of their departure, lost their ill temper when they joined their corps, and they restored the stature and the strength of twenty years. The courage of the French nation, excited by a new *Senatus-consultum*, demanded more men more, drawn not only from the ranks of the six previous conscriptions.

The faculty of organization was, therefore, exercised on 600,000 instead of 200,000, and to procure them the defection of the nobles was a very natural argument, not to the nobles, who required none, but to the ennobled public, who, while lamenting such a loss, could not dispute them in the face of the dangers which menaced France.

In Russia, also, he derived an argument of a kind of exaction. In Germany, and in France, had been made to all classes, beginning with the young nobility. In France, the aristocracy fell upon the middle and lower

classes. The higher classes escaped conscription by substitutes, whom they paid at a high rate since the war had become so horribly sanguinary. Nor had they equally contributed to the voluntary donations except by their fortune. Napoleon wished now to secure the assistance of their persons. For a long time he had thought of this, and the present seemed to be a favourable opportunity. In Germany, the young nobility had felt it their duty to rush to arms at the head of all classes in the nation: why should they not do the same in France? Heretofore the French nobility had allowed no one the honour of preceding them in the field: arms were their profession, their glory, their liveliest passion. Why should it not be the same now? There was indeed one explanation of their unwillingness to serve, in their attachment to the old dynasty and hatred of the new. This reason did not affect Napoleon, or, rather, it affected him very deeply. While admissible on the part of the fathers who were growing old in the tame retreat of their castles, it was not so, in his opinion, or at least would not long remain so, on the part of the young men, whose blood was still warm, and who could not feel that all the demands of their age, their name, and their prospects were met by the amusement of the chase. It was only necessary to take them with or without their consent, to unite them in a corps which should flatter their vanity by its title and the frivolity of their age by the beauty of its uniform, and when once transported to the army it would be easy to excite their ardour, for it was little to their credit to suppose them less susceptible than others to the sound of the cannon and the voice of a great leader. He would have the advantage of having rallied them to himself, instead of leaving them idle and unfriendly in the heart of the provinces on the eve of events which might prove of a very serious character.

As it was impossible to proceed with them on the ground of conscription, which they had already satisfied, or would satisfy by substitution, and as it was necessary to select them arbitrarily, some for their fortune, others for their name, Napoleon thought it right to invest the prefects with the power of designating them at will, assigning as an excuse for so irregular a course the rule of equality,—a most singular evasion, for equality was expressed by the conscription. They were to declare to the country that since this class of nobles endeavoured by means of money to avoid military service, the most painful of all duties, it was necessary to compel them like the rest, and to employ whatever means might be found necessary for this end.

By these methods, whose character he was not scrupulous to investigate, Napoleon hoped to obtain 10,000 fine horsemen, distinguished by birth and fortune, and probably by valour. He resolved to form them into four regiments of 2500 men each, called regiments of the guard of honour, intended to serve near the person of the Emperor and to wear a brilliant uniform. They were to receive from their parents at least one thousand francs per annum, and to bear the rank of sub-lieutenant whenever they should exchange into other corps. This was, therefore, a true corps of nobility, and when the first difficulties were overcome it would be a brilliant

legion, which might be rendered as serviceable as the corresponding one had been under the old monarchy. Napoleon immediately selected the cities of Versailles, Metz, Lyons, and Tours for the places where these regiments were to be formed, and named as their colonels four persons remarkable for their name, rank, and services. These were Count de Pully, general of division, Baron Lepic, general of the horse-grenadiers of the Guard, Count Philip de Segur, general of brigade, and Count de St. Sulpice, general of cuirassiers.

As to the mode of appeal, it was said in the *Senatus-consult* that the prefect should be charged to concert with the departmental authorities for the formation of a new cavalry-legion. Furnished with such a commission, the prefects were left very much to their own discretion. They were to convoke the councils of the department, to endeavour to procure through the functionaries, or the families attached to the Government, the offer of some of their sons, with the promise that their blood should not be lavishly shed, and then to assume any such manifestations as a warrant for designating a sufficient number of young men among the sons of the wealthy proprietors who spent the summer on their estates and the winter in the aristocratical quarters of the large towns. They reckoned on the self-regard and activity of the young men to make them consent to such designations, and, in default of these, upon tacit but efficacious means of constraint, with which the prefects were abundantly supplied.

Napoleon thus found himself well compensated for the accession of a new enemy by this augmentation of his resources, and he appeared as eager for war as in the days of early youth. But, having by this extension of his arms met what had occurred in Prussia, it was necessary to pay equal attention to Austria, who, while retaining the title of ally, was already gradually assuming the part of a mediator, and might perhaps be induced to adopt a still less friendly character. Since the defection of Prussia, she had become urgent for some ground for negotiation, some preliminaries to a peace which she declared to be indispensable, and it would be very difficult to avoid an explanation with her, especially now that Prince Schwarzenberg was on the road to Paris, with such access to the court of the Tuileries that reserve towards him would be almost impossible. Observing the behaviour of the Austrian court, Napoleon had indeed questioned the possibility of her taking part against him, but he had dwelt little upon that idea, for the following reasons. He believed the public at Vienna not to be so exacting as at Berlin, and the court not so weak. Besides, Austria was united with us in bonds of family and alliance, which, if not indissoluble, were at least in some degree binding, for the sense of decency is not without force. Austria could not in a moment forget the marriage of Maria Louisa and the treaty of alliance of March 14, 1812. Besides, she was governed by men who had learned to fear the arms of France. And Austria was a selfish power, which always sought her own interest before all other considerations, and which might be gained by the offer of some rich territory. Thus, Napoleon reduced the whole policy

of Austria to her fear of a war with France and a desire of gaining something from the general confusion of Europe: unhappily for himself and for us, he was deceived. He did not perceive that Austria, though no doubt selfish, but also as prudent as selfish, greatly preferred to the material advantage of regaining an extension of territory the political advantage of regaining the independence of Germany, and of thus establishing a better balance in Europe; that she preferred a smaller share in a stable and well-balanced state of things to a greater in an ill-balanced state, hateful to all the world, which could not last, because nothing can be durably built on universal hatred. And with respect to territorial acquisitions, there was nothing that the European coalition did not offer, and was not ready to give, so that her co-operation against us would obtain for her, in addition to vast augmentations, a better European constitution,—an advantage which she placed above every other. She was restrained simply by the fear of war with us,—a fear which was daily diminished by the constantly-increasing number of our enemies.

Seeing, therefore, in the Austrian cabinet nothing but fear and interest, Napoleon sought in the very defection of Prussia the means of attaching that cabinet to himself, and he proposed to offer the following inducements. Austria desired peace, and he desired it himself, always, however, on his own terms. That power, in his opinion, had the means of speedily securing peace, so much desired, and of concluding it in a manner agreeable both to himself and to France. He knew that she was arming, and he urged her to do so. She was recruiting the auxiliary corps of Prince Schwarzenberg, which had withdrawn to Cracow, and the Gallician corps of observation; she was also forming a corps of reserve in Bohemia. The whole amounted to about 100,000 men, whom she might employ very decisively from the opening of the campaign, of which a very good opportunity had just been offered her. Her overtures of peace had, indeed, been ill received, at which she might justly be much displeased. She might forthwith constitute herself mediatrix, call upon the belligerent parties to agree to an armistice during negotiations, and then, if they refused acquiescence, pour her 100,000 men into Silesia from Bohemia, take in flank the coalition which the French should attack in front, and, by so acting, in one month not a single Russian or Prussian would be left between the Elbe and the Niemen. Thus Europe would be found at the mercy of France and Austria, and the spoils would be easily divided. The Emperor Francis would take Silesia, whose loss had ever been regretted by Austria, a good portion of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and, finally, Illyria, which had been promised to her in any case. Saxony should be indemnified for the loss of the archbishopric of Warsaw by Brandenburg and Berlin; France should be driven back beyond the Oder; Old Prussia should be left to her, with the addition of the principal part of the duchy of Warsaw, and out of her should be made a kind of Poland, half German, half Polish, with Königsberg and Warsaw for capital towns.

It is very certain that Austria, by throwing into Silesia the 100,000 men who were now

ready, and in case of need another 100,000 who would be so in three months, would secure the total defeat of Europe, and force her to treat immediately. But what result could Napoleon propose to her to induce such an employment of her forces? He offered to drive Prussia beyond the Vistula, to leave her none of her former states but Old Prussia from Dantzic to Königsberg, and to add to this the grand duchy of Warsaw, i.e. to make a Poland out of Prussia, and in its place, between the Oder and the Elbe, to put the fief of Saxony. He therefore made a pure and simple offer to destroy Prussia, for that power, if transported to Königsberg or Warsaw, would no more have become Poland than Saxony if extended from Dresden to Berlin would have become Prussia. The strength of a nation does not consist only in its territory, but in its history, its past, its traditions. It was no more possible to give to the house of Brandenburg the traditions of Sobieski by giving it Warsaw, than to the house of Saxony the traditions of Frederick the Great by giving it Berlin. There would no more have been any Prussia, i.e. Germany; and Austria, who sought her own independence in that of renewed Germany, would not have found what she sought, even though she might have had an additional province, and that province had been Silesia. Austria would only have been a slave enriched. This Austria perfectly understood; and, even had she not, the cry of the indignant Germans would have forced the explanation upon her. If it be still asked how a man of so much genius as Napoleon could fail to recognise truths so palpable, it should be remembered that the most powerful mind, if it refuse to consider events from any other than its own point of view, is apt to form strange illusions by supposing itself able to mould the world according to its own ideas. Thus it was that Napoleon created an ideal Europe, and imagined that with 100,000 men more introduced into his army, and one more battle added to his glorious career, he could arrange Europe according to his fancy. Undoubtedly, Austria had long hated Prussia, she had long regretted Silesia, and he concluded from this that he had only to gratify her hatred by the destruction of Prussia and the restitution of Silesia in order to gain her to his cause. He could not understand how the grandson of Maria Theresa could resist such a bait, nor how so calculating a minister as M. de Metternich could regard the cries of German patriotism. He did not understand that there is a time when every one is constrained to be honest and disinterested, and that is when an intolerable oppression has roused all the world to resistance; and unfortunately he had brought on that time, had brought it on for our ruin by making us, who were the first objects of his oppression, the involuntary oppressors of Europe. Nor did he perceive that even in the view of interest these plans of Europe which he rearranged after every victory and by every treaty, with his imagination and his sword, appeared to every one's eyes a mere surface of shifting sand, of which no one would desire to retain a portion, and which might be changed by the slightest breeze. He did not understand that Austria might prefer less territory with greater stability to a larger territory with a fictitious order of

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things arbitrarily conceived and more arbitrarily established, even apart from the consideration that, in point of territory, the coalition, as we have said, was prepared to offer and to present every thing to Austria.

Such were the illusions of Napoleon, and such the sad causes of these illusions. However, he himself partly perceived the error of his plans, for he would not all at once reveal to Austria the plan of Europe which he projected lest she should shrink from such strange proposals. He intended merely to say to her, "Exhibit your 100,000 men in Silesia, on the flank of the coalition, without even obliging them to fight: I will fight for all; I will throw the Russians and Prussians beyond the Niemen, and in return for this service I will give you Silesia, besides a million of Poles, in addition to Illyria."

This is what he meant to convey, and what he wished should gain a hearing. But, besides the error of misunderstanding the views of Austria, there was in this conduct the very grave error which we have already indicated, of giving her too great a prominence and even a dangerous importance in events, of furnishing her with a pretext for arming, and with the means of changing her part of ally into that of mediator, and speedily, perhaps, of enemy, if we should be unwilling to submit to her conditions, and thus ourselves smoothing the path by which she might pass without dishonour, almost without difficulty, from the state of close alliance to that of war with us. Napoleon crowned this egregious error by the selection of the person charged to enforce his ideas at Vienna. Our ambassador at that court was M. Otto, formerly ambassador at Berlin, a prudent and modest man, who never aimed at exaggerating his part, and who was perfectly adapted to a residence at the court of Austria if the desire had been to maintain friendly relations with her without allowing her too much weight in the policy of the day. Napoleon, considering him neither sufficiently influential nor sufficiently penetrating, looked around him for a successor, and selected M. de Narbonne, whose tardy but zealous adhesion to the Empire we have already described. A patriot of 1789, formerly a minister of Louis XVI., disavowing none of his previous character, an extensive proprietor, an accomplished soldier, a man of brilliant and varied talents, possessed of much tact and grace, M. de Narbonne was singularly adapted to an elegant and aristocratic court, capable of blending the spirit of the world with that of public business. But he was not a man to keep strictly to the limits of his office. M. de Metternich, skilful as he was, would have some trouble in escaping his penetration and his urgency, nor could a better agent have been chosen for an active part. But the question was how far it was right to stimulate that court to the extent proposed.\*

\* Napoleon, at St. Helena, regretted the choice of M. de Narbonne, and, while rendering all justice to his rare talents and zeal, said that his very qualities had rendered him hurtful by urging Austria prematurely to throw off the mask. It is very true that M. de Narbonne was, perhaps, too penetrating and too venturesome at Vienna; but we shall see that he was much less guilty in this respect than his instructions warranted, and that the real error, which Napoleon perceived too late, when he could reflect on the past without prejudice, at St. Helena, was

Napoleon, then, chose M. de Narbonne for his ambassador, and he was in such haste to despatch him that he did not even wait the arrival of Prince Schwarzenberg, who was to bring to Paris the views of the Austrian court. It little concerned him, indeed, to know those views, since without regard to them he wished to enforce his own, and, besides, it was impossible that M. de Narbonne should arrive too soon, as the campaign must open in a few days. Napoleon did not explain at first the nature of that distribution of Europe which should be made at the peace: he only communicated the first part of his secret, which was that Austria should bring her 100,000 men towards Silesia, that she should call upon the coalition to stay proceedings, which they would probably refuse, and, in that case, that she should take them in flank while he took them in front, and as the reward of their common victory that she should accept Silesia and part of Poland with Illyria. Such were the proposals of which M. de Narbonne was the bearer.

Napoleon, having obtained all the levies he desired, and directed his diplomacy as we have seen, prepared to enter on the campaign. They were now at the close of March, 1813. His various military schemes were rapidly maturing under his irresistible activity. His cavalry alone detained him, for it had not been reorganized so rapidly as he had wished. Nevertheless, he prepared to leave in the middle of April, impatient to realize his plans, for which he now formed his final arrangements. He addressed some words of reproach to Prince Eugene for having retrograded too rapidly and too far, not that he regretted the steps taken in consequence by the coalition, for, on the contrary, he wished them to come as much as possible within reach of his blows. But he regretted the time lost to him by this rapid progress of the enemy, and he considered that he would be obliged to advance the opening of hostilities by at least twenty days, which was annoying, for during the twenty days he might have done much to perfect his armaments. He especially regretted the horses which he should lose by leaving the German territories, a loss which he estimated at not less than 12,000 or 15,000. He also blamed Prince Eugene for having strengthened himself too much on the right, and in his wish to protect Dresden, which was of small consequence, as we shall see, exposed Hamburg, which it was of importance to secure from the infection of German passions. He blamed him, however, with paternal kindness, as usual, without those cutting sarcasms which he poured upon his brothers simply because they appeared to him to put forth unfounded pretensions. He traced out his conduct to him, and in general terms indicated the following plan of operations.

He ordered him not to be much concerned about the road from Dresden to Erfurt, Fulde, and Mentz, because it was of little consequence that the coalition should make considerable progress in that direction. On the other hand, he recommended him to retain at any price that of Magdeburg, Hanover, Osnabruck, and

Wesel, which passed by Lower Germany, and urged him to give all his attention to that. By firmly establishing himself upon that line, Prince Eugene would keep the greater part of the course of the Elbe, would protect Hamburg, which they proposed to recover, Bremen, Holland, Westphalia, and finally that part of Germany which they wished to incorporate with France. If the coalition should avail themselves of the arrangement to penetrate by Dresden and advance to the mountains of Thuringia and the celebrated fields of Jena, he was not to be alarmed, but merely to change his front by bringing the left forward and the right to the rear, i.e. the left to Wittenberg, the right to Eisenach, with the Hartz Mountains on the rear. When this position should be taken by Prince Eugene, Napoleon would come to his aid with 180,000 men by Hesse or Thuringia, would join him on the Elbe; then, mustering 250,000 men, he would cast off the coalition from Berlin and the sea, would trample them under foot, drive them against the mountains of Bohemia, and by a second step would re-enter Berlin, relieve the French garrisons at Stettin, Custring, Glogau, Thorn, and Dantzig, and in a month return victorious to the banks of the Vistula.

It would be impossible to cast over the field which was to be rendered illustrious by so many acts of genius and heroism, and by so many misfortunes, a glance better deserving the name of an eagle's glance, for these results so well foreseen were precisely those which the imprudence of the coalition was about to create. To these general views, Napoleon added, as usual, a minute statement of details. He blamed the prince for having sent the judicious formidable Marshal Davout to Dresden, where it was necessary to encourage and soothe the worthy Saxons, instead of reserving him for Hamburg and Lower Germany, where he must work by terror. The name of that marshal sufficed to fill with alarm the countries of the Lower Elbe, where he had already displayed the harshness of his own character and of the imperial system,—never, indeed, for his own advantage, and always in execution of his master's orders. Napoleon wished him to be sent thither again, to supply by the terror of his name what was wanting in military resources. Marshal Davout had just received his second battalions, to the number of sixteen, recently reorganized at Erfurt by the union of the cadres from Russia with the recruits from the banks of the Rhine. Marshal Victor had also received his, to the number of twelve. Napoleon gave orders to leave Marshal Victor on the Upper Elbe, to connect Prince Eugene with the grand army, which was to debouch from Thuringia, and to send Marshal Davout to recover Hamburg. The cadres of the third and fourth battalions of Marshals Davout and Victor were at that moment being recruited on the Rhine with the men of the former class. There were, then, thirty-two battalions for Marshal Davout and twenty-four for Marshal Victor, which, added to the second battalions which they already had, would make forty-eight for the one and thirty-six for the other, i.e. eighty-four for the two, forming another fine army, which in two months should appear upon the Elbe. Napoleon formed a plan for

chargeable on the French Government, and not on M. de Narbonne himself. Our narrative will explain this singular and melancholy point of history.



augmenting it by twenty-eight battalions. It has been said that the cadres of the first battalion of those old corps had been kept in the fortresses of the Oder. But it was found that the cadres of two companies had been sufficient for the soldiers who had returned from Russia. As there had been thirty-six regiments, or a total of sixty-two companies, which, increased by the ships' crews, and by the numerous troops of artillery and engineers left on the Vistula and Oder, had formed the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau. It will be remembered that the garrisons of Dantzic and Thorn had been supplied with the divisions of Heudelet, Grandjean, Loison, &c., and the remains of the Bavarian troops. The cadres of the first battalion which were now available, excepting two companies, had returned to the Rhine, and Napoleon, supplying the two deficient companies by two others from the dépôt, had completed their organization. All these cadres were to be filled up by the fine men of the former classes. Thus, in a few weeks, Marshals Davout and Victor, already provided with their second battalions, would receive the third, fourth, and first in addition, which would make up one hundred and twelve, and at the rate of 800 men to a battalion would procure them 90,000 infantry. Three hundred guns were being prepared for them in the fortresses of Westphalia, Holland, and Hanover. The cadres of dragoons and chasseurs from Spain would furnish a sufficient cavalry, so that, independently of the 300,000 men with whom Napoleon was to open the campaign, he was preparing a second army of 110,000 men on the Lower Elbe. But, since the insurrection of Lubeck and Hamburg rendered assistance urgent, he despatched immediately a certain number of the battalions which were ready into the Hanseatic departments under the orders of General Vandamme. All these battalions being along the Rhine, they were embarked upon that river as soon as they had received some new clothing, and, having been brought down to Wesel, they were forwarded to Bremen. The very name of General Vandamme was enough to make a powerful impression on those revolted districts. Add to this that constitutional government was suspended in all the 32d military division (comprising the country from the Lower Rhine to the Lower Elbe) and that martial law had been established.

At Mentz, independently of the Guard, and of the two corps of the Rhine, which had just been then organized, and which were already disseminated between Frankfurt, Wurzburg, and Fulde, Napoleon projected the formation of a new force with the remains of the cadres recalled from Spain. The formal order had been sent beyond the Pyrenees to leave only the cadres necessary for the actual number of men, which took from Spain several select soldiers, but a force numerically small. These cadres arrived in succession, in haste, and Napoleon ordered to fill them up with the 80,000 men from the six former classes, levied as we have just described. The cadres taken from Spain were the best, as we have said. The war in which they had been engaged was of a nature the best calculated to form good officers, being a war of surprise, in which every one must be almost a general. They were accustomed to

fatigue, and, not having directly served under Napoleon for a long time, were eager to enjoy the honour of so doing, and were full of zeal, whilst, on the contrary, the cadres returning from Russia, though unexceptionable in respect to military qualifications, were exhausted, and animated with feelings of resentment which found vent in dangerous language.\* These required repose, indemnity for their losses, and ample recruiting, before they could be fit for service. The cadres of Spain required no great attention, and the day they arrived at Mentz they entered on their duties and served with ardour. With these cadres Napoleon prepared an army of reserve on the Rhine, as he had formed one on the Elbe from the old corps.

And, lastly, he had resolved to prepare also an army of reserve for Italy. We have seen that General Bertrand had repaired thither to organize a corps of 40,000 or 50,000 men with the numerous military elements accumulated by France beyond the Alps since 1796, and that the cadres of Prince Eugene's corps destroyed in Russia had returned to be reorganized half-way, i.e. at Augsburg. General Bertrand had accomplished his task, and was on the march with about 45,000 men. His journey had been prosperous, except that an Italian regiment, which had met a detachment of the same nation returning from Russia, had deserted almost in a body on hearing their reports. Apart from this incident, General Bertrand arrived in good order, with troops in the best possible temper. Napoleon, considering Augsburg too remote from Italy for the reorganization of the told corps of Prince Eugene, changed his purpose, and directed the cadres returning from Russia to Verona, and assigned to General Bertrand the 3000 recruits already assembled at Augsburg whom he should collect on his way. The cadres sent back to Verona ought to furnish twenty-four battalions, which should be reorganized during the spring and summer. The dépôts of Italy being filled with conscripts from Provence, Languedoc, Savoy, Piedmont, and Corsica, all of an excellent quality, and resident at the dépôts for a year or even two, he had no fear of their being recruited. Of forty-eight battalions composing the Italian army strictly so called, there were seven or eight in Spain and about twenty in Germany. There remained nearly twenty in Italy, already recruited in their own locality, which, with the twenty-four French cadres returned from Russia, should present a total of forty-eight battalions. They might be raised to sixty, by adding some French cadres recalled from Spain, now on the road to Piedmont to join their dépôts. There were here the materials for a second army of Italy. By joining to it the Neapolitan army, which Murat was carefully reorganizing, and with which he consoled himself for the vexation caused by the severity of Napoleon, he might combine 80,000 men in Italy if Austria should give cause of uneasiness.

Napoleon, then, had in Germany and Italy, besides the armies entering upon active service, other armies ready to act as reserves and to repair the losses of the war. They were composed, indeed, of young troops; but these were contained in admirable cadres, and the

\* This is proved incontrovertibly by the correspondence of Prince Eugene, the Duke of Valmy, General Lauriston, Marshal Marmont, and the French foreign ministers.

cadres are well known to be the sinews of armies. Besides, the German troops which were to be opposed to us were equally young, and to their patriotic enthusiasm we could oppose the most exalted sense of military honour, Napoleon at our head, and the necessity of preserving our fortune. The advantages, therefore, were well balanced. In cavalry alone were we still deficient. General Bourcier in Lower Germany had seen his cautions overthrown, and the field for obtaining fresh horses greatly restricted by the insurrection of the Hanseatic provinces, all his manufactures of harness interrupted by the ill-will of the German workmen, and the credit granted to him almost annihilated by the impossibility of procuring cash even with the paper of the best merchants. Instead of 30,000 saddle or draught horses, on which he had calculated at first, he was scarcely able to muster half that number. He had, however, the means of remounting 12,000 horsemen, of whom 6000 were already on horseback, rested from their labours, and ready to take their places in the corps of Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani. The depôts of the Rhine could furnish a nearly equal number of mounted men, who were to join the army under the Duke of Placenza, and were soon to be followed by a similar contingent. Finally, the cadres of the cavalry of Spain were on their way, and these would procure new resources. They reckoned upon 50,000 horsemen by the middle of the year. But it was possible that they should have only 10,000 at the opening of the campaign. Napoleon was little troubled at this circumstance. "We shall have," he said, "some Egyptian battles, and we shall gain them like that of the Pyramids,—with our squares." Accordingly, he had himself traced out a plan of instruction for his young infantry, prescribing the formation in square as the most frequent manœuvre.\* Except the delay of the cavalry, every thing had advanced with marvellous rapidity, for he had been working for only three months, and he was already in a condition to pour down upon his enemies, who had imprudently advanced as far as the Saale, with 300,000 infantry and eight hundred guns.

We have seen that Spain had been a nursery of officers and subalterns of the first quality. This resource was the least he could derive from that deplorable war, after having exhausted himself to maintain it. But he was unwilling greatly to weaken his armies in the Peninsula, for the following reason. He had in heart relinquished Spain without acknowledging it, reserving to himself that single concession to determine England to treat at the last moment. To disarm the continent by his victories, and to subject it to such territorial arrangements as he might choose, to disarm England by a sacrifice in Spain, was the sum of his policy, and it would have been sound if the territorial arrangements he proposed had been more acceptable. In this disposition, to evacuate Spain in order to restore it to Ferdinand, and to withdraw the 300,000 men who were still there, among whom he might

\* On this subject there exist some very curious and minute letters dictated by Napoleon. He always enforces the instruction of the conscripts in two things, the formation in square, and then the deployment in line of battle, or the falling into column of attack under protection of the division of the centre. These manœuvres were to be executed on the road, so as to improve the time occupied by the march.

have found immediately 200,000 admirable soldiers, would have been the wisest part, if his determinations had been free. But this course would have obliged him to fight the English in the South of France instead of in Spain, which would have been infinitely more dangerous, and he would have deprived himself of a pledge which he might have made the principal means of negotiation in the future European congress. The penalty of having entered Spain was the necessity of remaining there, even against his will. It was consequently necessary that he should defend it to the last if he wished to retain it, that is to say, as zealously as in 1809 and 1810.

Besides, he approved the position recently adopted in that country, while he bitterly blamed the errors which had led to it. He approved their retaining only Valencia, Catalonia, Aragon, and the Castiles, which was one-half of the Peninsula, and that the most important; but he wished that these places should be kept in such a manner as to throw the English to the greatest possible distance if they should make a fresh attempt upon Valladolid and Burgos, and that they should give them sufficient occupation to prevent any maritime expeditions against the coast of France. Marshal Suchet, who had been in no degree weakened, appeared to him equal to the defence of the Ebro and the Mediterranean coast from Barcelona to Valencia. The armies of Andalusia, of the centre, and of Portugal, united as they had been in the last campaign, seemed to him sufficient for the defence of the Castiles against Wellington. But he set great importance upon the close approximation of these three armies to each other, and he ordered them to recross the Guadarrama, to retain only the cavalry on the Tagus, and one division of the advanced guard at Madrid, which should be left there for its moral effect and to establish the court at Valladolid. He wished the three armies to be united before Valladolid, so as to be able in a moment to concentrate themselves and to march against the English army. He ordered the preparation of a park of siege-artillery, which might suggest to Lord Wellington an attack upon Ciudad-Rodrigo, with the view of detaining him in the Peninsula. He ordered only one measure apparently in contradiction to these prudent arrangements, which was to take, as occasion required, a part of these three armies to destroy, at any cost, the bands who wasted the North of Spain and interrupted communications with France in Navarre, Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava. This interruption of communication he considered very annoying, and a most serious political inconvenience. Proposing shortly to make Spain an object of negotiation and exchange, he wished to be able to say that he possessed the better part incontestably, to appropriate to himself Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, the Basque provinces,—in a word, what was called the bank of the Ebro,—and to restore the rest to Ferdinand. This arrangement he thought to impose upon Joseph, and he was prepared to conclude with Ferdinand and the English; but he kept his own secret, in order to communicate it as late as possible and with the greatest effect.†

† This secret has remained a mystery; but the careful perusal of Napoleon's papers, correspondence, notes, and orders, military and administrative, leaves no doubt upon the point, and for this reason we do not hesitate to present the statement in the text as historically certain.

With this intention, and for the purpose of insuring his communications, he had intrusted the army of the North to General Clausel, whose recently-discovered merit had struck him from a distance, and he had given him authority to appropriate part of the three armies concentrated in Castile in order to have time to destroy the bands before the usual period of the English taking the field. This was an important determination, and one which, as we shall see, might be attended with serious consequences. With the exception of this determination, (which was erroneous, to judge from the result,) the arrangements were excellent. He had taken from Spain only about 30,000 men by taking the cadres, and of 280,000 effective men he left 200,000 combatants, the best which France possessed at the time. He had recalled Marshal Soult, whose presence was no longer admissible at the court of Madrid, and had given to Joseph, in addition to Marshal Jourdan as his counsellor, Generals Reille, d'Erlon, and Gazan, to command under himself the three armies of the centre, of Andalusia, and of Portugal.

Being thus set at ease with respect to Spain, and satisfied with the progress of his armaments in Germany, Napoleon prepared to start, as confident as ever in the result of his vast combinations. But he wished, before doing so, to organize his government, so as to guard against an accident real or supposed, such as that which had enabled General Malet to imprison even his ministers.

We have already said that he had consulted the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, the only man in whom he placed full confidence in matters of internal policy, on the subject of crowning the King of Rome in the course of the winter, and of investing Maria Louisa with the regency. To crown the King of Rome at a time of general grief, to attract to Paris the most influential persons of the departments at a time when they were needed to stimulate patriotic demonstrations, was not a proposal that bore reflection. It remained to consider the question of the regency, with which Maria Louisa might be invested without any great parade, in order that in the case of Napoleon being carried off by a shot there might exist a constituted and even operative government, around which men might rally. Now Napoleon, who had made the campaign of 1812 as an emperor, wished to make that of 1813 as a general, even as a soldier. He perceived the necessity of this, and he was pleased to reassume the character of a simple warrior, for war was his chosen art, and when once at ease with regard to his wife and son, whom he sincerely loved, he felt almost happy to return unreservedly, and, as it were, without care, to the profession of his youth, the profession which had been his joy and glory. He therefore resolved to give the regency to Maria Louisa, and to confer it upon her before his departure. This arrangement had the further important advantage of flattering the Emperor Francis, who was much attached to his daughter, though still more so to his house. It might be presumed that if Napoleon should fall upon the field, and Maria Louisa remain sovereign of France, she would have her father as a friend. It is even probable that if that case had actually occurred, and that France had not been so en-

feebled as she was in 1814, they would have been contented with imposing some sacrifices upon her, while leaving her the Alps and the Rhine as her boundary.

It will easily be believed that it was not to Maria Louisa, who, though amiable and sensible, was profoundly ignorant of state affairs, that Napoleon thought of confiding the government of his vast empire, but to a man of unequalled good sense, of consummate experience, and of a character which, if not very strong, was not so weak as was generally supposed. We mean the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. Napoleon wished him to remain at her side and exercise the government in her name. Napoleon would have died without anxiety, if, after the termination of the war, he had been certain to leave for the space of ten years the minority of his son and the ignorance of his wife under the care of Cambacérès, in whom subtlety, tact, moderation, and knowledge combined to form a statesman, not indeed firm, bold, and of a lofty tone, as we see in free countries, but a skilful manager, such as is required in a country like France, which, even though not free, can only be governed by the exercise of the greatest precaution. For such a task Napoleon feared his brothers, and was suspicious of their pretensions and of their restlessness, especially during a minority.

His time of life, the commencement of misfortune, a long experience of mankind, the servile subjection of men to absolute power, historical studies which had occupied his youth and recurred to him in mature age, had greatly added to his natural suspicion. Though so confident whenever he directed affairs in person, he contemplated under a gloomy aspect the prospects after his death of his wife and child. Irritated with his brothers and brother-in-law, who opposed him, and whom he treated unjustly, he was convinced that they would dispute the power if he left his son in infancy, and would disturb the minority. He discoursed long on these subjects of anxiety with Prince Cambacérès, and expressed himself resolved to employ the most offensive precautions against his brothers. The Imperial constitution gave the regency to the uncles of the Emperor during his minority in preference to a female. Napoleon openly said to Prince Cambacérès that he was not willing that his brothers should be invested with the regency, and that he intended to confer it upon Maria Louisa, and that he (Cambacérès) should really exercise the power in the name of the Empress. His death in battle seemed to him very possible, and alarmed him very little on his own account: it might, indeed, be regarded by him as not the least desirable termination of life. He therefore wished to leave a government fully constituted, and in active operation, before setting off for Germany. These views, though so flattering, greatly alarmed the aged Cambacérès. His ambition had always been restrained by prudence, and it was now still further restrained by age. For a time his overburdened spirit had been amused by some sensual pursuits little worthy of his dignity: at this period, strange as it may seem, his mind, so little regulated by the imagination, inclined to devotion, and, far from aspiring to the government of a vast empire during the absence or after the death of

the great man who had called it into existence, he was contemplating retirement into religious seclusion. He shuddered at the part assigned to him, and earnestly pleaded with Napoleon the cause of his brothers. In the first place, he said, it would be necessary by a constitutional arrangement to set them aside, and history shows but too plainly that the arrangements of defunct sovereigns, whether established constitutionally or otherwise, have little power against passions, which commonly lose restraint at their death. Moreover, Joseph was kindly disposed, thoroughly attached to Napoleon, had no son, and was probably thinking of uniting one of his daughters to the King of Rome. These were reasons for not fearing him, and even for trusting him. Jerome was wholly devoted to his brother, and, from his age, was not in a condition to dispute the regency. Louis had disappeared from the scene. Murat was of no weight except as a soldier. There need therefore be no anxiety with regard to them, and it would be right to leave the regency to Joseph, in whose hands it would be exposed to little opposition. None of these reasons affected Napoleon, and he seemed determined to lay aside his brothers. He merely wished that his consort should be under the guidance of an able man. The arch-chancellor then spoke to Napoleon of Prince Eugene, who had never displeased him except by a slight degree of negligence, and who had acquired much honour in the last campaign. At the name of Prince Eugene, Napoleon, commonly so affectionate towards him, suddenly seemed struck by some anxious and gloomy reflection. "Eugene," said he, "is an excellent man, but he is very young. We must guard against kindling an undue ambition in a heart so little alive as yet to the passions of the world. . . . Who knows what time may bring about?"

All the Imperial princes having been thus laid aside, and Napoleon continually reverting to his idea, it was necessary to adopt such forms as should satisfy him with the least offence to others. For such a task none could be better adapted than Prince Cambacérès. One very natural and incontestable reason for excluding most of the princes of the Imperial family from the regency, and even from the council of regency, existed in their possession of a foreign throne. Princes who held dominion without the Empire might have interests so contrary to those of France that their exclusion from the government in case of a minority was a matter of course, and did not of necessity involve the charge of suspicion, nor of that excessive rigour which is sure to be abolished by the power which succeeds that which has established it. It was therefore agreed that, by an article in the proposed *Senatus-consult*, they should exclude from the regency all princes occupying foreign thrones, unless they should abdicate (which was very unlikely) in order to exercise in France their rights as princes and dignitaries of the Empire. Another equally natural arrangement was the selection of the mother to govern during the minority of her son. Nature here spoke to every heart. And foreign policy added another reason in favour of Maria Louisa,—viz., the advantage of conferring the power on a daughter of the Cæsars, beloved by the emperor her

father, and thus having a sacred claim to the protection of the principal European courts. The brothers of Napoleon being thus excluded without injustice or offence, and the Empress constituted regent on the soundest principles, it was necessary to compose a council of regency and to regulate its powers. Napoleon decided that it should be composed of the princes of the blood, the uncles of the Emperor, and of princes, high dignitaries, (always on condition of their holding no foreign sovereignty,) in the following order: the arch-chancellor, the arch-chancellor of state, the grand elector, the constable, the arch-treasurer, the high-admiral. This order assigned the first place to Prince Cambacérès and secured him the principal influence, and Napoleon took care to insure this still further by his secret instructions to the Empress. The council was to be consulted on all great affairs of state, but it had no power beyond that of consultation.

Affairs being thus regulated in the draft of a *Senatus-consult*, Napoleon presented this draft to the Council of State before sending it to the Senate. He explained it orally with precision and authority. All were silent and seemed to assent unreservedly. But one member asked whether it might not be well to repair an omission, and to confer the regency on the mother of the young Emperor, even though she should not be Empress-dowager. This case might occur if Napoleon should select for his heir a son of his brother Louis and of Queen Hortense. That princess, since King Louis had abdicated the crown of Holland, lived in France separated from her husband and much esteemed in Parisian society. The claim, evidently made in his interest, was supported by a young councillor of state who enjoyed largely the Imperial favour, Count Molé. Napoleon rejected it in a harsh and peremptory manner, and the question was dropped. On leaving the council, Napoleon said to Cambacérès, "Well, did you observe how the friends of Hortense are stirring? What would be done if I were dead?" And he sighed at the thought.

The *Senatus-consult* was adopted by the Senate without alteration. By letters-patent Napoleon conferred on the regent the semblance of full sovereign authority, except the right of presenting laws to the legislative body and *Senatus-consults* to the Senate, but he practically restricted the use of that authority by judicious precautions, and forbade the regent to do any thing without the signature of Prince Cambacérès. He also gave him as secretary to the regency, with the duties of minister of state, the prudent Duke of Cadore, M. de Champagny. He certainly could not have surrounded her with better councillors.

On the 30th of March he invested the Empress with her new dignity. Surrounded by the high dignitaries of the Empire, he received her in the throne-room, and administered to her an oath to exercise the high functions with which she was endowed as a good mother, a faithful wife, a good Frenchwoman. After this formality, he dismissed the assembly, retaining only the ministers, and caused the Empress to be present at a council in which the greatest affairs were discussed. She appeared attentive, interested, and by no means without intelligence. During the following days he sur-

moned her to every council, discussed every matter in her presence, and endeavoured to initiate her in the art of government. In this short apprenticeship he pointed out to those who were to be her guides what it was necessary to disclose to her and what to conceal. Running over the police-reports, he laid several aside, saying to Cambacères, "The mind of a young woman must not be subjected to certain details. You will read these reports, and you will select such as ought to be communicated to the Empress."\* He then reserved to himself the nomination of the superior officers of the army. "Neither you nor the Empress," said he to Cambacères, "are acquainted with the personnel of the army. This is known only to the minister of war, and in him I have not confidence. If I leave him alone, he will fill the army with persons on whose devotion I cannot rely, and I shall be at length constrained to depose him. You will therefore carefully send all the commissions for my signature." M. Clarke, the Duke of Feltre, minister of war, a man of industry in the discharge of his duties, and of affecting devotion to Napoleon, but beginning to doubt the perpetuity of the Imperial dynasty, soon was seeking in all quarters for future support. He was deeply embroiled with the minister of police. Napoleon was not sorry to expose his somewhat doubtful fidelity to the surveillance of the Duke of Rovigo, who hated him, and in whose sincerity he had full confidence.

At the moment of leaving for the army, Napoleon, wishing to gain friends for his wife and son, would have made a considerable promotion of Senators in order to support by selfish gratification the tottering devotion of many distinguished persons. But the penetrating arch-chancellor pointed out a danger attendant on such a measure. There only remained thirteen vacant places in the Senate, and thirteen disposable endowments. To make more nominations than there were vacancies was to reduce himself to the necessity of further dividing existing resources, or of augmenting the revenues of the Senate. The state of the finances did not allow the latter measure, and he was unwilling to have recourse to the former, from the fear of displeasing the Senate: he therefore only nominated thirteen new members, who, as we shall see, did not add much to the fidelity of that body. He lavishly disseminated the decorations of the order of the Reunion, and created Count Decrès a duke, a title which had been unjustly delayed, for it was not the fault of that minister that the navy had enjoyed no remarkable success during the Imperial era. For aides-de-camp he chose General Corbinau, who had singularly discovered the passage of the Beresina, and the illustrious Drouet, who

rendered such important services in the artillery of the Guard, which had so greatly contributed to the victories obtained. He did not confine himself to the attempts to secure friends for his wife and son: he laboured also to avert from them the sources of perplexity. He had recalled Marshal Soult from Spain, and had permitted M. Fouché to return from rustication. He was unwilling to leave these two distinguished persons unemployed at Paris, especially the second. He took Marshal Soult with him, intending to assign him some office in his guard, and he resolved, as soon as he should have re-entered the German territory, to confide to M. Fouché the government of the conquered provinces.

The session of the legislative body had just closed, after a duration of three or four weeks, and it had voted the law of finance and the law relating to the sale of communal property. In order to secure the confidence of the public to the bills on the sinking-fund, he had bought for the civil list and the *trésor extraordinaire* about seventy millions, which was a great help to M. Mollien but involved a very considerable diminution of the bullion reserved at the Tuileries. According to his custom, he sent some millions to Mentz in a chest unknown to his ministers, that none of them might reckon upon them, but that he might be able to provide for any extraordinary wants of his troops.

Before quitting, he took some further steps in relation to the concordat of Fontainebleau. The pope, without denying the authenticity of that concordat or the reality of his own signature, had adopted the plan of not executing the new treaty and of giving no hint of his intentions. He did not speak of his removal to Avignon, for which, indeed, nothing was yet prepared; he exercised none of the pontifical functions; he had made no choice of a minister to communicate with the French Government, nor had he informed the different Catholic courts that they might send accredited representatives to him at Avignon. Of the famous bulls for the institution of bishops designated by Napoleon, so often announced and so long expected, he said nothing, so that the government of the church remained in abeyance. In regard to these different subjects, Pius VII., adopting a system of finance which originated not with himself but with his counsellors, was far from declaring any wish to repudiate the concordat of Fontainebleau and to withdraw his signature, but he seemed to indicate that at the present conjuncture the execution of the treaty was not urgent, and affected to slumber more than usual in his quiet retreat. Only the stirring parties in the church made frequent journeys to Fontainebleau. The impetuous Napoleon was almost carried away, and nearly spoiled by display of the skillfulness of his reconciliation with the Holy Father. But on better advice he contented himself with securing the advantages it involved. The pope having signed the concordat publicly and freely, Napoleon had no reason to keep it secret. He had, indeed, promised not to publish it until it had been communicated to the cardinals; but the insincerity with which he had been treated, the delay in communicating with the cardinals, who were all at Paris, the contradiction of many members of the church, some of whom asserted

\* This kind of solicitude is indicated by the following interesting letter to the Duke of Rovigo:—

TO THE MINISTER OF POLICE.

"RAPPORT, April 26, 1813.

"I do not mean you to subject to the Empress your reports on police-affairs. This can be attended with no advantage, and may be highly unsuitable. The Empress is too young to have her mind disturbed with such details. You will therefore address only to the arch-chancellor the copy of the reports which you will send to me. The arch-chancellor will present to her only such as it is right that she should know, and he will treat such matters as lightly as possible."

that the concordat did not exist, others that it had been extorted by violence, gave Napoleon a right to make it public. He consequently caused it to be inserted in the bulletin of laws, as a law of the state, which was to commence from the period of insertion. He then took measures to secure the institution of the new prelates, officially intimated to the pope, being performed by the metropolitan unless granted by the pope himself within six months. He also restricted the number of visitors at Fontainebleau, and designated those who should have access to the pope. Finally, he ordered that Cardinal di Pietro should be secretly arrested and carried forty leagues from Paris, as being distinguished by his evil counsels in the last-named matter. Nor did he conceal his motive for this severity from those about the pope. But he did not extend it to his other advisers. He wished to give a warning, but not to make a display.

A few days before his departure for Mentz arrived Prince Schwarzenberg, who was announced as the bearer of the most secret resolutions of the Austrian cabinet. Napoleon had already sent back to Vienna M. de Bubna, whose intelligence he had liked, whose vanity he had flattered, and whose favourable dispositions towards France he had fostered as much as possible. He had laboured to inculcate upon him the idea, at that time so difficult to be received by a German, that Austria ought to endeavour with the aid of France to repair her shattered fortunes. He attempted the same thing with Prince Schwarzenberg. That prince, who had no dislike to Napoleon, but, on the contrary, had reason personally to be pleased with him, began to feel much embarrassed, for he was unwilling to displease him, and he also wished to study the passions of his country, though he did not fully participate in them. M. de Metternich had sent him rather to question than to speak: he had particularly enjoined him to learn the nature of the peace which Napoleon would be willing to conclude, and to insinuate that Austria would draw the sword only in the cause of peace, and of peace in the interest of Germany. To say this to Napoleon, glowing with confidence, ardour, and impetuosity, was neither easy nor agreeable. And, accordingly, Prince Schwarzenberg accepted the mission with regret, and fulfilled it with a bad grace. He expressed nothing clear or satisfactory, spoke only of the necessity of peace, of the exasperation of the public mind in Germany, and ventured to express only a small part of that which he had been instructed to say. Napoleon allowed him neither time nor opportunity for explanation, endeavoured to gain him over to his views by flattering attention, exhibited towards him a studied confidence, and, taking up the reports of his troops, which he always kept upon his study-table, endeavoured to persuade him that he possessed, in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, 1,100,000 or 1,200,000 men under arms, quite equal in quality to the young Germans opposed to them, with much superior officers, and, above all, a very different general. He affirmed that he was going to crush the Russians and Prussians

and to throw them beyond the Vistula. He then endeavoured to persuade the prince that it was in the power of Austria to render the peace certain and immediate by pronouncing in favour of France, and the most advantageous she had ever concluded, by accepting Silesia, one million of Poles, and Illyria, all which he was ready to bestow. Prince Schwarzenberg, though possessed of a tolerably firm mind, was moved by the proposals of Napoleon, but still endeavoured to convince him that he would have to contend in the approaching campaign against troops excited to a violent degree of fanaticism, that it would not be a matter of one or two battles, that it would be, therefore, prudent in him to think of negotiating, that Austria was ready to aid him, but that she could not oppose all Europe in support of an arrangement which would in no respect conform to the wishes and interests of Germany. But the temper of Napoleon was much too ardent to be arrested by cool arguments. Prince Schwarzenberg perceived plainly that he wished to contend to the last extremity, that nothing would prevent him, that he would probably succeed, and he thought that it would be right to await that success and estimate its importance before forming any decided calculation or resolution. He consequently gave expression to some words without force or relevance, and was then silent, fearing to tell Napoleon the truth which he well knew in a very important particular, and which it was specially his duty to communicate. This related to the Austrian auxiliary corps. Austria pretending to abide by the treaty of alliance of March 14, 1812, the Austrian auxiliary corps was to be always at the disposal of Napoleon, and its entrance on the field was of great consequence at the present moment. Napoleon said to Prince Schwarzenberg that he was about to send orders to that corps to advance with Prince Poniatowski towards Upper Silesia, which orders he hoped would be executed. Prince Schwarzenberg, who was well aware that his government would not fire a gun, feared to confess this to Napoleon, and had the weakness to reply that the Austrian corps would obey.

After having vainly endeavoured to convert Prince Schwarzenberg, Napoleon sent word to his allies, the Grand Duke of Baden, the prince primate, the Duke of Wurzburg, the Kings of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony, to prepare their contingents, and especially to forward all the organized cavalry they possessed. He particularly urged this upon the King of Saxony, who had retired to Ratisbon, and who had with him the 2400 fine horsemen of whom we have spoken, and on whom Napoleon counted as an addition to Marshal Ney's corps. This demand he made in the tone of an absolute order. After all these arrangements had been made, and he had received the last embrace of the Emperor, agitated and afflicted at the separation, he set off on the 15th of April, as ardent and as confident as at the opening of his most glorious campaigns. Happy and fatal confidence, which might produce great results, but also, by its excess, might induce new and irreparable disasters!

## BOOK XLVIII.

## LUTZEN AND BAUTZEN.

DEPARTURE of Prince Schwarzenberg from Paris—Occurrences at Vienna since the defection of Prussia—Continued efforts of Austria to secure a peace—Secret arrangement with Russia—Arrival of M. de Narbonne at Vienna, and his discussion with M. de Metternich—Surprise and irritation of Napoleon on arriving at Mentz—His military arrangements there—His plan of the campaign—Forces of the coalition—Battle at Weissenfels, and union of the two French armies—March of Napoleon upon Lutzen—Battle of Lutzen—Entry into Dresden—Passage of the Elbe—The Cabinet of Vienna renounce the treaty of alliance—Consequent resolution of Napoleon—Prince Eugene sent to Milan—Reception of the King of Saxony at Dresden—Interviews of Napoleon with M. de Bubna—Departure of Napoleon for Bautzen—Battle of Bautzen—Battle of Reichenbach—Occupation of Breslau—Distress of the Coalition—Proposals for an armistice—Conditions of the armistice, and close of the first campaign.

AFTER the departure of Napoleon, Prince Schwarzenberg remained amazed at all that he had seen and heard, and much displeased with himself for not having ventured to express any of the truths which he was commissioned to tell to the court of France. He endeavoured to be more open with the Empress, to whom he had access, for in addition to his character as a German, and as the ambassador of her father, he had also been the negotiator of her marriage, and had, consequently, every title to attention. Unhappily, his conversation with that princess could not have much effect. Maria Louisa, dazzled by the splendour which surrounded her, charmed with her husband, who loaded her with assiduities, put up ardent prayers for his success, but she had no influence over him. Her eyes were yet red with tears at his departure when she received the ambassador of her father. She listened with grief to what was said by Prince Schwarzenberg on the dangers of the present situation, on the passions excited through Europe against France, on the necessity of concluding peace with some and preserving it with others. The young Empress could only repeat in reply what she had been told of the immense forces of Napoleon; but, understanding little of warlike matters, she confined herself to requesting them to consider her position in France, and not to expose her to be another victim of revolutionary outbreaks after they had sent her there as a pledge of peace. The misfortunes of Marie Antoinette had left so painful an impression, that Maria Louisa was often seized with sudden alarm, and considered herself in great danger if Austria should make war with France. She spoke of her fears to Prince Schwarzenberg, but without much effect, for he did not regard them in a serious light, and, besides, he thought as a soldier and politician, and, though a little impeded by the favours he had received from the French court, his chief anxiety was consecrated to the welfare of his country and his own. Nothing important could result from such interviews. Those between Prince Schwarzenberg and M. de Bassano, who had remained some days at Paris, might have been more useful, but they were not.

At the time of the marriage of Maria Louisa, Prince Schwarzenberg had carried his intimacy with M. de Bassano to the furthest possible extent: they were, therefore, on very familiar

terms, and could speak freely with each other. Prince Schwarzenberg attempted to speak the truth, but without all the courage that the case demanded, and which, at a later period, might have excused him from the charge of ingratitude towards Napoleon, if he had been unable to obtain a hearing. He endeavoured to contest in some degree the allegations of M. de Bassano, to deduct something from the immense armaments of which that minister made a constant display, to speak of the inexperience of our infantry and the destruction of our cavalry, of the patriotic fury we should meet with among the members of the coalition, of the passions which carried away the nations of Europe and even the Governments themselves, of the impossibility of Austria fighting against Germany for France unless it should appear that she fought to secure a peace wholly in the interest of Germany. M. de Bassano appeared not to comprehend these truths, and, with a *naïveté* highly creditable to his sincerity but not to his political sagacity, repeatedly adduced the treaty of alliance, and, in particular, the marriage. Prince Schwarzenberg, losing patience, exclaimed, "The marriage! policy formed it; policy can annul it!" At this frank exclamation of the prince, M. de Bassano, in surprise, began to understand the state of matters; but, instead of helping the prince out of his difficulty by encouraging him to express boldly what he knew, viz., that Austria would not fight for us against the Germans, and that she would even associate herself with them if we refused the peace which she contemplated, he pretended not to understand him, in order that he might not be called upon to reply, and allowed the interview to terminate in new and false protestations of fidelity to the alliance. No doubt, to appear not to understand in order to avoid an outbreak might perhaps be a proof of tact; but a frank explanation, friendly and unreserved, would, in our opinion, have been much more so. But, while he could dissimulate with the representative of Austria, he could not with Napoleon: to him it was necessary to say what he had pretended not to have understood in another, which was that unless he made sacrifices he would have Austria on his hands and would sink under the coalition of all Europe. M. de Bassano thought it better to repeat to the Emperor nothing of what he had learned, lest it should irritate him against Austria. The intention was certainly

good, but by such a course servants destroy their masters whom they have not accustomed to the language of truth. If the whole world, if the nature of things, would evince the same consideration, it is possible that to conceal the evil would be to destroy its power; but, as other circumstances are not equally obsequious, the facts of which they are left ignorant increase in power and weight, until they issue in disasters.

Prince Schwarzenberg left Paris much displeased at what he had seen, and if he had been just he would have been equally displeased with himself, for he had not expressed all the truths which his Government authorized him to declare, and which he owed to Napoleon if he would clear himself of the charge of ingratitude in accepting the new part which he was shortly to play.

Affairs were no better at Vienna, though conducted by the representatives of France and Austria with much more penetration and intelligence. Whilst M. de Narbonne was on the road, our situation there had become much worse, and M. de Metternich and the Emperor, pressed between the universal opinion of Germany, which summoned them to join the coalition, and France, to whom they were pledged, knew not how to extricate themselves from the difficulty, and found themselves daily compelled to the most painful dissimulation. Their object was not changed, for there was only one which could be recognised as prudent and honourable in their position. To pass from the condition of ally of France so that of ally of Russia, Prussia, and England, by the intermediate stage of empire; to impose on each party a peace in the interest of Germany; to abide by this intermediate part as long as possible; to join the coalition only at the last extremity, was in the eyes of the prudent Emperor and skilful minister the only course left. This reconciled the interests of the Emperor as a German sovereign with his duties as a father; to the minister it presented a method of passing from one line of policy to another, and of remaining with decency at the head of affairs. And in the eyes of both it had the great recommendation of sparing Austria the war with France, which appeared to them fraught with the greatest danger. But to reconcile the coalition to such a gradual transition, and Napoleon to moderate measures, was an almost impossible effort, and one which might fail notwithstanding all imaginable dexterity, in the midst, especially, of circumstances incident at all times to extraordinary situations. It would have undoubtedly been better to come to a clear and immediate explanation with all; to say to the coalition and to Napoleon that they wished for peace, primarily, in the interest of Germany, but also in the interest of all Europe, whose equilibrium indispensably required that Germany should be independent; that, being able to turn the scale, they were ready to do so in opposition to whichever party should refuse the complete and immediate adoption of this general pacification. But to use such language before they had 200,000 men in Bohemia, in the presence of so impetuous a person as Napoleon, and of a coalition so intoxicated with success as that of Russia, England, and Prussia, would have been attended with danger. It was there-

fore prudent to gain time before coming to an explanation. The Austrian cabinet neglected nothing in this respect, and they were not without talent adequate to the emergency.

In the first place, Austria had desired to secure adherents to her policy of mediation in Germany itself, and had sought them among the princes engaged, like herself, to the French alliance by prudence or interest. She had begun by secretly addressing Prussia, who, with a degree of rapidity resulting from her position and from the passions of the people, had all at once plunged from the design of mediation into open war. Unable to make further use of Prussia, she had turned her efforts towards Saxony and Bavaria, (still in secret,) who desired nothing more than peace, especially on terms advantageous to Germany, and she had gained them over to her policy. She had induced, as we have seen, the King of Saxony to quit Dresden, to refuse his contingent in cavalry, and to shut up his infantry-contingent in Torgau. But this was not enough: she wished now to bring him from Ratisbon to Prague, in order to have him more at her disposal and to force him to adopt all her views. The principal of these was, to obtain from the old king the sacrifice of Poland, a very flattering present of Napoleon, but of a chimerical and dangerous character, as indicated by the Moscow campaign. Having gained the consent of the King of Saxony to the suppression of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the Austrian cabinet hoped to find less difficulties on the part of Napoleon, who would no longer be exposed to the disagreeable difficulty of abandoning an ally for whom he had always professed great partiality. Then, with the territories extending from the Bug to the Warta, they had the means of reconstituting Prussia; they would deliver Russia from the grand duchy of Warsaw, which was to her a threatening and accusing phantom; they would give her something for the Duke of Oldenburg; and they would reserve for themselves what, in the midst of many views for the public good, was not indifferent to Austria,—the portion of Galicia lost after the battle of Wagram. This, then, was a very important point to gain from the King of Saxony, and they pursued the object with secrecy, dexterity, and urgency. Finally, it was wished that Saxony should only employ her forces in union with those of Austria, at the same time and in the same proportion. Her forces consisted in the fine cavalry which had followed the court, in the 10,000 infantry stationed at Torgau, in the fortress of Torgau itself, and that of Konigstein on the Elbe, and, finally, in the Polish contingent of Prince Poniatowski, who had retired towards Cracow after Prince Schwarzenberg. This last part of the Saxon forces was the most interesting in the eyes of Austria, not from its military importance, but from its peculiar position. Care must be taken to prevent the Polish corps, on the approaching renewal of hostilities, putting itself in motion on the orders of Napoleon, and thereby attracting the Russians towards Bohemia. Add to this, that on the renewal of hostilities Napoleon would send orders to move not only to the Poles, but also to the Austrian corps itself. To solve so many complications, M. de Metternich, with his usual fertility of resources, had de-



vised a first measure, skilful, but dangerous if divulged, which was to continue by written agreement that which had been tacitly concluded,—i.e. to withdraw before the Russians under the pretence of compulsion by superior forces. Consequently, through M. de Lebselttern, who had been sent to Kalisch to offer the mediation of Austria, they had agreed to the following articles in a note exchanged between the parties, which was promised to be kept forever secret. The Russian general, Baron de Sacken, should denounce the armistice in virtue of which the Russians had suspended hostilities with the Austrians at the end of the last campaign, and should pretend to deploy a considerable force upon their flank; the Austrians, on their side, should pretend to withdraw by necessity, should repass the Upper Vistula, abandon Cracow, return into Galicia, and bring with them the Polish corps of Poniatowski, obliging him to submit to this pretended necessity. Once there, the Russians should halt and respect the Austrian frontiers. But in order not to keep the Poles so near the grand duchy of Warsaw, and especially that they might not be left in the middle of Galicia, which they might excite to revolution, the Austrian cabinet proposed to agree with the King of Saxony, their grand duke, to bring them back through the Austrian States to the Elbe, where Napoleon might use them as he pleased. Thus would be resolved one of the most pressing difficulties.

The Russians had accepted the secret convention, and M. de Nesselrode, who was now not in title but in fact the guiding minister of Alexander, hastened to sign it. It remained to render these different arrangements acceptable to the King of Saxony.

That unhappy king, terribly perplexed, ignorant to whom he ought to resign himself, but willingly following the example of Austria, whose situation resembled his own, had consented to all that had been proposed to him. With regard to the cavalry at Ratisbon, the infantry at Torgau, Torgau itself, and Konigstein, he had agreed not to use these forces and fortresses, except in accordance with Austria, conjointly with her, and in conformity with her plan of mediation. With regard to the Polish troops, he had consented that when they should have re-entered Galicia they should be for a time deprived of their arms, on condition of recovering them again, and of being led through the Austrian States, receiving all necessary supplies, to some point in Bavaria or Saxony, which should afterwards be determined. Unfortunately for this design, there existed among the Polish troops a battalion of French voltigeurs; and it would be no easy matter to disarm the French, especially while they professed to remain the allies of France.

This point gained, it was necessary to obtain from the King of Saxony the final abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw, in order to relieve Napoleon from a difficulty and to deprive him of an argument, and Austria wished to propose to Saxony, in compensation for Poland, the beautiful principality of Erfurt, hitherto kept as a deposit by France, and at one time offered as a compensation to the Duke of Oldenburg. But Saxony, while yielding to the views of Austria, had excused herself when they spoke of sacrificing the grand duchy of Warsaw; for Erfurt,

though a pretty appendage to her states, was by no means equal in value to the glorious crown of Poland, which in an earlier age had so brilliantly adorned the brow of the princes of Saxony. Accordingly, the Austrian cabinet wished to bring the King of Saxony from Bavaria to Bohemia, in order to have him more under their power. With this view, they had enforced upon that prince the advantage of being at Prague, in an inviolable country, at some hours from Dresden, able to have daily intercourse with his subjects and to retain their affection.

The negotiations of Bavaria were quite as delicate, and involved still more difficulties. Besides being necessary to make her accept a project of mediation which was altogether foreign from Napoleon's policy, (which could not be without some risk,) it was necessary to incline her to a sacrifice in no way necessary to the general cause, but very useful to Austria, viz., the re-establishment of the frontier of the Inn, broken by the treaty of peace of 1809, at the expense of Austria and in favour of Bavaria. Here, only menace could be employed, and no compensation could be offered, for around Bavaria were found only the territories of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, which they could hardly dismember for the benefit of a neighbour. The task was difficult, and there was a risk of Bavaria, in displeasure, revealing all to Napoleon. Our allies of Baden and Wurtemberg Austria could only address with great reserve, their proximity to the Rhine rendering them subject to the vigilant domination of Napoleon.

In the midst of this subtle and secret labour, M. de Narbonne arrived unexpectedly at Vienna, bringing proposals very different from those entertained by that court. Instead of a plan for reconstituting Prussia and rendering Germany independent, M. de Narbonne suggested a still greater confusion of Germany than that which they wished to rectify, i.e. the final destruction of Prussia, the substitution of Saxony in its place, Austria remunerated by Silesia but rendered more dependent than ever! Certainly, with such proposals there was no great probability of a mutual understanding; added to this, that M. de Narbonne, who had recently entered into favour with Napoleon, naturally brought with him the desire to distinguish himself, and in particular to avoid being, like his predecessor, the dupe of M. de Metternich,—a dangerous though very natural disposition, for the best method would have been to appear to be a dupe without being so, or even to be really so rather than to force Austria to declare herself, by showing that her designs had been detected.

From M. de Metternich he met the most flattering reception. That minister piqued himself not merely on professed political sagacity, but also on amiability and sincerity, which he really possessed, and could exhibit as occasion required. He received M. de Narbonne, therefore, with the utmost courtesy, as a friend from whom he need conceal nothing, and with whose help he hoped to save France, Austria, and Europe from a frightful catastrophe, by a prompt and frank explanation of every thing. He took great pains to learn whether M. de Narbonne proposed any concessions to the

European policy which might indicate an inclination to peace on the part of Napoleon. But M. de Narbonne still awaited his last instructions from Paris, in which should be minutely traced the manner in which he should propose to Austria the important overtures of which he was the bearer. Hitherto he could only say that Napoleon designed to make no concession, but that if Austria would co-operate with him he would pay her well with the territory of some one, no matter whom. In such a situation, all that M. de Narbonne could do was to speak little and hear and conjecture much; and this he did. As he did not speak, M. de Metternich endeavoured to do so. He said some things which might have been conjectured without his saying them, and which certainly ought to have been understood, when he took care to repeat them so frequently, and with such an evident desire to render them useful. He said, with truth, that at Vienna their position was very difficult since the defection of Prussia. The whole of Germany required them to join Russia and England against France. All classes at Vienna, though less bold than at Berlin, held the same language essentially, and, what was still more serious, the army shared in their sentiments. Every one wished them to seize the opportunity of relieving Germany from the yoke of France, and of terminating a state of things which was deemed intolerable. Austria was, of course, aware of the exaggerations and imprudence of such language. She knew that Napoleon was very powerful, very formidable, one whom it was not safe to attack; and he was not himself disposed to fall into those errors from which he had hoped to deter the policy of Austria by the marriage of Maria Louisa. He overlooked neither the policy of Napoleon, nor the marriage, nor the treaty of alliance of March, 1812, and he would no more allow himself to be led by the people of the capitals than by those of the drawing-rooms and stables. Yet he could not blind himself to evident truths,—an error with which his adversaries were charged; he could not but perceive that there was in Europe a universal excitement against France, at least against her ruler, and even in France a very natural desire for rest; that they might no doubt gain some battles, but this would not long enable them to resist such a movement; that it was necessary, therefore, to come to some agreement not inconsistent with their legitimate greatness, but such as should not oppress the independence of others so as to render their condition intolerable. He added that the views of Austria were just and moderate, that she wished to continue the ally of France, but that she could not be expected to shed the blood of her subjects in order to add weight to a chain to which she was herself subjected; that, if she were required to support with all her forces a project of peace which should be acceptable to Europe, her people would probably excuse her remaining united to France for such a purpose, but that on the contrary supposition she would excite universal rebellion among her own subjects. In support of this he mentioned the arrest of persons of consequence, particularly M. de Hormayer, and numerous cases of deposition which had been found necessary in order to silence the most

turbulent of the German patriots. But he pointed out that every thing had its limit, that the cabinet was swimming with all its force against the stream, but incapable of succeeding unless aided by Napoleon. Then, fearing lest his words might convey some idea of menace or censure, he broke out into protestations of attachment, esteem, and admiration of Napoleon, and affirmed that he in no degree sympathized with those who wished to abase him. "Abase him!" exclaimed he, with energy: "it is proposed to leave him three or four times as great as Louis XIV. If he would but be contented with such greatness, how happy he would make us all, how secure he would render the future of his son, which is now one with our own!"

To these general truths M. de Metternich receiving no other reply than vain generalities on the extent of our armaments, our approaching victories, the necessity of looking to ourselves, he renewed, with much address, and with the tone of an inquirer, his attempts to fathom our ambition. He repeated his remarks on the impossibility of maintaining the chimera of the grand duchy of Warsaw, condemned by the campaign of 1812; on the necessity of reinforcing the intermediate powers, and Prussia above all, the only one able to replace Poland, now forever destroyed; on the necessity of re-constituting Germany; on the impossibility of perpetuating the Confederation of the Rhine, an institution forever ruined in the mind of the German people, and much more inconvenient than useful to Napoleon; on the impossibility of inducing the belligerent powers to agree to the final union of Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen to the French territory; on all these points, in short, which we have previously indicated, and in regard to which had been already clearly expressed the sentiments of the Austrian cabinet. "We shall have sufficient trouble," added M. de Metternich, "to prevent allusion to Holland, Spain, and Italy! England will probably speak of these countries, and if she should give way in regard to Holland and Italy she certainly will not in regard to Spain. But of this we shall say nothing, to avoid complication: if necessary, we shall even treat independently of England. We shall perhaps induce Russia and Prussia to separate from her, if we offer acceptable conditions, and in this case France will again find us her faithful allies. But pray let France explain herself, let us know her intentions, and let her make it possible for us to remain her allies by granting us a reasonable cause to maintain, a cause which we can openly avow to our people!" With respect to the special interests of Austria, M. de Metternich exhibited a freedom from all prepossession, which clearly proved that he had only to accept the offers which were made from all parties to Austria. "What was not offered," he said himself, "by the coalition?" But he would not listen to their foolish proposals:—he would content himself with that which they could not refuse to Austria,—viz., that portion of Galicia which had been taken from her in 1809 to aggrandize the impossible duchy of Warsaw, and the Illyrian provinces, which had been promised to her by France, and he spoke of this as a certain and irrevocable fact, though scarcely a word had been said about it between the French and Austrian cabinets.

Such was the language of M. de Metternich. It was far from being new. The Emperor Francis, more circumspect and less bold in his interviews, contented himself with receiving M. de Narbonne with great courtesy, assuring him of his satisfaction in the happiness of his daughter, of his high estimate of the genius of his son-in-law, and of his great desire to remain his ally; but he did not conceal that this could only be with a view to peace, for his people would never allow it in any other point of view. He added that it would be necessary to purchase this peace in two ways,—by victories and by sacrifices; that his son-in-law had done well to exercise his great talents in the creation of vast resources, for the struggle would be more severe than he imagined, but that his success would no doubt lead his adversaries to adopt more moderate ideas, and that if, after having conquered them, he should wish to make the necessary sacrifices for the peace of the nations, Austria would use her utmost efforts, and thus they should obtain a durable peace, a peace which ought to be acceptable to his son-in-law after so many glorious labours, and which he himself eagerly desired, not only as a sovereign but as a father, for it would secure the happiness of his beloved daughter, and the prospects of his grandson, in whom he took a lively interest.

To all these demonstrations M. de Narbonne replied as well as he could, always extolling his master's greatness, and repeating that it was necessary to study him, and he employed the art which he had acquired in drawing-rooms of concealing by the grace and ease of his manner his inability to make any serious communication. And, though he still kept up appearances, he had divined the secret intentions of Austria. She was evidently not inclined to fire a gun for France against Germany; yet she had no intention of passing, like Prussia, at once from alliance to war. The Emperor did not wish to forget his part as a father; the minister wished to effect his change of policy with decency; and they thought that they might present themselves as mediators, and offer a reasonable peace, exerting all their influence with each party to induce them to accept it. A proof of this design appeared in every direction. Austria was arming, not indeed with the genius of Napoleon, but with equal precipitation, and, without denying it, she made no mention of her being thus engaged. Certainly she would have told us, and would have boasted of her zeal, if she had been arming in our favour.

M. de Narbonne became immediately convinced that the best which could be obtained from that court was neutrality, and that by careful study, by speaking little and demanding nothing, she might be kept inactive,—which ought to suffice us. There was certainly a still better course to pursue, as we have already remarked,—viz., while pardoning her dissimulation and her semi-desertion, to recognise that she was essentially right in her determination to struggle only for peace, and for peace in the interest of Germany, to enter frankly into her views, to make her a mediator predisposed in our favour, and thus to obtain such a peace as she wished to effect; for France, though deprived of the grand duchy of Warsaw, the Hanse towns, and Spain, but possessing Holland,

Belgium, the Rhine provinces, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman States, independently of the vassal kingdoms of Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, was still too great to be really strong. It would therefore have been better to enter without any ill-feeling into the views of Austria, and to venture to say so to Napoleon. But M. de Narbonne did not even attempt what he knew would be in vain; and therefore, to aim at the neutrality of Austria, and to endeavour to paralyze that court instead of exciting her activity, was the course most to be commended for prudence and for the probability of success. M. de Narbonne understood this perfectly, and was about to recommend it to his Government, when he received the long-expected instructions, which were certainly very far from encouraging neutrality.

Having been forwarded on the 29th of March, and arrived on the 9th of April, they enabled M. de Narbonne to lay aside the unmeaning language he had hitherto adopted; and now, carrying his opinions to the furthest extreme possible, he read to M. de Metternich the very text of M. de Bassano, a text well adapted to excite a smile in the Austrian minister by the vaunting air which the French minister united to the impetuous policy of Napoleon. M. de Narbonne read the instructions, which consisted in telling Austria that she must exercise the principal part; that, since she desired peace, she must put herself in a position to dictate it by preparing great forces and then calling upon the belligerent powers to halt, under the threat of sending 100,000 men against their flank, then throwing these 100,000 men into Silesia, if they did not stop their course, and keeping Silesia for herself, while Napoleon should drive beyond the Vistula the Prussians, Russians, English, Swedes, &c. M. de Metternich listened to the plan without apparent emotion, proposed many questions in order to obtain full explanation of all the details, and then touched a point which had not been met in the despatch. "If," said he, "the belligerent powers should halt at our summons, on what bases shall we offer them peace?" To this question M. de Narbonne could give no answer; for M. de Bassano's despatch, contemplating only the case of war, developed only the course of ulterior proceedings. Napoleon, in fact, was not willing at the present stage to describe the arrangement of Europe which he proposed to institute in the case of immediate negotiation. M. de Metternich professed to forbear pressing this last point, and to reflect deeply on the communication. He promised a reply as early as was consistent with the gravity of the subject.

If, in his present embarrassment between the allied powers impatient for him to declare himself their ally, and Napoleon who wished to retain him in his chains, he had been asked what method of escape he could desire, he certainly could not have conceived any other than that which was provided by the communication from Paris. For in what did his difficulty consist? It consisted first in his venturing to say to Napoleon that Austria was acting the part of a mediator, which involved the relinquishment of her part as ally; secondly, in finding a pretext for arming to an unjustifiable extent; thirdly, in coming to an explanation on the approaching employment of the Austrian auxiliary

corps, which, instead of fighting the Russians, was about to return to Galicia. On these three points, which placed Austria in a position of great difficulty in regard to France, they had now come marvellously to her aid, as we shall show; and M. de Metternich was too skilful not to seize the advantage.

He took two days to reply, after having, very probably, not occupied one hour in reflection. He sent for M. de Narbonne, and announced to him, with an air of satisfaction, that, after having consulted his master, he was ready to explain, himself, the important subjects in hand admitting of no delay. He was happy, he said, to find himself perfectly in accordance with Napoleon on the most important points of the recent communication. Thus, for instance, the Austrian cabinet thought with him that it was impossible for them to act a subordinate part and to limit their operations to the same degree as in 1812; that in circumstances so different a different course was necessary. Austria had foreseen this and prepared for it. This was the cause of her armaments, which, independently of the auxiliary corps from Poland, and the corps of observation which had remained in Galicia, would soon procure for her 100,000 men in Bohemia. Her manner of presenting herself before the belligerent powers was to be that of an armed mediator, which corresponded to the idea of Napoleon. She would propose to the powers to arrest their course, to agree to an armistice, and to name plenipotentiaries. If they consented to this, she would then announce the conditions, and on this subject he awaited anxiously further communication from the French cabinet. If, on the contrary, they should refuse to admit any proposal of peace, it would be time to act and to regulate the employment of the Austrian forces in concurrence with those of France. This case would render evident the insufficiency of the last treaty of alliance, and the necessity of modifying it in accordance with circumstances. From all this there resulted the adoption of new arrangements of the Austrian auxiliary corps which existed on the frontiers of Poland in a perfectly false position, and which was to be brought back to the Austrian territory with the Polish corps, to prevent its being employed in a manner contrary to the views of the two cabinets. To this declaration M. de Metternich joined the expression of entire satisfaction, repeating that he was happy to be so fully in accord with the French cabinet, and promising to do his best to unite the two offices of ally and mediator.

Never had the difficult and complicated game of diplomacy been better played and with more success than by M. de Metternich on this occasion. At a single stroke he had resolved all his embarrassments. From a slavish ally he had converted himself into an armed mediator. He had ventured to profess that the treaty of alliance of March, 1812, was no longer applicable; he had assigned motives for his armaments to which we could not bring any objection; he had solved, beforehand, a great approaching difficulty, the intended employment of the Austrian auxiliary corps. It is needless to add that at no price would Austria consent to co-operate with France for the subversion of Germany, the displacement, or, in other words, the destruction, of Prussia, the appropriation of

Silesia, &c., not from regard to Prussia, but from regard to the common independence. She therefore evaded this proposal, considering the case supposed as one of war, a question to be taken up at a later period, when the belligerent powers should have refused all overtures of peace,—which was highly improbable. M. de Metternich closed the statement by announcing that a courier-extraordinary was about to convey a copy to Prince Schwarzenberg at Paris.

The mere tone of the communication would have exposed it to suspicion, even though the meaning had not been obvious. The force with which M. de Metternich had dwelt upon the essential points, and his eagerness to inform Prince Schwarzenberg at Paris, indicated the desire that the important declaration he had just made should take immediate effect simultaneously in the two capitals,—which rather displayed the precautions of friends about to separate than the cordiality of friends ready to blend their interests and efforts. M. de Narbonne was much too penetrating not to perceive that under the affectation of perfect concord there lay concealed the most entire and formidable opposition. What had the French cabinet intended to convey in their imprudent communication? They had intended that, instead of the partial co-operation stipulated by the treaty of 1812, Austria should be held bound to furnish France with the whole of her forces, *i. e.* 100,000 or 150,000 men; that in order to be able to do so she should adopt the form most agreeable to the spirit of her people, that of mediation; and that, on the probable or even certain refusal of the powers to accept the proposals which should be made, Austria should join the struggle with all her armies, and should remunerate herself from the spoils of Prussia. Now M. de Metternich conveyed the exactly opposite idea in words copied with scrupulous affection from ours. He, in fact, admitted that the treaty of 1812, which merely required an aid of 30,000 men, was no longer applicable; that it was necessary to interpose with 150,000 men, and to do so, as France had wished, under the form of an armed mediation; to propose an armistice to the belligerent powers, and to use all her influence with them to make them accept the terms which should be approved. Now, though they might expect somewhat exaggerated pretensions from England, Russia, and Prussia, yet Austria was confident that she should induce them to give way by the single menace of joining her forces to ours, and consequently she had no fear of being at variance with them. She could, indeed, anticipate no difficulty except from Napoleon, who would neither relinquish the grand duchy of Warsaw in order to repair Prussia, nor abolish the Confederation of the Rhine, nor resign the Hanseatic provinces. The weight of 150,000 Austrians would therefore press upon him, and upon him alone. The alliance, thus enlarged in its end and its means, but changed into a mediation, was simply a method of constantly designed against himself in the terms of his own proposal.

M. de Narbonne, without either bitterness or irritation, but rather with the carelessness of a clever man who is unwilling to be considered a dupe, sought to obtain from M. de Metternich such explanations as would disclose part of his

secret meaning. "The alliance," he said, "shall not be more limited; be it so: Austria shall play the part which becomes her power; agreed: she shall interfere, not with 30,000 men but with 150,000, to enforce the conditions of peace; but what are those conditions?" "Those on which we shall agree," said M. de Metternich, "and on which we have urged you in vain to explain yourself for three months, those which we hoped would by this time have been conveyed to us, but which you still withhold, which makes our declaration incomplete in an essential point, that of the conditions to be offered to the belligerent powers in calling upon them to accept either our armistice or war." M. de Narbonne here found himself outwitted by his skillful antagonist, who owed his advantage to his being in the right, for France dared not avow her conditions of peace in the present circumstances. "But," resumed M. de Narbonne, "if these conditions, which I do not as yet know, should not be such as you desire!" Thereupon M. de Metternich, unwilling to do too much in one day, and contented with the ground he had gained,—which was, indeed, considerable, for Austria had succeeded in changing her alliance into an armed mediation,—hastily interrupted M. de Narbonne, saying, "The conditions give me no anxiety. . . . Your master will be reasonable: . . . it is not possible that he should be otherwise. . . . What, then! would he risk every thing for the ridiculous chimera of the grand duchy of Warsaw, or the equally ridiculous Confederation of the Rhine, or the Hanse towns, which will lose all their value to him on the day which terminates the continental blockade by a general peace? . . . No! it is impossible!" M. de Narbonne, unwilling to let his adversary escape, replied, "But supposing my master should think differently from you, and should make it a point of honour not to yield territories constitutionally united to the empire, nor to renounce a title which is disputed merely with the design of humiliating him, but to retain for France all that she had ever conquered: what will then happen?" "It will happen," replied M. de Metternich, with mingled confusion and impatience,—“it will happen that you will be obliged to yield what France herself will demand, and what she will have every right to demand after so many glorious efforts,—viz., peace, peace with the possession of that greatness which she has acquired with so much bloodshed, and which no one, not even England, is inclined to dispute." M. de Narbonne still insisted, saying, "But supposing my master should not be reasonable, (in your sense;) supposing he should reject your conditions, however acceptable they may seem to you: how will you then understand the duty of mediator? . . . Do you think it will be right to employ against us the force which we have agreed to raise from 30,000 men to 150,000?" Urged to say more than he wished, M. de Metternich at length exclaimed, with impatience, "Well, the mediator, as his title indicates, is an impartial umpire: the armed mediator, as his title implies, is an arbiter who holds in his hands the force necessary to secure respect to justice, of which he has been constituted the servant." Then, as if vexed at having said too much, he added, "Always supposing that the favour of the arbiter should

always incline to France,—that all the partiality that he can justly retain shall be for her." "Well, then, in certain cases you will make war upon us," replied M. de Narbonne. "No, no," replied M. de Metternich: "we shall not make war, because you will not be unreasonable." Then M. de Narbonne, endeavouring to give a pleasant turn to a conversation which he feared he had rendered too serious, said to M. de Metternich, "I am inclined to think that by assuming your new position you wish to gain time, and to give us an opportunity to gain a victory. . . . In this case, allow me to feel assured that the arbiter will lean to our side, if it is victory that shall decide him." "I count upon your victories," replied M. de Metternich, "and I need to do so, for several victories are necessary to bring our adversaries to reason. But be not deceived: the day after a victory we shall address you with even greater firmness than we do now."

M. de Metternich, driven to an extremity, had spoken with a degree of energy which showed to what extent the Austrian cabinet were resolved to support the system of peace which they had adopted; and here appeared in full force the great error which MM. de Caulaincourt, de Talleyrand, and de Cambacérès had feared when they advised that no appeal should be made to Austria. For this could only be done on the supposition that we had resolved to accept her conditions, which, happily for us, were very reasonable; but if we rejected these conditions, which she had indicated with tolerable clearness, it was necessary to gain time, not to urge her to increase her armaments, not to demand more than 80,000 men, not even to exact these with great urgency, to allow whatever she might happen to do, to defer explanations, and, in the mean while, with all speed to drive the coalition beyond the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, in order so to separate them from Austria that she should be unable to afford them aid. But the fault did not lie with M. de Narbonne, who had been sent for the express purpose of committing it, chosen as the person who would do so most rapidly and completely: the fault was chargeable on Napoleon, on his attempt to make Austria a tool when this was no longer possible, and in so doing to put arms in her hands which she would shortly turn against us.

The consequences of this error were immediate, and they occurred in rapid succession. Scarcely had Austria assumed the position of armed mediator by her declaration of April 12, when she profited by the ground she had gained to make further advances. The King of Saxony was still at Ratisbon, assailed by the counsels, menaces, and solicitations of every one. Prussia had invited him to join the coalition, promising all sorts of compensation on compliance, and threatening every kind of evil on refusal. He had declined the offers of Prussia with much circumspection, assigning his engagements with France, and he had adhered to the views of Austria. The conferences with her on the subject of renouncing the grand duchy of Warsaw were still continuing. She had now a fresh argument to adduce. France and Austria, she said, had come to an agreement. France had demanded the mediation of Austria, and Austria had consented. They would, there-

fore, act in accordance with the rules of Napoleon, and would relieve him from a serious difficulty, if they could assure him that Saxony relinquished her claim to the grand duchy of Warsaw. Peace would thus be rendered not only easy, but certain. Besides, it was necessary to save the substance, *i.e.* Saxony, at the sacrifice of the shadow, *i.e.* Poland, and relinquish a dream which was no longer possible. Overcome by these reasons, Frederick Augustus, who was conscious that conquests were not his vocation, and that by becoming associated with a conqueror just emerged from the inferno of revolutions he had formed an association as much above his genius as it was against his conscience, agreed to the renunciation required, and signed it on the 15th of April, three days after the declaration of the armed mediation made by Austria, impudently provoked by ourselves.

But this was not all that Austria desired of the King of Saxony. They knew that Napoleon would soon arrive at Mentz, then at Erfurt, to take the head of his armies, and that by a movement of his hand he could regain the poor king who had withdrawn into Bavaria, and annul his intelligence, memory, and sense of truth, by promising that he should be King of Poland. That fascinating and terrible enchanter was to pass too near Ratisbon to allow the feeble Frederick Augustus to be left there exposed to his formidable influence. They again urged him to repair to Prague. The heads of the coalition, they said, had entered Dresden, and there they prepared to govern the kingdom of Saxony, after the manner of Baron de Stein, nearly in the same manner that they had governed Old Prussia, by persuading the people that they were the masters of their own condition, and that they might surrender themselves to whomsoever they chose, when their princes deserted their common country. It was therefore necessary that he should hasten to Prague, a safe place, at a short distance from Dresden, from whence he could administer his kingdom as if present, and without incurring any danger either from the coalition or the French.

At the very moment when these things were being said, the King of Saxony had received the summons sent from Paris, and renewed by Marshal Ney, to deliver his fine cavalry to that marshal, who required them for the opening of the campaign. This was almost to demand the life of the excellent king. He was pre-eminently alive to the fear of the Cossacks, who alarmed those whom they came to aid more than those against whom they fought. Three thousand admirable horsemen and artillerymen, escorting a treasure with which they paid in ready money for the supplies of every day, formed a guard in the midst of whom the fugitive king might rest in peace. And, besides, the leaders of his troops had declared that they would no longer serve with the French. In these circumstances, Count Marcolini, an obsequious old man of the same temper as his master, possessed of more intelligence but less sense of honour, and who governed his master from habit, persuaded him that the only possible resource was the retreat to Prague. Almost at the same time, M. de Serra, the French minister, insisting on a reply in reference to the cavalry, Frederick Augustus, filled with alarm,

and full of regret at being placed in such difficulties by the chimera of his ancestors, suddenly determined to leave. He had with him an enlightened minister, M. de Senft, who had hitherto retained him in the French alliance, and had played at Dresden the same part as M. de Metternich at Vienna, M. de Hardenberg at Berlin, M. de Cetto at Munich. He was overcome like the other partisans of the French alliance, and gave way. Without any warning to the French minister, on the night between the 19th and 20th of April, the court of Saxony left for Prague, in a long series of carriages, surrounded by 3000 cavalry and artillery, who left Ratisbon sword in hand, with their matches kindled, in the fear of meeting the French, and took the road to Lintz in order to avoid them. At the last moment, M. de Serra received a letter for the Emperor, in which the good Frederick Augustus said that on the invitation of Austria, of whose perfect understanding with France he was convinced, he was repairing to Prague, but still remained the faithful ally of the great monarch who had loaded him with so many benefits.

When this news reached Vienna, the Emperor Francis, and his minister M. de Metternich, did not conceal their joy at possessing so valuable an instrument of their designs. At the same time, believing it no longer necessary to maintain the same reserve with respect to the auxiliary corps, he wrote to Prince Poniatowski that he must evacuate Cracow and return into the Austrian states, for hostilities were about to be renewed, and they did not wish to attract the Russians to Bohemia by fighting against them. They warned him, further, that during the march the arms of the Poles, Saxons, and French should be deposited in the wagons, to be afterwards restored to them. This advice reached Prince Poniatowski at the same time that he received orders from Paris to prepare to take the field, and to co-operate with the Austrian corps, which was also to receive instructions from Napoleon. Prince Poniatowski sent the whole to M. de Narbonne, in order to obtain from that ambassador a solution of the enigma, which he could not comprehend.

M. de Narbonne, on learning the sudden flight of the King of Saxony to Prague, the forced retreat of the Polish corps, the design of disarming that corps, and the defection, as it were, of the Austrian auxiliary corps, recognised in these combined facts the development of the designs of Austria, who, being more free since she had openly constituted herself the mediator, on one side attracted the King of Saxony to Prague in order to obtain his adhesion to her plan of pacification, and on the other recalled the Austrian troops in order to terminate her part as a belligerent power, and, finally, with the Polish corps had removed any remains of the government of the grand duchy which had been brought to the frontier of Galicia. In fact, since the evacuation of Warsaw, the ministers of the grand duchy had taken refuge with Prince Poniatowski at Cracow, where they presented the last semblance of the Government of Poland.

M. de Narbonne, who kept careful surveillance over the Austrian policy, hastened to M. de Metternich, to obtain some explanation of the singular events thus simultaneously occurring. He found M. de Metternich much per-

plexed at being called upon to answer so many questions, and almost vexed that the results he had desired had been so rapidly accomplished. Beginning with the King of Saxony, he assured M. de Narbonne that his sudden arrival at Prague had come upon himself and the Emperor like a thunderbolt. "Be it so," said M. de Narbonne; "but I believe you are the Franklin that can guide its course." The French ambassador did not dwell longer on a subject which could lead only to a series of contradictions, which was neither becoming nor politic, and he immediately passed on to the most important point, i.e. the proposal to recall the Polish corps into Bohemia and there to disarm them, which demanded a direct explanation, for there might occur at Cracow a conflict between Prince Poniatowski and Count Frimont, who was charged with the disarming, and even an open outbreak with Austria if the orders of Napoleon to the Austrian auxiliary corps were disobeyed. M. de Metternich, unwilling to acknowledge the secret agreement with the Russians, excused himself as well as he could, saying that the advice given to Prince Poniatowski was merely that of a friend, but was not compulsory; that, having faithfully fulfilled the duties of a companion-in-arms towards the Poles since the retreat which they had begun in common, they had given them warning that they should not be able to render them further aid; that the Russians were approaching in force; that he was unwilling to attract them to the Austrian territory by engaging anew, and thus acting inconsistently with the part of mediator, which Austria had assumed at the instigation of France; that they were, therefore, resolved to re-enter Galicia, where they hoped they would not be followed if they avoided every act of hostility, and that consequently they had offered to Prince Poniatowski the opportunity of retiring thither with the Austrians, to avoid being taken prisoner, which obliged him instantly to lay down his arms, for it was not the custom to traverse a friendly country under arms.

Such were the explanations of M. de Metternich, to which many answers might have been given, for if he had adopted a true and simple position by openly advising peace, and undertaking at our suggestion the office of mediator to effect it, it was necessary that he should assume an equally frank position in regard to the treaty of alliance. In fact, while asserting the insufficiency of some of the arrangements, he did not contest the principle of the alliance, and therefore the concurrence of forces remained obligatory, at least as far as concerned the Austrian auxiliary corps. There were, therefore, many ways of answering M. de Metternich, but it would have been much better to leave him in the idea that he could fulfil the two offices of mediator and ally in order to impose upon him the duties of the latter office as long as possible. Unfortunately, M. de Narbonne had not been sent with any such intention, and he persisted in embarrassing his antagonist. The treaty of alliance, he said, still existed; M. de Metternich agreed, and even took pains to maintain it. Indeed, this treaty was considered no longer applicable to the circumstances, but merely from the fact that the contribution of 80,000 men did not appear adequate to the gravity of the situation. This by no means

implied that even that aid should be refused. These 80,000 Austrians joined to the Poles might present a force of 45,000 men, which, placed on the left flank of the enemy, might inflict very sensible blows, or, at least, might paralyze by their presence 60,000 of their soldiers. Finally, Napoleon when leaving for the army had announced that he would soon give orders to the Austrian corps in virtue of the treaty of March 14, 1812. Were they about to disobey, and to declare that the treaty existed no longer, in the face of Europe, and to Napoleon himself? And had they no regard to military honour? Were they to retreat before a few thousand Russians, (for Sacken's corps did not include more than 20,000 men,) and, after having thus timidly withdrawn into their frontiers, were they to conceal themselves there and to disarm their own allies? Was this conduct worthy of Austria? Would these allies themselves consent to lay down their arms, especially when they included Frenchmen in their number? And, if they refused to lay them down, would they be disarmed by force, or delivered over to the Russians?

To these observations there could be no reply, as M. de Metternich had not as yet had the boldness to lay wholly aside the character of ally in declaring himself mediator. Accordingly, avoiding questions of a very embarrassing character, he confined himself to the more tenable ground of prudence. Of what consequence, said he, were a few thousand additional Austrians and Poles at Cracow to Napoleon, who was about to attack in front the combined powers who had imprudently come to meet him? For the vain satisfaction of compromising Austria (for in reality this only was designed) they would place her on a false position with regard to the belligerent powers, to whom she had offered her mediation, which would thus be rendered impossible, they would expose her to an outbreak of public opinion if she fired a gun against the coalition, and they might cause her to lose the helm of German affairs, which she already held with an anxious and trembling hand. If she now refused 80,000 men, it was only to offer 150,000 at a later period when they should have agreed upon conditions of peace, which depended wholly on France, and which she might render instantaneous. France should be reasonable, and not require Austria to fight against the Germans for the Poles. This was not a tenable position in the present state of opinion at Vienna, Dresden, and Berlin. They had considered the question of their honour, and if they had determined to withdraw it was because they were sure of meeting considerable forces. The Poles they offered to receive and to maintain simply from a desire to gratify France, for to admit them into Galicia was in the highest degree inconvenient, and it would be very dangerous to leave them there in the possession of their arms. Moreover, their sovereign, the King of Saxony, had consented to their being immediately disarmed. With respect to the French battalion, they readily understood their sensitiveness, justified by so many exploits: they would therefore respect the glory of Napoleon and of the French army in these few hundred men, and would sacrifice principles by allowing that battalion to remain armed in a neutral territory, for, in fact, they had, with the knowledge of

Napoleon, declared the neutrality of Bohemia in order to prevent the entry of the Russians.

By abandoning the ground of right for that of prudence, M. de Metternich became stronger, and it is only to be regretted that he could not also become franker, and that M. de Narbonne had no permission to moderate his demands, for in this case we should soon have arrived at a mediation equitable in itself and acceptable to all Europe. However this be, M. de Narbonne soon perceived that he should in vain hope to obtain from Austria an effectual concurrence with our understood conditions of peace, and that neutrality was all that we could expect from her, and that at the price of speedy and decisive victories. He communicated this to M. de Bassano, requesting new instructions for his present difficult position. Another fact communicated to him from Munich by our ambassador, M. Mercy d'Argenteau, disclosed all the efforts of Austria to gain over adherents to her system of armed mediation. She had endeavoured to treat Bavaria as she had treated Saxony, *i.e.* make her the ally of France if France would accept a German peace, an enemy if she continued to demand a peace opposed to the interest of Germany. Bavaria, eager for repose, and assailed by the cries of patriotic Germany, had listened to the proposals of Austria, and had almost admitted them, until the latter, with a regard to her own interests, had demanded back the line of the Inn, which occasioned a territorial sacrifice to Bavaria without any possible compensation. At the mere enunciation of this pretence, Bavaria had resumed her fidelity to France, and many instances, apparently of inadvertence but really of design on her part, had informed our legation that Austria had attempted but without success to seduce one of our German allies. These details had been sent to M. de Narbonne at Vienna, and to M. de Bassano at Paris. They fully confirmed the ideas which were naturally suggested by the conduct and language of the Austrian court, that she sought to form an intermediate party in order to obtain a peace agreeable to herself and to Germany, but not to Napoleon. Alas! why did we not accept such a peace, which retrenched nothing of our real greatness, but only of that chimerical and impossible greatness which Napoleon persisted in defending?

These numerous and important facts of European policy had taken place between the 1st and 20th of April, during which period Napoleon had made preparations for leaving Paris, had left it, arrived at Mentz, and given his first orders. Having reached Mentz on the 17th of April, he had immediately set to work, and, while he directed his keen eye and powerful hand towards every thing, he had arrested on their journey the diplomatic couriers, and had learned—not completely, for they did not all pass through Mentz, but sufficiently—that which we have related, and had formed at least an approximative idea of them. What chiefly surprised him was the sudden departure of the King of Saxony for Prussia at the very time when the French army was coming to relieve his states, and the complicated policy of Austria in regard to that prince; and he had even supposed, from not being acquainted with all the circumstances, that Austria wished to induce

the unhappy Frederick Augustus to commit errors in order to destroy him in the affection of France, and to deprive that power of every motive to preserve to him the grand duchy of Warsaw. The retreat of the Austrian corps seemed to him more intelligible, and he perceived that Austria, without repudiating the alliance, refused the consequent obligations. But at the disarming of the Poles he was indignant, and he had forwarded a courier to Cracow to enjoin Prince Poniatowski to refuse to disarm on any consideration, to return into Poland, if necessary, there, at all hazards, to excite a war of parties, and rather to die than to lay down his arms, adding, with characteristic vehemence and grandeur of language, "The Emperor does not hold himself bound to spare men who have dishonoured themselves." He also renewed the intimation to Count Frimont to hold himself ready to obey his first orders.

Employing M. de Caulaincourt as his minister of foreign affairs in the absence of M. de Bassano, he wrote to M. de Narbonne that he did not understand the conduct of Austria, or rather that he was beginning to understand it too well; that he had placed too much confidence in her, but that she was now playing a double game, and studying at once himself and his enemies; that the policy of that power in regard to Saxony was singularly obscure: that he must endeavour to discover the secret, and to find out whether the fortress of Torgau, to which the Saxon infantry had retired, would be faithful or not to France, which it was important to know at a time when they were preparing operations on the Elbe; that he must also make Austria give some explanation of what might be expected from the auxiliary corps, compel her to say whether it would obey or not, and, especially, persuade her that she must renounce all idea of disarming the Polish troops. In a word, Napoleon enjoined M. de Narbonne to penetrate all the mysteries which surrounded him, but without display, and with due regard to the father of the Empress, and in such a manner as to allow time to himself to cut the Gordian knot at Dresden, whither he was about to proceed, which they had not been able to untie at Vienna. At the same time he wrote to M. de Bassano, who had remained at Paris, to communicate to Prince Schwarzenberg the news he had received, and to ask some explanation of the strange contradiction between his words and the events which had transpired at Cracow. Prince Schwarzenberg had said to Napoleon that his orders would be obeyed by Count Frimont; and yet every thing now implied the contrary.

These circumstances, however, occasioned Napoleon little uneasiness. He hoped to put a speedy termination to these perplexities and artifices, by pouring into Saxony, with 200,000 men, by all the avenues of Thuringia. As soon as he arrived at Mentz he employed his time with that unequalled intelligence and activity which made him superior to all others in administrative power. Though his orders were of the wisest character, and he secured obedience better than any other man, and though he had not lost a moment, yet the results actually accomplished were far from perfect. Notwithstanding the exact order to forward from the depôts only detachments well organized,



well clothed, well armed, and notwithstanding the presence at Mentz and the indefatigable seal of the old Duke of Valmy, many corps were still deficient in matériel and still more so in officers. But the presence and labour of Napoleon sufficed to repair all in ten or fifteen days.

He began with the question of money, of which there was a total want. The Treasury, in fact, interpreting too literally the order to centralize the chests at Magdeburg, in order to place them in safety from the accidents of war, had not left a chest at Mentz,—which had arrested many administrative operations. Napoleon remedied the error. He brought with him his private chest, which was unknown to all his co-operators, and from that he drew supplies for unforeseen consequences so constantly occurring in war. Officers of the line or the Guard, returned from Russia after having lost every thing, were still waiting to be indemnified,—which was immediately done. Many detachments arrived, some with a single garment, others with their clothing entire but their arms deficient. The articles wanting were either not yet made, or were on the road, following the corps. The provisional regiments especially, which, as we have said, had been composed of scattered battalions, were the worst provided, from the want of a common administration. They had neither flags nor bands, and often not even the most indispensable articles of equipment. In these regiments officers were deficient,—especially in the regiments of cohorts, which were almost wholly commanded by those who had been on half-pay. The artillery-guns had arrived, but the harness and other necessary articles had not yet followed. There was a deficiency of draught-horses. The cavalry, as might easily be anticipated, was the most deficient of all. Independently of that which General Bourcier was reorganizing in Hanover with horses taken in Germany and men returning from Russia, the Duke of Placenza was collecting in all the dépôts of the Rhine whatever was ready for service, and was to bring them to the grand army in provisional regiments: here, again, the supply of horses constituted the great difficulty.

Napoleon provided for every thing by his great activity and his ready money. Officers were sent from all sides to accelerate the transport of that which had remained on the roads, demanding and paying for extra wagons. The countries on the banks of the Rhine and Main being rich in every thing, Napoleon brought together for hire workmen and materials, and also ordered the regiments to supply themselves with what they required from funds which he gave them, which they did with eagerness and efficiency. Horses were abundant in that country, and they went to purchase them as far as to Stuttgart, where many were found both for the saddle and for draught. Napoleon employed immediately the officers whom he had called in great numbers from Spain, and who were arriving by the public conveyances. When this source was insufficient, he remarked, during the reviews which he held in person, those who were capable of filling the vacant grades, and delivered them commissions without waiting for the formalities of the War-Office, and caused them to take their place in the regiments on the same day. He had said that he would no longer

be the Emperor Napoleon, but General Bonaparte; and he kept his word. He had reduced his own equipage to the smallest possible, and required all the generals to follow his example. "We must be light," he said, "for we shall have many enemies to engage, and we can only do so by multiplying ourselves,—that is to say, by marching quickly."

Thus animating every thing by his presence, as soon as a regiment was fully supplied both in regard to matériel and personnel, he sent it forward to join Marshal Ney at Würzburg, or Marshal Marmont at Hanau, or the Imperial Guard at Frankfurt. The Guard in particular required the greatest care, for the sound part was on the Elbe with Prince Eugene, the shattered remains requiring reorganization were dispersed between Fulde and Frankfurt, and all the new levies covered the roads from Paris to Mentz. Each horse-soldier brought, besides the horse he rode, two others for those who had returned from Russia dismounted. Napoleon occupied himself with the combination of these different elements, and by his assiduity the organization of these various corps was effected with singular rapidity. General Lauriston's corps, exclusively composed of cohorts, had already joined Prince Eugene on the Elbe. Those of Marshals Ney and Marmont were ready to take the field; General Bertrand's debouched upon Augsburg, and there found the artillery which Napoleon had sent, to prevent the necessity of dragging it across the Alps, money to purchase 2000 draught-horses in Bavaria, and 8000 recruits intended first for the cadres returned from Russia but finally for the corps arriving from Italy. Every thing was accomplished so quickly, even to the training of the men, that the troops were halted every day on the march to repeat the manœuvres specially recommended by Napoleon, consisting in forming battalions in square, deploying in line, and then reforming in column of attack.

This is, certainly, not the way in which good armies are created. But when, in consequence of an unrestrained policy, one is condemned to do every thing in haste, it is at least fortunate to be able to exercise such amazing rapidity.

Besides, it must be acknowledged that the peculiar genius of the French nation rendered them wonderfully open to the errors of Napoleon, and almost tempted him to commit them. That prompt, intelligent, and heroic nation, which from its earliest history has always been at war with Europe, which for twenty-two years of revolution, from 1792 to 1815, had not enjoyed one day of rest, while the nations to which she was successively opposed had by turns some period of repose, is perhaps the only one in the world whose sons could be formed into soldiers in the space of three months. In 1818 the affair was more easy than at any other time. Napoleon possessed subalterns, officers, and consummate generals, who had exercised the art of war for twenty years, who had unbounded confidence in themselves and in him, who, while owing him a grudge for the disaster of Moscow, were nevertheless anxious to repair that disaster, and who required no long time to inspire the youth of France with the sentiments which animated themselves. With such elements, wonders might

yet be performed. One thing only remained to be wished,—viz., that all this generous blood should not be spilled merely to add new éclat to glory already too dazzling, and that it might be employed to save our greatness,—not that foolish greatness which prided itself on having prefects at Rome and Hamburg, but that reasonable greatness which consisted in our finally establishing ourselves within the limits which nature traced, and which our revolution of 1789, uniting to the enunciation of immortal principles the completion of our national territory, had gloriously acquired! Let us follow these sad events, and see the trials to which we were still reserved.

Napoleon had calculated that by leaving about 30,000 men at Dantzic and Thorn, 30,000 at Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, and Spandau, making 60,000 men for the fortresses of the Vistula and Oder, Prince Eugene, reinforced by the corps of General Lauriston, which had been sent to him in March, might combine 80,000 combatants on the Elbe. He hoped to debouche from Thuringia with 150,000, to collect in passing 50,000 from Italy, and thus with 200,000 men to join the 80,000 under Prince Eugene. This number was more than sufficient to overthrow the 150,000 soldiers whom the Russians and Prussians hoped to have at their disposal at the opening of the campaign. Then came the three armies of reserve, one in the course of formation in Italy, the other at Mentz, the third in Westphalia, which should be ready in June or July. These afforded means to resist not only the enemies which they would have to engage in the spring, but also the future enemies which might be brought against us some months later by the advance of the season or the policy of Austria.

As always happens, there was some mistake, not exactly in the number of troops, but in the time of their conjunction, which would deprive Napoleon of part of the forces on which he trusted for the commencement of hostilities. Thus, instead of having 280,000 men at the end of April or the beginning of May, he was only to have 200,000 actually under command; but these were present at their colours, and they were enough to repel promptly to the Elbe, the Oder, and even the Vistula, the enemies who had rashly ventured to approach us so nearly. The state and distribution of his forces at the end of April, when he was about to commence operations, were as follows.

After leaving 27,000 or 28,000 men at Dantzic, and 32,000 or 33,000 in the other strongholds on the Vistula and Oder, making the 60,000 of whom we previously spoke, Prince Eugene had nearly 80,000 active troops, but not sufficiently disposable to be brought all at once to meet Napoleon when he should enter Saxony. Thus, Prince Poniatowski, driven back to the frontiers of Bohemia, was separated from Prince Eugene by the whole forces of the coalition, which had passed the Elbe at different points. Of all the Poles at our service, they had been able to collect only the Dombrowski division, of about 2000 foot and 1500 horse, at present being reorganized at Cassel. Of Reynier's corps, since the separation of the Saxons, there remained the French division of Durutte, which had consisted of 16,000 men, and which still contained 4000

after the campaign of 1812, made not indeed in Russia but in Poland. The 28,000 men of the Lagrange division and of Grenier's corps were reduced to 24,000 by daily encounters with the Prussians and Russians. These three divisions, (for Grenier's corps had been divided into two,) under the superior orders of Marshal Macdonald, and directly assigned to Generals Fressinet, Gerard, and Charpentier, presented an excellent troop after a winter spent in presence of the enemy. Lastly, General Lauriston's corps, which ought to have contained 40,000 combatants, contained no more than 32,000, in consequence of disease and of the delay of several cohorts; but these were all grown men, commanded by generals of division of the highest merits, as General Maison, for example. From this corps it had been necessary to detach Puthol's division, in order to protect the Lower Elbe until Marshals Davout and Victor, with their reorganized battalions, should respectively reoccupy Hamburg and Magdeburg. Among these reorganized battalions there were eight, those of Marshal Victor, which had remained hitherto at the disposal of Prince Eugene, and which were guarding Dessau, a very important point, since it was placed at a little distance from the confluence of the Elbe and Saale, and it was behind these two streams that Prince Eugene and Napoleon were to effect their union. This prince had, lastly, the cavalry remounted in Hanover, which was slowly arriving, and 3000 men of the Imperial Guard, which he was soon to restore to the grand army. In consequence of these detachments, delays, and reductions, Prince Eugene could not bring more than about 62,000 men to Napoleon instead of 80,000, whom he would have had at his disposal if he had not been separated from Prince Poniatowski and obliged to send Puthol's division to the Lower Elbe, and if his corps had not suffered some unavoidable losses during the winter. But these 62,000 men were all actually under arms, in high spirits, and well commanded. They were scattered over the Elbe from Wittenberg to Magdeburg, ready to join Napoleon behind the Saale, whom they expected with impatience. They had recently given to the Prussians and Russians before Magdeburg a reception which had rendered them very circumspect.

On the Main, Napoleon hoped to combine 150,000 men, and 200,000 after his junction with General Bertrand. He had supposed that Marshal Ney might have 60,000 men, Marshal Marmont 40,000, General Bertrand 50,000, and that the Guard would contain not less than 40,000. Adding to these forces about 10,000 men belonging to the small German princes, he ought to muster 200,000 combatants at the time of his entering Saxony. The difference between hope and reality is evinced by the following deductions.

Marshal Ney, instead of 60,000 men, had only 48,000, because the Wurtembergians and Bavarians were wanting, and because he had not been able to secure the Saxon cavalry. He possessed four fine divisions of French infantry, formed of the cohorts and provisional regiments, which were in point of training two months in advance of the rest and for more than a month and a half had been exercised under his own eyes, in the neighbourhood of

Wurzburg. They comprised about 42,000 foot-soldiers actually present at their colours, and they expected 7000 or 8000 more. To these Napoleon had joined those of the allies who had exhibited the most ready obedience, being the nearest to us, the Hessians, Badians, and Frankfortians, to the number of 4000 men under General Marchand; 1500 artillerymen, and 500 hussars, who composed all his cavalry, raised his corps to 48,000 men, as we have just said.

The second corps of the Rhine, which was being organized at Hanau, under Marshal Marmont, did not amount to 40,000 men, as had been supposed, but to 32,000, many detachments being still delayed. The third of the divisions of this corps, that of General Teste, having too many men in the rear, was obliged to wait for them before joining the grand army. When complete, it was to enter Hesse to protect the threatened royalty of Jerome, to collect, in passing, the Dombrowski division, and then to join upon the Elbe the corps of which it was to form a part. The three remaining divisions mustered 26,000 or 27,000 men, including the fine corps of marine infantry, and at their head some illustrious generals of division, such as Compans and Bonnet. The latter was he who had been distinguished in Spain, which proves that Napoleon withdrew from that country the best it contained in order to oppose the new coalition.

Finally, the Imperial Guard, which should muster more than 40,000 men, was far from being ready, notwithstanding the activity employed by Napoleon in reorganizing it. There were about 3000 soldiers of the Old Guard, 8000 or 9000 of the Young, all in condition to leave, besides 3000 horsemen and sufficient artillerymen to serve one hundred guns. These 15,000 or 16,000 men were to combine with themselves the 3000 who were with Prince Eugene, and they left behind them 25,000 men on the road, who were soon to form at Mentz, Hanau, and Wurzburg, when room should have been made for them.

General Bertrand had been the most accurate in his calculations of the composition of his *corps d'armée*. He was bringing four divisions of infantry, of whom three were French and one was Italian, comprising 36,000 or 37,000 foot and 2500 artillery. Instead of 6000 horsemen whom he had hoped to have, he could muster only 2500, the 19th chasseurs, and the two regiments of hussars forming at Turin and Florence, not being ready in time. Adding to this effective 3000 conscripts from Augsburg, he had nearly 45,000 men, in excellent temper, and better trained than the rest of the new army, because they were composed of the old cadres and of conscripts who had been under training for a year or two. General Bertrand having never exercised command, Napoleon had given him, as an assistant, General Morand, the former companion of Friant and Gudin in the 1st corps, and one of the best generals in the army. Napoleon could not leave him four divisions, the greater part of the marshals having only three. He gave him Morand's division, and Peyri's Italian division, which were found in advance of the rest, and assigned to Marshal Oudinot the Pactod and Lorencez divisions, which had remained in the rear. The Wurtembergians and Bavarians,

when they could be brought, would furnish a third division, the former for General Bertrand, the latter for Marshal Oudinot.

While making allowance for these reductions, Napoleon might, with the 48,000 men under Marshal Ney, the 27,000 under Marshal Marmont, the 16,000 of the Guard, and the 45,000 of General Bertrand, enter Saxony at the head of 135,000 men and three hundred and fifty guns, join Prince Eugene, who awaited him upon the Elbe with 62,000 men and one hundred guns, and thus oppose the enemy with 200,000 combatants actually at their colours. These were soon to be increased by 50,000 more, and followed by three armies of reserve, which would raise the sum total of our forces to at least 400,000 men. This was a prodigious result of three months' labour on the part of Napoleon in bringing together these scattered and almost ruined elements: it was, indeed, scarcely credible. Accordingly, the Germans, whose hatred expressed itself in ridicule as well as in rage, published caricatures representing detachments of soldiers who, leaving Mentz by one gate, re-entered it by another, in order to feign an incessant series of troops crossing the Rhine. But when they now saw the French corps defile in long columns from Mentz to Frankfort, from Frankfort to Fulde or Wurzburg, there was no room left for doubt, but much for fear. It is true that the artillery-teams consisted of young horses, many of them injured, on account of their age, and the inexperience of the drivers; that there was scarcely any cavalry; that Marshals Ney and Marmont had each 500 horse to clear their way, and General Bertrand 2500; it is true that, to form a reserve of heavy cavalry capable of charging in line, it was necessary to content themselves with 3000 chasseurs and horse-grenadiers of the Guard, with 4000 or 5000 hussars and cuirassiers brought from Hanover by General Latour-Maubourg, and almost all mounted on horses too young for service; but the real thing to be considered was the spirit with which they were animated. These generals and officers from Spain and Italy, and some escaped by miracle from Russia, their momentary irritation being appeased, were indignant to see not the glory but the power of France in jeopardy, and were resolved to re-establish it by extraordinary efforts, and, while blaming the policy which demanded such desperate efforts, they had communicated their spirit to their young soldiers to such a degree that they, though just torn from their families, displayed singular ardour, and loudly shouted "Vive l'Empereur" whenever they beheld Napoleon, the author of sanguinary wars in which they were all to perish, the author detested by their families, and recently detested by themselves, and every day loudly censured in the bivouacs and among the staffs,—a noble and affecting inconsistency of patriotism reduced to despair!

Napoleon, having finished his preparations, left Mentz on the 28th of April, visited in succession Wurzburg and Fulde, and then repaired to Weimar, where he had been preceded by Marshal Ney with his brave young divisions. His plan, conceived with his usual accuracy and rapidity, consisted in allowing the coalition, already across the Elbe, to advance as far

as they chose, even to the Upper Saale, then to direct himself against Erfurt and Weimar, to defile behind the Saale, as behind a curtain, (the expression used in his despatches,) to join Prince Eugene towards Naumburg or Weissenfels, then to cross that river *en masse*, and with 200,000 men to take the enemy in flank in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. If favoured by fortune, he might derive the most important results from this plan. After having conquered his adversaries in a great battle, and taken a great number of them, he might throw back the rest beyond the Elbe and the Oder, relieve his garrisons on the Oder, return victorious to Berlin, put himself in communication with Dantzic, and show that the lion which was supposed to be subdued was more terrible than ever.

With these views, he had sent Marshal Ney towards Erfurt, Weimar, and Naumburg, to occupy all the passages of the Saale before the enemy should have time to secure them. He had even enjoined him to occupy the well-known passages of Saalfeld, Jena, and Dornburg; not to cross the Saale, but merely to guard it; and he had ordered General Bertrand to join him, followed at a short distance by Marshal Oudinot, through Bamberg and Coburg to Saalfeld. The Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, who had become less wavering, the former since the abortive intrigues of Austria, the latter since the prodigious development of our forces, had at length set in motion 6000 or 7000 men each, so as to furnish two more divisions, one for General Bertrand, the other for Marshal Oudinot,—which would bring our united forces to about 212,000 men. At the same time Napoleon ordered Prince Eugene to advance *en masse* in the direction of Dessau, sufficiently near the point of junction of the Saale and Elbe, and to ascend the Saale as far as Weissenfels. He was himself to follow Marshal Ney and General Bertrand, with the Guard and the corps of Marshal Marmont. On the 26th he was at Erfurt, on the 28th at Eckartsberg, near the famous field of Auerstadt. He had everywhere ordered immense supplies, at Wurzburg, which belonged to the brother of the Emperor Francis, at Erfurt, which belonged to France, at Weimar and Naumburg, which belonged to Saxony. By means of money he had overcome the German patriotism, a little less ardent in these parts than elsewhere. He could therefore hope that his soldiers might be supported without being guilty of great irregularities. His delicate operation at this moment was the double movement along the Saale, which he was to descend, while Prince Eugene should ascend it, the result of which should be to bring together into one body the 212,000 men at his disposal. But the enemy, though very near him, were neither sufficiently informed nor sufficiently alert to conjecture and defeat his manœuvre. They were, however, very near, and by a single step they might have interrupted and baffled him.

Hitherto they had done their best to improve the time, but had not succeeded so well as Napoleon. The Russian army, as we have seen, had suffered almost as much as ourselves during the retreat from Moscow, and mustered no more than 100,000 men, whom they had scarcely time to recruit, and who were scattered from Cracow

to Dantzic. About 20,000 Russians under Generals Sacken and Doctoroff were opposed to the Poles and Austrians around Cracow: 20,000 remained before Thorn and Dantzic; 8000 or 9000 were on the Lower Elbe towards Hamburg and Lubeck under Tettenborn and Czernicheff; 10,000 had followed Wittgenstein beyond Berlin, and with the Prussian corps of D'York were keeping guard at Magdeburg; 12,000, the greater part cavalry, had passed the Elbe at Dresden under Wintzingerode; and, lastly, 30,000, composing the principal body, and consisting of the Guard, the grenadiers, and the remains of Kutusoff's army, had remained with head-quarters on the Oder.

The Prussians had reformed their army with a degree of promptitude involving an organization secretly prearranged. Their treaties with Napoleon obliged them to have no more than 42,000 men under arms, of whom they had given us 20,000 for the last campaign, and of these more than a third had fallen. But they had kept up numerous cadres, and left in the town and country parts fully-trained soldiers on leave, who awaited only the signal to join their colours. They had been able from this source, and from the voluntary levies of the Prussian youth, to muster 120,000 men, of whom 60,000 were active well-trained troops, about 40,000 were troops in training, intended to join the former, and about 20,000 in the fortresses. They hoped to raise this armament to 150,000 men, of whom 100,000 should be actually in line and should speedily receive English subsidies. The youth from the schools and from mercantile establishments filled the battalions of the *chasseurs à pied* attached to the regiments of infantry; the youth of noble and wealthy families joined the *chasseurs à cheval*, attached to each cavalry-regiment.

At the present moment, deducting the forces necessary to be left on their rear, or employed in the blockade of fortresses, or sent on distant excursions towards the extremity of their lines, the coalition could present on the field, on the right, the Prussian corps of D'York, which since their defection had never left the Russian corps of Wittgenstein, combined with which they formed a body of 30,000 men; in their centre the corps of Wintzingerode of 12,000 or 15,000 light cavalry and infantry, marching in the van; in the second line, and also towards their centre, Blücher with 26,000 Prussians, Kutusoff with 30,000 Russians; and on their left, but out of reach, 10,000 or 12,000 men under General Sacken; i.e. a total of 110,000 or 112,000 fighting-men. This was not much to warrant such bold, presumptuous, and lofty promises scattered through Europe to rouse her against us.

They had counted on one source of aid which they had not yet received,—viz., that of Prince Bernadotte. In the interview at Abo, the future King of Sweden had agreed with Alexander to aid the efforts of the coalition with a corps of 30,000 Swedes, to whom should be added 15,000 or 20,000 Russians under his command. The English had granted a subsidy of twenty-five millions of francs to facilitate the formation of this army, the reward for war with France being, as we have seen, the kingdom of Norway. The English, in order to bind Prince Bernadotte by an infernal bargain, as it were,

wished to add to Norway Guadaloupe, one of the spoils of France. Yet he was in no hurry to fulfil his engagements, and was principally anxious to send his troops into Norway in order to seize the promised reward of his defection. They sought to dissuade him from this step, chiefly from regard to Denmark, whom they hoped to induce to join the coalition, by offering him compensation either in Pomerania or the Hanse territories. To these remonstrances the Prince-Royal of Sweden paid little regard, and continued to confine his attention to Norway. The coalition, therefore, entertained very natural distrust towards him, for at this very moment numerous successive emissaries affirmed in Paris that the former Marshal Bernadotte had not yet taken his part, and that by means of certain advantages it was still possible to regain him to France.

Deprived of this aid, and of that of Austria, who had not yet joined them, because she wished first to exhaust every chance of a pacific solution, and because, also, she was not ready, the coalition had resolved to receive with 112,000 men the shock of Napoleon, and, what was still better, to run to meet him. At first they had doubted, or seemed to doubt, the extent of his forces, and when it was no longer possible to question it they had denied their quality, asserting that they consisted of children led by old men, and that the excellent soldiers of Russia and Prussia, animated by the most ardent patriotism, need not be alarmed at their number. Besides, they were on level ground, and these young soldiers would never resist the shock of the finest and most numerous cavalry in Europe. After so much boasting, to recross the Elbe at the approach of Napoleon would have been difficult and even dangerous. They would thus have greatly discouraged the minds of men in Germany, after having excited them to the highest degree, and, by removing to a distance, would have surrendered Austria to Napoleon. It was therefore necessary to fight where they were, and yet, in their impatience to advance, so as to emancipate other parts of Germany, they had crossed the Elbe on the left, i.e. at Dresden, being unable to cross it on the right on account of Magdeburg, and they had thus become entangled in a snare. They were, in fact, between Prince Eugene on one side, and the mountains of Bohemia on the other, and Napoleon in front, thus exposed to a powerful attack in front and a mortal blow in flank. The prudent Kutusoff, who since his triumphs was regarded as an oracle, not much liking the Germans and their patriotic demonstrations, persisted in saying that they must be satisfied with what they had done, keep the grand duchy of Warsaw, conclude a peace with France at that price, and return home. Alexander, arrested in his career as the liberator of Germany, which then fascinated him as much as he had been fascinated after Tilsit by the anticipated conquest of Constantinople, was singularly annoyed by this opposition, which he dared not neglect so far as to make a further advance. Accordingly, while Wintzingerode, marching in company with the eager Blucher, had crossed the Elbe at the beginning of April, the Russian corps had remained in the rear, and had entered Dresden only on the 26th, the very day that

Napoleon arrived at Erfurt. But suddenly Kutusoff had died at Bunslau, exhausted by the last campaign, in the midst, as it were, of his triumph. From that moment, prudential considerations lost their only efficient advocate, and Alexander, surrounded by German enthusiasts, could only think of most promptly assuming the offensive. To give battle immediately, no matter when or how, was no longer a question, provided it was in the plains of Saxony, where the cavalry would have so many advantages against the French, who had merely a young infantry and no cavalry.

They therefore continued to advance during the 27th, 28th, and 29th of April, between Prince Eugene, who was at the confluence of the Saale and Elbe, and Napoleon, who was coming from the forest of Thuringia. There was certainly one method of avoiding the danger of this position, which was to march with all haste to Leipsic, Lutzen, Weissenfels, and Naumburg with the 100,000 men at their disposal, (deducting Sacken's corps left in Poland,) to cut the line of the Saale, and to interpose between Napoleon and Prince Eugene and thus prevent their junction. This operation was naturally indicated and very practicable, for ever since the 28th they were between the Pleiss and the Elster at the level of Leipsic. But a commander was necessary, and, Kutusoff being dead, Alexander was the only military authority left, and he gave ear to every opinion without knowing which to adopt, and thus they advanced with the mingled fear and desire of meeting Napoleon. It was agreed that, from the importance of their part, the Russians should have the command, and among them they sought in vain for one on whom it might devolve. Tormazoff was the oldest of their generals, but he was also the least capable. Wittgenstein, who had obtained singular renown for having defended the Dwina against the French when they had no desire to cross it, was in great favour, and received the order to command whenever they should be before the enemy. But his exaggerated success was not to be ascribed to himself: it was due to the chief of his staff, General Diebitch, an enterprising officer, full of intelligence and of military talent, who gave his opinion but did not possess the faculty of securing its adoption. The command could, therefore, be neither prompt, nor sure, nor imperative, and in the mean while they urged forward, to a level with Leipsic, Wittgenstein and D'York on the right in the direction of Halle, Wintzingerode in front to Lutzen, Blucher and the main Russian army in the centre, between Rotha and Borna, Miloradovitch to the left, on the road to Chemnitz, which passes along the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, to guard themselves on that side, in case Napoleon should chance to present himself there. They marched, well aware that he was advancing, but ignorant of one thing which might have been easily conjectured,—viz., that, instead of keeping by the mountains of Bohemia on leaving the forest of Thuringia, he would take the opposite direction and descend the Saale so as to join the viceroy.

Napoleon, who knew his adversaries, was pretty sure that they would not do what was necessary to prevent his junction with Prince Eugene; and yet he neglected nothing to in-

sure the success of his movement, as if he were in presence of the most prudent and active enemy. Having arrived, as we have said, at Eckartsberg on the 28th of April, he had urged forward along the Saale, so as successively to cut off all the avenues to it, Marshal Ney, General Bertrand, and Marshal Oudinot. At the same time he had brought near to himself, by a contrary movement, Prince Eugene, whom he had brought up the Saale, by Halle and Merseburg. He followed Ney with the Guard and Marmont. In order to effect the contemplated junction, it only remained on the 28th to occupy the space between Merseburg and Naumburg, by going to meet Prince Eugene at Weissenfels, which is between the two. Napoleon, in order to render infallible the success of his manœuvre, had not been contented with causing Ney and Eugene to advance each towards the other, in order to make them meet at Weissenfels: he had detached from Marmont's corps the Compans division, the best-commanded and the most numerous of the corps, and had taken it to the left towards Freyburg, in order that by doubling the heads of column under Ney and Eugene it might form a species of link between them. These movements were ordered from Eckartsberg on the evening of the 28th, to be executed the following day. Ney was to descend the Saale from Naumburg to Weissenfels with his two first divisions, to cross that river on a level with Weissenfels, to take possession of that city, whilst his other divisions should follow him and Bertrand, and Oudinot should occupy the debouches left by himself at Jena, Dornburg, and Naumburg. Prince Eugene, on his side, was to re-ascend the Saale, Lauriston's corps to the level of Halle, Macdonald's to that of Merseburg and somewhat higher, in order to join Ney. These various instructions were drawn out with admirable precision and foresight. And Napoleon, not supposing that the enemy was so near with the mass of his forces, remained himself at Eckartsberg, to keep in order the rear of his column.

On the 29th, Marshal Ney descended the Saale, and crossed it a little above Weissenfels, on a bridge which they had thrown over it without difficulty, and advanced into the immense plains which extend on the other side of the river. In the midst of these plains is Lutzen, rendered famous by Gustavus Adolphus, and subsequently still more so by Napoleon.

Agreeably to the instructions of Napoleon, Marshal Ney was crossing the plain of Weissenfels, with the Souham division, formed in several squares. Advanced posts of cavalry had clearly revealed to him the approach of numerous squadrons of Wintzingerode. That German general, who commanded the Russian advance-guard, had under his orders the infantry of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, and a superb cavalry of 8000 or 9000 men. He had that very day passed Weissenfels, to get news of the French on the Saale. This he soon learned by the appearance of Ney.

Our conscripts, who now saw the enemy for the first time, being under the command of officers who had spent their lives upon the field, and of a marshal whose attitude alone inspired confidence, advanced with the joy of a youthful and exuberant courage. They had to cross a

considerable undulation of surface, and they perceived in the distance numerous squadrons, supported by light infantry and horse-artillery. They received the first balls without shrinking. Some chosen tirailleurs crossed the undulating ground and drove back those of the enemy. They then followed them, descended into the lower ground, ascended the other side, and debouched in several squares in the plain, and poured on the enemy a brisk fire of artillery. After a few volleys, the Landskoy division of cavalry charged our squares. The moment was critical. The aged and intrepid Souham, and the heroic Ney, and the generals of brigade, each placed himself in a square to support the infantry unused to such a spectacle. At the given signal, a well-executed fire of musketry arrested the enemy's cavalry. Our young soldiers, wondering that the matter was so easily got over, awaited a new assault, which they received even better than the former, and strewed the ground with Landskoy's horsemen. Then Ney, breaking the squares and forming them into columns, drove the enemy before him. He congratulated his brave conscripts, who filled the air with shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" From this moment the highest hopes might be entertained of their steadiness. They entered Weissenfels on the heels of the Russians, drove them out, and at the close of the day were masters of that decisive point. Ney, who from his youth had never fought with such inexperienced soldiers, instantly wrote to Napoleon to express his joy and confidence. "These children," said he, "are heroes: I shall accomplish with them whatever you please."

At the same moment Macdonald, forming the head of Prince Eugene's column, had entered Merseburg, and had combined his advanced posts with those of Marshal Ney. General Lauriston, who followed him, had found the bridges of Halle strongly occupied by the Prussian General Kleist. These bridges, as it may be remembered on recalling one of the heroic acts of the unfortunate General Dupont in the campaign of 1806, cross several of the branches of the Saale, and are impregnable if in the hands of steady troops, such as were the Prussians at the present time, who were inflamed by a noble patriotism and a kind of national desperation. They occupied the bridges of Halle with the infantry and a numerous artillery. General Lauriston did not insist upon forcing a position which they would turn on the following day.

Napoleon, on reading the reports of his generals, shared their joy, and wrote to Munich, Stuttgart, Carlsruhe, and Paris, to relate the prowess of his young soldiers. He left Eckartsberg on the following day, the 30th, to spend the night at Weissenfels.

His junction with Eugene having been effected on the Lower Saale, he naturally thought of deriving from it the advantage he had promised himself, that of debouching en masse into the famous plains of Lutzen, of rushing in a strong column upon Leipsic, of passing the Elster at Leipsic, and then, wheeling about with the left forward, to march against the enemy and drive them against the mountains of Bohemia. Not having sufficient cavalry to reconnoitre, (for that which he had remained closely attached to the infantry, from the fear of being crushed.)

he could very imperfectly detect the designs of the enemy. But he had learned by several reconnoissances and reports, interpreted with his usual penetration, that the Russians and Prussians were accumulating on his right, and were consequently between him and the mountains, on the Upper Elster, the stream which we should meet after crossing the Saale. His plan, therefore, still promised the greatest chance of success, and he resolved to advance from Weissenfels to Lutzen, thence to advance upon Leipsic in close column, and then pass the Elster. But, not being able to march on one road with nearly 200,000 men, he sent Marshal Ney, the Guard, and Marshal Marmont, by the highroad from Lutzen to Leipsic. To flank this, the principal column, on the right, he ordered General Bertrand and Marshal Oudinot, who had remained on the Upper Saale, to debouche from Naumburg upon Stossen. To flank it on the left, he ordered Prince Eugene to debouche from Merseburg, and to march with all his forces to Leipsic by the road of Mackranstaedt. These different corps, thus leaving the Saale at three or four leagues' distance from each other, all converged towards the common point of Leipsic. After these arrangements were made for the following day, May 1, he occupied himself, as he frequently did during this march, with the organization of his troops, and in particular with that of the Imperial Guard. Prince Eugene brought him four battalions of the Old Guard and two of the Young, besides a certain portion of the artillery and cavalry belonging to that select corps. This was all that could be collected from the wrecks of Moscow. Prince Eugene had taken care to secure them repose and fresh equipment. Napoleon added the four battalions to two which he had with himself, thus making six. He united the two of the Young Guard to the fourteen of Dumoutier's division, which was thus raised to sixteen. He dealt in the same way with the other arms, and thus raised the Guard to 17,000 or 18,000 men, without including the other divisions which were just completing their organization in the rear. He left to Prince Eugene the 4000 remounted horsemen whom General Latour-Maubourg had gone to collect in Hanover, and who formed with the cavalry of the Guard the only troop of horse capable of attacking in line.

On the following day, May 1, he was early on horseback, having at his side the Marshals Ney, Mortier, Bessières, Soult, Duroc, and M. de Caulaincourt. He wished to enjoy the spectacle which had so recently delighted Marshal Ney, that of our young soldiers gayly and steadily supporting the assault of the enemy's cavalry.

The vast plain of Lutzen, though very continuous, presented, like every other, some peculiarities. On leaving Weissenfels we met a ravine of considerable length and depth, called the Rippach, from the village which it crosses. Here Marshal Ney's troops had been marching with confidence since the morning, arranged in squares between which was the artillery, and preceded by numerous tirailleurs. Having reached the border of the ravine, they broke the squares in order to pass it, overcame the obstacle, reformed the squares, and advanced while firing their guns. The Souham

division was always in the van, and maintained an admirable attitude. At the moment of their deploying, Marshal Bessières, who commonly commanded the cavalry of the Guard, and who therefore ought not to have been there, but who was anxious to attend Napoleon, went a little to the right, in order better to observe the movement of the enemy. Suddenly a ball broke the wrist of the hand with which he held the bridle, and then struck him in the breast and overthrew him. In a moment he had passed from life to death. This was the second time that that brave man had been struck by the side of Napoleon. Once at Wagram he had been struck by a bullet, but had escaped with a contusion; on this occasion he was instantly killed! Was it because our fortune was on the wane? that fortune which warned us in 1809 now struck us in 1813? In spite of the general confidence inspired by the devotion of the troops, this painful sentiment penetrated many hearts. Bessières, commandant of the cavalry of the Guard, created by Napoleon marshal and Duke of Istria, was a brave man, full of Gascon life and not quite free from Gascon boasting, but witty and intelligent, and often bold enough to tell Napoleon useful truths, not in the form of passing expressions of vexation, but with seriousness and consistency. Napoleon loved, esteemed, and sincerely regretted him. Then, exclaiming, "Death is coming near us," he urged forward his horse to see his young soldiers, while Bessières was carried away in a cloak. He experienced the same satisfaction that Ney had done some days before. He saw his conscripts attacked by repeated charges of cavalry, which they repelled with imperturbable good humour, laying 300 or 400 of the enemy prostrate before their ranks. They closed the day at Lutzen, content with the result, but more grieved than was readily admitted by the death of Bessières, in which many persisted in seeing an unpropitious omen. However, the weather was fine, the troops were in high spirits; every thing seemed to smile anew, both Nature and Fortune! Napoleon visited the monument of Gustavus Adolphus, killed on that plain in the moment of victory, like Epaminondas, and he ordered that a monument should also be raised to the Duke of Istria, who fell on the same place. In the bulletin of the day he referred to him in flattering terms, and wrote to his widow a letter calculated to impart that amount of consolation and pride which a bereaved family can derive from glory.

On the following day, May 2, a memorable day, one of the last in which Fortune favoured our arms, Napoleon rose at three o'clock to give his orders, and to dictate a multitude of letters. They were only four leagues distant from Leipsic, including the passage of the Elster. The reports of spies, more explicit than on the preceding days, affirmed that the Russians and Prussians were continuing their movement on our right, that from Leipsic they had gone back towards Zwenkau and Pegau, keeping behind the Elster, apparently to seek us where we were not, i.e. in a road nearer to the mountains. On this report, Napoleon was confirmed in the thought of marching *en masse* upon Leipsic, and then falling upon the flank of the enemy; and, in order to realize this thought, he regulated his movements with a depth of prudence which,

in the uncertainty in which he was thrown by the want of cavalry, procured for him one of his most brilliant and best-merited triumphs. Prince Eugene, having reached Mackranstaedt in the course of the day, was first upon the field of battle, and Napoleon allowed him to retain the precedence in order to go immediately to Leipsic. He ordered him to send Lauriston's corps directly against Leipsic, then to direct Macdonald to the right against Zwenkau, the point where he was likely to meet the most advanced detachments of the enemy, and recommended him to remain in person between Lauriston and Macdonald with Durutte's division, the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, and a strong reserve of artillery, so as to be able to assist those in the greatest difficulty. But, with foresight peculiar to himself, suspecting that the enemy might, during this movement upon Leipsic, muster in full force upon his right, (for it was possible that they should have ascended the Elster to take him in flank,) he retained Ney with his five divisions in the neighbourhood of Lutzen, and posted him at a group of five villages, the principal of which was called Kaja. This village was situated one league above Lutzen, on the border of the Floss-Graben, an irrigating canal traversing the whole plain between the Saale and the Elster. Ney, posted at this spot with his five divisions, was there to form the solid pivot round which we should effect our movement. There remained Marmont, Bertrand, Oudinot, who were following the army, and were respectively situated, Marmont on the banks of the Rippach, Bertrand a little in the rear, Oudinot on the Saale. Napoleon ordered Marmont and Oudinot to cross in succession the Rippach, and to take up their position on the right of Ney, to afford him aid or to be aided by him if they should be suddenly attacked, and then to go all together to the Elster between Zwenkau and Pegau in the case of their not having met with any one. Ney was then the solid point round which one half of the army was to wheel while the other half, advancing, should enter Leipsic and effect that movement which should place us on the flank of the enemy. With such precautions, the wisdom of which we shall soon be able to appreciate, there was very little serious danger to be feared, while executing before an army of more than 100,000 men a very delicate manœuvre, necessary to the attainment of any considerable results. The two armies presented a mass of nearly 300,000 fighting-men, at an interval of four or five leagues.

These arrangements having been made, and precise intimation given to each head of a corps of the end which was aimed at and the conduct to be pursued in every event, Napoleon proceeded to dictate letters the rest of the morning, not intending to take horse till nine or ten o'clock, because none could be in full march for his destination before that time. He wrote to the aged Duke of Valmy about the composition of certain battalions; to General Lemarois, envoy in the grand duchy of Berg, about the depôts of cavalry in his department; to Prince Poniatowski about the union of the two armies of the Elbe and the Main, and their further march; to the major-general about the trial of the governor of Spandau, who had capitulated; to several other persons on a multitude of sub-

jects, and among others to the Duke of Rovigo on the manner of speaking of military events at a time when public opinion, becoming suspicious, received with less readiness than ever the assertions of the Government; and he closed his observations with these remarkable words:—"Truth and simplicity are the qualities now demanded."

After having thus dictated a great many letters with perfect composure, he set off at ten o'clock, followed by a squadron of the Guard, towards Leipsic, from which he was only four leagues distant. Among the officers of high rank who accompanied him was Marshal Ney, who came to see on what side the tempest which seemed to gather round us would probably burst. He could regain his corps in half an hour if it should threaten the villages guarded by his five divisions. At this moment Marshal Macdonald, crossing the Leipsic road before us from left to right, was advancing upon Zwenkau; on the left, General Lauriston was advancing from Mackranstaedt upon Leipsic. Prince Eugene, with the reserve composed for him by Napoleon, consisting, as we have said, in Durutte's division and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, was actually on the Leipsic road, ready to aid either Marshal Macdonald or General Lauriston. The whole Guard in a body followed Prince Eugene towards Leipsic. After having crossed these numerous columns and shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" Napoleon arrived before Leipsic to witness a most animated spectacle.

The fire of musketry and cannon at this point was indeed very brisk. The gallant Mison, at the head of the first division of Lauriston's corps, with his wonted resolution and intelligence attacked the city of Leipsic, defended by General Kleist with the Prussian infantry. Some marshy and wooded ground, traversed by several arms of the Elster, lay before the city of Leipsic on coming from Lutzen, and it is necessary to cross the long series of bridges thrown over these different arms in order to reach the city itself. The surrounding woods were filled with tirailleurs; a strong artillery, supported by the Prussian infantry, was at the village of Lindenau, at the entrance of the bridges of the Elster. General Maison, after having forced the tirailleurs of the enemy to fall back, and placed a part of his artillery in battery, had gone to the village of Leutsch, situated to the left of Lindenau, and had opened a flank-fire upon Lindenau with his guns and a column of infantry. He had then thrown a battalion into the first arm of the Elster, which they were to ford, and take the Prussians in the rear, while occupied with the defence of the bridges. This operation being finished, he had formed a column of attack under his own direction, and had charged with the bravest the troops defending Lindenau. The Prussians, after a gallant defence, seeing themselves threatened in the rear by the column which had entered the Elster, had evacuated the first bridge after setting fire to it, and Maison had followed them at the head of his infantry. Napoleon, with his glass, beheld for some moments this well-conducted attack, saw his soldiers enter Leipsic pell-mell with the Prussians, and the numerous inhabitants of the city watching the issue from the roofs of their houses.



While during a fine day in May he was contemplating this scene, so similar to many others which he had witnessed during his life, a brisk cannonade was suddenly heard on his right from the direction of Kaja, towards the villages where Ney's corps had been left on duty. Having calculated all the chances of this great manœuvre, he could neither be surprised nor disconcerted. He listened to the cannonade for several moments: it continually increased, till it became perfectly frightful. "While we are trying to turn them, they are trying to turn us," said Napoleon; "but they will find us prepared at all points." He immediately despatched Ney at full gallop, ordering him to fix himself like a rock in the five villages,—which was possible, for he had 48,000 men, and was to be assisted by considerable forces on the right, left, and rear. Then, with the promptness of a mind prepared for every alternative, he ordered the entire change of his line of march,—an order very difficult to prescribe in time and to execute with precision, especially when working with such large bodies. First, he recommended General Lauriston not to abandon Leipsic, but to leave there only one of his three divisions, and to place the others in the rear *en échelon*, the head towards Zwenkau, in order to ascend the Elster as far as Zwenkau itself and to go to the left of Ney. He ordered Macdonald, whose instructions directed him to Zwenkau, to fall back again from Zwenkau to Eisdorf, a little village near the left of Ney, on the borders of the Floss-Graben, the irrigating canal which, as we have said, traversed the plain of Lutzen, and which our troops had been obliged to cross in order to reach Leipsic, while Ney's corps, posted at Kaja, had remained on this side and supported their left by it. Macdonald was to ascend the Floss-Graben as far as Eisdorf and Kitzén, and at that level he was in condition to flank Ney's left, and even to outflank the enemy who had come from Zwenkau. Prince Eugene, leaving Lauriston at Leipsic, was to support Macdonald with the rest of his troops. Such were the arrangements on the left of Ney. Marmont, having remained on the banks of the Rippach, in the rear of Lutzen, was at this moment on the march. Napoleon ordered him to place himself to the right of Ney's corps at Starsiedel, one of the five villages guarded by that corps. General Bertrand, who was still a little farther off, was ordered to debouche upon the rear of the enemy, uniting himself to Marmont. Thus Ney would be flanked right and left by corps which should not only support him, but bend round on the two flanks of the enemy. Lastly, that his centre might not be broken, Napoleon made the whole Guard retrace their steps, and directed them by the Lutzen road to Kaja. He brought to Ney the aid of 18,000 infantry, not a mere troop for parade, but a troop for vigorous action, devoted, like their emperor, to every danger in a campaign whose object was to restore the prestige of our arms at any cost. Some required two hours, and others three, to reach the scene of action; but it was now 11 A.M., and all had time to take part in this great battle, and to concur in the re-establishment of our shaken power. Having so promptly conceived and ordered this great change in his order of march, Napoleon left at full gallop, passing the columns of

his Guard, who were retrograding towards the battle-field which we had hoped to find before us, and which we must now seek on our right in the rear. The cannonade had continued to increase in vivacity and extent: it filled the air, and every thing announced one of the most memorable days of that sanguinary and heroic period.

The following account explains what had transpired on the side of the enemy, and which had occasioned the meeting which Napoleon had expected on the other side of Leipsic to take place at Kaja. On the news of the two battles which General Wintzingerode had fought with his cavalry on the 29th of April and the 1st of May, in front and in the rear of Weissenfels, the members of the coalition at length understood that Napoleon, no longer descending the Saale to join the viceroy, had just crossed it to march from the Saale to the Elster, then to cross the Elster and take them in flank. Since they had desired the battle, they had it now to their heart's content in that beautiful plain of Lutzen, where the fine cavalry of the allies would enjoy every advantage against a young infantry possessing only a few squadrons for reconnoitring. Count Wittgenstein, who had taken the place of Kutusoff,—who was said to be absent and not dead, to meet the superstitious mind of the Russian soldiers,—had been summoned, and Diebitch, the chief of his staff, had given him the plan for the battle. He had proposed to avail himself of the flank-movement effected by Napoleon to take him in flank and attack him towards Lutzen, *i.e.* towards Kaja, where they perceived only a few detachments, there to attack him *en masse*, and, having taken these posts, to pour down upon him with the cavalry of the allied army to the amount of 25,000 men, and, if the French infantry thus briskly attacked should be overthrown, to drive them into the marshy lands extending from Leipsic to Merseburg, where the Saale joins the Elster. Should they succeed in this, Napoleon would suffer a real disaster. The plan was ingeniously devised: it obtained the consent of the two sovereigns and that of the fiery Blücher, who demanded an early battle at any price. But a plan must be well executed as well as devised; and, however excellent, if it come from below instead of from above, it has little chance of being well executed. On this occasion, the orders must ascend from Diebitch to Wittgenstein, from Wittgenstein to Alexander and Frederick William, and then redescend to their generals, which implied a long round for setting in motion 100,000 men between 11 A.M. and 6 P.M. However, as they were very near each other, and much devoted to the common cause, and that small feelings, the frequent obstacle to great actions, had little to do in the resolutions of each, the impediments were less than might be expected from a command so organized, and on the evening of May 1 every thing was in movement towards the end proposed.

It was agreed that in the night between the 1st and 2d of May they should pass the Elster, those who were coming from Leipsic and Rotha at Zwenkau, those from Borna at Pegau; that they should then cross the Floss-Graben, and should wheel round upon the five villages to the right of Lutzen, where they had observed only some bivouacs, and that there they should fall in full

force upon the flank of the French army, the cavalry being ready to charge as soon as the infantry should have taken the villages.

The whole night was employed in these manœuvres. Wittgenstein and D'York, coming from Leipsic with 24,000 men, passed the Elster at Zwenkau, and there met Blücher, who was crossing it with 25,000, which occasioned some confusion and delay. The 18,000 men comprising the guards and reserves which the Emperor Alexander was bringing crossed the Elster at Pegau, and all together came to form upon the ground which had been reconnoitred by the cavalry of Wintzingerode, on the flank of the French army, parallel to the road from Lutzen to Leipsic. This cavalry mustered about 12,000 or 13,000 men. Miloradovitch, with 12,000 men, was on the Elster at a higher point, along the mountains where it had been first supposed that Napoleon would appear. This was a mass of about 92,000 combatants of the finest character, animated in general, especially the Prussians, by an ardent patriotism. The required movements had occupied some time. At 10 A.M. they were still defiling, and were pleased to see the French army in march upon Leipsic, in the hope of surprising it. Ney's corps, lying concealed in the villages, only allowed a few fires to be seen, and presented the appearance of some detachments placed there from precaution. Alexander and Frederick William, leaving the command to Wittgenstein, who exercised it with difficulty because he acted upon the thought of another, rode through the ranks of their soldiers, receiving their acclamations, and thus contributed to the further loss of valuable time.

The forces of the coalition having crossed the Floss-Graben above us in order to reach Lutzen, while we crossed it below with an opposite view, to go towards Leipsic, rested their right on the Floss-Graben, their left on the ravine of the Rippach, having in front the five villages which were to be so violently disputed. The village of Gross-Gorschen was the nearest; then came Rahna on the left, and Klein-Gorschen on their right. Though in a plain, these three villages were at the bottom of a slight declivity, in which were united some small streams bordered by trees, forming pools for the use of the cattle, and emptying themselves into the Floss-Graben. From the point where they stood, the enemy distinctly saw those three villages of Gross-Gorschen in the first line, Rahna and Klein-Gorschen in the second; then, looking beyond, they saw the ground rise gradually, and in the upper part appeared the village of Kaja on the right, opposite the Floss-Graben, the village of Starsiedel to the left, near the Rippach, and lastly, at a considerable distance, the pointed steeple of Lutzen and the road to Leipsic.

It was agreed that Blücher should first attack the three first villages, that Wittgenstein and D'York should support him, that Wintzingerode, posted on the left with all his cavalry, should be ready to pour down upon the French as soon as they should seem to be shaken, and that the Russian guard and reserves, infantry and cavalry, ranged on the right, along the Floss-Graben, should be ready to fly to the aid of any who might seem to be giving way. They did not despair of seeing Miloradovitch arrive

in time to take part in the action. Even without him they had 80,000 men well put together and full of resolution.

After having allowed the troops an hour's rest, Blücher's Prussians were the first to make the attack under the eyes of the two sovereigns, who, placed at some distance, on a slight eminence, could witness the devotion of their soldiers. Towards mid-day, Blücher, who, though seventy-two years of age, was present at every attack, and was a worthy adversary of Marshal Ney, to whom he was to be opposed during the day, advanced at the head of Kleist's division upon Gross-Gorschen. The Souham division of Ney's corps, warned by the long preparation, had been able to assume their arms. Four battalions were outside the village with some guns. General Blücher, preceded by three battalions, poured a violent and well-directed fire upon the four battalions of Souham. The young soldiers of Souham stood the fire well; but two or three of their guns having been dismounted, and the infantry of Kleist's division attacking them with great vigour, they were driven back to Gross-Gorschen, then outflanked right and left, and thrown back upon Rahna and Klein-Gorschen, the second position. The joy was great on the ground from which Alexander and Frederick William were observing the battle, and every heart was excited with the hope of a great victory. To the left of this hot action, in front of Starsiedel, Wintzingerode, with his horse-artillery, approached the villages which had been attacked, intending to outflank them and to seize the opportunity of a decisive charge. But the combat was only beginning, and many changes might occur during the day.

When fallen back upon Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, Souham's soldiers were not so easily dislodged. The ditches, enclosures, and pools of water existing between the villages offered numerous means of resistance. The Souham division, about 12,000 strong, having rallied in full force under their old general, who united singular intrepidity with the experience of twenty years, defended themselves with vigour. Unfortunately, the Gerard division, which was little to the right, in the direction of Starsiedel, not expecting this attack, was still in the disorder of the bivouac, and, their horses having been engaged in foraging, their artillery was perfectly immovable. Souham might therefore be outflanked on that side. But at this moment Marshal Marmont, having crossed the Rippach, debouched from Starsiedel opposite to Wintzingerode. That marshal, marching with his arm in a sling at the head of his men, drew up Bonnet's division on one side and Compans's on the other, forming each into several squares so as to cover Souham's right and to protect Gerard's division while rallying. Wintzingerode, not venturing to attack this force, which appeared as solid as a wall, riddled them with bullets, but without effect. Under their shelter Gerard's division formed, and came to take its position on the right of Souham, in the line of Rahna and Klein-Gorschen.

On seeing this, Blücher and the two sovereigns perceived that the French army was less surprised than they had hoped, and that to carry these villages to which they clung so tenaciously would be no easy task. Regardless of every obstacle, and inflamed with every Ger-



at a distance on our right, approaching in several squares.

This was the time for the final effort of the coalition before being outflanked in every direction. Hitherto only Blücher and Wittgenstein had been engaged, i.e. about 40,000 men. There remained in the rear, to the left, D'York and Wittgenstein with 18,000 men, and then the 18,000 of the Russian guards and reserves.

Blücher, all bleeding, demands support, and urges them to strike a strong blow on the centre, where only they could obtain decisive results, a vast crescent of fire beginning now to envelop the allied army from right to left. There was no room for hesitation, and orders were given to the second line—that of Wittgenstein and D'York—to march to the aid of the suffering troops of Blücher. It would have been still better to send, besides Wittgenstein and D'York, the Russian guards and reserves against the French centre, and the cavalry of Wittgenstein and all that could be spared against Marmont's divisions, which had no other support than their squares. But the Emperor Alexander, in the affectionation of being seen everywhere, and therefore not being really where he ought to be, exercised no command, and prevented Wittgenstein from doing so, while the wise King of Prussia, not caring to appear brave, though he really was so, dared not issue any order. However, the resolution to make a last effort, thus adopted in confusion, was put in execution. It was 6 p.m., and there was still time to break the centre of the French army, where Blücher, almost to his own destruction, had nearly destroyed two of Ney's divisions. The troops of Wittgenstein and D'York came up to support and to pass the half-annihilated corps of Blücher. They marched over the burning ruins of Klein-Gorschen and Rahna, passed across remains of the Prussian army, and, under a shower of balls, advanced upon Kaja, while Wittgenstein with the Prussian horse-guard and part of the Russian cavalry charged Marmont's squares, which had taken a position a little in the rear to secure the support of Starsiedel. Vain assaults! The squares of Bonnet and Compans poured forth fire like burning citadels from their standing walls; but, to the right, the 18,000 men of Wittgenstein and D'York, led on with a vigour proportioned to the urgency of the case, repulsed Ney's divisions, which had suffered as much as Blücher's, drove them back into Kaja, entered that village, emerged from it, and found themselves face to face with Napoleon's Guard. Beyond the Floss-Graben, the Prince of Wurtemberg disputed Eisdorf with Macdonald's troops.

It was now Napoleon's turn to make a decisive effort, for in vain would his wings fall back upon the enemy if his centre were pierced. But he had still in hand the 18,000 men and the strong artillery-reserve of the Imperial Guard. In the middle of our conscripts, some of whom fled even into his presence, in the midst of balls and bullets falling all around him, he advanced the Young Guard, and ordered the sixteen battalions of Dumoutier's division to break their squares and form in columns of attack, to march with the left upon Kaja, the right upon Starsiedel, to charge desperately, and at every cost to pierce the enemy's lines; in a word, to secure a victory which was absolutely necessary. In the mean while, the Old

Guard, drawn up in six squares, remained like so many redoubts intended to protect our centre. Napoleon at the same time ordered Drouot to go with eighty guns of the Guard and take his position somewhat obliquely on our right below Starsiedel, so as to take in front the cavalry which attacked without interruption Marmont's divisions, and in flank the line of infantry under Wittgenstein and D'York.

These orders were executed without a minute's delay. The sixteen battalions of the Young Guard, under General Dumoutier and Marshal Mortier, advanced in columns of attack, rallied on their way those of Ney's troops who were still capable of action, and re-entered Kaja under a shower of balls. After having retaken that village, they passed beyond it, and drove back upon Klein-Gorschen and Rahna the troops of Wittgenstein, D'York, and Blücher, pell-mell into the hollow where those villages are situated. They then halted on the declivity, and left to Drouot the space necessary for working his artillery. Skillfully improving the advantage of the ground, he directed part of his eighty guns against the enemy's cavalry, and with the rest fired slantingly upon the infantry of Wittgenstein and D'York, pouring balls and bullets upon each. Overwhelmed by this mass of fire, the infantry and cavalry of the enemy were soon obliged to beat a retreat. At the same moment, on our left and beyond the Floss-Graben, two of Macdonald's divisions—those of Fresinet and Charpentier—attacked respectively Kitzen and Eisdorf, and took them from Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, notwithstanding the aid sent by Alexander. At the opposite extremity, i.e. to the right, Bonnet and Compans, led by Marmont, finally broke their squares and marched in column on the flank of the enemy behind where the guns of Marmont were already heard.

It was nearly eight o'clock, and some degree of indecision was beginning to be perceptible in the staff of the allies. Frederick William and Alexander, collected with their generals on the eminence from which they contemplated the battle, deliberated on future movements. Blücher, more vehement than ever, his arm still in a sling, wished to make a further attack on the French centre at the head of the Russian guard. In his opinion, Miloradovitch would arrive during the night, to act as a reserve and to cover the retreat of the army should that be found necessary. They might therefore risk without hesitation all the troops who had not yet been engaged. Wittgenstein and Dietrich replied with truth that they were outflanked on the right towards Eisdorf, to the left towards Starsiedel, that if they persisted they would run the risk of being surrounded and of losing at least a part of the allied army in the hands of Napoleon, and, finally, that the commander of the artillery had exhausted his ammunition. Such reasons left no alternative but retreat, which was accordingly ordered. But Blücher, indignant, exclaimed, in the obscurity which was now extending itself over both armies, that so much generous blood ought not to be spent in vain, that the day was not lost, that he would prove this with his cavalry alone, and that he would cause a blush to those who were so eager to relinquish a victory when in their grasp. There remained, in fact, about 4000 or 5000

men of the Prussian cavalry, principally of the royal guard, who could still be brought into action: he collected them, placed himself at their head, and, though the night had begun, he poured down like a madman upon the French troops on the left of the allies, before Starsiedel, which belonged to Marmont's corps. The soldiers of that marshal, worn out by a long day's battle, were scarcely in their ranks. The first regiment, the 37th light, of recent formation, surprised by this sudden irruption of the Prussian cavalry, took to flight. Marmont hastened to the spot with his staff, and was himself carried away by the rout. Dismounting from his horse, with his arm in a sling, he brought back the fugitive soldiers of the 37th. But the divisions of Bonnet and Compans, being formed in good time, resisted all the efforts of Blucher. Unhappily, firing promiscuously in the dark upon all who came towards them, they killed several soldiers of the 37th, and even several of Marmont's officers, and in particular Colonel Jarret, whom he had sent to Napoleon after the battle of Salamanca.

This temporary disturbance was soon allayed, and our soldiers at length lay down upon the field of battle, covered with ruins, saturated with blood, which the allies were obliged to leave to us after so long a contest. But we no longer possessed that fine cavalry with which we were wont to pursue the conquered and to collect prisoners and guns in thousands. And before so infuriated an enemy it was necessary to be circumspect and to renounce the trophies of victory.

Napoleon determined to remain where they were: he knew that from Kaja, as from an impregnable rock, he had arrested the fury of his enemies, foolishly intoxicated with their success, and that they would not take a step in advance. It was indeed true that from this moment his fortune might be re-established, on one condition,—that his reason should be re-established also. He slept upon the field, awaiting the morrow to collect any trophies of his victory, but already well aware of their probable extent.

On the following day, May 8, he was on horseback at break of day, to assist the wounded, restore order to his troops, and pursue the enemy. He galloped across the hollow in which the villages of Rahna, Klein-Gorschen, and Gross-Gorschen were still burning, ascended towards the position occupied by the two allied sovereigns during the battle, and saw more plainly what they had attempted against him,—viz., to turn his flank while he was turning others. But the scheme of his enemies had been completely frustrated by his singular forethought in providing a firm pivot at Kaja about which he could manœuvre in safety. Had he now possessed the cavalry which he had lost in Russia, he would have taken thousands of prisoners. As it was, he could only collect some wounded men and dismounted cannons: of these trophies he gained a great number. Of the 92,000 men of the allied army, about 65,000 had been engaged, and these had fought with fury. On our side, not many more had been engaged, for only four divisions of Ney, two of Marmont, one of the Guard, and two of Macdonald had shared in the action. The loss was great on both sides. The Prussians and Russians—especially the Prussians—had lost at least 20,000 men, and

we had lost 17,000 or 18,000. We had even lost more than the enemy until the moment when the terrible artillery of the Guard had turned the scale in our favour. The Prussians behaved heroically, the Russians bravely but without enthusiasm. Both had exhibited in their councils the confusion incident to a coalition. Our infantry had behaved with the impetuous courage of youth, and had the advantage of Napoleon's personal direction. On no occasion had he more exposed his life, displayed his genius, or exhibited the talents not only of a general of large views who skilfully prepares his operations, but of a general in the field who modifies his plans and wholly reverses his arrangements according to the change of circumstances. Here was ground for satisfaction, though the material results were not so considerable as they had formerly been when every branch of the service was in perfection and when our enemies were not nerved by desperation; here, we say, was ground for satisfaction and for gratitude on the part of Napoleon, to that generous nation which had once more so freely lavished her purest blood, and for prudence, at least for her sake. Was Napoleon about to accept this favour of Heaven in the spirit which it became him to exercise, and which the nation had exhibited at so much cost, and was he never to return to the dreams of his insatiable ambition? Events will prove.

At the present moment it only remained to profit by the victory; and in this art Napoleon was as unrivalled as in that of securing it. After having passed the 3d of May on the field, and employed it in collecting the wounded, in rallying his troops, somewhat disordered by so rude an encounter, in collecting information in respect to the march of the enemy; he speedily discerned the decisive character of the blow he had inflicted on the enemy, for, notwithstanding their pompous pretences, they were retiring in all haste. The roads were covered with columns of troops or carriages in retreat, which they were unable to capture from the want of cavalry. But it was evident that they would not halt before they reached the Elbe, or perhaps the Oder. This indubitable defeat did not prevent their holding the most arrogant language. Alexander, elated with his own conduct under fire, ventured to claim the victory; and it must be confessed that his generals had a sad habit of strangely deceiving him as to military events, as if they had not during the last two centuries achieved enough to warrant their speaking truth. That this should occur with the Russians is readily understood, for in proportion as a nation is ignorant it is open to deceit; but the Germans deserved to be treated with greater sincerity. Yet the Prussians, astonished at their having been able to show face to Napoleon, wrote to every quarter, and particularly to Vienna, that they had gained a victory, and that their retirement was to be ascribed to their want of ammunition, and to a military calculation. A calculation it might be, but it was that of the vanquished, who sought safety at a distance from the enemy whose approach they feared. The allies, in fact, marched as quickly as possible, in order to recross the Elster, the Pleiss, the Mulde, and the Elbe, and to place one hundred leagues between themselves and the French.

Napoleon, after having satisfied himself of the importance of this battle of Lutzen by the promptitude of the enemy's retreat, wrote, to Munich, Stuttgart, and Paris, letters full of just pride and well-merited admiration of his young soldiers. He slept at Pegau on the 3d, and, according to his custom, rose in the middle of the night to give orders for the march. It was possible that the allies might take two directions,—that the Prussians should gain the road to Berlin by Torgau, in order to protect their capital, and that the Russians should follow the road to Dresden to re-enter Silesia. It was possible, on the contrary, that, leaving Berlin to its fate and to the zeal of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, the allies should continue to march all together upon Dresden, remaining supported by the mountains of Bohemia and by Austria in order to decide the latter in their favour, by assuring her that they were victorious, or that, if not so now, they should be on the next opportunity. The allies might possibly adopt either of these courses; for strong arguments might be adduced in favour of each. If, in fact, it was of great importance to remain united, and near to Austria, it was equally so not to abandon Berlin and all the resources of the Prussian monarchy to the French. Napoleon formed his arrangements in accordance with this double hypothesis. If the allies should divide, he could do the same, and on one side send a column of 80,000 men after the Prussians, which should pursue them to the utmost extremity, should pass the Elbe after them, then enter Berlin in triumph, and, on the other, march himself with 140,000 men after the Russians, dog their heels incessantly, penetrate into Dresden along with them, and then throw them back into Poland. If, on the contrary, the allies did not separate, it would be necessary to follow their example, to defer the satisfaction of entering Berlin, and to pursue *en masse* an enemy who was retreating *en masse*. Napoleon, with his unequalled power of combination, formed his plan of proceeding so as to meet either case. He left Ney's corps in the rear, to tend their wounded,—for of 17,000 or 18,000 killed and wounded on our side 12,000 belonged to that corps alone. He authorized the marshal to remain two days at Lutzen, in order to place in a good hospital those who had suffered most severely, and to prepare to transport the rest to Leipzig. He ordered him then to enter Leipzig with great pomp. That city had evinced too hostile a spirit to allow us to spare it the spectacle of our triumph and the terror of our arms. From Leipzig the marshal was to march upon Torgau, and there to rally the Saxons, whose fidelity would probably have been restored by the victory of Lutzen. By replacing them with Dürutte's division under General Reynier, Marshal Ney would find himself reinforced by a body of 14,000 or 15,000 men. Napoleon gave him in addition Marshal Victor, not only with the second battalions belonging to that marshal reorganized at Erfurt, but with part of those of Marshal Davout, which he was to lend for some days. Marshal Victor would thus have twenty-two battalions, making about 15,000 or 16,000 men. Lastly, there remained Puthod's division, the fourth of Lauriston's corps, which had been left with General Sebastiani on the

left of the Elbe to chastise the Cossacks of Tettensborn, Donnenberg, and Czernicheff. Napoleon sent this division in all haste towards Wittenberg to join Marshal Ney beyond Torgau. He intrusted the safety of the Lower Elbe and the Hanseatic departments to General Vandamme, who was already at Bremen with part of the battalions of the old corps reformed, and to the influence of the victory of Lutzen. Marshal Ney, who retained 35,000 or 36,000 of his 48,000 men, was then to join Reynier with 15,000, or 16,000 French and Saxons, the Duke of Belluno with 15,000 French, General Sebastiani with 14,000, and thus form a total of 80,000 men within eight days. To him was assigned the honour of pursuing Blücher, if he should take the Berlin road, and of entering that capital after him. Napoleon thus wished to oppose the impetuosity of Ney to that of the Prussian hero. If, on the contrary, the enemy should not divide, but should venture another battle before crossing the Elbe,—which was very improbable,—two days would suffice to bring Ney's 80,000 men against the flank of the allied army. Napoleon, pursuing, instead of being pursued, might choose both the time and place for risking another battle.

Napoleon reserved to himself the care of marching after the main body of the allies with Oudinot and Bertrand, one reinforced by a Bavarian division, the other by a Wurtembergian division, with Marmont, who had not lost more than 600 or 700 men, with Macdonald, who had lost scarcely 2000, with Lauriston, who had left 600 or 700 before Leipzig, and lastly with the Guard, diminished by about 1000 men,—i.e. with about 140,000 combatants. Having made these arrangements, and recommended Ney to reinstate his troops as well as possible, to order the preparation of 6000 beds for the wounded at Leipzig, to provide himself in that city with all that he required, Napoleon left Pegau in three columns. The principal one, composed of Macdonald, Marmont, and the Guard, commanded by Prince Eugene in person, was to gain by Borna the highroad of Dresden, which passes by Waldheim and Wüdruff. The second, composed of Bertrand and Oudinot, keeping four or five leagues to the right, was to follow, by Rochlitz, Mittweitz, and Freyberg, the base of the Bohemian mountains. The third, formed of Lauriston's corps alone, and keeping a few leagues to the left, was to go by Wurtzen to Meissen, the point of passing the Elbe which it was most essential to occupy, and to connect Napoleon with Marshal Ney. The enemy was plainly enough in retreat to insure their not meeting them *en masse* at any point whatever, and columns of 50,000 or 60,000 men would suffice for every probable encounter. Besides, in a few hours they could unite two of these columns, which allowed them to anticipate only accident, and besides being more easily supported and better informed by following the three roads leading to the Elbe, they would also have the chance of surrounding, as in a net, the struggling detachments whom they could not overtake for want of cavalry.

Napoleon left for Borna on the morning of May 5, to follow the steps of his principal column. Prince Eugene preceded him. Having reached Kolditz on the Mulde, that prince found

the rear-guard of the Prussians posted along the river, the bridges over which had been destroyed. He ascended a little to the right, discovered a passage for a column and part of his artillery, and established himself on a height commanding the highroad to Dresden. The Prussians were then obliged to leave the banks of the river and to retire in haste, defiling under the fire of twenty guns. They thus lost a few hundred men and withdrew towards Leissnig by passing across the lines of a Russian corps which was in position at Seyfersdorf, before Harta. This was the corps of Miloradovitch, which had been prevented assisting at the battle of Lutzen by a bad arrangement. Miloradovitch was a brave man, eager to distinguish himself, as he had already frequently done, and anxious to give an answer to the Prussians, who loudly complained that at Lutzen the whole weight of the battle had been made to bear upon them alone,—a kind of language too frequent between allies associated in a work so difficult as that of war. After opening his ranks to allow the passage of the Prussians, Miloradovitch reformed his ranks, and, profiting by the advantage of his position, held firm. Prince Eugene attacked him with vigour, and only succeeded in dislodging him by turning him. On each side about 700 or 800 men were lost, but for want of cavalry we could take no prisoners. The Russians, notwithstanding having sacrificed several hundred men to check our course, were obliged to leave in our hands a great many wagons loaded with the wounded, and to destroy many others loaded with baggage.

They continued the pursuit without intermission during the 6th and 7th, Napoleon being desirous of reaching Dresden by the 8th at latest. The Prussians had taken the road to Meissen, the Russians that to Dresden, though it could not certainly be concluded from this that they would separate, the one to protect Berlin, the others to protect Breslau. Napoleon, having directed Lauriston's corps by Wurtzen towards Meissen, urged him to hasten his march towards the Elbe, to surprise, if possible, the passage of that river, which was of great importance, for we had pontooneers but no pontoons, that heavy matériel being far in the rear. Napoleon had another reason for urging General Lauriston upon Meissen there to cross the Elbe, which was the desire in this manner to subdue the resistance which might be offered at Dresden itself. It was in fact impossible to attempt to force a passage near that city without exposing it to destruction; and we had already done enough in destroying two arches of its stone bridge, an accident of war of which it had been highly sensible, without risking the beautiful buildings with which the Electors had adorned it.

On the 7th they went to Nossen and Wilsdruff. The viceroy found Miloradovitch occupying a good position, which he seemed resolved to defend. They quickly carried it, and made him pay for this useless boast by the loss of several hundred men. On the next day, May 8, they appeared on that amphitheatre of hills from which is perceived the beautiful town of Dresden, situated on the two banks of the Elbe and at the foot of the Bohemian mountains, like Florence on the Arno at the foot of the

Apennines. The weather was beautiful; the country, enamelled with spring flowers, presented the most smiling aspect; nor could they without painful emotions contemplate this rich basin, exposed, if the enemy should resist, to become in a few hours a prey to the flames. They descended the slopes of this amphitheatre in as many columns as there are roads verging towards Dresden, and they saw with pleasure the dark columns of the Russian army declining the battle, bury themselves in the streets of the city, and repass the Elbe, burning the bridges. Since the stone bridge had been broken, three means of passage had been formed for the use of the allied armies, one with boats above the town, one below with rafts, one in the town itself, by replacing with two wooden arches the two stone ones blown up by Marshal Davout. All these bridges were observed to be in flames, which showed that the Russians were seeking an asylum behind the Elbe. We therefore entered the principal town, i.e. the old town, situated on the left bank, and the Russians remained in the new town, situated on the right bank.

Scarcely had our columns entered Dresden when a municipal deputation went to meet the viceroy and implore his clemency. The city was, indeed, much alarmed, on remembering their conduct during the last month. They had wished to attack the French, who were saved only by their good position; they had received the foreign sovereigns under triumphal arches and strewed their path with flowers. They had urged and even threatened their king to induce him to follow the example of the King of Prussia, and it must be owned that what was perfectly legitimate on the part of the Prussians was less so on that of the Saxons, whom we had elevated instead of having depressed. The inhabitants, therefore, awaited with some apprehension the decision of Napoleon, who had reached the gates a little after the viceroy, who, with his accustomed modesty, had referred the municipal deputation to his father.

Napoleon received the keys of the city on horseback, and said with hauteur, to those who presented them, that he accepted the keys merely to restore them to their sovereign; that he pardoned their ill treatment of the French, for which their gratitude was due to the king, Frederick Augustus; that it was in consideration of the virtues, age, and loyalty of that prince that he dispensed with the exercise of the rights of war; that they should, therefore, prepare to receive him with the respect which was his due, to raise in his honour those triumphal arches which they had so imprudently raised to the Emperor Alexander, and that they should express to him their thanks, when they should again see him, for the clemency with which they had been treated, for had it not been from regard to him the French army would have trodden them under foot like a conquered city; that they must give heed to themselves and avoid every act that might favour the enemy, for the least act of treason would immediately be followed by terrible chastisement. Napoleon then ordered them to prepare bread for his columns on the march.

The strictest discipline was enjoined and observed. But Napoleon wished to cross the Elbe

to oblige the Russians to evacuate the new town, in order to avoid the combats from one bank to the other which would have damaged that beautiful capital. He was unwilling even to wait till General Lauriston should have effected his passage at Meissen, that operation being uncertain and dependent on the obstacles and resources which that general might meet. Scarcely had he devoted an hour to the first arrangements required by the peaceable establishment of the army, when he again rode out to reconnoitre the banks of the Elbe. At the stone bridge in the middle of the town, the wooden arches had been burned, and, though the passage might easily be restored, the attempt would provoke a cannonade which must be returned, and this Napoleon wished to avoid. The Russians lodging in the houses bordering the right bank of the Elbe fired some shots at him, to which he paid no attention, and he left the town to reconnoitre the upper and lower passages. The upper passage was not practicable, because the right bank, on which they must land, commanded the left, from which they were to leave. Napoleon galloped down below Dresden, and, following the course of the Elbe, which at about a league takes a turn to the south, he found at Priesnitz a ground adapted to a passage effected by force. At this place the bank which we occupied commanded that occupied by the Russians, and it was possible there to establish artillery to protect the operations of the army. Napoleon made every preparation for the next day, May 9. Some boats, the remains of the upper bridge, and some small vessels collected by the cavalry along the river, had been brought together and placed beyond the reach of any attempts of the enemy, to be employed on the following day.

Accordingly, on the next day, Napoleon, who had been on horseback since the dawn, descended as far as Priesnitz with a strong column of infantry and all the artillery of the Guard, and ordered the passage to be begun in his presence. The Russians were ranged on the other bank, and appeared resolved on its defence. Napoleon ordered a strong battery to be established on the heights of Priesnitz in order to sweep the opposite plain, and immediately sent some voltigeurs on board the vessels they had seized. Three hundred passed at once and drove back the Russian tirailleurs, while others reinforced them in close succession. They immediately began to form a fosse for their protection, while the guns played over their head. The Russians brought artillery, Napoleon brought more, and in a short time the labour at the bridge was continued under the fire of fifty Russian and eighty French guns. Balls fell on every side, and one of them struck a heap of planks near where Napoleon was standing, and threw off a splinter which struck his head without wounding him. Some Italians drawn up at that spot yielded to a movement of fear for him rather than for themselves. "Non fa male," said he, adding some humorous expressions, which excited bursts of laughter among them and made them remain cheerfully under a shower of projectiles.

The place being no longer tenable by the Russians under eighty French guns, they withdrew, and ceased to present obstacles to the

construction of the bridge, which could not be finished before the next day, the 10th. Fortunately, the Russians had also evacuated the new town, and there the passage might be immediately re-established without occasioning any cannonade. Thick planks were thrown upon the stone pillars of the destroyed arches, which formed a communication between the two parts of the town. Our troops went to occupy the faubourg of Neustadt, or the new town. On the same day General Bertrand and Marshal Oudinot arrived. Napoleon distributed them between Dresden and Pirna. He learned that General Lauriston had met at Meissen the extreme rear of the Prussians, and that he had crossed the Elbe without much difficulty. We were, then, at all points masters of the course of the river, and in quiet possession of the capital of Saxony. The promise of Napoleon to send back the allies more quickly than they had come was accomplished, for, having taken the field on the 1st of May, he was on the 10th possessor of Saxony, and had thrown back the allies beyond the Elbe.

Before following them farther, Napoleon resolved to halt some days at Dresden to rally and repose his troops, to collect the different corps of cavalry which were preparing to join him, to recall the King of Saxony to his states, and to adapt his military combinations to those of the allies. The designs of the Prussians and Russians were not yet perfectly clear, and contradictory reports were spread concerning them. It appeared that they would abandon Berlin to us, and that they would postpone the object of defending that capital, important as it was, to the still more important one of remaining united and supported by Austria, which rendered the conduct of diplomatic affairs as important at the present time as that of military affairs. Napoleon, after having again sent Ney's corps in the direction of Torgau, which left him at liberty either to send him to Berlin or to recall him to Dresden, and after having renewed and defined still more the orders which should raise that corps to 80,000 men, immediately occupied himself with diplomatic affairs which now demanded all his attention.

The King of Saxony had fled not only from his states, but from Bavaria, at the very moment of Napoleon's arrival, to go to Prague and throw himself into the arms of Austria, whose policy he had evidently adopted. There was certainly some ground to be displeased with him; but to have declared him fallen would have been to acknowledge another instance of defection, to give some support to the assertions of the Germans that our allies were treated like slaves, and to involve ourselves in great difficulty; for what could we have done with Saxony if we had not restored it to him? It would have been also to declare too plainly to Austria the views which we entertained of the policy of mediation, and the manner in which we proposed to treat it, which belonged to Austria, and had been only adopted by the King of Saxony at her instigation. Napoleon never restrained his ambition, but he sometimes restrained his anger, and on this occasion he gave an instance of self-control which was unfortunately too rare in the course of his life. He pretended not to have understood the conduct of the King of Saxony, to ascribe it to bad ad-



visers, and to see in that monarch only a perplexed but still loyal prince. He therefore sent him one of his aides-de-camp to Prague, with a formal summons, upon pain of desertion, to return immediately to Dresden, to bring with him his cavalry, his artillery, and his court, all that had followed him, and to restore to General Reynier the fortress of Torgau with the 10,000 Saxons who occupied it. M. de Serra, our minister at the court of Saxony, who had accompanied King Frederick Augustus to Prague, was ordered to repair to him instantly and to demand an immediate reply.

The course to be pursued in respect to Austria had acquired great additional importance from what had transpired at Vienna while Napoleon was fighting the battle of Lutzen and marching upon Dresden. M. de Narbonne, very uneasy at what might occur at Cracow, between the Russians, Austrians, and Poles, on the reception of Napoleon's orders forbidding the Poles to disarm, had continually urged upon M. de Metternich to come to some satisfactory resolution on this subject. M. de Metternich, on his side, engaged, as we have seen, with Russia by a secret convention, had always declined, and persisted in saying that it was impossible to be at the same time a mediator and a belligerent. Finally, M. de Narbonne, receiving from Paris through M. de Bassano, and from Mentz through M. de Caulaincourt, still more formal instructions of the Emperor, who would on no account allow the Poles to lay down their arms, and who even pretended to continue giving orders to the Austrian auxiliary corps, thought it his duty to use strong measures to induce M. de Metternich to lay aside ambiguity. M. de Narbonne was not aware that in the archives of the embassy was found the prohibition to present any written note which did not emanate from the cabinet itself. He consequently repaired to M. de Metternich, and informed him that he was about to send him a note, with a demand to explain himself categorically on the treaty of alliance, the literal execution of which he now refused. "Hitherto," said he, "I have exercised patience, and have accepted all the excuses you have assigned for the evasion of your engagements, and the extent of your preparations, which you would openly avow if they were made in our interest. But I am constrained by the events which have occurred in Galicia to demand a categorical explanation, and to ask whether you are our ally or not, and whether you intend to break the treaty of alliance of March 14, 1812. If you do not intend to break it, it is absolutely necessary that you should bring into action the Austrian auxiliary corps by conforming to the orders of Napoleon, and, above all, that you should not think of disarming our allies." It would have been impossible to place M. de Metternich in a more embarrassing position, or himself in a more perilous one in relation to him. If he had been free, he would perhaps have yielded a little, and have ordered some pretended hostilities, which he would afterwards have excused to the Russians through M. de Lebzelter. Unfortunately, he had promised not to renew hostilities by an engagement, which though secret was formal and written, which the Russians would have been authorized to publish if it had been vio-

lated. There was, therefore, no way of yielding to the demands of M. de Narbonne, and M. de Metternich was obliged to resist him, mildly in manner but very firmly in fact. "Yes," said he, "I am your ally, and I wish to continue so; but I am also a mediator, and, until my part as mediator shall have been annulled by the refusal of reasonable conditions, I cannot resume the part of belligerent." He then repeated all the skilful and subtle line of argument with which the reader is familiar, and which we did not wish him to abandon as long as we were unwilling to come to an outbreak with Austria and to declare war against her. Then, relinquishing subtleties, and presenting the consideration of common sense, M. de Metternich entreated M. de Narbonne not to insist further, nor to place him in a false position by demanding what he could not grant, i.e. the resumption of hostilities with the Russians. "If I now refuse you 80,000 men," said he, "it is that I may give you 150,000 at a later time, when we shall have come to an agreement on the conditions of peace that may be acceptable to Europe." These wise remarks introduced the only great question of the moment, viz., the conditions of the peace, in which we were altogether in the wrong, and which was to be the cause of our ruin. M. de Narbonne returning to the charge, M. de Metternich went so far as to say that he was wrong to insist upon this point, for he thought that he knew that Napoleon did not wish him to push Austria to an extremity. In fact, M. de Bubna, returning from Paris, much affected by the assiduities which had been lavished upon him, affirmed that Napoleon wished to act in harmony with his father-in-law, and that if they acted wisely they would soon effect a reasonable arrangement of European affairs. M. de Bubna repaired to M. de Narbonne, and urged him not to disturb the intimacy about to be renewed between the son-in-law and father-in-law, but to have patience, saying that if they were in any degree reasonable the allies would be so much the reverse that Austria must return to Napoleon whether she would or not, and that in that case they would have not 80,000 Austrians but 150,000.

This was very sensible language; but M. de Narbonne, full of the despatches he had just received, alarmed at what might happen if Napoleon's orders to M. de Frimont at Cracow should be disobeyed, if Prince Poniatowski, refusing to disarm, should cause a collision between the Poles and Austrians, yielding also to the dictate of the part he had undertaken to act in a manner wholly different from his predecessor M. Otto, thought right to send a formal note, in which, appealing to the treaty of alliance of March 14, 1812, and the frequent instances in which the Austrians had confirmed it, he called upon the court of Vienna either to execute that treaty or to declare it at an end. But, fearful that such a step might induce an answer from which he shrunk, and anxious to prevent it, he demanded an interview with the Emperor Francis, and, having been immediately received by that monarch, he conjured him not to place Austria and France again in a position of mutual hostility, which had hitherto led to nothing but misfortunes, and might lead to still greater. The Emperor received M. de Nar-

bonne with much politeness and calmness, repeated what had been said by M. de Metternich, and added, with considerable acumen, that, if he wished to ascertain whether the sovereign and his minister were of one mind, he might retire with full satisfaction on this point; that for himself, he wished to remain the ally of his son-in-law, but not to abandon the only part which the Austrian people would regard with pleasure,—that of mediator; that he would persist in this to the end, and would never quit it till he had lost all hope of effecting a reconciliation between the belligerent parties. He ended, like M. de Metternich, in saying that he was induced to believe that M. de Narbonne, no doubt with the view of satisfying his personal responsibility, took somewhat too much upon him, and went beyond the real intentions of his master.

M. de Narbonne again insisted on the serious consequences that might result from a public disturbance at Cracow, and on the necessity of preventing it, and he refused to withdraw his note.

M. de Metternich, obliged at last to reply, had a very simple method of escape, which was to recur to the declaration he had made on the 12th of April, when he had been invited to take a very active share in events. He had then taken occasion from what was proposed to him to profess the part of armed mediator, to announce considerable armaments placed at the service of the mediator, and to affirm that the treaty of March 14, 1812, while remaining in full force as the principle of alliance, was no longer applicable to the circumstances as to the means of action. Referring to that declaration, M. de Metternich replied that the court of Vienna could not yield to the demand to bring the auxiliary corps into action, because, in the first place, that court having become the mediator on the express invitation of France herself, she could not assume hostilities towards either of the belligerent powers, and because, secondly, the auxiliary corps being only one of the means stipulated by the treaty of alliance, and this means being recognised as insufficient for the circumstances, it was right to defer the employment of them.

The reply was clever, and very unfavourable to us, for it compelled us to hear a second time that the treaty of alliance, though remaining virtually in force, was no longer capable of being executed, and, therefore, was inefficacious. However, provided it secured the neutrality of Austria, it was necessary that we should be satisfied, and not by any act of ours invalidate its remaining virtue by causing the repeated assertion that it was no longer applicable to the circumstances. M. de Narbonne had certainly gone too far, though in the direction which he was constantly urged to follow with augmented speed.

M. de Metternich, who had no wish for a rupture with France, perceived that the fears of M. de Narbonne were not wholly ungrounded, especially with regard to the possibility of a difficulty between Prince Poniatowski and General Count Frimont if they should persist in demanding the disarming of the Polish corps. Fortunately, it was easy to find a remedy for this evil, and he was not wanting in the application of it. He had already granted that the French battalion comprised in the Polish army

should not be disarmed on entering the Austrian territory. He also granted that the Polish army, which was always at liberty not to withdraw behind the Austrian frontier if they preferred to fight alone against the Russian, should also be at liberty, if they wished to traverse Bohemia and enter Saxony, to raise their arms during the transit. He further promised that at every stage they should find help and provisions. "It has been sufficient," said M. de Metternich, "for the Emperor Francis to know that the Emperor Napoleon, with a very justifiable susceptibility to his military character, has disapproved the execution of a formality quite in accordance with the rights of nations, as far as concerns the Poles, to induce him spontaneously to renounce it. The Emperor Francis, however, demands urgently that the stay of an armed body on neutral territory should be as short as possible."

The inconvenience of these disputes was merely that they rendered it easy to Austria to make declarations which should afterwards be turned against us, but also that they led her to despair of our mediation, when she saw us imperious and so unaccommodating, and she matured the fatal resolution which every thing around her induced her to adopt. After every such scene it might be perceived that M. de Metternich was more constrained towards us and more involved with our enemies. Every day our adversaries at Vienna were heard to boast that they had gained him over, so that the echo of these remarks reached M. de Narbonne from the court and from society.

However, they were somewhat interrupted by the report of recent military events. Suddenly it was learned that a great battle had been fought, that torrents of blood had been shed, and that we were beaten, according to those who spread the news, who were generally our enemies. Our defeat was everywhere affirmed with unparalleled assurance. These rumours were founded on the letters of the Emperor Alexander and several of the Prussian generals, but not on any of the King of Prussia, who was too prudent to write in this manner. The Emperor Alexander was so well pleased with himself, and the Prussian generals with their own performances, that they were hardly conscious of being conquered, though they were unable to keep their ground at any point. The English ambassador, Lord Cathcart, an experienced soldier, and a witness of the battle, perceived the ridiculous character of these false reports, and said that if they only gained victories of that kind it would soon be necessary to treat for peace at any cost. M. de Metternich had too much sense to credit such boasting. Yet the assertions were so positive that he was surprised, for he could not believe that they would venture on such an extent of falsehood, and he expressed his astonishment to M. de Narbonne. These circumstances brought out in full force the character of M. de Narbonne as a great nobleman, a wise and haughty soldier. "We are conquered," said he to every one. "Be it so. . . . We shall see in a few days what will be the conquered and the conquerors." Four days afterwards, they learned that the reputed conquered were at the gates of Dresden, and the reputed conquerors were beyond the Elbe. The confusion was extreme. In the

drawing-rooms of Vienna, men loudly declared against the military incapacity of the two allied sovereigns; but, instead of being more inclined towards us, they insisted with greater energy on the necessity of Austria flying to their aid and joining them to save Europe from an intolerable yoke.

M. de Metternich immediately called upon M. de Narbonne, and, with a degree of confidence not wholly insincere, said to him that Napoleon's victories did not surprise him, for on these victories he had based all his pacific calculations; that to render peace acceptable it was necessary to forego at least two-thirds of the Russian, English, and Prussian proposals; that the victory of Lutzen would favour this; that he had counted upon it, and that his hopes would have been deceived if it had turned out otherwise, (an assertion which, however singular, was true;) but that a third of those proposals still remained, the reasonableness, justice, and wisdom of which must be acknowledged; that it was now time for the court of Vienna to act her part as mediator, assumed at the instigation of France and with the consent of the belligerent powers; that it would soon be too late to act that part with advantage, as affairs were now advancing; that he was, therefore, about to despatch two plenipotentiaries, one to the French head-quarters and the other to those of the Russian general; that in order to gain audience it was necessary to employ persons agreeable to those whom they addressed; that, General Count Bubna having seemed to please Napoleon, (we have stated that he was a soldier and a wit,) they would employ him again; that M. de Stadion, already celebrated in the anti-French party, had better chance than any other of meeting a good reception at the head-quarters of the allies, and therefore they were about to send him there; that, far from being a dangerous enemy to France, he would be more useful than a friend, for he would with greater boldness express to the Russians and Prussians the truths which it behooved them to hear; that, being now in agreement with the Emperor and M. de Metternich on the conditions of the mediation of peace, he alone was capable of rendering those conditions acceptable to the belligerent parties, supporting his demands by the victories of Napoleon. In all these things M. de Metternich was in the right, and he had exercised double skill; for, while choosing in M. de Stadion a negotiator who from his very hostility to us would have all the more weight with the allies, he occupied and compromised a rival, an antagonist, in a word, the head of the anti-French party, the party who desired war with us as speedily as possible. To deprive that party of such a head was the best step that could be taken for himself and for us.

It was, then, announced that M. de Bubna and de Stadion were to be despatched to propose an armistice and to induce an explanation of the conditions of the future peace. Without pretending to impose them on Napoleon, they declared that they would take the liberty to indicate those which they supposed would be acceptable to all the belligerent parties; and, unwilling to make any mystery of them to M. de Narbonne, M. de Metternich, who had already clearly indicated them in several particulars, enumerated them now with the greatest

precision. They were such as we have repeatedly described,—the suppression of the grand duchy of Warsaw and its restoration to Prussia, except some portions rightly reverting to Russia and Austria, the reconstitution of Prussia by means of the grand duchy and of territories to be formed in Germany, the abandonment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and, finally, the renunciation of the Hanseatic departments, *i.e.* the towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck. Nothing was to be said of Holland, Italy, and Spain, to avoid raising insoluble difficulties, and they were to defer as long as necessary the maritime peace if there were no means of coming to an understanding with England, in order to conclude without delay the continental peace, which was the most urgent. Such, independently of the restitution of the Illyrian provinces, which we had almost promised to Austria, were the conditions which left us Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, like royal vassals, Holland, Belgium, the Rhine provinces, Piedmont, Tuscany, the Roman States, like French departments. Such was the France which was offered to us, an offer which we regarded as an insult. As to Spain, it was certain that it was necessary to sacrifice it in order to obtain peace with England; but this sacrifice would be enough. M. de Metternich said that he had assured himself of this on several occasions. Our previous statements have shown that in this respect at least there would be no insurmountable difficulty on the part of Napoleon.

M. de Narbonne said repeatedly that, Napoleon being victorious, he would not accept these conditions; but M. de Metternich replied that Napoleon was more reasonable than he was represented; that these conditions were inevitable, and that he must still use great efforts to render them acceptable to the allied powers.

There remained the King of Saxony, who was known to be placed between the alternative of defection or return to Dresden; and the course of Austria in regard to him was plain. Some foolish men, regardless of the means to be employed, at least in words, said at Vienna that they ought to seize the person of that monarch, and thus to prevent his again falling under the yoke of Napoleon by returning to Dresden. Nothing of the kind could be thought of for a moment. Nor would they have had time to do so, for he had been obliged to give an immediate answer to our summons, and to consent, though with tears, to the proposal of Napoleon. He prepared to leave Prague with his troops and his court, urgently demanding secrecy, and promising the same to Austria on the subject of her negotiations between the cabinets of Dresden and Vienna. The secret was neither very profound nor very dark. It consisted in adhesion to a policy of mediation, which the poor King of Saxony might well regard as no treason when he saw it openly followed by the father-in-law of Napoleon without the occurrence of any rupture between them. He therefore intimated his arrival at Dresden in two days, a period absolutely necessary for a court which was not very expeditious to make all their preparations for the journey. It consisted of many princes and princesses, some very old, and all characterized by the same goodness and timidity as the king.

When Napoleon heard in succession all that

has been related, he prepared to receive his ally, now returned to his fidelity, but first he gave his instructions to his representative at Vienna. He at length perceived the error of having urged Austria so far and provoked her to constitute herself an armed mediator, *i.e.* an arbiter, when he was unwilling to submit to her decision. He also perceived his error in supposing that he could engage that power in his designs by the offer of the spoils of Prussia, and in not seeing that Austria was anxious to reconstitute Germany in order to regain her own independence, which she preferred to all territorial aggrandizement. But, as usual with princes who are unwilling to acknowledge their error, he threw all the blame on his representative, M. de Narbonne, who could not have acted otherwise with the mission he had undertaken and the instructions he had received. However, as Napoleon loved that distinguished man, he reproved him without severity for having carried things so far, for having presented a note notwithstanding the prohibition of the cabinet to present any without a formal order, and for having induced M. de Metternich to declare on two occasions that the treaty of alliance was not applicable to present circumstances.

He said that he regretted that his father-in-law had been placed in a false position, which would shortly be seen, for the French had only begun that course of victories which was to be rapidly continued. However this be, Austria would very soon be obliged to draw back, owing to the mistakes she had made; but at present M. de Narbonne must show himself calm and reserved without coldness, and should make no further demand upon nor give any further reply to the court of Vienna, in order that she might perceive that she was no longer regarded as an ally, though accepted as a mediator, but not as an armed mediator.

Notwithstanding the apparent moderation of this language, Napoleon was at heart exasperated against Austria and his father-in-law. Notwithstanding his profound sagacity, the tendency to self-flattery, which influences all men, however penetrating, when their position requires them to impose upon themselves, had induced him to believe that he would obtain every thing from Austria for liberal payment; and he was much irritated at finding his calculation so completely frustrated. The conditions proposed to him, and which ought not to have appeared new, were wholly unacceptable. He had in thought renounced the grand duchy of Warsaw, especially after having seen more closely the difficulty of creating it; but at the close of the war of 1812, a war undertaken with the view of humiliating Russia, reconstituting Poland, and augmenting the pressure of his yoke upon Europe,—at the close of this war, to find Russia aggrandized, Poland irrevocably destroyed instead of restored, to put up with the defection of Prussia and even to reward it, to renounce the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, to abandon the Hanse towns, the original cause of dispute with Russia, involved an amount of mortification which in no degree diminished his real power, but which gave a cruel check to his pride. In reference to the true interests of France, none of these sacrifices were to be regretted. The grand duchy of

Warsaw was a chimera so long as Prussia and Austria did not think of restoring Poland, for, after all, they were the states whom Poland was intended to protect, and if they wished no such protection it was puerile to force it upon them. As to Prussia, we had no interest to keep her so weak, either in regard to Russia or Austria. The protectorate of the Rhine was an empty title, hateful to the Germans, calculated merely to insure their hatred without any actual influence over them. And obstinately to cling to the Hanse towns was to extend our military and commercial frontier beyond all reasonable bounds. With difficulty could we defend the Zuyderzee and Texel, for beyond the Wahal we had no solid frontier: the whole genius of Napoleon had been required to make Holland assume a good system of defence, and even at the present time his efforts had only proved partially successful. Yet the possession of Holland presented such great maritime advantages that it might naturally be coveted by an ambition which rivalled that of Charlemagne. But the Hanse towns involved a charge without adequate remuneration, for it was impossible to defend them without extending France to the Elbe, and commercially they were indispensable to the support of Germany and useless to us. Relatively to the continental blockade their advantage ceased with the cessation of the blockade and with the peace. Had we been wise, we might even have renounced Westphalia with some compensation to King Jerome; but this was not demanded, for the Emperor Alexander had refused to form any engagement with the Grand Duke of Hesse to restore his estates, and there was no need to enter upon the question. Nothing, then, but implacable pride could induce Napoleon to reject the conditions proposed by Austria. He said that he would not submit to humiliation. And he considered it humiliation to be unable to realize all the dreams of his vast ambition even when his actual power was in no degree affected. Alas! the punishment of the man whose pride has encroached upon others is found in the inability to yield even when it is seen to be just and necessary to do so. He is nailed to his foolish pretensions, like Prometheus to the rock,—a terrible example to those who, listening only to their own desires, make sport of the rights and dignity of mankind.

When Napoleon was assured of the intentions of Austria, which ought to have been rendered familiar to him by the frequent insinuations of the last four months, he was highly irritated against that power. He detected a double treason, a violation of the treaty and of the claims of relationship, and he said to himself, as he had often done before, down to the very day when a sudden movement of ill humour towards Russia had decided him to unite himself with Austria by marriage, that it was impossible to count upon the court of Vienna, that she always presented an abase of dissimulation, cunning, and egoism, that it would be better to come to an understanding with all the world than with her, and, if sacrifices must be made, to make them in favour of Russia or England than of Austria or Prussia. An accidental circumstance put the finishing-stroke to his irritation. A courier from Vienna had been arrested at Dresden bringing despatches from

M. de Stackelberg, the Russian representative in Austria since relations between those two powers had been resumed in reference to the mediation. In these despatches from M. de Stackelberg to M. de Nesselrode had been found many singular details, and they disclosed the fact that M. de Metternich, placed in a difficult position, condemning him to extreme dissimulation, lavished expressions of good will on all parties, but more on the Russians and Prussians than on the French. M. de Metternich, to excuse his not immediately bringing all the forces of Austria to the aid of our enemies and adopting all their conditions of peace, did not hesitate, when in private with them, to say that his conduct was constrained by the treaty of alliance of March 14, 1812, by the marriage of Maria Louisa, by the danger of war with France, and by the unfinished state of the preparations of Austria, and, wherever circumstances allowed, he evinced a real preference for the coalition. Without having read any of the foreign diplomatic despatches, such, or even more than this, might have been confidently conjectured, nor ought it to have occasioned astonishment or emotion; all that M. de Metternich said might have been regarded as true when he affirmed that on certain conditions he would place himself on our side. It should be remembered that M. de Metternich, being a German, did not and could not love the French, and that if he studied us it was from policy, and simply to avoid foolishly compromising his country with us; it was necessary for him to make the most advantage of his prudence, but not to aim at the impossible. Such are the dictates of policy, whose art consists in comprehending all situations, studying them, and turning them to account; but the reasoning of Napoleon was dictated by pride, victory, and despotism. These sudden discoveries irritated him,—as if a mind such as his, all light when undisturbed by passion, all smoke and fire when under its influence, ought not to have foreseen them. One item exasperated him more than all the rest. At the moment when they were impatiently expecting at Vienna news of the battle of the 2d of May, anticipated but not known, M. de Metternich, in his zeal for Russia, had written to M. de Stackelberg that if he should receive despatches even during the night he should awaken him to let him know their import. This was to pay great attention to Russia, especially on the part of a minister who declared himself the faithful ally of France! A letter had also been found from the King of Saxony to General Thielmann, which, contemplating the probable arrival of the French as victors on the Elbe, enjoined him to close the fortress of Torgau against the Russians, and still more firmly against the French. In these provident instructions Napoleon refused to see the good and improvident Saxon monarch, but he ascribed them to the subtle craft of Vienna. All this, examined, exaggerated, and estimated by passion, appeared to be absolute treason; whereas it was merely the effort of prudence to escape the numerous rocks which embarrassed his course. Once more, we ought to have profited by the counsels of M. de Metternich, and by the fear that we continually occasioned him, to escape from this situation at the smallest sacrifice; and, as any proposed sacrifice only

affected vanity and not actual power, it was necessary to submit with good or bad grace: the disaster of Moscow must inevitably cost us something! Too happy ought we to have been that we had not paid for it with our existence. Let the reader pardon these vain reflections, fifty years after the event; let him pardon the grief inspired by the constant contemplation of the fatal resolutions which lost us not only Napoleon, (for the fate of one man, whoever he be, matters little,) but the greatness of our country!

Napoleon hastily reverted to the policy proposed in the council held at the Tuileries in January, and strongly supported by MM. de Caulaincourt, de Talleyrand, and de Cambacérés, consisting in laying Austria aside, but without offending her, and seeking direct communication with Russia. This policy, though prudent in as far as it did not greatly involve Austria in actual events nor assign to her a part in which she might act against us, was nevertheless attended with one serious practical inconvenience, the difficulty of personal intercourse with the Emperor Alexander. This difficulty, which was great in January, must have been increased by the recent military events, by the hope which the Germans cherished in Alexander of making him the liberator of Europe and the first of reigning monarchs. It is true that the battle of Lutzen, and a subsequent victory which Napoleon might reasonably anticipate, might dissipate the fumes which intoxicated Alexander and facilitate intercourse with him. Napoleon hoped this with that sanguine energy which is common to powerful minds with whom it is converted into a principle of action, and he made all his arrangements accordingly.

He resolved to continue the campaign without intermission, to strike some decisive blow as soon as possible, to take advantage of it to conclude peace, but rather by coming to an understanding with Russia or even England than with the German powers, to sacrifice to England the whole or part of Spain, with which he was disgusted, as all the world would readily believe, and the relinquishment of which would appear rather in the light of a relief than a sacrifice, and would certainly have involved no great humiliation, for the error of having sought to possess it was now universally acknowledged. By yielding Poland in whole or in part to Russia, and Spain in whole or in part to the Bourbons, it seemed to him that every thing might be arranged, and that he would not be in any way subjected to Prussia, who, in his opinion, had betrayed him openly, or to Austria, who had betrayed him secretly, and that he would thus free himself from faithless allies by inevitable sacrifices, the mortification of which had been mollified by destiny and physical impediments, that of Poland by Moscow, that of Spain by the invincible obstinacy of the people. If war did not bring about speedily a decisive result and negotiation, he proposed to prolong the present situation until the completion of the second series of his armaments, when he would have 200,000 more men on the field, who, with the previous 300,000 which were hourly making up their numbers, would compose a total of 500,000 men, and allow him to throw off all dissimulation with Austria, to regard her even

as an enemy, and then, placed on the Elbe as formerly he had been on the Adige, at Dresden as formerly at Verona, at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia as formerly at the foot of the Alps, to attempt on a much larger scale, not against one power only but against the whole of Europe, a new Italian campaign, in which General Bonaparte, converted into the Emperor Napoleon, should appear as young in character but more vast in conception, matured by an unequalled experience, should renew in his mature age the prodigies of his youth, prodigies augmented by every thing which time had added to his position, and should terminate as formerly by astounding triumphs, and then enjoy repose himself and grant the same privilege to the world! Alas! only one thing was wanting to this beautiful dream, namely, that human nature should be as indefatigable as Napoleon, and should be willing to perish as one man to gratify the ambition of a conqueror who to the genius of a geometer united the imagination of a poet!

After having adopted these resolutions, Napoleon, as usual, proceeded to practice; for, chimerical as were his conceptions, nothing could be more precise and positive than their execution. At first he addressed a series of despatches to M. de Narbonne, (sometimes three in a day on the same subject,) which displayed the change that had occurred in his mind. He said that nothing more was to be demanded of Austria, but neither was she to be offended, nor, especially, was she to be in any way challenged, but rather a conduct reserved and calm was to be maintained towards her, without attempting deceit, for falsehood profited nothing. She must be allowed to see that no further reliance was placed upon her, and that they perfectly understood her frequently-repeated maxim that the treaty of March 14, 1812, was no longer applicable to the circumstances. Then when she would learn that vast armaments were rapidly being formed in Italy, Bavaria, and France, it would not be necessary to deny it, but rather to state the true amount if it were called in question, without assigning any other motive than the seriousness of the conjuncture. Napoleon wrote again to M. de Narbonne, that Austria would certainly understand the meaning of this new attitude, and that it was desirable that she should, that she ought to be assured that her mediation was not essential to France in her intercourse with other powers, that between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander there was a political but by no means a personal quarrel, and that the two sovereigns had never ceased to cherish a mutual regard which would reappear on the first friendly expression of Napoleon. "A direct mission to the Russian headquarters," said Napoleon, "would divide the world in two parts." This expression disclosed his whole thought: it signified that M. de Caulaincourt, whose former intimacy with Alexander was well known, when sent to that prince, would change the whole aspect of things by placing France and Russia in one camp and the rest of the world in another. But this was not the case since they had so deeply wounded the pride of Alexander; and, at any rate, it was very imprudent to say so, for the expression of such a thought would suffice to make

Austria without an hour's delay throw herself into the arms of Russia, and the two months required to convert the 300,000 men, whom he possessed, into 500,000, would be reduced to a few days. Happily, M. de Narbonne was too intelligent to allow M. de Metternich to perceive this possibility. He might there find ground for confidence, but not for dangerous and useless boasting.

After having expressed his real thoughts to M. de Narbonne through M. de Caulaincourt, who replaced at Dresden M. de Bassano, still detained at Paris, Napoleon sent for Prince Eugene. The viceroy, though not without his faults, those particularly arising from his half-creole origin,—i.e. some degree of indifference and negligence in matters of detail, which had occasionally subjected him to the censure of Napoleon,—had nevertheless gained his esteem by his great bravery, quick sense of honour, and exemplary resignation to a frightful situation during the retreat. Napoleon expressed his satisfaction, informed him that he had arranged a beautiful dowry for his daughter, that of the duchy of Galliera, and that this would be published in the *Moniteur* as the reward of his services during the campaign of 1812. He then told him that he must immediately set off for Milan, where he would see his family, from whom he had been separated for more than a year, and would place himself in readiness to fulfil an important mission, which Napoleon thus explained to him.\* He was first to take the command, not only of the kingdom of Lombardy, but of Piedmont and Tuscany, in a military sense, and employ the whole summer in organizing a fine army of Italy. The necessary elements were found upon the spot, either in the form of cadres or of trained conscripts. The cadres of the 4th corps, with which Prince Eugene had made the Russian campaign, had just returned to Italy, and might furnish twenty-four battalions. The Italian army might furnish at least twenty-four more. The regiments of Piedmont which had recruited the battalions sent into Spain returned in diminished numbers but with greater experience of war, and might perhaps raise the army of Upper Italy to eighty battalions. Artillery abounded in that country, and by the month of July they ought easily to have procured one hundred and fifty guns with their horses. The cavalry, which ought to have been ready for General Bertrand, but which had not, would be so for Prince Eugene. It was then easy to have there an army of 80,000 men in two or three months, and one much better organized than that with which they had just conquered the allies in Saxony, because they would have time and repose to procure the necessary matériel. Finally, Napoleon assigned to Prince Eugene lieutenants of the highest merit,—General Grenier, who had been recently wounded, but who was about to return to Italy to be healed, and the illustrious Miollis, wise, witty, and heroic as a Spartan.

There remained Murat. That unhappy prince had almost lost his wits when he gained a crown. Keenly wounded by the words inserted

\* Here I place no confidence in conjecture. I state facts from authentic sources, the letters of Napoleon to Eugene, in which all these facts are recalled or stated, with the reasons always stated at length.

in the *Moniteur* after his departure from the army, fearing that he had incurred lasting disgrace with Napoleon, and that he was henceforward reserved with his kingdom of Naples to act as some convenient make-weight in the arrangements for peace, having lent an ear to the overtures addressed by Austria to all those who wished to abandon France but dared not do so, fearing at each step to do too much or too little, he was in the condition of the King of Bavaria and the King of Saxony, of all those allies, in short, who, while too honest to betray us, were not sufficiently honest not to think of so doing, and he had greater remorse than they, for he owed every thing to Napoleon, whose sister he had married, a sister whom he suspected, although she was no less inclined than he to retain the much-loved kingdom, the cause of all their errors and misfortunes. At times he seemed almost delirious. His health suffered manifestly, and the hero so beautiful upon the field of the Moskowa had become a weak king, tormented with anxiety, and had lost his beauty, his serenity, and his courage. His people, whom he had contrived to please, were moved with compassion, and, as if to console him, loaded him with applause wherever they saw him. Sometimes he wished to throw himself at the feet of Napoleon and offer to command the remains of his cavalry; sometimes to give himself to Austria, and had despatched thither one Prince Cariati, whose conduct at Vienna had been so scandalous that M. de Narbonne was obliged to report it to Napoleon.

All this excited the pity but not the kindness of Napoleon, and he was resolved to put an end to it. He had no doubt that upon a formal order from him, accompanied by a positive menace which could be more easily realized towards Naples than towards Sweden, Murat would run to his feet, and he resolved first to summon him to the army, and then to demand that his troops should be united with those of Prince Eugene. Murat had employed all his time since 1808 in erecting a Neapolitan army; and he was the only man who could succeed, for, in addition to his renown, he charmed the Neapolitans by his beautiful and graceful countenance. Of this army about 10,000 men had been scattered widely among the troops sent to Russia, and of them 3000 or 4000 had been saved. But Murat had still under arms about 40,000 men, perfectly organized, and Napoleon prepared to take 20,000 to add to the troops of Prince Eugene. "When Austria shall see 100,000 men upon the Adige," he said to the viceroy, "she will perceive that she must settle accounts with us and not we with her." These verbal instructions having been given to Prince Eugene, and subsequently consigned to writing in several despatches, Napoleon pressed his hand with affection, which he always entertained for that prince, though he sometimes lost confidence in him as in all whom he held most dear, and he dismissed him the same day.

We have seen what arrangements he had made for assembling an army at Mentz with the cadres returned from Spain. The incessant consumption of men in the Peninsula giving some idea of what would remain in cadres always less numerous, Napoleon reckoned upon sixty cadres of battalions at Mentz, which

should be daily filled by conscripts of the former classes. He hoped to add to them the cadres of sixty squadrons of cavalry, recruited with the men trained at the depôts and supplied with horses taken from France. In Westphalia, the reorganization of the corps of Marshal Davout and the Duke of Belluno should furnish, as we have seen, one hundred and twelve battalions, i.e. at least 90,000 infantry. Already the twenty-eight second battalions reorganized at Erfurt were united under the Duke of Belluno, who, besides the twelve belonging to himself, had the sixteen belonging to Marshal Davout; twenty-eight had just arrived at Bremen under General Vandamme; the others were soon to follow. When they should all be formed, it was proposed, as we have said, to put together the four battalions of each regiment, thus to re-compose the twenty-eight old regiments, to give sixteen of them to Marshal Davout, twelve to Marshal Victor, and to create an army of 120,000 men, with a numerous artillery drawn from Holland and the Hanse departments with the rest of the cavalry remounted by General Bourcier. If Denmark, at this time courted by England and Russia, who wished to extract from her, for an indemnity, the voluntary sacrifice of Norway, should return to us, as every thing led to hope, we might promise ourselves 12,000 or 15,000 good Danish soldiers, which would raise the army of the Lower Rhine to at least 130,000 men. There were, then, three armies, one at Milan, one at Mentz, one at Hamburg, which Napoleon was preparing independently of what he had already under his hand, whose organization was rapidly advancing, especially since he had been at Dresden. He reckoned upon 100,000 men in Italy, 70,000 at Mentz, 130,000 between Magdeburg and Hamburg, i.e. 600,000 combatants including those in Saxony,—an enormous force, well calculated, it must be confessed, to bias his judgment by inspiring unbounded confidence.

On the organization of these different troops he addressed the most precise instructions to Marshal Davout, under whose firm and skillful guidance they were in part to be executed. He announced to him that he would soon restore the battalions borrowed from him for the Duke of Belluno; he ordered him to return as quickly as possible to Hamburg, to take advantage, for this purpose, of the projected movement upon Berlin, to exercise everywhere, and particularly at Hamburg, a rigorous justice. Napoleon was exasperated against the Hanse towns, which had expelled, and in many places assassinated, the collectors of customs and taxes and the French officers of police, which had welcomed with transport the Cossacks, and which seemed to be the object of military and diplomatic efforts on the part of the coalition. He wished to bring back these towns to his authority by force and terror, and, if necessary to restore them to Germany, to restore them in ruins. He ordered Marshal Davout to shoot the members of the former senate, who had resumed their power, the principal leaders of the insurrection, and several officers of the Hanseatic legion levied against us; he ordered him to arrest five hundred principal merchants who were considered the enemies of France, and to confiscate their property, and to seize everywhere, without examination, the colonial produce and

English merchandise which had reached Hamburg by the Elbe in abundance since the insurrection. This he said would help to pay for the war, of which the merchants of those countries were in some degree the cause. Never basely concealing himself behind his agents when he ordered severe measures, he wished Marshal Davout, while executing these formidable instructions, to declare that he acted upon the express orders of the Emperor, and he added that he counted upon his known inflexibility to effect their complete execution. Fortunately, he also counted, without expressing it, on the goodness and wisdom of that marshal, who, with all his sternness, knew how to defer compliance till the anger of his master should have evaporated in threats. The greater part of all these orders were to remain unexecuted, and they were to result in heavy contributions on which the army were supported for more than six months from Hamburg to Dresden.

Napoleon, spending on horseback the time which he did not occupy with labour in his cabinet, had traversed the banks of the Elbe, reconnoitred Königstein and Pirna as well as all the country above and below Dresden, ordered the construction of two bridges, one of wood at Dresden, to unite the remaining portions of the stone bridge, and one of rafts at Priesnitz, where the army had forcibly effected a passage. He had constructed strong *têtes de pont* embracing each bank in case he should be obliged to fall back upon the line of the Elbe in consequence of the loss of a battle, and he had personally superintended the creation of vast hospitals and magazines of provisions situated on the left bank, that nothing might be exposed to the attempts of the enemy. All these works he paid for from his private treasury, in order to attract the people of Dresden, whom he wished at the same time to intimidate and to please. The detachments of cavalry brought from the dépôts by the Duke of Placenza having arrived, he fused them into the corps of General Latour-Maubourg so as to bring together the squadrons of each regiment. This corps had thus been raised to 8000 excellent horsemen, and with 3000 Saxons who were to return, and 1000 or 2000 Bavarians and Wurtembergians who were expected, it would in a few days amount to 12,000 horsemen, which with the addition of 4000 of the Guard would give a total of 16,000 cavalry, a respectable force, and independent of the light troops of that arm which attended each corps for reconnoitring purposes. Of the detachments from the dépôts under the Duke of Placenza there remained at least 3000 horsemen intended for General Sebastiani, to complete his regiments when he should have arrived at Wittenberg. The army would then have 25,000 horse capable of service in the field. They had to wait eight or ten days still before they should pass from a state of almost entire destitution in respect to cavalry to one of a tolerably imposing character. Moreover, General Barrois had brought a second division of the infantry of the Young Guard, and he was preparing a third in Franconia under General Delaborde. Thus were completed, during the few days of rest at Dresden, the 300,000 men who were to form the first army of Napoleon, and who would perhaps suffice to dictate terms to the whole of allied

Europe. In this period of repose, so actively employed, he awaited the King of Saxony, who had been summoned to repair to Dresden, and Count Bubna, so pompously announced from Vienna.

The King of Saxony had not lost an hour in complying with the summons of his formidable ally. He had left Prague, demanding of Austria, as we have said, and promising to her, secrecy on all that had transpired. On the 12th of May, the aged king, surrounded by his family and his fine cavalry so often demanded in vain, arrived by the Peterswalde road at the gates of Dresden. Napoleon, who had resolved to act a kind of farce, but of a lofty character, as it became him, had left the town at the head of his Guard to receive the Saxon monarch, to whom, he said, he was happy to restore his states reconquered by the arms of France. The French army was on foot: the weather was beautiful, and every thing favoured so imposing a scene. Napoleon, approaching the aged king, dismounted and embraced him affectionately as a prince who had torn himself from dangerous enemies in order to join him, and not as a repentant prince brought back by fear. Frederick Augustus was powerfully moved, for, though he feared Napoleon, he also loved him, having received from him only benefit, a benefit indeed chimerical and oppressive to one so weak, being the heavy crown of Poland, but still a benefit, and on meeting him again so powerful and so friendly he was seized with a sense of gratitude. Napoleon received him with equal respect and dignity, in the presence of the inhabitants of Dresden, who had flocked in crowds to be present at the interview, and who, with the childishness common to great multitudes, were struck by the spectacle, and were moved, and as it were appeased, at the sight of the reconciled monarchs. And it may be added that the behaviour of the Russians in Saxony had tended greatly to diminish the hatred of the French.

Napoleon conducted Frederick Augustus to his palace, which he professed to restore to him, and dined the same day at his table with great pomp. He had lodged temporarily at the palace of the king, but had publicly announced his intention of choosing a more military and less inconvenient abode, with the view also of giving the king the appearance of perfect freedom. A country-house was found for Napoleon near the gates of Dresden, where he might have his time uninterrupted and enjoy the fine weather, and also have the air, which so well suited him, of living in camp.

After these demonstrations came the explanations and interchange of affectionate expressions between Napoleon and the aged monarch. Did that prince in his agitation make those confessions which were afterwards ascribed to him to justify the spoliation of part of his states? Such has been pretended; but all existing documents prove the contrary. It is probable that the views of Austria appeared in his statements without any unfaithfulness on his part, and that if he disclosed them it was involuntarily, for they were sufficiently plain in themselves, and, after all, not very culpable, though at the time Napoleon regarded them with much displeasure. It is certain that those disclosures, which had changed the sentiments of Napoleon towards Austria, had reached him



before May 12, the day on which Frederick Augustus entered Dresden, and that he had learned all either through M. de Narbonne or the intercepted despatches, and nothing through the King of Saxony, who was still absent from his capital.

Napoleon in their interview encouraged the king in respect to the results of the war, imparted to him his own confidence, and restored to him as much tranquillity as he could experience in the midst of the tumult of arms, to which he was so little adapted. Their union was perfectly restored; and Napoleon was desirous that this should plainly appear, for it suited him to exhibit the greatest intimacy with his allies, by whom he was said to be equally feared and hated,—which was certainly true of the German people, but much less so of their sovereigns.

The first advantage derived by Napoleon from the presence of the King at Dresden was the acquisition of his troops. The Saxon cavalry was superb. By a little recruiting, it should muster about 8000 men, already charmed by the skilful flatteries of Napoleon. It was assigned that very day to the brave Latour-Maubourg. The infantry confined at Torgau were exposed to a dangerous trial. General Thielmann, one of the most sincere and zealous of the German patriots, had been compromised by his conduct. He had gone to visit the Emperor Alexander at Dresden, had expressed his devotion to the cause of the allies, but as a faithful subject had not dared to deliver up Torgau, having orders from the king to open the gates to none but the Austrians. Having returned to Torgau, he had been dismayed at seeing, after the battle of Lutzen, his king fallen again into the hands of the French, and, moreover, had conceived great fear on his own account. Yielding to the double motive of patriotism and personal fear, he had attempted to shake the fidelity of his troops, and to induce them to go over to the Russians on the ground that the king was not free, and that his orders were extorted from him by violence. Though his patriotic expressions found an echo in the hearts of his officers, he could not prevail upon them; and all, with their soldiers, remained faithful to the authority of their sovereign. After this fruitless attempt he fled to the camp of Alexander, abandoning his infantry, who from that moment returned without difficulty to the command of General Reynier, for whose talents and character they had a well-merited respect.

In the mean while, Marshal Ney, in conformity with his instructions, had traversed Leipsic and repaired to Torgau, where he received the Saxons. A little to the left, at Wittenberg, that marshal had the Duke of Belluno with his reorganized battalions on the right, General Lauriston with his corps at Meissen. General Sebastiani, who was bringing the cavalry which had been remounted in Hanover, and the Puthod division, (that one of Lauriston's corps which had remained in the rear,) had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, with Reynier, Victor, and Lauriston, Marshal Ney had sufficient forces to march upon Berlin; and he awaited impatiently the order to do so.

Before ordering him to advance, Napoleon wished to have accurate information of the designs of the allies. He had already brought Prince Eugene's corps beyond the Elbe. Since

the departure of the prince, his corps had been placed under the command of Marshal Macdonald; and it was now directed to Bischoffswerda, which it had entered after destroying a rear-guard of the enemy and passing through the flames. At this moment the Russians were accused of wishing to behave in Germany as they had done in Russia,—i.e. of burning the countries which they evacuated. It is certain that the unfortunate little town of Bischoffswerda had been burned, perhaps by the howitzers without the fault of any one. From Bischoffswerda, Marshal Macdonald had directed his course to Bautzen. There the reports were more definite, and the Russians and Prussians combined seemed resolved to risk another battle,—which was really the case. Notwithstanding their losses and the danger of another defeat, no one had doubted the necessity of another battle between the Elbe and the Oder. To retreat farther would be to abandon three-fourths of the Prussian monarchy, and especially Berlin, which they could not defend directly by the detachment of a corps, but which was to a certain degree protected by a strong position maintained in Lusatia. This would be to acknowledge to Germany and to Europe that they had made an empty boast after Lutzen, that on that day they had been so beaten that they had no means of staying their retreat either behind the Elbe or even the Oder; it would be to dismiss all the German patriots whom they had invited to meet on all the battle-fields of Saxony, and Austria, whom they retained only by means of promises, boasting, exaggeration, and especially neighbourhood, by remaining in some manner physically attached to her. It was therefore necessary to conquer or to die, rather than to allow themselves to be torn from the mountains of Bohemia, at whose foot they had halted on quitting Dresden, and to defend themselves by one of the numerous streams which descend from the Riesen-Gebirge across Lusatia and divide the space between the Elbe and the Oder. At Bautzen, near the course of the Spree, was a strong position, in a sense double, presenting two fields of battle, one before the Spree, the other behind it,—a position rendered famous by Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War,\*—on which might be fought one or even two defensive battles, the left being protected by the mountains of Bohemia, the right by vast marshes. Partly by past fame and partly by the local advantages they had resolved to adopt the position of Bautzen and to fight with desperation. Of the 92,000 men who met on the plains of Lutzen on the 2d of May, about 20,000 had been lost either in battle or on the march; but they had been replaced by 80,000 others, some taken from Silesia, by means of reserves prepared by Prussia in that rich province, others from the corps which besieged the fortresses on the Vistula. This was the corps of Barclay de Tolly, comprising about 15,000 Russians, who had just taken Thorn from a garrison, chiefly Bavarian, consumed by disease and lodged in works scarcely defensible. This was the only garrison on the Oder or Vistula which had yielded; and it appeared to the allies much more useful to gain a great battle than to besiege forts which they had little chance of taking, and which, being

\* He had here fought the battle of Hochkirch.

situated in the midst of very hostile people, could exert no influence beyond their own walls. They had therefore collected in front and rear of Bautzen, along the Spree, under the protection of vast abatis and numerous redoubts, about 100,000 Prussians and Russians, full of ardour and very difficult to be forced in this asylum, and they were prepared to risk a decisive battle. To the Prussian Generals Bulow and Borstell had been assigned the duty of protecting Berlin and Brandenburg as well as they could, to the foragers of Czernicheff and Tettenborn the task of maintaining themselves upon the Lower Elbe, eating, drinking, and burning at the expense of the Germans whom they had come to deliver; and they had determined themselves to solve the great European question in the sight of Austria and at the foot of her mountains. They addressed to her the finest description of their position and forces, and entreated her not to be intimidated or seduced by the tyrant of Europe, who, they said, would soon be brought to bay.

Such were the details brought by our spies and reconnoissances, which the augmentation of our cavalry allowed us to carry farther than formerly. Having spent at Dresden only seven days, a period absolutely necessary to reinstate the King of Saxony, to collect a few cavalry, and to bring his corps into line, Napoleon determined to march forward immediately and again to dissipate the fumes of pride which intoxicated the allies. Already was Marshal Macdonald in sight of Bautzen; he supported him on the right and along the mountains by Marshal Oudinot with two French and one Bavarian division, on the left by Marshal Marmont with his three divisions, two French and one German, still farther to the left by General Bertrand with a French, Italian, and Wurtembergian division. At the same time, he had kept Marshal Ney and General Lauriston in front of the Elbe, capable of moving either to the right to the main army or to the left to Berlin. Marshal Ney was at Luckau, General Lauriston at Dobriluch, the latter connecting Marshal Ney with the main army. On the 15th of May, the day that he received the certain information which he had expected, Napoleon ordered them to march without delay upon Hoyerswerda, so as to debouche on the flank and rear position of Bautzen, which it would be difficult to maintain when 60,000 men should be on the march to turn it. Desirous of turning to account all the forces which were not otherwise indispensably requisite, he ordered General Reynier to follow Ney and Lauriston. He left Marshal Victor, the Duke of Belluno, in front of Wittenberg, as a permanent menace to Berlin,—a menace to be subsequently put in execution, according as circumstances should allow; and he prepared to start as soon as the prescribed movements should be sufficiently advanced towards the proposed end to render his presence necessary. Already had the Guard itself been directed against Bautzen, whither all our forces were now tending and whither they were to be followed by the attention of Europe. With 160,000 or 170,000 men to oppose to 100,000, however strong their position, Napoleon had little anxiety for the result. The manœuvre assigned to Marshal Ney was worth any position in the world; and the French army, even in its

present state, could have secured the victory without its numerical superiority.

Napoleon was about to leave Dresden, when M. de Bubna at length appeared on the evening of May 18, having come from Vienna as rapidly as possible in order to regain the time which had been lost in remodelling his instructions according to the reports brought from the two head-quarters. Napoleon gave him audience immediately; and though he had resolved to practise dissimulation towards Austria, and though he had great personal kindness for M. de Bubna, he gave him at first a somewhat rude reception. In solitude he formed his plans with coolness and accuracy; but the actual presence of men exerted upon him an almost irresistible influence. He could not restrain the irritation occasioned by the efforts of Austria to impose laws upon him, a son-in-law and ally, and especially by the pretended duplicity of M. de Metternich, of which he thought he had the proof. Against him he uttered angry threats, which if reported by an unfriendly witness might have had fatal consequences. Fortunately, M. de Bubna was a man of great intelligence, and with a strong leaning to the glorious person whom he addressed, earnestly desirous of peace, and not likely to abuse the exhibitions of passion which he witnessed. Without being disturbed, he drew from his portfolio a letter from the Emperor Francis to Napoleon. It was the letter of a father and an honourable man, and expressed the whole truth. At once affectionate and sincere, it displayed to Napoleon the gravity of the situation, the danger of rash determinations, clearly traced the limits between the duties of a father and those of a sovereign, and entreated him with dignity and urgency to listen, for his own sake and that of the world, to the overtures to be made by M. de Bubna. This letter was well calculated to affect a sensitive nature like that of Napoleon; and accordingly it produced a favourable impression. The Emperor Francis, more reserved than M. de Metternich, and having less to say and to do, had more easily kept his position, had been less obliged to court each party alternately, and thus had not incurred the same charge of duplicity; and when he alleged his double relation of father and sovereign, in explanation of the ambiguity of his conduct, he was certainly in the right, for, though he had bestowed upon Napoleon his beloved daughter, and though he still regarded that bond, he ought not to forget the interest of his empire, which had great injuries to repair, the interest of Germany, without which Austria could not exist; and though he sought to reconcile these different interests, it was certainly in the fulfilment of all his duties at once.

Napoleon, though much irritated, felt the truth of this, and was manifestly softened by the letter,—though his resolutions were not much modified by it. He listened to the propositions of M. de Bubna, not as conditions,—for great attention was paid to the form of his address,—but as conjectures of what it might be possible to obtain from the belligerent powers, and as propositions which Austria would support as reasonable. These different propositions were already known to Napoleon; and if he were not wholly gained over to them, he was at least somewhat less violently opposed to them. He

listened to them attentively, pretending to hear them now for the first time, remained tranquil while they were explained, but gradually displayed the true reason of his refusal, which was pride,—pride which was mortified by the renunciation of titles which he had assumed with great pomp, or of territories which he had solemnly annexed to the Empire. The grand duchy of Warsaw was irrecoverably lost at Moscow. All the mortification arising from this he had already undergone. Besides, the greatness of the catastrophe seemed worthy of the destiny of Napoleon. His resolution in respect to this point was, therefore, taken; nor did it involve the integrity of his Empire, but merely a vast political design, the re-establishment of Poland, which he said he had attempted in the interest of Europe, but for which he was not bound to sacrifice himself when Providence and mankind had declared against it. In regard to Spain—perhaps a still weightier subject—Napoleon, to the great surprise of M. de Bubna, appeared less absolute than formerly, though he avoided any distinct explanation. He did not say what he would yield, but he seemed to be prepared to yield something; and for the present, in order to induce England to negotiate, he declared himself ready to admit the Spanish insurgents to the conferences. Here was revealed, but without being observed by M. de Bubna, the new disposition of Napoleon to be more open to treat with Russia or England than with the German powers. M. de Bubna, who did not expect so much in respect to the Spanish question, was surprised and delighted. But the very points to which Austria adhered most tenaciously were those which occasioned the greatest difficulty to Napoleon. To reward Prussia for her desertion by reconstituting her was singularly displeasing to him. However, since, though violent, he was ready to pardon, he might be softened on this point. But to renounce the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine appeared to him in the light of a humiliation; and another humiliation equally mortifying was the relinquishment of the Hanseatic departments, which had been constitutionally annexed to the Empire. In vain did M. de Bubna urge that the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine was an empty title without any advantage to France: Napoleon adduced the emptiness of the title as a reason to show that his being called upon to renounce it was simply from the desire to mortify him. With respect to the Hanse Territories, the Austrian negotiator affirmed that, while it would be difficult to obtain from the belligerent powers a consent to the union of Holland with France, it would be impossible to obtain their consent to his retaining these provinces: their being on the sea would be an insuperable objection in the eyes of England, their proximity, in the eyes of Prussia, and the duchy of Oldenburg, in those of Russia. In regard to them, Napoleon had one reason, which was not merely the dictate of pride, but of policy, to which M. de Bubna could not so easily reply,—viz. that France required these territories as the price by which she might procure from England the restitution of her colonies. M. de Metternich himself had more than once contemplated the matter from this point of view. Here M. de Bubna replied that he was only stating preliminary proposi-

tions, which were by no means final, but which might be discussed subsequently and modified agreeably to all; that when England should be present they might place Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen in the scale against Guadaloupe, the Isle of France, the Cape, and only yield the one in return for the other; and he strongly urged that they should at least meet in congress at Prague, for example, whither the Emperor Francis would repair in person, in order to be nearer the belligerent powers and be able more efficiently to employ his good offices.

This interview had lasted several hours. Napoleon appeared somewhat softened, without giving reason to suppose that his resolution was shaken; and it was agreed that he should see M. de Bubna on the following day before leaving for the army. Though determined not to submit to the proposed conditions, especially not to accept them from Austria, and though he thought himself in a position to impose others provided that he had two or three months to complete his armaments, he was struck with the advantage of a congress,—first, to show his German allies, France, and Europe, his pacific dispositions; secondly, to secure to himself two or three months, which he required to complete his forces; and, thirdly, to seize the opportunity of renewing direct relations with Russia and England, by means of which he hoped to come to an understanding with those powers without the intervention of the German powers, but rather to their detriment. He would thus pay Austria in her own coin. She had in a manner made use of him to secure the office of a mediator; and that office, when attained through him, she would employ to dictate the terms of peace. Her finesse he would now meet by finesse still more refined. After having employed Austria to effect a meeting in congress with the most apparently hostile powers, he would dispense with her in forming any treaty, which might even be concluded on terms opposed to her interest. Success in diplomacy was as agreeable to him as success in military affairs, and he was as proud of victory in one game as in the other: besides which, if Austria, in accordance with the promises of M. de Bubna, pressed with sufficient force upon the allied powers to obtain from them more satisfactory conditions, peace thus obtained and accepted from the hands of his father-in-law would be more graceful than from any other source. For these reasons, Napoleon determined to dissimulate with Austria, to appear moved by her reasons, to agree to a congress at Prague or elsewhere, and not only to a congress but to an armistice to be arranged by negotiators sent to the advanced posts in presence of the two armies. Before this should be concluded, he hoped to gain another battle, which would improve his position in the congress; and, at any rate, this armistice would secure him time to terminate the vast preparations by means of which he hoped to be able to dictate conditions to Europe, far from receiving those which might be dictated to him, and would also furnish him with the opportunity of opening up communications with the Emperor Alexander, the principal object of his desire.

He again saw M. de Bubna on the following day, May 17, and while appearing to acquiesce in some of his reasons, and affirming

that he would rather die in arms and occasion the death of many others than consent to certain of the proposed conditions, he declared himself ready to accept both a congress and an armistice, and to receive into the congress the representatives of the Spanish insurgents, which England had always regarded as an essential condition, preliminary to all negotiation. M. de Bubna, astonished and delighted at having obtained so much,—especially the last article, which was altogether unexpected,—offered to write immediately to M. de Stadion, who had gone to the Russian head-quarters to perform there the part which M. de Bubna had performed at those of the French, and to inform him of the formal acquiescence of Napoleon in the meeting of a congress and the conclusion of an armistice. The letter of M. de Bubna to M. de Stadion, sketched out at the time and corrected by Napoleon himself, said, in effect, that the Emperor of the French, in no degree elated by the recent success of his arms, but anxious to terminate the troubles of Europe, consented to the immediate meeting of a congress at Prague; that, to prevent any further effusion of blood, he was ready to send commissioners to the advanced posts to negotiate an armistice. This last condition, which so enchanted M. de Bubna, was precisely that on which Napoleon set the most value, for the reasons we have stated. M. de Bubna sent off the letter by a courier in all haste to the Russian head-quarters, that it might be delivered without delay to M. de Stadion. He then asked leave to return to Vienna to rejoice the hearts of the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich by the announcement of the excellent disposition in which he had found Napoleon, and to prepare them to modify some of the proposed conditions. Napoleon approved of this new journey of M. de Bubna to Vienna, and said, with sincerity, that these modifications alone could give peace, and that if they were sufficient they would certainly do so. At the same time he intrusted to him a letter to his father-in-law, in terms as affectionate and filial as those of Francis had been friendly and paternal, in which he displayed the point in which he was most painfully susceptible: he said that he was ready for peace, but that, having become the son-in-law of Francis, he consigned his honour to his hands, which he regarded more than either power or life, and that he was resolved to die on the field with all the generous sons of France rather than become the laughing-stock of his enemies by accepting humiliating conditions. He then despatched M. de Bubna, laden with expressions of his favour.

Thus was opened the negotiation, partly sincere, partly feigned, on Napoleon's side, but undertaken in perfect good faith and great zeal by the Austrian representative, who flattered himself that he had by his tact reconciled the most formidable powers in the world when ready to come again into collision. Immediately after having despatched M. de Bubna, Napoleon made preparations for his own departure: but before leaving Dresden he wished to derive from these negotiations the principal result which he anticipated, which consisted in his evading the influence of Austria by coming into direct communication with Alexander. Under pretext of the armistice which was to be immediately negotiated in the sight of the

two armies if they would prevent another sanguinary battle, he proposed to send to the advanced posts M. de Caulaincourt,—the most suitable man for such a reconciliation, for he had enjoyed not only the esteem but the favour of Alexander and his most intimate daily intercourse. So clearly was M. de Caulaincourt marked out for such an embassy that he might be said to be too much so, and that at his appearance the intention of Napoleon would be too strikingly evinced, that Prussia would be alarmed, Austria set on the watch, and possibly the most fatal resolutions hastily adopted. As Napoleon seldom allowed calculations to interfere with his desires, he was in such haste to attempt a direct reconciliation with Russia that he took no thought of the inconveniences we have just mentioned, and on starting from Dresden he sent M. de Caulaincourt with a letter for M. de Nesselrode, dated May 18, as that of M. de Bubna to M. de Stadion. It was said in this letter that, in consequence of what had been agreed upon with M. de Bubna, the Emperor Napoleon hastened to send a commissioner to the advanced posts to negotiate an armistice which appeared to him to be urgent considering the proximity of the armies, and that he had selected from his principal officers the person whom he supposed to be the most agreeable to the Emperor Alexander.

This having been done, and all the necessary orders having been given to General Drouot for perfectly arming the *létés du pont* on the Elbe, for preparing the hospitals for the reception of many wounded, for an abundant supply of provisions in case of retreat, for firmly restraining the population during the formidable scenes that might be expected, for guarding the weak but good King of Saxony, who remained trembling in his palace against the old rumours of every day, Napoleon left on the 18th and took the road to Bautzen, confident, calm, and full of hope, living amid dangers and blood, the sufferings of others and his own, as others live amid pleasure and amusement.

On his road he found the little town of Niechoffswerda in ruins and still burning, stripped of its inhabitants, who had nearly all taken refuge in the woods. His susceptible nature was affected by the misfortune of that little town, a stranger to the quarrels of the potentates who destroyed it. He was affected as we are wont to be by a poor animal which we have unintentionally wounded and which we see groaning at our feet. He ordered a sum from his private treasure to aid in rebuilding it,—an order given in perfect seriousness; and the failure in the execution was owing to no fault of Napoleon. He then continued his journey, and slept halfway between Dresden and Bautzen.

Early on the following day—May 19—he appeared before Bautzen, where his Guard had just arrived, and where his troops awaited him with impatience in hopes of a new triumph. He immediately mounted his horse to reconnoitre, according to his custom, the ground on which he was to give battle. The following is the description of the position in which we were once more to meet the allied forces of Europe to renew the prestige of our arms.

As we have already said, that position had in the rear the highest mountains of Bohemia, the Riesen-Gebirge, a neutral ground, on which

each party might rest with security, for neither of the belligerents ought to be tempted to alienate Austria by violating her territory. To our right were seen these mountains covered with dark firs, then the Spree issuing from their side, flowing in a deeply-embanked bed and surrounding the little town of Bautzen, crossed by a strongly-barricaded stone bridge. Immediately before us was the town of Bautzen, surrounded by an old crenelated wall flanked with towers and armed with guns; then to the left the Spree, which, after having wound through wooded heights much lower than the mountains on the right, suddenly spread itself in an open bed in the midst of verdant meadows interspersed with ponds, extending as far as the eye could reach.

Such was the first line, that of the Spree, which was not easily carried. To the right, on the high mountains and on their slopes, were seen cuttings of wood, and behind them, many guns, bayonets, and Russian uniforms. In the centre, above and below Bautzen, were also seen many Russian troops, and to the left, on the wooded hills, pierced by the Spree, were seen masses of infantry and cavalry, some deployed in line, others posted behind field-works, all indicating by their equipment that they belonged to the Prussian army.

The line of the Spree, defended by numerous and well-posted troops, Napoleon determined to force on the following day, May 20. This would give occasion to the first battle. He then proposed to fight another in order to force the second line which appeared behind the former and seemed to be still more formidable. He determined that on the next day Marshal Oudinot, on the right, should pass the Spree in the direction of the mountains, either by a ford or a wooden bridge, and should endeavour to throw the enemy back on their second position; that in the centre Marshal Macdonald should carry the stone bridge, built over the Spree opposite Bautzen, and endeavour to take that town by assault; that a little below the centre Marshal Marmont should cross the Spree on pontoons, between Bautzen and the village of Nimschutz, and establish himself in a good position on the other side; and that to the left, General Bertrand, effecting a passage at Nieder-Gurck, opposite the last hills bathed by the Spree before diffusing itself through the meadows, should endeavour to take those hills, or at least to establish himself in their neighbourhood. Such was to be the work of the first day. In the mean time, Marshal Ney, having accomplished his movement upon Hoyerswerda with about 60,000 men, should arrive on the Lower Spree, at Klitz, four leagues below Bautzen. By forcing the passage at Klitz he might on the next day attack in flank the second position which Napoleon should attack in front. Neither redoubts nor obstinacy could hold out against such a combination of efforts.

Towards the evening of the 19th had been heard, at a distance on the left, a brisk cannonade, which, without alarming Marshal Ney, who felt quite secure with 60,000 men, had suggested the thought that the enemy was attempting to prevent the junction of the two parts of our army. In the course of the evening some aides-de-camp came to report what had transpired.

The allies, ascribing errors to Napoleon which

he was by no means wont to commit, had supposed that Marshal Ney was advancing with only his own corps, which they reckoned at 25,000 men, after all the losses he had experienced at Lutzen. They had detached Barclay de Tolly, who since his arrival from Thorn formed as it were an isolated corps on the wings of the principal army, and had added to him General d'York with 8000 men, which raised the force of this detachment to 23,000 or 24,000 men. They imagined that this would be enough to cause great injury to Marshal Ney by the surprise it would occasion, added to his ignorance of the ground he traversed for the first time, and that without destroying him they would, at least, disable him for the decisive battle. Consequently Generals Barclay de Tolly and d'York had taken the road from Klitz to Hoyerswerda, one keeping to the right, the other to the left.

At this moment the Italian division of Peyri, the second of Bertrand's corps, had been detached in the direction of Hoyerswerda to join Ney, who was approaching. Napoleon had given this order that he might always keep his corps in communication. Unfortunately, General Peyri had not executed this delicate movement with suitable precautions. He had neither reconnoitred on the right where he might find himself in contact with the enemy's army, nor in front on the road where he ought to meet Ney. When, therefore, in the neighbourhood of Konigswarta he fell unawares with his 7000 or 8000 young Italians into the midst of 15,000 veterans of Barclay de Tolly, was assailed, and surrounded, and, though defending himself bravely, would have yielded had not General Kellermann, son of the old Duke of Valmy, come up on the road from Hoyerswerda with Ney's cavalry, and released him by an impetuous charge upon the Russians. General Peyri lost nearly 2000 men, in dead, wounded, and prisoners, and three guns.

At the same moment, the Prussian General d'York, placed on the right of Barclay de Tolly, was seeking for Ney's corps, and had just fallen not upon Ney himself, but upon his lieutenant Lauriston who was advancing with 20,000 men. They met near the village of Weissig. D'York found himself in presence of Lauriston's first division, against which he maintained an obstinate combat, but left on the ground more than 2000 men, and was constrained to retire upon the Spree, where he rejoined the Russian corps of Barclay de Tolly on the evening of the 19th. The loss was of little consequence to us, owing to the superiority of our numbers; but it was important to the allies, for it greatly weakened a corps which they much needed for the defence of positions which would be exposed to our attack.

On the evening of the 19th each had returned to his post. Barclay de Tolly had gone towards the extreme right of the allies; General d'York, reduced from 8000 to 6000 men, and these much fatigued, had returned to the centre; Ney was only a few leagues from Klitz, where he was to cross the Spree; Peyri's division, collecting their remains, had rallied around General Bertrand as well as they could. These contests, which would formerly have been regarded as battles, were mere skirmishes in this gigantic struggle. On the next day, May 20, Napoleon,

calculating on the time requisite to force the first line, determined not to commence the action till midday, in order that the night might put a necessary limit between the first operation and the second. The morning was employed in preparing the bridge of piles and the boats necessary for the different passages of the Spree.

At midday, placing himself opposite Bautzen, Napoleon gave the signal, and the action began by a general fire of our tirailleurs dispersed along the Spree, with the view of driving off those of the enemy. To the right, Marshal Oudinot, agreeably to his orders, approached the Spree, near the village of Sinkwitz, with Pactod's division. Two columns of infantry, descending almost unperceived into the deep bed of the river, crossed, one by fording, the other on a bridge of piles, and concealed by the steep bank on the right debouched before the enemy had remarked their presence. But when arrived on the other side of the Spree, they found themselves opposed to the Russian troops forming the left wing of the allies. This left wing, placed under the order of Miloradovitch, was composed of the old corps of Miloradovitch, that of Wittgenstein, and of the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. The two brigades of General Pactod were immediately charged by several columns of infantry, but they stood firm, and allowed time to the French division of Lorencez, Marshal Oudinot's second, to take their place on their right, and they remained masters of the ground they had invaded. Marshal Oudinot sent after them the Bavarian division, and with these three divisions combined advanced to the foot of the mountains on our right, particularly of the principal one called Tronberg, and undertook to ascend it under the fire of the enemy, having their left towards the village of Jessnitz, their right in the direction of Klein-Kunitz.

While these events were taking place on our right, in the centre Marshal Macdonald with his three divisions was attacking in front the town of Bautzen, beginning with the attack on the stone bridge which was strongly barricaded and guarded by infantry. To shake the courage of the defenders, he ordered a column into the bed of the Spree which should cross the river on some piles. The marshal then threw himself upon the stone bridge, which he carried without difficulty, and rushed upon the town, which he surrounded with two of his divisions. With the third, that of General Gerard, he kept aloof the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, who appeared desirous of aiding Bautzen. At the same time he battered the gates with cannon, in order to effect an entrance into the town with fixed bayonets.

A little below Bautzen, opposite to Nimschutz, Marshal Marmont had also crossed the Spree with his three divisions, and had gained the ground assigned to him between the centre and the left of the general position. But in order to establish himself there, it was necessary to carry the village of Burk, defended by the Prussian General Kleist, an officer equally skilful and active. Marshal Marmont with the Bonnet and Compans divisions attacked that village, and took it with some difficulty. Beyond this was the commencement of the second position of the allies. A deep and marshy stream bordered by trees formed its first de-

fence. Three villages, Nadelwitz on the right, Nieder-Kayne in the centre, and Bazankwitz to the left, occupied the bank of this stream. General Kleist had fallen back upon these villages, and had called General d'York to his aid. In addition to these two Prussian corps, Marshal Marmont had on his left, upon some wooded hills, Blucher himself with 20,000 men, and in the rear to the right the town of Bautzen, which was not yet taken. He, therefore, did not think of attacking the second position of the allies, and all that he desired was to keep the ground he had gained. Admirably seconded by his troops, he resisted all the attacks of the Prussians. General Kleist left Bazankwitz on his left to attack him with the bayonet, but General Bonnet with the marines met the charge and repulsed it triumphantly. At the same time Blucher's cavalry poured down upon the gallant troop already engaged with the Prussian infantry. They were received in squares with imperturbable firmness by the 37th light and 4th marines. While thus maintaining his ground, Marshal Marmont, that he might not have at his back the town of Bautzen, which had been attacked but not taken, detached Compans's division to the right, which, having found one part of the walls of that town more accessible, scaled them and facilitated the entrance of Macdonald's troops. Meanwhile, General Bertrand crossed the Spree at Nieder-Gurck at the foot of the hills where Blucher was encamped, lower down than Marshal Marmont. He had at first succeeded in crossing the Spree, which at this point is divided into several marshy arms, but when it was necessary to ascend the high bank on the right side and to debouche in presence of Blucher's corps, it had become necessary to halt, for he found himself before a very strong position defended by the most energetic portion of the Prussian army. However, he had taken possession of a hill on the right bank of the Spree, and there lodged the 23d regiment, which would be protected by all the artillery on the left bank. It was 6 p.m., and the enemy's first line was completely in our hands. To the right, Marshal Oudinot had crossed the Spree and taken the Tronberg from the Russians: in the centre, Marshal Macdonald had taken the stone bridge of Bautzen, as well as the town itself; and Marshal Marmont, after having crossed the Spree, had taken his ground on the bank of the stream, at which commenced the second line of the enemy; to the left, General Bertrand had secured an outlet for himself on the other side of the Spree opposite the hills occupied by Blucher, forming the most important point of the second position. We had, therefore, gained our object, and without much loss. Certainly, if the enemy had counted less upon their second line, they might have more vigorously disputed the first. They had, nevertheless, bravely defended it, and we had gloriously overcome their resistance. This first act, then, had terminated agreeably to our wishes, and Marshal Ney arriving at the same time at Klitz, every thing promised equal success on the following day, though the result being decisive the difficulty might be greater.

Napoleon entered Bautzen at 8 p.m., encouraged the alarmed inhabitants, and encamped without the town in the midst of his guard.

formed in several squares. He made every preparation for the attack of the following day, May 21.

From the ground acquired by passing the Spree it was possible to form a more accurate idea of the second position. The stream which formed the principal feature, called the Bloesaer-Wasser,\* from one of the villages which it traversed, issued from the dark mountains on the right, and after making its way through their abrupt detours, kept along the foot of the plateau on which Bautzen is built, flowed among the willows and poplars opposite Nadelwitz, Nieder-Kayne, and Baznakwitz,—villages in front of which Marshal Marmont had taken his position the preceding evening,—then reaching our left at the level of the village of Kreckwitz, turned to the rear of the wooded hills on which Blucher was placed, continued in their rear as far as Klein-Bautzen, then passed behind these hills while the Spree passed before them, left them at a village called Preititz, and mixed with the Spree, in the vast plain of meadows and ponds of which we have spoken.

The Russian left, composed of the old corps of Miloradovitch, and Wittgenstein, and the division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, had fallen back upon one of the high mountains where the Bloesaer-Wasser takes its course between Jenkwitz and Pilitz, which they were to defend to the last extremity against our right, which was posted on the Tronberg. The centre, composed of the Russian guards and reserves, charged with the defence of the middle of the position, was placed behind the Bloesaer-Wasser, at Baschutz, on an elevation opposite Nadelwitz and Nieder-Kayne, under the protection of several redoubts and a strong artillery. Thus the centre of the allies presented an amphitheatre bristling with guns, and if, to attack it, Marmont, the guard, and Macdonald, forming the centre of the French army, should descend from the plateau of Bautzen and cross the Bloesaer-Wasser at Nieder-Kayne or Bazankwitz, they must traverse a marshy meadow under a formidable plunging fire, and then take, wholly unprotected, the heights of Baschutz furnished with redoubts.

Towards their right and our left, the allies had established themselves in front of the Bloesaer-Wasser instead of behind it. Justly attaching great importance to the wooded hills from which the Spree debouched upon the plain, and behind which flowed the Bloesaer-Wasser, they left Blucher there to dispute them with his wonted vigour, so that their line at its extremity, instead of retrograding like the Bloesaer-Wasser, presented the appearance of an advanced promontory. Blucher was there with 20,000 men, waiting till General Bertrand should leave the footing he had secured the previous evening when passing the Spree at Nieder-Gurck. Blucher had on his left, along the Bloesaer-Wasser, i.e. at Kreckwitz, the wearied remains of the troops of Kleist and d'York; then on the reverse of the hills, the Prussian cavalry and part of the Russian

cavalry to cover his rear. Finally, in the damp and verdant plain extending beyond these hills, in the midst of which the Spree and the Bloesaer-Wasser mingled their waters, upon a slight eminence surmounted by a windmill, was Barclay de Tolly with his 15,000 Russians. He was there to resist the attempts of Marshal Ney, whose importance the allied powers did not yet fully appreciate.

A formidable amount of positions, therefore, were to be carried, for our right, under Marshal Oudinot, was to maintain their ground on the Tronberg which they had gained, and even if possible to go beyond it; our centre under Macdonald and Marmont, supported by the guard, was to descend to the banks of the Bloesaer-Wasser, to cross that river, to traverse the meadow beyond under the fire of the Russian redoubts of Baschutz, and to carry those redoubts. Our left, under General Bertrand, had the difficult task of taking the hills defended by Blucher. Our forces might have failed before this triple task, rendered doubly difficult by the numerous obstacles of the ground behind which were ranged nearly 100,000 resolute Russians and Prussians, if their only resource had been an attack in front. But Ney, arriving the same evening at Klix with 60,000 men, was there to cross the Spree, to traverse the vast plain interspersed with meadows and ponds, situated on our extreme left, and at the extreme right of the allies, to force every obstacle, to defile behind the hills occupied by Blucher, and to direct his course by the steeple of Hochkirch, which was seen at the end of this battle-field, covered with a greenish and shining copper. This steeple was seen from all quarters, and Napoleon pointed it out to Ney as the object of his efforts. The marshal was ordered to begin his movement early in the morning, to cross the Spree at Klix at any cost, then to debouche on the rear of the enemy, and as soon as possible to let his guns be heard in the direction of Preititz and Klein-Bautzen, on the road to Hochkirch. This was the moment designed by Napoleon for the attack on Blucher, in front by Bertrand, in flank by Marmont, and then for crossing the Bloesaer-Wasser, and assaulting the redoubts of the centre defended by the Russian guard. It was possible that if Ney should appear in time at Klein-Bautzen, Blucher should not only be repulsed but taken with all his forces. It is at least certain that his retreat must determine that of the whole army of the enemy.

Such were the skilful arrangements of Napoleon for the following day, the 21st, which being ordered from some distance, especially as regarded Ney, left a greater latitude than usual to the intelligence of his lieutenants. The weather was beautiful, and every one slept at the bivouac on the ground he had conquered, in full confidence of the result of the next day. Napoleon bivouacked amid the squares of his guard, on the plateau of Bautzen, in view of all the enemy's positions, but not of the ground to be traversed by Ney, which was hidden by the hills occupied by the Prussian army. He questioned at this moment, whether this new battle would not be anticipated by the reply to his letter of the 18th, in which he adhered to the principle of an armistice proposed by Austria, and announced the mission of M. de Cau-

\* At the place itself, which I have recently visited, this stream bears no other name than that commonly given to most streams in all countries, the *mill stream*; but in a very accurate and minute German plan, a copy of which exists at the war depot, it is called the Bloesaer-Wasser, a name which I here employ for the sake of convenience.

laincourt to negotiate it. But the reply had not reached him on the evening of the 28th, whether from their not having allowed M. de Caulaincourt to have access to the Emperor Alexander, or from their wishing once more to try the fate of arms. Of these two suppositions, the latter was the most agreeable to Napoleon, for he felt sure that the new battle would occasion prudent reflection to the most obstinate of his enemies. However this may have been, he resigned himself to rest, as usual on the eve of a great battle.

Opposite to him, in a corresponding position, at the post-house of Neu-Burschwitz, the allied sovereigns, agitated as men always are who without experience are placed in circumstances of difficulty, were occupied with a sad and troublesome deliberation during the whole night. They were firmly resolved to risk another battle. They had received the letter relating to the armistice and the mission of M. de Caulaincourt, and their determination in regard to it was instantly formed. They considered that if they should receive M. de Caulaincourt, Austria would immediately take offence, and would not fail to perceive the probability of a direct arrangement between France and Russia. They had, therefore, resolved to refer M. de Caulaincourt politely to M. de Stadion, as representing the mediating power charged with all conferences, even those relating to the armistice, and moreover, to defer this reply till after the battle, for the party of German patriots who directly led the Prussian army, and indirectly the Russian, would have complained loudly if they had accepted an armistice without being compelled by the most imperious necessity. Having resolved on the battle, the sovereigns discussed its probable issue. The King of Prussia had little hopes, the Emperor of Russia was sanguine. The latter was filled with martial ardour which left him no rest. He had, as it were, seized the chief command, and to exercise it with greater care had nominally conferred it on Count Wittgenstein, who was prompted by General Diebitch. The real command ought to have belonged to Barclay de Tolly from his antecedents and his rank, but they had got rid of his inflexibility by assigning to him an isolated part at the extreme rank of the allies in the marshy lands between the Bloesner-Wasser and the Spree, at a position named from the windmill. The discussion between Alexander and the numerous Russian and Prussian officers, who in turn expressed and enforced their opinions, turned precisely on the position of Barclay de Tolly. They had greatly strengthened the left under Miloradovich; the centre was covered by the strong redoubts of Baschutz, and defended by the Russian imperial guard. The right, on the hills, was invincible, according to Blucher, and the Prussians had sworn to render these hills the Thermopylæ of Germany. But could Barclay de Tolly resist Ney, who appeared to direct himself against him? Such was the real question. Alexander, whose *coup d'œil* was not much practised, had persuaded himself that Napoleon wished to deprive him of the support of the mountains, and for this reason he was unwilling to weaken that side in favour of any other. M. de Muffling, a distinguished staff officer, who had carefully reconnoitred the

ground, insisted on the danger which threatened Barclay de Tolly, and at length gained the ear of Alexander, who was inclined to listen to every advice from the benevolence of his character, and the honest desire of forming a correct opinion. But when Count Wittgenstein replied that Barclay de Tolly had 15,000 men, Alexander appeared satisfied, and all his staff as well, except M. de Muffling; and day beginning to dawn, it was necessary to terminate the discussion, and to assume their several posts.

Napoleon, in fact, summoned every one to his place, and was at his own early in the morning. From the position of the sovereigns he might be seen on the plateau of Bautzen, on horseback, giving orders quite within reach of the enemy's guns. Lord Cathcart, the British ambassador, possessed an excellent English glass, with which he perceived all the movements of Napoleon, and which he lent to all around, who would gladly have divined what passed in the mind of that terrible adversary as readily as they could detect what took place about his person. A yellow-laced uniform discovered by his side occasioned great curiosity. It was asked whether he who wore it might not be Murat, whose costume was always singular, and if this did not afford a new proof of the arrival on the field of the French cavalry newly organized. Soon after it was discovered that this yellow uniform belonged to a Saxon postilion, whom Napoleon employed to mark the situation of the different villages mentioned in his map.

But already a fearful cannonade re-echoed through the field. Marshal Oudinot, on our right, was on the heights of Tronberg, which we had conquered the day before, and was disputing them with the Russians of Miloradovich who attempted to retake them. In the centre, Macdonald and Marmont immovable, having between them the squares of the Guard, and behind them the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, were awaiting the orders of Napoleon, who himself awaited the result of Marshal Ney's manœuvre. General Bertrand, to the left, finishing the passage of the Spree, which had been begun the previous day, was with his three divisions, ascending the steep bank on the right of the river, protected by the artillery on the left. But the decisive event of the day was transpiring two leagues lower down, at Klitz. Marshal Ney had crossed the Spree at that point, and driven back the advanced post of Barclay de Tolly.

Having crossed the Spree, he had on his right the reverse of the hills occupied by Blucher, and the posts which were formed along the foot of these hills, before him the windmill, at which was placed Barclay de Tolly, and on the left the marshy banks of the Bloesner-Wasser. He marched boldly towards the windmill. To the right he detached towards Pliskowitz, one of the three divisions of Lauriston's corps commanded by General Maison, to attempt to climb the hills covered by artillery and Prussian uniforms. To the left he directed the other two divisions of General Lauriston under that general himself, to pass the Bloesner-Wasser below Gleina, and thus to outflank the enemy's position.

Having passed the Spree early in the morning, it was still early when he attacked the position occupied by Barclay de Tolly, who met him with a heavy discharge of artillery, for he



had more guns than men. Being obliged to guard a very extensive line from the foot of the mountains where Blücher was posted to the vast meadows traversed by the Bloesaer-Wasser, he had at the windmill only 5000 or 6000 men. But Ney was not to be checked by balls. He continued to advance upon the windmill, and notwithstanding the energy of Barclay de Tolly, he succeeded in throwing him into disorder. Barclay, at this moment, had by his side M. de Muffling, who had so much insisted upon calling the attention of Alexander to this position, and after having made him the witness of his resistance and his peril, he despatched him to Blücher for aid. Fearing lest he should be thrown back in disorder if he persisted in maintaining his ground in advance of the Bloesaer-Wasser, he recrossed it at Gleinie, and went to establish himself upon the slope of the hills which terminated the field of battle, to dispute with the French the roads of Wurschen and Hochkirch, which all the allied army was to follow when retiring. He there met the troops of Lauriston who came to harass him, but against whom he was able to defend himself, owing to the advantage of his position.

Ney, after having taken the windmill, ascended a little to the right to take in reverse the hills on which he had noticed the mass of Prussian troops, and found himself before the village of Preititz, situated on the Bloesaer-Wasser, just at the point where this river, after having turned behind Blücher's position, prepared to debouche upon the plain. He caused that village to be taken by Souham's division, and once there, began to entertain doubts on the conduct he ought to pursue. He clearly saw the Hochkirch steeple in the distance, the point at which he was to aim; but, having before him deep masses of cavalry to which he could oppose only a small number of light-horse; on the left Barclay de Tolly in an advantageous position; to the right the hills occupied by Blücher; separated from Napoleon by the space of three leagues, and by wooded hills, that hero, whose mind was liable to hesitation though his courage never failed, halted to hear the guns of the rest of the army, and to avoid too hastily becoming engaged.

At this time arrived the succour destined to Barclay de Tolly, which with great difficulty M. de Muffling had obtained from the incredulity of Blücher and Gneisenau. These two, in fact, were found by M. de Muffling, occupied in pouring forth patriotic harangues to the Prussian troops, in speaking of the German Thermopylæ, at which they were to die, and they would not believe that they were threatened in the rear. However, at the urgent solicitation of M. de Muffling, Blücher ordered several battalions of Kleist and two of the Royal Guard, to quit his rear and to retake Preititz.

Accordingly, those battalions proceeded in haste towards Preititz, where they surprised Souham's division and took the village as well as the bridge of the Bloesaer-Wasser. Ney, surprised at this sudden attack, returned to the charge with his second division, cut down the Prussian battalions, and re-entered Preititz. That village being regained, he ought to have marched forward, rallied Lauriston on the left, and followed by Reynier, turned Blücher's po-

sition, received the masses of Prussian cavalry in square, as they had so often done, then ascended the slopes defended by Barclay de Tolly and cut the roads of Wurschen and Hochkirch which were to serve for a retreat to the right wing of the allies. He would thus have taken 25,000 Prussians and 200 guns and dissolved the coalition. General Jomini, chief of the staff of Ney's corps, urgently pressed this course upon the illustrious marshal, but he resolved to wait till the sound of artillery, which was but faintly heard on the right, should be more distinct and near, and he should himself be less isolated on that vast, and complicated, and unknown battle-field.

However, he had done enough to render the position of the enemy untenable. Napoleon, impatient to begin the attack, but never yielding to impatience in the field, had not given orders to open fire on his side until he thought the time was come. General Bertrand, protected by the artillery of the left bank of the Spree, had climbed the steep of the right bank, and succeeded in debouching opposite to Blücher, who had his rear and right to the wooded hills of which we have spoken, his left to the Bloesaer-Wasser and the village of Kreckwitz, his infantry on his two wings, his cavalry in the middle, and a long line of artillery in front. General Bertrand deployed before him, having Morand's division on the left, the Wurtembergian division on the right, the Italian division in reserve. Between Bertrand's position and the town of Bautzen were Marmont, the Guard, and Macdonald, all eager for action.

Scarcely had the guns of Ney been heard in the rear of Blücher, when Napoleon hastened to give the signal. Marmont, having in addition to his own artillery all that of the Guard, had opened a terrible fire on the redoubts of the centre before him, and had then directed part of his fire a little obliquely on Kreckwitz and on Blücher's flank, whose position had thus become exceedingly difficult.

After a few moments of this cannonade, Bertrand was putting himself in motion to attack Blücher's line, when he saw the Prussian cavalry pouring down upon him at full gallop. But Morand's division received them in square unshaken, repulsed them by a shower of musketry, and then formed in column to attack Blücher. Meanwhile the Wurtembergian division was advancing upon Kreckwitz, situated in the bend of the Bloesaer-Wasser, on the flank of the wooded hills. Marmont's guns had so shaken the troops who guarded Kreckwitz, that a Wurtembergian battalion had succeeded in taking it by a vigorous assault. Blücher, seeing himself threatened in front, called to him his second division, Ziethen's, and brought it in line to meet Bertrand's corps. That division found Morand firmly fixed at his post, from which they were unable to displace him, but they gained some ground upon the Wurtembergian division, and passing Kreckwitz, took the battalion which had taken possession of that village. Marmont then redoubled his oblique fire upon Kreckwitz, whilst Morand, changing defence into attack, drove back the Ziethen division on the hills by which Blücher was supported. It would have been necessary at this moment that Blücher should have been able to call to his aid the whole Prussian Royal

Guard, Kleist's corps and a part of the Russian forces. But to all his demands for aid, it was replied that these troops were occupied in disputing Preititz on his rear, that they had even lost that village, and that if he did not speedily retire, far from being able to defend the position which he had just called the Thermopylæ of Germany, he and his corps would be taken by Marshal Ney. In presence of this danger which, with great difficulty, M. de Muffling made him perceive, he determined with deep vexation to sound a retreat, much inclined to blame Barclay de Tolly, who he said, had not protected his rear, but not daring to do so he vented his indignation by a thousand reproaches on the Russian staff, who had uselessly accumulated in the mountains forces which were greatly needed on the right of the allies. Blucher then withdrew and passed in sight of Preititz, very near Ney, who remained master of that village. By great good fortune, while he was descending these hills where he had hoped to resist all the efforts of the French, by Klein-Bautzen, Ney thinking it more prudent to clear them of the enemy before directing himself against Hockkirch, was ascending them by Preititz, so that Ney was ascending on one side, while Blucher was descending on the other. Blucher, therefore, was able to effect his retreat without any serious encounter, and crossed the lines of the Russian and Prussian cavalry, which had remained in order of battle behind him, and whose long array had so much imposed upon Marshal Ney.

But the victory was not the less certain. Bertrand followed Blucher in retreat; Marmont with his corps, Mortier with the Young Guard, seeing the retrograde movement of the enemy, descended to the banks of the Bloesner-Wasser, crossed that stream, and traversed the marshy meadow extending to the foot of the redoubts of Baschutz. The Young Guard scaled them without much loss, for the movement in retreat impressed on the right of the allies had been communicated to the rest of their army. That general movement came very seasonably to the relief of Oudinot, who, on our right being attacked on the Tronberg, by all the forces of Miloradovitch, had been constrained to fall back, and take his position in the rear, with his left at Rabitz, and the right at Grubitz, where he was supported by the gallant Gerard, commanding Macdonald's right. At the report of the victory gained over that extensive line, Oudinot resumed the offensive against the Russians, who were retiring, and he drove them back with energy. They proceeded to pursue the allies in a line of three leagues, but owing to the ground being well suited to cavalry, and also owing to their being themselves deficient in that arm, they were unable to take any prisoners except the wounded, or any guns except the dismounted, the number of which was considerable, and sufficed to give great eclat to this victory. Certainly, if Marshal Ney had on this occasion been as rash as he was brave, (and it must be acknowledged that his distance from Napoleon naturally caused him great unsensibility, if he had been animated by the fortunate audacity of past times, they would have gathered on that field more trophies than at Austerlitz, at Jena, or at Friedland, for they would have taken all the right of the enemy's army, and

especially Blucher, our most determined adversary. But this victory, such as it was, was of the most brilliant character: it reduced a most formidable position, defended by nearly 100,000 men, and the last illusion of the allies, at least for this part of the country. They could no longer hope to har our way to the Oder; nor could they, without an immediate armistice, remain attached to the territory of Austria, and to her policy by means of her territory.

With respect to losses, whatever may have been said by German writers, they were less on our side than on that of the enemy. They admitted a loss of about 15,000 in killed and wounded during the two days, but it was much greater. According to the most exact statements, our loss could not be greater than 13,000 men in killed and wounded, though we were the assailants, and our task was much the most laborious. The situation of the contending parties explains the difference. Marshal Oudinot, on the morning of the 21st, occupied a commanding position from which the Russians were obliged to displace him. In the centre, Marshals Macdonald and Marmont, during the same day had merely to fire upon the enemy without being exposed to their guns in return. In the engagement of General Bertrand with Blucher, the situation of the two adversaries was equally difficult, and General Blucher had experienced a terrible cannonade in flank from Marshal Marmont. Lastly, on Marshal Ney's side, the most vigorous action had taken place at Preititz, which they had taken and retaken under conditions equally destructive to each party. That which gave rise to all the false reports of the allies concerning our losses, was the fact that when they quitted the field of battle, they left their wounded to us, and that the inhabitants of Lusatia, touched by the misfortune of so many victims, chiefly German, began to collect them on the field, and to carry them in the little country vehicles, sometimes in common barrows, to the nearest towns, or even to Dresden. But of these numerous sufferers, some belonged to the allies. In one respect only had we to regret a loss to which the allies were not subject, viz. the missing. This title is given to those who are not found either among the killed or wounded, and are generally deserters. In Peyri's Italian division, and in the three German divisions serving in the corps of Oudinot, Ney, and Bertrand, there were 2000 or 3000 deserters, who sought in the mountains of Bohemia refuge from the dangers of a war in which they had no sympathy.

But here, as at Lutzen, the victory was to be judged by its consequences rather than by its trophies. On the following morning, May 22, Napoleon determined to follow the enemy closely, to throw them beyond the Oder, and at the same time to enter the town of Breslau, where had been celebrated the alliance between Russia and Prussia, and the city of Berlin, the true capital of what was called the German fatherland, the centre of the much infuriated passions. While he should march in person after the conquered sovereigns, he thought himself strong enough to separate from one of his corps, Marshal Oudinot's, which had suffered the most during the 20th and 21st, and which required three or four days to rest, and which was suf-

ciently accustomed to war, and under sufficiently vigorous command to be risked against Berlin. Napoleon added to it eight battalions which were keeping garrison at Magdeburg, and were to be there replaced by Teste's division, (one of Marmont's divisions which had remained in Hesse;) to this he added about 1000 horse, left at Dresden, which would raise this corps to 23,000 or 24,000 men, a force sufficient to overcome General Bulow, who was charged with the protection of Berlin. Marshal Oudinot was vigorously to attack General Bulow, to drive him back upon the Oder, and then to advance upon Berlin, whilst Napoleon with the main army should drive the allies to Breslau.

After resting some hours, Napoleon, on the morning of the 22d of May, issued his orders, and then went forward, preceded by Generals Reynier and Lauriston, who had scarcely been engaged on the previous day, and by Marshal Ney, who followed them, Napoleon following with the guard, and having behind him Marmont, Bertrand, and Macdonald; there remained to him after the losses incurred on the two days, and after the separation of Marshal Oudinot, a total of at least 135,000 men, which would be raised to 150,000 on the arrival of the Duke of Belluno, with his reorganized battalions. This number was more than was necessary against an enemy who reckoned no more than 80,000 combatants. He set off on the morning of the 22d, and determined to be personally present in the pursuit, in order to put to the test his recently-organized cavalry. The allies withdrew by the road from Bautzen to Górlitz, they travelled all day during fine but very hot weather, through a broken country, as might naturally be expected along the foot of the high mountains of Bohemia. Napoleon, carrying on the war at the advanced posts as when twenty years of age, personally directed each separate manoeuvre, with a precision and an accuracy which attracted the admiration of those who accompanied him, even of witnesses little inclined to regard him with favour, such as the foreign officers of the staff who were compelled to follow him in the capacity of allies.\* Arriving near Reichenbach, they perceived at the end of an open basin a line of hills, on which the enemy's infantry were effecting their retreat, protected by a body of cavalry in the rear; the bold Lefebvre-Desnoettes, at the head of Polish lancers and the red lancers of the guard, poured down upon the enemy's cavalry with his accustomed vigour and dexterity: he repulsed them with energy, but soon drew upon himself a force much superior to his own. Napoleon, who had in hand the 12,000 horse of Latour-Maubourg, sent them against the enemy, and we retained the plain of Reichenbach, strewed with a large number of the Russians and Prussians. Unhappily, we had lost an excellent cavalry officer, General Bruyère, an old soldier of Italy, whose leg had been broken by a ball. Notwithstanding our superiority in this encounter, Napoleon perceived that his cavalry, though including some who had returned from Russia, had been too recently organized to possess its former

value; in fact, the greater part of the horses were wounded or fatigued. He could also perceive that enemies animated by energetic sentiments were more difficult of pursuit than those who had lost their martial spirit, such as he pursued after Austerlitz and Jena. Yet he had kept the allies in quick motion since the morning, for by the close of day they had marched at least eight leagues. After the battle of cavalry fought in the plain, General Reynier with the Saxon infantry occupied the heights of Reichenbach, and it was possible to reach Górlitz by the evening. But at Górlitz it would have been necessary to engage with the rear-guard, and Napoleon, thinking that enough had been done for that day, ordered his tent to be prepared where he stood. He had just dismounted, when a cry was heard, "Kircgenger is killed!" Hearing this, Napoleon exclaimed, "Fortune owes us a grudge to-day." But the first cry was soon followed by a second: "Duroc is killed!" "Impossible," replied Napoleon, "I spoke to him this moment." But it was not merely possible: it was true. A ball had struck a tree near Napoleon, and then successively killed General Kircgenger, an excellent engineer officer, and Duroc, the grand marshal of the palace. A few minutes before, Duroc, with a degree of sadness natural to a good man, and not unusual to him, but more than commonly marked on this occasion, had said to M. de Caulaincourt, "My friend, do you observe the Emperor? He has just obtained victories after reverses, and this would be the time to profit by misfortune. . . . But you see he is not changed. . . . His desire for war is insatiable. . . . The issue cannot be happy!" Scarcely had M. de Caulaincourt signified his assent by a movement of the head, when Duroc met the end which he had foreseen. His wound was of the most painful character. The ball had lacerated his bowels, which were enveloped in cloths saturated with opium to allay the sufferings of his last moments, for no hope was entertained of his life. Napoleon ran to him and seized his hands, calling him his friend, and spoke of another life where they should find the term of their labours, in a tone of remorse which he deeply felt without acknowledging it. Duroc, with emotion, thanked him for these expressions of regard, confided to him his only daughter, expressed his hope that he would live to conquer the enemies of France, and then to enjoy a peace which had become necessary. "For myself," he said, "I have lived as an honourable man and I die as a soldier. I have no self-reproach. . . . I again recommend my daughter to your care." Then, Napoleon remaining near his bed and holding his hands, plunged into deep thought, Duroc added, "Leave, sire, leave. . . . The sight is too painful for you." Napoleon left him, saying, "Adieu, my friend, we shall meet again, . . . perhaps very soon!"

It has been pretended that the words of Duroc, "I have no self-reproach," alluded to some unjust reproaches of Napoleon, who in periods of excitement spared none, not even those whom he most esteemed. But he rendered full justice to his grand marshal. Duroc, born in Auvergne, of a good military family in poor circumstances, had been educated in the schools of the old artillery, and possessed the severe

\* Among others, the Saxon Major Odeleben, who, attached to the staff of Napoleon, has given an account of the most minute circumstances connected with the campaign in Saxony.

manners and calm intelligence common to the officers of that arm. Naturally melancholy, sensible, discreet, and possessed of little ambition, suspicious of the dazzling prosperity of the Empire, he almost regretted being fastened to a car which was rushing across precipices, but he could not abstain from following it, attracted by the genius of Napoleon, flattered by his confidence, and loaded with his benefits. A wise man, even though distrustful of fortune, is not always able to resist her. Having in his capacity of grand marshal of the palace a kind of inspection of every thing and everybody, Duroc never failed to inform Napoleon of all he ought to know, without, however, injuring or calumniating any one, because he always desired merely to be useful, but not to gratify his antipathies or preferences. He was the second sure and really devoted friend whom Napoleon had lost in the course of twenty years, and accordingly he was much affected by the loss. Leaving the hut where Duroc was dying, he sat down upon some hurdles near the advanced posts, pensive, his hands resting upon his knees, his eyes moist, scarcely hearing the guns of the tirailleurs, unconscious of the caresses of a dog belonging to a regiment of the guard which often followed his horse, and which at this moment was licking his hands. Roused from this reverie by an equerry, he arose briskly, and concealed his tears that his emotion might not be detected. Such is human nature, changeable and inconsistent, beyond all judgment but that of God! The man thus softened by the fate of one wounded man had been the cause of wounding more than 80,000 during the last month, more than 2,000,000 in eighteen years, and was on the point of lacerating several hundred thousand now!

Napoleon immediately ordered a public ceremony for the solemn funeral eulogies of Marshals Bessières and Duroc, by MM. Villemain and Victorin-Fabre. "I do not want priests," he wrote the same day to the Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, influenced, no doubt, by his recent quarrels with the clergy. He transferred the duchy of Friuli to the daughter of Duroc, as well as all the gifts he had bestowed upon her father, and constituted Count Molé her guardian.

But such is war! For a moment we are moved, then, carried away by the torrent of events, we pass from the funeral of to-day to that of to-morrow, excusing our forgetfulness of others by the forgetfulness of ourselves. The next day, May 23, they entered Gorlitz and crossed the Neise. On the 24th they crossed the Queiss, and on the 25th the Bober. The allies had divided themselves into two columns, one to our right composed of the troops of Miloradovitch and the Russian guard, the other to our left composed of the Prussians and Barclay de Tolly, an arrangement corresponding to that observed on the field of Bautzen. Napoleon followed both. A column formed of the corps of Bertrand and Marmont marched on the right by Gorlitz, Lauban, Goldberg, and Schweidnitz, still following the foot of the mountains. Another, comprising the corps of Reynier, Lauriston, and Ney, the guard and the imperial head-quarters, marched in the centre by Gorlitz, Bunzlau, Haynau, Liegnitz, and Breslau. On our right the Duke of Belluno,

preceded by the cavalry of General Sebastiani, directed his course to the Oder, to relieve Glogau. We were in Silesia, in a rich country, in the territory of the King of Prussia, which we had no other reason to spare than a regard to our own interests in economizing the resources of the country. Napoleon ordered the severest discipline, first from foresight, and also with the view of contrasting favourably with the Russians in the sight of the Germans.

At Haynau, Maison's division, the best of Lauriston's corps, experienced a troublesome surprise attended with great loss. The allies, finding themselves briskly pursued, and anxious to be in some degree relieved from the pressure, laid a very ingenious snare for us which cost us dear. In the plain of Haynau, where there was space for a large body of cavalry, and which they had reached after passing through a village, they concealed five or six regiments of heavy cavalry, and then displayed to us on the high-road a kind of rear-guard who were retiring apparently without much circumspection. General Maison, being somewhat suspicious, advanced with caution; but Marshal Ney, stimulated by the reproaches of Napoleon, who continually complained of his not taking prisoners, urged forward General Maison, and placing himself at his side, determined to pour boldly into the plain. They had no more crossed the defile of the village, than they saw on the right a mill in flames, and at this signal (agreed on by the enemy) an innumerable cavalry poured down upon our infantry before they had time to form in square. The confusion was great, notwithstanding the efforts of Marshal Ney and General Maison. We lost three or four guns and about 1000 men, either put to the sword or to flight. With great difficulty Marshal Ney was extricated, and General Maison, after unparalleled efforts, at length succeeded in rallying his division, but with a mind so tortured with vexation that he would scarcely consent to survive an accident in which he was perfectly blameless. The Prussians paid for this success with the death of Colonel de Dolffs, their best cavalry officer after Blücher, and the commander of their cavalry reserve.

On the following day, General Sebastiani, who was marching at the head of Belluno's corps towards Glogau, revenged in the neighbourhood of Sprottau the check experienced by General Maison, by taking a large part of artillery and five hundred prisoners. These are the daily vicissitudes of war, but at the time these skirmishes were of little importance. On the 27th they reached the Katsbach at Liegnitz, and our left corps, reaching the Oder, relieved Glogau. Our garrison, invested for five months, joyfully embraced their liberators. General Lauriston, on his side, having reached the Oder, seized sixty barges of food and ammunition designed for the siege of that fortress, which he employed in re-entraining it. Marshal Ney was within one march of Breslau.

The reader will no doubt be astonished that there was no question about the armistice after the letter of General de Bubna to M. de Serdion, and after that of M. de Caulincourt to M. de Nesselrode, one announcing the proposal of an armistice, the other offering the means of immediately negotiating it. But, as we have

already said, the Russians had refused to admit M. de Caulaincourt, from the fear of giving offence either to the allies whom they already possessed, i.e. the Prussians, or to those whom they hoped to gain, i.e. the Austrians. They had, therefore, replied that since the offer of mediation had been accepted, M. de Caulaincourt ought to address himself to M. de Stadion, who represented the mediatory power. This reply, signed by M. de Nesselrode, and accompanied by the most flattering expressions in regard to M. de Caulaincourt personally, was enclosed in a letter of M. de Stadion to Prince Berthier, and forwarded to him. It stated that, agreeably to the reference which had been made to him, M. de Stadion was ready to meet M. de Caulaincourt and commissioners, Russian and Prussian, for the purpose of immediately concluding an armistice.

This double reply, deferred till the day after the battle, was sent, May 22, to the French advanced posts. Napoleon, having received it and observed the reception given to his overtures, did not feel it right to show himself urgent with those who exhibited so much pride, and he replied that the commissioners should be received when they appeared at the advanced posts. He then continued his march, and arrived at Liegnitz, at one or two days' march from Breslau.

At this moment the allies were in a state of great excitement. Notwithstanding a foolish pride arising from their having been able to resist us a little better than formerly, they began to feel the consequences of two great defects. The Prussian officers, almost all of them members of the Tugend-bund, had all the ardour of partisans in the noblest cause,—that of their country; but the troops, who consisted greatly of young soldiers, felt deeply the effects of the loss of the battles and of the rapid retreats. The Russians were even more staggered than the Prussians. The war, from having been purely patriotic, having become purely political since they had crossed through Poland, they bore the sufferings attendant upon it with impatience. Besides, the Emperor Alexander, no longer able to refuse the command to Barclay de Tolly, the only capable person though unpopular with the soldiers, that general, with his wonted exactness, had endeavoured to restore order to his army, but with little success owing to the confusion of the retreat. He thought, and said, with his usual bluntness, that the Russian army would dissolve away unless it were brought back into Poland to refit behind the Vistula, and he not only said this but determined to act accordingly. It had required the formal expression of Alexander's orders to induce him to leave the road to Breslau, which led directly to Poland, and to adopt that of Schweidnitz. Here they hoped to halt in the famous field of Bunzelwitz, so long occupied by Frederick the Great, in the neighbourhood of Austria, a neighbourhood always strongly recommended by the diplomatic members of the coalition. Barclay de Tolly had obeyed, though he declared at the same time that this conduct might perhaps be politic, but certainly it was not according to military principles, and led to expect an obstinate opposition to orders of that nature even if issued by the Emperor himself.

The Germans, and Alexander, always infatuated with his office of liberator of Europe, had sent to Barclay de Tolly, M. de Muffling, who had some claims to respect in his eyes, from having defended his conduct on the 21st of May, and fully displayed his dangers and his services. M. de Muffling had endeavoured to shake these resolutions but in vain, and in order to convince him had brought him to the camp at Bunzelwitz to point out the advantages. But the fortress of Schweidnitz, which had been the support of that camp, they had found destroyed by the French in 1807, and not fully restored by the Prussians in 1813; besides which, the position of Bunzelwitz did not appear proportionate to the means at the disposal of modern armies. Barclay de Tolly had justly maintained that the allied armies could not hold out many hours in such a position, and that they would be almost annihilated by another encounter with Napoleon. This visit, therefore, had merely confirmed the Russian general in his resolution to leave the Prussians in Silesia, and to repair to Boland to refit his army, with the intention of returning to the Oder in two months. But in the mean while the coalition might be dissolved.

After all these conferences they soon perceived that their only resource lay in an armistice, already proposed by the diplomacy of the belligerent powers. They met at the quarters of the two allied monarchs at Schweidnitz, and agreed upon the necessity of a suspension of hostilities, as the only means of escape from their difficulties. Unfortunately for the allies, the Prussian leaders were not favourable to it. General Gneisenau, a member of the Tugend-bund, a man of courage and intelligence, but ardent and unreflecting, full of the passions of his countrymen, the successor of General Scharnhorst in the functions of chief of the staff to Blücher, violently opposed the proposal of an armistice in language which might have a very unfavourable influence on the excitable minds of the Prussian officers. But the necessity of suspending hostilities was imperious, and it was agreed to send commissioners to the French head-quarters to negotiate an armistice. At the same time, an attempt was made to act upon the most excited minds by assuring them that they merely laid down their arms to resume them shortly, and, when resumed, to quit them only when they had destroyed the common enemy. They did not confine themselves to sending commissioners to head-quarters, but they also despatched M. de Nesselrode to Vienna. He was there to explain the dangers incurred by the belligerent powers, the impossibility of confining themselves longer to Bohemia, and that unless the cabinet of Vienna came to a speedy decision, it would be probably necessary to make a forced retreat into Poland, which would infallibly occasion the dissolution of the coalition, and the loss to Austria of an opportunity of saving Europe and herself. He was furnished with a powerful argument in the threat of an immediate arrangement between Russia and France, an arrangement which the Emperor Alexander had very nobly declined, but which he could negotiate in a few hours, for it merely required him to admit M. de Caulaincourt to an interview. Indeed, the mere fact of that nobleman having appeared at the

advanced posts had already exerted an influence on the Austrian cabinet, and M. de Nesselrode, on arriving at Vienna, was to find in operation the effect expected from this argument. To second M. de Nesselrode, M. de Stadion had written, and also the Prussians,—all using M. de Caulaincourt as a bugbear to lead the cabinet of Vienna to an immediate decision.

M. de Nesselrode set off for the Austrian capital, while General Kleist in the name of the Prussians, and General Count Schouvaloff in the name of the Russians, repaired to the French advanced posts. They arrived there on the 29th of May, at 10 A.M., and were received by Prince Borthier, who immediately gave notice to the Emperor.

Napoleon, pledged by his former replies, could not refuse to negotiate, though it was his interest to beat the allies once more and to drive them in disorder to the Vistula, at a distance from Austria, who would certainly not join the alliance when so far removed. However, the state of his cavalry, the desire of completing the second series of his armaments so as to be able to keep his ground even against Austria, and to conclude only such a pence as he should choose, the hope of being ready in two months, and of then resuming his victorious operations after having escaped the great heat of the summer, inclined him to a suspension of arms. He, therefore, consented to the principle of an armistice because he was in some degree bound, because refusal would have implied too little regard for peace, and especially because he hoped to have time to become by his armaments the arbiter of the conditions of peace. But he designed in the temporary arrangements that were to be agreed upon, to keep Silesia as far as Breslau, and Lower Germany as far as the Elbe, including Hamburg and Lubeck, whether these towns should have been reconquered by the French troops or not. Moreover, he required the armistice to continue for two months at least, and that during that time the garrisons of his fortresses on the Oder and Vistula should not consume the provisions which they now had, but should be revictualled for payment. M. de Caulaincourt, the bugbear of Austria, was sent to Gebersdorf on the 30th of May, between the two armies, to treat on the bases which we have indicated.

He found the Prussian and Russian commissioners very animated, and still more so in pretence than in reality, much too proud for their situation, but very polite to the former ambassador of France in Russia. M. de Caulaincourt might thus perceive that the justice of a cause is a great aid in defeats, and that Napoleon would have to maintain a violent struggle if he refused to make any concession to Europe. On the three following points the commissioners were nearly determined. They would not relinquish Breslau during the armistice, for that city might now be regarded as the second capital of Prussia; they would not suffer us to occupy Hamburg, which would be to allow beforehand a prejudice in favour of the final union of the Hanse towns to France; and finally, they proposed to grant an armistice of only one month. On these three points M. de Caulaincourt had a conference which lasted for ten hours, without gaining any thing by so long a discussion. He referred the questions

to the Emperor, who was at Neumarkt, near the gates of Breslau, which he had the rare prudence not to enter, that he might retain the power of yielding it, if that sacrifice should be necessary. He had satisfied himself with sending thither a detachment of troops belonging to Marshal Ney.

He was greatly irritated by the tone and the requirements of the commissioners.\* He replied that the armistice was not necessary to him, but that it was indispensable to them; that if they wished to give to this suspension of hostilities the character of a capitulation, he would march forward and drive them beyond the Vistula; that they would be beaten a third or fourth time, as often, in short, as they should meet the French army; that if, while this was his conviction, he was willing to halt, it was with the view of rendering to Europe those hopes of peace which she required, and of avoiding the imputation of having destroyed them; that he demanded at least the half of Silesia; that he would not relinquish Hamburg, and that if he renounced Breslau, it was merely from complaisance, for he was already master of that city. But he avoided any absolute declaration on this point, and left it to be conjectured that Breslau would be regarded as the equivalent of Hamburg. But he was peremptory on the duration of the armistice, saying that to stipulate for one month for the treatment of such difficult questions, was to trace the circle of Popilius around him, in which he was wont to enclose others, but not to be enclosed himself; and that being really desirous of a congress, he demanded adequate time to hold it with the fair prospect of a suitable result. Unhappily, he did not really wish it, and he sought time to re-arm and not to negotiate.

The commissioners met again, and proceeded to discuss these several subjects at the village of Pleiswitz, after having taken the precaution to stipulate for a provisional suspension during the continuance of these conferences. The commissioners of the allies held to their pretensions, without, however, appearing to be invincible, for an armistice was absolutely necessary to them. Napoleon, on his side, had just received news which rendered him somewhat more accommodating. M. de Bassano, recently arrived from Paris at Dresden, had repaired to Liegnitz to resume his diplomatic functions at head-quarters, and immediately after his arrival at Liegnitz he had been joined by M. de Bubna from Vienna, who brought detailed explanations on all the points discussed with him by Napoleon at Dresden on the 17th and 18th of May. The following was M. de Bubna's account of his journey and negotiations.

On returning to Vienna he had described Napoleon as even more yielding than he had found him, though Napoleon himself had assumed the appearance of being more so than he really was. He had dwelt upon his willingness to admit the Spanish insurgents to a congress, as a concession which he had not expected, and took great care to be silent with regard to his angry expressions towards M. de Metternich, which he mentioned only to M. de Narbonne.

\* We possess in the archives all the correspondence of Napoleon with M. de Caulaincourt during the negotiation of this armistice; and it is from this correspondence that I derive my account of the transaction.

This report had greatly delighted the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, both of whom wished to escape from their position without war. Moreover, they had been much pleased with the letters of Napoleon, and had made some allowance for his repugnance to certain of the proposed conditions. On the dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, on its dismemberment in the interest of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and on the relinquishment of Illyria and Austria, they had considered Napoleon overcome, though he had not expressly said so to M. de Bubna. But since he had shown himself more tenacious in respect to the renunciation of the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the restitution of the Hanse towns, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich had determined to admit some modifications on these points, and they had thought of the following as calculated to save what Napoleon called his honour. The Hanse provinces should not be restored to reconstitute the free towns of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, till peace should be made with England. The question of the Confederation of the Rhine should also be referred to the general peace, which should comprise all the powers in the world, including America. If at the present moment they should only treat with Russia, Prussia, and Austria, they would adjourn these two points. If, on the contrary, they should treat with all the world, Napoleon might readily make those sacrifices to ensure universal peace, including a maritime peace, which should procure to himself so many advantages and so much glory.

They had, therefore, immediately sent back M. de Bubna to the French head-quarters with these two modifications, which were in fact very important, and the Emperor Francis addressed a new letter to Napoleon, in which, in reply to his request to study his honour, he said these words: "When I gave you my daughter, your honour and mine became identical. Put confidence in me, and I will demand of you nothing that can tarnish your glory." To all these expressions M. de Bubna was to add the formal declaration that Austria was as yet pledged to none, and that if Napoleon would accept the conditions of peace thus modified, she was ready to unite herself with him by new articles joined to the treaty of alliance of March 14, 1812.

Such was the disposition of the court of Vienna when M. de Bubna resumed his journey; and it was sincere, for at that moment Austria had not heard of the direct arrangement between Russia and France; she had, therefore, no ground for displeasure, nor any particular reason for haste, and she offered these conditions because she felt sure that she could force them upon Russia and Prussia, by the simple threat of uniting herself with Napoleon. M. de Bubna had used diligence, and reached Liegnitz on the 30th of May, and explained at length to M. de Bassano the propositions of which he was the bearer. Notwithstanding the coolness of M. de Bassano, he explained them with perfect good faith, and with the energy of a man who desired to succeed for the sake of his country in the first place, but also from regard to his own reputation. M. de Bassano immediately sent an account of this conference

to Napoleon, without expressing a single word either in support or refutation of the propositions, whose rejection is the greatest misfortune that ever happened to France.

Certainly such news ought to have appeared good news to Napoleon, for it gave him the power of terminating his long struggle with Europe, with the acquisition of a magnificent empire, and of a maritime peace, the effect of which might well atone for the sacrifice of Hamburg and the Confederation of the Rhine. Unfortunately, this communication irritated instead of satisfying him. It conveyed to him the resolution of Austria to intervene immediately, which was true, and not to allow the continuance of hostilities without imposing her arbitration. It was, therefore, necessary either to accept conditions which he would on no account consent to, however modified, or else to run the chance of being immediately engaged with Austria, and he would not be in a condition to meet that new enemy within two months. This was, then, the final turning point which induced him to yield some of the contested points of the armistice. Instead of being accommodating towards Austria, who demanded definite sacrifices, he became so towards Prussia and Russia, who required merely those of a provisional character. He wrote in cipher to M. de Bassano: "Gain time; come to no explanation with M. de Bubna; bring him with you to Dresden, and put off the time for accepting or refusing the Austrian propositions. I am about to conclude an armistice, and then I shall have gained all the time I require. If, however, they persist in demanding conditions for the armistice which do not suit me, I will furnish you with the means of prolonging the conferences with M. de Bubna, and of securing to me the few days necessary to drive the allies far from the Austrian territory."

At this moment, unhappily for him and for us, Napoleon had just received the news that Marshal Davout was at the gates of Hamburg, and would certainly enter that city on June 1. It was now the 3d: he, therefore, thought he could resolve the difficulty of Hamburg by saying in the armistice that, in reference to the Hanse provinces, they should agree to that state which should be determined by the fate of arms by midnight of June 8. As to Breslau, he agreed that there should be left between the two armies a neutral ground of about ten leagues, which should include Breslau; and, as to the duration of the armistice, that it should extend to July 20, with six days of delay between the termination of the armistice and the renewal of hostilities, which would bring them to July 26, and make nearly two months. He sent these conditions with orders to break off intercourse instantly if they were not accepted.

M. de Caulaincourt having presented them on the 4th of June, the commissioners, who were ordered to yield, provided that Breslau was not left in the hands of Napoleon, acquiesced, and this fatal armistice, one of Napoleon's greatest misfortunes, was signed on the 4th of June. It was agreed to adopt the Katzbach as the line of demarcation between the two armies, so as to leave out Breslau as neutral; after the Katzbach, the Oder, which would ensure to us Lower Silesia as a station and as a source of provi-

sion; after the Oder, the old frontier, which had always separated Saxony from Prussia, which left in our possession all the states of Saxony; lastly, the line of the Elbe, from Wittenberg to the sea, except what should be affected by the Hanse towns. It was further stipulated that the invested garrisons of the Vistula and Oder should be successively supplied with provisions for payment. On the same day, it was learned that Hamburg and the Hanse towns had fallen into the hands of Marshal Davout, which secured us the possession of them during the suspension of hostilities.

Such was this deplorable armistice, which certainly ought to have been accepted if peace were desired, but otherwise to have been absolutely rejected, for it would have been better in that case to have completed the ruin of the allies; and which, on the contrary, Napoleon accepted simply because he was opposed to this peace, and desired to secure two months to complete his armaments, and to put himself in a condition to refuse the conditions of Austria.\*

This error, the result and sum of all the rest, formed part of that fatal series of foolishly ambitious resolutions which were destined to bring his reign to a hasty termination. It created, however, except in Prussia, a universal joy through Europe, because it presented forcibly the appearance of peace. Napoleon, when sending his army into cantonments, ordered the construction of a monument on the summit of the Alps with this inscription: **NAPOLEON TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE, IN MEMORY OF THEIR GENEROUS EFFORTS AGAINST THE COALITION OF 1813.** The idea accorded with the greatness of his genius; but it would have been better for the French people and for himself, to have sent to Paris a treaty of peace, stipulating the resignation of the Confederation of the Rhine, Hamburg, Illyria, and Spain, with these words: **SACRIFICES OF NAPOLEON TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE.** Napoleon would then have appeared not indeed more poetical, but greater, and that noble people would not have lost the reward of their purest blood shed through twenty years.

## BOOK XLIX.

### DRESDEN AND VITTORIA.

NAPOLEON'S arrangements for the troops during the armistice—His return to Dresden—Note presented by M. de Bunsen—Reply by Napoleon—Consequent conduct of the Austrian cabinet—Arrival of Metternich at Dresden—Interview with Napoleon—Acceptance of the Austrian mediation—Plenipotentiaries appointed to meet at Prague—Events in Spain—Battle of Vittoria—Ruin of the French cause in Spain—Consequences of the negotiations at Prague—Intentional delay of Napoleon—Austria proclaims her adhesion to the coalition—Departure of Napoleon from Dresden—His plans for the second part of the campaign of 1813—Battle of Dresden, August 27—Disaster of General Vandamme at Kulm and its consequences.

THE only object of Napoleon in signing the armistice of Pleiswitz was to gain two months for the completion of his armaments and their adaptation to the forces of the new enemies whom he was about to bring upon himself; but he never for a moment had thought of peace, which he would on no account have concluded on the conditions proposed by Austria. These conditions, so often disclosed during the previous four months, either by mere insinuations or by the more formal recent declarations of M. de Bunsen, were, as we have seen, the following: The dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw; the reconstitution of Poland by means of a considerable part of that grand duchy and of some portions of the Hanse provinces; the restoration to Germany of the free towns of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg; the abolition of the

Confederacy of the Rhine; and the restoration to Austria of Illyria and of those portions of Poland which had formerly belonged to her. Although this continental peace, the certain prelude to a maritime peace, would have left to France, independently of Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman States, in the condition of French provinces, Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, as vassal kingdoms, Napoleon rejected it with determination, not on account of the trivial loss of territory, but as derogatory to his glory, and without hesitation preferred war with the whole of Europe. This was no doubt an act of singular temerity in regard to himself, of cruelty towards the numerous victims destined to perish on the field, a species of crime against France, exposed to so many dangers simply to gratify the pride of her prince, but it was a resolution which he had nearly formed, and which it was scarcely possible to shake, from which he could only have been moved by better and more influential counsellors than those who actually surrounded him. Yet, though fully resolved, as appears incontestably from his orders, his diplomatic communications, and certain unavoidable admissions to his most immediate co-operators, he could not with advantage allow his designs to be perceived by the powers with whom he was to treat, nor by the greater part of the agents of his government, of whom

\* We are not reduced to conjectures in regard to this famous armistice, so justly censured as a great political and military error, since it afforded time to the allies to save themselves when fairly brought to bay. The most ridiculous motives have been ascribed to Napoleon, consistent neither with his character nor his genius. But, happily for history, he wrote to Prince Eugene and M. de Bassano, the minister of war, the reasons which determined him, and we see in his statements, that being forced to come to an explanation with Austria in a few days, and therefore liable to be engaged with that power immediately, he signed the armistice in order to gain two months for the preparation of the second series of his armaments. In this case, we may say that the error of the armistice was the same as that of refusing the conditions of Austria.



zealous devotion he stood in need. In fact, had the design of Napoleon been known to Austria, it would have finally determined that power against us, accelerated her armaments already in active preparation, spread despair throughout our allies, already weary of our alliance, and rendered impossible a prolongation of the armistice which Napoleon deemed of essential importance and which he hoped to secure by drawing out the negotiations. Had his resolution to reject peace been acknowledged to the members of his government, it would speedily have gained publicity, augmented the dislike to his policy, extended that dislike to his person and his dynasty, increased the difficulty of raising levies, and irritated and discouraged the army, who, seeing no term to the effusion of their blood, would have indulged in language still more bold and unsparing. For, indeed, it appeared as if the spirit of opposition checked in all other quarters had found refuge in the camp, and that our soldiers of every rank, in return for the sacrifices demanded of them, had assumed to themselves that liberty which is inalienable from the French character. Those who in the morning had rushed fearlessly into the midst of danger, deplored in the evening bivouac the fatal obstinacy which shed so much blood in support of a policy they could no longer understand. They would have allowed that Moscow and the Berezina demanded a signal revenge; but after the prestige of our arms had been restored by Lutzen and Bautzen, they would have been disgusted and their zeal would have been cooled, if they had learned that Napoleon was not content with Belgium, the Rhenish provinces, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Naples, but was eager to sacrifice thousands of men in order to retain Lubeck, Hamburg, Bremen, and the vain title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. For all these reasons Napoleon expressed his whole design to none, except perhaps M. de Bassano; he told nothing more to any one than was necessary for the accomplishment of his particular task, and reserved to himself the full knowledge of his fatal plans.

We have just seen that M. de Bubna had repaired to head-quarters with the conditions proposed by Austria, and that these conditions had been considerably modified; for by deferring till the establishment of a maritime peace the sacrifice of the Hanse towns and of the Confederation of the Rhine, the only objection that could be reasonably brought against them had been removed. Napoleon perceiving himself to be closely pressed, and fearing that he might be forced to declare himself immediately, which would have brought him into conflict with Austria before he was duly prepared, had signed the disadvantageous armistice of Pleiswitz, with the view of securing time not for treating but for arming. He wrote confidentially to Prince Eugene and to the ministers of war, that he had signed that armistice, the danger of which he partly foresaw, in order to secure time for preparations against Austria, to whom he designed to give the law rather than to receive it from her hands. He recommended each of them to use all diligence to cause the army of Italy intended to threaten Austria by Carinthia, and the army of Mentz intended to threaten her by Bavaria, to be ready by the

end of July, and so to act that the days should *reckon double*, for they had barely two months for the completion of armaments rendered indispensable by circumstances. However, he did not communicate to either what that law of Austria was to which he refused to submit; he merely allowed them to believe that her demands were exorbitant, and tended to the ruin of France and his own disgrace. He wrote to Prince Cambacérès, to whom he had delegated his authority on parting, that the armistice which had been signed might indeed lead to peace, but this was no reason for relaxing the preparations for war, but rather for redoubling them; for it was merely so long as we showed ourselves formidable at all points that peace could be secure and honourable. But no more to Prince Cambacérès than to others did he venture to describe the peace which he would consider secure and honourable, and he carefully avoided saying that he should not consider as such a peace which, independently of the Rhine and the Alps, should concede to France, directly or indirectly, Holland, Westphalia, Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, the Roman States, and Naples.

To M. de Bassano alone, whom he could not deceive, since he was the medium of all the communications between France and the European powers, and from whom he did not fear the slightest opposition, he discovered his real design, when he assigned to him the task of receiving M. de Bubna in his stead. He said to him that he did not wish to have a personal interview with that envoy, in order to avoid any express declaration on the subject of the conditions proposed by Austria; he enjoined him to take him to Dresden, where the French head-quarters were shortly to arrive, and there to retain him till his return, which would gain about ten days, and would bring them to the middle of June, before the assembly of the plenipotentiaries. By subsequently suggesting formal difficulties, it would be possible to reach July before he should make any absolute declaration. Then at the last moment, by showing some inclination to treat, and dwelling on the shortness of time remaining, it would be possible to prolong the armistice for another month, which would secure the whole month of August, and thus procure three months for arming; a period of which the allies would undoubtedly avail themselves, but not so ably as France, for their affairs were not administered with the same activity or the same genius as hers.

After determining on this plan, Napoleon sent M. de Bassano to Dresden, with orders to announce his speedy arrival in that capital, and to secure for him apart from the royal residence a suitable and convenient abode, where he might be at the same time in the town and the country, where he might work without interruption, breathe a pure air, and be within reach of the training camps on the banks of the Elba. He ordered part of his suite to be brought thither, and even the French theatre, that he might exhibit a kind of pacific splendour which should give an impression of satisfaction, confidence, and desire for repose; a desire which was never further from his mind. "It is well," he wrote to Prince Cambacérès, "that we should be supposed to pass our time here in amusement."

According to his custom, Napoleon did not leave his troops until he had ensured their maintenance, good health, and training during the armistice. Agreeably to the terms of the armistice, he had secured for himself lower Silesia, a country rich in every resource for the food and clothing of man. He there distributed his *corps d'armée* from the mountains of Bohemia to the Oder in the following manner. He placed Reynier at Grolitz with the 7th corps, Macdonald at Lowenberg with the 11th, Lauriston at Goldberg with the 5th, Ney at Liegnitz with the 3rd, Marmont at Buntzlau with the 6th, Bertrand at Sprottau with the 4th, Mortier around Glogau with the infantry of the young guard, Victor at Crossen with the 2d, Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani on the banks of the Oder with the cavalry of reserve. Marshal Oudinot, with the corps destined to march upon Berlin, was stationed on the limits of Saxony and Brandenburg, which formed from the Oder to the Elbe the line of demarcation stipulated by the armistice. These different corps were to encamp in villages or barracks, to manœuvre, to take rest, and live in abundance; they were to be supported by means of exactions upon the country, regulated so as to be able to subsist there for at least three months, and to provide for the time of renewing hostilities. Napoleon also ordered collections to be made of cloth in that part of Silesia which remained to him, and which produced it in abundance, to renew the clothing which had been already worn out by the soldiers. As Silesia was destined in any case to revert to Prussia, since Austria did not wish it, he only cared to husband its resources so long as he should require.

Of all his strongholds upon the Oder and the Vistula, that of Glogau alone having been relieved, he renewed its garrison and provisions, and commanded the completion of its means of defence. He hurried officers to Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic to inform those garrisons of the latest triumphs of our arms; to bear rewards to them, and to see that the provisions consumed each day were immediately replaced by equal quantities, agreeably to the conditions expressed in the armistice. It had been settled by one of the stipulations of the armistice, that the fate of the important stronghold of Hamburg should depend upon the fortune of war, and should belong to those who should occupy it on the evening of the 8th of June. It had fallen into our hands on the 29th of May by the arrival of General Vandamme at the head of two divisions, and would have done so at an earlier period but for the singular, and for a time inexplicable, intervention of Denmark. Hitherto, Denmark had been faithful to us, and with a good cause, for the preservation of Norway to Denmark was the object of our war with Sweden. After our disaster at Moscow, she had been urgently solicited by Russia and England to abandon Norway to Sweden, with the promise of indemnity at the expense of France if she acquiesced, and the threat of destruction to the Danish monarchy if she should resist. To these menacing solicitations of Russia and England were added the milder instances of Austria, inviting the co-operation of Denmark, and promising the preservation of Norway, if she would adhere to her policy of mediation. In this conflict of opposing suggestions, Denmark, fearing that France might not

be in a condition to maintain her interests, had honourably demanded of Napoleon authority to treat independently, in order to escape the threatening dangers; and Napoleon, moved by her frankness, had generously consented. He had even sent back the Danish sailors who were serving in our fleet, to render her position more entirely neutral. Denmark had placed her hopes of preserving Norway on resuming peace with England by the intervention of Russia, and then remaining neutral. It was speedily intimated to her that she must not only declare war against us, which would be very painful to her sense of honour, but that she must also renounce her claim to Norway, saving an eventual indemnity, so that her defection from us would not even have saved her from spoliation. Disgusted by these demands, Denmark had returned to our alliance, and one of her divisions, which had remained at the gates of Hamburg in an equivocal and somewhat alarming attitude, had united with us instead of affording us opposition. Vandamme, then, whom nothing detained, had expelled the forces of Tettensborg, composed of Cossacks, Prussians, Mecklenburgians, and soldiers of the Hanse towns, and had again established the French eagles along the whole course of the lower Elbe. Napoleon had immediately forwarded to Marshal Davout orders to establish himself firmly in Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, severely to punish the revolt of those cities, to derive from them the supplies necessary to the army, and to create on the lower Elbe a vast military establishment which should complete the defences of that large river, on which we were to possess Königsstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg. This important line, the object of such lively debate in the negotiation of the armistice, was then secured to us, independently of that of the Oder, of which we held the essential part, that opposite to Dresden. Some troops of volunteers indeed had crossed the line of the Elbe, and were at this moment overrunning Westphalia, Hesse, and Saxony, diffusing everywhere the terror of the Cossacks, which amounted almost to superstition. Napoleon formed on his rear a body of infantry and cavalry to pursue them to the utmost, and to put to the sword without mercy those whom they should take on his side of the Elbe. The Duke of Padua destined, as we have said, to command a third corps of cavalry, when the first two, those of Latour-Maubourg and of Sebastiani, should be completed, was then at Leipzig, with the nucleus of his troops, amounting to about 3000 horsemen and some pieces of horse artillery. Napoleon added to him Dombrowski's Polish division, that of Teste (the 4th of Marmont) left in the rear to perfect their organization, a second Wurtemberg division, recently arrived, and some garrison battalions from Magdeburg, which formed a total of 8000 horse and 11,000 foot. He ordered him to devote himself exclusively to the police of the country comprised between the Elbe and the Rhine, to pacify it, to purge it of rangers, and if he should take any subsequent to the 8th of June, the last day allowed to hostilities, to treat them as bandits, and at least to make them prisoners, in order to get possession of their horses, which were of excellent quality.

After having in the first instance, devoted

these cares to the execution of the armistice and the welfare of the troops during its continuance, Napoleon took the road to Dresden, where he proposed to pass all the time of the approaching negotiations, and retrograde towards the Elba with the cavalry and infantry of the Old Guard, keeping pace with his own troops. He did not return to Dresden till June 10, in accordance with his plan of deferring his meeting with M. de Bubna as long as possible. The King of Saxony came to meet him, and even the inhabitants of Dresden, pleased to see the war removed from their own homes and their king treated with respect, gave him a reception which could hardly have been expected from a German population.

Napoleon alighted at the Marcolini palace, which M. de Bassano had selected for him. It was surrounded by a large and beautiful garden situated in the faubourg of Friedrichstadt, near the meadow of Osterwise, where numerous troops could exercise on the banks of the Elba. Here Napoleon found his domestic establishment in readiness to receive him. Without being any trouble to the court of Saxony, and without being incommoded by it, he here enjoyed a suitable establishment, free air, verdure, and a field for the exercise of his troops. He determined to hold a levee in the morning, as at the Tuileries; reviews and manoeuvres at midday; and in the evening, dinners, receptions, and the performance of the principal works of Corneille, Racine, and Molière, by the principal actors of the French theatre. The very day after his return to Dresden, his course of life, as previously determined, began with all the precision and uniformity of a military order. But at the same time M. de Bubna, who had arrived from Vienna more than a fortnight before, was vainly waiting for an interview, and he reminded him of his presence by a formal note, to which it was absolutely necessary to give a distinct and prompt reply.

In order to understand this note and its importance, it is requisite to know the circumstances which had most recently occurred in Austria, where, as elsewhere, events succeeded each other with prodigious rapidity, under the violent impulse everywhere imparted by Napoleon. By employing M. de Caulaincourt in the negotiation of the armistice, in order to give occasion to a direct arrangement with Russia, Napoleon had furnished that power with a dangerous weapon, of which she was to make a fatal use. If the Emperor Alexander had been less wounded by the contempt of Napoleon, had been less enamoured of his new function as king of kings, and had shared in some degree the opinion of Prince Kutusof, who wished to terminate this war by signing with France a peace exclusively Russian, it would have been very suitable to send to him M. de Caulaincourt, who had long been his confidant, and almost his friend. But intoxicated by the incense offered him by the Germans, Alexander had become, notwithstanding his usual mildness, an implacable enemy, whom it was dangerous to address. Instead of affecting him by the mission of M. de Caulaincourt this merely furnished him with the means of bringing to a close the long hesitation of Austria. It would enable Alexander to say to that power, "Decide, for if for want of aiding us you allow us to fight as at Lutzen and at

Bautzen, we shall be forced to treat with our common enemy, to accept the advances which he makes to us, to conclude with him a peace exclusively in favor of Russia, and to resign you finally to his resentment, which is not likely to be very moderate, for though you have not done enough to assist us, you have done quite enough to inspire him with the greatest distrust." This language at the court of Vienna would have been all the more appropriate immediately after Bautzen, from the fact that a new movement in retreat was about to withdraw the allies from the confines of Austria, and deprive them of all contact with her. This then, or never, was the time to unite, for one step more would render it impossible to combine, however eager to do so.

Such are the reasons which they had resolved to urge with the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich; and whilst MM. Kleist and de Schouvaloff were negotiating at Pleiswitz the armistice of June 4, they had summoned M. de Stadion, had pointed out to him the selection of M. de Caulaincourt for that negotiation, and even added falsehood to truth, for they had spoken of insinuations, falsely ascribed to that individual, from which they might conclude that Napoleon was thinking of coming to an understanding with Russia directly at the expense of Austria. All that the mission of M. de Caulaincourt could suggest in the form of diplomatic attempts was represented as actually accomplished, and M. de Stadion was urged to declare to his cabinet that whatever they now refused they would be constrained to accept in a few days by the force of circumstances and the victories of Napoleon. M. de Stadion, who was no friend to France, and who was much offended by the presence of M. de Caulaincourt, hastened to describe to his court, with much exaggeration, the danger of a direct arrangement between France and Russia. Not satisfied with written statements, they had forwarded, as we have said, M. de Nesselrode, the same person who for forty years has constantly proposed to his various masters a profound policy,—the result of his own patience, but little in accordance with their irritable temperament. At that time young, simple, and modest, less dogmatic than M. de Metternich, and less enterprising, but equal to him in finesse, he was well adapted to gain the confidence of so enlightened a prince as Alexander, and had actually acquired a marked ascendancy over him. Though the Czar had left to M. de Romanzoff the empty title of chancellor, in memory of the conquest of Finland and Bessarabia under his ministry, he had brought M. de Nesselrode to his head-quarters, and constantly availed himself of his advice. As early as the 1st of June he had despatched him to Vienna to urge the court of Austria with entreaties, and, if necessary, with threats, by holding up the head of Medusa, in the form of Napoleon in personal intercourse with Alexander, renewing on the Oder the interview on the Niemen, and perhaps at Breslau the alliance of Tilset. M. de Nesselrode had immediately set out for Vienna through Bohemia.

This was more than enough to excite a real alarm in two minds of so much penetration as the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich. In fact, Austria restored by fortune to a high position from which she had been precipitated

twenty years before by the sword of Napoleon, was, nevertheless, exposed to great danger. At this moment she was caressed by every party; from every quarter were offered the most magnificent donations. By Alexander were offered not only Illyria and part of Poland, but Italy, the Tyrol, the imperial crown of Germany, which Napoleon had caused to fall from her head, and above all independence. By France were offered in addition to Illyria and part of Poland, not indeed Italy nor the Tyrol nor the crown Imperial, but that which in a previous age would have possessed a charm, viz. Silesia; but without independence, which she valued more than all the rest. She had therefore only to choose; but if, from the desire of too long enjoying the position of a power universally courted, she should not decide correctly, it was possible that, after having been flattered and caressed by all, she should be disgraced by all, and crushed under their common resentment; for if Napoleon and Alexander came to an understanding, there must ensue a peace exclusively Russian; Austria would have no part of Poland, Illyria, or Italy; her desire to reconstitute Germany would never be gratified further than by some compensation made to Prussia; and far from recovering her independence, she would again fall under the dominion of Napoleon, to be exercised with greater severity than before. All this might be determined in a moment; and in present circumstances every thing depended on the sword, and the whole face of the world might be changed in forty-eight hours.

Full of these anxieties M. de Metternich had already thought of conducting his master to Prague in order to be near the theatre of battles and negotiations, and to be able from the heights of Bohemia, as from a lofty and near observatory, to watch the rapid movement of affairs and mingle in them as occasion might demand. His emotion at the selection of M. de Caulaincourt to conduct the negotiation had not escaped the penetrating observation of M. de Narbonne. Every doubt had been removed by the letters of M. de Stadion, and in twenty-four hours the Emperor and his minister had resolved to quit Vienna for Prague, to the great surprise of the public; not so much at the resolution itself as at the promptitude with which it had been formed. In the relation which they at present held with France they were in a manner obliged to explain every thing to that power, and M. de Metternich lost no time in informing M. de Narbonne that, as negotiations were about to commence by the mediation of Austria, it was necessary that she should come into close proximity with the parties whose case was to be submitted to her consideration; and that at Prague six days, at least, would be gained at each communication, which was of great importance, as the peace of the world was to be concluded in six weeks. This reason explained the journey to Prague, but not the suddenness of the departure. Secret information and the constrained air of M. de Metternich had disclosed every thing to the vigilance of the French legation. M. de Narbonne had learned from undoubted sources that the court of Vienna was hastening its departure from the fear of a direct arrangement between France and Russia, and the same information explained to him the change of sentiment which he thought he could

detect in M. de Metternich, whom he had perceived to be very sensibly cooled towards us, which was natural; for though M. de Metternich had escaped from our alliance as it were by the wriggling movements of a serpent, yet he had not wholly deserted our cause, and in the wise design of terminating every thing without war, he had defended with the allies a moderate peace which had been no easy task, and he was resolved to expose us to the reproach of seeking to negotiate a peace disastrous to himself while he constrained himself to stipulate for one that should be very favourable to us.

Besides, M. de Narbonne had scarcely had time for an interview with M. de Metternich, who, having left in great haste, had reached the Emperor Francis at Gitschen, about twenty leagues from Prague, on the evening of June 3. He had there met M. de Nesselrode who, having heard of the departure of the court, had retraced his steps in order to join it. It is easy to conjecture the intercourse that would take place between these two important statesmen. M. de Nesselrode had entreated M. de Metternich, in the name of the Emperor of Russia and of the King of Prussia, to put an end to these protracted delays, not to allow the allies to engage again, for if again beaten they must submit themselves to Napoleon and treat with him at the expense of Austria, and thus determine forever the dependence of Europe. M. de Nesselrode endeavoured especially to prove to M. de Metternich that Napoleon was betraying the Austrians; for while these were supporting, in his favour, the plan of a moderate peace, he was proposing to sacrifice them, and to conclude a peace entirely destructive to them. He therefore strenuously urged the Austrian minister to follow the example of Prussia, and to unite with the allied sovereigns by a formal treaty. M. de Metternich was in no need of either stimulus or information. But that minister, who was always characterized by the union of a dispassioned policy with an ardent mind, adhered with increasing tenacity to the line of conduct he had adopted,—that of entirely exhausting the part of mediator before assuming that of belligerent. This system besides sparing the honour of the Emperor Francis, as a sovereign and a father, had the advantage of saving the interest of Austria, of procuring time for her to arm, and above all, of rendering possible a pacific conclusion, for it would have been a noble result for her to reconstitute Prussia, to re-establish the independence of Germany, and to recover Illyria and the lost portion of Galicia, without increasing the risk of a new war with Napoleon; a war which none could then foresee would not have proved fatal to her.

M. de Metternich, with singular foresight, wished to avoid not only the chance of seeing all the world, weary of his delays, arrange itself at his expense, but also the chance of being beaten by France, which he greatly feared, notwithstanding the events of the preceding year; and for this reason he endeavoured with one hand to hold Russia and Prussia, to prevent them escaping from his grasp, and with the other to keep Napoleon in check to force him to accept a peace agreeable to Europe. He had accordingly said to M. de Nesselrode that he had undertaken to be mediator, a task which he would frankly discharge during the two follow-

ing months; that it was actually incumbent upon him, from his relation to France, to pass through the office of mediator before assuming that of enemy; that at the present moment he could take no part, but that if the reasonable conditions of peace should be finally rejected, he would advise his master, on the expiry of the armistice, to unite with the allied powers, and to make one final effort to rescue Europe from the domination of Napoleon.

That which was actually promised, in consequence of these views, was, on the part of Russia, not to allow herself to be seduced by the baits of a direct arrangement, and on the part of Austria, to declare war on the day named if the conditions of mediation were not accepted by France. M. de Metternich, taking advantage of the neighbourhood of Prague, had recalled thither M. de Bubna for twenty-four hours, had fully explained to him the state of affairs, had positively asserted that he was not yet engaged to the belligerent parties, and had authorized him to support this assertion by the word of honour of the Emperor Francis; but he had also authorized him to signify most expressly that he would at length enter into engagements with them, if the period of the armistice were not faithfully employed in the negotiation of a moderate peace. At the same time he had charged him to announce to the French cabinet that the mediation of Austria had been formally accepted by Russia and Prussia, which obliged the mediator to demand of each party their several conditions, and more particularly of France, who was urgently requested to state those to which she adhered. M. de Bubna was on this occasion to express the desire of M. de Metternich to come for a short time to Dresden to terminate all on the spot, in a cordial interview with Napoleon. At Dresden, in fact, the question might have been settled in a few hours, for, if M. de Metternich should succeed in persuading Napoleon, all would be done, for the allies could not possibly refuse the conditions which should be sanctioned by Austria.

Such were the important communications which M. de Bubna, on his return to Dresden, wished to make to Napoleon, and a part only of which he mentioned to M. de Bassano, aware of the uselessness of any explanation with that minister who adopted the opinions of his master without aiding in their formation. Napoleon having arrived on the 10th of June, M. de Bubna transmitted on the 11th a note declaring that Russia and Prussia had officially accepted the mediation of Austria, who was engaged in demanding the conditions of peace proposed by them, and that all were awaiting the proposals of France. This was merely a first step, aiming not at an immediate and full enunciation of the conditions required by France, but at preliminary conferences and confidential disclosures,—an indispensable prelude to official and final declarations, which should be of longer or shorter duration according to the time at their disposal.

If Napoleon had desired peace, such peace, at least, as was possible, and the conditions of which he well knew, he would not have lost time, for no more than forty days remained for negotiation. It was now the 10th of June, and the armistice was to expire on the 20th of July.

With his wonted ardour, he would have summoned M. de Metternich to Dresden, endeavoured to extract from him some modification of the Austrian proposals, which was very possible considering her desire of a pacific termination, and repeatedly despatched that minister to the head-quarters of the allies, to smooth those difficulties of detail which are wont to occur in every treaty, but especially in one which involved the interests of the whole world. But the evident proof that he did not wish for peace (independently of those irrefragable arguments which may be derived from his correspondence) is to be found in the time which he allowed to be lost. His design, as we have said, was to defer the moment of explanation, and with this view to multiply questions of form, then to appear suddenly to correct himself as the expiration of the armistice drew near, to seem willing to yield, to obtain by means of these pacific demonstrations a prolongation of the armistice, and thus to give himself till the 1st of September to terminate his military preparations, at that time to break off on some motive well adapted to deceive the public, and suddenly to fall upon the coalition with all his forces, to dissolve it, and to establish more firmly than ever his contested dominion, a design certainly pardonable, and unhappily too frequent in the history of conquerors, if it had been founded on realities! With such views it was not the time to receive M. de Bubna and to reply to him yea or nay to conditions which were reduced to a small number of perfectly unequivocal points. Accordingly, Napoleon resolved to allow four or five days to elapse before admitting M. de Bubna or replying to his note,—a very intelligible delay if no term had been assigned to the negotiations, and if, as in the treaty of Westphalia, they had months, and even years, at their disposal. But to lose four or five days out of forty in a preliminary question of form which implied a thousand others, was too plainly to indicate what he wished, or rather what he wished not.

However, Napoleon had just arrived at Dresden, fatigued no doubt and overwhelmed with a multiplicity of cares, and he might readily be excused for not receiving M. de Bubna on the same day. Besides, no sovereign was ever less disposed to meet the convenience of others or less in the habit of doing so. This delay evinced towards M. de Bubna, therefore, was not very significant, but it proved that Napoleon was himself in no hurry, for when he was so, day and night, fatigue and repose, were all one to him, and at the present moment not to be eager for peace was not to desire it. M. de Bassano received the despatch of M. de Bubna, which he professed to regard as of a very serious character, promised a reply in the course of three or four days, during which time also Napoleon would give audience to M. de Bubna and would enter upon the subject of his note.

During this interval the reply was prepared and drawn up. The character of this reply, even more than the voluntary loss of time, was calculated to reveal the true disposition of the French Government. It was first objected to M. de Bubna that he had no authority to transmit a note. That agent, indeed, though eagerly received by Napoleon, and sent to him,

as being more acceptable than any other, and, in particular, more intelligent than Prince Schwarzenberg, who was but little so, had never been formally accredited either with the title of plenipotentiary or ambassador; he had, therefore, no authority to transmit a note. This was a mere pretence, for already most important communications had been exchanged with that personage. Nevertheless, a first reply to M. de Bubna was drawn up, in which it was maintained that the note presented ought to have been signed by M. de Metternich in order to be admitted to the archives of the French cabinet, for he possessed himself no title that could give authenticity to the note. After this difficulty in form, others were raised of a more essential character. The first related to the mediation itself. Undoubtedly, it was said, France had appeared inclined to admit the mediation of Austria, and had even promised to accept it, but so important a resolution must not be merely inferred from an ordinary interview, it required an official act, defining the design, the form, the purport, and the direction of this mediation. Nor was this all: how would this mediation agree with the treaty of alliance? would the Austrian cabinet be mediator, that is, arbitrator, and an arbitrator ready to pronounce against either party with arms in her hand, as is usual with an armed mediator? what, then, would become of the treaty of alliance between Austria and France? This point required explanation. Finally, whatever might be the design of the mediation, there was a question of form which honour forbade to be passed over in silence. The mediator so hastily, and, as it were, even cavalierly, seizing his office, already indicated a manner of conducting the business which could not be agreeable to France. He seemed, in fact, to wish to be the sole mode of communication between all the belligerent parties, never to allow them to come into personal intercourse, which was already the secret desire of Austria, in order to prevent any direct arrangement. Such a mode of negotiation was wholly inadmissible. France would not delegate to any power the right to treat of her affairs. Thus to act was to impose upon her a peace contrived in concert with others, and France, so long victorious, able to dictate conditions to Europe, was not reduced, especially when victory had again appeared on her side, to accept conditions from any source whatever. She was willing, for the sake of peace, which was required by the whole world, to resign her right of dictating conditions; but she would never consent to be dictated to by others, were the whole of Europe combined to impose a law upon her.

Several notes were filled with sophistries of this nature, as well as a long interview between Napoleon himself and M. de Bubna, held on the 14th of June; the notes were signed and remitted on the 15th. M. de Bassano accompanied them with a private letter to M. de Metternich, the tone of which was contrary to the end proposed, for Napoleon wished to gain time, and the language of hauteur was not calculated to attain this object. In this letter he imputed the loss of time to M. de Metternich, complained very foolishly that though the armistice had been signed on the 4th of

June, they had made so little progress on the 15th, as if M. de Bubna had not been at the French head-quarters even since the latter end of May, vainly demanding an interview, as if Austria had not shown herself at all points anxious to call forth and to give explanations. Finally, as to the desire expressed by M. de Metternich to go to Dresden, M. de Bassano, without eluding it, replied, in a manner scarcely civil, that the questions were not yet so mature that an interview between M. de Metternich and the minister of foreign affairs, or even Napoleon himself, should yield the benefit anticipated, but which might be derived at a subsequent period.

Such were the replies with which M. de Bubna was forced to be content, and which were forwarded to M. de Metternich at Prague. One day was necessary to reach that capital of Bohemia, one day to return, and if M. de Metternich and his master allowed three or four days for coming to a resolution, they might wait till the 20th of June before being obliged to speak again. On the other hand, it was quite allowable to French diplomacy to spend some days in deciding upon the text of the convention on which they would accept the mediation, some days more for the gathering of the plenipotentiaries, and they would thus reach July 1 before meeting with European diplomacy. It would then be sufficient to exhibit a conciliating disposition for a time, say from the 1st to the 10th of July, in order to be in a condition to demand the prolongation of the armistice from July 20 to August 21, which, with six days for declaration of hostilities, would bring to August 26, very near the 1st of September, the time desired by Napoleon. Such were his designs and the means employed for their accomplishment.

While he appeared only to lose time in negotiations, his real object was to employ it wisely in the completion of his military plans. His first project when he reckoned on the alliance or neutrality of Austria was to advance to the Oder and the Vistula, to throw back the Russians to the Niemen, and to send them home conquered and separated from the Prussians. All the actual preparations having been made in the supposition of war with Austria, the plans could not remain the same, for in advancing only to the Oder he would have left the Austrian armies on his flanks and rear. For his future line of defence, therefore, he had only to choose between the Elbe and the Rhine, or, at most, the Main. He preferred the Elbe, for profound reasons not generally known nor adequately appreciated. We may premise that to fall upon the Rhine or the Main was nearly the same thing, for the Elbe river Main, describing several turns across the mountainous country of Franconia, and falling into the Rhine at Mentz after a brief course, might serve to defend the approaches of the Rhine when they were fighting with armies of 60,000 or 80,000 men, but could not do so when fighting with masses of 500,000 or 600,000, and it would have been outflanked on the right or left before a fortnight. The Main, therefore, may be considered merely as an addition to the line of the Rhine,—that is, as the Rhine itself,—and it remained merely to choose between the Elbe and the Rhine. That

to present the question is almost to resolve it. To withdraw immediately to the Rhine was to abandon to Europe an extent of territory which would be a hundred times more humiliating than the sacrifices demanded as the price of peace. It was to abandon not only the alliances of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, &c., but the Hanse towns, which were the subjects of such vehement dispute, as well as Westphalia and Holland, which were not in dispute, for Holland itself is only protected when we should be upon the Rhine. And how would it be possible to demand in a treaty the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, when, by falling back upon that river, we should declare ourselves unable to defend it? How could we lay claim to the Hanse towns, to Westphalia, and Holland, when we proved that we could no longer occupy them? Rather than select that territory as a battle-field it would have been much more simple to accept the conditions of peace offered by Austria, for by renouncing the Confederation of the Rhine and the Hanse towns we should have retained without dispute Westphalia and Holland, and finally extricated from danger the throne of Napoleon, and, what was of still greater importance, the territorial grandeur of France. Independently of these reasons, which politically were decisive, there was another equally strong in a moral and patriotic point of view, viz. that to fall back upon the Rhine was to transport the theatre of war into France. No doubt, as long as that river was not crossed by the enemy, the war might be considered to be out of France; but the neighbourhood was such that, as regards the frontier provinces, the suffering was nearly the same. Moreover, while gaining victories on the Upper Rhine, as between Strasbourg and Mentz, Napoleon was not sure that one of his lieutenants might not allow his position to be forced below him, which would carry the war into France, and the position of Napoleon would no longer be that of a conqueror contending for the dominion of the world, but that of a sovereign defending the homes of his empire against an invading force. It would have been better, we repeat, to accept peace at once; for, while it was not humiliating, but, on the contrary, highly honourable, it would not have demanded of Napoleon any sacrifice comparable to that involved in a voluntary retreat to the Rhine. Those, therefore, who blamed him for having adopted the line of the Elbe would do better to reproach him for not having accepted peace, which would have involved sacrifices of all kinds a hundred times less than the immediate retreat upon the Rhine. Allowing the deplorable idea of continuing the war for the sake of the Hanse towns and the Confederation of the Rhine, the only conduct admissible was to occupy and defend the line of the Elbe.

On this point the great intelligence of Napoleon could not be deceived, and, hovering like an eagle over the map of Europe, he had pounced upon Dresden as the rock from which he should make a stand against his enemies. The narrative of events will prove that if his position there was forced, this was not to be ascribed to the fault of the position itself, but to the extraordinary extent of his combinations, the exhaustion of his army, and the patriotic ardour excited through Europe against him. Six years

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earlier, with the army of Friedland, he would have maintained it against all the world.

The line of the Elbe, though presenting in its upper part a less considerable obstacle than the Rhine, had, nevertheless, the advantage of being shorter, less broken, and more easily traversed interiorly, and, therefore, more readily allowing aid to be brought from one point to another, and from the mountains of Bohemia to the sea interspersed with solid points, such as Konigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg. Some of these points required works, and, for this reason, Napoleon in his military calculations, which were more profound than his political, constantly wished to prolong the armistice, in order to repair the error of having signed it. It was a question whether, as the line of the Elbe rested in its extreme right on the mountains of Bohemia, which thus allowed Austria the means of debouching on the rear of that position, it would be possible to defend himself against an attempt of the enemy to turn it. This question many intelligent men openly proposed. But Napoleon, who could not prevent these objections, his misfortunes giving some license to the language of timidity, expressed contempt whenever it was suggested that his position at Dresden could be turned by a descent of the Austrians upon Freyberg or Chemnitz. Such fear could not be excited in the mind of a general of the army of Italy, who found again the position he had so long occupied about Verona, but in augmented force; who found in the Elbe the Adige, in Bohemia the Tyrol, in Dresden Verona itself, and who formerly, firmly established at the entrance of the Alps, had poured down in turns upon those who presented themselves in his front or rear, and on the latter with the greater violence. He replied, with reason, that his most ardent wish was that the main body of the enemy should debouche behind the Elbe while he remained posted on that river, that he should there fall upon them and take them all at once between the Elbe and the forest of Thuringia. The subsequent disaster of the allies at Dresden proved the accuracy of his anticipations; and if, at a later period, he was forced upon the Elbe, it was not through Bohemia, but through the Lower Elbe, which his lieutenants had not been able to defend, and after he had been greatly weakened by various accidents. His design, always profound, and of unexampled compass when extensive combinations were concerned, was to establish himself firmly upon the Elbe, so as to be able to remove to a distance for some days without anxiety, in case it should be necessary either to meet the mass which might advance in front, or to fall back rapidly on that which might have debouched upon his rear from Bohemia; in a word, to recommence with 500,000 men against 700,000, what he had performed in his youth with 50,000 French against 80,000 Austrians, and results will prove that with means less exhausted, the incomparable superiority of his conceptions would have triumphed on this occasion as formerly. But the glory of realizing on so vast a scale the marvels of his youth was not destined to be his,—as a punishment for his ill use of men and things, of bodies and souls.

In order to obtain from the line of the Elbe all the advantage that it was fitted to yield, it was necessary to employ the period of the armis-

tice in fortifying the principal points, and to use all diligence, whether the duration were prolonged or not. The first point was Königstein, at the spot where the Elbe issues from the mountains of Bohemia to enter Saxony. Two rocks, those of Königstein and Lillenstein, placed like two advanced sentinels to the left and right of the river, compress the Elbe at its entrance on the plains of Germany, and command its course, which at this point is very narrow. On the rock of Königstein, situated to our right, i.e. on the left of the river, was found the fortress of that name, which commands the celebrated camp of Pirna, rendered illustrious by the wars of Frederick the Great. There was nothing to add to the works of this citadel; only, the garrison being Saxon, Napoleon took care to supply it gradually and imperceptibly with French troops. He ordered the collection there of 10,000 quintals of flour, and the construction of ovens, to provide for the support of about 100,000 men for nine or ten days,—we shall see with what intention. On the opposite rock, situated on the right bank, that of Lillenstein, almost every thing was to be created anew. Napoleon ordered the formation of hasty works which might lodge 2000 men in safety, and consigned the charge of them to General Roguet, one of the distinguished generals of his Guard. He then collected the number of boats necessary for the construction of a spacious and solid bridge, capable of affording passage to a considerable army, which should be protected from all attack by the two forts of Lillenstein and Königstein. With profound forethought, Napoleon calculated that if an enemy's army—as feared by many alarmists—were to debouche upon his rear from Bohemia to attack Dresden, while he might be at Bautzen, for instance, he might pass the Elbe at Königstein and take such an imprudent army in the rear. We shall soon see how penetrating a view of the future was implied in such a precaution.

After Königstein and Lillenstein, the forts situated at the entrance of the mountains, came Dresden, the centre of the approaching operations, which was to become, as we have said, what Verona had been during the wars of Italy. During the last campaign of Austria, unwilling to make Dresden the aim of the enemy's operations, and anxious to spare his placid ally the King of Saxony the trial of a siege, Napoleon had advised the Saxon ministers to demolish the fortifications of Dresden and to substitute those of Torgau. With negligence too commonly observed, they had demolished Dresden without constructing the fortifications of Torgau, which had scarcely been begun. This was much to be regretted; but Napoleon provided for it by works which, though hastily constructed, were sufficient for the object. Of the enceinte of Dresden some bastions remained, which he repaired and armed. He supplied the place of curtains by moats filled with water and by strong palisades. In front of Dresden, as in all ancient cities, there existed large faubourgs, the defence of which was as important as that of the city itself. Napoleon surrounded them with palisades, and in front of all the salient points he constructed well-armed redoubts flanking each other, and offering a very strong first line of works. On the right bank, that is in the Neustadt, (or new town,) he ordered the con-

struction of a series of closer works which were soon to be converted into a vast *tête de pont*, almost wholly fortified. Two wooden bridges, one above the other below the stone bridge, maintained, along with the latter, the communication between the town and the army. Things being thus arranged, 30,000 men might have maintained themselves in Dresden for about fifteen days against 200,000 men, if under the command of an energetic chief. To these means of defence Napoleon added immense magazines, provided as we shall soon state, and vast hospitals, sufficient for the most numerous army. There were already in Dresden 16,000 sick or wounded: these he prepared to remove, in order to have at his disposal the 16,000 beds which would become vacant, besides those which he intended to prepare. The principal material required in these hospitals would be supplied by the linen of Silesia.

After Dresden, Napoleon occupied himself with Torgau and Wittenberg. His principle was that with wood every thing was possible, and that earth-works strongly palisaded could oppose the most protracted resistance. From this source he prepared to supply what was deficient in the fortifications of Torgau and Wittenberg, and he gave the necessary orders for causing the completion of these works in six or seven weeks. Thousands of well-paid Saxon peasants laboured day and night at Königstein, Dresden, Torgau, and Wittenberg. At these last two points, as well as the rest, magazines and hospitals were established simultaneously with defensive works. At Magdeburg, one of the strongest forts in Europe, scarcely any thing was required of the nature of walls; it was sufficient to complete the armament and the garrison. To this Napoleon resolved to devote a *corps d'armée* which, without being entirely stationary, might at the same time serve as a garrison and perform movements around the fort, so as to connect our two principal acting bodies, that on the Upper and that on the Lower Elbe. In this view, he proposed to transfer to Magdeburg almost the whole of his wounded, and also the depot of General Bourcier's cavalry. It was of the first importance that our wounded and the depot of our cavalry recruits, in Germany, should be protected from all attack, and so situated as not to impede the movements of our active forces. In these different respects, Magdeburg presented the necessary advantages, for to ramparts almost inaccessible that fort added numerous buildings for hospitals, and free space for the construction of temporary stables. It was, moreover, nearly equally distant from Hamburg and Dresden, which made it a valuable depot between the two extreme points of our line of battle. Napoleon, after having named as governor his aide-de-camp General Lemercier, an intelligent and vigorous officer, gave him summary instructions to convert the whole of Magdeburg into stables and hospitals. He calculated that by bringing by water to Magdeburg all the wounded and sick who impeded him at Dresden, and by transporting thither the depot of Bourcier's cavalry, then in Hanover, he would always have, out of 15,000 or 18,000 wounded or convalescent and 10,000 or 12,000 dismounted horsemen, from 3000 to 4000 convalescents recovered, and from 3000 to 4000 horsemen capable of serving on foot and of supplying the cit



defence a garrison force of 7000 or 8000; and a movable body of about 20,000 men established at Magdeburg, in order to connect our armies of the Upper and Lower Elbe, might leave 5000 or 6000 men within, and carry 15,000 out, and advance to a considerable distance without endangering the fort. We see with what profound and subtle art he could combine his resources and make them concur to the accomplishment of his vast designs.

From Magdeburg to Hamburg the course of the Elbe remained undefended, for there was not one fortified point between these two towns. This subject had occupied Napoleon from the day of signing the armistice, and after having formed various projects he had sent General Haxo to verify on the spot that which was the best. After a long examination he had determined to construct at Werben, nearer Magdeburg than Hamburg, at the angle formed by the Elbe in turning from north to east, and at the point nearest to Berlin, a kind of citadel, formed of earth and palisades, furnished with barricades and magazines, in which 3000 men might maintain themselves for a considerable time. Finally, Hamburg was the last and most important object of his solicitude.

It was very necessary that this strong commercial city, which was one of the principal obstacles to a necessary peace, should be not only defended by words against the negotiators, but also in fact against the allied armies. Unfortunately, time was wanting, and there, as elsewhere, only such works could be executed as were urgently required. To render Hamburg capable of sustaining a long siege, like Dantzic, Magdeburg, or Mentz, would have required ten years in time, and forty millions in money. By repairing and arming the bastions of the old enceinte, by digging and inundating the moats, replacing the walls by palisades, and connecting the different islands around Hamburg, Napoleon prepared a vast military establishment, half fortress half entrenched camp, where a resolute man could make a long resistance, as was soon after experienced by the illustrious Marshal Davout. There remained below Hamburg, at the very mouth of the Elbe, the fort of Gluckstadt, the protection of which was intrusted to the Danes, at that time reduced by the ill treatment of others to conquer or to fall with us.

Thus, from the mountains of Bohemia to the Northern Ocean, the line of the Elbe would be found studded with a series of fortified points of a strength proportioned to the task assigned to each, and provided with bridges which would belong exclusively to us, so as to enable us to cross at will and to manoeuvre in every way, offensively and defensively. The maxim of Napoleon, that it was right to defend the course of a river only offensively, *i.e.* by securing all the passages and always retaining the power of crossing, was here to receive its most striking confirmation.

But it was necessary to meet the expense of these works, which, in order to be rapidly completed, must be paid in ready money. The military establishments just enumerated must receive immense stores of provisions to supply the wants of the masses of men who were to move upon this line. In this respect the ingenuity of Napoleon was equal to his relentless

determination to impose the heavy charges of the war upon the nations engaged in it.

We have seen that he had ordered Marshal Davout to take a cruel revenge of the revolt of the inhabitants of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen, immediately to shoot the former senators, the officers and soldiers of the Hanse legion, the functionaries of the insurrection who had not had time to escape, and then to prepare a list of the five hundred principal merchants, to seize their estates, and, as he said, to *displace the property*. When giving these orders he had reckoned upon the inexorable rigour of Marshal Davout, but also, to the honour of both, on the good sense and probity of the marshal. The latter had arrived some days after General Vandamme, had not found occasion to shoot a single delinquent, and took care to avoid finding any. The frontier of Denmark, which reached the very gates of the city, had assisted him in his designs to save all. Some executions, which were to be regretted, had previously taken place, but this was at the time of the first movement of insurrection, in the month of February, and as the punishment of the ill treatment of the French functionaries.

The marshal, then, was so happy as to have no one to shoot. It remained to prepare lists of the proscribed, which should involve not the loss of life but of estates; and this measure seemed to him no wiser than the other. The guilty Hamburgians, or those supposed to be so, were in large numbers in the little town of Altona, a faubourg of Hamburg, demanding to return to their abodes at the expense of Denmark, who was unwilling to be compromised with France, and to the reproach of the latter, who both wished and was able to derive from them great resources, which was more profitable than the infliction of vengeance. Marshal Davout represented to Napoleon that it would be better to pardon those who should return at an early date, merely to impose upon them a heavy contribution, which they would first declare themselves unable to pay, but would ultimately pay; thus to employ only fear and a mode of punishment heavily felt by them, and very profitable to the army. No blood and large resources expressed the policy which he recommended to the Emperor.

To Napoleon, who desired great resources but was not eager for blood, this transaction proved highly acceptable. "It might have been well," he wrote to Marshal Davout, "to have shot a few the day after your entrance, but now it is too late. Pecuniary punishment will be much better." Such is the language taught by despotism and war to men who are not naturally cruel. It was therefore decided that every citizen of Hamburg who should return within fifteen days should be pardoned, that the rest should be sequestered, and that the city should pay in money or *matériel* a contribution of fifty millions. A small portion of this should be derived from Lubeck, Bremen, and the district of the 82d military division. Ten millions were to be paid in ready money, twenty millions in bills. For the rest was opened an account for the payment of horses, corn, rice, wine, salt meat, cattle, and wood, which should be demanded of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen. To the same account was to be carried the price of all the houses demolished for the defensive works of

Hamburg. The citizens bitterly complained, desired to present their grievances to Napoleon, who refused to receive them, and on this occasion they found the marshal, who had been their defender some days before, inflexible. However, they paid the portion which was to be contributed immediately either in money or *matériel*, which was the most important to the army. About ten millions were sent to Dresden; large quantities of grain, cattle, and spirituous liquors were embarked upon the Elbe.

As soon as Napoleon saw himself in possession of these resources, he disposed of them in such a manner as to procure at all points of the river, and particularly at Dresden, the means of supporting the numerous troops that were to be there concentrated. He wished to have at Dresden, the principal centre of his operations, sufficient to maintain 300,000 men for two months, and in particular an adequate reserve of biscuit, which being carried on the back of soldiers would allow them to manœuvre seven or eight days in succession without being checked by the consideration of food. For this purpose were needed 100,000 quintals of grain or flour at Dresden, and 8000 or 10,000 at Königstein. He found about 70,000 at Magdeburg, collected there during the winter for provision in case of siege, and for the support of troops of passage. Napoleon ordered this quantity to be transported by the Elbe to Dresden and immediately replaced by an equal quantity from Hamburg. By this combination, these immense provisions were only subjected to one-half the distance of carriage. It had been perceived that heat and fatigue occasioned dysentery to our young soldiers, and that they were speedily cured by a ration of rice. All the rice was seized which could be found at Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, as well as the spirits, salt meat, cattle, horses, leather, drapery, and linen. These articles were embarked on the Elbe, under the regulations just stated of seizing what was found at Magdeburg and replacing it by what should be sent from Hamburg. All the barges on the river, being put in requisition and paid for by bills upon Hamburg, were set in motion in the early part of June, at the very time when, under pretence of fatigue, Napoleon refused to receive M. de Bubna. Thus, in the hands of Napoleon, the Elbe was at once a powerful line of defence and an inexhaustible source of provisions.

But he did not confine his precautions to that line. He wished to have well-supplied magazines at Liegnitz on the one side of Dresden, and at Erfurt on the other. Profiting by the richness of Lower Silesia, on which was encamped the army which had fought at Bautzen, and being little concerned to spare that province, he ordered that the two months of armistice should be employed in collecting a reserve of twenty days' provisions for each corps, and in preparing every day much more than was necessary. In the rear of Dresden, at Erfurt, Weimar, Leipsic, Nuremberg, and Würzburg, Saxon or Franconian territories, he was in the land of allies, and he only used the abundance of the country in paying for the articles derived from it. He ordered to make large collections of provisions for ready money. But he did not show equal consideration for the city of Leipsic, which had proved itself openly hostile. He

seized the linen and woollen cloths, grain, and spirits, with which the magazines of Leipsic were abundantly supplied, and, moreover, converted the public establishments into hospitals. He threatened to burn the city at the first symptom of insurrection. The cities of Erfurt, Naumburg, Weimar, and Würzburg were also filled with hospitals. Erfurt, of which he had always retained possession since 1809, Würzburg, which was the capital of the grand duchy of Würzburg, fortresses each capable of showing a certain degree of resistance, were armed, in order to secure a series of fortified points on the road of Mentz should unforeseen events render a retreat necessary; for, as we have already said, Napoleon, who never allowed in his political calculations the possibility of a reverse, always did so in his military calculations. Finally, as he was able to find nowhere but in France arms, ammunition, and certain articles of equipment, while provisions could be everywhere found, he concluded with certain German companies ready-money bargains for the transportation from Mentz to Dresden, by the three roads of Cassel, Eisenach, and Hof, the materials of armament and equipment which it was impossible to procure in Saxony.

Such were the measures designed by Napoleon to enure his line of battle to be both well defended and abundantly provisioned on the resumption of hostilities. There remained the care of proportioning the number of soldiers to the future extent of the war; and this Napoleon had not neglected, for in his vast intelligence all measures advanced simultaneously with perfect order and without the loss of an hour.

We have already seen that while flattering himself with the idea that Austria would, perhaps, fall in with his plans, he had nevertheless taken his measures on the contrary hypothesis, and he had prepared in Westphalia, on the Rhine, and in Italy, three armies of reserve capable of immediately taking the field. The two months of the armistice, which he wished to extend to three months, were to terminate about the beginning of August this work which had been begun in March.

We have already said that in Westphalia the reorganized regiments of the grand army of Russia were to compose two grand corps under Marshals Victor and Davout, the latter of sixteen regiments, the former of twelve. The other regiments of the grand army had been sent back to Italy, whence they originally came. As the battalions of each regiment could not be all reorganized at once, the second battalions had been first formed, then the fourth, and lastly the first, according to the return of the cadres, and the divisions had been successively composed of second, fourth, and first battalions, so that each regiment might be separated into three divisions. Napoleon, anxious to put an end to a vicious state of things, determined to unite the three battalions now ready, and form the divisions by regiments, not by battalions. Only the third battalions were wanting, which were also soon to be disposable, and then all the regiments would be raised to four battalions. Marshal Davout formed with his four fine divisions, and Marshal Victor three. While these organizations were being completed, Napoleon determined the position and employ-

ment of these two *corps d'armée*. That of Marshal Victor, which had hitherto remained in the rear, was directed to the frontier line of the armistice, and cantoned along the Oder, around Glogau, to finish their training and to procure provisions agreeably to the orders prescribed to all the other corps.

Napoleon, thinking that Marshal Davout, when reinforced by the Danes, would have more than sufficient in four divisions to guard the Hanseatic ports and the Lower Elbe,—for in all probability the most serious blows were to be struck upon the Upper Elbe,—proposed to divide his corps, leaving two divisions to him, and investing two to General Vandamme, to place the latter at Wittenberg, whence he might summon them to himself, if necessary, or send them back to the Lower Elbe, if required by Marshal Davout.

The other corps intended to reinforce the mass of active troops were organized at Mentz. hitherto, as the reader will remember, had required the cadres taken from France or Spain, which were filled up on the banks of the Rhine with conscripts hastily trained, and which were combined as soon as two battalions of the same regiment could be procured, in order to avoid as much as possible the objectionable formation of provisional regiments. At Mentz were four divisions whose organization was nearly completed, and which in two months would be in as good a condition as circumstances allowed. Napoleon destined these to Marshal St. Cyr, who had been wounded in 1812 on the Dniester, but had now recovered from his fatigues and wound. He was, then, with three *corps d'armée*,—those of Marshal Victor, General Vandamme, and Marshal St. Cyr,—comprising about 80,000 infantry, without the special arms, that Napoleon was about to augment his forces in Saxony against the eventual appearance of Austria upon the theatre of war. This powerful reinforcement as independent of the augmentations to be received by the corps with which he had opened the campaign. Besides the four divisions already prepared at Mentz, Napoleon had also brought together the elements of two others, which were to be formed under Marshal Augereau, and to be joined by two Bavarian divisions. The court of Bavaria, attracted, like that of Saxony, for a moment to the mediating policy of Austria, had suddenly drawn back on finding that sacrifices on the banks of the Inn were demanded without compensation. She had hastily renewed her armaments, and two good divisions might be expected from her, always on the condition that victory should hold in check the spirit of her people and encourage the fidelity of her king. These four divisions, two French and two Bavarian, were to threaten Austria in the direction of the Upper Palatinate.

Finally, Napoleon had followed with his wonted attention the execution of the orders given to Prince Eugene, in order that with the dres returned from Russia, and those which were daily returning from Spain, an army of 100,000 men should be formed in Italy, to which he wished to add 20,000 Neapolitans. Murat, always vibrating between the most opposite sentiments, wounded by the treatment he experienced from Napoleon, but anxious above all things to save his crown, ignorant with whom he would be the most secure, Austria or France,

still delayed the despatch of his contingent. Napoleon, immediately on his return to Dresden, had called upon him to decide, and had enjoined M. Durand de Mareuil, minister of France at Naples, to withdraw if marching orders were not immediately given to the Neapolitan corps. There remained in the depot the means of supplying 8000 or 7000 light cavalry to the future army of Italy, which was sufficient in that country, where the cavalry, having little opportunity to charge in line, was used merely for the purpose of exploring. The arsenals and depots of Italy still contained the elements of a fine artillery. Napoleon, therefore, flattered himself with having in Italy by August 1 an army of 80,000 men, with 200 guns, threatening to invade Austria by Illyria, and aiming directly at Vienna itself. He calculated that if Austria had armed 300,000 men, which would be a large number in the present state of her finances, with the time at her disposal she could not actually bring more than 200,000 men into the field, of whom 50,000 must be diverted to resist Prince Eugene in Italy, and 80,000 to meet Marshal Augereau in Bavaria, which would not allow her to add more than 120,000 men to the allied troops on the Elbe.

The three corps of Victor, Vandamme, and St. Cyr (without reckoning that of Augereau, which was not intended to act upon the Elbe) appeared to him a resource almost sufficient against the appearance of Austria on the arena of this formidable contest. But the corps of Poniatowski, having, after many vicissitudes, been brought across Galicia and Bohemia to Zittau, on the line of our corps of Silesia, was an additional resource of considerable importance, less for the quantity than the quality of the soldiers, than whom none were more brave, more warlike, or more devoted to France. Of their country there remained only the remembrance and the desire to avenge her. Napoleon resolved to give them a country by making them Frenchmen and adopting them into the service of France. In anticipation of their final annexation to the French army, he placed them under the direct administration of M. de Bassano, and ordered that minister to pay them their arrears, to provide them with clothing, arms, and whatever they might require, in a word, to see that they spent there two months in plenty. By collecting certain Polish troops scattered here and there, without touching either Dombrowski's division or the different detachments of that nation disseminated through the fortresses, they could bring together about 12,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. This was a new force added to those which had fought at Lutzen and Bautzen.

Finally, in the number of resources formed for the autumn campaign, and for the possible occurrence of war with Austria, must be reckoned the development given to the Imperial Guard. At the beginning of the campaign it only possessed two divisions,—one of the Old Guard and the other of the Young Guard. A third division had joined at the moment of the armistice, a fourth had just arrived, a fifth was on the march, which, with 12,000 cavalry and 200 guns, would compose a body of nearly 50,000 men, of whom 30,000 were of the Young Guard, whom Napoleon did not propose to spare as he did the Old Guard, but to employ in all the

great battles, which, unhappily, were destined to be numerous and sanguinary.

There remained the cavalry, which had been deficient at the beginning of the campaign, which had been one of the motives inducing Napoleon to sign the armistice. An insufficient cavalry is almost equivalent to none, for they dare not engage, from the fear of being overwhelmed, and remain hidden behind the infantry to which they can scarcely yield any assistance, as was seen at Lutzen and Bautzen. The two corps of Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani did not exceed 8000 horsemen on the 1st of June; 4000 might be drawn from the depots of General Bourcier, and about 28,000 from France,—some to be brought by the Duke of Placenza, others on the march under the Duke of Padua,—which would raise to 40,000 men the forces of the army of Germany as respects cavalry, without reckoning that of the Imperial Guard and the allies, Saxons, Wurtembergians, and Bavarians. But of the 28,000 drawn from France, several thousands were coming on foot, to whom it was necessary to supply horses. The remounts had been remarkably injured by the troubles on the left of the Elbe, consequent on the insurrection of the Hanse towns. Napoleon ordered them to be resumed, and inserted an article on the subject in the treaty of alliance by which Denmark definitely attached herself to France. By this treaty France promised to maintain always 20,000 active troops at Hamburg to concur in the defence of the Danish provinces, and Denmark in return engaged to supply France with 6000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, all paid by the French treasury, and to procure 10,000 horses for ready money. This was, independently of the purchases renewed in Hanover, a new resource for mounting the horsemen coming on foot from France. They were, therefore, almost sure to collect, in two or three months, nearly 40,000 horsemen of every arm, not including 10,000 or 12,000 of the Guard, and 8000 or 10,000 of the allies, which would compose a total force of 60,000 horse. To each *corps d'armée* Napoleon attached about 2000 men of light cavalry of the line to reconnoitre. The rest, according to his custom, he formed into different *corps de réserve*, intended to engage in line. Of these, Generals Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani commanded two, which had made the campaign of spring. The Duke of Padua commanded the third, which had just arrived, and was occupied in chastising the Cossacks. The Count of Valmy, son of the old Duke of Valmy, was placed at the head of the fourth. Napoleon prepared to create a fifth with the regiments recently drawn from Spain. Since he had given orders to evacuate Madrid, and to concentrate all the French forces in the North of the Peninsula, the cavalry, whose principal mission had been to connect the different corps of observation, was much less needed. There were still in the Peninsula thirty-six regiments of cavalry, of which twenty were dragoons, eleven were chasseurs, and five hussars. Napoleon considered twenty to be enough, especially if he took only the cadres and left the greater part of the men in Spain. He therefore ordered the departure of seven regiments of dragoons, four of chasseurs, and two of hussars. He assigned two of them to Italy, and fourteen to Germany, recommending the immediate trans-

port of these cadres to Mentz, where they would be filled by contributions from the last conscription, already tolerably trained. The horses derived from France, and paid for with ready money, would serve to mount them. Napoleon promised himself still 14,000 or 15,000 horsemen from the same source, all comprised in excellent cadres. This last supplement ought to raise his cavalry to at least 75,000 men by the autumn. To these preparations for infantry and cavalry, Napoleon added such as concerned the artillery, and made his arrangements such as to put in motion 1000 field-guns.

Thus established on the line of the Elbe, which he had rendered formidable by the points of support he had there secured, Napoleon flattered himself that he would have, besides the garrisons, 400,000 combatants, more than 20,000 in Bavaria, and 80,000 in Italy, which would raise the whole of his resources to 500,000 active troops, and 700,000 including those not actually present at their colours. It was in order to attain these vast numbers—sufficient in his powerful hand to overcome the coalition even when aided by Austria—that he had consented to an armistice which gave the allies time to escape his pursuit, and also, unfortunately, to augment considerably their forces. The question was, whether, in this respect, time would be as profitable to them as to Napoleon. The allies, it is true, did not possess his genius, and on this he founded his hope; but they possessed passion, the only substitute for genius, especially when ardent and sincere. Napoleon, setting little by passion, had supposed that time would be of greater advantage to him than to his enemies, and in this hope he employed as much art in advancing his military preparations and delaying his negotiations.

The reply sent to M. de Metternich on the 15th of June had been correctly interpreted, and the able Austrian minister clearly perceived that, since of forty days remaining for the negotiation of the general peace they lost five in replying to the note that constituted the mediation, independently of those which they should still lose in resolving questions of form, he could not but conclude that Napoleon was in a hurry to arrive at a pacific solution. It was possible, indeed, that Napoleon should be unwilling to express his real sentiments before the last hour; it was also possible that among the difficulties which he had suggested there were some which he seriously felt, and therefore M. de Metternich did not absolutely despair of peace, either on the conditions proposed by Austria or on such as would nearly approach them. In either case, he felt it necessary to wait Napoleon's time, without neglecting the means of stimulating him. The two sovereigns of Russia and Prussia forcibly insisted upon seeing the Emperor Francis, in the hope of attaching him definitely to what they called the European cause. But the Emperor Francis, thinking that as father and mediator he ought to maintain extreme reserve toward two sovereigns who had become the implacable enemies of France, was unwilling to come into intercourse with them so long as he had not declared war against us. The same reasons for reserve did not exist with M. de Metternich, and accordingly that minister had repaired to Oppotschna to confer with the two allied monarchs, designing to avail him-

self of this opportunity to bring them over to his ideas; an easier matter, no doubt, than to bring over Napoleon, but still difficult, and requiring much care and effort, for they demanded immediate war at any price, even to the utter destruction of Napoleon, which certainly was not at that time the desire of Austria. M. de Metternich had, therefore, openly set off, confident that when Napoleon should know him to be in conference with the two sovereigns he would experience a keen sense of jealousy, and, instead of forbidding him to come to Dresden, would address to him an urgent invitation. This view, confirmed by the event, appeared both correct and profound to the Emperor Francis, who, therefore, approved the journey of M. de Metternich to Oppotschna.

While that minister was on his road thither, Prussia and Russia had formed a treaty of subsidies with England. By this treaty, concluded on the 15th of June, and signed by Lord Cathcart, M. de Nesselrode, and M. de Hardenberg, England engaged to furnish immediately two millions sterling to Russia and Prussia, and to undertake one-half the issue of paper money entitled federative paper, intended for circulation in the allied states. The sum issued was to be five millions sterling. England, then, was to furnish four and a half millions sterling (112,500,000 francs) to the two powers, on the condition of their maintaining active troops to the number of 160,000 men by Russia and 80,000 by Prussia, that they should engage in a war to the utmost extremity with the common enemy of Europe, and that they should not treat without England, or at least without concert with her. The sovereigns of Russia and Prussia having informed Lord Cathcart that they were called upon to accept the mediation of Austria, and that they were disposed to do so, saving the conditions of peace which should be determined in accordance with the British cabinet, Lord Cathcart had not considered this any infraction of the treaty of subsidies, and had himself recognised the necessity of meeting the wishes of Austria, for probably the conditions regarded by that power as indispensable would not be admitted by Napoleon, and thus that power would be drawn into war by the pacific channel of mediation.

M. de Metternich, on his arrival at Oppotschna, had been laden with caresses and solicitations by the sovereigns and their ministers. In order to bring him to a decision, they spoke of their immense forces, which they deemed irresistible if Austria joined them, and in this case Napoleon would be lost and Europe saved. They also said that peace with him was impossible, for he evidently did not desire it, and besides very doubtful, for if they lost the opportunity of destroying him when weak, he would resume arms as soon as he should recover his forces, and the struggle with him would be endless. These could not possibly be the views of Austria. She was not, like Russia, intoxicated with the office of the liberator of Europe, nor, like Prussia, reduced to the alternative of victory or death, nor, like England, protected from all the consequences of an unsuccessful war; moreover, she was connected with Napoleon by ties which neither decency nor paternal affection allowed to be broken, unless by the most powerful motives. She was also dreaming of the

possibility of re-establishing the independence of Europe without a war, which she regarded as full of danger, notwithstanding the weakened condition of Napoleon. She, therefore, thought that if it were possible to conclude an advantageous peace, with good promise of security, it would be right to seize the opportunity, and not to compromise every thing with the view of regaining every thing by a single blow. If, for instance, Napoleon would relinquish the Polish chimera, (as they called the grand duchy of Warsaw,) if he would consent to reconstitute Prussia, to restore independence to Germany by abolishing the Confederation of the Rhine, and her commerce by the restitution of the Hanse towns, it would be better to accept this peace than to incur the danger of a formidable war, which, while it offered some favourable chances, involved very formidable risks. If England were not inclined to this manner of thought, it would be necessary to constrain her to adopt it by threatening to leave her to stand alone. And with respect to that power the most important point was already obtained; for it was easy to see that Napoleon was about to relinquish Spain, since he admitted to the Congress the representatives of the insurrection of Cadiz, which he had never before allowed. It was therefore necessary to impose peace upon England as well as upon Napoleon, for peace was urgently required by the whole world, and it could be obtained by threatening England with a separate treaty, and Napoleon with the overwhelming weight of the united forces of Europe. Such were the ideas of Austria, but they were by no means shared by the two sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, who were regulated by the passions of the moment. They would have desired a peace on conditions much more stringent to France: for example, it appeared to them that Westphalia and Holland ought not to be granted to Napoleon. They spoke of taking from him at least part of Italy to restore it to Austria, who had no need to have that kind of appetite excited, but whose prudence imposed silence on her ambition. M. de Metternich, though he considered these aims very legitimate, had declared that Austria, in the hope of a pacific conclusion, would confine her demands to the abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw, the reconstitution of Prussia, the abolition of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the restitution of the Hanse towns, and would only make war upon France if these conditions were refused. They had replied to him that they would be inevitably rejected, to which the Austrian minister readily replied that, if they were refused, his master could with honour become a member of the alliance, and would do so with all his heart.

That Austria should formally impose conditions was sufficient to secure their adoption, for without her co-operation war against Napoleon offered no chance of success. Giving the law to Prussia and Russia, she virtually gave it also to England, who would speedily find herself constrained to treat if the continent generally did so. They were, therefore, obliged to submit to the will of Austria, but they did so without reluctance, for they were convinced that the conditions proposed by her would be rejected by Napoleon, and they thought that by yielding to her they would rather hold than be

held by her. The result of these conferences had been that they should accept the mediation of Austria, that they should communicate with Napoleon through the means of Austria, who should propose to him the forenamed conditions, that she should not declare war against him unless in the case of refusal, that she should till that point remain neutral, that in regard to England, while informing her of the situation of affairs, they should defer peace with her in order to simplify the question at issue; yet it was always supposed that the continental peace would inevitably be followed by a maritime peace at no long interval.

Having adopted these principles, M. de Metternich had returned to Gitschin, to his master, where he had found his conjectures fully justified. In fact, Napoleon, uneasy at the events which were transpiring in Bohemia, aware of the continual interchange of communications between Gitschin, the residence of his father-in-law, and Reichenbach, the head-quarters of the allies, and that M. de Metternich must have seen the two sovereigns of Prussia and Russia at Oppotschna, thought it inexpedient to continue his delays to such an extent as to remain a stranger to what was going on between the various powers, and to allow, perhaps, a formidable coalition to be formed when he might prevent it by a seasonable intervention. By seeing M. de Metternich, with whom he was much accustomed to converse, he hoped that he would at least be able to penetrate the designs of the coalition, a matter of no small importance, and above all to secure a further prolongation of the armistice, the only result at which he really aimed, for as to peace he would by no means accept it on the proposed conditions. He had consequently sent word through M. de Bassano to M. de Bubna that he would gladly receive M. de Metternich at Dresden, and that he even thought his presence necessary for the full explanation of the questions to be resolved. M. de Bubna had immediately written to Gitschin, and thus it was that M. de Metternich, on returning from his interview with Alexander and Frederick William, had found the invitation to repair to Napoleon at Dresden. As this was precisely that which he and the Emperor Francis desired, there was no room to hesitate on accepting the proposed rendezvous, and M. de Metternich immediately decided on renewing his journey. At the moment of his departure the Emperor Francis had sent him a letter for his son-in-law, in which he gave power to his minister of foreign affairs to sign all articles relative to the modification of the treaty of alliance and to the acceptance of the Austrian mediation. In this letter he again urged Napoleon to resolve on peace, which was, he said, the most splendid and indeed the only glory which remained for him to acquire.

M. de Metternich reached Dresden on the 25th of June, and on the following day had his first interview with M. de Bassano, for ostensibly it was with that minister that he was to negotiate. They employed about two days in vain quibbles on the treaty of alliance, which still existed, and yet was to remain suspended, on the manner of reconciling the part of mediator and that of ally, on the form of mediation, on the pretence of the mediator to be the only channel of communication between the belli-

gerent powers. Faithful to his plan of gaining time, Napoleon had thus gained two days; but M. de Metternich had not come simply to converse with a minister possessed of no influence, and he was moreover intrusted with a letter from the Emperor Francis to the Emperor Napoleon: it was, therefore, necessary that he should see him, and that without further delay. Napoleon, on his side, filled with anger, which was doubly excited by the presence of M. de Metternich, was now quite ready to receive him. To penetrate his secret, and to force from him a prolongation of the armistice, was no longer his aim, but his most urgent desire, in reality, was to tell him his resolution and to give vent to his passion. He received M. de Metternich on the 28th of June, in the afternoon. On traversing the antechambers of the Marcolini palace, M. de Metternich found them filled with foreign ministers, officers of every grade, and in particular he met Prince Berthier, who desired peace without venturing to say so to Napoleon, and could only manifest his desire to those from whom he ought to have concealed it. At the sight of M. de Metternich every countenance expressed anxiety. Prince Berthier, when conducting him to the apartment of the Emperor, said to him, "Well, do you bring us peace? Let us be reasonable; let us finish this war, for we need to end it, and you as much as we." From this language M. de Metternich could judge that the reports of his spies were perfectly true,—that everywhere in France, even in the army, peace was eagerly desired, which, unfortunately, was not the way to incline our enemies to conclude it. It would have been better, indeed, to have exhibited a greater love of peace to Napoleon, and less to M. de Metternich; but so it always happens when we are afraid to speak, we often say to the whole world what we ought only to say to our master. M. de Metternich, when introduced to the cabinet of Napoleon, found him on foot, his sword by his side, his hat under his arm, restraining himself, but with the appearance of one who could not do so long, polite but cold. "Well, M. de Metternich," said he, "you are late;" and, immediately adopting the language agreed upon in the French cabinet, he laboured by his explanation of the state of affairs to charge Austria with the time lost since the armistice, and not less than twenty-four days had elapsed without result, for it was now the 28th of June and the armistice had been signed on the 4th. He then detailed his relations with Austria, of whom he bitterly complained, and dwelt at great length on the want of security in the relations with that power. "Three times," said he, "have I restored his throne to the Emperor Francis; I have even committed the error of marrying his daughter, hoping thus to attach him to me, but nothing has been sufficient to bring him to a better mind. Last year, reckoning upon him, I concluded a treaty of alliance, by which I guaranteed his states, and by which he also guaranteed mine. Had he told me that that treaty did not suit him, I should not have insisted upon it, I should not even have engaged in the Russian war. But he signed it, and after one campaign, rendered unfortunate by the elements, he wavers, and no longer desires what he appeared to desire eagerly: he interposes between my enemies and myself to

negotiate peace, as he says, but in reality to check me in my victories, and to wrench from my grasp those adversaries whom I was about to destroy. If you no longer regard my alliance," added Napoleon, with increasing animation, "if it be irksome to you, if it draw you, along with Europe, into a war which you dislike, why did you not tell me? I should not have used constraint; your neutrality would have sufficed, and at the present hour the coalition would have been dissolved. But, under pretext of obtaining peace by interposing your mediation, you have armed; and then, after finishing, or nearly finishing, your armaments, you pretend to dictate conditions to me, which are the very same as those proposed by my enemies: in a word, you assume the attitude of persons ready to declare war against me. Explain yourselves: is war your desire? . . . Men will be always incorrigible; they will never learn! . . . The Russians and Prussians, notwithstanding cruel experience, have dared, emboldened by the success of last winter, to meet me, and I have beaten them soundly, though they have told you the contrary; and now you wish to have your turn! Well, be it so; you shall have it. . . . I shall meet you in Vienna, in October."

This strange method of treating, this contemptuous manner of speaking of a marriage with which he seemed well pleased as a private man, offended and irritated M. de Metternich, without exerting much influence upon him; a cool firmness would have impressed him more. "Sire," he replied, "we have no desire to proclaim war against you, but we wish to terminate a state of affairs which has become intolerable to Europe, which at every moment threatens a universal revolution. Your majesty is as much interested in it as we are, for fortune may some day forsake you, and in the present frightful uncertainty of every thing it is not impossible that you should be subjected to some fatal chance." "What, then, is it you wish?" replied Napoleon: "what do you seek?" "A peace," rejoined M. de Metternich, "indispensably necessary to you as well as to us, a peace which shall secure your position as well as ours." Then, with great ingenuity and delicacy, rather insinuating than expressly announcing his conditions, M. de Metternich proceeded to enumerate those which we have already made known. Napoleon, like a rampant lion, scarcely allowed M. de Metternich to finish his statement, but interrupted him at each particular as if he had uttered an insult or a blasphemy. "Oh! I guess your meaning," he said: "you now demand only Illyria to procure ports for Austria, some portions of Westphalia and of the grand duchy of Warsaw to reconstitute Prussia, the cities of Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen to re-establish the commerce of Germany and to restore her pretended independence, the abolition of the Protectorate of the Rhine, of a vain title, as you say. . . . But I know your secret. I know what you all desire at heart. . . . You Austrians wish for the whole of Italy; your friends the Russians wish for Poland; the Prussians for Saxony; the English for Holland and Belgium; and if I yield to-day, you will tomorrow make all these demands upon me. But, in order to this, prepare to raise millions of men, to shed the blood of several generations,

and to come to treat at the foot of Montmartre." On pronouncing these words, Napoleon was, as it were, beside himself, and it is even pretended that he uttered insulting words to M. de Metternich, which, however, that gentleman always denied.

M. de Metternich then tried to show to Napoleon that no such questions were thought of; that a war imprudently prolonged might, perhaps, revive such pretensions; that no doubt there were in Europe some foolish persons whose heads had been carried by the events of 1812; that there were some such at St. Petersburg, London, or Berlin, but none at Vienna; that in that city their wishes were fully expressed by their demands; that the true method of undeceiving such foolish persons was to accept peace on honourable terms, and that which they offered was not only honourable, but glorious. Somewhat softened by these words, Napoleon said to M. de Metternich, that if he were merely called upon to relinquish some extent of territory, he might possibly yield; but that they had combined together to impose a law upon him, to constrain him to yield, to destroy his prestige, and with a singular combination of naïveté and pride, allowed it to be seen that he was much less sensibly touched by the sacrifices demanded than by the humiliation of receiving the law after having been in the habit of giving it. Then, with the pride of a soldier, which became him well, he continued:—"Your sovereigns born to a throne cannot understand my feelings. They return beaten to their capitals, and, personally, they are unaffected. But I am a soldier. I require honour and glory; I cannot appear among my people with diminished splendour; I must remain great, glorious, and admired!" "When, then," said M. de Metternich, "shall this state of things come to an end, if defeats and victories equally contribute to the continuance of these desolating wars? If victorious, you wish to reap the fruits of your victories; if conquered, you wish to regain your position. Sire, we shall then remain constantly armed, eternally dependent on the issue of battles,—you as well as we." "But," resumed Napoleon, "I am not my own. I belong to that brave nation which at my summons has shed its best blood. To such devotion I must not reply by personal considerations, by weakness; I must preserve to it all the greatness purchased by such heroic efforts." "But, sire," replied M. de Metternich, "that brave nation, whom all the world admires, requires rest. I have just passed through your regiments: your soldiers are mere children; you have made levies by anticipation, and have summoned a generation scarcely mature; if that generation be once destroyed by actual war, can you anticipate still further? can you summon those still younger?" These words, recalling the reproach so often thrown out by his enemies, touched Napoleon to the quick. He grew pale with rage; his countenance became discomposed; and, no longer master of himself, he threw, or allowed to fall, his hat upon the ground, which M. de Metternich did not raise, and, walking up to him, he said, "You are not a soldier, sir, nor have you, as I have, the soul of a soldier; you have not lived in camp; you have not learned to despise your own life and that of others when necessary."

What care I for 200,000 men?" These words, uttered with soldierly indifference which we cannot represent, greatly excited M. de Metternich. "Let us open, sire," he exclaimed, "the doors and windows, that all Europe may hear you; and the cause that I defend will be no loser." Returning a little to himself, Napoleon said to M. de Metternich, with a smile of irony, "After all, the French, whom you so much pity, have no great cause of complaint against me. It is true that I have lost 200,000 men in Russia. In this number were 100,000 excellent French soldiers. These I regret,—bitterly regret. . . . The rest were Italians, Poles, and principally Germans," he added, with a gesture signifying how little their loss affected him. "Be it so," replied M. de Metternich; "but you will allow, sire, that this reason can hardly be offered to a German." "You spoke on behalf of the French: I replied in reference to them," said Napoleon. He then spent more than an hour in relating to M. de Metternich that in Russia he had been surprised and overcome by the weather; that he could foresee and surmount every thing except nature; that he could fight with men, but not with the elements. Not having seen M. de Metternich since the catastrophe of 1812, he endeavoured to renew in his mind the prestige of his invincibility, greatly impaired in the minds of many, and laboured to prove that on the field he had never been overcome,—which was true; that if he had lost guns, it was by the cold, which, by killing his horses, had destroyed the means of moving artillery. While speaking and walking with great animation, he had kicked his hat into a corner of the room. He continually reverted to the fundamental idea of his discourse,—that Austria, from whom he had so frequently averted penalties which she had incurred, from whom he had demanded an archduchess in marriage, a great error on his part, still dared to declare war against him, notwithstanding so many benefits. "An error," replied M. de Metternich, "in Napoleon as a conqueror, but not in Napoleon as a politician and the founder of an empire." "Error or not," said Napoleon, "you wish to declare war against me! Be it so. What are your means? 200,000 men in Bohemia, you say; and you expect to make me believe such tales. You have only 100,000 at most; and I maintain that these will probably be reduced to 80,000 on the field." Thereupon he led M. de Metternich into his study, showed him his notes and maps, said that M. de Narbonne had covered Austria with his spies, and that it would be vain to attempt to frighten him with chimeras; that the Austrians had not even 100,000 men in Bohemia. They pretended to have 350,000 men under arms, of whom 100,000 were on the road to Italy, 50,000 in Bavaria, and 200,000 in Bohemia. These were the words of men unaccustomed to such calculations, and who did not know that if Austria had 350,000 men on her lists, she had no more than 200,000 ready for action, 50,000 of whom might be on the Italian road, 30,000 on that of Bavaria, and 100,000 or 120,000 in Bohemia. Napoleon, well aware of the constant numerical errors in war, treated lightly the assertions of M. de Metternich, which, from want of familiarity with military details, that minister was unable

to support adequately. Quitting this subject, on which it was not easy to come to an understanding, Napoleon said to M. de Metternich, "Let me advise you not to meddle in this quarrel, in which you run risks disproportioned to the advantages. You wish for Illyria; well, I grant it to you; but be neutral, and I will fight by your side and without your aid. The peace which you wish for Europe I will assuredly give, and with justice to all parties. But the peace which you wish to conclude by your mediation is a forced peace, which presents me to the eyes of Europe as conquered and compelled to receive a law, when I have just gained two brilliant victories." M. de Metternich reverted to the idea of mediation, of which he could not divest himself, laboured to show that it imposed no constraint upon Napoleon, but that it was the intervention of an ally, a friend, a father, who, when all the conditions were known, should be regarded as exhibiting great partiality to his son-in-law. "Ah! you persist," cried Napoleon, with anger: "you still wish to dictate a law to me. Well, be it so,—war! But we shall meet again at Vienna."\*

This memorable interview, which, as we shall soon see, did not decide the question of peace or war, but which brought out so inopportunistically the inward dispositions of Napoleon, lasted five or six hours, and before it terminated the day was so far advanced that the parties engaged could scarcely distinguish each other's features. Napoleon, unwilling to quit M. de Metternich in ill humour, expressed a few words of milder import, and appointed a new meeting in the course of a few days. The length of the interview had greatly impressed those accustomed to attend in the imperial antechamber. Berthier, the major-general hastening to learn something that had transpired, asked M. de Metternich if he were satisfied with the emperor. "Yes," replied the Austrian minister, "quite satisfied, for he has cleared my conscience; and I give you my oath that your master has lost his reason."

It was not the violent character of this interview which chiefly injured the affairs of the empire, but the melancholy conviction that Napoleon must have left in the mind of M. de Metternich that he would never accept the moderate conditions demanded by Austria. But, happily, M. de Metternich, considering that both his glory and his safety were involved

\* This celebrated interview is the most difficult to describe faithfully of all those in which Napoleon took part from the want of sufficient documents. In regard to the others related in this history, there existed numerous documents, either in our own diplomatic archives or in those of foreign nations; but in regard to the present one, as Napoleon did not communicate any of the particulars to his agents at a distance, one of the most correct means of information is wanting. He merely spoke of it to M. de Basano, who was subsequently the author of the various versions published by writers with whom he was associated. This memorable interview would therefore have been nearly lost had not M. de Metternich himself described it with the minutest detail and at a very reasonable time. Having been favoured by him with that narration, which appeared to me too severe to Napoleon but generally exact, I have retained in the text all that appeared to me unquestionable from my knowledge of the negotiations of the time, and of other statements published by writers to whom M. de Basano had communicated what he remembered. I have, as usual, retained only what I considered free from all controversy; and this seems sufficient to give an idea of this passage in history as soon exact and complete.



in obtaining by peace the conditions which he deemed indispensable, was one who would sacrifice his pride to policy and would not take offence as long as a chance of success existed. Hence Napoleon might give the rein to his temper, provided that at the last moment he should recover his good sense and accept the very honourable peace which was offered to him. The ebullitions of his temper would have been readily excused in deference to his genius and his power, and a great result would have been gladly purchased at the price of a sacrifice of feeling. Moreover, those who suffered from his impetuosity were speedily repaid; for he felt ashamed when he had given way to his passions, and, quickly recovering himself, eagerly caressed those whom he had most injured, to obliterate from their minds the sense of his errors. Of this the scene just described was to afford a new instance.

Scarcely was he separated from the Austrian minister when he became filled with regret for having so much given way to his natural impetuosity; for he had obtained from this interview nothing which he had promised to himself. Far from penetrating the secrets of the Austrian minister, he had revealed to him his own by exhibiting the invincible obstinacy of his pride; and he had especially injured his principal design, the prolongation of the armistice, by showing too plainly that it was not a prelude to peace. He, accordingly, immediately ordered M. de Bassano to follow M. de Metternich, and to speak to him of the essential object, which had been scarcely touched upon during the interview, viz., the Austrian mediation, its form and conditions, and the delay requisite for its exercise. M. de Metternich might even have thought it refused, from the language of Napoleon. To destroy this idea, M. de Bassano was ordered to draw up, in concert with M. de Metternich, a convention relative to the mode of mediation, which would prove to the Austrian minister that, notwithstanding the hastiness of Napoleon, every thing was not lost, and that the French Government had not finally resolved to reject all pacific arbitration.

The following day was, in fact, devoted by MM. de Bassano and de Metternich to the discussion of the question of the mediation; and nothing more was said of the treaty of alliance, from every article of which they had so maladroitly enabled Austria to free herself, and the poor remains of which were not worth the trouble of attempting to retain. They merely spoke of the mediation, of the manner in which it was to be conducted, and of the feelings of Austria towards France. M. de Metternich renewed the assurance of a mediation in our favour, but seemed to hold much by the form, which constituted the mediator the exclusive channel of communication between the contracting parties. A plan was attempted to be drawn up, but without success, because M. de Bassano wished to load it with precautions offensive to M. de Metternich. But the details were discussed without bitterness, and with the temper of men desirous of coming to an understanding. All was sent back to the emperor, and M. de Metternich was to see him again on the 30th of June for the final settlement of difficulties.

Accordingly, on the 30th, M. de Metternich, accompanied by M. de Bassano, again saw Napoleon, and found him quite changed, as if the sky had been purified by the storm. He was open, cheerful, full of amiable regrets. "You persist, then, in opposing us," he said to M. de Metternich with an air of gracious familiarity. He then took from M. de Bassano the draft of the convention, of the difficulties in which he was well aware, and proceeded to read the articles in order. At each article, as if on the side of M. de Metternich, he said, with little concern for the feelings of his minister, "This is not common sense;" and he seemed almost always to enter into the ideas of the Austrian diplomatist. Then, addressing M. de Bassano, he said, "Sit down and write;" and he dictated a simple, clear, and brief draft, such as he was well able to make, avoiding all difficulties; and when finished, he demanded of M. de Metternich, "Does this draft suit you?" "Yes, sire," replied he, "saving a few expressions." "Which are they?" inquired Napoleon. M. de Metternich having pointed them out, Napoleon immediately altered them to his satisfaction, making a point of pleasing him in every thing. At length, having fully completed the draft, which declared that, in the desire and hope of establishing peace, at least between the continental states, the Emperor of Austria offered his mediation to the Emperor Napoleon, that the Emperor Napoleon accepted it, and that the plenipotentiaries of the different powers would meet at Prague on the 5th of July, at latest, Napoleon, in the easiest manner possible, said to M. de Metternich, "But this is not all: I must have a prolongation of the armistice. How is it possible between the 5th and 20th of July to terminate a negotiation involving the interests of the whole world, which would require years if all difficulties were to be rightly regulated?" The question was really embarrassing, although, on the important points, they could have come to an understanding in a few hours, if they had wished it. But, at the first glance, the question admitted no other reply than assent: M. de Metternich, overcome by all the condescension of that day, was not disposed to compromise the mediation, to which he attached so great value, for the sake of a few days more or less in the negotiation. He replied that he hoped to prevail upon the Prussians and Russians to allow the prolongation, though they were convinced that the armistice was useful only to France, and injurious to themselves, and he only questioned the extent of the prolongation. Napoleon wished to obtain till August 20, in order to reach the 26th with the six days granted for declaring the close of the armistice. M. de Metternich disputed so long a period, not in his own name, but in the name of those whose consent he must procure, and repeated, that if they were willing to act in perfect good faith, all might be ended in a day. Napoleon replied that he required at least forty to judge of the views of his adversaries and to make known his own. "For myself," he added, "you may be sure that I shall not tell you my real intentions till the fortieth day." "Then," replied M. de Metternich, "the preceding thirty-nine days will be useless." The conversation having taken this

pleasant turn, they were plainly approaching an agreement; and, after discussion, M. de Metternich seemed disposed to prolong the armistice to August 10, with six days' warning, which would bring to the 16th, and involve a prolongation of twenty days from the 26th of July to August 10. Napoleon, professing to find in this period the forty days which he required for negotiation, and in reality, though he wished for more, thinking it well to gain that time, at least, for completing his preparations, declared that he accepted the proposal of M. de Metternich. An article was, therefore, added, saying, that in consideration of the short time remaining for negotiation according to the terms of the armistice signed at Pleiswitz, the Emperor Napoleon engaged not to declare it before August 10, (the 16th including the six days' warning,) and that the Emperor of Austria undertook to obtain the same pledge from the King of Prussia and Emperor of Russia. Napoleon desired an immediate signature, and dismissed M. de Metternich laden with caresses. Thus the lion metamorphosed into a siren had contrived to extract from the able Austrian minister the only thing which he really desired, viz. a prolongation of the armistice. Unwilling to accept the peace which was offered, and anxious only to secure the time necessary to impose one more to his taste, the gain of twenty days was a conquest of inestimable value. The sacrifice of questions of form which he had appeared to make by simplifying the text of the convention was really no sacrifice to him; for on the important point of knowing whether the contracting parties were all to communicate personally in a common conference, or to treat only by the intervention of a mediator, he had eluded, but he had not relinquished the difficulty by omitting all mention of it in the draft; and he was very glad to have reserved it, for it remained to him as a subject to occupy the first days of the congress, and a means of wasting the time to which they were confined, without being called upon to explain himself on essential points. To M. de Metternich, who ardently desired the success of the mediation, it was a matter of regret that this difficulty had not been immediately removed, but had been allowed to remain as an obstacle in the way of the negotiations. Thus, by a few moments of mildness, Napoleon had repaired to a certain point the evil caused by imprudent outbursts of passion, and had obtained all that he wished. Happy would it have been for that wonderful genius, and happy for France, if he had been able to employ that marvellous versatility in extricating himself from the false step by which he entangled himself!

However, the skill of Austria, so eagerly desirous of the success of the mediation, would have consisted in not allowing Napoleon a single pretext for the loss of time, and therefore in replying to him immediately that the convention constituting the mediation was accepted, that the prolongation of the armistice was also agreed upon, and that the negotiators, as had been stipulated, would meet punctually on the 5th of July. Unfortunately, this was not the course adopted. M. de Metternich, having left Dresden on the 30th of June, the very day of the signature, and arrived at Git-

schin on the 1st of July, occasioned great joy to his master by announcing the acceptance of the mediation, which caused the court of Austria to pass from the embarrassing situation of the ally of France to the firm and independent situation of arbiter, and procured a lustre which she needed in the eyes of the Austrian public. M. de Metternich had, therefore, no trouble in obtaining from the Emperor Francis the immediate ratification of the convention. But, either from not having fully penetrated the procrastinating designs of Napoleon, or from being overcome by practical difficulties, M. de Metternich himself furnished pretexts for loss of time, by demanding that the meeting of the plenipotentiaries should be deferred from the 5th to the 8th of July. After having demanded this delay, which, from what we have seen of Napoleon's designs, could meet no obstacle from us, M. de Metternich addressed himself to the sovereigns met at Reichenbach, to announce to them the acceptance of the mediation, to prevail upon them to allow the prolongation of the armistice, and to obtain the speedy mission of their plenipotentiaries to Prague.

The allies at Reichenbach had not fully understood the bearing of the armistice of Pleiswitz when they signed it. They had at first only seen the advantage of withdrawing themselves from the immediate consequences of the battle of Bautzen, without perceiving the advantage gained by Napoleon in respect to time. Now that they had escaped the danger, and had thus reaped the principal fruit of the armistice, and saw the armaments of Napoleon becoming developed every day, though their own were also developed, they almost regretted a suspension of arms, to which, however, they owed their preservation, and they were by no means disposed to prolong its duration. They were rendered especially disinclined to it by the circumstance of their having for their support the least fertile part of Silesia, while Napoleon had the best part; and they, therefore, feared that their means of subsistence might fail. Moreover, to the Germans, especially to the Prussians, all adjournment of hostilities appeared to be a step made towards the pacific policy of Austria, and a species of treason. It was, therefore, somewhat difficult to extract their consent, and this involved a further loss of time. However, the two sovereigns could refuse nothing to Austria, but were constrained to acquiesce in all her wishes; and Austria having engaged herself to Napoleon to prolong the armistice, it was impossible to insist her by declaring her engagement imprudent and null. It was therefore ratified, but with the demand of a new delay from the 8th to the 12th of July, owing to the distance, and to the time already elapsed, for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries at Prague, and with the promise that they should be punctual at the rendezvous. M. de Metternich informed M. de Bassano of these last determinations; but, in doing so, he expressed himself with respect to the prolongation of the armistice as if emanating from himself, and did not communicate the official acceptance of it by the sovereigns of Prussia and Russia.

Nothing suited Napoleon better than delays of which he was not the author. He replied

as if he submitted to them rather than rejoiced in them. Since the court of Austria had removed from Vienna to the neighbourhood of Prague, he had recalled M. de Narbonne to Dresden, where he had detained him several days, and had then despatched him anew to continue his office of ambassador at Prague as at Vienna. Napoleon ordered him to express regret at the last delay, and at the same time to complain of the apparent negligence in officially communicating the consent to the prolongation of the armistice,—as if that consent could have been doubtful. He further authorized him to declare that, when the Russian and Prussian negotiators should have been fixed upon and have set off for their destination, France would name and despatch her negotiators, and to insinuate that these should be MM. de Narbonne and de Caulaincourt.

While addressing these replies, Napoleon proposed to derive from the imprudent delays which Austria had allowed, others which he would adroitly annex to those of which he was not the cause. For a long time he had projected certain excursions, to visit, according to his custom, the places which were to become the theatre of the war; and he wished, if leisure allowed, to traverse the banks of the Elbe from Königstein to Hamburg, to spend some days at Mentz with the Empress, who was impatient to see him and to whom he wished to give public testimony of his affection. By showing himself tenderly careful of Maria-Louisa he rendered it increasingly difficult to the Emperor Francis to forget the ties of paternity which bound him to France. He resolved to begin with the most careful of these excursions,—that which should procure him a view of the important points of Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg. It was now July 8. Napoleon, who had no doubt of the meeting of the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries at Prague on the 12th at the latest, could have named his own, have drawn up their instructions, and despatched them, or have held them in readiness to leave at the first signal. Had it even been necessary to defer his excursions for a few days, it would have been right to do so; for at this moment no interest was so urgent as that of a speedy meeting of the congress; and, besides, the local inspections and the reviews of the troops which he contemplated would have been equally useful if delayed for a week. On the contrary, by waiting for a day he would have received from Prague the communications which he complained had not been sent, he would have known the names of the plenipotentiaries elect, the precise time of their meeting, and the formal acceptance of the new term assigned to the armistice. But it suited him better to profess himself obliged to depart immediately; because he would, in that case, not be obliged to reply before his return; and the four or five days which he would thus gain might be regarded as the consequence of the time lost between July 5 and 12. He therefore suddenly declared that, having deferred his departure till the 9th without having heard from Prague, he felt himself obliged by the urgent concerns of his army to leave Dresden on the 10th. At the same time, from the fear of giving his enemies the opportunity of capturing him by a party of Cossacks

notwithstanding the armistice, he did not say where he was going, being sure that when they should learn he was in any part he would be there no longer. Nor did he say how long he would remain absent, giving ground to hope that it would not be longer than three days at most, that, consequently, they would not have long to wait for the replies which his departure would inevitably delay. The Austrian diplomacy having thus involuntarily lost eight days, they were about voluntarily to lose four or five more, which would delay the meeting of the plenipotentiaries, fixed at first for the 5th of July, then for the 12th, to some other period not as yet determined.

On the morning of July 10, Napoleon left for Torgau in haste, assigning no false pretext when he said that he was absenting himself for important affairs, but practising deceits only in regard to their urgency.

At the moment of his departure, news was brought of the most recent events in Spain, which, though they might easily have been foreseen from what had passed, could not fail to excite surprise very agreeable to our enemies, but very painful to us, and of a fatal influence on our affairs generally. We must detail these events, which, by their political consequences, were necessarily connected with those occurring in Germany.

After the union of the three armies of the centre, of Portugal and of Andalusia, the situation of the French in the Peninsula had still many chances in its favour. Marshal Suchet, maintaining himself by his most advanced corps at Valencia and by two others in Catalonia and Aragon, was master of that part of Spain which was most essential to us, and had in his possession all the fortified places. King Joseph was at Madrid with the army of the centre, having before him, spread over the Tagus from Tarancon to Almaraz, the army of Andalusia, and on his right, in the rear, between the Tormes and the Douro, the army of Portugal. In this position he had nothing to fear, if, continuing to hold together these recently-united forces, he should be always ready to fall *en masse* upon the English as soon as they should appear. These three armies in January, 1813, presented 86,000 men of all arms, comprising the remains of the best troops which France had sent into Spain. Delivered from the opposition of Marshal Soult, whom Napoleon had taken with him into Germany, and from the obstinacy of General Caffarelli, he might promise himself a more faithful compliance with his orders. In consequence of these changes, General Clausel commanded the army of the North, General Reille that of Portugal, Count d'Erlon that of the centre, and General Gazan that of Andalusia. Without the formidable effect produced by the events of Russia, the situation of Joseph need not have been bad. But those events had remarkably excited the minds of men, and awakened in the Spaniards the hope of speedy deliverance from our dominion.

The Cortès of Cadiz governed the affairs of the Spanish insurrection, somewhat confusedly, indeed, but with zealous patriotism, and Lord Wellington those of the Portuguese insurrection, with much firmness and consistency. The Cortès, as we have stated elsewhere, had com-

pleted their constitution, and, closely imitating that adopted by France in 1791, had determined upon one chamber, and a king possessing only the power of a suspensive veto. Until this king should be restored to them, the Cortès professed to represent the whole sovereign power, appropriating to themselves the title of Majesty, and that of Highness to an elective regency composed of five members, invested with the executive power in the absence of Ferdinand VII. The Cortès were opposed not only by the French and the few partisans of Joseph, but also by all the friends of the old regime which they had abolished, and found themselves in constant conflict with the regency, which they regarded with suspicion because it had been composed of the high personages of the clergy and army. This explains why, Seville and all Andalusia having been abandoned by the French, the Cortès had preferred to remain among the people of Cadiz, in whom they placed greater confidence than in the inhabitants of any other city. Had it not been for the misfortunes in Russia and the defeat at Salamanca, Joseph, if less thwarted and better provided with money, might in time have derived great strength from the divisions among the Spaniards.

At the present moment these divisions had been much increased by the question as to the command of the armies. The success of Lord Wellington, and especially the qualities displayed by the Portuguese army under his orders, had suggested to certain members of the Cortès the idea of offering to him the command in chief of the Spanish troops. The independent and jealous temper of the nation had at first presented obstacles to this project; but the hope of seeing the Spanish army in a short time equal and even surpass the Portuguese army, and in particular the victory of Salamanca, had silenced all opposition, and Lord Wellington had been named *generalissimo*. That distinguished personage had attached two conditions to his acceptance of the office: first, that he should obtain the consent of his own Government, and secondly, that he should exercise absolute authority over the organization and movements of the Spanish army. The British Government having quite naturally consented to his accepting the office, he had repaired to Cadiz during the winter, to treat with the regency on all the subjects involved in his future command. Received with great honour, but at the same time attacked by the journals, which expressed the national jealousy, he had repeatedly regretted having exposed himself to such treatment, and would even have refused the office, had he not feared by such a step to inflict a fatal blow upon the insurrection. Nevertheless, the authority he demanded had been accorded to him, but he much feared that he would not derive great advantage from the Spaniards, for want of money and of good officers. They promised him money, but they had not the means of supplying it; and as to officers he would have wished in vain to supply the deficiency by English officers. Never would the Spanish army, notwithstanding the example of the Portuguese, have accepted foreigners. He left, however, much more applauded than assailed, and resolved to occupy himself almost exclusively with the Spanish army of Galicia, which was to serve under his immediate orders.

Having returned to Fresnada, on the northern frontier of Portugal, he had employed the whole of the winter in preparing for the approaching campaign. His plan was to have about 45,000 English, well organized, 25,000 Portuguese, and about 80,000 Spaniards, trained and equipped as little imperfectly as possible, and thus to advance with 100,000 men to the North of the Peninsula, so as to strike at the root of the French power in Spain. However, since the concentration of the three armies of Portugal, the centre, and the South had collected at Madrid a force of 80,000 or 90,000 French, at least equal to the English and much superior to the Portuguese and Spanish, he regarded his enterprise as very hazardous, and was unwilling to risk it without much circumspection, and on the condition that the insurgents of Catalonia and Murcia, supported by the Anglo-Sicilian army, should make a powerful diversion in his favour upon Valencia, and that the English fleets, aiding the bands of Asturia and the Pyrenees, should keep our army of the North in continual occupation. When consulted in reference to a plan of invading the South of France while Napoleon was actively engaged in Saxony, he replied that the first care of the English ought to be to force the French to cross the Pyrenees, and to enter France only on their steps. But he was far from promising this result in the presence of 86,000 men actually combined under Joseph in the neighbourhood of Madrid.

These ideas of the British commander-in-chief, which it was easy to divine without the aid of information, sufficiently indicate what ought to have been the plan of the French in order to render this campaign more prosperous than the preceding,—which should have been above all to remain united, and then to have made a good selection of their position. Unfortunately, the choice of their positions both in front and rear of Madrid was not the best possible. In fact, when it should be necessary to fall back in order to resist the Anglo-Portuguese in Old Castile, between Salamanca and Valladolid, it was to be feared that they would not arrive in time, and that they would be obliged, in order to protect Madrid, to deprive themselves of forces which would be much missed on the field. The best thing, therefore, would have been to evacuate Madrid, to transport numbers to Valladolid, there to retain only what was indispensable in *matériel*, to forward to Vittoria the sick and wounded, provisions and ammunition, and thus to be in their newly-adopted capital, at the same time concentrated and exonerated from every useless encumbrance. This was the opinion of Marshal Jourdan: but, though his opinions were perfectly correct, they were expressed without force, of which much was needed to overcome the repugnance of Joseph to evacuate Madrid. Since he had seen Lord Wellington fly before him, and had been able to return triumphantly to his capital, he had again fancied himself King of Spain, and but for the events in Russia he would have had no doubt of his final establishment in the country. To propose to him to leave Madrid at the present time was to propose to him again to become a vagabond king, to restore to the Spaniards all their lost hopes, again to drag through the roads a crowd of miserable followers, and to deprive himself of the most secure

portion of his revenue, which consisted in the customs of Madrid and the produce of two or three surrounding provinces. Yet Joseph possessed so clear an understanding that he had not absolutely rejected the idea of quitting Madrid when Marshal Jourdan had spoken of it, and if he had more powerfully insisted upon it they might have evacuated Madrid in January, have employed the months of February and March in repressing the bands of the North, and then returned in April in order to combine in full force against the Duke of Wellington in May, granting an entire month's rest to the troops in preparation for the decisive campaign of 1813. These ideas, though fully matured in the mind of Marshal Jourdan, remained in abeyance until the receipt of despatches from Napoleon, from Paris, containing very definite instructions for this campaign.

We have already made known the thoughts of Napoleon in regard to Spain for 1813. Disgusted with an enterprise which had deplorably divided his forces, he would gladly have renounced it if he could; but, having drawn the English into the Peninsula, he could no longer free himself from them at his pleasure. By opening the gates of Valençay to Ferdinand VII. he would have had the English at Toulouse or at Bordeaux instead of at Burgos or Valladolid. It was therefore necessary to continue warlike operations beyond the Pyrenees to avoid the necessity of conducting them on his own side of them. But Napoleon, as we have seen, had reduced this task as much as possible for 1813, for, so far from sending reinforcements into Spain, he had drawn from that country some cadres and many picked men, retaining, however, the power to preserve Old Castile, the Basque provinces, Catalonia, and Aragon. His secret design was to treat with England, restoring to Ferdinand VII. Spain, excepting the provinces of the Ebro, compensating him by means of Portugal, which the house of Braganza might very well relinquish, having found so good an asylum in Brazil. This explains why Napoleon had now for the first time consented to admit the representatives of the Spanish insurrection to a congress.

The instructions of Napoleon were drawn up in conformity with these ideas, but in too general a form, owing to his being absorbed in preparations for the Saxon campaign. Annoyed because a courier sometimes occupied thirty or forty days in going from Paris to Madrid, and anxious above every thing to subject the provinces of the Ebro, which he designed to annex to France, he enjoined the re-establishment of communications at any price, repeating, with his wonted irritation when engrossed by any idea, that it was scandalous and disgraceful that at the gates of France one should be in greater danger than in the middle of La Mancha or Castile, and that one could not go from Bayonne to Burgos without being pillaged or murdered. He therefore ordered that the winter should be devoted to the subjection of Mina, Longa, Porlier, and all the banditti chiefs who infested Navarre, Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava. In order more certainly to insure success, he ordered the evacuation of Madrid, which concerned him little, since he proposed to restore the crown to Ferdinand VII., and that Joseph should transfer his court to Valladolid, that he should bring

back the mass of the French troops to Old Castile, bring the army of Portugal to the neighbourhood of Burgos, and lend a large part of it to General Clausel to destroy the bands, and that he should bring back the army of Andalusia from Talavera to Salamanca, the army of the centre from Madrid to Segovia, leaving no more than one detachment in that capital, that it might not appear to be wholly abandoned. Finally, he ordered the army of Andalusia to assume an attitude of offence, to persuade the English that he still cherished designs upon Portugal. He thus hoped, by bringing the seat of government from Madrid to Valladolid, and retaining only one army instead of three, by the rear of that army to subdue the bands of Spaniards who ravaged the North, and by its head to menace Portugal, so as to confine the English to that part and divert them from any enterprise upon the South of France. Unfortunately, this plan involved many errors. In the first place, it was very unlikely that we should have any serious design upon Lisbon when we had evacuated Madrid, and Lord Wellington had shown too much good sense to allow the supposition that he could be so far deceived. Besides, it was not necessary to excite his uneasiness for Portugal in order to detain him in the Peninsula: it was sufficient to fight him in Castile, at Salamanca, Valladolid, or Burgos, no matter where, to shut him up once more behind the lines of Torrès-Védras. But this great object was plainly compromised by lending the army of Portugal to General Clausel, in the hope of subjecting the bands of the North of Spain. These bands were for a considerable time indomitable, and Joseph correctly compared them to La Vendée, in which moral means were more powerful than physical. It was, therefore, very doubtful that 20,000 additional men should enable General Clausel to overcome the Northern bands, and it was certain that the deduction of 20,000 men would render it impossible for Joseph to gain a victory over the English. But, wholly engrossed day and night with the restoration of the military power of France, neglecting to read the correspondence from Spain, and issuing his orders from a distance without sufficiently-sustained attention, Napoleon thought a detachment of 20,000 men granted to General Clausel would allow him to put an end to the guerillas during the winter, and that on the return of spring they would be able in good time and in full force to meet the English.

The instructions of Napoleon, transmitted by the minister of war during the month of January and repeated in February, did not arrive before the middle of February in the first instance and the beginning of March in the second, i.e. about thirty days after their departure. This loss of time was much to be regretted, and it arose from circumstances which deeply affected Napoleon, viz., the occupation of the roads by the guerillas. It cost Joseph much to leave Madrid, as we have said, for his authority over the Spaniards, his finances, and the families of afrancesados, would all suffer from this step. But already his own reason and Marshal Jourdan convinced him that he must submit to the sacrifice. The orders of Napoleon merely gave the finishing-stroke to his determination. It would certainly have been better to have done so at an earlier time, for the troops

which were to be lent to General Clausel would have been sooner at liberty; but Joseph, though inclined to this resolution by his own good sense, had not been able to resolve on it till the last moment. He accordingly ordered the removal of his court and government to Valladolid, leaving a division at Madrid. The number of sick and wounded to be removed was so great, (about 9000,) the *matériel* to be placed in safety was so vast, and the families of functionaries to be transported were so numerous, that the evacuation required nearly a month. The new establishment was not settled before the end of April. The troops were distributed in the following manner. The army of Portugal was transferred from Salamanca to Burgos. It had been reduced by the dismissal of useless cadres and the fusion of the effective into a smaller number of regiments, from eight divisions to six, and it had gained in organization what it had lost in numbers. Three of these divisions were sent to General Clausel, to assist in subduing the bands; one was retained at Burgos; two were stationed *en échelon* before Palencia, ready to support the cavalry along the Esla, in observation of the Spanish army of Galicia. The army of Andalusia, transported from the valley of the Tagus to that of the Douro, and connected on the right with that of Portugal, occupied the Douro and the Tormes, to remain as guard against the Anglo-Portuguese army encamped in Beira. It occupied Zamora, Toro, Salamanca, and Avila. One of its divisions, that of General Leval, was left at Madrid, to keep up the appearance of occupying that capital, and to draw the products. Lastly, one of the two divisions of the army of the centre was established at Valladolid, the other at Segovia, to support Leval's division, which remained idly in the middle of New Castile.

These three armies, which in the month of January still presented 86,000 men accustomed to war, including 12,000 superb cavalry, in April only amounted to 76,000, owing to the departure of the cadres and of the picked men summoned by Napoleon to Saxony. Their division into three armies was attended with many inconveniences; for, notwithstanding the revocation of the commanders who had so fatally opposed the authority of Joseph, there still remained in the three staffs a very dangerous tendency to isolation, and to the habit of exploring the country for the benefit of each army distinctly. To fuse these into one compact army under one commander,—such as General Clausel, equally vigorous in the field and submissive to the royal staff,—to muster it in full force between Valladolid and Burgos, to procure it rest, repair its *matériel*, and compose the magazines, would probably have been the means of saving all. Unhappily, nothing of this kind was done.

The three armies were left separate, for Napoleon would not willingly have seen the combination of such a mass of forces in the hands of Joseph. Thus, each staff retained its own claims, and when, by the advice of Jourdan, Joseph demanded of the authorities in these three armies the means necessary for the creation of magazines, each of them refused to obey head-quarters. A new order was necessary from Paris, which occupied more than a month in reaching Madrid, requiring each of the three superintendents to obey the orders of the super-

intendent-in-chief. Thus was lost the most valuable time for the securing of provisions. Finally, after having sent three divisions of the army of Portugal to General Clausel to assist in subduing the guerillas, it was necessary to forward him a fourth, and then a fifth as far as Briviesca, so that General Reille retained only one himself. This it was necessary to divide into two, and to place one of the brigades at Burgos, the other at Palencia, behind the cavalry which was guarding the Esla. If, therefore, the Anglo-Portuguese were to come upon them suddenly, they had only two of the three armies to oppose to them, and the benefit of concentration, on which, after the unfortunate battle of Salamanca, the re-establishment of our affairs depended, was almost lost. If, again, these reinforcements sent to General Clausel had placed him in a position to annihilate the guerillas, the evil of the dispersion, though irreparable, would not have been wholly without compensation. But the Spanish Vendée was as difficult to conquer as the French Vendée had been, and it became evident that force would never be sufficient without moral and political means.

The English fleet, coasting continually the shores of the Asturias from Santander to St. Sebastian, pouring in arms, ammunition, food, and clothing, uniting in the attack and defence of maritime posts, brought to the insurgents aid which doubled their means and their confidence. Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Mina, and Merino, sometimes united, sometimes separated, always well informed, avoided our columns as soon as they were considerable in number, attacked them only when they were divided to pursue them, and then contrived to combine in order to overthrow them. They had nowhere gained any considerable advantage, but they had destroyed two battalions at once, especially at Levin; and though General Clausel had 50,000 men to oppose to them, and pursued them with the greatest activity, he seldom overtook them, and scarcely even succeeded in securing his communications, because in order effectually to guard the roads it would have been necessary to occupy them in all points, which was absolutely impossible. General Clausel had recovered Castro, on the sea-shore, put the English on their guard, handled Mina *ruite*, and re-occupied Pampeluna,—acts no doubt very meritorious, but of little weight in the general affairs of the Peninsula. Still an escort of 3000 or 4000 men was necessary to travel in safety from Bayonne to Burgos, if the attention of the enemy were attracted by the person or article escorted; and in the mean while, for so small a result, they wasted the strength of troops which were the last resource which could be opposed to the English.

While they were thus exhausting themselves in useless excursions, the months of April and May had passed away, and the time for grand operations having come, Lord Wellington quitted his cantonments. He entered on the field with 48,000 English, 20,000 Portuguese, 24,000 Spaniards, the last better armed and clad than usually: he thus had more than 90,000 men at his disposal. His intention was to cross the Esla with his left, under Sir Thomas Graham, and not to attempt with his centre and right the line of the Douro, which was more difficult to

force, until his left should be, by the passage of the Esla, on the rear of the French who were defending the Douro. On this occasion he marched with a park of siege-artillery, and was no longer exposed to failure before a work such as the fortress of Burgos.

On the 11th of May his left executed the first movement, and stretched itself along the Esla. The cavalry of General Reille, being supported by only one brigade of infantry, had been unable to exhibit either boldness or vigilance, and the Esla had been passed before they were able to know or to hinder the passage. The English made no haste to press us, for one wing would not march without the other, and it was about the 20th of May before Lord Wellington with his right directed himself against Salamanca and the Tormès. On the 24th he was reported to General Gazan as advancing at the head of considerable forces.

The French army, which ought to have been ready and concentrated by the 1st of May in the neighbourhood of Valladolid, found itself surprised in the most difficult position. No doubt had Marshal Jourdan been younger, and Joseph more active and decided, they would not have allowed things to remain in the state in which the enemy found them. Thus, notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of obtaining information in Spain, they would have endeavoured to have kept themselves more acquainted with the movements of the English; notwithstanding the orders of the Emperor, which, after all, were rather instructions than orders, they would have been able at the approach of danger to recall the divisions of the army of Portugal which had been lent to General Clausel, to bring that general himself to their neighbourhood, being the only one capable of commanding in a grand battle; they would have been able, at least, better to concentrate the armies of Andalusia and of the centre, and what remained of that of Portugal; lastly, notwithstanding the resistance of different administrations which it was necessary to destroy when occasion required, they might have erected at Burgos magazines, without which it was impossible to manœuvre at liberty in such a country. But Jourdan, weary of the Imperial regime, the abuses of which came so immediately under his notice, and of a war of which he had long ago predicted the fatal consequences, beginning to feel the effects of age, restrained only by his affection for Joseph, and anxious only to return to France, was content to point out, with singular penetration, the errors they were about to commit, but was unable to impart to Joseph the courage necessary to prevent them. Joseph, correctly discerning the existing errors, indulged sometimes in irritation against his brother, but never ventured to disobey him, nor to assume, as general and king, the authority which, after all, would not have drawn upon him any severe animadversion. Jourdan too much consoled himself for what he saw by the undisguised contempt of an honourable man, Joseph gave way to vexation; but things went on their own course, notwithstanding, sometimes fortunately, more frequently the reverse, but destined, ultimately, to be ruinous at no distant time.

Thus it was that Lord Wellington, on the march from the 11th of May with his left, and from the 20th with his right, found the army of

Andalusia scattered from Madrid to Salamanca, that of the centre from Segovia to Valladolid, that of Portugal from Burgos to Pampeluna.

The first care ought to have been to summon from Madrid Leval's division and to make it recross the Guadarrama for Valladolid. General Gazan might have given the order to do so at once, but, as the final abandonment of the capital was in question, he thought it his duty to come to Valladolid, to have an interview with Joseph. Thus, two days were lost. The order to evacuate was forwarded from Valladolid on the 25th. At the same time was sent to all the troops on the lines of the Tormès, the Douro, and the Esla, an order to retrograde slowly, so as to secure time to Leval's division to fall back, and as General Reille had, to support his cavalry along the Esla, only one of the two brigades of Maucune's division, he was reinforced by a division of the army of the centre, that of General Darmagnac. The rest of the army of the centre was left *en échelon* at Segovia, to collect Leval's division. The army of Andalusia, the most entire of the three, was to retire from Salamanca to Tordesillas by slow degrees, that all our scattered troops might have time to reassemble. To these measures, dictated by their situation, another was added, that of warning General Clausel of the approach of the English, of demanding from him the restitution of the five divisions of the army of Portugal, and of inducing him to come personally with some troops of the army of the North, in order to have at least 80,000 men to oppose to the English. Finally, they wrote to M. Clarke, the minister of war, to inform him of the state of things, and to urge him to order the concentration of the forces. That minister, who had remained alone at Paris since Napoleon had left for Germany, could only repeat implicitly the orders of the Emperor, which prescribed, as essential, the re-establishment of communications with France, the maintenance of our superiority in the Northern provinces, and the assumption of an offensive attitude toward Portugal, in order to divert the English from any attempt upon the French shores. Even some days before the appearance of the English, he had not feared to order into Aragon a new division of the army of Portugal, to maintain the communications with Marshal Suchet. No great assistance, then, could be expected from the Duke of Feltre. The only service which he could render was to transmit to General Clausel intimation of the march of the English, which was not indifferent, for, notwithstanding all that had been done to communicate safely with the army of the North, they were not certain of doing so before three or four weeks. Moreover, General Clausel was so good a companion in arms, and so well understood the importance of beating the English, that when once warned he would not fail to send back the divisions of the army of Portugal, and to come in person with the disposable troops of the army of the North.

Happily for the first days of the campaign, they had to do with a firm but cautious enemy, and it was not easy to disconcert our brave and well-commanded soldiers. General Reille mustered his cavalry, fell back in good order upon Palencia, and with Maucune's division of infantry, the only one remaining to him, and that of Darmagnac, which had been lent to him, secured from attack the road from Valladolid to

Burgos, which was the line of retreat of the army. General Villatte, posted on the Tormès, defended it with valour, even to excess, for, though it was useful to retard the enemy, it was dangerous to profess to arrest his course, and he thus lost several hundred men, though he occasioned a much greater loss to the English. Owing to this position and to the prudent slowness of Lord Wellington, General Leval was able to evacuate Madrid and to cross the Guadarrama in safety, bringing with him the last remains of our establishment at Madrid. He joined the army of the centre at Segovia. On the 2d of June they held the following positions: General Reille between Rio Seco and Palencia with his cavalry and two divisions; the army of Andalusia at Tordesillas, on the Douro, with its four divisions; and the army of the centre at Valladolid with a French and a Spanish division. This made a total of about 52,000 men, instead of 76,000 who might have been assembled if the advantages of concentration had not been so quickly relinquished for the chimerical project of destroying the guerilla bands.

Once grouped around Valladolid, three methods might be adopted: the first was to halt and give battle immediately with 52,000 men against 90,000, which would have been imprudent and premature, since every step in retreat gave a chance of recovering one or more of the divisions of the army of Portugal; the second, to fall back upon Burgos, then upon Miranda and Vittoria, until they should have joined the army of the North itself, which was simple and attended with little risk; the third, not to quit the line of the Douro, to manoeuvre on that river, ascending it transversely as far as Aranda or even Soria, whence, by a road followed by Marshal Ney in 1808, they would issue between Tudela and Logrono, *i.e.* in Navarre, at the exact point where they were sure to meet General Clausel and even Marshal Suchet, if any extraordinary events should require the general concentration of all our forces,—a plan somewhat rash in appearance, but the safest in reality. The three plans were discussed. No one thought of fighting immediately with 52,000 men against 90,000, when they hoped daily to receive additions. They did not overlook the merit of the third plan of ascending the Douro to the approaches of Navarre, but it was deemed rash and complicated, and, especially, involved the error of abandoning the Bayonne road and neglecting the communications so urgently recommended in the instructions from Paris,—as if an English army would ever have dared to cross the Pyrenees leaving on their rear 80,000 French, and, including Marshal Suchet, 150,000. For these various reasons the second plan was preferred, which consisted in falling back quietly upon Burgos, writing repeated letters to recall the divisions lent to General Clausel, or, if not all, at least those which should receive the orders time enough to be of service.

The retreat, then, was begun, and it was necessary after Madrid to evacuate also Valladolid, the second capital, which had just been created in Old Castile. They sent before them the *mal-traité*, the sick, the wounded, and the *afancesados*, and the march could not be other than very slow. The troops, being badly provisioned, were obliged to scatter themselves to obtain

food, which rendered their retreat very insecure. Fortunately, we had 10,000 excellent cavalry, the enemy was not enterprising, and thus they were able to retire without any serious accident. Lord Wellington, waiting on Fortune without running after her, was well aware that a general battle was inevitable, and resigned himself to the necessity, but with his usual resolution not to fight except on favourable ground: and up to this time he seemed to content himself with the single result of bringing us toward the Pyrenees. With this design, he always pushed forward his left, which had set off from the frontiers of Galicia, so as to threaten our right, (supposing the Pyrenees at our back,) and then more quickly to decide our retrograde movements. It is not easy to see why so prudent a general should himself hasten us upon our reinforcements, and not seek to meet us when we were only 50,000 instead of 70,000.

On the 6th of June they reached the neighbourhood of Palencia, and a reconnaissance performed by Joseph and Jourdan fully disclosed this design of the English to bring their left in force upon our right. On the 7th they continued the march upon Burgos, and took up the position of Castro-Xeriz, between the Pysanga and the Arlanzon, before Burgos. The scarcity of provisions obliging them to leave this excellent position earlier than they wished, they fell back upon Burgos on the 9th. General Bailli, with the Maucune and Darmagnac divisions, established himself on the Rio Hormaza, General Gazan, with the army of Andalusia, behind the Rio Urbel on each side of the Arlanzon, the army of the centre within Burgos.

They had made all haste, from the scarcity of provisions, to reach Burgos, and they were destined, from the same cause, to hasten their departure from it. The numerous convoys of sick, of expatriated, of conductors of artillery, accumulated at Burgos, had consumed the very moderate magazines formed in that city, and the troops could scarcely remain many days. They despatched these convoys to Miranda and Vittoria, and they committed the error, after having formed the resolution to retrograde to the Pyrenees, of not sending all their encumbrances to Bayonne, in order completely to free the army. Some days' rest was allowed to the troops, in order to consume the remaining provisions and to gain time for concentration, for every day increased the chance of joining General Clausel. At Burgos, also, they had found the Lanninière division, one of those which had been lent to the army of the North, and which was the most numerous of the army of Portugal. This promised an addition of nearly 6000 men to General Reille, which allowed the restoration of Darmagnac's division, which had been recently borrowed from the army of the centre.

This was a new reason for approaching the Ebro and urging still further the retrograde movement, for, if they did not join all the divisions sent to General Clausel, they might, at least, recover one or two of them, and such a reinforcement was of decided importance. Besides, provisions were failing, and it was necessary to seek them at a greater distance. Here, for the second time, arose the question whether they should continue to follow the high-road of Bayonne, in compliance with the orders recommending so urgently the care of the communi-



cations with France, or effect a transverse movement to debouche upon the Ebro at Logrono, instead of reaching it by Miranda, which rendered it almost certain that they should join General Clausel. This was, without any of the former objections, the plan which had been rejected at Valladolid, and which consisted in going to Navarre by Soria, in order more certainly to join General Clausel. On this occasion the detour required was so inconsiderable, and the certainty of joining General Clausel, who was engaged in Navarre, of such prime importance, that it is difficult to understand why such a proposal should meet with opposition. It was strongly supported by Generals Reille and d'Erlon; but Marshal Jourdan and Joseph, with less judgment than usual, and influenced above all by the instructions from Paris repeated by every courier, feared to expose the communications with Bayonne, and persisted in aiming directly at Miranda and Vittoria. Only, having received no news of General Clausel, they sent to him, under the escort of 1500 men, intimation of the arrival of the army in the direction of Vittoria. They then again resolved to retrograde upon the Ebro by Briviesca, Pancorbo, and Miranda.

On the 12th of June General Reille, seeing the English again attempt to outflank our right, (our right, we repeat, supposing the Pyrenees to be in our rear,) wished to compel them to deploy their forces, and he remained in the rear of the Rio Hormaza. The English presented about 25,000 men, but General Reille, who had not half that number, manoeuvred with so much vigour and accuracy that he killed 300 or 400 men, without the loss of more than about 50, and recrossed the Rio Hormaza and even the Arlanzon in perfect order. It was evident that the English, while impatiently desiring to give us battle, wished to force us to give ground, by always outflanking one of our wings. On the 13th they resolved to leave Burgos, and as they knew that in this campaign Lord Wellington was provided with a considerable siege-equipage, and were unwilling to leave 2000 or 3000 men at Burgos, which we should probably never see again, they determined to blow up the fort which had rendered us such good service the previous year, along with all the ammunition with which it abounded, and which could not be transported.

On the 13th, while marching to Briviesca, the army was distressed by the sound of a frightful explosion, the melancholy indication of a final and hopeless retreat, and it became known to the rear-guard that this operation, executed without the necessary precautions, had caused considerable damage to our troops and still more to the town. They reached Briviesca on the 14th of June, Pancorbo on the 15th, Miranda on the 16th. Having reached this last point, they were on the banks of the Ebro, and one step more would bring them to Vittoria, at the very foot of the Pyrenees. The enemy had advanced by their left as far as Villarcayo, continuing their wonted manoeuvre to outflank our right. At the same time it was learned that General Clausel, on the first news of the approach of the English, had hastened to forward to the army Sarrut's division, which they had just come up to on the road, and Foy's division, which was still on the other side of the Pyrenees, between Mondragon and Tolosa, and that

he was himself advancing by Logrono, ascending the Ebro with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, and two divisions of the army of the North. He was expected at Logrono on the 20th.

The case called for the execution of the simplest movement, viz. to descend the Ebro from Miranda to Logrono, which would have involved a detour of merely a few leagues and have secured a union with General Clausel. But the direct road from Bayonne by Vittoria occupied more than ever the attention of Joseph and Jourdan. They not only feared to expose it by descending the Ebro to Logrono, but even not to protect it sufficiently by remaining on the road from Miranda to Vittoria, for the enemy might cross the mountains a little higher up by Villarcayo, make their way by Orduna to Bilbao, and from Bilbao to Tolosa, and cut off from us the road to Bayonne. To avert this danger Marshal Jourdan wished to bring the army of Portugal by Puente-Larra to Orduna, in order to close the passage by which the road from Vittoria to Bayonne might be intercepted. The pertinacity of the minister of war in continually reiterating the first orders of Napoleon induced this fatal idea, which would have deprived Joseph of General Reille's three divisions until they should have recrossed the Pyrenees and have replaced the army, even after being joined by General Clausel, in its present dangerous state of numerical inferiority; but it was not probable that the English would allow us to cross the Pyrenees unopposed, though at present they seemed to have no other end in view than to make us evacuate Spain. Marshal Jourdan was inclined to suppose that they had no other intention; and it must be granted that their habitual conduct gave some support to such an opinion.

They had remained at Miranda on the 17th, to give some rest to the army. It was necessary, however, to decide, for they could not remain longer in this place, and allow the enemy to anticipate us in the various passes of the Pyrenees. There had always prevailed in the staff two very different opinions,—one to move as quickly as possible by a transverse course upon Logrono and Navarre in order to join General Clausel, without regarding the movement of the English against our right, for they could not think of passing those mountains before having conquered us in a decisive battle; the other, on the contrary, to pay extreme attention to the movement by which the English threatened our communications, and to guard against it by never quitting the high-road of Bayonne, but summoning General Clausel thither, whom they hoped every moment to see arrive. The first opinion was that of General Reille and Count d'Erlon; the second was that of Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, fatally governed by the orders from Paris.

The struggle between the two opinions was very brisk at Miranda, for the moment of decision was now come. General Reille maintained that General Clausel having announced his arrival on the Ebro, in the neighbourhood of Logrono, it was right to lose no time in joining him there, and that every consideration ought to yield to the great object of concentrating our forces, repeating what he had always said,

that the movement by which the English sought to outflank us was not serious so long as they had not seriously beaten us. Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, on the contrary, feared above every thing the movement which, by bringing the English by Orduna to Bilbao and Tolosa, should place them between us and Bayonne on the other side of the great chain of the Pyrenees. Moreover, the convoy, comprising all our sick and wounded and the expatriated Spaniards, was at Vittoria, and it would be left, unprotected, to the power of the enemy by our descent upon Logrono. Finally, General Clausel, to whom Vittoria had been named as a rendezvous, might very possibly go there without touching at Logrono, in which case he would be compromised as well as the convoy.

It must be acknowledged that the advice of General Reille and Count d'Erlon, though the best, as we shall soon see, had lost its apparent merit, since the convoy had been sent to Vittoria, and orders had been sent to General Clausel to repair thither, for, without any fear of being turned by Orduna, the danger of exposing the convoy, and perhaps even General Clausel himself, by descending obliquely upon Logrono, was a very specious motive for continuing to march directly upon Vittoria; and we cannot blame Joseph and Marshal Jourdan for having adhered to their first opinion, especially considering the orders from Paris, which imposed upon them as an imperative duty the care of our communications with France.

Joseph and Marshal Jourdan were not content with adopting the direct course of Vittoria: they desired to relieve themselves of all fear of being outflanked by Orduna and Bilbao, and they ordered General Reille to go by Puente-Larra to Osma, by Osma to Orduna and Bilbao, while the rest of the army should immediately advance upon Vittoria. They hoped to meet General Clausel at Vittoria, and by that union to gain more than they should have lost by the departure of General Reille, and thus, resting on the Pyrenees along with Generals Coxen, d'Erlon, and Clausel, and having General Reille on the reverse of those mountains to parry any outflanking movement, to oppose in every direction a barrier of iron to the enemy. But, while adopting such arrangements, it would have been right to warn General Clausel otherwise than by peasants or detached officers; it would have been necessary, by a regiment of cavalry, (of which they had many more than they could employ,) to intimate to him at Logrono itself the true place of rendezvous, and to forward positive orders to hasten the departure of the convoy from Vittoria, that he might not meet it there on his way and become encumbered to a dangerous extent.\*

Neither Joseph nor Marshal Jourdan were ever deficient in good sense or sound judgment; but, as we have said elsewhere, they were wholly wanting in that activity which multiplies precautions, which never trusts to the mere issue of orders, and which arises from

youth and ardour. They therefore resolved to direct General Reille with all that he retained of the army of Portugal upon Osma and Generals Gazan and d'Erlon with the armies of the centre and of Andalusia upon Vittoria, unhappily without taking any of the precautions which we have just indicated.

On the 18th General Reille began his movement upon Osma with the Sarrut, Lamarina, and Maucune divisions. But scarcely had the last-named division begun the march when it was assailed by a cloud of enemies, from which it escaped only by dint of vigour and presence of mind. General Reille, having reached Osma, found numerous troops in the direction of Barcelona, already posted at all the approaches of the mountains and barring access. These were Spaniards of the army of Galicia, who had anticipated us in the occupation of the passes of the Pyrenees. One might have believed that, agreeably to the conjectures of Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, they were going to cross the Pyrenees at Orduna in order to cut off the road to Bayonne; but this was not in their thought. They merely wished to get before us at the foot of the mountains to take up commanding positions in our flank if we should determine to fight a defensive battle with the Pyrenees on our rear, or to push us at furthest to the ridge of Salinas in order to engage us before we should regain the frontiers of France.

General Reille, seeing the road of Orduna intercepted, readily renounced an operation which he censured, and determined to reach by a lateral movement the high-road from Miranda to Vittoria. Joseph, on his side, had decamped on the night of the 18th of June for Vittoria, and by the morning of the 19th all our corps were in full march upon that city. Vittoria, situated at the foot of the Pyrenees, on the Spanish side, rises in the midst of a beautiful plain surrounded on all sides by mountains. Standing there with the backs to the Pyrenees, we have on the right Mount Arrato, which separates us from the valley of Murguia, in front the Sierra de Andia, and on the left some hills crossed by the road from Salvatierra to Pampeluna. A small river, the Zadorra, waters the whole of this plain, running first along the Pyrenees, where it has its source, then along Mount Arrato to the right, to escape by a very narrow defile across the Sierra de Andia.

The main of our army, coming from Miranda and the banks of the Ebro, traversed the high-road of Bayonne, which penetrates directly into the plain of Vittoria by the defile through which issues the river Zadorra. General Reille reached that point laterally by the different ridges of Mount Arrato. The corps with which Lord Wellington had always attempted to outflank us, which was composed of Spaniards and English, might have anticipated us at the passages of Mount Arrato, and thus occupied before us the plain of Vittoria, if General Reille, who was opposed to him in his lateral movement, had not checked him by the vigour with which he disputed the ground the whole of the 19th. In fact, the detour enjoined upon General Reille, though useless for the end proposed, was, nevertheless, attended with happy consequences, for, though it did not prevent

\* We venture to indicate these measures as those which ought to have been adopted, because Joseph and Jourdan have been reproached for not adopting them, and common sense is sufficient to appreciate their suitableness and necessity.

us from the chimerical danger of seeing the Bayonne road cut off beyond the Pyrenees, it saved us from the real danger of seeing it cut off on the Spanish side by the occupation of the basin of Vittoria. On the evening of the 19th, our three armies were combined there without any accident. General Reille had killed many of the enemy, and had scarcely lost a man.

It became urgent to decide. It was not to be presumed that Lord Wellington would allow us to recross the Pyrenees without a battle, for if once we should reach the great chain, be supported by its heights on our rear and concealed in its valleys, we should be no longer accessible, and if, moreover, concentrated before being attacked, we might fall upon the English army with 80,000 men and destroy it. Lord Wellington had already been guilty of a somewhat serious error in allowing us to go so far without engaging us, and in giving us so many chances of joining General Clausel; but it could not be supposed that he should continue longer in this error. A battle might, therefore, be expected before long, unless we immediately quitted Vittoria to cross the ridge of Salinas and to descend on the Bidassoa. But this was scarcely possible. To recross the Pyrenees without a battle was to fly disgracefully before those whom a few months previous we had put to flight near Salamanca; to abandon General Clausel to the greatest danger, for he would be left alone on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees; and also to leave there in danger, though less immediately, Marshal Suchet, with all the forces he possessed from Saragossa to Alicante. Thus, military honour, the safety of General Clausel, and the security of Marshal Suchet, all forbade the passage of the Pyrenees, and it was necessary to fight at their foot, i.e. in the basin of Vittoria, where we should be joined by General Clausel. If that general should arrive in time, there might be at least 70,000 combatants, and still more if General Foy, who was on the other side between Salinas and Tolosa with a division of the army of Portugal, should also arrive. We had, therefore, every chance to beat the English, who, though combined with the Portuguese and Spanish they made a total of 90,000 men, possessed only 47,000 or 48,000 of their own countrymen. Yet it was possible that our forces should not be joined by General Clausel immediately, and that a day or two might elapse before his arrival. It was, therefore, necessary to put themselves in a position to withstand the English till the arrival of General Clausel, and for this purpose carefully to reconnoitre the ground and to take all precaution for its defence. There was now great cause for that degree of vigilance which was unfortunately always wanting to this army.

Of the six divisions of the army of Portugal they had three, the Maucune division, which had not quitted the army, and the Sarrut and Lamartinière divisions, which had joined it on the road. There was a fourth, that of General Foy, on the other side of the Pyrenees. The two others, those of Generals Barbot and Taupin, were still with General Clausel, who was bringing them reinforced by two divisions of the army of the North. With the divisions

of the army of Portugal which they had recovered, and the army of the centre and of Andalusia, they would have reckoned about 60,000 men, without the losses on the retreat. But, although they had not engaged in any serious combats, they had lost 3000 or 4000 men by sickness, fatigue, and dispersion. There remained 56,000 or 57,000 men, a part of which must be withdrawn to escort the convoy, which they could not keep at Vittoria, and they would thus find themselves reduced to about 54,000 men.\* To engage with such a numerical inferiority was to give a great chance to ill fortune, but as they had no choice, and might be assailed by the enemy before the arrival of General Clausel, it was necessary to make use of the best possible localities to compensate the inferiority of numbers, and to adopt their measures, if not on the evening of the 19th, at least on the morning of the 20th. For it might be presumed that the English, having reached the Pyrenees at the same time as ourselves, would not allow us much time to take up our position. On the evening of the 19th they ought to have freed themselves from the immense convoy, which, including the wounded, the expatriated, and the *matériel*, was composed of more than 1000 carriages; for it was a great encumbrance if it were necessary to fight, and almost certain disaster if it should be necessary to retire. By forwarding it the same evening, and escorting it only to the other side of the mountain of Salinas, where they should meet General Foy, it was possible to bring back in time the troops that should have accompanied it. After freeing themselves of the convoy they should have firmly established themselves in the plain of Vittoria. The English, having always attempted to outflank our right, would probably continue the same manœuvre. Coming from Murguia, they must attempt to debouche across the passages of Mount Arrato, in the plain of Vittoria, which would lead them to the banks of the Zadorra, which, as we have said, passes along the foot of Mount Arrato. Though this river was inconsiderable, the passage might have been rendered difficult by breaking all the bridges and protecting the fords with artillery, which was easy, since we drew along with us an enormous mass of guns. But it was indispensable to render this passage not merely difficult, but almost impossible, for by crossing the Zadorra the enemy might fall upon the rear, or, at least, the flank, of our army drawn up in the basin of Vittoria, in face of the defile by which it is entered from Miranda. This defile, across which the Zadorra escapes, as we have already said, which is called the defile of the Puebla, was the second obstacle to present to the enemy, and it was necessary to study the ground accurately to discover the best means of defending it. For this purpose there was a position whose advantages were proved by the event, and which

\* In the Memoirs of Marshal Jourdan, recently printed along with those of King Joseph, are found somewhat different numbers; but the marshal, though always extremely truthful, has too much reduced the forces of the French, in order to excuse the defeat of the battle of Vittoria. After calculations too long to be enumerated, we have come to the conviction that the numbers we have stated are a nearer approximation to the truth: moreover, the difference is only about 4000 or 5000 men. We should add that Marshal Jourdan is perfectly right in opposition to the numbers assigned by the minister of war, which are wholly erroneous.

would have supplied the means of interdicting the English from all access to the plain. In fact, a little to the rear, in the interior of the basin of Vittoria, occurs an eminence, that of Zuazo, which would enable them to fire upon the enemy debouching from the defile or descending from the heights of Sierra de Andia, and then to follow up the fire by the bayonet. This position, not far from Vittoria, and from the passes of Mount Arrato by which the English threatened to debouche upon our rear, brought every thing within reach of eye and hand, and facilitated those movements which might be required by circumstances. It was, then, possible, by cutting the bridges of the Zadorra and carefully occupying the heights of Zuazo, to defend the basin of Vittoria with the troops they had, and there to await, in safety, General Clausel. Finally, to all these precautions should have been added that of sending to General Clausel not ill-paid peasants, but a regiment of cavalry, to renew the exact intimation of the rendezvous. But, as we have said, they had no more cavalry than was needed on the ground where they were to engage.

Not one of these precautions was taken. On the evening of the 19th they did not despatch the convoy, and they merely sent to General Clausel some peasants, on whom they could not rely, and who, even if faithful, ran the risk of being taken. On the following day, instead of reconnoitring the ground in person, Jourdan and Joseph never left Vittoria. Marshal Jourdan was affected with a violent fever, resulting from age, fatigue, and chagrin. Joseph, who could only see through the eyes of the marshal, deferred the reconnoissance till the following day. He flattered himself, and in this Jourdan coincided, that the English, with their usual circumspection, would endeavour to outflank us by crossing the mountains, but would be in no haste to attack us in front. The only thing not prevented by the illness of Jourdan was their deliverance from the convoy, which impeded them in the highest degree, and which they determined should leave on the 20th. In order to keep with themselves only the field-artillery, they ordered the armies of Portugal and Andalusia to furnish all the horses which were not necessary to draw the heavy guns across the Pyrenees. Moreover, though they knew that Foy's division was on the reverse of the chain, between Salinas and Tolosa, as the guerilla hands crept across the narrowest space, they gave the Maucune division as escort to the convoy. In consequence of this arrangement, the army of Portugal was again reduced to two divisions, and the whole army to 53,000 or 54,000 men.

Thus, all the measures ordered on the 20th consisted in sending off the convoy to Tolosa, which ought to have left on the 19th, in drawing up General Gazan with the army of Andalusia in face of the defile of Puebla, the Count d'Erlon with the army of the centre behind General Gazan, and then to the right and in the rear, along the Zadorra, General Reille with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, to oppose the body of English coming by the road of Murguia with the intention of outflanking them. To the other instances of neglect was added that of not cutting any one of the bridges of the Zadorra. Between our dif-

ferent corps of infantry was placed our splendid cavalry, which, unhappily, on the ground which they occupied, could render little service; for the basin of Vittoria is crossed by numerous canals, which everywhere check the force of cavalry. We reckoned about 9000 or 10,000 horse, so that our infantry amounted to about 43,000 or 44,000 men,—nearly one-half that of the enemy.

Thus was employed, or rather lost, the 20th. Every moment they hoped to see General Clausel: but no indication of his approach was apparent at any of the points at which he might arrive. The unfortunate Joseph was in the utmost anxiety, without being rendered more active; for in those who are not naturally inclined to forethought, expectation produces agitation, but not activity.

On the following day, the 21st, General Clausel had not appeared, and, as it could not be supposed that the enemy would remain long inactive, Joseph and Jourdan determined to reconnoitre the ground in preparation for the approaching struggle. Marshal Jourdan, somewhat relieved from his fever, though still unwell, mounted his horse and went with Joseph to reconnoitre the plain of Vittoria. On the right of our position, and to the rear, at the foot of Mount Arrato, General Reille, with the French divisions of Lamartinière and Sarret, and the remains of a Spanish division, guarded the bridges of the Zadorra. The bridge of Durana, situated in the mountains on the side of the Pyrenees, was guarded by the Spanish division. The bridge of Gamarra-Mayor, at the beginning of the plain, was occupied by the Lamartinière division. That of Arraga, just in the middle of the plain and on a level with Vittoria, was defended by the Sarret division. Behind these divisions were formed, in addition to the light cavalry, several divisions of dragoons ready to pour down upon any body which should have crossed the Zadorra. It would have been better to destroy the bridges over that small river and to defend the fords with artillery. However this be, the presence at this point of so good an officer as General Reille was encouraging.

Proceeding straight forward toward the entry of the plain, at the mouth of the defile of the Puebla, Jourdan and Joseph ascended the height of which we have spoken, that of Zuazo, which cut the basin transversely and commanded the exit of the defile. With his practised eye Marshal Jourdan instantly perceived that it was at this point that General Gazan ought to be posted at the head of the whole army of Andalusia, that the height must be covered with guns, that Count d'Erlon must be drawn up at the right on the Zadorra, to unite with General Reille and to guard the bridge of Trespoueta, which debouched on the side of the heights of Zuazo. Had this accurate observation been made the day before, it might have saved the French army, and perhaps our position in Spain. Officers of the staff were sent to transmit these orders to General Gazan, and to cause him to execute them without delay.

But it was too late, and the battle began at the very moment. It was easy to foresee that Lord Wellington, after having accompanied us to the Pyrenees, would not allow us to cross them without a battle, which, if gained, would

enable him to cross them in the rear of a conquered army. He had brought General Graham with two English divisions, and the Portuguese and Spaniards who formed his left, on the Murguia road, across the passes of Mount Arrato, to endeavour to force General Reille upon the Zadorra. He had directed his centre, composed of three divisions, under Marshal Beresford, across the other passes of Mount Arrato, to debouche also upon the Zadorra, but about the middle of the plain, which would make them issue at the bridge of Trespuentes, in the face of General d'Erlon, and on the flank of the position of Zuazo. Finally, his right, composed of two English divisions under General Hill, and of the Spanish division of Morillo, having followed us on the Miranda road, was to pierce the defile of the Puebla and to debouche at the very foot of Zuazo. All these corps were already on the march when Marshal Jourdan and Joseph sent to General Gazan the order to fall back towards the heights of Zuazo, whence, as we have said, they might riddle at once the troops which should have forced the defile of the Puebla and these which should have crossed the Zadorra at Trespuentes.

When the aide-de-camp of Joseph brought his orders to General Gazan, that general declared that, being already engaged with the enemy, he was unable to execute the required movements. Joseph and Jourdan hastened to the spot, and immediately perceived what had happened. On the right, they perceived Beresford's troops, which, having crossed the ridges nearest to Mount Arrato, were endeavouring to cross the Zadorra at Trespuentes. Before them they saw General Hill engaged in the defile of the Puebla, but with much caution, and after having thrown Morillo's Spanish division to his right on the heights of the Sierra de Andia, to aid the English troops who should attempt the passage.

Jourdan and Joseph ordered General Gazan to send to the left Maransin's brigade of advanced guard to the heights of the Sierra de Andia, to rout as quickly as possible Morillo's Spanish division, to support that brigade by a whole division, if necessary, then, having recovered the heights, to drive the Spaniards into the defile of the Puebla, and to throw himself, in their steps, upon the flank of General Hill, with the Darricau and Conroux divisions. General Gazan was to bar the defile, to keep in reserve the Villatte division on the left, and finally to dispose upon his right the Leval division to watch Beresford's troops, who threatened the Zadorra at Trespuentes. Count d'Erlon, drawn up behind General Gazan, was to watch the Zadorra, and to be ready to fall upon the troops which should endeavour to pass it between him and General Reille.

Scarcely had these orders been forwarded when the fire was heard in a wide circle, on our left, front, and right. Nothing was yet heard directly in the rear toward General Reille. General Gazan, who had received orders first to clear the heights on our left which terminated the Sierra de Andia, attacked the Spaniards who had crossed them without sufficient concentration. He sent one regiment after another, and thus obtained no result. The Spaniards, well sheltered behind rocks and woods, a species of ground which they were very skilful in defending, presented a firm resistance to our ill-

managed regiments. General Gazan, urged by Marshal Jourdan to act with more vigour, detached, first, from his front, a brigade of the Conroux division, and then a brigade of the Darricau division, to support General Maransin's vanguard. These two brigades, more than sufficient if brought simultaneously and in full force on the heights to our left, remained half-way, firing at a disadvantage against the well-positioned Spaniards, and affording no aid to Maransin's advanced guard, which lost many men. Two hours thus elapsed without any distinct advantage; and this delay was all the more to be regretted because, if they had been well employed, and if, after having drawn the Spaniards from the heights of the Sierra de Andia into the defile of the Puebla, they had also driven into that defile the English who were attempting to pass it, they might then have returned to the aid of General Reille, who was about to be vigorously attacked.

The king and the marshal reiterating their orders, General Gazan at length determined to send Villatte's division, which was drawn up a little to the rear on the left, against the heights so long and so unsuccessfully attacked. Villatte's division rapidly ascended the slopes of the Sierra de Andia under a most murderous plunging fire, and drove the Spaniards to the higher ground into the woods which crowned the heights. But in the mean while the English divisions under General Hill, seeing our front weakened by the detachment of the two first brigades of General Conroux and General Darricau, and also seeing an important village on our left, Subijana de Alava, altogether exposed by the departure of the Villatte division, threw themselves upon that village by a rapid movement from the defile, and succeeded in taking it. From that moment the English had effected an entrance upon the plain, and it became very difficult to displace them. Marshal Jourdan proposed to launch against them that one of Count d'Erlon's divisions which had been placed in reserve on the right to the rear. But Count d'Erlon, perceiving that Beresford's troops were threatening to cross the Zadorra at Trespuentes, had sent thither his two divisions in succession. There remained, therefore, no reserve; and, to increase their perplexity, the fire, which had not begun in General Reille's direction till late, was now heard in great violence toward the bottom of the plain.

Decided by this combination of circumstances, the king and the marshal ordered a retrograde movement to the height of Zuazo, where by a heavy fire of artillery they could check the enemies, who had invaded the plain at every point; some on our right, by passing the Zadorra at Trespuentes, others on our front, by debouching from the defile of the Puebla, and others on our left, by descending from the heights of the Sierra de Andia. At the same time Marshal Jourdan ordered General Tirlet, the commander of our artillery, to place many guns upon the height of Zuazo.

These orders, being better executed than those which had been given to General Gazan, led to a result which might have been decisive. They fell back upon the height of Zuazo, and General Tirlet, in the twinkling of an eye, brought to that point forty-five guns, and covered with grape the English who were issuing from the

tefile of the Puebla, and one of Beresford's columns which had forced the passage of the Zadorra at Trespuentes, covering the earth with the slain. For a moment thrown into disorder, the English troops soon reformed, advanced, and were again thrown back by the grape. If at this moment we had possessed 4000 or 5000 men at our command, and had launched them against the staggering masses of the English, it would have been possible to give them a sanguinary check by driving them back into the defile. Unhappily, General Gazan, instead of falling back upon the transversal Heights of Zuazo, had moved to the left, to draw up his forces half-way on the flank of the Sierra de Andia, near the Villatte division,—which left an open space between his troops and those of Count d'Erlon. The latter, with his two divisions, disputed, to the best of his power, the passages of the Zadorra above and below Trespuentes. We possessed, therefore, on the decisive heights of Zuazo only the unsupported artillery. At the bottom of the plain, General Reille, attacked at Duran, Gamarra-Mayor, and Arriagua, defended himself bravely, and each time that he lost one of his three bridges he recovered it with singular vigour, but at the same time he declared that he would be soon forced unless promptly succoured. Marshal Jourdan, justly estimating this situation, advised Joseph to order the retreat, the only course which at that time could be taken. The design was to retreat on the high-road of Bayonne, by Salinas and Tolosa, in order to save the artillery; for though by Salvatierra and Pampeluna they might possibly meet General Clausel, yet they were sure to lose all their guns, owing to the state of the roads.

The order to retreat was obeyed without the least delay, but without that unity and consistency which might have prevented the inconveniences of a retrograde movement. Count d'Erlon, not seeing General Gazan on his left, and perceiving the English cavalry ready to pour down upon the plain, endeavoured to support himself in the direction of the Zadorra while retiring, and thus exposed Vittoria. The enemy's cavalry rushed upon the town, and occasioned unutterable confusion. The convoy, to whose safety a division had been devoted, had not wholly left. There remained a park of artillery of 150 guns, and many fugitive families, much baggage, and many fatigue-parties sent out in search of provisions. The sight of the English dragoons produced upon these persons the most lively panic, and they began to fly in all directions with loud cries. Their first movement was to reach the high-road of Bayonne and the ridge of Salinas; but General Reille, firmly disputing the Upper Zadorra, by turns losing and regaining his position, was fighting upon that road, and covering it with fire and blood. The fugitives then fled to that of Pampeluna by Salvatierra. General Tirlet, having hastened to Vittoria to order a retreat, knowing the bad state of the Salvatierra road, foreseeing that the artillery could not pass it, especially with the encumbrance which would necessarily be created, and also aware that there was no lack of *material* in our frontier arsenals, and that horses only were of importance, gave orders to cut the traces and to save the horses and men by abandoning the guns.

The retreat, which was at first to be directed to Salinas and Bayonne, came to be directed to Pampeluna, that is, to Navarre, by the movement of General Gazan, and a sort of instinct of preservation which had driven the fugitives toward the road of Salvatierra, where no gun was heard. They rushed thither in a kind of fury, leaving an immense *material* in Vittoria. From this moment the situation of General Reille became imminently dangerous. He had held on as long as possible on the Zadorra, rejecting the English and Spaniards across that small river every time that they forced one of the three bridges which he guarded. But having perceived the movement of retreat upon Salvatierra, he determined to withdraw in the same direction. In order to escape safe and sound from his dangerous position it was necessary to keep in check on one side those of the enemy's troops who were beginning to cross the Zadorra before him, and on the other those which were already debouching from Vittoria on his rear. He had very fortunately kept in reserve, at some distance from the three bridges, Fririon's brigade, composed of the 2d light and 36th of the line, and also several regiments of cavalry. He immediately ordered General Sarrot, who defended the bridge of Arriagua, General Lamartiniere, who defended that of Gamarra-Mayor, and General Casalpaccia, who guarded the bridge of Duran with the Spaniards and several hundred men of the 3d of the line, to fall back in good order toward Salvatierra, while he should himself make a stand against the English coming from Vittoria. General Sarrot was killed while defending the bridge of Arriagua. General Menne replaced him, and was often attacked, but never allowed himself to be drawn into action. General Lamartiniere met the impulse of the victorious enemy with singular calmness and vigour. In the mean while, General Reille, who endeavoured to protect them all in the direction of Vittoria, received the full shock of the English cavalry. But with the dragoons of Digeon, Tilly, and Mermet he supported it, and succeeded in protecting the retreat of his *corps d'armée* as far as Betono. At this place was a wood: this they entered, which allowed them to traverse in safety a part of the way which led to the Pampeluna road, by turning behind Vittoria. But on leaving the wood they perceived a heavy body of cavalry awaiting us. General Reille charged them with the 3d hussars and 15th dragons, and then hastily marched toward the village of Arbulo, whither the enemy's cavalry pursued us with eagerness. General Reille, with the 2d light and 36th of the line of Fririon's brigade, formed in front of that village, to allow the rest of his *corps d'armée* the time to defile. Assailed by the numerous squadrons of the English, he received them in square, and covered the earth with their dead. All his troops having defiled, he himself crossed the village, and thus reached in safety the Salvatierra road, whither hastened in confusion the different *corps* of our army and all the long train of conveyance which we had brought with so much difficulty from Madrid to Vittoria.

On this fatal day we lost about 5000 in killed and wounded, and the loss of the English was nearly the same. But of soldiers on fatigue-duty, fugitives, and army servants, we had lost

from 1500 to 1800 men, taken by the enemy. We also left to the enemy 200 guns, not, indeed, lost in line, but abandoned for want of a road suited to their conveyance, besides 400 tumbrils and an infinite number of baggage-wagons. Joseph did not even save his own carriage, which contained his papers.

The reader will naturally ask, where, all this time, was General Clausel with the 15,000 men whom he might have brought? what was General Foy doing on the reverse of the mountains, who, being reinforced by several small garrisons and by General Maucune, had likewise 15,000 men, whose presence would have been so useful on the fatal plain of Vittoria? These 30,000 men, joined to Joseph's 52,000 or 54,000, making up the enormous mass of 80,000 combatants, would have sufficed to overwhelm the English and to drive them back into Portugal. How great a difference would have been thus produced not only in the affairs of the Peninsula but of all Europe! for if the English, who exercised such great influence in Germany over the resolutions of the allies, had conceived any fear for their army in the Peninsula, they would certainly have facilitated the negotiations so as to meet as nearly as possible the pride of Napoleon! But in this instance, as in so many others, what was wanting to the soldiers of the army of Spain was neither numbers, nor valour, nor devotion, but guidance. General Foy, who was separated from Joseph by the mountains of Salinas, had received none of the intimations sent to him, and had known the presence of the army at Vittoria only by the appearance of Maucune's division, escorting the convoy. If this movement of Maucune's division had been ordered two days earlier, the convoy might have been placed in security and a reinforcement of 10,000 or 12,000 men might have been brought to Vittoria. As to General Clausel, as soon as he knew the march of the English and the retreat of our army, he had combined his divisions with all haste, had reached Logrono on the 20th, had there on all sides inquired for news of Joseph, had found the inhabitants all either fugitives or sullen, and none who could or would give him any information. Only he had met some English agents preparing provisions, and, from several traces collected on the road, he was led to think that the French army had gone from Miranda to Vittoria. On the 21st he had determined to advance by Penacurada as far as the reverse of the Sierra de Andia, to see if he could join Joseph across that Sierra. But, justly suspecting that he had the English army between Joseph and himself, without knowing where or in what number, he approached with caution, had met none of the peasants who had been sent to him, and toward the close of the day he had at length learned that they had been fighting all day, unhappily, with no favourable result. On the morning of the 22d, anxious to know the whole truth, and at any price to endeavour to join the French army, in order to bring them assistance, he had the boldness to ascend the Sierra de Andia and to take a view of the plain of Vittoria. From the summit of that Sierra he had seen our terrible disaster, and, being separated from Joseph by the victorious English, he thought only of his own safety. He had calmly regained the banks of the Ebro, had descended that river to Logrono,

and having always between Joseph and himself the English, who were pursuing us into Navarre, he had formed the resolution, one of the wisest and boldest adopted during the war, of marching toward Saragossa, to which he was induced by the desire of saving his *corps d'armée*, and by the not less powerful motive of covering the rear of Marshal Suchet and securing his retreat.

Jourdan and Joseph—having regained Pampeluna with an army which, though greatly displeased with the commanders, was not demoralized, was reduced only to the extent of 5000 or 6000 men, deprived of its guns but not of its horses,—werestill in a condition to oppose a firm resistance to the English, independently of the natural resistance that would be presented by the Pyrenees themselves. Joseph, on the advice of Jourdan, after having left a garrison in Pampeluna, sent the army of Andalusia into the valley of Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port, that of the centre into the valley of Bastan, that of Portugal into the valley of Bidassoa, so as to close all the issues, and to take time to reform the artillery, and to put an end to the division into three different armies, which had again occasioned such great inconvenience. While making this arrangement, General Foy, aided by General Maucune, had skilfully and bravely withstood the English, who wished to descend from Salinas upon Tolosa, and had repulsed them to some distance. Spain was lost, but not as yet the frontier; and the Empire, so long acting the part of invader, was not yet invaded, though, very nearly so.

Such was the campaign of 1813 in Spain, so sadly distinguished by the disaster at Vittoria, which signalized our latest movements in that country, where we had for six years vainly shed our blood and that of the Spaniards. A dispassionate judgment may without difficulty detect the true causes of the final reverse. Here, as elsewhere, the first cause must be sought in the orders of Napoleon, who, regarding Spain as merely an accessory in his immense enterprises, either failed to devote to it adequate forces, or subjected the employment of them to calculations foreign from Spain and irreconcilable with the success of operations in that country. This year, the forces left there, though reduced by the recall of many cadres, were, since the concentration of the three armies of Andalusia, of the centre, and of Portugal, sufficient to keep their ground in Castile, since they could muster 80,000 men against the English. But in the double design of preserving the Northern provinces, which he intended to reserve for himself at the peace, and of alarming the English for Portugal, in order to divert them from every enterprise against the South of France, Napoleon had again unintentionally introduced the dispersion of the three armies from Salamanca to Pampeluna; so that, after having regained the ascendancy over the English by our concentration, we lost it again by an imprudent dissemination of our forces. This essential cause of the disaster at Vittoria can be found nowhere but in the orders from Paris, given by Napoleon at a distance from the scene of action, without knowledge of the real facts, and repeated by the minister of war with inexcusable pertinacity, even when their danger had been demonstrated by events and by the objections

of Marshal Jourdan. In addition to this cause was another very old one, and one always fertile in misfortunes in the Peninsula, which was that want of unity in command, from which it arose that, as no administration was willing to obey, nothing was prepared on the route of the army, and that it was necessary, in retrograding to meet General Clausel, to fall back with such precipitation as to render the meeting more doubtful and more difficult and the losses on the road more considerable. This want of unity was the fault of Napoleon, who always refused the necessary authority to his brother; of Joseph, who did not know how to take it; and of the generals, who would not supply its place by submission. In addition to these causes, the want of activity in Joseph and Marshal Jourdan—one indolent, the other worn out with age and vexation—contributed much to the misfortunes of the campaign. Had Joseph and Jourdan been more active and more prompt to resolve, they might have evacuated Madrid at an earlier period and have rallied more early either before Valladolid or Burgos. Even at Vittoria two days were lost, which were of great value for the departure of the convoy and the clearing of the battle-field, for the selection of the ground where they might dispute the entry on the plain, and for meeting with General Clausel. At that important moment, as we have seen, Jourdan was ill, and Joseph had not thought of supplying his place. Finally, certain orders of detail, badly executed by the generals, had completed the series of errors and misfortunes which brought on the final catastrophe of Vittoria. After all, Napoleon, who ought to have appropriated to himself the largest share in these fatal results, for with his profound genius and perfect knowledge he was more able than any other to foresee every thing, and, with his absolute authority, to anticipate every thing, laid the blame on every one but himself, and upon Joseph and Jourdan more than on any other.

Unable to follow the events in Spain in any of their details, absorbed as he was by the war in Saxony, which he personally directed, giving full credence to the minister, M. Clarke, who, while addressing Joseph in the most affectionate terms, sent the most unfavourable reports to Dresden, he had a twofold ground of irritation,—first, in the results, which could not fail to be deplorable; and in the errors, which disgusted his military judgment. The results were, Spain lost, the frontier of the South threatened, and the most powerful means of negotiation with England annulled; since in the present state of affairs it was no longer sufficient merely to resign Spain, other and fresh sacrifices must be added to those demanded by Austria, peace more difficult than ever, and newly-inspired confidence and assurance in those who thought the time was come for the humiliation of France. The errors were not only those which we have just enumerated, which were but too real, but also those which M. Clarke gratuitously ascribed to the unhappy Joseph and the still more unhappy Jourdan, the chief of his staff. The minister of war had not said that the orders of Napoleon to destroy the guerilla bands and to menace Portugal, orders deplorably repented by the offices at Paris, had been designated by Jourdan as an inevitable cause of disaster, that

the resistance of the administration of each army to the commander-in-chief had been also denounced as another serious inconvenience, preventing the necessary preparation for the resumption of operations. The same minister had not said that the English amounted to nearly 100,000 men and the French to no more than 50,000. On the contrary, he presented estimates which would scarcely have been received by the least-informed gazettes. In Wellington's army he reckoned only the English, whom he estimated at 40,000 or 45,000, omitted the Portuguese, who had become nearly equal to the English, and the Spaniards, excellent soldiers in the mountains, and ascribed to the French army not the number which they actually possessed on the field, but that which they might have had if the orders from Paris had not scattered them, and assigned to them 60,000 or 90,000 against 45,000. He had, in fact, the assurance, after the disaster at Vittoria, to write to Joseph that he must have had 90,000 men against 45,000, and that it was astonishing that he could be beaten while he possessed such a numerical superiority. This fact alone gives some idea of what might take place with Napoleon himself when he no longer beheld things with his own eyes, but derived his information from courtiers who withheld from him whatever might be disagreeable to hear.

We may readily understand that Napoleon, considering on one hand the results, and on the other the true and imaginary errors ascribed to Joseph, who already displeased him greatly, and who had a formidable accuser in Marshal Soult at Dresden, should be highly irritated. He had learned in a summary manner the events of Spain, at the moment of leaving for Dresden to enter on the military career which we have detailed. He learned successively at Toros, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg the detail of these events, always by the reports of M. Clarke. His rage was, therefore, extreme, and it vented itself in exclamations against Joseph and all his brothers. The abdication of Louis, the threatened defection of Murat, the ostentatious desertion of the army by Jerome the preceding year, all rushed upon his mind, and drew forth the bitterest expressions. The time was now come to see the fault he had committed in wishing to subvert all dynasties and to substitute his own. But, to be just, it must be acknowledged that his ambition had, much more than that of his brothers, contributed to this disordered policy, and that after having given them thrones or armies he had omitted nothing that could add to the essential difficulty of their tasks. He had, in fact, demanded of them the renunciation of the interests of their subjects, the art of doing every thing with nothing or almost nothing, which it was cruel to exact of them, and which was destined to occasion more than one family quarrel, as in the abdication of the King of Holland. With respect to Joseph in particular, after having withdrawn him from Naples, where he had a task congenial to his character and talents, where he rendered a small nation happy by being happy himself, Napoleon had transported him to Spain, almost without consulting him, had there plunged him into a frightful war, had assisted him for a moment with all his forces, then, preoccupied by the Austrian war in 1806 and the Russian war



in 1812, had left him without aid, without money, exposed to the hatred of his subjects, to the disobedience and sometimes the insolence of his generals, had listened to none of his opinions, which were almost all justified by the event, and, as the only reply to them, had continually ridiculed his military pretensions and his manners, in scoffs which from the court of France resounded to the court of Spain and contributed to the contempt exhibited to the newly-created royalty. Yet Napoleon loved his family, but, spoiled by unrestrained power, he paid no more regard to the rights of his brothers than to those of the nations, and he disposed of them as of inanimate objects, until he found the nations revolted and even his brothers in a state of defection.

His treatment of Joseph was extremely rigorous. "I have too long endangered my interests for the sake of imbeciles," he wrote to Cambacérès, to the minister of war, and to the minister of police; and after this preamble he gave orders respecting Joseph of the severest and most humiliating character. To replace him in Spain he selected the person whom he knew to be most disagreeable to him, viz., Marshal Soult, who was at that moment at Dresden. Napoleon conferred on him the title of his lieutenant in Spain, with extraordinary powers, ordered him to leave immediately, to remain in Paris no more than twelve hours, there to see only the arch-chancellor Cambacérès and the minister of war, and then to repair to Bayonne to rally the army and withstand the English. Thus far all was natural. But he required Joseph to leave Spain instantly, forbade him to visit Paris, and ordered him to retire to Morfontaine, there to seclude himself, to see no one, charged Cambacérès to forbid all the high functionaries to visit him, as if there were some generous emotions on their part to fear, and to all these orders he added one to arrest him if they should be infringed. Having lost confidence in men ever since he had lost confidence in fortune, he everywhere perceived plots against the regency of his wife and the authority of his son. For these reasons he had not allowed the Duke of Otranto, Marshal Soult, to remain at Paris, but had kept him unemployed at Dresden, under various pretexts. The angry mind of Napoleon was haunted with the ill-omened visions of Joseph malcontent at Paris, and surrounded with malcontents, and possibly at some time disputing the regency of Maria Louisa, which dictated the unnecessary order to arrest his own brother. Certainly, if Joseph had been capable of these dark designs, he would have begun by disobeying him in Spain, and probably he would then have been more useful to him than by servilely executing the orders given from too remote a distance under the dominion of fatal distraction. Common sense present at the field of action, and exclusively devoted to the one object, is often of more value than genius at a distance occupied by extravagant enterprises.

If the events of Spain, which were about to raise the demands of Napoleon's enemies, had at the same time rendered him more reasonable and conciliating, it might be said that a great misfortune had been converted into a great advantage: but it was far otherwise. After having visited Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg, reviewed certain corps which he wished to in-

spect, and ordered the works he had projected on the Elbe, Napoleon returned to Dresden, there to continue the formidable game of losing time in order to reach the close of the armistice without having given any explanation on the conditions of peace, and thus to obtain a further suspension of arms by pretending at the last moment to negotiate seriously. Prussia and Russia had chosen their plenipotentiaries and sent them to Prague, where they had arrived on the 11th of July, one day before the time assigned for the meeting of the congress. Neither of those powers had made the distinguished selection which had been expected. It had been believed that Prussia would appoint the Chancellor de Hardenberg, and Russia M. de Nesselrode. But from a regard to England those powers had avoided giving too much éclat to the congress; they had wished to appear there as if under the guidance of Austria, by sending no one who could be put on a level with M. de Metternich. Prussia had chosen M. de Humboldt, a name already famous in science, but little known as yet in politics, (the Prussian plenipotentiary was the brother of the learned man who is one of the glories of the age.) Russia had chosen Baron d'Anstett, an Alsatian, (and consequently a Frenchman,) belonging to an eminent family, a man of some intelligence but little weight, and whose sentiments were very hostile to France. Though this selection was rather displeasing, since the real intention was to leave every thing to M. de Metternich, it was necessary to make account of him alone, without any regard to his co-operators. These two negotiators, immediately on reaching Prague, had communicated their powers to the mediator, and they complained of the little respect shown them by making them wait without even announcing the day of the arrival of the French plenipotentiaries. On the 15th of July nothing had been said, and M. de Narbonne—having returned to Prague as ambassador, and also designated as one of our plenipotentiaries, though without having yet received either powers or instructions—knew not what language to hold nor what attitude to assume. To all the remonstrances of M. de Metternich transmitted to Dresden, M. de Bassano had replied that the fault lay with the Austrian cabinet, which had allowed the Emperor Napoleon to leave for Magdeburg without officially communicating the ratification of the new convention prolonging the armistice till August 16. To this reproach, M. de Metternich had replied that, having made known this ratification, they might, while awaiting the official communication, have named the plenipotentiaries, and despatched them, which would at least have fulfilled the requirements of courtesy, which bind great states as well as individuals. Without attending to this reply, M. de Bassano had again thrown all upon M. de Metternich.

Napoleon having returned from Dresden on the 15th, after a journey of five days, and having at length received the ratification of the new convention by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, he could no longer defer the nomination of his plenipotentiaries. He, consequently, charged MM. de Narbonne and de Caulaincourt to represent him at the Congress of Prague. It was impossible to select wiser, more enlightened, or more noble-minded men. In naming M. de

Caulaincourt, Napoleon cherished the secret hope of a direct intercourse with Russia, and of a treaty of peace which, by sacrificing Germany to the two great empires of the East and West, would at once satisfy Russia and France, a melancholy peace, which might perhaps flatter the self-love of Napoleon, but could by no means satisfy the real interest of his empire. Though this seemed very improbable, to judge from the selection of M. d'Anstett, yet Napoleon did not altogether despair, and it was perhaps the only condition on which he would have consented to a serious negotiation. M. de Caulaincourt, though made the tool of these illusions, by no means participated in them. That excellent and highly intelligent citizen possessed the rare virtue, though desirous to please, of risking giving displeasure by speaking the truth, and was thus a singular example of an honest courtier who disregards the most envied favours of the court, when, by so doing, he can protect his prince from an error or avert a calamity from his country. He had said to Napoleon that a crafty peace, obtained by the defection of any of the parties, was not to be expected in the present state of firm alliance between the cabinets, that Russia would not allow herself to be detached from Austria, that the favour which he had personally enjoyed with Alexander would be of no service in this matter, that the concessions demanded by Austria were the only means of attaining an honourable peace, that such a peace was indispensable, that he entreated not to be sent to Prague with his hands bound, there to experience the grief of seeing the opportunity lost of serving and saving his country. He had even gone so far as to declare that he would not accept the mission unless he were allowed sufficient latitude. Napoleon, who had need of M. de Caulaincourt's name to give respect to a feigned negotiation, had promised him extended powers, and the illustrious negotiator, in the faith of these promises, had submitted to his master's will.

The selection of these two persons gained universal approbation, and in some degree corrected the bad impression made at Prague by our continual delays. Though now the 16th of July, and only thirty days remained for negotiation, every thing might yet be saved, when an unfortunate incident furnished Napoleon with the specious pretext which he sought for further delay. There were at Neumarkt certain commissaries of the belligerent parties formed into a permanent commission for the daily regulation of any thing that concerned the execution of the armistice. When the French commissary had communicated to them the last convention, which prolonged the armistice to August 10, with a delay of six days between the termination of the armistice and the resumption of hostilities, which fixed the renewal of this unhappy war for the 17th, the Prussian and Russian commissaries appeared to receive the information for the first time, and to be much astonished at the statement. After having referred to the head-quarters of the allies, they had received from Barclay de Tolly, the commander-in-chief, the confirmation of the convention, and at the same time the declaration that hostilities might recommence, not on the 17th, but on the 10th. This declaration was equally strange and unforeseen. According to the real sense of the

convention, the armistice could not be declared at an end before August 10, and if in fact then denounced, it was requisite, in accordance with the first convention and with all regular proceedings, that some interval should elapse between that declaration and the actual resumption of hostilities. This interval, which was determined to be six days in the first convention, ought by right to exist in the second, an interpretation supported by custom, by the intention of the contracting parties, and by the text. The cause of the mistake which was to furnish Napoleon with such fatal pretext was as follows: The two sovereigns of Prussia and Russia were surrounded by men of such ardent minds that they had been brought with difficulty to allow the former armistice, however much they required it. They had been unable to refuse the second at the request of M. de Metternich: however, while consenting they had scarcely ventured to acknowledge it, and the Emperor Alexander, when leaving for Trachenberg, when a general conference of the chiefs of the coalition was to be held, had said to General Barclay de Tolly, without entering into details, that he had consented to an armistice till August 14, but not a day longer. By thus expressing himself generally, the Emperor Alexander had only spoken of the principal delay, but had not intended to exclude the six days' interval. But Barclay de Tolly, who carried to excess the exact observation of forms, had yielded to no representation, and had declared that he would not undertake the solution of such a difficulty without reference to the Emperor Alexander himself.

Napoleon, on learning this singular dispute, was much displeased, for he felt that the result might be of serious consequence, and thought it possible that the allies aimed at depriving him of seven days, which he regarded as very important, for with his present activity every hour was of value. But, upon reflection, and recalling his discussions with M. de Metternich and the calculations they had made together in reference to time, he was no longer able to retain any doubt on the interpretation of the second convention, and, far from being disturbed by the incident, he resolved to turn it to his own advantage, and make it a new and plausible excuse for the loss of some additional days. He immediately intimated through M. de Narbonne, at Prague, that a strange incident having occurred at Neumarkt, the meaning of the convention, in virtue of which they were about to meet and negotiate, being contested, it was consistent neither with his dignity nor safety to treat with persons who took such a view of their engagements; and that, before despatching M. de Caulaincourt, he demanded a categorical explanation of that which had been said by General Barclay de Tolly. M. de Narbonne, one of the two French plenipotentiaries, having already reached Prague, all the requirements of courtesy had been fulfilled on his part, and the second French plenipotentiary might well delay his departure until a perfectly satisfactory explanation had been given.

When this new difficulty became known at Prague on the 18th of July, by a despatch which left Dresden on the 17th, it produced a powerful and very natural impression. The two plenipotentiaries, Russian and Prussian, professed to

be much more irritated and offended than they really were. But M. de Metternich was in consternation, and the Emperor Francis was deeply wounded. Each desired peace on the terms described, though the Emperor believed in its possibility less than his minister, and each loss of a chance in concluding it caused them sincere regret. Moreover, they were humiliated by the part assigned them. The enemies of their policy of mediation ridiculed them, and were pleased to say that, as a reward of their pacific efforts, Napoleon would not even send them a negotiator, and that these contrivers of the Prague Congress, far from conducting it with skill, could not even bring the members together. This melancholy prognostic of the war-party seemed to be nearly realized, for already, on the most futile pretext, that the ratification of the second convention, though communicated in courtesy, had not been communicated officially, Napoleon had lost five or six days; now, on an equally frivolous pretext, because the commissaries of Neumarcht, mere executive agents without any moral authority, raised a difficulty in the interpretation of a text of which they were ignorant, they were to lose some days more. 'And when they had twenty days before them,—twenty-seven days, including the delay in question,—to sacrifice five or six on every occasion was an obvious but offensive farce. And the most serious feature in the transaction was not the loss of time, for if they were willing to come to a mutual understanding, two days would suffice; the most serious was the disposition of Napoleon thus revealed. From his thus trifling with his adversaries and the mediator, he was evidently not desirous of peace, and, after having obtained the time he had so eagerly desired and so diligently employed, he took no pains to conceal his duplicity. Such was the language, unfortunately too well founded, of the war-party everywhere, carefully calculated to wound and annoy the Emperor Francis and his minister.

M. de Metternich met M. de Narbonne, and exhibited the greatest distress. "The new difficulty which you raise," he said, "is no more serious than the preceding. We had announced to you in a friendly way the express ratification of the convention, in virtue of which the armistice was prolonged to August 16; you, therefore, could not doubt of the fact, and there was no reason to defer the nomination and mission of your plenipotentiaries, when those of the other belligerent parties were to be here on the 12th, and actually arrived on the 11th. To-day, the commissaries of Neumarcht, who are nothing, and who are all instigated by the passions common to the staff, pretend to interpret a text with which they are unacquainted, and you profess to regard the matter in a serious light, and to be alarmed. Your alarm cannot be real. Do you believe that hostilities would be renewed against our will, and consequently against yours? Can you really believe this? Certainly not. If so, where is the difficulty? An insignificant difficulty which we might have made the subject of discussion at the first meeting of the plenipotentiaries, and upon which you would have had the favourable opinion of two plenipotentiaries, the Prussian and the Russian, and the decisive opinion of the mediator, whose opinion, indeed, you already know. It was, therefore,

not worth while to lose several days more when scarcely twenty remained before August 10. In this conduct we can only see one thing, which is the desire of the Emperor Napoleon to bring us in this manner to the close of the armistice without any thing being effected. But let him not deceive himself: he will not succeed in prolonging the armistice by a single day. From the difficulties which you meet at Neumarcht, you may judge of those which we have had to overcome in order to procure a first prolongation. Be assured that you will not obtain a second. Nor let the Emperor be deceived upon another still more important point. As soon as the 10th of August shall have arrived, there will not be one word of peace; war will be certainly declared. We shall not remain neutral; let him not flatter himself that we shall. After having employed all imaginable means to reduce him to reasonable conditions, which he knows well, and which he has known from the first day, in which we have been able to make no change, for they constitute the only tolerable condition of Europe, nothing remains for us, if he refuse them, but to assume the part of belligerents ourselves. If we remain neuter, as he in heart desires, the allies will have been beaten, we doubt not; but our turn will come afterwards, and we shall have deserved it. We shall, therefore, not be guilty of this error. At present, whatever you may say, we are free. I give you my word, and that of my sovereign, that we are pledged to no one in any manner. But I also give you my word that by midnight of August 10 we shall be pledged to all the world excepting yourselves, and that on the morning of the 17th you will have 300,000 Austrians in addition on your hands. It is not lightly, nor without grief, that the Emperor my master has adopted this resolution, for he is a father and he loves his daughter; but he owes to his people, to himself, and to Europe, to restore a stable condition to all,—since he has the means of so doing, and since, besides, the alternative would be to fall beneath your blows, some days later, into a state of dependence worse than that in which you had placed Prussia. Certainly, we know the chance we run in risking to fight Napoleon at the head of French armies, even though our numbers be great; but, after much reflection, we prefer that risk to disgrace or slavery. Let us not, then, be told after the event that we deceived you. Every thing is possible till midnight of August 10, even till the latest hour; but, that day passed, not a day, not an hour, of respite, war, war with every one, ourselves included." M. de Narbonne, struck by this language, calm, sorrowful, and elevated, said to M. de Metternich, "What! not a moment of respite, even if the negotiation should have begun?" "On one condition only," replied M. de Metternich, "which is, that the basis of the peace should be admitted wholly, and that nothing should remain but to regulate the details."

M. de Narbonne, who had quite accurately appreciated the state of affairs, and who plainly saw that he could no longer play with time and men, that by so doing they deceived no one but themselves, wrote to M. de Bassano that it was necessary either to decide upon certain war with all Europe, or, if they were willing to have peace with some modification of the conditions, to ne-

gotiate seriously, and, even if they merely wished a prolongation of the armistice, not to seem to trifle with those with whom they were treating. He, therefore, requested that M. de Caulaincourt should be despatched, for the Prussian and Russian negotiators every day threatened to withdraw, (which they had every right to do, since they had now waited from July 11 to July 20,) and if they were to leave Prague all would be at an end. Scarcely should they obtain for the honour of the allies that the armistice should be observed till the 17th of August, and if obtained it would be due only to the prudence and moderation of Austria.

These prudent counsels, dictated by a perfect acquaintance with the state of things, affected M. de Bassano little and Napoleon less. The latter, though determined on war rather than on the conditions brought by M. de Bubna, and flattering himself with his new preparations to fight all the allies, Austria included, was not indifferent to the hope of a further prolongation of the armistice, and his ardent desire strengthened the unreasonable hope. He, indeed, doubted his power to bring over Prussia and Russia to that prolongation in their present temper; but there was a better plan for him than to delay hostilities with all the powers, which was to allow them to begin with Russia and Prussia and to defer them with Austria for some days, which would give him the time to destroy the two former and then to fall upon Austria, who would *have her turn*, as M. de Metternich had well said. There was one way to succeed in this, which was, by opening the negotiation toward the end of the armistice, so as to give some hopes to M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis that they could negotiate while fighting, which was possible, having occurred on several occasions, and which would probably retard the entrance of Austria on the field, for while there was any chance of the conditions being accepted it was likely that she would not enter upon war with France. His real thought, therefore, was not to obtain a new armistice which should arrest the operations of all Europe, but a negotiation continued during hostilities, which, for a few days, should restrain the arm of Austria. But in order to this something must be done, and Napoleon, notwithstanding the doubt remaining at Neumarkt, in which he did not participate, despatched to M. de Narbonne his powers and instructions which had been detained till that period, with the power granted to each of the two French plenipotentiaries to treat in the absence of the other. From this time the negotiation could not be said to be suspended, since M. de Narbonne, by himself, had authority to begin it and to conduct it to a termination. But however the merit of M. de Narbonne might be appreciated in Austria and throughout Europe, the Duke of Vicenza (M. de Caulaincourt) was considered to be the only person really acquainted with the ideas of Napoleon, and so long as he had not reached Prague the negotiation was hardly considered to be serious. On this point, Napoleon repeated that as soon as the enigma of Neumarkt should be explained, he would send the Duke of Vicenza, and in order to present a specious motive for attaching so much importance to what was said by the commissaries at Neumarkt, he wrote to M. de Metternich that, as he communicated by their means

with the blockaded fortresses of Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic, both for correspondence and provisions, he required a clear and positive explanation, and only delayed the departure of the Duke of Vicenza till that should be obtained.

M. de Bassano, constantly forming himself on the model of his master, and imitating his culpable but heroic indifference in the midst of danger, wrote to M. de Narbonne as follows:—"I send you more *powers* than *power*: you will have your hands tied, but your feet and mouth at liberty to walk and dine." Such was the tone assumed by the French minister at the moment of deciding the fate of his master and his country!

After indulging in this play of words, M. de Bassano allowed M. de Narbonne to proceed to the exchange of powers, adhering to the same mode of negotiating as previously insisted on. He was, accordingly, to offer the exchange of powers in a common conference, and, after that formality, to propose the discussion of matters in conferences at which all the plenipotentiaries should be present, in sight of the mediator, who should be thus the witness and a party in the negotiations, but not the exclusive medium. He was then to propose the drawing up of protocols which should assure the authenticity of the conferences. All these questions of *form* being settled, which could not fail to occupy a considerable time, M. de Narbonne was ordered to present as the first basis of negotiation the *uti possidetis*, i.e. the retention of what each possessed in the present state of the war, as if none of the events of 1812 and 1813 had taken place.

The mere question of form must occupy a long time, for on this question the allies were resolved, and to insist upon it would have been to risk the loss of several months when they had only eighteen days. M. de Metternich, in fact, when he learned that M. de Narbonne had received his powers, was only partially consoled for the absence of the Duke of Vicenza, especially when he knew that M. de Narbonne wished to present and exchange his powers in a general meeting of the plenipotentiaries, communicating under the presidency of the mediator, but not confining themselves to him as their only medium of intercourse. This last point, as we have said, had acquired great importance, since Napoleon had plainly indicated, by selecting M. de Caulaincourt, his intention of coming into direct communication with Russia at the expense of Austria. From this moment, Prussia and Russia, to avoid the suspicion of entering into Napoleon's design, and still more of supporting it, affected to hold more than even Austria, by a form of negotiation which should cause every thing to be conducted by the intervention of a mediator. Thus MM. de Humboldt and Anstett, particularly the latter, hastened to transmit their powers to M. de Metternich, and consented to consign them to him alone. M. de Metternich, being at ease with respect to direct negotiation between Russia and France, which he wished to set at rest by going to Prague, would have acquiesced in this question of form in the desire of Russia, simply to insure the commencement of negotiation; but that no longer depended on him, for Russia and France were more eager that he

should be satisfied than was necessary. Accordingly, he did not fail to say to M. de Narbonne that for his part he would willingly consent to this exchange of powers executed in common, but that already the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries had remitted to him their powers directly, and had thus become accredited, and that certainly they would never retrace their steps, were it merely from self-respect. He proposed to them, in fact, to yield upon this point, but he was refused, and, notwithstanding the credentials sent to M. de Narbonne, the negotiation did not advance a step. M. de Metternich again expressed his regret to M. de Narbonne, and repeated that the evil was not irreparable till August 10 at midnight, after which it could not be remedied.

During this unprofitable correspondence, Napoleon, no longer indulging any illusion on the possibility of a separate negotiation with Russia, thought only of retaining Austria in a state of inactivity for a few days after the 17th of August, in order to have time to overwhelm the Prussians and Russians in the first instance, and then to engage the Austrians, if they should be so blind as to be deceived by him. He thought little of peace, being determined on no consideration to abandon the Hanse towns constitutionally annexed to the Empire, nor to renounce the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, which he had hitherto borne with ostentation, nor to reconstitute Prussia immediately after her defection. Each of these sacrifices was most painful to him; yet it was not possible, even after the triumphs of Lutzen and Bautzen, that the terrible catastrophe of 1812 should be without consequences, if not to France, at least to himself; and it was necessary that he should know how to atone for his error by some personal inconvenience. He ought to have esteemed himself happy, after such great misfortunes, to be punished only in his pride, and to be called upon to sacrifice nothing which France could really regret; for, as we have already said, but which may well be repeated, when he was allowed to retain, besides the Alps and the Rhine, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome, as French departments, Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples as principalities of his family, more was granted to him than France ought to desire or than she could possess. Here are suggested some reflections which, though previously indicated, should be more powerfully recalled at the decisive moment in order justly to appreciate the resolutions of Napoleon. If we examine his territorial pretensions in detail, we perceive how unreasonable it was to adhere to them. Holland itself, which was the least unreasonable of the whole, could not without great difficulty be annexed materially and morally to the empire. Assuming what had been taken by Napoleon from King Louis, in 1810, to punish his obstinacy, *i.e.* the part situated to the left of the Wahal,—which is the true Rhine, and constitutes the most powerful barrier,—they would have acquired all that was desirable as regards the frontiers, though the serious moral difficulty would remain of dividing so homogeneous a country as Holland, all the parts of which are so intimately and essentially combined. As to the part beyond the Wahal, extending to the Texel, and comprising Gorcum, Nimeguen,

Utrecht, Rotterdam, the Hague, Amsterdam, the Texel, *i.e.* the greater Holland, it was impossible to annex it to the military geography of France, and Napoleon, in his most able combinations for the defence of the territory, had never been able to contrive any means of protecting the Zuyderzee and of establishing a solid frontier from Wesel to Groningen. Having only the weaker line of the Yssel to protect that part of Holland, he had perceived no other resource than inundations, which he had ordered; but a country which can only be guarded by sinking it under water it is inhuman and impolitic to think to retain. Having on the ocean La Rochelle, Brest, Cherbourg, Antwerp, and Flushing, Napoleon possessed all that he could desire in opposition to England, and these lands, half islands and half continent, extending from Nimeguen to Groningen, from Bergen-op-Zoom to the Texel, between land and sea, with an independent, haughty, wise, and wealthy population, full of traditions sufficiently glorious to prevent their confusion with those of any other nation, deserved to be left independent among all the powers of Europe, and to continue to be the widest and freest channel of maritime commerce. Even as to Piedmont, was it quite prudent to seek a territory beyond the Alps, *i.e.* beyond our natural frontiers, which should forever alienate from us the Italians, as the possession of Lombardy has alienated Austria, bringing us hatred instead of influence, and destined to elude our grasp inevitably during the first feeble reign? However, in a system of greatness after the model of Charlemagne, which in modern times is a pure anachronism, for when Charlemagne reigned upon the continent from the Elbe to the Ebro he embraced in his vast states countries half savage, without any historic existence,—in such a system the addition of Holland might be conceived a sort of maritime appendix to our territory, as Piedmont is a continental appendix useful to any one who might wish frequently to descend from the Alps. But even in this false system what had Tuscany and Rome to do? What Illyria, Hamburg, and Lubeck? Such a system was merely a series of senseless augmentations, without plan and without limit, which might last during the life of a conqueror such as Attila or Alexander, but which must at his death give place to a division of territories among his lieutenants or neighbours. With such a system, which, resting on no political principle, could have no territorial limit, in which every thing might be included but nothing kept, it was impossible to say that the empire of Napoleon was truly less because Hamburg or Lubeck was not comprised. Napoleon was quite as much Charlemagne without those towns as with them, for he who, besides Brussels, Antwerp, Flushing, Cologne, Mentz, and Strasbourg, had also Utrecht, Amsterdam, the Texel, Turin, Florence, and Rome, without reckoning Cassel, Milan, and Naples, was as great, perhaps even greater than Charlemagne, in that style of fabulous greatness which was appropriate to the ninth century but not to the nineteenth, and which saw Charlemagne inevitably succeeded by Louis le Debonnaire. It is inconceivable that while the main part of this chimerical greatness was accorded to Napoleon he should risk it for Hamburg, Lubeck, or a vain title such as that of

Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. No doubt, if the honour of his arms were compromised, it may be seen why he would not yield, for it is better to lose provinces than the honour of our arms, which is of greater value to the dignity and safety of a great empire; but after Lutzer and Bautzen, where mere children had avenged the misfortune of our old soldiers, the honour of our arms was safe; true greatness, to an exaggerated and even useless degree, was likewise safe; pride only was at stake! And to this personal feeling, melancholy to say, Napoleon was ready to sacrifice not only the solid greatness of France, that which she had acquired without his aid during the Revolution, but that factitious and fabulous greatness which he had added by his prodigious exploits! To this sentiment he was about to sacrifice his wife, his son, and himself!

However, these questions affected him deeply, and though, with his extraordinary faculty of occupying himself with multitudinous labours, he succeeded in retaining a serene countenance, and, full of his vast and profound military conceptions, he maintained his self-confidence, he was, nevertheless, sometimes troubled, and thought incessantly on the weighty subject which we have now detailed. Ever in motion around Dresden, and, notwithstanding his commencing corpulence, making excursions of thirty or forty leagues a day, one-half on horseback, studying along the frontiers of Bohemia the battle-fields which were soon to flow with blood, bringing his generals there with him, and sometimes sending them thither without him to study the ground, he was ever occupied with the same thoughts, and both on the road and on his return to Dresden he conferred with the men of all professions who followed him in his campaigns. Though absolute in power, his penetration made him dependent on those who surrounded him, for it was impossible for him to see disapprobation expressed in their countenances without the desire to overcome it, which was often a work of much difficulty. Though, in fact, very submissive and well disposed to please him, the sense of danger gave license to the tongues of the more courageous and saddened the countenances of the more timid.

Each in his place, as soldier or civilian, perceived what in the situation concerned himself, and revealed the dangers which struck him most forcibly. The military men, who had considered the position of the Elbe as excellent when they had only to do with the Prussians and Russians, were alarmed, when there was a risk of engaging with the Austrians also, to find themselves on the Elbe exposed to be turned by them in the direction of Bohemia, and thus to have the enemy on our rear between us and Thuringia. Politicians clearly saw Austria led away by the patriotic spirit of Germany, and, urged by her own interest, ready to imitate Prussia and to complete the union of all states against us; and they beheld us reduced to struggle against Europe excited by hatred, while France was dejected by fatigue: thus, all were of opinion to admit the mediation and its conditions whatever they might be, even though less advantageous than they really were. Undoubtedly they would on no consideration have allowed France to be deprived of her natural frontiers; but if it had been told them that, di-

rectly or indirectly, she should have Mentz, Cologne, Antwerp, Flushing, Amsterdam, the Texel, Cassel, Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples, they would on their knees have entreated Napoleon to accept the offer. But they were left ignorant of the real state of things; vague expressions were uttered in their presence of dishonourable sacrifices, and, without knowing precisely what these were, they nevertheless supposed that France was still sufficiently formidable to forbid any proposal short of her natural frontiers, and on this supposition, which was far short of the reality, they preferred the sacrifice of vanity to the danger of a frightful struggle against combined Europe.

Both politicians and military men spoke among themselves on this subject, either in their bivouacs or in the ante-chambers of Napoleon, were silent when he approached, and even sometimes only partially checked themselves, to give him an opportunity of renewing the conversation if he should condescend to continue it with them, which he seldom neglected. He was never at a loss with the military, for if they were in the right in pointing out the boldness of our position on the Elbe, where we might be turned on the side of Bohemia in case of war with Austria, they were wrong in proposing, as many did, the short line of the Saale, which embraced only the space comprised between Hof and Magdeburg, which it was easy to form at all points, and in danger of being turned toward Bavaria as the line of the Elbe was toward Bohemia. By adopting this line they would have been thrown back upon the Rhine in eight days, and it would have been strangely inconsistent to have abandoned in action what they had obstinately and rashly defended in negotiation. There was no middle course; either it was necessary to renounce Germany immediately, and to accept the conditions of M. de Metternich, or if it were contended for in diplomacy it should also be contended for in arms, and this could be only done upon the Elbe. But, placed at Dresden, with Konigsberg on his right, and Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg on his left, able to destroy any that should attempt to turn him,—as he did shortly after at Dresden,—Napoleon had still great chances in his favour. There remained, indeed, the danger involved in fighting so far from the Rhine against all Europe,—and, if any one of his lieutenants should be weak or unskilful in the vast line from Konigsberg to Hamburg, the risk of finding himself isolated in the midst of Germany in arms; but then it was necessary to have the good sense to recognise and the courage to say that the error of Napoleon was one of policy, and to advise him to relinquish Germany, which would certainly secure an immediate and glorious peace. For want of placing the question in this light, they gave Napoleon the advantage, for if he wished to keep Germany it could be defended only on the Elbe. Accordingly, in their numerous conversations, Prince Berthier, Marshals Soult, Ney, and Mortier, not venturing to maintain resolutely the necessity of falling back upon the Rhine, were open to complete refutation when they proposed any lines intermediate between the Elbe and the Rhine, were overcome by the stringent logic of Napoleon, and held their peace, while they re-

tained the conviction of great danger, for there was really great danger in contending with Europe, not upon the Rhine for the legitimate defence of our soil, but upon the Elbe for the ambitious idea of universal dominion. It was otherwise when the purely political question of peace or war was discussed. Here Napoleon clearly perceived himself to be in the wrong, for he had no good reason to adduce. He did not speak the truth; spoke vaguely of sacrifices which, though moderate at first, apparently, would soon become, if allowed, excessive and intolerable, and allowed men to understand, without expressly saying it, that Austria had the boldness to demand Italy from him. He then became angry, spoke of the honour of the Empire, and exclaimed that it would be better to die than to endure such conditions, especially from Austria, who, after having given him an archduchess in marriage and accepted his alliance in 1812, took advantage of his first reverse to turn against him; as if such conduct, supposing it to be such as that described by Napoleon, would have been criminal in a power which, for a long time beaten and robbed of a great part of her states, seized the opportunity of recovering what she could, especially from a conqueror who acknowledged no limits nor moderation! Those who opposed him, ignorant of the real character of the negotiations, supposing the sacrifices demanded to be greater than they really were, granting that it was difficult to yield, especially to those who, as it were, laid a snare for us, fell back upon the absolute necessity of peace, and here their advantage was indisputable. Napoleon found in M. de Caulaincourt a constant advocate of peace, who entreated him incessantly not to resist the storm, and to put up with an annoyance in order to save France, the army, himself, and his son. In this courageous and patriotic task, M. de Caulaincourt was indefatigable, and he renewed it with admirable perseverance. M. de Caulaincourt had found a singular auxiliary in the Duke of Otranto, M. Fouché, who, though seeking to regain the lost imperial favour, did not hesitate, instigated by his good sense, and perhaps also by the danger threatened to all the revolutionists by the fall of the Empire, to maintain boldly that it was necessary to conclude a peace. In his opinion, to know the nature of that peace was not in question; this belonged to the secret instructions of the plenipotentiaries appointed by Napoleon; but, after Lutzen and Bautzen, he felt assured that public opinion and the fear still excited by the power of France would insure honourable conditions, and if, as every thing led to suppose, they conceded to France any territory beyond the Rhine and the Alps; they conceded more than France either required or desired. It was, therefore, right to sign the offered peace, leaving open the questions of detail; for Europe was exasperated, and France herself, in her exhausted condition, began to share the exasperation of Europe against a system which was alike ruinous to the conqueror and the conquered. In one of these conversations, in which were present M. Daru, M. de Caulaincourt, M. de Bassano, and even the King of Saxony, M. Fouché ventured to say to Napoleon that if he did not grant peace immediately he would soon become hateful to France, and would endanger not only himself,

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but his son and his dynasty; that if he did not seize this last opportunity of laying down arms he would be ruined; that France had been induced by honour to make a last effort, being unwilling to retire conquered from the great battle of Europe; but that after the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen she considered her honour redeemed, and would be satisfied with the conditions of retaining the Rhine and the Alps, which no one, not even England, contested; but that if, notwithstanding the manifest possibility of signing such a peace, war were continued, she would consider herself sacrificed to a system personal to Napoleon, an insane system which she hated as much as the rest of Europe, for no country suffered from it more severely.

These bold assertions irritated Napoleon exceedingly. His only answer was that they were unacquainted with the secret of the negotiations; that the demands of the belligerent powers were inadmissible; that if he should grant them, Europe would regard him as so greatly weakened that she would soon exact all that he could not grant, and which none of his opponents would consent to grant; that in order to retain the necessary it was requisite to defend the superfluous, to exhibit himself as indomitable, to be willing to risk a battle or two more in order to retain a greatness acquired by the bloodshed of twenty years, and to face war for a few days longer to secure a true and solid peace. In short, in this conversation, as in all others on the same subject, his tact was to conceal the real facts; that in truth the only question concerned Hamburg and the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine; and to maintain that it was every thing or nothing; that it was necessary to defend every thing or to yield every thing; and as no one was disposed to yield every thing, he concluded that it was necessary to defend every thing. His power of mind and language sufficed to embarrass objectors, who, from ignorance of the state of the negotiations, were unable to reply, but not to convince them, and they remained, therefore, alarmed at the fatal resolution indicated by his attitude and language. They admired sometimes his indomitable decision while they hated his pride, and withdrew silent, dissatisfied, and, commonly, in despair. Only one among them appeared free from apprehension, and affirmed that the genius of the Emperor was inexhaustible in resources, that he would triumph over all his enemies, and would recover the power he possessed in 1810 and 1811 more firm than ever, or at least as firm. The reader will readily recognise in this person M. de Bassano, who was the less excusable from being in the secret, and alone knowing that all was risked merely for Hamburg and the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. It must be added, however, not to exaggerate his responsibility, which would be otherwise so weighty, that he exerted very little influence over the resolutions of Napoleon, who appeared to be wholly unaffected by his magnificent anticipations, and that he merely excited in M. de Caulaincourt very ill-concealed, and unflattering indications of impatience.

It was not only at Dresden that Napoleon had met this opposition, softened by temporary submission, but also at Paris. The Duke of Rovigo, minister of police, who understood public opinion better than any other man, and

feared little the outbursts of passion on the part of Napoleon, which he had become habituated to disregard, had frequently ventured to write to him what none of his ministers had ventured to say, viz., that peace was urgent and even indispensable; that he must not expect from France, exhausted as she was, a new effort such as that she had just made; that all the enemies of government, hitherto dispirited and dispersed, were now resuming hope and courage; that the revolutionists, long kept down by the remembrance of 1793, the Bourbons, long and completely forgotten, were attempting to revive; that the latter were even disseminating manifestoes, which were read without anger and even with some degree of interest. All these assertions were true, and it was plain that the idea of another government than that of Napoleon—an idea which for fourteen years had occurred to none, not even on his return from Moscow—was becoming familiar to many, and would become general if the war should continue; that as in 1799 men had sought in General Bonaparte a refuge against anarchy, so they would shortly seek in the Bourbons a refuge against a perpetual war. All this, more or less clearly and skilfully, had the minister of police endeavoured to convey to Napoleon with honourable boldness, which would have been of higher value had Napoleon attached more importance to what came from that source. Prince Cambacérès would not have ventured to say so much, though he even thought more, because from him Napoleon would have taken it more seriously, though perhaps on that account less patiently. But, weary of the Duke of Rovigo's letters, Napoleon ordered Prince Cambacérès to tell him that they annoyed him, that by showing so great a desire for peace he injured him more than he served him; that such a course rendered his enemies more exacting, by supporting the idea that France could no longer continue the war; that he (Napoleon) was the only judge of the manner of giving peace to France with security and honour; that the Duke of Rovigo, by meddling in the matter, meddled with what he knew nothing about; in short, that he must hold his tongue, for indiscretion of that nature could not be longer tolerated.

This severe reprimand was not calculated to frighten or discourage the Duke of Rovigo, for the irritation of Napoleon affected him as little as his policy affected Napoleon, and he shortly made another attempt, not indeed more successful, but one which proves how universal was the desire of peace, since it could penetrate that despotism which then weighed so heavily upon the whole of France.

Napoleon, after having shut the mouth of the Duke of Rovigo, gave an office to the Duke of Otranto. He had already found one for Marshal Soult in Spain, and he found one for the Duke of Otranto by a sad and remarkable accident. The unfortunate Junot had never recovered his physical and moral powers since the wound he had received in the head in Portugal. In the campaign of Russia he had not evinced his wonted ardour, though he had been less blameworthy than was supposed, and he had received reproaches from Napoleon which had contributed to deprive him of rea-

son. When sent to Laybach as Governor of Illyria, he had suddenly exhibited symptoms of insanity to such an extent as to render it necessary to seize him by force and to transport him to Burgundy, his native country, where he died. Napoleon named M. Fouché Governor of Illyria, a post little in accordance with the high position of that minister, but which he accepted, because he valued any method of returning to office. He was, in passing, to see M. de Metternich at Prague, and to profit by former relations to support the pretensions of France with that diplomatist. The means were slight in proportion to the object, and could not compensate the ill effect which would be produced in Austria by a nomination which showed little inclination on our part to renounce Illyria.

Napoleon, immovable, though sometimes agitated, persisted in his manner of negotiating, which, as we have seen, consisted in gaining time, either to obtain, if possible, a further prolongation of the armistice, or at least to defer for some weeks the active operations of Austria, or to break up the congress on some question of form, that he might not be forced to conform to Europe in general, and to France in particular, that he refused peace for the sake of Hamburg and the Protectorate of the Rhine. To succeed in these tactics, coincident with the opening of the negotiations, he made another journey which he had resolved to perform at the end of July, to see the Empress at Mentz, and which could only occasion new impediments to the progress of the negotiations. He had, in fact, appointed Maria Louisa to meet him at Mentz about July 26, when he proposed to remain some days with her, and to review the divisions intended to form the corps of Marshals St. Cyr and Augereau. On setting out, he left powers for M. de Caulaincourt, who was to repair to Prague as soon as a satisfactory reply should have been received from the commissaries met at Neumarcht relative to the precise time of the armistice; to these powers he added instructions, concerted with M. de Bassano, in order that M. de Caulaincourt, once at Prague, might speciously employ the six or eight days occupied by the journey to the Rhine. It was now July 24, and it was not supposed that the reply from Neumarcht could arrive before the 25th or 26th. M. de Caulaincourt was to begin his journey the next day, to spend a day or two in making acquaintance with the plenipotentiaries, then five or six in discussing the exchange of powers and the form of the conferences. If in his zeal for peace M. de Caulaincourt should become urgent, and demand authority from M. de Bassano to go a little further, M. de Bassano was to allow him to make some concessions relative to the exchange of powers and the form of negotiations, but with the express prohibition to enter upon the real question. It would be easy thus to gain till the 3d or 4th of August, when Napoleon would probably return to Dresden, and then he would himself trace the course they were to pursue.

After having drawn up M. de Caulaincourt's instructions in accordance with these principles, Napoleon made his arrangements for leaving on the evening of July 24. He at the same time forwarded some orders relative to



the army. It will readily be believed that the two months lost for the negotiations were not lost for military preparations. The infantry, well encamped, well fed, well exercised, had gained remarkably in many respects, particularly in numbers. The cavalry had completely changed its aspect: it was now numerous and well mounted. The young horses, almost all wounded at the beginning of the campaign, were in a better state. Our horsemen, so readily trained, could already use and tend their horses. Besides the light cavalry attached to each army, Napoleon had four fine corps of reserve cavalry under Generals Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, de Padua, and de Valmy. The Guard, formed of five infantry divisions, comprised also 12,000 horsemen and 200 well-served guns. Fifteen hundred guards of honour, under General Dejean, had arrived at Dresden. These brave young men, who had not left home in the best temper, when actually in line aspired only at distinction in the sight of the grand army. The corps of General Vandamme, which Napoleon had seen at Magdeburg, composed of young men but of the old cadres from Moscow, was in fine condition. The four divisions organized at Mentz, intended to come by Wurzburg, Hof, Freyberg, and Dresden, to take up their position at Konigstein, were marching towards that point, and presented a satisfactory appearance though filled with young men, like the rest of the army. Provisions, ordered from all quarters, were arriving by the Elbe at Dresden, where more than 50,000 quintals of grain and flour had been actually collected. The activity of Marshal Davout had, as it were, raised the defences of Hamburg from the ground. They now carried 200 guns in battery, and were soon to receive 300. Every thing, then, was being completed according to the views of Napoleon, and the progress of his designs little disposed him to peace, which authorized M. de Bassano to repeat on all occasions that the Emperor's forces were immense and his genius greater than ever, that Europe ought to tremble before them, and that it did not belong to the stronger party to make sacrifices to the weaker.

With the view of diffusing a little animation in his camps, where his young troops had remained idle for two months, with the exception of the hours devoted to manœuvres, Napoleon devised a species of exercise both attractive and useful. He ordered them to fire at the target; and, to give them greater interest in this important exercise, he ordered prizes to be distributed in proportion to their skill. The six best shots in each company were to receive a reward of four francs: these were to be then united with all of the same battalion, and to compete afresh for another prize of triple value. The prizemen of the battalions were to unite by regiments, those of regiments by divisions, those of divisions by corps d'armée, and again to compete for prizes increasing in value, so that the best shots in a corps d'armée might obtain prizes as high as 100 francs. These prizes involved an outlay of about 100,000 francs, which was a trifle, and this expenditure had, besides the invaluable advantage of improving their fire, that of occupying and amusing the men, and giv-

ing them the opportunity and the means of entertaining their companions. He also gave their pay to the officers, in order that they might enjoy their few remaining days of repose, which for many, alas! were the last of their lives. Napoleon's fate, August 16, was at hand. He appointed the celebration of it to take place on the 10th, that the period of rejoicings should not be too near the scenes of carnage which he foresaw on the renewal of hostilities on the 17th. On the 10th were to be held feasts in all the camps at his expense and to his honour. The officers were to dine with the marshals, the soldiers among themselves at tables in the open air. Wine was to be lavishly bestowed and drunk to the health of Napoleon or the triumph of the arms of France. Thus Napoleon sought in some degree to give an air of gaiety to war, and to mingle death with sports. On the 24th of July he left for Mentz, leaving behind him precautions and arrangements to meet every circumstance.

On the 26th, the commissioners of Neumarkt replied in a satisfactory manner in relation to the precise day for resuming hostilities, and it was agreed, after conference with the Emperor Alexander, and after some sharp remarks of M. de Metternich, that the commander-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly, had imperfectly understood his master, and that if the armistice should be denounced on August 10 it should expire on the 16th, which deferred the resumption of hostilities till the 17th. This misunderstanding, as we have seen, arose from a want of perspicuity in Alexander's explanation of a concession which embarrassed him with the war-party, and from the disinclination of the latter to interpret doubtful stipulations in a pacific sense. The Emperor Alexander was then at Trachenberg, a little town of Silesia, whither he had repaired from Reichenbach with the King of Prussia and the greater part of the generals of the coalition, to confer with the Prince of Sweden upon the plan of future operations. This meeting, though greatly desired by the two sovereigns, who wished to attach the former Marshal Bernadotte finally to their cause, and to terminate his long vacillation, was far from pleasing to the Russian and German officers, particularly the latter. They spoke of conferring an important command upon the prince royal; they prepared extraordinary honours for him on the road, in order to touch him in the most sensitive part, his vanity. These assiduities for a man who in the eyes of the Germans and Russians had no other merit than that of a French general, not of the first order, greatly excited the national jealousy of the allied staffs. Their monarchs, they said, wished to declare that a French second-rate general was of more value than all the generals of the coalition, and that to carry arms against our country was a title to honour. The prospect of being placed under his orders was supremely disagreeable to them.

Unfortunately, they began to speak of another French general, a great warrior, endowed with real civil and military virtues, and not, like Bernadotte, rewarded with a crown for moderate services, but with exile in return for those of immense value, who, overcome by

ennui, the want of occupation, irritation at a fortunate rival, and the horror of the Moscow campaign, had suffered himself to be persuaded to leave America for Europe. This general was the illustrious Moreau. He had come to Stockholm attracted by Bernadotte, who seemed anxious to procure imitators. Surrounded there by the worst counsels, agitated, opposed, unhappy, doubtful whether he did right or wrong, he marched, without perceiving it, towards an abyss, under the influence of confused sentiments, which he considered honourable, because, under the sincere indignation which he indulged, he could not detect the extent to which hatred and idleness influenced his conduct. They were much occupied with his arrival, and fancied that General Moreau was destined to be the counsellor of the Emperor Alexander. This was a new ground of displeasure to the Russian and German military, who, with redoubled jealousy, asked if their sovereigns supposed that French generals could be conquered by none but their own class.

However, the former Marshal Bernadotte arrived at Trachenberg, travelling, not like the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, with extreme simplicity, but with dazzling pomp, like a monarch making a solemn progress through his states. After having reviewed some of his troops who already availed themselves of the armistice to enter Prussia, he appeared near Stettin, where there was a French garrison. His inflammable imagination began to persuade him that Napoleon, having become odious to France and burdensome to Europe, could not reign long, that the long-forgotten Bourbons could not be restored in the present generation, and, therefore, that he was himself destined to replace Napoleon on the throne of France. The madman, in his pride, did not see that, after glory, old tradition would exert the greatest influence over the human mind, and that mediocrity stained with French blood would never be called to succeed ill-fated genius. While riding under the walls of Stettin in sight of the French garrison, some shots were fired by an unknown party. Some of Bernadotte's officers came to complain of this violation of the armistice to the brave General Dufresse, commandant of the fortress. "It is nothing," he ironically replied: "the guard perceived a deserter and fired upon him."

Conducted by relays to Trachenberg, with numerous escorts and a magnificent cortège, the Prince of Sweden met from the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia an extraordinary reception, as if he had brought to them the genius of Napoleon or of Frederick the Great. These eager attentions were due less to his talents than to the fear entertained of his fidelity, and to the desire of exhibiting one of Napoleon's lieutenants as so weary of his domination as to turn his arms against him. The homage would have been still more excessive if to the character of Frenchman and lieutenant of Napoleon he could have added that of his brother, for in this case his defection would have been still more significant. Until the very day when they had broken with Denmark and had finally adjudged Norway to Sweden, the new Swede had by turns promised, hesitated, and even threatened; but at last he had taken his side, and had set in motion 25,000

Swedes. In return for this contingent, which consisted of excellent soldiers, for none are braver or more honourable than the Swedes, he made strange pretensions. He wished to be generalissimo, or at least to command all the armies not commanded in person by the two sovereigns themselves. He had been mildly resisted, and gradually brought to more moderate demands by the simple reason of position, which did not allow the different armies to operate very near to each other and to be combined under the authority of one commander. After debates which had lasted from the 9th to the 13th of July, the following plan of campaign had been formed, founded on the co-operation of the Austrians; for, although these had been commissioned to negotiate for all parties, the generally-received conviction that Napoleon would not accept their scheme of pacification led to the impression that their troops assembled in Bohemia, Bavaria, and Styria were inevitably destined to co-operate with the Russian and Prussian armies.

Duly estimating the danger of measuring their strength with Napoleon, they proposed to overwhelm him with the mass of forces, and they did not despair of mustering 800,000 soldiers, of whom 500,000 in the first line should act concentrically upon Dresden. Three large, active armies were to expel Napoleon from this position of Dresden, where it was perceived that he wished to establish his centre of operations. A first army of 250,000 men, formed in Bohemia with 130,000 Austrians and 120,000 Prussians and Russians, under an Austrian general, to gratify Austria, was to operate by Bohemia on Napoleon's flank. A second, of 120,000 men, under General Blücher, in Silesia, composed of an equal number of Prussians and Russians, was to march directly upon Dresden by Liegnitz and Bautzen, while a third, of 130,000 men, under the Prince of Sweden, composed of Swedes, Prussians, Russians, Germans, and English, should proceed from Berlin to Magdeburg. It was agreed that these three armies should march cautiously, should avoid any direct encounter with Napoleon, should retrograde when he advanced, to fall upon each of his lieutenants as he should have left upon his flanks or his rear, should again retire whenever he came to the aid of his lieutenant, and immediately fall upon another, and thus should endeavour to exhaust him, and when they should judge him sufficiently weakened should seize a favourable opportunity to attack himself and strike him in the hundred arms of the coalition. If notwithstanding the advice addressed to all the commanders to act with caution towards Napoleon and boldness towards his lieutenants, they should be beaten, they were not to be discouraged, for there remained in reserve 300,000 men ready to recruit the army in actual service and to prevent its destruction by continually renewing its numbers. In a word, they were resolved to conquer or to die to the last man. Prussia had reserves in Silesia, Brandenburg, and Pomerania; Russia in Poland, Austria in Bohemia. Austria was also to bring together an army of observation in Bavaria, an active army in Italy; and on the supposition, unhappily too probable, of a rupture with us, she had allowed us to calculate on her forces as if

already joined to the alliance, which gave occasion to say falsely that she was finally plodged to our enemies, and that the negotiations of Prague were an artifice on her part as well as on ours.

This plan, based upon the probable manoeuvres of Napoleon, and evincing the extent to which his adversaries had profited by his lessons, was the work not of the Swedish prince, but of the Russian and Prussian generals, who were accustomed to our manner of making war. Bernadotte, though called upon to command 130,000 men, of whom 100,000 might be found assembled on the same battle-field,—a task far beyond his talents, for he had never commanded more than 20,000, and even then always under a superior,—was not content with the part assigned to him. He wished to command, in addition, the army of Silesia, and even to have Blücher under his orders, which he thought due to his royal rank and military talents. But such a pretension was liable to insurmountable obstacles. Around Blücher were collected those German officers who were the most distinguished, the most patriotic, the most engaged in secret German societies, persons to whom Bernadotte was in every way unacceptable, as a Frenchman, as a traitor to his country, as a speculator who for a year had exposed his very questionable services to the highest bidder, as a general full of presumption though of very doubtful merit. The idea of obeying such a commander was repulsive to all, and the language held at Trachenberg was far from complimentary to the Prince of Sweden. He was, therefore, given to understand that he must renounce this singular claim, for the three armies would be called upon to act at too great distance from each other to be under one commander, and, merely to satisfy him, it was agreed that in the case of the army of Silesia being called upon to co-operate with that of the North, (the name given to his,) both armies should be under his orders. Blücher and his officers had been induced to allow this possibility, however disagreeable to them, by the assurance that the two armies destined to meet and to co-operate were those of Silesia and Bohemia, because they each had Dresden as a common end, but the army of the North, on the contrary, threatening at once Hamburg and Magdeburg, would have little chance to be associated with that of Silesia, which also looked upon the Elbe, but at a higher point.

After these arrangements, they had sent back Bernadotte intoxicated with the incense offered by royal hands, and Alexander and Frederick William had returned to Reichenbach to await the issue of the negotiations, on the result of which they placed little reliance, the success of which was little desired by Alexander, ever irritated against Napoleon and prodigiously flattered by the idea of leading all Europe, which Frederick William in his constant and wise mistrust of fortune would gladly have seen brought to a favourable conclusion if only he could have put confidence in it. It was upon their return that the reply of the commissaries at Neumarkt, already reported, was given, which removed all pretext for any longer detaining M. de Caulaincourt at Dresden.

That excellent and fearless man received from M. de Bassano, on the 26th, the instructions left for him by Napoleon before his departure for Mentz. Though the real question was not touched, the formal difficulties were detailed with so much complacency, and so openly stated as a method of losing time, that M. de Caulaincourt was filled with consternation. It was simply with the view of effecting a peace, which he considered to be indispensable, that he had accepted the part of plenipotentiary at Prague, a part more painful to him than to any other, for, after having enjoyed the particular favour of the Emperor Alexander, to meet merely a mortifying coolness from himself, or from his most vulgar agents, could not fail to be very painful to him. To expose himself to such treatment without any real service, merely to act a senseless farce, wounded equally his dignity and his patriotism. He set off, however, in the simple hope of allaying in some degree, at least, the effects of the perverseness of his master, and in quitting Dresden he addressed the following letter to Napoleon, a letter well deserving a place in history:—

DRESDEN, July 26, 1813.

“SIRE:—

“Before leaving Dresden, I wish to ease my heart in order to bring with me to Prague only the sense of those duties imposed on me by your Majesty. It is two o'clock. The Duke of Bassano has sent me only the instructions which the response from Neumarkt and the orders of your Majesty have not allowed him to send me earlier: they are so different from the arrangements to which your Majesty appeared to assent when determining me to accept this mission that I should not hesitate again to refuse the honour of being your plenipotentiary, if, after the loss of so much time, the hours were not counted at Prague while your Majesty is at Mentz and I am at Dresden. Whatever, then, may be my repugnance to negotiations of so illusory a character, I, before every thing, yield to my duty and obey. Tomorrow I shall be on my journey, and the following day at Prague, as it is prescribed; but, Sire, allow the reflections of your faithful servant to find some place. The political horizon is so overcast, every thing wears so serious an aspect, that I cannot resist the desire of entreating your Majesty to adopt a salutary resolution before it be too late,—which your minister leads me to hope may be the case. May you be convinced that the time is urgent, that the irritation of the Germans is extreme, and that this sentiment of exasperation hastens events with an accelerated and irresistible impetus even more than the fear of cabinets. Austria is already too much compromised to draw back, if not reassured by a continent at peace. Your Majesty well knows that it is not the cause of that power which I plead; certainly it is not her abandonment of us in our reverses that I wish to reward, it is not even her 150,000 bayonets that I wish to remove from the field, though this well deserves attention, but it is the rising of all Germany, which the ancient ascendancy of that power might effect, which I entreat your Majesty to avoid at any cost. All the sacrifices made with this view, and consequently at the present moment,

for a speedy peace, will render your Majesty more powerful than all your victories, and you will be the idol of the nations," &c. &c.

This was the language of an honourable man who clearly perceived a part of the threatened evil but not the whole, for instead of encountering 150,000 Austrians he was to find 300,000 engaged, and instead of a rising in Germany it was a rising throughout the whole of Europe that he must brave; and, unhappily, this language was destined to produce little effect. However, the Duke of Vicenza had left for Prague, where he was impatiently expected, determined to aim at doing good, however feeble the hope of succeeding. His reception was worthy of himself and of the respect he had acquired throughout Europe. On learning his departure, all discussions were suspended till his arrival. After having come into communication with the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian plenipotentiaries, he resumed with M. de Metternich the old subject which M. de Narbonne had already treated, that it was impossible to exchange powers and to treat questions except in a common assembly, in the presence and under the presidency of the mediator, but in common conference with all. This difficulty, which was, no doubt, serious if any hope were still entertained of a direct reconciliation with Russia, deserved no attention from us when it had been determined to make peace only through Austria and with her consent. It was even more convenient to us to have the mediator as the principal organ than to come into direct intercourse with two ill-inclined plenipotentiaries who made little efforts to facilitate a peace which Austria alone desired. The proof that it was so was seen in the evident desire of M. de Metternich to obtain a concession on this question of form from MM. de Humboldt and d'Anstett in order to render possible at least the opening of the congress. Since he himself wished the direct intercourse of the French plenipotentiaries with the Prussian and Russian, it is plain that he had nothing to fear from it. And, speaking frankly with M. de Caulaincourt as with M. de Narbonne, he showed him the futility of disputing longer on the forms adopted at Munster, Tetschen, or Siskow, for the two plenipotentiaries were engaged in their present course by self-respect and interest: self-respect, because they had already consigned their powers to the mediator; interest, because they were unwilling to be accused of secretly bargaining with the French diplomacy, and that to treat by means of notes transmitted to the mediator was the only method that precluded every false interpretation. He said that for these reasons they would not consent to yield; that, moreover, they were not very desirous of peace, and that that desire could not silence in their minds the claims of self-respect and interest; that, consequently, every discussion with them would be useless; that he perceived, also, that Napoleon had no wish to come to any result; that as long as he chose to contend on such ground as this, it was plain that he did not wish to take one step towards peace: that it was, therefore, useless to trouble themselves to obtain concessions in respect to matters of form which would lead to nothing essential; that they must wait even to the last moment,

for with a character so extraordinary as Napoleon every thing was possible; that at the very last day or hour it was possible that he would suddenly send orders to treat on acceptable grounds, and that peace should suddenly issue from a desperate position; that on this supposition, which, though very doubtful, was possible, he would wait till midnight of August 19; that till that time he repeated the assurance that he would be pledged to none, but that after that time he would become irrevocably associated with our enemies; that in the name of his sovereign he would sign a treaty of alliance with the allied powers, and would be the most determined of our enemies to conquer or die.

M. de Metternich repeated these statements, which he had already made to M. de Narbonne in so calm but firm a tone, with expressions of such regard for M. de Caulaincourt, and with such manifest sincerity, (for we must not, with the vulgar, suppose that falsehood is essential to diplomacy,) that M. de Caulaincourt could not resist so much evidence. Accordingly, with his wonted veracity, he wrote immediately to M. de Bassano, whom he feared little, and to Napoleon, whom he feared much, to let them know once more the real situation, the great and even certain danger of Austria joining the coalition, which would perfect and complete the union of Europe against us,—a situation perilous but tenable in 1792, when we began the career of revolutions, when we were still full of passion and of hope, unjustly attacked and not ourselves the stern oppressors, but a situation utterly disastrous when we were exhausted, when we were at fault with all the world, and when all the world was animated against us with that indignation which had been our strength in 1792. The conviction of M. de Caulaincourt in this respect was so clear and so profound, that, knowing the ambition of M. de Bassano, and anxious to bring that ambition to the aid of his honourable feelings, and supposing that he might be alive to the honour of personally signing the peace of the world, he urgently invited him to Prague, invested as he was with all the confidence of the Emperor, having all his powers, having no need to depend upon his will to lose the few remaining hours, and to render himself the object of a transport of universal gratitude by concluding a peace which should save so many victims, including, probably, France herself.

M. de Bassano, whose patriotism was as great as was compatible with perfect submission to his master, would have no doubt yielded to so much reason and patriotism if he had possessed a will of his own; but as he acknowledged only one in the world, that of Napoleon, which he no more thought of resisting than the will of God himself, he contented himself with meeting the urgent solicitations of M. de Caulaincourt by granting him some facilities for treating the question of form, without, however, relinquishing the latitude allowed to himself. Thus, for example, he allowed the two French negotiators to give a certified copy of their powers to the mediator, who should transmit it to the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries, so that this first communication should take place in the manner desired by

our adversaries, but in return he continued to require that the definitive exchange of powers should take place in a common conference. As to the form itself of the negotiation, he consented that the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries should adopt official notes, as they wished, in order to protect their responsibility, but on condition that the French plenipotentiaries should be able to discuss those notes in conferences where the adverse parties should be found together.

These were miserable subtleties, unworthy of so grave a position. M. de Bassano wrote to the Emperor at Mentz that he had allowed this degree of latitude to our plenipotentiaries in order that all the questions of form should be settled before his return to Dresden, and that if he should then be disposed in the last six days to give a serious turn to the negotiations, he should find the preliminary discussions terminated.\*

Napoleon was at this moment at Mentz, whither he had gone, as he had said, to spend some days with the Empress, and to see on the way the troops on march, the works in the course of execution, and, in short, whatever required his presence to complete or perfect it. Leaving during the night of the 24th of July, he reached Mentz on the evening of the 26th, where there awaited him a brilliant court, which had come from Paris in the suite of the Empress, and a great number of his agents, who had hastened to receive his direct orders. He had found the Empress in great distress, concealing her tears from the public, but not restraining them in his presence, for she was sincerely attached to her glorious husband. She trembled for his life and his fortune. She feared for herself, lest the new declaration of war with Austria should awaken in France all the popular hatred which had destroyed the unhappy Queen Marie Antoinette.

\* For the conviction of any who may find it difficult to believe that they had endeavoured to render the negotiations at Prague as illusory as we have said, we shall give the following extract of a letter from M. de Bassano to the Emperor, dated from Dresden, August 1, 1813, 4 A.M. "I transmit to your Majesty the despatches of your plenipotentiaries. I thought it my duty to reply to them without awaiting the orders of your Majesty. It is now the 1st of August; my letter will only leave this morning, the plenipotentiaries will only receive it to-morrow, and sufficient time will have elapsed to prevent their being too deeply pledged before the 10th of August, agreeably to the instructions left by your Majesty. It appeared to me so much the less the intention of your Majesty to carry too far the discussions on form which would expose the project of gaining time, that we shall quite naturally arrive at the moment of your Majesty's return to Dresden without a negotiation having made any real progress or any question being compromised. Scarcely even will that of the provisioning of the forts have been entered upon.

"Of the three difficulties which have presented themselves, those relating to the exchange of powers and to the place of the conferences will resolve themselves. As to the mode to be adopted" (From this word the minute is written by the hand of the Duke of Bassano) "in negotiation, I thought that we could not defer a reply for several days without taking these delays upon ourselves, whilst in fact, and if M. de Metternich insists upon a proposition which is in opposition to all right and all usage, the impediments thrown in the way of negotiation can only be imputed to him.

"Although the declarations which he has made to MM. de Vicenza and de Narbonne and to M. d'André have perhaps for their object only to render his position as mediator more imposing, it might enter into the views of your Majesty to give immediately on your arrival here so serious a turn to the negotiations that they could not be broken off. On this supposition, I thought it would be agreeable to your Majesty to find the preliminary discussions nearly finished."

She could have wished to retain in the French alliance her father, whom she loved and by whom she was loved, but she could no more overcome the tranquil inflexibility of the Emperor Francis than the impetuous humour of Napoleon, and she did what women are wont to do when power fails them: she wept. The secret of the interview between Napoleon and Maria Louisa has remained unknown;\* and it has probably done so because it was of no import, for Napoleon wished to devolve nothing on the Empress, business being conducted at Prague in such a manner that she could render no service. He wished to see her, to console her, to give her public proofs of his tenderness, which would have a good effect in Austria and on Europe; he also wished, with his wonted suspicion, to discover whether she had received from Vienna any secret communication which might enlighten him on the designs of Austria. But such efforts were always perfectly useless, for Austria had told all her secret by the lips of M. de Metternich, and the secret was no other than this, that on certain conditions, one hundred times repeated, she would arrest Europe, oblige her to lay down her arms, and effect a peace not only continental but also maritime, and that without these conditions she would immediately declare herself our enemy and would join the universal coalition which was preparing against us. Napoleon, then, had nothing to learn from Maria Louisa; but he afforded her the pleasure of a few days with himself, and in the mean while he settled, on the spot, a number of civil and military affairs. From that powerful hand from which so much good and evil flowed, he indeed threw forth both good and evil with the usual prodigality of his genius. The Duke of Rovigo had desired to come to Mentz to make a fresh attempt in favour of peace, by enlightening Napoleon on the subject of public opinion and on the danger he incurred of alienating finally the affection of France. Public opinion was, in fact, much excited ever since the fear had arisen that the congress so tardily convened remained without result. The enemies of Napoleon were full of hope, the greater part of the country full of grief and of gloomy apprehension. Already affection had vanished, hatred was springing up and silencing the voice of admiration. In Lower Germany and Holland was heard the cry of *Orange forever!* in all Germany, *Alexander forever!* In France no one dared to cry *The Bourbons forever!* but their memory was gradually recalled, and men circulated a manifesto of Louis XVIII. published at Hartwell, which would certainly have produced a great effect if it had been free from numerous traces of prejudices arising from emigration. All these details the Duke of Rovigo proposed to communicate to the master whom he faithfully served; but Napoleon, unwilling to be disturbed by what he called the squabbles of the interior, refused to receive him, and ordered him to remain in Paris, under the pretext that his presence there was indispensable.

In accordance with the too usual proceeding of a government which obstinately perseveres

\* The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, the confident and director of the Empress regent, declares in his simple and truthful memoirs that he could never come to any knowledge of the subject.

in error, and which sees in the expressions of public opinion acts to be repressed instead of lessons to be studied, he displayed towards the clergy rigour altogether strange from the degree of audacity and despotism. The clergy naturally neglected no opportunity of multiplying their hostile expressions, especially in Belgium, and by their own errors provoked those of the party in power. The concordat of Fontainebleau, disputed with remarkable bad faith by the secret correspondence of the cardinals, was considered by the clergy generally as null. They obstinately refused to recognise the new prelates named by Napoleon, and whom Pius VII. constantly refused to institute though he had promised to do so. The most prudent remained at a distance from their new sees, to avoid offence. M. de Pradt, who had become the enemy of the Empire since his unfortunate embassy to Warsaw, and who was little desirous of bringing on himself annoyances for the gratification of the government, had abstained from presenting himself at Malines, of which he had been nominated archbishop. But the new bishops of Tournay and Ghent, by repairing to their dioceses and publicly officiating in their metropolitan cities, had excited a species of rebellion among the clergy and their flocks. On their appearance at the altar, priests and assistants had fled and had left the prelates almost alone in the churches. The seminarists of Tournay and Ghent had, under the direction of their professors, partaken in this disorder. Among the guilty were remarked an association of ladies who, under the name of *Beguines*, lived at Ghent in a kind of community, without being held by all the restrictions of the cloister; and they were accused of having exercised a great influence over the conduct of the clergy on the present occasion.

Napoleon gave orders to disperse the *Beguines*, to confine in the state prisons some members of the chapters of Tournay and Ghent, and to convey others to distant seminaries, to act in the same manner towards the professors, and as to the young seminarists, to send all above eighteen years of age to Magdeburg in a regiment, on the pretence that they were subject to the law of conscription, that they had been excused only exceptionally with the view of becoming ministers at the altar, not the fosterers of disturbance, and that such favour might cease at the option of the sovereign whenever he judged them no longer deserving of it. Those who were under eighteen years were to be restored to their families. Certain pious persons having combined to supply their places, Napoleon forbade such substitution for the present time. These several orders were expressly commanded to be immediately executed, which was done.

No longer allowing any restraint to his will from within or without, Napoleon ventured upon something still more extraordinary. The custom-revenue of Antwerp had for several years been subject to defalcations which had compromised several municipal functionaries. The defalcations were indisputable, and they had incurred a loss to the city of two or three millions. The persons accused were, justly or unjustly, considered by the government as the real authors of these losses; but the opinion

of the country was so hostile to the government that it did not hesitate to pronounce in favour of persons whom at any other time it would have openly condemned, and to shield them with indulgence, as if every one prosecuted by imperial authority could not fail to be an interesting victim. Seduced by this sentiment, or under the influence of corruption, as asserted by the judge, the jury boldly acquitted the accused functionaries, amid the applause of the provinces; and the city of Antwerp, already cheated of three millions, was exposed to pay the expenses of the prosecution, which were considerable. It is easy to understand the indignation of a regular government much attached to the maintenance of the most rigorous order in all parts of the administration. But however just may have been the indignation of Napoleon when he saw men whom he considered to be guilty escaping with impunity, and the city of Antwerp, the victim of serious defalcations, alone suffer condemnation, he ought to have admitted that, although the crime was real, the persons accused might not have been guilty, and even if they were, the declaration of the jury ought to have been held sacred as an irrevocable judgment, whether true or false. On learning this decision Napoleon became very angry, and as they had laid aside justice in order to oppose his government, he did not hesitate to meet hostility with hostility, and to lay aside all legality and to annul the decision of the jury. This extraordinary and unparalleled act was calculated to disgust universal opinion; but Napoleon was indifferent to this, and persisted, flattering himself that the sincerity of his indignation would justify the strange audacity of his act,—so quickly are ideas perverted whenever the habit is adopted of placing an individual will above the laws.

Notwithstanding the advice of the department of justice, and in particular of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who thought that the only thing possible was to change the law if it were bad, and to withdraw from the jury the cognizance of this species of delinquency if they were thought incapable of judging rightly in the matter, Napoleon, relying upon an article in the constitution of the Empire which allowed the senate to annul such judgments as were dangerous to the state, ordered a *senatus-consult* to be prepared to reverse the decision of the jury at Antwerp, and to send back to another court not only those who had been already acquitted, but also some of the jury themselves on the ground of corruption. It was impossible to accumulate a greater amount of irregularity into one act; for, granting that the 55th article of the constitution of the 16th Thermidor of the year X. (Aug. 4, 1802) was still in force, it was plain that the judgment in question was not one contemplated by the definition, and especially that in claiming the right of annulling the decision of a tribunal the design was to reverse the decision but certainly not to prosecute those who had passed it. These objections were submitted to Napoleon, but he disregarded them, and required that the *senatus-consult* should be drawn up as he had suggested, and immediately brought before the senate. He went still further. Convinced, in the blindness of his despotism, that a power

aiming at an honourable end ought not to allow any impediment from rules, he signed and published a private letter, in which, laying the affair before the privy council and indicating the decision required, he assumed the whole responsibility himself. The report of the councillor of state, charged with the presentation of the *senatus-consult*, contained this phrase, which fully expresses the opinion of Napoleon on the subject of sovereignty, and which certainly would not have been admitted in terms so absolute even before 1789:—"Our ordinary legislation presents no method of annulling such a decision. The hand of the sovereign must, therefore, interfere. The sovereign is the supreme and ever-living law: it is the property of the sovereign to include within himself all the powers necessary to secure the right and to prevent or to correct the wrong."

Arrogating thus to himself the unlimited right of providing for every thing, of distributing justice, of changing it if necessary to suit his taste, he lavished, from the same sovereign hand, benefits on those objects which he met in his path. The first president of the court of cassation, M. Muraire, a distinguished magistrate, by the bad management of his fortune had fallen into a condition distressing to a functionary of his rank. His son-in-law, destined soon to become a wise and courageous minister of Louis XVIII., M. Decazes, having repaired to Mentz to appeal to the imperial benevolence, Napoleon, who at the time had strong reasons to be sparing of his money, said to him, "How, then, has M. Muraire exposed himself to such difficulties? But no matter: how much do you require?" After which, he examined into the amount necessary to extricate M. Muraire, and granted him several hundred thousand francs from his private treasure, which, as we have seen, was the last resource of the army.

Napoleon profited by his sojourn at Mentz to give some attention to his finance. The plan of alienating the communal estates, which had been adopted and made law, had not as yet produced any great result, because it was necessary to secure some market for the bills on the sinking-fund before issuing any considerable number. Without this precaution, in fact, they would have accumulated on the exchange, and their value would shortly have become depreciated. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to accelerate the alienation of the communal estates, which alone could present the desired market. Before these could be sold, it was necessary to select them, to include them in the catalogue of alienable estates, to value them, to supply the price to the communes in the form of annual contribution for the state, to take possession, and finally to offer them publicly to sale. This series of administrative operations required time, however much they might be accelerated, and till they were completed for each estate it could not be exposed to sale. The bills issued before they should be demanded for this species of traffic would have fluctuated on the exchange, have lost twenty or thirty per cent., involved the fall of the bank-stocks and state annuities, the only securities current at the time, and ruined the very restricted form of credit which was then enjoyed; and of which, restricted as it was, there was great need. Napoleon had taken for his private account about

seventy-two millions of these new bills, the bank ten, the military treasury sixty-three, which formed a resource of one hundred and forty-five millions realized in advance, and which did not involve the actual issue of these bills, because the three departments which had taken them up had retained them in their portfolio. But this was not enough, with the immense expenses which were to be met; for the treasury payments in the first six months elapsed had already exceeded the ordinary receipts by more than 200,000,000. M. Mollien could not venture in his payments to employ the new bills on the sinking-fund, lest he should lessen their value. Some had been brought upon 'change to familiarize them to the public, and they had not lost more than five or six per cent., which was a moderate discount, but it was difficult and dangerous to diffuse them further. They could be given neither to fundholders nor functionaries, because the sums to be paid to each of these classes were but small, and the shares of these bills did not suit such claims, and also because this would have occasioned an outcry against the assignats. Still less could they be employed in the payment of the army, which was settled abroad in sums greatly divided. However, for this manner of payment, Napoleon had, in some proportion, employed the bills of the army treasury, payable at Paris or in the departments, which enabled officers who had families to transmit money to France with safety and without loss, and also procured to the treasury the facility of fulfilling their engagements with paper at tolerably distant date. It was by contrivances of this kind that the military treasury had been able to take up sixty-three millions of the new bills, which it was to keep in portfolio. The only payment which could be made with this new fund was that of the large supplies furnished by rich contractors for the army and navy. Such persons, anxious to continue their important transactions with the state, were not disposed to look too closely to the manner of payment, and, besides, they had so great need of money that they preferred to receive payment in a form which might lose ten or fifteen per cent., to risking the loss of all. There was also a kind of forced contractors, contractors against their own will, viz., the proprietors, farmers, or merchants, from whom had been taken, on the principle of requisition, either provisions, clothes, or horses, on condition of paying for them with ready money. To each of these might be given the new bills on the treasury, which some would get discounted by the large capitalists, and which others would retain to be used in the purchase of communal estates. But M. Mollien, always attached to regular modes of proceeding, preferred that the contractors, voluntary and involuntary, should be kept waiting, which might be excused under the pretext of unpaid debts, rather than issue a paper which might be called an assignat whenever its introduction into general use should appear to be at all compulsory. Accordingly, the contractors, accustomed to cry at the doors of the public offices, began to murmur, to complain of non-payment, and to allege this as the reason for remissness in their services. This occasioned the personal intervention of Napoleon, whose ear was now alive only to what concerned the wants of the army.

Addressing himself to M. Mollien, he maintained that the loss of nine or ten per cent. on such an amount, especially when a high interest exactly paid would have maintained the currency, was nothing in itself, and did not counterbalance the inconvenience of delaying the payment of persons whom it was important to satisfy. Those to whom ready money was not indispensable would have in hand an advantageous deposit; those to whom it was indispensable would realize the capital by discount, and this would be always the same result, that of one inconvenience, of lowering one of the three circulating media by nine or ten per cent. The annual claims on the State, for example, which had been seen at twelve francs the day before the 18th Brumaire, at thirty the following day, at ninety after 1806, and now again at seventy, had never by these variations involved the ruin of the State and of individuals. The fixedness and exact payment of the interest consoled the holders of the rent, who at length paid no attention to these fluctuations, which affected none but those who were forced to sell. This was a very partial inconvenience, to which those must submit who were in need of money.

Such was the specious argument of Napoleon against the minister of finance,—an argument which would have been not far from the truth if the fall of these bills could have been limited to ten, twelve, or even fifteen per cent. But who could say where it would stop, if there should be a considerable issue? This is what alarmed M. Mollien, but not Napoleon, for he ordered the distribution through Paris of about thirty millions of bills on the sinking-fund by the payment of contracts, and in the departments about eighteen or twenty by the payment of requisitions. Thus fifty millions were introduced, and in a manner forced into circulation. In order to facilitate the disposal of the communal estates, Napoleon ordered the Arch-Chancellor Cambac  res to pass an act of the Council of State, removing from the committee of litigants, whose forms are the same as the ordinary forms of justice, all questions pertaining to the communal estates, and consigning them to the committee of communal administration, to take the direction of that committee himself, and to forward with all expedition this kind of business by means of a summary and continuous examination.

After having thus, by somewhat violent means, brought aid to his finances, Napoleon, ever anxious for the levies of soldiers, invented new modes of conscription, which he hoped to render tolerable by imparting to them the character of local necessity and advantage. For example, the frontier of the Pyrenees being threatened in consequence of the latest movements in Spain, Napoleon proposed to levy 30,000 men from the four last classes in all the departments from Bordeaux to Montpellier, in order to secure that part of the territory from invasion. As the new recruits were to defend their own soil, Napoleon thought that he was, as it were, calling upon peasants to defend their cottages, citizens to defend their own cities, and that the urgency of the need would silence complaints, for it could not be said, as of all other levies of this period, that Napoleon was taking men to let them die on the Elbe and the Oder in the service of his ambition. The idea appearing to

him ingenious, he determined to apply to the departments of the North and East, always addressing himself to the departments of old France, which for more than twenty years bore the whole weight of the war, and to demand of them about 60,000 men under the same pretext of urgent local danger. But, as these conscriptions must soon assume the appearance and produce the effect of a general conscription, Napoleon resolved to defer the second for two or three months. Only he summoned without delay the 30,000 men demanded by the departments adjoining the Pyrenees.

These measures, civil and military, devised in a great degree before the journey to Mentz, were at Mentz either immediately resolved upon or specially examined in conjunction with agents from Paris, to be finally decreed at Dresden. Napoleon, adding to this labour incessant reviews of troops and continual inspection of *mat  riel*, could not afford much time to the *Empress*; but he loaded her with the tenderest expressions, expressions both sincere and designed, in order that the new war with Austria might not in public opinion weigh against a marriage which he still thought useful to his policy, and that he might leave the Emperor Francis under the weight of the same duties to his daughter: for the faithful discharge of his own duties as a husband made him all the more claimant on Francis to discharge the duties of a father. And it must be owned that he yielded to the inclination of his own heart, for he was touched by the attachment which he seemed to inspire in the noble daughter of the C  sars, and returned it as much as was allowed by the real and powerful distractions of his mind. Anxious to spare her, he did not even say to what extent war was certain and would be serious; he allowed her to depart in doubt, while in writing to Prince Eugene at Milan, to General B  nig at Dantzic, and to Marshal Davout at Hamburg, he confessed the real state, and ordered them to hold themselves in readiness for August 1<sup>st</sup>. In order to provide an agreeable diversion for the *Empress*, and to make her forget as much as possible the cruel anxieties of the moment, he ordered her a voyage on the Rhine from Mentz to Cologne, which she was to make in the midst of the homage of the population of the two banks, and, after having spent some days at Paris, she was to undertake a journey in Normandy, in order to preside at Cherbourg over an imposing ceremony,—the introduction of the waters of the ocean into the celebrated basin begun in the reign of Louis XVI. and finished in his own. He carried his attention so far as to recommend Prince Cambac  res to cause her to leave before the termination of the armistice, that she might not hear of the new hostilities till several days after their resumption, when perhaps some great event might have occurred to reassure her. He wished then to amuse, console, and render beloved by France his young wife, the mother and guardian of his son, the regent of the Empire, destined to take his place if he should fall. Alas! why could not the dark forebodings indicated by those residuities contribute to overcome the fatal obstinacy to which he was about to sacrifice his son, his wife, his throne, and himself?

After having spent from July 26 to August 1 with Maria Louisa, he embraced her in presence



of his court, and, leaving her in tears, set out for Franconia. He had already inspected, at Mentz, Marshal Augereau's divisions, which had just been completed on the borders of the Rhine. At Wurzburg were found two of Marshal St. Cyr's divisions actually on the march to the Elbe, where they were to take position at Konigstein. They appeared to him good, tolerably well trained, and animated by the sentiments which he desired. He visited the fortress of Wurzburg, the citadel, the magazines, in a word, the whole military establishment, which he wished to make one of the important points in his line of communication; he then directed himself to Bamberg and Bayreuth, where he successively saw the other divisions of Marshal St. Cyr and the Bavarian divisions intended to form part of Augereau's corps. After having thrown his penetrating glance over every thing, and given the necessary orders and encouragements, he left for Erfurt, and arrived at Dresden on the evening of the 4th. Early in the morning of the 5th he was up and at work, anxious to employ to advantage the last days of the armistice.

The sight of the troops he had inspected on his route and his incessant meditations on the plan of the approaching campaign had redoubled his confidence in his army and in his own genius. As he saw approach the moment of this terrible struggle, and meditated on his chances, remembering how readily his soldiers had braved death, and how in the midst of danger he devised the most fortunate combinations even when his adversaries could do nothing but blunder, regardless of those generous passions which he had excited against himself, whose ardour might compensate for want of skill, he was conscious of a mental glow which animated his whole being, which shone in his eyes and gave him the aspect of content, of hope, and of boldness. Those around him were struck by this, and to the wisest it was a cause of anxiety rather than of joy.\*

The very day that he arrived at Dresden, he was solicited with greater earnestness than ever by M. de Caulaincourt and M. de Narbonne for power to treat seriously. He seemed annoyed, and reproached those two negotiators for having allowed themselves to be too closely pressed by M. de Metternich. He considered that they had been deficient in dignity in allowing the Austrian minister to say that in such or such a case Austria would join the enemies of France to declare war against him; as if it was an of-

fence to announce frankly what she would do if certain conditions were not granted. Napoleon was so intoxicated with power that he would have no one venture to speak of declaring war with him as a natural and, in some case, even inevitable measure. He would have them only think of such a step with trembling, (which, indeed, they did,) and speak of it with a sort of respectful apprehension, as of a calamity which they could scarcely contemplate as possible. But after these very unmerited and unbecoming reprimands he occupied himself with more serious business. He no longer believed, after the difficulty experienced in procuring the first prolongation of the armistice, that he could obtain a second, and, moreover, he felt himself now ready. From this period, time would be in favour of his adversaries rather than himself, and he was anxious to strike a blow before winter. His only desire in respect of delay was to defer the active operations of Austria, which would have been very convenient to him, for it would thus have been possible to crush the Russians and Prussians separately and then to fall back upon the Austrians, to intimidate them, to prevent their taking part in the struggle, or to crush them in their turn. But the only way of disposing Austria to such a course was the adoption of a negotiation apparently sincere, and even the encouragement of sanguine hopes of a pacific conclusion. Napoleon, therefore, resolved to realize the prognostic of M. de Metternich, who had said that with such a character as his one ought to despair of nothing; and that perhaps at the last day, or even hour, a fortunate conclusion might be elicited from this negotiation, though at the present moment so illusory as to be absolutely offensive. He determined, while the plenipotentiaries should continue to lose time in puerile discussions on the form of the negotiations, secretly and exclusively to charge M. de Caulaincourt with a serious communication to Austria, the only power with which direct communication was possible. If peace should ensue from such a step, Napoleon would not be sorry, provided that all the objectionable conditions were avoided, and he flattered himself that he might perhaps obtain this from Austria, but only at the last moment, when that power should see herself definitely placed between peace and war. Accordingly he drew up, as follows, the conditions to be confidentially presented to M. de Metternich. In his own mind and in public opinion the grand-duchy of Warsaw, Spain and Illyria, had already been sacrificed, and it involved no new mortification to his pride; besides, this would cost nothing to the Imperial territory, for even Illyria had only remained conditionally in our hands, and had never been annexed to the constitutional territory of France. The real mortification to Napoleon was, as we have said, to restore Prussia stronger after her defection than before, to sacrifice the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, which he had ostentatiously borne for several years, and, finally, to relinquish Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, which had been annexed to the French territory by senatus-consulta. He felt that each of these sacrifices would exhibit him to the world as conquered, for otherwise he would not have rewarded defection, allowed the reconstitution of Germany beyond the reach of

\* The following remarkable words, written by M. de Bassano to M. de Vicenza, prove what we have stated:—"The Emperor leaves to-morrow, and will sleep at Bantzen. . . . We are here all in expectation and in the highest hopes. The whole army is in motion. Confidence prevails universally. The King of Saxony and the royal family are not to leave Dresden. . . . His Majesty does not wish to prolong the armistice: he is ready for war,—more so than Austria. He has no reason to wait for supplies, and is unwilling to lose valuable time and to become exposed to the winter." . . . (In fact, at this moment Napoleon had refused a prolongation of the armistice, and only wished to delay the active operations of Austria.) . . . "M. de Bubna, who will have arrived long before the bearer of this despatch, knows our position. The secret joy of his Majesty in finding himself in a position of difficulty worthy of his genius has not escaped M. de Bubna. . . . His Majesty, who trusts in Providence, foresees the great designs in store for him. His plans are fixed, and he everywhere sees grounds of confidence." (Despatch of M. de Bassano to the Duke of Vicenza accompanying his plenary powers, dated August 13, 1813.)

his influence, and relinquished a part of what he called the constitutional territory of the Empire. From certain words of M. de Bubna, whose desire of peace had led him always to represent difficulties in the mildest light, Napoleon had thought that at the last moment he should perhaps prevail upon Austria to concede these important points, or at least that by exhibiting a sincere negotiation he might negotiate while fighting, which would involve the resumption of hostilities with the Prussians and Russians and a fresh delay with the Austrians.

Agreeably to these ideas, he ordered M. de Caulaincourt (observing secrecy even with M. de Narbonne, that the negotiation might be of a still more private character) to repair to M. de Metternich, to address him point-blank, and to say that Napoleon was anxious to profit by the remaining five days to come to some determination upon essentials, particularly in what concerned Austria, whom he requested openly and without delay to state the conditions on which she would either negotiate or make war with France, that the remaining time was too short to be wasted in vulgar subtleties, and it was necessary, therefore, to declare with the utmost precision what she wished, in order that Napoleon might reply with equal precision and promptitude,—that is to say, by yes or no. The Duke of Vicenza was to point out to M. de Metternich the extent to which this communication was to be held secret, since it was withheld even from M. de Narbonne; he was to insist on its being kept from the Prussian and Russian negotiators, even if they should come to any understanding. It would be sufficient, in fact, to bring forward in the official negotiation the propositions secretly agreed upon with Austria in the private negotiation, in order to secure their adoption; and since, after all, there remained for negotiation not only to the 10th but to the 17th of August, it was possible, if an immediate answer were given to the present proposition, which left Dresden on the 5th and reached Prague on the 6th and which might be replied to on the 7th, to bring to M. de Metternich on the 9th the definite adhesion of France to the ideas of Austria, and thus on the very eve of its dissolution to give an unexpected air of seriousness and efficacy to the congress.

Unfortunately, while addressing Austria in this overture,—tardy, indeed, but not hopeless of success,—Napoleon added for the official negotiation a note altogether offensive, for it expressed that the difficulties in form raised by the representatives of the belligerent parties disclosed their real intention, which was no other than to draw Austria into war; employing with this view either her bad faith or her simplicity,—all suppositions very far from flattering to either party. MM. de Narbonne and de Caulaincourt were to remit this strange note in common to M. de Metternich, after which M. de Caulaincourt, taking M. de Metternich aside, was secretly to make the proposition detailed above.

The despatches containing these contradictory orders left Dresden on the 5th of August and reached Prague on the 6th, and greatly surprised M. de Caulaincourt, and filled him with a combined emotion of joy and sadness, for in the few remaining days he despaired of bringing the negotiation to a happy conclusion in

*extremis*, and, moreover, the official note made him fear an outbreak greatly prejudicial to the success of his efforts. This note, which was to be public, offended M. de Metternich, who expressed his great alarm for its effect both on his master and on the courts of Prussia and Russia; but his astonishment was extreme when, the two French negotiators having left him, he, a few minutes after, saw M. de Caulaincourt at his house bringing, with great secrecy, a communication as important as the public one which was the subject of consideration. It was so tardy, and he had been so much accustomed to despair of Napoleon's disposition to peace, that he had difficulty in believing it sincere, and this reason alone checked his indulgence in joy which he would otherwise certainly have both felt and exhibited. He expressed his regret that this step had not been taken a few days earlier, when it would have been possible, without violating the required secrecy, to sound Russia and Prussia upon certain delicate points, and to reconcile difficulties which would probably divide the belligerent courts. However, since he demanded of Austria to state her conditions, those to which she would lend all her influence, and which she was resolved to enforce upon Prussia and Russia, he would consult his master, and he hoped to be able to give an answer in twenty-four hours.

M. de Metternich, accordingly, repaired to Brandeis, the residence of the Emperor Francis, whom he found incensed, as every one at Prague had been, with the official note of August 6, and created as much astonishment as anger by communicating to him the unexpected step of the principal French negotiator. Every extraordinary feature corresponded with the prompt and hasty character of Napoleon; but a step so apparently pacific, taken at the last moment, created some suspicion. The Emperor Francis and his minister asked themselves whether this was an act of energy or of cunning on the part of Napoleon; whether from elevated views he had at length been able to silence his pride, in order to come to some agreement with the European powers, or whether he wished to provoke the allies to some extravagant demands, in order that he might have an excuse with the French public for preferring war to a humiliating peace. They recognised the necessity of an unhesitating reply in either case,—for if he desired peace they ought to come to a fresh explanation with him; if he sought to provoke an inadmissible proposal, it was of consequence to baffle him by addressing to him the conditions long before determined, and which France would certainly not deem dishonourable. These conditions were really so indicated when they wished to reconstitute Germany, and for that purpose to restore some power to Prussia, that all change was impossible. They were, as we have so frequently repeated, the division of the duchy of Warsaw, whose fate had been pronounced at Moscow, and the greatest part of which was to return to Prussia; the abolition of the Confederation of the Rhine, which all Germany demanded should not be placed under foreign authority, and the re-establishment of the Hanse towns, which she equally demanded for the recovery of her commerce; lastly, the restitution of Illyria, long ago agreed to by Napoleon, and eagerly desired by Austria for the sake of its maritime position. All this was so

necessary for the recovery of German independence—though she would still remain exposed to the influence of Napoleon, who retained Mentz, Cologne, Wesel, Gorkum, the Texel, and Westphalia—that no other arrangement could be thought of. They had communicated enough with Prussia and Russia to be assured of their adhesion to these bases, and as to England, as the Hanse towns were re established and as Napoleon seemed ready to forego Spain, they were certain to gain her over to peace, for she would not remain alone at war with France. It was, therefore, resolved to let Napoleon know the conditions, which were not new to him, with the same demand for secrecy that was required by himself, and with the demand of a reply in twenty-four hours, for after midnight of August 10 it would be too late.

M. de Metternich, having returned to Prague on the 7th, was suddenly recalled to Brandeiss by his master, who had been seized with sudden hesitation before committing himself to these private communications. But, upon examination, the Emperor and his minister persisted, and, after the unfortunate loss of one day, the reply was brought to M. de Caulaincourt,—always without the knowledge of M. de Narbonne. M. de Metternich said to him that his master had questioned whether this unexpected and tardy communication was a measure of energy or cunning: if of energy, as he wished to think, on the part of his son-in-law, it deserved a frank reply; if of cunning, still it deserved a reply, for the conditions which were offered might be acknowledged to all the world, and in particular to France. He then made, verbally, the following declaration, which he authorized him to transcribe immediately on his dictation, and which is so important that we shall present it in full.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COUNT METTERNICH SIGNED  
BY THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

"M. de Metternich will demand of the Duke of Vicenza his word of honour that his Government will observe the most absolute secrecy on the subject in question.

"Knowing by preliminary confidential explanations the conditions imposed by the courts of Russia and Prussia on pacific arrangements, and participating in their views because I regard those conditions as necessary to the well-being of my states and of the other powers, and as the only ones which can really lead to general peace, I do not hesitate to announce the articles which constitute my *ultimatum*.

"I expect *yes* or *no* in the course of the 10th of August.

"I am determined to declare on the 11th, as will also be done by Russia and Prussia, that the congress is dissolved, and that I unite my forces to those of the allies to obtain a peace compatible with the interests of all the powers, and I will from that time withdraw the conditions now offered, which must for the future be decided by the fate of arms.

"No proposals made after the 11th can be connected with the present negotiation."

*Conditions on which Austria considers peace feasible.*

"The dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, and its division between Austria, Russia, and

Prussia; consequently, the assignment of Dantzic to Prussia.

"The re-establishment of Hamburg and Lubeck as free Hanse towns, and eventual arrangement, in connection with the general peace, in respect to the other parts of the 82d military division, and to the renunciation of the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, in order that the independence of all the present sovereigns of Germany may be placed under the guarantee of all the great powers.

"The reconstruction of Prussia with a tenable frontier on the Elbe.

"The cession of the Illyrian provinces to Austria.

"The reciprocal guarantee that the possessions of the great and small powers, such as they shall be fixed by the peace, shall be neither changed nor injured by any one among them."

After this very important communication, which negatives all the false statements made by certain writers, M. de Metternich added some very weighty explanations. He said that till midnight of August 10 Austria would remain free from any engagement with the belligerent powers, that up to that time she could treat confidentially with Napoleon, as she had actually done, adopt certain of his proposals, and even impose them upon the allies, to whom she was bound by no treaty; but that from the 11th she would be bound to them, could receive no communication without imparting it to them, and could allow no condition of peace without their assent.

These observations deserved the most serious attention, for the difference between treating on the 10th and not on the 11th or 12th consisted in its depending on Austria alone, who desired peace because she feared war, instead of on the allied powers, who had no wish for peace because they expected to gain by war and were a prey to all the passions of the moment. The Duke of Vicenza, while relating with exactness the communications he had received, accompanied them with fresh entreaties, couched in the most beautiful and touching language.

"Sire," said he to Napoleon, "this peace will, perhaps, in some degree affect your self-love, but in no degree your glory, for it will deduct nothing from the true greatness of France. I conjure you to grant this peace to France, to her sufferings, to her noble devotion to you, to the imperious circumstances in which you are placed. Allow the extinction of this fever of irritation against us which has seized all Europe, and which the most decisive victories will excite rather than allay. I ask it not for the vain honour of signing it, but because I am certain that you can do nothing more beneficial to our country, or more worthy of yourself and of your great character." We are about to see the effect of these noble prayers of a noble heart.

The reply which was brought on the 8th of August by M. de Metternich, and transcribed during the day, could not reach Napoleon before the 9th, and in fact was not presented to him till 8 a.m. of that day. He ought to have made the sacrifices demanded, which were merely sacrifices of self-love, as M. de Caulaincourt had well said, and to have come to an immediate decision and forwarded the reply on the same evening, so that it might reach Prague

on the morning of the 10th, accompanied with powers for M. de Caulaincourt to sign the basis of the peace before midnight of August 10. Unhappily, Napoleon did nothing of the kind. In the first place, he would not believe in the situation of Austria as stated to be free till midnight of August 10, but after that pledged, and instead of depending on herself depending on the will of her new allies. This he conceived to be merely the language of diplomacy, adopted with the view of intimidating him or of hastening his determinations; and, further, as he was not anxious to avoid war at the cost of very painful sacrifices, and being blinded by a deplorable confidence in his own strength, he made no haste to form or to make known his resolutions. He employed the day in coming to a decision, thinking that it would be time enough to resolve on the 10th; that, as hostilities could not be renewed till the 17th, there would be time to come to an understanding; that Austria might do with her allies as she chose on the 11th or 12th as well as on the 10th, provided she did not pass the 17th, and that consequently he might without inconvenience allow himself twenty-four hours for reflection. He, therefore, employed twenty-four hours, not in combating his own passions, but in flattering himself, and thus letting slip the decisive moment of this negotiation; and he who had so often seized the propitious moment on the battle-field, and to that prompt decision had owed his greatest triumphs, was about to lose the most important political moment of his reign. And how was M. de Bassano employed meanwhile? Why did he not spend that night at his master's feet, loudly repeating the ardent and patriotic prayers of M. de Caulaincourt? and if it were necessary, in order to subdue him, foolishly to flatter his indomitable pride, and to persuade him that even after the peace he would be more powerful than ever, even more powerful than before Moscow, M. de Bassano might have been a useful and patriotic flatterer, and he would have been nearer the truth than in allowing Napoleon to believe that glory consisted in making no concessions.

But nothing of this kind reached Napoleon's ears, and during those hours, which were carrying away his greatness and ours, he heard only the echo of his own thoughts. After having spent the night in repeated revisions of his military returns in conjunction with M. de Bassano, and having persuaded himself that he could meet every thing, he felt that he ought to persevere in his views, and not to make the slightest further sacrifice to the cause of peace. He, therefore, insisted on the following conditions: He consented to sacrifice the grand-duchy of Warsaw as an attempt on the part of Poland which the event had negatived, but, while restoring some greatness to Prussia, he refused to reward her for what he called treason. He allowed her to receive the greatest part of the duchy of Warsaw, or even the whole, if Russia and Austria would consent; but he wished to throw her beyond the Oder, to deprive her, in favour of Saxony, of Brandenburg, Berlin, and Potsdam, that is to say, her native soil and her glory, to transport her between the Oder and the Vistula, and thus to make her rather a Polish than a German power, to leave her the choice of Warsaw or Königsberg for a capital,

without giving her Dantzic, which would again become a free town. In her stead, between the Oder and the Elbe, he wished to place Saxony, and to assign to that power all the space between Dresden and Berlin. As to Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, these were parts of the constitutional territory of the Empire, and he would not hear them mentioned. To deprive him of the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine was, in his view, to inflict upon him an indignity, since it was acknowledged to be an empty title. He was prepared to restore Illyria to Austria, retaining Istria, i.e. Trieste, the only object of strong desire to Austria. He also claimed to retain several positions beyond the Julian Alps,—such as Villach, Goritz, and, in a word, all the issues allowing a descent into Illyria, saying that he was not sure of Venice without these positions; that is to say, that he was not sure of his own house unless he possessed the key of his neighbour's. On these conditions he admitted peace without considering himself crippled, and he consented to return to the Rhine with his armies. On any other conditions he preferred to contend for years against all Europe. Such were the results of the meditation of that fatal night.

However, as there was no chance that Austria could obtain from her future allies that Prussia should relinquish Berlin in order to make up along with Saxony a false Prussia without antecedents, without consistency, without reality, he authorized M. de Caulaincourt to renounce this first project if it were not accepted, and he consented to leave to Prussia, besides what should be allotted to her of the duchy of Warsaw, all that she possessed between the Oder and the Elbe, but retaining Dantzic as a free town, and forbidding all mention of Lubeck, Hamburg, Bremen, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and restoring Illyria only on the condition of retaining Istria and particularly Trieste, because, he always maintained, to wish for Trieste was to wish for Venice.

On the morning of the 10th, Napoleon summoned to his presence M. de Bubna, who earnestly desired peace, and who, unhappily, lost himself rather too much to the views of his powerful interlocutor in the hope of softening him. Napoleon informed him of the secret negotiation with M. de Metternich, showed him his army returns, openly displayed his inclination for a campaign in Saxony, from which he anticipated equal power and glory, exhibited himself, as he really was, confident, ever cheerful, inclining to war as much as to peace, and consequently disposed to do little to turn the scale in the negotiations at Prague; then, after having without vain pomp or boasting revealed that fatal energy of his mind, he stated his conditions, demanding an assent to nearly all which, indeed, M. de Bubna could not grant, but which he did not refuse in so peremptory a manner as to scatter all illusion. On two points in particular, the Hanse towns and the Confederation of the Rhine, M. de Bubna never having found his court as absolute as on the rest, he appeared to give way, and Napoleon imagined that without submitting to these two conditions, which appeared to him intolerable, he might have peace, perhaps, at the sacrifice of Trieste. He did not, therefore, despair of a peace concluded on these bases; but in any case he had

made up his mind, and had no objection to renew the war; he even flattered himself that in a continuance of the war he should recover not all his glory, which had remained entire, but all his power,—all that which he had buried under the ruins of Moscow.

After this interview he sent back M. de Bubna, with the order to write to his Government in this sense, and he sent his final resolutions to M. de Caulaincourt. The courier could not arrive before the 11th. Napoleon concerned himself little about this delay, and awaited the reply, whatever it might be, while making all his arrangements for the renewal of hostilities on the 17th.

The 10th passed at Prague without any intelligence from Dresden, to the great satisfaction of the Prussian and Russian negotiators, the great grief of M. de Caulaincourt, and the great regret of M. de Metternich, who, although he had formed his decision, could not contemplate without alarm for Austria the terrible trial of a new war with France. Several times in the course of that day he repaired to M. de Caulaincourt to know if any reply had come from Dresden, and each time finding M. de Caulaincourt melancholy and silent because he had nothing to communicate, he repeated that after midnight he should no longer be an arbitrator but a belligerent, and consequently reduced to solicit peace from his new allies instead of being able to impose upon them one which should be moderate and acceptable to everybody.

After having vainly awaited during the whole of the 10th, M. de Metternich at length signed the adhesion of Austria to the coalition, and on the morning of the following day announced to M. de Caulaincourt and to M. de Narbonne, (the latter still ignorant of the secret negotiation,) with manifest grief, that the Congress of Prague was dissolved, that henceforward Austria, forced by her duties to Germany and to herself, was constrained to declare war with France. The Prussian and Russian negotiators, on their side, announced that they would withdraw, throwing upon France the responsibility of the failure of the negotiations, and they quitted Prague with unconcealed joy. Moreover, this joy was universal, and except M. de Metternich, who, though undeterred by them, perceived the possible consequences of a rupture with Napoleon, and the Emperor, whose heart was torn in thinking of his daughter, the Austrians of all classes exhibited transports of enthusiasm. The Germanic passions which they shared, and which they had been compelled to restrain, burst forth beyond all bounds, as they had done at Breslau and at Berlin some months before.

In the course of the 11th, M. de Caulaincourt at length received the courier so anxiously desired the day before, and when he saw his communication he regretted less its tardy arrival. Though he did not despair of obtaining some concessions from M. de Metternich, yet he did not flatter himself that he would consent to the translation of Prussia beyond the Oder, and even laying aside that chimerical condition, he did not think that he could retain for Napoleon Hamburg, the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and, above all, Trieste. Yet, while leaving Trieste to Austria, and making a temporary arrangement for the Hanse towns which should make their restitution dependent

on peace with England, he did not deem it impossible to bring M. de Metternich to adopt the proposals of France. He, therefore, hastened to his house, where he found him melancholy and agitated, vexed because they had come so late, astonished and displeased at their having communicated to M. de Bubna the secret of a negotiation which he had hoped would have been kept absolutely hidden; he did not consider the conditions proposed by Napoleon as acceptable, but, on the pretty plain indication that they were not irrevocable, he gave reason to believe that, while determined on the restitution of Trieste to Austria, the re-establishment of Prussia as far as the Elbe, the abolition of the protectorate of the Rhine, it might be possible to adjourn the question of the Hanse towns till peace should be made with England, which greatly compensated for the annoyance of the sacrifice to Napoleon, by the immense advantage of a maritime peace. "But," added M. de Metternich, "these conditions, thus modified, which we could have imposed upon the belligerent parties twenty-four hours ago, no longer depend upon us, and we can only propose them, uncertain whether we shall secure their acceptance." M. de Metternich was grieved and agitated, for although his rare penetration might enable him to detect in the present occasion many chances of raising his country, he also saw many chances of losing it by involving it in a frightful war. Napoleon, though very imprudent in the eyes of sensible men, remained so great in the imagination of the world that he was still much feared, though regarded as misled by passion and exposed to all the errors to which passion leads.

However, the official negotiation could not last, for the congress was dissolved, and war was officially declared by Austria against France. The Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries had withdrawn, and it was not becoming that the French plenipotentiaries should remain at Prague. It was agreed, if Napoleon consented, that M. de Narbonne should leave by himself, explaining to him as well as possible his isolated departure, that M. de Caulaincourt should remain to learn the result of the overtures which M. de Metternich was to make to the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, who were to repair to Prague in two or three days. This prolongation of his stay was very disagreeable to M. de Caulaincourt, for his position would become altogether false when he should be in the same city with the Emperor Alexander without the possibility of seeing him. But whatever afforded a chance of peace was endurable and even agreeable to him, and he willingly consented to remain. In relating to Napoleon what had taken place between him and the Austrian minister, he again urgently recommended peace, entreated him to continue the negotiation, however difficult it had now become, since it was no longer with Austria alone but with all the belligerent parties, pressed for latitude to treat, and especially for authentic powers to sign, for at this last moment the least defect in form might be taken for a new *ignis fatuus* and put a final termination to his office. All that an honourable man and a good citizen could say to a sovereign to avert a fatal error, M. de Caulaincourt repeated to Napoleon in language equally firm and devoted.

When these communications reached Dresden they found Napoleon ready for war, and neither grieved nor surprised at the dissolution of the congress. The very day in which Austria had declared the congress dissolved before it had met, and had announced her adhesion to the alliance, the armistice had been denounced by the commissaries of the belligerent powers, which fixed the 17th of August for the resumption of hostilities. The possibility of renewing by any secret way negotiations so openly broken off was of the slightest character, and Napoleon behaved as if he did not count upon it at all. He ordered M. de Narbonne to leave Prague immediately, for that diplomatist being both plenipotentiary at the congress and ambassador to the court of Austria, he could no longer appear at a court which had just declared war with France. He authorized M. de Caulaincourt to remain at Prague, not in the city itself but in the neighbourhood, in order that the former French ambassador at the court of Russia might not be in the same place as the Emperor Alexander, "whose triumph," he said, "he must not adorn," a triumph, alas! which we ourselves procured for him by our blind obstinacy; he consented that his last propositions should be transmitted to Prussia and Russia, not in his own name, but in the name of Austria, who should present them as her own, for, he added, he did not consider it becoming his dignity to make any proposal to the belligerent powers. He sent to M. de Caulaincourt powers in form but no latitude to treat, his conditions being invariable with regard to the Hanse towns, the protectorate of the Rhine, and even Trieste, which he wished to retain while restoring Illyria to Austria. This presented but a poor chance of peace, for Austria could not accept such conditions, and, even if willing to do so, she could no longer throw the weight of her sword into the balance, since, in spite of her repeated warnings, she had been compelled to join the coalition.

But Napoleon was little affected by these considerations. The solicitations of M. de Caulaincourt had made no impression upon him. He respected his decision and openness, and treated him with greater consideration than M. de Bassano, but was little influenced by his words, because he knew that his ideas differed from his own. He had celebrated his fête on the 10th of August instead of the 15th, had teased the whole army, distributed numerous prizes for shooting, and had removed as far as possible the gloomy images of death from the mind of soldiers so easily diverted and amused. His *corps d'armée* were all ready, and from the 11th had begun to leave their cantonments to concentrate themselves under their commanders, and to reach the line where they were to fight. The old corps were rested, recruited, and completed. The organization of the new was just finished. The cavalry, though young, was of a fine character, and even numerous. The works of Königstein and Lillenstein, of Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, Werben, and Hamburg, were either finished or nearly so. The vast supplies which it had been necessary to bring by the Elbe from Hamburg to Magdeburg, from Magdeburg to Dresden, were already collected at

the appropriate points. Dresden was overflowing with grain, flour, spirits, fresh and salt meat. All the convoys had been accelerated, and orders were issued that from the 15th there should be no wheel-carriage on the German roads, and no boat upon the Elbe, that the Cossacks might find nothing to carry off, and be able to *pillage only the country*, as Napoleon wrote to Marshal Davout. He prepared to leave on the 15th or 16th of August for Silesia and the Bohemian frontier, where he expected hostilities to begin. He left no one in doubt as to the renewal of the war. He wrote to General Rapp at Dantzic, to encourage him as to the issue of this new struggle, to confer extraordinary powers upon him, recommending him never to surrender the fortress, and promising to raise the blockade shortly. He acted in the same manner towards the commandants of Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin. He wrote to Marshal Davout at Hamburg, and to General Lemarois at Magdeburg, to be on their guard, for war was about to recommence, that it would be terrible, but that he was in a condition to meet all his enemies, Austria included, and that he hoped before three months to punish them for their insulting proposals. To none did he venture to say on what peace had depended; he did not even inform the real head of the government of the regency, the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and contented himself with saying that he should shortly be informed of the demands of Austria, which for the present must be kept secret, but which were really so extravagant as to be insulting. Showing a little less respect to the Duke of Rovigo, Napoleon did not scruple at direct falsehood with him, and wrote that they had wished to deprive us of Venice, founding his assertion, probably, on his ordinary remark, that to demand Trieste was to demand Venice,—as if to demand Magdeburg were to demand Mentz, because one is on the road to the other. Unwilling to alarm the Empress, he ordered the arch-chancellor to cause her to leave for Cherbours, that she might not hear of the rupture and the resumption of hostilities till some great battle had been gained and the greatest dangers were over.

At this moment appeared at Dresden a lieutenant of Napoleon, who was the most useful on the field, and who was desirable in the present circumstances in the twofold respect of war and policy,—the King of Naples. Independently of the necessity of a commander of superior merit for the reserve cavalry, amounting to 30,000 men, it was a real comfort to Napoleon, and a great ground of confidence, to have drawn Murat from Italy. We have seen that, weary of Napoleon's yoke, wounded by his offensive treatment, alarmed for the fate of the Imperial dynasty, Murat had thought of joining Austria and the mediating policy of that power, in order to save his throne from the general disaster, and that, mistrusting even his wife, he at length withdrew from her, and fell into a state of morbid agitation. We have also seen that Napoleon, to complete the army of Italy and to put the court of Naples to the test, had demanded of him one division of his troops, and that Murat, in league with Austria, and desirous of retaining his whole army in his hands, had refused the wishes of

his brother-in-law. But, in his usual manner, Napoleon had called upon Murat, through M. Durand de Mareuil, the French minister, to comply with his requisitions under pain of war. Murat, then ignorant which side to adopt, sometimes imagining Napoleon beaten, destroyed, all the thrones of the Bonapartes overthrown, except, perhaps, those of the sovereigns who should have saved themselves by a seasonable defection, sometimes imagining him conqueror at Lutzen, Bautzen, and elsewhere, disarming Europe by victory and by concessions, sacrificing, if necessary, Spain and Naples to peace, had fallen into a state of actual imbecility, until the counsels of his wife, and the letters of the Duke of Otranto, with whom he had been repeatedly in the relation of a secret intrigue, determined him to obey. But, unwilling to be reconciled by halves, he had come to place himself at the head of the cavalry of the grand army, and had reached Dresden the day before taking the field. Napoleon received him graciously, pretending not to perceive what had passed, appearing to attach no importance to the fluctuations of a brother-in-law equally brave and inconsistent,—in a word, pardoning him, but with a certain indication of disdain, which Murat perceived plainly and felt in silence.

Napoleon took him with him, and left for Bautzen in the night of the 15th of August, in order to be at the advanced posts twenty-four hours before the resumption of hostilities, evidently without hope of seeing peace result from the combined efforts of MM. de Caulaincourt and de Metternich. There was, indeed, very little room for hope, both on account of the conditions themselves and the time so sadly lost. M. de Caulaincourt, immediately after having received the last communications from Dresden, and having given some pretext to M. de Narbonne to account for his prolonged stay at Prague, had repaired to M. de Metternich to show his powers, and to furnish him with the proof of his being authorized to treat seriously, always on the condition of presenting the proposals in the name of Austria and not of France. In regard to essentials, he could not give much satisfaction, for Napoleon had persisted in almost all his claims. Nevertheless, if Austria had been still free, she would perhaps have admitted the French conditions, for in recovering Illyria and also that part of Galicia which had been taken from her to constitute the grand-duchy of Warsaw, in obtaining a kind of reconstitution of Prussia by means of the dissolution of that grand-duchy, in being relieved as well as her allies from the phantom of Poland, which for some years Napoleon had always held before the eyes of those among whom it had formerly been divided, she would probably have thought that she had profited enough by the circumstances, and she would not have run the risk of war for Trieste, and still less for Hamburg, which concerned Prussia and England much more nearly than herself. Unfortunately, she was no longer free, and, being unwilling to break her word with her new allies, she could only address their councils without being able to enforce them by refusing to join their alliance, which had been accepted since midnight of August 10. M. de Metternich, saying more than he

had ever said before, for his confidence was now attended with no inconvenience, confessed to the Duke of Vicenza that these conditions a little modified might have led to peace eight days earlier, but that now, being dependent on others and able to do nothing without his allies, he despaired of securing their acceptance. He spoke of the passions which animated them, of the hopes they had conceived, of the effect produced on them by the battle of Vittoria, and, by the emotion which he exhibited, it was easy to see that his regret was sincere. In fact, to England, protected by the sea, and to Russia, protected by distance, the struggle could have no fatal consequences; but to Prussia and Austria, whom nothing protected from the blows of Napoleon, and who had exchanged alliance with him for war against him, the struggle might bring disastrous results, and M. de Metternich was well aware that, whatever reason he might have for attempting to improve the situation of his country on this occasion, he would be overwhelmed with the bitterest reproach if Napoleon should prove conqueror. It is, therefore, very possible that, if still free, he would have accepted the proposed conditions with some modifications, and it was plain that in losing time with deplorable obstinacy more injury had been done, perhaps, than by persisting in exorbitant claims.

However this may be, it was agreed that, on the arrival of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia at Prague, M. de Metternich should present in the name of his master the overtures in question, and that he should give a reply before the 17th of August. In order to remove any awkwardness from the position of the Duke of Vicenza, who was the object of well-merited respect, it was decided that he should go to await the reply of M. de Metternich at the castle of Konigsal, situated near Prague and belonging to the Emperor Francis. He would thus avoid being in the same place as the Emperor Alexander, and also avoid witnessing the joy of the allies, who received with transport the news of approaching hostilities and of the adhesion of Austria to the European coalition.

Ever since the 11th a part of the Prussian and Russian staffs had hastened to Prague to concert military operations with the Austrian staff; an army of more than 100,000 men, Prussians and Russians, entered Bohemia to join the Austrian army; the officers of the three armies embraced, congratulated themselves on fighting together to contribute to what they called the common deliverance, and everywhere burst forth joy, which might be called convulsive, for it was a mixture of hope, fear, and desperate resolution.

On the 15th the Emperor Alexander made his entry into Prague, where he was received with the honours due to his rank and to the part of liberator of Europe assigned to him then by all except the Austrian Government, which was somewhat annoyed by these enthusiastic demonstrations, and little disposed to exchange the domination of France for that of Russia. As soon as that monarch had entered Prague, and before the arrival of the King of Prussia, M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis informed him of the secret of the clandestine negotiation which had been carried

on simultaneously with the official negotiation during the last days of the congress at Prague, and asked his opinion. To speak of peace at this time was most unreasonable. Alexander was intoxicated with hope since the battle of Vittoria, and still more since the adhesion of Austria. Perhaps even without that power he would have flattered himself that he could maintain the struggle, having received numerous reinforcements during the last two months, and Prussia had also greatly augmented her forces. But with Austria in addition, with the news sent by the English of their progress in Spain and their approaching entry into France, he did not doubt that he should soon be the conqueror of Napoleon and replace him in Europe. The mind of that young monarch was singularly inflamed, and to attain the object of his ambition there was no danger that he would not brave, no caress that he would not lavish on his associates, old and new. He was full of attentions, of apparent deference to all, and, far from self-exaltation, he affected to appear less than he really was, to avoid creating offence or disgust. With much respect and condescension to the Emperor Francis, without professing the intention to dethrone Napoleon, *i.e.* Maria Louisa, he expressed the hope of shortly obtaining, by means of war, more favourable conditions and an independence of Germany infinitely better guaranteed. He had, moreover, a very powerful reason to urge with Austria, *viz.*, that without relinquishing the Hanse towns it would be impossible to obtain the adhesion of England, to which they were strongly bound, and he had also a very seductive bait to hold before her eyes, which was the possibility, if victorious, of restoring a part of Italy. Consequently, without awaiting the arrival of the King of Prussia, Alexander replied in writing through the medium of M. de Metternich to M. de Caulaincourt, that their majesties the allied sovereigns, after mutual conference, thinking that every idea of real peace was inseparable from the general pacification which their majesties had hoped to prepare by the negotiations at Prague, they had not found in the articles now proposed by his majesty the Emperor Napoleon conditions which could secure the great end at which they aimed, and that, consequently, their majesties considered the conditions inadmissible. This was to say clearly enough that they considered the conditions unacceptable to England.

M. de Bender, employé of the Austrian legation, was ordered to convey this answer himself to M. de Caulaincourt, in the castle of Konigsal, and to send it to him in writing. Though prepared for it, it filled him with consternation, for his good sense and exalted patriotism augured great evils from the continuance of this war. He made his preparations for departure, saw M. de Metternich for the last time, with whom he exchanged renewed but unprofitable regrets, agreed with him that a congress might be opened for negotiation during the continuance of actual hostilities,—a feeble hope, which left to each party the chance of signing his own destruction after a frightful battle; and then he went to join Napoleon in Lusatia. With sorrowful heart he wrote to M. de Bassano to express, in haughty and

bitter language, his vexation at having been employed in a deceptive negotiation, and in the presence of Napoleon he testified, with great respect but firm conviction, the grief which he experienced at the neglect of the only opportunity of concluding peace. Napoleon, in a superficial manner, endeavoured to console him for the loss of this opportunity, promised to furnish him with a still more favourable one in a short time, and restored to him his functions, which were nominally those of grand equerry, but which became, after the death of Marshal Davout, sometimes those of grand marshal, sometimes even those of minister of foreign affairs and ambassador extraordinary. Honours might touch that noble heart, certainly not insensible to the favours of the court, but they could in no degree make him forget the misfortunes of his country.

Such was the celebrated and unfortunate negotiation with Austria, begun and carried on under the influence of the most fatal illusions, and with an awkwardness explicable only in the case of so penetrating an intellect as Napoleon's by the perverse bias of passion. As we have said, and as MM. de Caulaincourt, de Talleyrand, and de Cambacérès maintained in the council held in the Tuileries, it was necessary either to nullify Austria on this occasion, at least to attempt to do so by lulling her with attentions, pretending not to wish to engage her in a war in which she was not concerned, and especially demanding of her no part of her forces, to avoid furnishing any pretext for arming; or else, if she were urged to take a more prominent part, and thereby afforded a specious reason for augmenting her forces, if, so to speak, she were led by the hand to the office of mediator, it was necessary to foresee her desires which naturally arose from her position, and to be content to mislead them, which, after all, would not have been very difficult. But to urge her to take the sword, and then to suppose that she would employ it for us and not for herself, at our will and not at her own, was to indulge in illusion to which the greatest as well as the smallest minds are liable whenever they are inclined to self-deception. If to this error we add that of having signed the armistice of Pleiswitz before having thrown the allies back upon the Vistula at a distance from the Austrians, a second fault, which, as we have seen, arose from the same desire of avoiding the conditions of the court of Vienna, we have the true causes which led to so fatal an issue the events at first so prosperous of the spring of 1813.

But the guns were already resounding on a line of 150 leagues, from Konigsstein to Hamburg, and Napoleon, excited by the noise of arms, had soon forgotten the multiplied journeys and discussions of diplomatists, to think only of the vast military designs from which he expected such great results. It is now time to explain his plan and forces for this second part of the Saxon campaign. But, to understand them better, we must first understand the plan and forces of the enemy.

It will be remembered that at Trachenberg it was agreed by the allies that the three principal armies should march against Napoleon.



that all three should act on the offensive, but with precaution, to avoid disasters; that in this view, that one of the three against which Napoleon should direct his aim should slacken their pace, while the other two should endeavour to fall upon his flanks and rear and overthrow the lieutenants charged with their protection. These three armies were to be those of Bohemia, Silesia, and the North, which they hoped, with the corps of Italy and Bavaria, to raise to 575,000 effective troops, bringing with them 1500 guns, without reckoning 250,000 reserves scattered throughout Bohemia, Poland, and Old Prussia. In fact, they had almost reached these very high numbers during the armistice, which had been as serviceable to the allies as to Napoleon, for the Russians had received their reinforcements and their *matériel*, which they had been unable to bring in the haste of their winter march; the Prussians had also had leisure to arm and train their innumerable volunteers; and, finally, Austria had organized her army, which was merely nominal in January, in such a way that, independently of the political advantage of bringing Austria to a decision, the armistice of Pleiswitz had conferred on the allies the additional advantage of doubling the number of their troops.

The forces of the coalition were distributed as follows: about 120,000 Austrians, half of them old soldiers, were in Bohemia, at the foot of the mountains separating that province from Saxony, all in readiness to cross the defiles; 70,000 Russians under Barclay de Tolly, 60,000 Prussians under General Kleist, had awaited the declaration of Austria before passing from Silesia into Bohemia, and now came to form with the Austrians the grand army destined to turn the position of Dresden by a march into Saxony. The point of concentration for this army, called the army of Bohemia, was Leipsic, and the allies could not conceive that Napoleon, attacked in front on the Elbe by two other armies, could stand so formidable an attack as that prepared on his rear with 250,000 men. From deference for Austria, and to gain her over by every imaginable means, including flattery, they had decreed the chief command of the army of Bohemia to Prince Schwarzenberg, who in his quality of ambassador had negotiated the marriage of Maria Louisa, who had commanded the Austrian auxiliary corps in 1812, and had very recently been sent as an envoy to Paris. These contradictory offices caused that personage some difficulty, for he owed to Napoleon the marshal's baton without having earned it, and he was now called upon to earn it by acting against the person to whom he owed it. He was, therefore, much alarmed at finding himself in the presence of such an adversary as Napoleon, though in the aulic council he had spoken much of the weakening of the French army, and, as usual, he consoled himself for occupying a false position by indulging the emotions of gratified pride. It was indeed a great honour to him to hold so high a command in the presence of the allied sovereigns; nor was he undeserving of it, in some respects, for he was prudent, he had some understanding of war on a large scale, and he possessed a *savoir-vivre* which fitted him to deal with

characters so varied as those composing the coalition. To this flattery had been added a species of attention to Austria not less calculated to affect her. By a secret article of the treaty of subsidies concluded with the British Government at Reichenbach, it had been agreed that she should be allowed a pecuniary succour in case of her taking part in the war, and Lord Cathcart on arriving at Prague had already given bills of exchange upon London, to procure for her as quickly as possible the financial resources of which she stood in need.

After this principal army came that of Silesia. This was composed of the Russian corps of Generals Langeron and Saint-Priest, making together about 40,000 men, of the Prussian corps under General d'York, amounting to about 38,000, and of another Russian corps, that of General Sacken, comprising 17,000 or 18,000 men. The sum total was nearly 100,000 men. At the head of this army was the impetuous Blücher. It was to cross the limit which, in Silesia, had separated the belligerent troops during the armistice, to pass the Katzbach and the Bober, and to bring us back to Bautzen, unless Napoleon were on that side. Prudence had been strongly urged upon Blücher, but, surrounded as he was by the most eager Prussian officers, and having for the chief of his staff, instead of General Scharnhorst, who had died of his wounds, General Gneisenau, a spirited officer, ever acting on the first impulse, he had no one at his side to recall those wise instructions.

The army of the North collected around Berlin was the third of the active armies, and was to be commanded by the Prince-Royal of Sweden. Amounting on the whole to about 150,000 men of all nations, it comprised 25,000 Swedes and Germans under General Steding, 18,000 Russians under Prince Woronzow, 10,000 Cossacks and other scouts under Wintzingerode, 40,000 Prussians under General Bulow, 30,000 other Prussians under General Tauenzien,—these last specially devoted to the blockade of fortresses;—lastly, a mixture of English, Hanoverians, Germans, and Hanse, and of insurgents from every province under our sway, forming about 25,000 men, under General Walmoden. A part of this numerous army was to remain before Dantzic, Custrin, and Stettin, another part to observe Hamburg, a third,—the most considerable,—80,000 in number, was to march to Magdeburg, there if possible to cross the Elbe and threaten Napoleon on his left flank, while the grand army of Bohemia should threaten him on his right. It was hoped that by marching upon him concentrically, halting whenever he fell upon any of the three armies but advancing towards the point which he had abandoned, each time attempting to gain a little ground, they should continually press him closer and closer, and perhaps find an opportunity for attacking him with all their combined forces and crushing him under their weight.

To these three active armies, comprising 500,000 men and 1500 guns, had been added a force of 25,000 men for the observation of Bavaria, and another of 50,000 to make a stand against Prince Eugene in the direction of Italy. Austria, giving attention in every

quarter, but attaching little importance to any thing which might occur in this region, had sent from Vienna all that was most valuable in archives, arms, and works of art. She thought truly that the fate of the world was to be settled on the Elbe, between Dresden, Bautzen, Magdeburg, and Leipsic, and was content to see Prince Eugene at Vienna, which was very improbable, rather than withdraw her forces from the true theatre of war.

These two armies of Bavaria and Italy, then, brought up the active forces of the coalition to 575,000 men. To these must be added the reserves. Austria had 60,000 men between Presburg, Vienna, and Lintz. Russia had in Poland 50,000 men under General Benningsen, 50,000 under Prince Labanoff, all ready to enter on the field when their interference should be necessary. Prussia reckoned still on about 90,000 recruits whose training was completed, and who afforded a further amount of 250,000 men, intended to repair the losses occasioned by war in the troops earliest engaged. Though the ranks of these numerous armies would undoubtedly be thinned on the march, it may be said that upwards of 800,000 men were actually present at their colours, and that it was with this force, really and not merely nominally immense, that Napoleon would soon be engaged. Never in history had such masses of soldiers been set in motion, and never had there been a stronger motive than that which stimulated the coalition.

We may now judge of the extent of Napoleon's error in accepting the armistice of Pleiswitz. He had signed it for two reasons, viz., to relieve himself from the urgent solicitations of Austria in regard to peace, and being accustomed to find his own activity superior to that of all others, and not estimating the miracles which might be wrought by his adversaries under the influence of passion, he believed that during these two months 200,000 men might join his ranks, and not half that number should join those of the enemy. The contrary had taken place, for, as we have seen, he had scarcely added 150,000 men to his troops, (not reckoning, indeed, the increase of moral worth acquired by two months' instruction and repose,) while the coalition had added nearly 400,000, including the forces of Austria. His calculation, therefore, had been incorrect. Nevertheless, Napoleon had employed these two months with admirable activity, and his plans were contrived with a degree of skill well fitted to thwart all those of his adversaries.

The position of the Elbe, as we have said, though easy to turn by debouching from Bohemia upon Leipsic, had nevertheless been selected by Napoleon as the best and even the only one admissible. Dresden, fortified as well as it could be since the walls had been blown up, was to be his centre of operation and principal establishment. It contained his arsenals, his magazines, his dépôts, and three bridges. At the distance of seven or eight leagues to his right, at the point where the Elbe pierces the mountains of Bohemia to enter Saxony, he possessed the fortified posts of Königstein and Lillienstein, with a solid bridge and magazines, enabling him to man-

oeuvre at will on the two banks of the river. To his left, at Torgau, fifteen leagues below Dresden, he had works, provisions, and bridges; the same at Wittenberg and Magdeburg. This last point, moreover, was a vast fortress, regularly fortified, in which he had deposited, besides a large amount of ammunition and provisions, all the sick and wounded of the spring campaign. The temporary post of Werben filled up the vacancy between Magdeburg and Hamburg, and Hamburg protected the Lower Elbe. It was, no doubt, possible to pass the Elbe between Magdeburg and Hamburg, on account of the distance separating these two cities, which was but imperfectly occupied by the post of Werben; but the enemy who should wish to attempt that enterprise leaving on his flank the two important forts of Hamburg and Magdeburg, and having in front a considerable body whose position and duty we shall shortly state, could not do so as long as the grand army under Napoleon should retain the *point d'appui* of Dresden, which brought to that city, where Napoleon commanded in person, the nucleus of the immense military force about to be engaged.

The line of defence being thus established on the Elbe, it remains to be seen how Napoleon had distributed his forces. Divining the projects of the enemy as acutely as if he had been present at the conferences of Trachenberg, he had clearly perceived that he would have three powerful armies on his hands, one to the right in Bohemia, one in front in Silesia, one to the left in the direction of Berlin, threatening the Elbe between Magdeburg and Hamburg. Against these different attacks he had provided with the most perfect foresight. The new corps of Marshal St. Cyr, containing 30,000 men in four divisions, recently brought from Mentz to Dresden, had been placed at Königstein on the left bank of the Elbe, not to close the passages by which the grand army of the enemy might descend from Bohemia into Saxony on our rear. The corps of General Vandamme, containing also 30,000 men, detached from Marshal Davout's army, and brought from Hamburg to Dresden, had been placed on a level with the corps of St. Cyr, but on the other side of the Elbe, to guard on the right of the river, the defiles of the mountains of Bohemia issuing in Lusatia. A little farther on in Lusatia, still at the foot of the Bohemian mountains, at the defile of Zittau, had been posted the corps of Poniatowski and that of Marshal Victor, which had been formed during the armistice. And a little farther still—i.e. in Silesia, on the frontier line of the armistice, on the Katzbach and the Bober—were the four corps of Macdonald, (11th,) Lauriston, (5th,) Ney, (3d,) and Marmont, (6th,) comprising, together, 100,000 men. In the rear, near Bautzen, were the Imperial Guard, raised during the armistice from 12,000 men to 48,000, and the three corps of cavalry reserves of Generals Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, and Kellermann, comprising 24,000 well-mounted horsemen. To the left, three corps—those of Oudinot, (12th,) Bertrand, (4th,) and Reynier (7th)—had been ordered to oppose the army of the North commanded by Bernadotte.

His troops being thus distributed, Napoleon had resolved to parry all the possibilities of this formidable campaign in the following manner: Prince Schwarzenberg's army, by far the most numerous, which threatened our right flank by the debouches of Bohemia, might descend by two issues, one on this side of the Elbe, *i.e.* on our rear by the high-road of Peterswalde, the other on the other, *i.e.* in our front by the high-road from Bohemia into Alsatia, passing by Zittau. It was necessarily by one of these two issues that it must appear. Napoleon was equally ready on each hypothesis. Marshal St. Cyr with his four divisions occupied the road of Peterswalde on this side the Elbe. One of these divisions was a guard at the bridge thrown between the works of Konigstein and Lillenstein; two others occupied the camp of Pirna, whose fire commanded the high-road of Peterswalde; the fourth, with General Pajol's light cavalry, watched all the secondary roads which, still farther back, might take Dresden in the rear. If the enemy should attempt to descend on the rear of Dresden, either to attack that city or to march for Leipsic, Marshal St. Cyr, after availing himself of the local advantages to check the march of the allies, was to throw a garrison into the forts of Konigstein and Lillenstein, and then to fall back upon Dresden with his four divisions. Supported by that city with about 30,000 men, and finding there a garrison of 8000 or 10,000, which Napoleon had composed of convalescents, of marching battalions, and guards of honour, he was there to defend himself in an intrenched camp carefully prepared beforehand, and maintain his ground for some days without being called upon to make any great effort. In every case, things were disposed so as to procure for him prompt and decisive succour. General Vandamme with his three divisions on the other side of the Elbe, one at Stolpen on the Zittau road, another at Rumburg in the neighbourhood of Zittau itself, the third at Bautzen, might in twenty-four hours forward to Dresden the divisions which should be stationed at Stolpen, and in forty-eight hours bring up the other two. Thus, on the second day Marshal St. Cyr ought to be reinforced by 10,000 men, and on the third by 20,000, which would bring his whole force to nearly 70,000, and to at least 60,000 well posted in a good intrenched camp. This should shelter him from all attacks. After two more days, *i.e.* after four days from the appearance of the enemy, Napoleon was to hasten from Gorlitz with 48,000 of the Guard, 24,000 of the cavalry reserve, 24,000 of Marshal Victor's corps, leaving at Zittau Poniatowski's corps. Then, on the fourth day, 170,000 men were to be at Dresden, which would have sufficed in the places supposed to make the allies repent their boldness in wishing to turn our position, and probably to cut them off forever from Bohemia.

In the opposite case, if the enemy designed to descend from Bohemia into Lusatia, not on this side of the Elbe but on the other, not in the rear but in the front of Napoleon, and to debouche by Zittau on Gorlitz or Bautzen, the same distribution should effect an equally prompt concentration of forces. Napoleon had resolved to post at the Zittau defile Poniatowski's corps, amounting to about 12,000 men, and quite at hand to support him Marshal Victor's corps,

which made at least 36,000 men in a strong position at the very exit from the mountains and carefully studied beforehand. In one day the Guard and the cavalry, which were at Gorlitz, and Vandamme's division, which was at Rumburg, were ready to bring the aid of 80,000 men to the 36,000 stationed at Zittau. One day more, by the arrival of Vandamme with his two other divisions, and the falling back of one of the four corps posted on the Bober, ought to bring a further aid of 50,000 men. Thus were 170,000 men in the course of two days opposed to this second debouche, and so arranged as to be able to defend themselves while awaiting their concentration.

Such were the precautions adopted for the two most probable suppositions. But if neither of them should be realized, if the army of Bohemia, instead of attempting to debouche so near Napoleon, either in front or rear, should leave a corps in Bohemia, and join the main body to that of Silesia, and attack us in front with 250,000 men on the Bober, to risk a grand battle, the four corps of Ney, Lauriston, Marmont, and Macdonald, amounting to 100,000 men, might either defend themselves upon the Bober or fall back upon the Neisse and the Spree, and there reinforce themselves with 150,000 men by their union with the Guard, the reserve cavalry, Victor, Poniatowski, and Vandamme. They should thus, without touching St. Cyr, find themselves in equal force to the enemy on the third supposition, the only one conceivable after the two others. Add to all this the advantage of Napoleon's presence in each case, his art of profiting by circumstances, the almost certainty under his direction of gaining a great battle at the first encounter, and it is easily seen how he might hope to have all chances in his favour. What commander in any age had calculated with such exactness and universality of forethought the movements of such vast masses in opposition to other still heavier masses?

There remained a single hypothesis, for which, designedly, no precaution had been taken, *viz.*, that of the allies wishing to turn Napoleon in a still bolder manner, and, instead of immediately descending on his rear by Peterswalde, descending at a greater distance, *viz.*, by the Leipsic road, and boldly attempting to place themselves between the grand army and the Rhine. This supposition gave Napoleon little concern, and he smiled at the idea. "It is not from the Rhine but from the Elbe that it is important I should not be cut off," he said, with singular profoundness. "The enemy who should venture to advance between me and the Rhine should never return, while he that should succeed in establishing himself between me and the Elbe would cut me off from my real base of operations." Who, indeed, would venture to march upon the Rhine, leaving Napoleon behind him with 400,000 men, and Napoleon not conquered! Such dreams might be indulged at a distance from the field of battle, and were actually indulged; but we shall soon see that the first march would suffice to drive back the too bold adventurers in alarm.

Having thus foreseen and parried all the blows that might be struck on his rear, right, and front, against the two armies of Bohemia and Silesia, Napoleon had prepared on his left

an important operation with the view of resisting the army of the North, and of effecting a striking result on which he set a high value, that of occupying the capital of Prussia, of entering it in triumph by one of his lieutenants, and then inflicting vengeance on the German passions, not indeed cruel, but humiliating. He had ordered Marshal Oudinot with his corps, and those of Generals Bertrand and Reynier, and the reserve cavalry of the Duke of Padua, to march upon Berlin from Luckau. These three infantry corps, by the addition of part of the cavalry reserve, ought to have amounted to 70,000 men, but in reality comprised only 65,000 or 66,000. They reckoned, indeed, on considerable reinforcements. They were connected with our principal army, acting in front of Dresden, by General Corbineau, at the head of 3000 horse and 2000 light infantry. This was a link, but not a support; but at a greater distance on the left, i.e. on a level with Magdeburg, would be found General Girard, (who at Lutzen had so nobly atoned for an error committed in Spain,) with a body of 12,000 or 15,000 men, formed of Dombrowski's division and of the disposable part of the garrison of Magdeburg, composed with much ingenuity, as we have already described. This general, posted before Magdeburg with 5000 men of Dombrowski's division recruited and refreshed in Hesse, with 8000 or 10,000 of the Magdeburg garrison, should establish the communication between Marshal Oudinot and Marshal Davout, and follow Marshal Oudinot in his offensive movements, so as to raise the army of that marshal to nearly 80,000 men. Such a mass ought to have nothing to fear from the talents or the forces of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, who had in his troops a confused collection, who could not bring upon the same field more than 70,000 men, who would also have to face another formidable enemy in the person of Marshal Davout, who was ready to issue from Hamburg with 25,000 French and 10,000 Danes, and to threaten Berlin by Mecklenburg, while Marshal Oudinot should threaten it by Lusatia. There was, therefore, the greatest probability that Marshal Oudinot should in a few days enter Berlin, and be there joined by Marshal Davout with 35,000 men, which should place under the latter, who was to have the supreme command, a force of 110,000 or 115,000 men, and would suffice to thwart the plans of the Prince-Royal of Sweden. Thus Napoleon, while resisting on the right and in front the gigantic forces of the coalition, was by his left to penetrate Berlin, there to strike the focus of Germanic passions, to punish Prussia for her desertion and the Prince of Sweden for his treason, and to give aid to his garrisons of the Oder and the Vistula. This was no doubt a brilliant *début*, and could not fail to be attractive to Napoleon; but the movement which he ordered on his left was much prolonged, the corps which should meet them were very distant from each other, and their co-operation depended on many circumstances, which could not all be favourable. His generals, though not less brave, had no longer that confidence which sustains in dangerous circumstances; his troops were young and miscellaneous; and the collection of men under Bernadotte, with which they were to be engaged, though also a mixture of people from every

quarter, was united by the most powerful of all bonds, namely, passion. Finally, if one of his lieutenants should be beaten, it would be necessary to go to a great distance to bring aid. It is, then, true that in this part alone the net stretched by Napoleon was here somewhat relaxed; but the ardent desire to enter Berlin, to have his hand always directed towards Dantzic, to be able by gaining a battle to find himself again upon the Vistula, had here somewhat biassed the perfect accuracy of his military judgment, as the ambition to restore all his greatness at a single blow had completely perverted his political judgment.

This defect had occasioned another in that part of his plan which we have already traced and which was the most powerfully conceived. It had, indeed, removed too far from Dresden the four corps which guarded his front before the Elbe. From the banks of the Bober, where were posted the corps of Ney, Marmont, MacDonald, and Lauriston, to those of the Elbe, i.e. from Lowenberg to Dresden, was six days' march. This distance was far too great to allow Napoleon with his reserve the time to succour the corps at Lowenberg or at Dresden. As long as he could keep himself between two, either at Gorkitz or at Bautzen, there was no danger, for in less than three days it was easy for him to go to Lowenberg or to Dresden, and thus to be present wherever it might be necessary for the prevention or correction of a check. But if he had been attracted to either extremity, to Dresden for example, it was possible that one of his lieutenants should incur some great disaster upon the Bober, and that he should arrive too late to rectify it, since six days, at least, were necessary to bring thither a reinforcement, or else, if at the other extremity, i.e. Lowenberg, Dresden would be in danger of receiving aid too late. In a word, to manœuvre concentrically around Dresden, as he had formerly done around Verona, with a reserve placed in the centre and brought alternately to all points of the circumference, the circle was too wide, the radius too long.

Was this inadvertence in a mind which had attained such vast experience and rigorous accuracy in calculation? Certainly not: it was the dangerous desire of facilitating the movement upon Berlin and the Vistula. He had, in fact, long debated in his own mind whether he ought to establish his most advanced corps at the Bober or on the Neisse, i.e. at Lowenberg or at Gorkitz, and though he would have preferred placing it at Gorkitz, which would have allowed him to place his reserve at Bautzen, and would have reduced to one-half the distance he must traverse in bringing aid to either extremity, he had relinquished that plan from a motive which reveals the whole secret of his resolutions,\* viz. that by carrying his most advanced corps to Gorkitz he would not oppose sufficient obstacles to a movement which the allied armies might be tempted to execute by their right to check Marshal Oudinot in his march. At Lowenberg, on the contrary, the 100,000 men under Ney, Mar-

\* This serious self-debate of Napoleon is proved by the long notes which he wrote on his plan of campaign, in which he has stated all the motives of his different resolutions, long before the result which justified some and condemned others. No idea, therefore, is here ascribed to him falsely, or even conjecturally, for the intentions ascribed to him are formally proved by written statements.

mont, Macdonald, and Lauriston, absolutely hindered the armies of Bohemia and Silesia from transporting themselves by Lusatia into Brandenburg and succouring Berlin. Thus this desire of a wonderful result, of extending an arm towards Berlin and the Vistula, always spoiled his military combinations, as it had already perverted his political resolutions, and urged him to weaken by too widely extending a circle of defence which if more confined would have been invincible. War, which brings an immediate remuneration for good and evil plans, was speedily to reward the one by striking results and to punish the other by striking reverses. But let us not anticipate events whose sad recital will meet us but too soon.

The forces of Napoleon were far from equal to those of the allies. The corps of St. Cyr, Vandamme, Victor, and Poniatowski grouped together on his right, those of Ney, Marmont, Macdonald, and Lauriston ranged in front, the Guard and the cavalry reserve placed in the centre, might form a movable mass of 272,000 men present under arms. The troops of Oudinot, Girard, and Davout, directed against Berlin, formed another of 110,000 or 115,000, which raised the total of forces which he could bring to act against the coalition to 387,000 or 380,000 men at least. If to these be added 20,000 men in Bavaria, 60,000 in Italy, the garrisons of the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula,—such as Königstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, Werben, Hamburg, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic,—comprising about 90,000 men, we reach the number of 550,000 combatants, very inferior to 800,000 which the allies could muster. It is true that the reserves of the allies were comprised in this number of 800,000, but Napoleon could not, even by pressing heavily upon his cadres of the Rhine, extract more than 50,000 reserves, and hence his resources, rather exaggerated than otherwise, did not present a total of 600,000 men against 800,000. Yet these forces would have been more than sufficient in his hands, if moral causes had been in his favour instead of opposed to him; but his exasperated adversaries were resolved either to conquer or die, and his soldiers, though no doubt very brave, yet were fighting merely from honour, and were led by generals whose confidence was shaken, and who began to feel that they were erring against Europe, against France, against good sense! a fatal moral inferiority and much more formidable than such as was merely numerical.

Napoleon, after having personally inspected the forts of Königstein and Lilienstein, and satisfied himself that the position taken by St. Cyr and Vandamme, on his rear and right, was in accordance with his views, had gone on the 15th to Górlitz, where he had found the Guard and the reserve of cavalry. Thence he had gone to see the gorge of Zittau defended by Poniatowski and Victor. After having established Poniatowski on a mountain, called the mountain of Eckartsberg, in front of the opening of the defile, and affording the means of barring the passage, Napoleon had advanced some leagues farther, escorted by the light cavalry of his Guard, to reconnoitre a country which he should probably penetrate subsequently. He wished to collect some necessary information in the direction pursued by the enemy. In fact, there

was nothing to show whether the allies should debouche on the rear by Peterswalde upon Dresden, or on our right by Zittau, or on our front by Liegnitz and Lowenberg. Though Napoleon was surrounded by a cloud of enemies in motion, he knew nothing of their march, because it was difficult to penetrate the curtain formed by the mountains of Bohemia which separated him from those on his right. He listened, therefore, with singular attention, seeking to seize the slightest rumours, and, as usual, gathering nothing but contradictory stories. However, they agreed upon one point, that a Prussian and Russian *corps d'armée* had passed from Silesia into Bohemia to co-operate with the Austrian army. It was the corps which, as we have seen, was to form in conjunction with the Austrian troops the main army of Prince Schwarzenberg. This widely-spread report inspired Napoleon for a moment with the thought of precipitately entering Bohemia at the head of 100,000 men by the Zittau road, and of throwing himself upon the Russians and Prussians before their union with the Austrians. It is very certain that he had in hand 100,000 men with Poniatowski, Victor, the Guard, and cavalry reserve, and that by moving rapidly to the right, toward Leitmeritz, he would have been able to cut in two the long line which the allies should form before joining near Commotau. It would then have been possible for him to strike a severe blow at the beginning of the campaign, and Marshal St. Cyr, who was captivated with this idea, more brilliant than correct, urged it vehemently in his correspondence. But it was possible that, when once in Bohemia, Napoleon should find the allies already concentrated on his right between Toplitz and Commotau, and therefore protected from his blows, and in a condition to anticipate him at Dresden by descending by Peterswalde; so that while he should have penetrated into Bohemia to surprise them, they should have left it to turn him; or else it was possible that he should find them *en masse* on his path, that he should be obliged to engage them in considerable force in a disadvantageous position, for if victorious he would be unable to pursue them into the interior of Bohemia, and if conquered he would be obliged to pass the defile of Zittau in their presence. If he must give them battle, it was much better to wait for them on their issuing from the mountains of Bohemia, and to meet them on the right or left bank of the Elbe, at the very moment of their exit, for he might thus drive them back to the mountains, and profit by their entanglement in the defiles to take them in thousands, both men and guns. To cross the mountains himself to make war in Bohemia was to give himself voluntarily the false position which he ought to leave to them by waiting for them at the exit of these mountains on either side of the Elbe. Accordingly, Napoleon had little fancy for this singular idea, which Marshal St. Cyr maintained with earnestness. He would only have yielded to it if certain information had suddenly shown within his reach 60,000 or 80,000 Prussians and Russians, still separated from the 120,000 Austrians whom they were going to join.

Greatly excited by such various possibilities, Napoleon took horse on the morning of the 19th of August, and, followed by the light cavalry of the Guard, he penetrated into Bohemia at

the head of several thousand horsemen, making war like a young man, as he had formerly done in Italy and Egypt. He plunged into the gorges even beyond Gabel, and appeared to the surprised Bohemians at the entry of the beautiful basin of Bohemia. He seized clergymen and bailiffs to examine them, and learned from the lips of all that the Russian and Prussian troops on their way from Silesia kept along the foot of the mountains within Bohemia, to join the Austrians, and probably to descend into Saxony behind Dresden. The allies must in this movement cross the Elbe between Leitmeritz and Aussig, and every thing implied that they were already either on the banks of that river or across it, in the neighbourhood of Toplitz. The time was past for throwing himself upon them, even if that operation had been right, and it was necessary hastily to return into Saxony to fight around Dresden, on the field prepared with so much clear foresight. But Napoleon took pains to show himself, to let his name be known by the inhabitants, that the report of his presence in Bohemia might reach the headquarters of the allies. His reason for so acting was as follows.

It became evident that the plan of the allies, after having crossed the Elbe into Bohemia, was to enter Saxony, and descend upon Dresden so as to take that city, or to make for Leipsic, and to place themselves between the Rhine and the French army. We could have wished nothing better, for by thus engaging in the rear of Napoleon they exposed themselves to the danger of having Napoleon on their line of communications, and finding themselves in an abyss if they lost a battle in that position. This being the case, it concerned Napoleon to throw himself quickly upon the army of Silesia, which was before him, and to disable it for some time, and then to return and give his whole attention to the affairs in the rear of Dresden. For the success of such a project, it was useful to slacken the march of the allies, to make them hesitate, thus to cause them a loss of some days, which would be all gain to him, who had to hasten to the Bober before returning to the Elbe. There was no surer way of succeeding in this than to appear in Bohemia, for his presence in those parts would give rise to a thousand conjectures, anxious, or at least perplexing.

After having spent the 19th in riding on the plain and through the gorges, everywhere exhibiting himself and proclaiming his name, he repassed the defiles of Riesen-Gebirge and returned to Zittau. He devoted the 20th to arranging, in person, the corps of Poniatowski and that of Victor at the entry of the Zittau defile, so that these two corps might hold out against the strongest attacks for at least three days. Napoleon also secured their communications with General Vandamme, who had been placed between Zittau and Dresden toward Stolpen, that he might in one day reach either Zittau or Dresden. All these measures having been adopted, he intended to wait one whole day the full disclosure of the enemy's designs without experiencing the least uneasiness, which was precluded by the precautions which had been everywhere taken. In fact, 80,000 men on the march under Oudinot in the direction of Berlin, supported by 35,000 under Davout, St. Cyr and Vandamme at Dresden on the alert on the two

banks of the Elbe, two corps at Zittau guarding the passes of Bohemia, 100,000 men on the Bober under Marshal Ney, awaiting the attempt of the enemy to pass that river, finally, at Gorlitz, the centre of all these positions, Napoleon with the Guard and the cavalry reserve placed half-way between the different threatened points, presented an admirably woven net, from the midst of which its skilful contriver was ready to launch forth upon those who should rashly agitate the extremities.

Napoleon, having returned to Gorlitz on the 20th, suddenly learned that the army of Silesia had on the 15th invaded the neutral ground, which they ought to have respected until the 17th, which was a violation of the rights of nations, by no means excused by the ardent patriotism of General Blücher. This army took the direction of the Bober. Napoleon immediately set in motion the cavalry and the three divisions of the Guard, leaving the rest at Gorlitz, and made his arrangements so as to be on the Bober on the 21st. With the success he brought to Marshal Ney, he would have 130,000 men, which were more than sufficient to make Blücher repent his temerity and the infraction of national law. After again, for the last time, repeating his instructions to Poniatowski, Victor, Vandamme, and St. Cyr, he left, full of hope and confidence.

Hostilities having commenced in Silesia before the time assigned by the armistice, the four corps under Ney had scarcely left their cantonments when they met the enemy. Two of those corps were on the Bober, those of Macdonald and Marmont, the first to the right toward Lowenberg, the second to the left toward Buntzlau. Two were still more compromised, for they were farther on upon the Katsbach, that of Lauriston in the neighbourhood of Goldsberg, that of Ney between Liegnitz and Haynau. These last two, which had been almost turned by the sudden appearance of Langeron's corps on the right flank, were in great danger. Lauriston's corps had difficulty in falling back from the Katsbach to the Bober, but they accomplished the movement with coolness and vigour, and joined Macdonald at Lowenberg without accident. Ney, who was the most advanced on our left, instead of simply falling back upon Buntzlau, there to recross the Bober, came boldly to deploy between the Katsbach and the Bober, and to defy Blücher, who was furiously assaulting Lowenberg. On seeing him, Blücher having directed his efforts against him, and Lowenberg being thus relieved, Ney descended to Buntzlau, there passed the Bober, and joined Marmont.

On the 20th, our four corps were behind the Bober, those of Lauriston and Macdonald at Lowenberg, those of Marmont and Ney at Buntzlau, after having caused much more injury to the enemy than they had incurred. Napoleon arrived on the spot on the morning of the 21st, and determined immediately to assume the offensive. Blücher had presented about 80,000 men, the Russian general Sacken, with whom he would have had 100,000, having remained a little to the rear on his right. Napoleon, who had more than 130,000, employed the morning in throwing bridges on piles over the Bober, and in giving all his orders for a rapid and vigorous march, for he had no time to lose, since he expected shortly to be recalled

to the rear by the grand army of Bohemia. Consequently he resolved to debouche from Lowenberg with Macdonald and Lauriston, crossing the Bober at that point, and to draw Ney and Marmont to his left, after they had crossed the Bober at Buntzlau.

Toward mid-day they crossed the Bober at Lowenberg, and advanced quickly. Maison's division, which formed the head of our column, drove before them the troops of General d'York, and gave them no respite in any direction. The whole of Lauriston's corps followed, supported by that of Macdonald. On our left, Marshals Ney and Marmont debouched from Buntzlau, and closed in toward our centre. Blucher, seeing himself so vigorously pressed, suspected strongly that Napoleon was before him, and promptly acted upon his instructions to risk nothing against that formidable adversary. He protected himself by the Haynau, a small stream which flows between the Bober and the Katzbach. This day had already cost him between 2000 and 3000 men.

On the 22d Napoleon continued his offensive movement. The corps of Lauriston and Macdonald aimed directly at Goldberg, to throw Blucher beyond the Katzbach, while Ney and Marmont, always advancing on our left, urged him in the same direction. Maison's division again assailed the enemy with the greatest vigour. The troops, animated by the presence of Napoleon, exhibited everywhere the utmost ardour. The enemy wished to defend themselves, but, Lauriston attacking them with the remainder of his corps while Macdonald threatened their centre, they were forced to abandon the little stream behind which they had taken refuge, and to recross the Katzbach to take position at Goldberg. Their loss on this occasion was considerable.

It was evident that, notwithstanding the resistance of Blucher and his 100,000 men, he had not been rendered capable of withstanding Napoleon, and that the principal action would not take place in his direction. In fact, on the same evening, Napoleon received from Marshal St. Cyr a courier, who had travelled forty leagues to join him, and who informed him that they were attacked by numerous bodies, and that the grand allied army was evidently debouching by Peterswalde on the rear of Dresden, whether from a design of taking that city or from the idea of marching for Leipsic, to execute the bold manœuvre of placing themselves between the French and the Rhine. Thus was accomplished one of the two suppositions foreseen by Napoleon, and the most desirable of the two, and that for which every thing had been most carefully prepared. Napoleon was neither surprised nor distressed, quite the reverse; but he here saw an urgent reason for quickening his movements. On the evening of the 22d he halted his Guard, which was still on the march, and which fortunately had not passed Lowenberg, that they might, after a little repose, resume their march and be able to return to Dresden in four days, i.e. on the 26th. Marshal Marmont's corps, having been the least engaged, was the least fatigued, and without losing a moment he retraced his steps, to march in company with the Guard. Napoleon also forwarded a large part of the cavalry reserve, and then wrote to General Vandamme and to Marshal

Victor to fall back upon the Elbe, leaving Prince Poniatowski at the passes of Zittau. In this way 180,000 men should be found combined under Dresden in four days, and at least 80,000 in the first two days. There was, therefore, no possible cause for anxiety.

After having given these orders on the evening of the 22d, Napoleon resolved that on the morning of the 23d the corps of Lauriston, Macdonald, and Ney, who, with General Sebastiani's cavalry, amounted to at least 80,000 men, should again drive the enemy before them and throw them far beyond the Katzbach. At break of day Lauriston's corps on the right, Macdonald's in the centre, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the left, deployed along the Katzbach, whilst Ney, three leagues lower down, was advancing to Liegnitz with his corps and Sebastiani's cavalry. Blucher had drawn up the Russian troops under Langeron and the Prussian troops under d'York behind the Katzbach, on the heights of Wolfsberg. Girard's division attacked the banks of the river toward Niederau, and had a smart engagement with the Prussian division under the Prince of Mecklenburg. General Girard, after having dismounted the artillery of the enemy and shaken their infantry with his fire, charged them briskly with the bayonet. The Prussians, thrown back in disorder on the Katzbach, covered themselves with their cavalry, which was speedily repulsed by that of General Latour-Maubourg, and at length recrossed the Katzbach pursued by General Girard. To the right General Lauriston, having effected a passage toward Seyfnau, attacked the heights of Wolfsberg, and thrice took them from the Russians and thrice lost them again. But the 135th of the Rochambeau division made themselves masters of them by a final effort, from which time the action was decided in our favour. Blucher, perceiving himself at the same time outflanked on his right to the distance of two or three leagues by Marshal Ney's movement upon Liegnitz, fell back in all haste toward Jauer.

This useless violation of national law had cost the Prussian general about 8000 men, and the French one-half that number. Unfortunately, it had not shaken the morale of the enemy, who fought with the fury of despair. Napoleon, who had experienced the inconvenience of leaving several marshals together when removed from the influence of his own presence, and who foresaw the occurrence of hard-fought battles in which it would be of importance to have Ney at hand, resolved to take him with him, and to intrust the 8d corps to General Souham. Thus there would remain at this point only one marshal and two lieutenant-generals. The marshal was Macdonald, chief of the 11th corps, and the lieutenant-generals were Lauriston and Souham, chiefs of the 5th and 8d corps. When giving the chief command to Macdonald, Napoleon instructed him to hold his light troops in observation between the Bober and the Katzbach, but to encamp with the main body of his forces behind the Bober itself, between Lowenberg and Buntzlau, and to have posts of correspondence on the right in the mountains or Bohemia, on the left in the plains of Lusatia, so as to be constantly warned of the least movement of

the enemy. His principal mission was, first, to defend the Bober against Blücher, and then to intercept the roads from Bohemia to Prussia so as to impede the detachments which the enemy might send toward Berlin against Marshal Oudinot's corps. Ever occupied, as we see, with the march of that marshal upon the capital of Prussia, for which he had already too far extended the circle of his operations, Napoleon continued to make sacrifices to that object which were much to be regretted, for Macdonald at forty leagues from Dresden might, though relieved from the enemy at this moment, be again assailed with increased vigour, and run great risks while waiting for succour.

After these arrangements, Napoleon, having seen Blücher in retreat upon Jauer, left for Gorlitz about mid-day, whilst the Guard, the corps of Marmont, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg marched thither. Reports were multiplied in proportion as he approached, and they described the city of Dresden as in a state of great alarm. The King of Saxony, the population, even the generals charged with the defence of that important post, were struck by the immense mass of enemies coming from Bohemia and descending the mountains behind that capital. It was unanimously asserted that the heights around Dresden, on the left bank of the Elbe, were covered with soldiers of all nations. On the summits of the hills were seen poised the lances of the Cossacks, so formidable to the peaceable inhabitants.

The grand allied army, that which, consisting of Prussians, Russians, and Austrians, amounting to 250,000 men, was to make use of Bohemia to turn the position on the Elbe, had, in fact, executed the plan resolved upon at Trachenberg, and after having effected a concentration between Tetschen and Commotau, had debouched in Saxony by all the defiles of the Erz-Gebirge. They had marched in four columns, formed in reference to their several stations. The Russians coming from the heart of Bohemia, since they set out from Silesia, could scarcely have crossed the Elbe, and had taken the Peterswalde road, which passes by the camp of Pirna and descends upon Dresden, always keeping the Elbe in sight. The Prussian corps of Kleist, marching in advance of the Russians, had followed the road which was a little more to the left, (the left of the allies entering Saxony,) which was not well cleared but still quite practicable and passed by Toplitz, Zinnwald, Altenberg, and Dippoldiswalde. The Austrians, the most advanced because they had set out from their homes, had taken the high-road from Commotau to Marienberg and Chemnitz, which is to the left of the preceding and forms the high-road from Prague to Leipzig. The new Austrian lines forming a fourth column under General Klenau were to fall upon Leipzig by Carlsbad and Zwickau.

But scarcely had they begun their march when the plan adopted by the allies at Trachenberg had been modified, owing to the instability of the military counsels of the allies, where no one commanded, because no one was capable of doing so. The nominal command had been assigned to Prince Schwarzenberg to flatter Austria, but in reality the Emperor Alexander regretted that he had not assumed

it himself, and would have gladly appropriated it, especially since the arrival at his camp of General Moreau and of General Jomini, with whose aid he thought he could gloriously conduct the affairs of the coalition.

General Moreau, as we have already said, having returned from America on the report of Napoleon's disaster in Russia, with no other view than a vague hope of returning to his country in an honourable manner, had formed a project not wholly unfeasible. Having learned that the Emperor Alexander had more than 100,000 French prisoners, all exasperated against the author of the expedition to Moscow, he had conceived it possible to arm 40,000 or 50,000 of them, to transport them to Picardy by means of the English fleet, and by marching with them to Paris he undertook to overthrow the Imperial throne, provided that the allied sovereigns furnished him with a treaty of peace in which France, left free to choose a government, should retain her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine. Moreau, who loved liberty and hated the despotic government which then oppressed France, and thought himself superior to Napoleon's lieutenants, professed to overcome them all if he could show himself at the head of French soldiers and announce an honourable peace, a wise liberty, and a termination of the frightful carnage inflicted upon Europe by the boundless ambition of Napoleon. Without any engagements with the Bourbons, with whom he had no sympathy, he allowed that efforts should be made to reconcile that ancient family to the French Revolution, and that they should be recalled to establish a government at once stable and liberal, which should put a close to the long troubles of France.\* With these views he had come to Stockholm, where his old comrade, Bernadotte, pretending to listen to his scruples but really fostering his animosity, assured him that with the Emperor Alexander he should find all his desires met, and sent him forward to the Russian headquarters. Alexander had received the prescribed man with much respect, had treated him as a friend, and calmed his scruples by affirming that they owed no grudge to France or to her greatness, that they were ready to grant her the honourable conditions of the treaty of Lunéville, that they designed to impose no form of government upon her, but, on the contrary, they would gladly recognise that which she should herself choose, even were it a republic. Rejecting as impracticable the plan of arming the French prisoners, he had insensibly, and by carefully avoiding whatever might appear culpable, induced the unfortunate Moreau to adopt the deplorable resolution, not indeed to serve against France, but to remain with the sovereigns who were opposed to her, a difference which might deceive himself but which in reality was null, for it was

\* These statements are not made upon conjecture, nor upon interpretations given by Moreau's friends, but upon letters of that general himself, found after his death. The error of General Moreau was too serious to require exaggeration, and it is due to his great services at an earlier period, to his former disinterestedness, and to his glory, that we should reduce within its true limits the culpable act which tarnished one of the most excellent lives of modern times. Letters which I possess, written with the most perfect simplicity, incontestably confirm what I advance.



impossible that he should reside with them during this cruel war without at least aiding them by his counsels. To gain him over, Alexander had employed his sister, the Grand-Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenburg, a princess remarkable for intelligence, energy, and agreeable manners, and the two, treating Moreau as a friend, had blinded and bewildered him by skilful flattery, and at length seduced him into the path where he was destined to meet a cruel death, which was to deprive him, if not of his glory, at least of his innocence. It was when he had Moreau at his side that Alexander regretted the relinquishment of the chief command. He could have wished to take him as the chief of his staff, and with him to direct the war. But it was not possible to impose Moreau upon Schwarzenberg either as superior or subordinate, and to secure him a part becoming to himself and to the allied generals. Moreau, therefore, found himself in the camp of the allies in the character of private friend of the Emperor Alexander, living sometimes with him and sometimes with the Grand-Duchess Catherine, who was established at Toplitz, unwilling to appear in those desultory military councils, boiling over with patriotism, which was a tacit reproach to himself, and redundant in theoretical ideas, little in accordance with his simple and practical turn, merely giving his opinions directly to Alexander, seldom succeeding in securing their adoption in the midst of a chaos of contrary opinions, and already severely punished for his error by the false, uncomfortable, and almost humiliating position which he held among the enemies of his country.

General Jomini, a Swiss by birth, distinguished as a writer on military subjects, and practically as a prudent and high-minded staff-officer, had rendered to the French army at Ulm, at the Beresina, and at Bautzen, services which had been ill requited. At Bautzen, in particular, after having pointed out to Marshal Ney the true points at which he ought to aim, he had met with punishment instead of reward, which he owed to the ill offices of the major-general, whose susceptibility he had often wounded. Acute and irritable, he had often desired to give in his resignation, and to enter the service of Russia, who had eagerly responded to his desires, and he had no longer been able to restrain himself on experiencing the annoyance which had been lately inflicted upon him, and during the armistice he had passed over to the Russians, without, as it has been said, bringing plans of which he was ignorant, and without failing in duty to his country, being a native of Switzerland, but committing the error of not sacrificing real well-founded vexations to an ancient confraternity of arms, and of thus preparing for himself regrets which would sadden the whole of his life. He had come to Alexander, who, knowing his merits, had granted him a most brilliant reception. There he spoke out with the warmth of a convinced and ardent mind, displeased the allied generals by boasting of Napoleon and the French whom he was almost sorry to have left, and unsparingly censured all the military projects formed at Trachenberg. He had no trouble in proving to the Emperor Alexander that to march upon Leip-

sic was the height of folly, that to direct oneself against the communications of the enemy, when sure of not compromising our own, and in no fear of a decisive encounter, might be a correct manner of proceeding, but that such was not the case at present, for when once at Leipsic they would run the risk of being cut off from Bohemia, they would have Napoleon on their rear at the head of 300,000 men, hitherto always victorious, and if in this position they should lose a battle they would never return, the mountains of Bohemia being occupied by him, and the Elbe as far as Hamburg in his grasp. General Moreau, when consulted, had considered this opinion perfectly correct, and the project against Leipsic was renounced. They had resolved, instead of strengthening themselves on the left, to strengthen themselves on the right, and to approach the banks of the Elbe. The first two columns, that which had passed by Peterswalde, and that which had passed by Zinnwald and Altenberg, had kept the road very near Dresden, but it had been necessary to bring the third by Marienberg and Sayda to Dippoldiswalde, the fourth by Zwickau and Chemnitz to Tharandt. They had thus come upon Dresden without knowing precisely what they should do there, but they had the advantage, by remaining with the Bohemian mountains in their rear, of always maintaining their communications, of being like the sword of Damocles suspended over the head of Napoleon, of being able if necessary, and if an opportunity presented itself, to fall upon Dresden and take that city, which would have been the greatest injury they could inflict on the French. Whilst they were executing this transverse movement from left to right, following the foot of the Erz-Gebirge, they had heard of the appearance of Napoleon in Bohemia, which had made them fear a march upon Prague, and had rendered still more evident the propriety of retracing their steps toward the Elbe. Afterward at Dippoldiswalde they had learned the march of Napoleon on the Bober, and the dangerous position of Blücher. This was the time, then, to make some attempt, and to profit by the absence of Napoleon to strike a heavy blow,—for example, to take Dresden, which was advised by the bold, feared by the timid, and held by the prudent, such as Moreau, to depend on the state in which they should find the defences of that city.

Thus it is that the grand allied army of the coalition had deployed their imposing masses around the beautiful capital of Saxony. The column which they had first perceived was the Russian column of Wittgenstein, which, descending the nearest to the Elbe by the road from Peterswalde, had met Marshal Saint Cyr before the camp of Pirna. That which is called the camp of Pirna consists in an elevated plateau, having the Elbe on the rear, each side being nearly perpendicular, supported on the left by the fortress of Königstein, on the right by the castle of Sonnenstein and the town of Pirna. The high-road from Bohemia by Peterswalde, after having crossed the mountains, pierces some hollow lands toward Hollendorf, then ascends at Berg-Gieshübel another plateau situated below that of Pirna, passing

a, most under its guns, but at a distance sufficient to render the passage possible, so that the position of Pirna, though in itself invincible, affords no means of absolutely barring the road from Peterswalde. Only an army established in this position, besides having in the camp of Pirna a secure asylum, finds there also a post by which it can annoy, or even by skilful operations arrest, the enemy who might wish to follow the road from Peterswalde, either to descend into Saxony or ascend into Bohemia.

Marshal Saint Cyr, after having occupied by his first division the fortresses of Königstein and Lillienstein, between which was thrown a bridge over the Elbe, had placed the second on the road from Peterswalde, so as to slacken the march of the enemy, and to be able to fall back upon Dresden as he had been ordered. He had defended step by step the plateau of Berg-Gieshübel, with a degree of firmness remarkable in half-formed soldiers. In the mean while the third of Marshal Saint Cyr's divisions was observing the second passage, which from Toplitz issues upon Zinnwald, Altenberg, and Dippoldiswalde, and the fourth, placed to the right of Dippoldiswalde, watching the high-road of Freyberg, served as a support to General Pajol, who engaged with the advanced guard of the Austrian cavalry arriving by the more distant passages.

On the 23d of August Marshal Saint Cyr, having, as we have said, intrusted to his first division (the 42d of the army) the guard of the two fortresses of Königstein and Lillienstein, and all the posts on the banks of the Elbe, to prevent the enemy from passing from one bank to the other, had fallen back in order upon Dresden, where he had thus, besides the garrison, three infantry divisions, with the cavalry of Lheritier and Pajol. These forces, supported by field-works and the defences of the city, were capable of opposing a serious resistance to the enemy, though from the beginning they reckoned 150,000 men, and 200,000 some days after. The three infantry divisions of Marshal Saint Cyr ought not to comprise less than 21,000 or 22,000 men.\* From the garrison they might withdraw 5000 or 6000 men, some of them Germans indeed, to bring them to the left bank,

and the Generals Lheritier and Pajol had fully 4000 horses. Marshal Saint Cyr had thus at his disposal between 31,000 and 32,000 men, with a considerable force of horse-artillery to aid the artillery of position. He therefore had means of disputing the place with the enemy, and of giving Napoleon time to manœuvre around it as he should judge most useful to his main operations.

This was the state of things on which Napoleon founded his calculations, when he received at Górlitz the details of occurrences in the neighbourhood of Dresden. He could not know all that we have related of the movements of the enemy; but he knew, by the appearance of numerous bodies in the rear of Dresden, that of the different possible plans the allies had chosen that which consisted in turning his flank, by reaching the left bank of the Elbe, and descending into Saxony by Peterswalde. Having foreseen this movement as highly probable, he had placed at Dresden, as we have seen, sufficient forces to repel a first attack, and to keep in check the grand army of Schwarzenberg at least for several days. These certain data sufficed him, and he formed at once one of the most brilliant and formidable combinations which he had ever devised, and which, if executed according to his will, might terminate the war in a single day, by one of the most terrible blows he had ever struck.

Napoleon returned to Silesia, preceded or followed by the most movable masses of his army, which he had directed toward the Elbe. The enemy, in order to turn him, had crossed the Elbe in the interior of Bohemia, under shelter of the mountains which separate Bohemia from Saxony. It was necessary to punish this rash movement by recrossing the Elbe himself to pour down upon the enemy with overwhelming forces. Being master of the bridges of Dresden, Napoleon might there cross the Elbe at ease, and with 100,000 men attack the front of the allies and drive them violently back upon the mountains whence they had come. But, with that wonderful *coup d'œil* which seemed peculiar to himself, he considered that something better than this might be done. Instead of debouching on the front by Dresden, which would have allowed only a direct blow, he resolved to ascend to Königstein, which he had taken beforehand, provisioned and connected with the rock of Lillienstein by a bridge of boats, then, after having crossed the Elbe at that place, establish himself at Pirna, intercept the road of Peterswalde, then descend upon the rear of the enemy with 140,000 men, drive them upon Dresden, and thus take them between the Elbe and the French army. If this simple and extraordinary plan, which was rendered practicable by an admirable foresight, by securing beforehand all the passages of the Elbe, should succeed, (and it is not easy to conceive why it should not,) it was possible that in three or four days the coalition should cease to exist. They might have taken prisoners the sovereigns and their armies.

Excited by the thought, Napoleon quickly wrote in cipher to M. de Bassano, to explain the formidable combination which he had devised, recommending him to observe profound

\* Marshal Saint Cyr, with a spirit commonly little inclined to indulgence, and with the desire to justify his part during the campaign of 1813, has inaccurately represented the events of that year in his memoirs otherwise so remarkable. He wishes everywhere to prove that Napoleon had no plan, that he had provided for nothing, and that there nowhere existed sufficient forces. Thus he supposes that his second division contained no more than 5000 men, which would have given 15,000 men for the three divisions charged with the defence of Dresden. These assertions are inaccurate; for the marshal's divisions contained twelve battalions, and, granting that the battalions which had not yet fought contained only 500 men, the twelve battalions would have yielded 6000 men. Now the 42d, (the first of Saint Cyr's corps,) under General Mouton-Duvernet, was on the morning of the 29th at Kulm, with more than 8000 men in order of battle, as appears from the muster roll of the same day furnished by General Haxo in his circumstantial account of the affair at Kulm. It is, therefore, inconceivable that the others should reckon only 5000; to ascribe to them 7000, especially at the beginning of their operations, which supposes about 600 men for each battalion, is certainly not an exaggeration. Marshal Saint Cyr would thus have possessed, merely in the infantry of his corps, 21,000 or 22,000 men at Dresden, without reckoning the division left at Königstein.

secrecy, but also to prepare every one to second it by causing them to wait patiently the arrival of succour, for he was about to employ at least two days in concentrating his forces at Konigstein, in multiplying the means of passage to facilitate the movement of 140,000 men whom he was bringing with him, and, finally, in posting himself suitably on the Peterswalde road. He also wrote to Marshal Saint Cyr, to retrace afresh to him all the means of defence presented by the city of Dresden, and on the 25th he came to establish himself at Stolpen, on the right of the river, at an equal distance from Konigstein and Dresden. To this point he brought back all that had left Zittau to return to the Elbe, and all that was arriving from the banks of the Bober with the same intention.

Established at Stolpen, he made all his arrangements in conformity with his new plan. Vandamme's corps of three divisions had already fallen back upon Konigstein at the first appearance of the grand army of the allies. Half of one of his divisions—that of General Teste—was scattered along the Elbe from Konigstein to Dresden, to prevent the enemy recrossing the river and to hold them confined to the left bank. Napoleon left there this half division and reinforced it with a numerous cavalry, with orders to oppose the formation of any kind of bridge. He ordered Vandamme to pass with his two other divisions by the bridge thrown between Lillienstein and Konigstein, to assail the camp of Pirna, under which the enemy had defied without occupying it in force, to take possession of it, there to rally Saint Cyr's first division, that of Mouton-Duvernay, left at Pirna, and to go to take firm position on the Peterswalde road. He should thus have besides his first two divisions one-half of the third,—that of Teste,—and the first of Saint Cyr. In order to procure four entire divisions, Napoleon borrowed of Marshal Victor the brigade of Prince de Reuss, added to it Corbineau's cavalry, which made a body of more than 40,000 men, of whom 36,000 were infantry and nearly 5000 were cavalry. He then arranged all his Guard, and Marshal Victor, who had returned from Zittau around Stolpen, in such a manner as to follow General Vandamme as soon as he should have made himself master of the camp of Pirna, urged on the march of Marshal Marmont, and collected all the boats that could be found to throw two supplementary bridges between Lillienstein and Konigstein. When these bridges were completed he should have, with Vandamme, Victor, the Imperial Guard, and Marmont, 120,000 men to launch upon the enemy's rear. His project was, while recrossing the Elbe at Konigstein, to send the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg to recross it at Dresden, so as to deceive Prince Schwarzenberg, and to persuade him that all the French army was about to debouche by that city. He would thus have had about 40,000 men in Dresden and 120,000 in the camp of Pirna, to form the vice in which he proposed to grasp the allied army. In order to be more sure of the protection of the Elbe, of which he was to make an insurmountable obstacle, he was now content with half the Teste division and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg distributed between Konig-

stein and Dresden, but he ordered Marshal Saint Cyr to forward Lheritier's cavalry and two battalions of infantry to guard Meissen, eight leagues from Dresden, in order that the enemy, when driven back upon that city, should not be able to find any passage lower down. As the rain had saturated the roads, as the boats were with difficulty collected between Lillienstein and Konigstein, and as the troops were fatigued, he thought it possible without risk to allow a day's rest to the troops, for every thing seemed quiet around Dresden. He, consequently, determined that Vandamme should not cross the bridge of the Elbe between Lillienstein and Konigstein to attack the camp of Pirna till toward the close of the 26th.

In the mean while, unfortunately, anxiety was created at Dresden by the sight of masses of the allied army. From the 23d to the 25th they had only seen the first column, which followed the Peterswalde road. On the following days the other columns appeared, and the heights of Dresden seemed to be covered with them. Only the last Austrian column was wanting, that of Klenau, which, having passed by Carlsbad and Zwickau, had the longest road to traverse in order to reach Dresden. Alexander's advisers, hastening to the ground, were, as usual, divided, and the boldest, with Jomini at their head, seeing Saint Cyr's three divisions in the plain, had recommended to fall upon them in order to enter Dresden in their track, and thus, at a single blow, destroy our whole establishment upon the Elbe. The proposal was plausible, and Moreau when consulted had replied, with his usual caution, that the attempt might be reasonably made if it were possible to suppose that Saint Cyr would await unprotected the shock of overwhelming masses, and if there were nothing in his rear in the form either of defence-works or reserves, but that this was inconceivable, and that it would be a very serious matter to expose themselves to a disaster at the very commencement of hostilities. In the midst of the discussion Prince Schwarzenberg had said that at any rate it was necessary to wait a day, for his fourth column had not arrived. They had therefore deferred the decision till the 26th.

This excessive accumulation of troops around Dresden was perceived from within and created great alarm. Repeated messages had been sent to Napoleon urging him to come in person with all his reserves to repel the formidable attack which threatened the city. In reply he had sent Murat, who, after a reconnaissance with his cavalry in which he was almost taken, had confirmed the presence of a very numerous army, exhibiting the intention of attacking Dresden, but had seen nothing more, for he was unacquainted with the defences of the city and could have no clear idea of their strength. Napoleon, more and more urged to hasten to the spot, but still refusing from unwillingness to abandon a plan from which he expected immense results, had written to Marshal Saint Cyr, detailing to him afresh his means of defence, which consisted in an entrenched camp of five redoubts and vast abatis, in the old enceinte of the city renewed by means of a ditch full of water and strong pali-

sades, and finally in barricades formed at the head of every street, and had said to him that if the intrenched camp were taken there remained the enceinte, and after that the barricaded streets, that 30,000 soldiers under able command ought to defend themselves there for six or eight days, or even fifteen if resolved to do so. A man with less ability but more devotion than Marshal Saint Cyr would have promised to sacrifice his last man in the defence of the place, and would have kept his word, for the safety and greatness of France depended, on the present occasion, on an obstinate resistance of forty-eight hours. Unfortunately the marshal, fearful of rash promises, merely wrote that he would do his best, but that he could not be responsible for the result in the presence of the masses by which he was surrounded.\* Certainly when he promised to do his best he might have been depended on to keep his word, and that the best would be a firm and intelligent resistance. But the preservation of Dresden was of such paramount interest, that Napoleon, dissatisfied with the extreme reserve of the marshal, had despatched Gourgaud, his *officier d'ordonnance*, to the city with orders to see and hear every thing, and then to return at full speed, that he might be able to decide upon full information.

Gourgaud, chief of a squadron, a brave and intelligent officer, was not of sufficiently cool judgment for the execution of such a task. When he reached Dresden on the 25th, the population and the court were in alarm. Even the generals were beginning to lose their *sang-froid*, and the greatest anxiety prevailed everywhere. The people were in crowds abandoning the principal or old town, situated on the left bank of the Elbe, and therefore exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and were repairing to the faubourg on the right bank, called the new town. Here had been prepared the residence of the king and of M. de Bassano; the magistrates themselves had gone thither, and the whole population was following their example, without knowing where they should find lodging. It will readily be believed that this unhappy population would be terrified by an attack of 200,000 men and 600 guns, and that although their German tendencies would lead them to desire the success of the allies, yet they would gladly dispense with it on the present occasion, and they urgently entreated the succour of Napoleon. The king in particular, easily alarmed, and surrounded with a numerous family as timid as himself, was seized with terror. Marshal Saint Cyr and General Durosnel, charged with the defence, one as commandant of the 14th corps, the other as Governor of Dresden, when pressed by Gourgaud, appeared to him not to be convinced of the strength of the position, and gave a very discouraging report. The latter, who was easily excited, left on the evening of the 25th, reached Stolpen about 11 p.m.,

and so vividly described the dangers threatening Dresden as to shake the judgment of Napoleon, commonly so firm, and to make him forget the forcible considerations he had himself presented to Marshal Saint Cyr. Napoleon, in fact, required only two days to descend by Königstein on the rear of the enemy, and it was not possible that Dresden should be unable to hold out for two days, for the assailants would be met by the intrenched camp, the enceinte of the city, and the barricades of the streets. Supposing even that the old town should yield, one thing was certain, viz. that the new town, situated on the right bank of the Elbe, would not yield provided the bridge was burned, which was in a great measure formed of wood, that the enemy would then find themselves in a *cul-de-sac*, and that by debouching on their rear they might be thrown into an abyss. Yet the sacrifice of the old town was cruel, when viewed in the light of humanity, and much to be regretted on political considerations, for it would render our alliance very disastrous to Saxony, and Napoleon did not consider it desirable to adopt the extreme resource of defending himself in the new town. Besides, though much fascinated with his plan, and though no other combination could equal it in grandeur and in its probable results, there was another, also very promising, viz., instead of throwing all his forces on the rear of the enemy by Königstein, to send by that quarter only the 40,000 men under Vandamme, and to debouche directly by Dresden with 100,000. Certainly Vandamme, master of the camp of Pirna, and firmly posted on the Peterswalde road, ought to cause immense injury to the allies by falling upon them after they had been conquered before Dresden, for he would take all those who should attempt to pass by Peterswalde, and would drive the others on bad roads where retreat would be very difficult. This new plan certainly presented fewer advantages, but it still promised many, and was less hazardous, since, by combining more than 100,000 men at Dresden, Napoleon saved the city, had the means of beating the enemy under its walls, and to insure the victory and its consequences he had Vandamme in ambush at Königstein. He therefore determined on that plan, less vast but more certain; and thus, though bolder than even his policy, he was less so than usual in war, the reverse of what he ought to have been, for the less wisdom he had exhibited in his policy the greater boldness he ought to have displayed in his military operations, having brought himself into the necessity of obtaining unheard-of triumphs or of perishing. But how strange the contrast! He had become mistrustful of Fortune at a time when by refusing peace he had intrusted his whole existence to her favour!

His resolution was formed at midnight, and with his never-failing promptitude, he dictated his orders at the moment. He directed toward Dresden his Old Guard, which had arrived already in the environs of Stolpen, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, which had also arrived at the same place, and the half of Teste's division, which had remained on the banks of the Elbe, and ordered them to march all night, so as to reach Dresden by break of

\* Hitherto these events have been imperfectly or inaccurately related, and with a degree of posthumous flattery or disparagement of Napoleon which has disguised the truth. His grand conception of debouching by Königstein has never been well defined, from want of acquaintance with his correspondence. But the recital in the text is founded on that correspondence and on the attentive perusal of the orders and replies; and it may be received with entire confidence.

day, to cross the bridges, and to take up their position behind the corps of Marshal St. Cyr. He gave the same instructions to the Young Guard and to Marshal Marmont, who were still on the Lowenberg road, and to Marshal Victor, who had quitted Zittau for Königstein. At the same time he traced out to General Vandamme his task for the following day, the 26th. With his 40,000 men he was to cross the bridge between Lillienstein and Königstein, to debouche upon the left bank of the Elbe, to assault the camp of Pirna, and, having taken it, to establish himself upon both sides of the Peterswalde road. To these instructions he added the aid of an enlightened counsellor, General Haxo, whom he charged to be the guide and adviser of the impetuous Vandamme. Having issued these orders, Napoleon took a few hours' rest, and at break of day galloped off for Dresden, which he reached about 9 A.M. of the 26th of August,—the first of two justly-celebrated days.

On the road he had noticed a battery which from the right bank of the Elbe was to fire upon the left, which was less elevated than the right, to support the extremity of Marshal Saint Cyr's line. He ordered it to be reinforced and placed as advantageously as possible; he then entered Dresden, followed by the brave cuirassiers of Latour-Maubourg. The enthusiasm of the troops and the inhabitants upon seeing him was extreme. Near the great stone bridge was a hospital of wounded French, the convalescents among whom remained commonly near the entrance to the bridge, watching their companions labouring on the defence-works. At the sight of the Emperor, these young men, dragging themselves along upon their mutilated limbs as they best could, waving their caps or their crutches, exclaimed, *Vive l'Empereur!* with wild enthusiasm. The inhabitants, constrained to salute in him their preserver, received him with similar cries, entreating him to protect their wives and children from the horrors of war. Indeed, the recent sojourn of the allies among them, especially the Russians, had almost reconciled them to the French, who treated them with much less severity. Already several balls had fallen upon the bridge and the large square and warned them of their danger, and Napoleon appeared at the moment as a real liberator. He repaired to the dwelling of the King of Saxony to encourage him, entreated him not to be uneasy for the issue of the day, and then went to the front of the intrenched camp to join Marshal Saint Cyr, who was at the head of his troops and was executing his tactics with his wonted ability.

We have already given some idea of the position and aspect of Dresden. The principal city is upon the left of the Elbe, and consequently is the first seen by those who come from the banks of the Rhine. A series of heights detached from the mountains of Bohemia surround the city in the form of an amphitheatre. On this amphitheatre were ranged the allies who had descended from Bohemia to attack our rear. Their back was, therefore, turned to France, as if they had come from thence, and ours to Germany, as if we were but to fight for her. Our line of defence, with the old town in the rear, formed

a semicircle whose extremities rested on the Elbe, the left at the faubourg of Pirna, the right at the faubourg of Friedrichstadt. This line consisted first, as we have said, in five elevated redoubts at the extremity of the faubourgs and joined together by enclosures and abatis, (this was called the intrenched camp;) next, in the old enceinte composed of a ditch and palisades; and, lastly, in the barricaded streets. It was at the outer line of the redoubts that Marshal Saint Cyr had placed his troops. His first division having remained with Vandamme, he had drawn up the second (43d of the army) on the first half of the circumference of the city, from the barrier of Pirna to that of Dippoldiswalde. His fourth division (45th) he had ranged on the other half of the circumference ending at the faubourg of Friedrichstadt. In front of the faubourg of Pirna was a large public garden called the *Gross-Garten*, 400 or 500 toises in breadth, 1000 or 1200 in length, which presented, in relation to the arrangements of this day, a strong projection in front of our left. Marshal Saint Cyr had there established his third division, (44th,) but with the precaution of leaving only guards in the advanced part of the garden and of placing the main body of the division in the rear, that it might not be cut off from the enceinte of the town, to which the *Gross-Garten* was not immediately joined. Marshal Saint Cyr had stationed his Guards with the greatest skill, so as to afford mutual support, and between the redoubts, some of which were not sufficiently near to the others, he had disposed horse-artillery to supply by movable guns the deficiency of the fixed. The Russians of Wittgenstein and Miloradovitch, under Barclay de Tolly, descended from Peterswalde, who were in front of our left, were to make the attack between the Elbe and the *Gross-Garten*, by the barriers of Pirna and Pilnitz. The Prussians under General Kleist were to attack the *Gross-Garten*. The Austrians, who had come from the more distant passes, and had then marched upon Dresden by the Freyburg road, formed the left of the allies, and consequently were in front of our right, and were to make the attack between the barriers of Dippoldiswalde and Freyburg. This, at least, might be inferred from the apparent distribution of the enemy's forces upon the semicircle of the heights.

Napoleon, after having traversed the line under a brisk fire, approved all the arrangements of Marshal Saint Cyr, and imparted to him his intentions. The cuirassiers had just arrived and the Old Guard was following; but the Young Guard of four fine divisions could not reach Dresden till late in the day. Marshals Marmont and Victor were at a still greater distance. The plan of Napoleon was to place part of the Old Guard at the different barriers to secure them against any unexpected success of the enemy, and to employ that select troop only in the last extremity. With the rest of the Old Guard, kept in the rear in the principal square of the town, he was to await the event. As soon as he should have the Young Guard at his command, Napoleon meant to employ them himself as occasion required. He ranged Murat with all

the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg in the plain of Friedrichstadt, which extends in front of the faubourg of that name which formed the extreme right of our line of defence, to occupy the space which the 4th division of Marshal Saint Cyr could not occupy by itself. Between this division and the second—*i.e.* toward the centre—the forces appeared insufficient, and Napoleon, therefore, sent thither part of the Dresden garrison composed of Westphalians. He ordered General Teste to return into the town with his brigade, which had been left upon the Elbe, to support the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg in the plain of Friedrichstadt.

They thus awaited calmly the attack of 200,000 enemies who stood before them, whose effort they must suppose would be violent, for they could not expect to carry Dresden without a blow of extreme vigour. However, it was now mid-day, and nothing was heard but a fire of musketry on our left, in the direction of the Gross-Garten. This had occurred between the Prussians and the 44th division, ably commanded by General Berthelene.

It is easy to guess why the allies were so tardy on that day: their hesitation arose from a fresh conflict of opinions in the staff. On the previous day they had agreed to adjourn all resolution till the 26th, either to admit of the arrival of the 4th column,—that of Klenau,—or to discover more clearly the designs of the French. On the morning of the 26th every thing appeared changed; for Saint Cyr, instead of deploying in the plain, had wisely fallen back upon the works of the city, and it seemed difficult to force his present position. Moreover, it was to be supposed that Napoleon was not the man to desert him, and hence that the five or six or even ten thousand men whom they might lose in taking Dresden would be sacrificed to no purpose, which would be a sad beginning to the allied army, apart from the danger incurred from Pirna, of which no one among the allies seemed to have any clear idea. In this state of affairs, General Jomini, whose mind though ardent was accurate, adopted the sentiment of Moreau, and was followed by the Emperor Alexander, and they appeared to be decided to fall back on the heights of Dippoldiswalde, there to take their position with the mountains in the rear,—a position at once secure and menacing. But the King of Prussia, ruled by the passions of his army, said, in a tone of coldness and pertinacity, that, after having made so ostentatious an attempt upon Napoleon's rear, to retire without even making a demonstration against Dresden would denote as much levity as weakness, and would greatly cool the patriotism of his soldiers. General Jomini replied that war was not a matter of feeling but of calculation, that they ought to have attacked the town the preceding day, the 25th, when they would have had some chance, but that on that day there was not enough to sanction the sacrifice of 6000 men. Moreau supported this opinion; Alexander, as usual, was undecided; the King of Prussia displeased and obstinate; when an inhabitant of Dresden, arrested at the advanced posts and required to tell what he knew, declared that Napoleon had just entered Dresden, and

not alone, and gave such details as left no doubt upon the subject. The Russian column from Peterswalde had perceived beyond the Elbe masses of the French army hastening to Dresden: so that every thing announced a most serious resistance. Henceforward there could be only one opinion, *viz.*, to take the position of Dippoldiswalde as quickly as possible. Prince Schwarzenberg, while acknowledging the correctness of the proposal, said that it was not so easily effected as was supposed; that his fourth column, which had arrived the last, and much in advance to the left, would be endangered if they should retrograde too rapidly, for in the movement to the rear which they must operate in order to remove from Dresden and place the mountains on their rear, that division would have the largest arc to describe and several valleys to cross, and that it would be necessary for the sake of it to fall back very slowly. He promised, however, to countermand all order of attack. The Austrian generalissimo, whose orders were principally drawn up by General Radetzki, had on the previous day prepared for the following day the order which had been agreed upon, to make a strong demonstration against Dresden, which in any case was ill conceived, for it was necessary either to make a furious attack or none at all. Whether from the difficulty of changing with sufficient rapidity the orders issued to a mass of 200,000 men, or from repugnance to depart without a battle, the order of attack was not countermanded in time, and the clocks of all the churches in Dresden having struck three, the numerous columns of the allies set in motion at once, and soon a violent cannonade was heard, to the great surprise of the sovereigns, who thought only of retiring. The movement being then given from right to left, it was no longer possible to stop it, and the attack was begun on all the circumference of Dresden.

Wittgenstein's corps, forming the right of the allies, and consequently opposed to our left, advanced between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten in front of the faubourg of Pirna. It was necessary to cross a large stream formed into a canal, called the Land-Graben, which poured into the Elbe the waters of the surrounding heights. The soldiers of the 43d division (second of Saint Cyr) vigorously disputed the ground. The Russians, independently of a French battery placed on the other bank of the Elbe, had on their right our first redoubt built in front of the barrier of Ziegel, on their left our second redoubt built in front of the barrier of Pirna, and in front batteries of horse-artillery whose movable fire awaited them at each exposed part of the ground. They had, therefore, great difficulty in advancing: they, nevertheless, crossed the Land-Graben, then passed between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten, aided by the progress made by the Russians in the Gross-Garten, for after violent efforts their numerical force had enabled them to take possession of the place. They were more than 25,000 against a single division (the 43d) consisting of 6000 or 7000, and which would not maintain the defence with an obstinacy which might cause them to be cut off from the city. They retrograded by degrees, so as to protect as long as possible

the parts of our line which extended right and left, and they fell back between the barriers of Pirna and Dohna, obstinately disputing the garden of Prince Antony, situated behind the Gross-Garten, and forming the salient of the faubourg of Pirna. There they were to join the 45th division, (4th of Saint Cyr), charged with the defence of the rest of the enceinte.

Such was the state of things in this part of our line about 5 p.m. At this point the enemy had very closely approached the redoubts, but had taken none. In the centre the attack had made more progress. The Austrians, perceiving an immense mass of cavalry already covering the plain of Friedrichstadt on their left, had directed all their efforts against our centre, and had attacked two of the redoubts, the third and fourth, built in that part, one in front of the Mocinski garden, near the Dohna gate, the other in front of the Freyburg gate. Attacking each of these redoubts with fifty guns, they had at length silenced their fire, and then, taking advantage of some inequalities in the ground, they had opened so murderous a fire, especially on the redoubt of the Mocinski garden, that they had forced our soldiers to evacuate it, and had occupied it themselves. This was the only one of our redoubts which they had taken; but an energetic effort against the fourth and fifth might render them the masters, and on their right the Russians were already at the foot of the first and second, ready to make the assault.

Though now late, and little daylight remained for the operations of the enemy, the danger was serious. In spite of the order to spare the Old Guard, Friant, who commanded the grenadiers of that body, and who was placed in reserve in the faubourg of Pirna, had ventured to employ some companies of those brave men. Those old soldiers, boldly opening the barriers of Pilnitz and Pirna, had fired point-blank upon the heads of the Russian columns, and then repulsed with the bayonet the detachments which had ventured too near. At the opposite extremity, i.e. at the Freyburg gate, the fusiliers had acted in the same manner and overthrown the Austrians. Happily these energetic acts had not occasioned much loss to the Old Guard, whom Napoleon was anxious to spare, while he reserved to the Young Guard the honour and instruction accruing from exposure to great danger.

But the columns of the Young Guard arrived at the moment, impatient to measure their strength with the enemy, and filling Dresden with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* They presented four fine divisions of 8000 or 9000 men each, two under Marshal Mortier, two under Marshal Ney. On seeing them, Napoleon hastened to meet and arrange them in person. The Decouz and Roguet divisions he sent to the barrier of Pilnitz to drive back the Russians, who were continually gaining ground, those of Barrois and Parmentier to the Pirna barrier to drive back the Prussians, who, after having crossed the Gross-Garten, were already beginning to join the Austrians near the redoubt of the Mocinski garden. At the same time Napoleon ordered Murat, who had just been joined by General Teste's infantry, to charge with all his cavalry in the plain of Friedrichstadt.

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In a moment the scene changed. The barriers of Ziegel and Pilnitz opened, and two divisions of the Young Guard rushed forth like torrents upon the Russians and Prussians. They first deployed to fire, then formed in columns and charged the enemy's masses with the bayonet. The Russians, taken by surprise, were arrested and soon driven back upon the Land-Graben, which they were forced to recross in disorder. One of these two divisions fell to the right upon the garden of Prince Antony, which was attacked by the Prussians, and drove them away with the bayonet. It then joined the troops of the 44th division to regain the redoubt at the extremity of the Mocinski garden. The soldiers of the Young Guard, those of the 43d and 44th divisions, debouched from that garden in several columns, fell upon the redoubt, some by the gorge and others by the epaulements, made themselves masters of it, and took 800 Austrians prisoners. At the same moment General Teste, with his remaining brigade, issued by the Freyburg gate, secured the village of Klein-Hamburg, whilst Murat, deploying on our extreme right with 12,000 horse, drove the Austrians from the plain of Friedrichstadt and forced them back to the heights. The allies, on all sides briskly repulsed, recognised in these vigorous acts the hand of Napoleon, and resolved to retreat, leaving 8000 or 4000 dead or wounded and 2000 prisoners. As we fought under protection, we had lost only 2000 men.

Napoleon was delighted with the result of the first day, for, although he had no anxiety for the preservation of Dresden, he was well pleased to be so easily quit of that attack, and at the same time to have delivered the inhabitants of Dresden and the court of Saxony from their alarm, and he foresaw with joy a brilliant triumph on the morrow. In fact, the attempt of the 26th could not be considered the last effort of the enemy, and as 40,000 men at least were expected in the evening, besides all that should arrive in the afternoon, Napoleon thought himself in condition to venture on a decisive battle the following day. Having frequently, during the day, ascended a steeple of the town whence he distinctly perceived the semicircle of heights surrounding Dresden, he had on a sudden conceived one of the finest movements which he ever executed. To our left the Russians, forming the extreme right of the allies, were drawn up between the Elbe and the Gross-Garten. A little less to the left, and nearer the centre, were the Prussians under General Kleist, who had been drawn from the Gross-Garten and had fallen back on the heights of Strehlen. Exactly in the centre were found part of the Austrians, opposite the barriers of Dippoldiswalde and Freyburg, on the heights of Racknitz and Plauen. There, between the centre and our right, was seen a deep and narrow gorge, serving as a bed to the little river Weisseritz, which falls into the Elbe between the old town and the faubourg of Friedrichstadt. On the other side of this gorge, called the valley of Plauen, at the extreme left of the allies and at our extreme right, were ranged the greater part of the Austrians, who were thus separated from the rest of the allied army by a kind of gulf, across which it was impossible to give them

aid. Further, this side of the field of battle was better adapted than the rest to cavalry-maneuvres. Napoleon, seizing at a glance the advantages offered by this local position, had resolved to reinforce the King of Naples with all Marshal Victor's corps, to launch him, by a *détour* to the right, like a thunderbolt upon the Austrians, who, being beyond aid, would be inevitably thrown into the gorge of Plauen, and, after having thus destroyed the left of the allies, to push forward Ney with all the Young Guard upon their right, to drive them back *en masse* upon the heights from which they had attempted to descend. From this double movement must arise a double advantage, that of taking from them, on the right, the high-road of Freyburg, the widest and best on which to effect a retreat, to drive them on the left upon the Peterswalde road, where Vandamme was waiting them with 40,000 men, and thus to compel them to return into Bohemia on encumbered roads, which they could not traverse without immense loss.

Having formed these combinations with marvellous promptitude, Napoleon became animated with a degree of satisfaction which enlightened his whole countenance in anticipation of a great and almost certain triumph on the following day. Before taking either rest or food, he gave his orders without quitting his position.\* To the right he placed General Teste under Marshal Victor, both under Murat, who would thus have 20,000 infantry and about 12,000 cavalry, with orders to turn the left of the Austrians, and to draw them as far as possible toward the valley of Plauen. He ordered Marshal Marmont, who came up at the moment, to establish himself in the centre at the barrier of Dippoldiswalde, near the Mocinski garden, with the Old Guard and the artillery reserve in his rear. Marshal Saint Cyr was to combine his three divisions, to range them in close column between the barrier of Dippoldiswalde and that of Dohna, having their right to Marshal Marmont and the left to the Gross-Garten. These two corps, placed near Napoleon, who intended to remain at the centre, (which he made known to all his lieutenants, that they might know where to find him,) were not to receive instructions till on the ground, and then from his own lips. Lastly, to the extreme left, Ney, with all the Young Guard and part of the cavalry under Nansouty, was instructed to defile behind the Gross-Garten with nearly 40,000 men, to turn round that garden, to drive the Russians from the plain extending from Striesen to Dobritz, and to drive them back upon the heights when they should have been sufficiently disordered by the disaster on the left. By acting by the two wings, each of which was to cut off from the allies one of their principal roads, Napoleon wished to remain immovable in the centre

with 50,000 men to be disposed of as events should require, without fear of weakening the middle of his line, which was supported by the city and by strong redoubts. He had accordingly given orders that all the redoubts, especially those of the centre, should be rearméd and reinforced in men and artillery. And, foreseeing a violent engagement of artillery in the centre, he had brought there more than 100 guns of the Guard, independently of all the batteries of Marmont and Saint Cyr.

Napoleon with about 120,000 men was going to fight 200,000, for the allies could not be less than that after the arrival of all the Austrians under Klenau. Of these 200,000 there were 180,000 before Dresden and 20,000 before Pirna under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. The allies might have even brought together a larger number, if they had not left about 30,000 men between Prague and Zittau to guard that débouché where Prince Poniatowski had remained. But Napoleon had, to counterbalance the inequality of numbers, the advantage of his combinations and 40,000 men under General Vandamme posted more usefully at Pirna than at Dresden.

After having dictated these arrangements in the most precise manner possible, Napoleon went to sup with the King of Saxony and his marshals, and to receive the congratulations of all the court, rejoiced, now that it was irrevocably attached to our fate, to see the enemy removed from the capital and threatened with a speedy and utter defeat. He revealed his plans to no one, but announced a decisive battle for the following day, did not hesitate to say that it would be fatal to the allies, and exhibited during the whole evening a singular cheerfulness. He retired late, to take a little rest between two battles.

The day was not closed with equal cheerfulness in the camp of the allied sovereigns. They reproached themselves with the disaster they had experienced before Dresden, which they ascribed to the neglect of issuing the counter-order, and they were not inclined to renew the imprudent attempt which had just cost to no purpose 5000 or 6000 men. It was not at present practicable to take at Dippoldiswalde, on the slope of the Bohemian mountains, the threatening position recommended by Moreau, for this would have been to proclaim an actual defeat and to have represented it as greater than it really was. But they resolved to remain in their present excellent position on the hills around Dresden. The French had the advantage of position by being supported by Dresden: they would themselves now have it by the semicircle of heights, and if the French were to attack them they would throw them back in disorder toward the suburbs which they had been unable to penetrate. Nobody thought of the abyss of Plauen, beyond which was a part of the Austrian army, whom it would be impossible to aid if subjected to any misfortune. Only Prince Schwarzenberg, fearing that he was not sufficiently strong in the centre, withdrew part of the troops which he had on the other side of the valley of Plauen, and thus weakened his left wing which he ought to have strengthened, rendering, indeed, upon the arrival of the second half of Klenau's corps, to restore to that wing

\* Marshal Saint Cyr, with his usual severity, has, in his memoir, represented Napoleon as without any plan for the next day, though there exists a series of letters, (evidently unknown to the marshal,) dated August 28, 7 P.M., immediately at the close of the first battle, in which all the orders for the following day are given with the most singular precision and perfect foresight. We must, therefore, never pronounce upon these great events without having seen the documents themselves, and, if possible, the whole of them. Otherwise, we shall pass an erroneous sentence, however good judges we may be and however near the scene of events we may have been.



the force of which he had deprived it. Such were the attitudes in which each party awaited the morrow.

On that day, August 27, the rain fell in abundance, and in the intervals of the rain a thick mist enveloped the field of battle,—a circumstance disagreeable to the soldiers of each army, but favourable to the execution of Napoleon's plans. The first hours of the morning were spent in manœuvres. On our side, beginning with the right, General Teste, under Marshal Victor's orders, established himself with the eight battalions at his disposal opposite the village of Lobda and at the entry of the valley of Plauen, to prevent the Austrian grenadiers under Bianchi from debouching as they had done on the previous day. Marshal Victor with his three divisions (one of which was reduced to a single brigade) was formed in columns at the foot of the heights, waiting till Murat should have executed his movement of turning on the left of the Austrians, and Murat himself, on horseback since the morning, with the heavy cavalry of Latour-Maubourg taking the longer way from Priesnitz, hastened to ascend unperceived the plateau on which he was to manœuvre. In the centre, Marmont, having the Old Guard behind him, and in front a formidable artillery, ranged himself at the foot of the heights of Racknitz, to receive the oral instructions of Napoleon, who was placed at his side. A little to the left, but still in the centre, Saint Cyr, having combined his three divisions, scattered the day before all round the city, took position in front of the Gross-Garten, ready to attack the heights of Strehlen. Finally, on the extreme left, Ney, with the Young Guard and Nansouty's cavalry, defiled in columns behind the Gross-Garten to turn it, and then come between Gruna and Dobritz to measure his strength with the Russians.

On the side of the allies the arrangement was the same as on the previous day, with the exception of some corrections of their position, and they awaited almost immovably the attack of the French, whose preparations they perceived through the mist. Count Wittgenstein (to begin with the right) was with the main body of the Russians opposed to Marshal Ney between Prohlis and Leubnitz; his main forces were on the heights, his advanced guards in the plain. In the rear to the right, around Prohlis, was the cavalry of the guard under the Grand-Duke Constantine; in the rear to the left, between Torna and Leubnitz, the corps of grenadiers under Miloradovitch. Barclay de Tolly commanded these reserves. A little to the left and toward the centre were the Russians of Kleist, between Leubnitz and Racknitz, with the Prussian guard in the rear and their advanced guards in the plain, in the neighbourhood of Strehlen, in front of Marshal Saint Cyr. Exactly in the centre, the Austrian corps of Colloredo and Chasteler were deployed from Racknitz to Plauen, in opposition to Marshal Marmont and the Old Guard. At Racknitz was posted the Emperor Alexander with General Moreau, who had become his faithful companion, almost within sight of Napoleon at the Dohna barrier. To the left, over against the valley of Plauen,

were ranged in columns Bianchi's grenadiers, detached from Giulay's corps to reinforce the centre, having in their rear, toward Coschitz, the Austrian reserves under the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. Lastly, more to the left, beyond the valley of Plauen, so deep and so difficult to cross, were at Toltschen the rest of Giulay's corps, a little farther off at Rosthal and Corbitz the infantry division of Aloys Lichtenstein, and quite to the left, between Comptitz and Altfranken, the Meszko division, forming part of Klenau's corps, which was still on the march. These are the troops which were to be engaged with Victor and the King of Naples.

As soon as the various positions were taken and it was possible to see through the mist, the cannonade began, and soon became violent, for between the two armies there were no less than 1200 guns in battery. Napoleon kept up the fire principally in the centre, where he had no other means of action. On the right General Teste took Lobda, from which he drove the Austrian tirailleurs, and reached the entry of the valley of Plauen. Marshal Victor, who had marched part of the night, after a little rest allowed to the troops, formed his men into several columns, and attempted to scale the heights to approach the villages of Toltschen, Rosthal, and Corbitz, which he was to take, and Murat, having crossed the steep of the hill by the little road of Priesnitz, deployed his sixty squadrons on the right of the Freyburg road, threatening the Austrians' left. This movement was nearly accomplished by half-past ten A.M.

In the centre, Saint Cyr, drawn up a little to the left of Marmont and the Old Guard, left the walls of the Gross-Garten, which were in his rear, carried Strehlen from the Prussians, and endeavoured to follow them to the heights of Leubnitz. The Prussians fell upon him, and a most violent struggle ensued between Strehlen and Leubnitz. On the other side of the Gross-Garten, Ney, after having defiled behind the garden and wheeled on his right, the left forward, deployed between Gruna and Dobritz, and then advanced toward Reick, driving before him the advanced guards of Wittgenstein. Marching at the head of a superb infantry of 36,000 men and of 5000 or 6000 horse, he presented the attitude of resolution which was so natural to him.

Excepting the serious engagement between Saint Cyr and the Prussians in the direction of Strehlen, nothing had occurred by 11 A.M. but the exchange of a brisk cannonade on the greatest part of the line, and the time was principally spent in manœuvring on the two wings. The allies, however, who could not perceive what was passing on their left, beyond the valley of Plauen, and who saw on their right the sustained and imposing march of Marshal Ney, consulted what was to be done. In accordance with an idea of General Jomini, it was proposed to the Emperor Alexander that as soon as Marshal Ney should have reached Prohlis the main body of the Prussians should attack him in flank, while Barclay de Tolly with the Russian reserves should attack his front. By thus directing against him 50,000 or 60,000 men simultaneously they thought to overwhelm him. But

Marshal Saint Cyr falling upon the Prussians with 20,000 men, and taking them in the rear, would have been able to give a very different aspect to affairs, and probably rendered them very disastrous to the allies. Alexander approved the idea; Prince Schwarzenberg adopted it; it suited the ardour of the Prussians; and emissaries were despatched to the cool and methodic Barclay de Tolly to induce him to support with all his forces a manœuvre which they trusted would be decisive.

But while this danger, more or less real, threatened Marshal Ney, a certain danger, not dependent on the concurrence of many wills, threatened the left of the allies. About half-past eleven o'clock, on the other side of the valley of Plauen, Victor and Murat, having arrived in line, and well concerted their attack, began to execute it with equal promptitude and vigour. Marshal Victor brought on his left Dubreton's division, one brigade of which was to take Toltschen from Weissenwolf's grenadiers, and the other to take Rosthal from the Aloys Lichtenstein division. On his right he brought Dufour's division, reduced to a brigade, and directed it against the village of Corbitz, through which passed the high-road of Freyburg and where was situated the rest of the Aloys Lichtenstein division. He kept in reserve the Vial division. Beyond Corbitz and on the other side of the Freyburg road, Murat, continuing to manœuvre, endeavoured, by advancing as far as Comptitz, to outflank the Austrians' left, formed by the Meszko division. When Murat appeared to have gained sufficient ground on the left of the Austrians, Marshal Victor gave the signal, and they marched rapidly against the three named villages. The Austrians first poured a murderous fire from fifty guns, and when our attacking columns were nearer, met them with musketry. But neither balls nor bullets staggered our young soldiers, led, as they were, by vigorous officers. Bearing down briskly upon the three villages, they carried the enclosure of the gardens which preceded them, and then fell upon the villages themselves. Of the two brigades of the Dubreton division, one entered Toltschen, where they fought hand to hand with the grenadiers of Weissenwolf, the other entered Rosthal and engaged a part of the Aloys Lichtenstein division. After a short combat these two villages fell into our hands. To the right, Dufour's division assailed Corbitz, carried it, and made 2000 prisoners. The Austrians then fell back on the ground in their rear, which rises in the form of a glacis. Thither they were followed. Suddenly the Aloys Lichtenstein division, perceiving a vacancy between Dubreton's division, which had gone a little to the left toward Toltschen, and Dufour's, which had remained at Corbitz, on the high-road to Freyburg, endeavoured to break through it. But Vial's division, which was in reserve in the centre, advanced to resist it, while Murat, seizing the opportunity with the practised eye of an able cavalry general, launched the Bordessoulle division against the infantry of Aloys Lichtenstein. The cuirassiers of Bordessoulle poured in full gallop upon the Austrians formed into square and deprived by the rain of the use of their guns. Two squares were in a moment broken and sabred. Dufour's

division, being disengaged, resumed its march along the Freyburg road, while on the left the two brigades of Dubreton endeavoured to drive the Austrians to the abyss at Plauen. Weissenwolf's grenadiers struggled in vain to hold their ground: they were hurled into the Weiseritz; more than 2000 were taken. At the same time Bordessoulle's cavalry, renewing the charge against the Aloys Lichtenstein division, drove it to the summit of the heights between Altfranken and Pesterwitz, then up a Potschappel in the very depth of the valley of Plauen. Men and guns were collected in large quantities. To the right, Murat, who had always followed with his eye the Meszko division to prevent its joining that of Aloys Lichtenstein, drove it upon Comptitz to throw it beyond the heights. Three thousand Austrian horse placed on the flanks of that division then rushed upon him. He opposed them with the dragoons of Doumerc's division, and overthrew them. He then attacked Meszko's infantry with his cuirassiers, and drove them, fighting all the way, more than a league on the high-road to Freyburg. At times that unhappy division halted to receive the charge of our horsemen with the bayonet, for the torrents of rain rendered their fire-arms useless: at times they withdrew as quickly as possible. At length, outflanked and surrounded by our squadrons, they were reduced to lay down their arms, to the number of 6000 or 8000 men. It was two o'clock, and Murat had already killed or wounded 4000 or 5000 men, made 12,000 prisoners, and seized more than thirty guns. So complete was the disaster of the enemy's left wing, that without exaggeration it might be said to have ceased to exist.

Whilst these events were occurring on the left of the allies, a strange accident happened in the centre. Napoleon had at that point opened a violent fire of artillery upon the Austrians, who had many guns and a dominant position, and, finding it was insufficient, he had brought up thirty-two 12-pounders of the Guard commanded by Colonel Griou. Directing these batteries in person under the fire of the enemy, he brought them as near as possible to the point at which they were to aim. At this moment the Emperor Alexander was opposite at Racknitz with General Morozov on his side. That general, pointing out the danger of the position to the Emperor Alexander, advised him to remove to a greater distance. Scarcely had this advice been given and followed, when a ball from the batteries directed by Napoleon struck him in both legs and threw to the ground himself and his horse. Strange fate! he was struck by a ball fired at it were by Napoleon himself! How many sufferings, deserved or undeserved, fell upon the head of this unhappy man, who merited a better death! The Emperor Alexander rushed to Moreau, embraced him in his arms, caused him to be removed, and remained much troubled at the event, which, being reported from one to another, produced a general impression among the allies. To this news was soon added that of the disaster on the left, which it was impossible to aid across the valley of Plauen, and that of the refusal of Barclay de Tolly to execute the manœuvre proposed

against Ney, saying that on ground so saturated with rain and so intersected with canals he could not bring down his artillery without sacrificing it. At the same time an officer arriving from Pirna announced that Vandamme, debouching from Konigstein, had carried that post from Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg.

Suffering a serious disaster on the left, violently cannonaded in the centre, threatened to be outflanked by the movement of Marshal Ney, who was advancing unimpeded from Reick upon Prohlis, and fearing soon to see the Peterswalde road in the hands of Vandamme, the allied generals around the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia began to discuss the course to be pursued. The most ardent wished to persevere; but Prince Schwarzenberg, prostrated by the loss of more than 20,000 men on his left, deprived of ammunition by the delay of his convoys, ignorant of the effect which might be produced on the rest of Klenau's corps by Murat, who had assaulted his rear, peremptorily refused to continue the battle. The retreat was, therefore, ordered toward the mountains of Bohemia by which they had penetrated Saxony, without any very definite direction being assigned to each column. They gradually gave ground, passing over the crest of the hills surrounding Dresden.

At this sight the joy of our ranks was extreme. Murat, to the right, galloping on the Freyburg road, every moment collected prisoners, baggage-wagons, and artillery. In the centre, the cannonade was carried on with increased briskness, and Saint Cyr and Ney, on the left, climbed the heights in pursuit of the Russians. At six p.m. we had taken from the allies 15,000 or 16,000 prisoners, at least forty guns, and there remained on the ground 10,000 or 11,000 of the enemy killed or wounded, the greater part by the cannons, excepting those who had fallen under the bayonets of Victor and the sabres of Murat. Thus the allies had lost 26,000 or 27,000 men, without reckoning the stragglers and the wandered whom we collected in thousands. This glorious day, the last favour of Fortune in this terrible campaign, had cost us about 8000 or 9000 men, almost all from cannon-balls. It was principally due to Napoleon, who at a glance had perceived in the deep valley of Plauen a method of isolating and destroying a wing of the enemy's army, and after Napoleon to Murat, who had executed that beautiful manœuvre with singular success. Without that peculiarity of the ground, the field of Dresden, everywhere commanded, could not have been held by us; but Napoleon, by seizing with the eye of genius a purely local peculiarity, had suddenly made it a theatre of victory to himself and confusion to his enemies.—a happy inspiration, from which he calculated upon deriving still greater results than he had yet obtained. Having, at four leagues' distance on his left, 40,000 men in ambush, he could not think without an involuntary joy of the effect of their falling unexpectedly upon the rear of his conquered foes, and while congratulating himself on the victory of that day he promised to himself and to every one else still greater triumphs on the following day. Alas! he never guessed

that a plan destined to produce the most brilliant results should speedily become the source of misfortunes! In these last times Fortune would only allow him a poisoned triumph,—the treatment which she commonly reserves for those who abuse her favour!

Napoleon entered Dresden at the close of the day amid the enthusiastic shouts of the people, delighted to be delivered from 200,000 allies who, before delivering them from the French, would have exposed them to all the horrors of a city taken by storm. Having been exposed for twelve hours to a continual rain, the flaps of his hat were fallen upon his shoulders, and he was covered with mud, but radiant with delight. He repaired to the King of Saxony, who expressed the greatest joy, and in the midst of rejoicing, sincere with some, affected by others, but very demonstrative in all, he constantly addressed one question to everybody. At the moment when the ball which had struck Moreau had fallen into the group around Alexander, Napoleon had clearly discerned by the splendour of the uniforms that this group was that of the sovereigns, and he continually asked, "Whom did we kill in that brilliant company?" He learned this shortly after by a strange incident. The illustrious sufferer had a dog which had remained in the hut where he received the first attention: it bore upon the collar the inscription, "I belong to General Moreau," and being brought to Napoleon disclosed the presence and the death of Moreau in the ranks of the allies. Napoleon gave orders that his *corps d'armée*, after being well warmed at large fires and rested for a whole night, should be set in motion at the break of day on the 28th to pursue the enemy to the utmost and to reap all the fruits of their glorious victory of the 27th.

The allies, having retired to the summit of the heights around Dresden, began to discuss the direction in which they should effect their retreat. Some were for halting at the issues from the mountains of Bohemia, as Moreau had advised before the battle, others for retiring immediately into Bohemia, even beyond the Eger, in which opinion accorded the generalissimo, Prince Schwarzenberg, who wished to reorganize his army and to recover it from the rude blow which it had received. To remain on the slope of the mountains in presence of a victorious enemy, accustomed, as Napoleon was, to make the most of a victory, was not to be thought of. To recross the mountains, and then to decide how far the retrograde movement should be carried, was the first and inevitable step; and this was taken. It remained to determine the paths to be chosen. The high-road of Peterswalde was either wholly lost or much endangered. In fact, General Vandamme, in obedience to the Emperor's orders, had the day before, the 26th, crossed the Elbe at Konigstein, attacked the plateau of Pirna, which was feebly guarded, and established himself in that camp, from which he commanded the Peterswalde road, without completely intercepting it. During the day, they had sent Count Ostermann to succour Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg; they did not exactly know the strength of Vandamme's corps, whether he had 20,000, 30,000, or 40,000 men, and whether, in the interval, he had not suc-

ceeded in descending from the camp of Pirna to bar the defiles of the Peterswalde road. To relinquish the idea of passing in that direction was attended with the double inconvenience of leaving unsupported the Prince of Wurtemberg and Count Ostermann, and of crowding the secondary roads, which were very imperfect, and would be sadly encumbered by the combination of the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians. It was, therefore, decided that the main body of the Russians, under Barclay de Tolly, should march in the steps of Count Ostermann by the Peterswalde road, and force it if closed; that the Prussians and part of the Austrians should take the road by the side, that of Altenberg, Zinnwald, and Toplitz, by which had arrived the second column of the allies; that, finally, the rest of the Austrian army should go by the Freyburg road, to gain the high-road from Leipzig to Prague by Connotau. Thus they should re-enter Bohemia in three columns, instead of four in which they had left it. It was agreed that, after resting all night, they should leave on the next day, the 28th, very early, in order to reach the mountain-defiles before being very closely pressed by the enemy.

A few hours after these arrangements were planned they were executed. The following morning the troops were set in motion in three columns, in the directions indicated, while the French corps marched in their steps, though at a considerable distance, owing to the state of the roads. At every step were left the wounded, the stragglers, and wagons, destined to fall a prey to the French. Melancholy filled every heart. The King of Prussia saw in the events of the last few days the course of his ordinary ill fortune; Alexander began to fear lest the success on which he had counted might prove an illusion, and that he had been too sanguine in hoping that he could conquer Napoleon. Thus they advanced, uneasy at the encounters to which they should be exposed before crossing the curtain of high mountains before them, while on their rear was a victorious enemy, and no one, either of the pursued or the pursuers, conjecturing what might happen within forty-eight hours.

While marching, Barclay de Tolly, perceiving great encumbrances on the Peterswalde road, and aware that he should be soon closely pressed, began to fear that he should lose much valuable time if exposed to any difficulty in that direction, and that he should no longer be able to fall back in time upon the Altenberg road; he therefore conceived the plan of suddenly changing his course with the main body of the Russian army, and of taking to the right to regain the same Altenberg road which the Prussians and part of the Austrian army were to traverse, at the risk of occasioning there a frightful crush. He sent word to Count Ostermann to fall back upon him, and to allow Prince Eugene to return alone by the Peterswalde road into Bohemia.

These orders occasioned a violent struggle between Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg and Count Ostermann. Prince Eugene, who was contending with General Vandamme for the possession of the Peterswalde road, was naturally unwilling to remain there alone with the chance of finding Vandamme sometimes on his flank, sometimes on his rear, perhaps even in

his front, for the French descending from the plateau of Pirna were seen in all directions. He said, moreover, that if free entry into Bohemia were allowed to Vandamme's corps, which was believed to be very strong, that corps would probably take position at Toplitz, at the entry of the roads followed by the different retreating columns, and might cause them serious difficulties. Count Ostermann, on his side, feared to compromise the troops of the guard intrusted to him, and for that reason resisted the urgent solicitation of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. Overcome by the strong reasons of the prince, and by his offer to take upon himself the principal share of the danger, he at length determined to follow the Peterswalde road, and to force it if necessary, in order to reach the outlet from Toplitz before Vandamme. At the same time he gave intimation to Barclay de Tolly of his resolution, without concealing from himself the disadvantages of it, but believing that he should thus avert great dangers from the rest of the allied army.

Consequently, on the morning of the 28th, Prince Eugene and Count Ostermann attempted to make their way on the plateau of Gieshubel, situated below that of Pirna, and separated from it only by the river Gottleube. It was necessary to cross several very difficult passages where they might meet the French, particularly at Zehist, a little town at the entry of the plateau of Gieshubel, under a height called the Kohlberg, occupied at that moment by a French battalion. Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg attacked and carried the Kohlberg, and then availed himself of that advantage to defile with all his corps. Vandamme reoccupied the position, but at the moment the two Russian corps were not interested in its recovery. Continuing to traverse the plateau of Gieshubel, they came in contact at Gross-Cotta and Klein-Cotta with the French, who had descended from Pirna in too feeble detachments, and overcame all obstacles, though with some loss. Arrived at length, at the extremity of this plateau, they escaped by the descent of Gieshubel, and reached the Peterswalde road without any serious accident, having escaped a great danger at an inconsiderable cost.

The cause of this good fortune was that Vandamme, having had difficulty in bringing his artillery, owing to the bad weather, had been able to do no more on the 26th than ascend the plateau of Pirna, and had spent the whole of the 27th in securing the possession of it, and on the morning of the 28th had been surprised by the appearance of the Russians before he knew what had occurred at Dresden. But, being now informed of the victory of the 27th, and having brought together his divisions, he had pursued the Russians, engaged their rear-guard at Gieshubel, killed about 1,000 men, and driven them to Hollendorf, at some distance from Peterswalde. There he waited patiently farther orders from Napoleon.

Such were the operations of the enemy on the morning and forenoon of the 28th. During this time Napoleon, up at an early hour, had forwarded his first orders in writing, enjoining Marshal Mortier with the Young Guard and Marshal St. Cyr with the 14th corps to repair to Gieshubel, one of the defiles of the Peterswalde road, there to join Vandamme, Marshal

Marmont to follow the allies by the Altenberg road, and Murat, who had with him Victor's corps, to pursue them with all energy on the great Freyburg road. In the same despatches Napoleon had announced his presence, and promised to give such orders on the spot as circumstances should require. Accordingly, at break of day he had ridden to Marshal Marmont to watch the retreat of the enemy with his own eyes.

Having reached the heights of Dresden, where Marshal Marmont was, he had seen the different columns of the allies moving toward the wooded mountains of the Erz-Gebirge. He had been struck with the transverse movement from left to right executed by the Russian troops under Barclay de Tolly, to get from the Peterswalde to the Altenberg road, in virtue of which a great part of the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian troops would be found united in the same direction. Before such masses the corps of Marmont was manifestly insufficient, and Napoleon had himself ordered Marshal St. Cyr to fall back from Dohna to Maxen, to combine with Marshal Marmont in the pursuit of the enemy. This order having been given orally, Napoleon went to Pirna to see what was going on there, and to declare what was to be done on the Peterswalde road.

Having reached Pirna about mid-day, Napoleon took a light repast, and was suddenly seized with pain in the bowels, to which he was subject when exposed to damp; and through the whole of the previous day he had been exposed to torrents of rain. But these sufferings did not prevent the issue of his orders or the performance of whatever was rendered urgent by circumstances.\* But at this moment he received despatches which he had anxiously expected from the neighbourhood of Berlin and the banks of the Bober. Marshal Oudinot, who ought to have entered Berlin several days before, had been arrested by the inundations, and thus had not attacked the enemy in force, and had suffered considerably in one of his corps. Marshal Macdonald, on the Bober, had been surprised by Blücher, and had incurred considerable loss. Thus, fortune scarcely allowed Napoleon time to enjoy his glorious victory of Dresden, when suddenly the horizon darkened around him, after having been perfectly serene.

\* The flatterers of Napoleon's memory, ignorant of the real motives of his sudden return to Dresden, because his correspondence was unknown to them, and unwilling to admit that he could be in error, ascribed that return to sudden indisposition. The numerous orders issued on the same day, the 28th, and on the 29th, prove that this indisposition did not prevent Napoleon from engaging in his affairs, and eye-witnesses, particularly Marshal Marmont, affirm that he was not at all ill. By more willingly referring to authentic documents than to the accounts of eye-witnesses, which are almost always contradictory, we think we have obtained proof, by the letters of Napoleon, that this pretended indisposition did not prevent him doing all that was necessary, and we are convinced that the real motive of his return to Dresden, which was so fatal two days later, was no other than the despatches received from the neighbourhood of Berlin and Lowenberg. The orders of the 29th and 30th leave this beyond doubt. We shall demonstrate in the sequel, by the simple statement of facts, that what has been published concerning this important epoch has been purely erroneous, and has rendered wholly inexplicable the catastrophe of General Vandamme. We hope that after the following narrative it will be perfectly clear, and that that great misfortune will be referred to its true cause, which was less accidental and more general than is commonly supposed.

In every point of view, moral, political, and military, the march upon Berlin had always appeared to him of great importance. It would dazzle the minds of men, strike at the very heart of Prussia, punish Bernadotte, and put us in communication with the fortresses of the Oder, perhaps with those of the Vistula, which all required to be revictualled. The check sustained by Macdonald, added to that of Oudinot, might render this much-valued march upon Berlin more difficult and doubtful, and he thought it necessary to return to Dresden immediately, to give such orders as the case required. Whilst Berlin recalled him, the movement upon Peterswalde less urgently demanded his presence after what he had heard. In fact, he might have believed, when leaving Dresden in the morning, that Vandamme, occupying Pirna and Gieshübel, would oppose a barrier of iron to the Russian column, and that St. Cyr and Mortier coming on the rear of that column would take it entirely. But he had just learned that the Russian column had had time to regain the Peterswalde road, and that, in consequence, all that Vandamme could do would be to pursue them vigorously, and he thought that no more of his lieutenants were necessary to reap all the fruits of his Dresden victory. He thought it would be sufficient to leave to Vandamme all the divisions which he already commanded, to make him descend into Bohemia by the Peterswalde road, and to bring him to Teplitz, where he would find himself on the line of retreat pursued by the allies about to debouch from the mountain defiles, and briskly pursued by St. Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat. It was probable that Vandamme, in ambush at Kulm or Teplitz, would make several good captures, and that passing then between Tetschen and Aussig he would take a great part of the *matériel* of the allies when the latter should attempt to recross the Elbe. In this position Vandamme would render another service, that of occupying the direct road from Prague, to which Napoleon attached great importance, for since the receipt of the despatches of Oudinot and Macdonald he contemplated a rapid march upon Berlin or Prague, so as to fall unawares upon the army of the North, or to complete the defeat of that of Bohemia. Even if he should return to Dresden at this moment, it was with the view of employing a day in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a march on one or other of these capitals. Considering, then, the situation under this new aspect, he left General Vandamme not only his two first divisions, the Philippon and Dumonceau, with Quoyot's brigade, forming one-half of Teste's division, but the first division of Marshal St. Cyr, (42d,) which had been lent him some days before, and to this he added the brigade of De Reuss of Victor's corps, to compensate for the loss of one-half of Teste's division. He, moreover, added General Corbincieu's cavalry. Vandamme should thus have the strength of four infantry divisions, and of three cavalry brigades, forming together at least 40,000 men. Napoleon ordered him to pursue briskly the Russians into Bohemia, to descend upon Kulm, to occupy Teplitz on one side, to annoy the allies on their egress from the mountains, and Aussig and Tetschen on the other, to guard the passages of the Elbe

and the road from Prague.\* He even ordered him—which plainly shows his real intentions—to bring up as far as Tetschen the second bridge of boats constructed at Pirna, and further issued his final orders. However, he placed Mortier at Pirna with four divisions of the Young Guard, that he might if necessary assist General Vandamme, from whom he would be only seven or eight leagues distant. At the same time he recommended Saint Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat always to follow close upon the allies, and to drive them upon the mountains so violently that they should not be able to pass them except in disorder. After giving these instructions, he left for Dresden in a carriage, and ordered the Old Guard to join him there.

During the same day, (the 28th,) Saint Cyr, Marmont, Victor, and Murat tracked the enemy without intermission. Saint Cyr collected some wounded and stragglers. At Possendorf Marmont took 2000 prisoners and 300 or 400 carriages. At Dippoldiswalde he gained a battle and took or killed several hundred men. Murat and Victor, on their side, collected wounded, stragglers, prisoners, guns, carriages, and at least 5000 or 6000 men. The loss of the allies the day before, which might be estimated at more than 25,000 men, amounted to at least 32,000 or 33,000 from the results of the 28th. Signs of discouragement were visible among the enemy, and gave reason to hope for important results if they were vigorously pursued.

On the following day, (the 29th,) Vandamme, roused by the orders received the previous evening, resolved to allow the Russians no rest, and to make them atone for their good fortune in passing before him with impunity under the plateau of Pirna. That general, richly endowed with *coup-d'œil*, vigour, experience in war, and intelligence, disparaged, unfortunately, by the roughness of his manners and the violence of his character, had been treated without favour, and complained of not being as yet a marshal,—a rank which he deserved much more than several of his contemporaries on whom Napoleon had bestowed it. The difficulty of the circumstances, and the necessity of replacing the warriors who were so prodigally consumed, having recalled the Emperor's attention to him, he hoped to obtain the reward which he thought he had long deserved, and he became the subject of redoubled zeal, which, though very needful in

other circumstances, might in the present carry him beyond the bounds of prudence. He resolutely advanced from the morning of the 29th on the rear-guard of the Russians. The brigade of De Reuss, commanded by a young German prince, a soldier of the highest distinction, marched at the head, under the direction of Vandamme, accompanied by General Haxo. Between Hollendorf and Peterswalde, Vandamme and Prince de Reuss attacked a Russian column, which made some resistance, but they outflanked it, threw it into disorder, and deprived it of 2000 men. Unhappily the young Prince de Reuss was killed by a ball to the regret of the whole army, for to the merit of being a brilliant officer he added that of sincere attachment to the French.

After this exploit Vandamme continued his energetic pursuit of the Russians. He crossed the mountains on their track, descended into the plain, and at mid-day attacked Kulm, whence he commanded the vast basin into which the hardly-driven columns of the enemy began to pour. At his sight the soldiers of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg and Ostermann's guards, whom he had pursued incessantly, and from whom he had taken several thousand prisoners, halted and came to take up their position before him to protect the passage from Tœplitz, of which they well knew the importance. From the heights of Kulm Vandamme perceived the Tœplitz passage, where he was ordered to touch, if necessary, and whither he was drawn by the desire to bar the way to the enemy's columns which had taken the roads parallel to that of Peterswalde. Unfortunately he had at command only his vanguard; the rest followed, forming a long train in the gorges, and the Russian troops, which were before him in greater numbers than in the morning, and reinforced by new corps, seemed resolved to maintain their position. He, therefore, suspended his march for a short time, to allow his *corps d'armée* to come up. In the interval the following events had transpired on the side of the allies.

The Emperor Alexander had passed the night of the 28th at Altenberg, at the foot of the mountains of the Erz-Gebirge, more particularly of that called the Geyersberg, had crossed it on the morning of the 29th, and had reached the other side at an early hour. Discovering from that point on the left the position at Kulm where Vandamme had halted in presence of the Russians, on the right Tœplitz and the basin of the Eger which falls into the Elbe, he was able to appreciate the danger of a precipitate retreat, effected without order, threatened in flank by Vandamme's corps, which was known to be considerable and which might become increasingly so every hour. He had lost the counsellor in whom he had placed so much confidence, General Moreau, whom the soldiers bore on their shoulders in a dying state, and there remained General Jomini, whom Moreau had recommended to him as capable of giving good advice, though very irritable. General Jomini and several others, much disposed to disparage the Austrians, and in particular Prince Schwarzenberg, bitterly complained of any proposal to withdraw beyond the Eger, declaring that any such retrograde movement would be at

\* We may here quote the very order, which completely elucidates the intention of the Emperor:—

"One league from Pirna, August 28, 1812, 4 p. m.

"General Vandamme, the Emperor orders you to make for Peterswalde, with all your *corps d'armée*, the Corbineau division, the 121 division, and the brigade of the 21 corps under General de Reuss, which will give you an augmentation of eighteen battalions. Pirna will be guarded by the troops of the Duke of Trivise, who will reach Pirna this evening. The marshal has also orders to relieve your posts in the Liebenitz camp. General Baltus, with your battery of twelve guns and your park, will reach Pirna this evening; find him out. The Emperor desires you to join all the forces placed at your disposal, and with them to penetrate into Bohemia, and overthrow the Prince of Wurtemberg if he should oppose you. The enemy whom we have beaten seem to direct their course to Annaberg. His Majesty thinks that you may arrive before them at the communication of Tetschen, Aussig, and Tœplitz, and thus take the equipages, ambulances, baggage, and whatever follows the rear of an army. The Emperor orders the bridge of boats at Pirna to be raised, and one to be constructed at Tetschen."

merely unnecessary but dangerous, especially since Vandamme's corps appeared at the exit from the Peterswalde road on the flank of the retreating columns. The Emperor Alexander, who was becoming better acquainted with war, and who was wrong merely in allowing himself to be affected by opposite advice to the extent of falling into endless indecision, had duly estimated the objection and was quite disposed to entertain it. Formerly, when they were less exasperated against the French, when they were weighed down by the transcendent genius of Napoleon, they were little inclined to fret at a defeat which they regarded as an inevitable check, and they readily repaired to the first corps which they met on their way after the loss of a battle. Now it was different. The passion for resistance had become extreme, the prestige of Napoleon was diminished, and the sense of discouragement was less, and at the slightest ray of hope they eagerly resumed the determination to fight. Thus, all the generals about Alexander were of opinion that if any opportunity occurred of renewing the struggle, it ought to be seized, and that, as a French corps appeared on their left, they ought to halt and engage it rather than go beyond the Eger. Moreover, it was as yet an isolated corps, which might possibly be supported, but possibly not, and in the latter case would be an easy prey. Barclay de Tolly and General Diebitch, who was now chief of the staff, being of this opinion, orders were given to the columns of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg and Ostermann to make a stand before Kulm, however fatigued they might be. Reinforcements were promised them, and in fact, several columns of Russian and Prussian infantry arriving by the Altenberg road with the cavalry of the guard, they were sent to them. Nor was this all. The Austrian troops at the time debouched in greater numbers than the Russians, because they had first set out and had not turned back upon the Altenberg road. The first corps which presented itself was that of Colloredo. But that general, when required to form before Kulm, behind the Russian lines, having alleged the instructions of Prince Schwarzenberg enjoining him to retire beyond the Eger, they appealed to M. de Metternich, who was at Duchs, the castle of the famous Wallenstein, where the sovereigns were then assembled, and order was given to all the Austrian troops to converge to the left, to put themselves in battle-array along with the Russian troops from Peterswalde.

But several hours must elapse before these orders could bring any considerable forces into line, and Vandamme, after a moment's reflection, though he saw that the fugitive troops halted and even received accessions, resolved to dislodge them from the post which they seemed desirous of holding in order to protect from us the outlets from the Geyersberg. By thus acting he obeyed at once precise orders and the dictate of circumstances, for his orders required him to go to Toplitz, and circumstances required him to close the mountain-passes against the beaten columns, since he had been sent to those parts merely to present obstacles to their retreat. Having always in hand the brigade of De Reuss, with which he

had marched since the morning, and only that, he, nevertheless, drove the Russians from Kulm, where they had endeavoured to hold their ground, and from the village of Straden, on which they had fallen back. Having taken that village, he found himself before a second position, situated in the rear of a ravine and apparently of considerable strength. On one side, i.e. to our right, it was supported by the mountains, toward the centre by the village of Priesten built on the Toplitz road, to the left by meadows intersected with canals and by the village of Karbitz. Vandamme determined immediately to attack the village of Priesten, to prevent the Russians establishing themselves there, but for the first time he met an obstinate resistance, and was repulsed by a charge of the regiment of guards of Ismailow. He had neither his heavy artillery nor his masses of infantry: he was, therefore, obliged to await Mouton-Duvernet's division, (42d,) and he would manifestly have done better to have deferred the engagement till the arrival of his entire corps rather than have risked the combat with inadequate forces. However, as it would be late before his other divisions could appear, and as he was still anxious to cut off the enemy's retreat, he attacked them with nine battalions belonging to General Mouton-Duvernet, which alone of the fourteen composing his division had at that time joined. With these nine battalions moved to the right in the direction of the woods, he renewed the combat, and threw back the Russians upon Priesten. But he was suddenly assailed by forty squadrons of the Russian guard, who had just come into line, and who deployed, some to our right toward the foot of the mountains, some to the left in the plain of Karbitz. The battalions of Mouton-Duvernet restrained the Russian cavalry along the mountains, the squadrons of Corbineau charged them on the side of the meadows; but, nevertheless, once more, instead of advancing we could do no more than keep the ground we had gained. At 2 p.m. appeared the first brigade of the Philippon division, (the first of Vandamme's.) That brigade, commanded by General Pouchelon, sent to the right the 12th of the line to support Mouton-Duvernet, and to the centre the 7th light to attack Priesten. These regiments met so formidable a fire that they could not carry the position. Philippon's second brigade, having arrived under General de Fezensac, was also engaged, and with much vigour, but with no better success. The 7th light of the first brigade, attempting to attack Priesten, was riddled with grape, then charged by the Russian cavalry, and saved by the second brigade rallied by General Fezensac under the enemy's fire. Vandamme, perceiving too late that these desultory attacks could accomplish nothing, determined to place his line a little to the rear on the heights of Kulm, which, being situated at the outlet of the Peterswalde road, commanded the plain. The Russians attempting to advance were saluted in their turn from twenty-four guns placed in battery by General Baltus, who had arrived with the artillery reserve. They retired under the shower and before the charge of our cavalry, and went to resume the position of Priesten, supported, as in the morning, on the left by the mountains,

the centre by Priesten on the Tœplitz road, and the right in the meadows of Karbitz. We were directly opposite, having on one side the mountains, on the other the meadows, and in the centre the commanding position of Kulm, where defence was easy.

It was no error in Vandamme to endeavour to take the Russian position, since he had been ordered to drive them as far as Tœplitz, and, besides, had perceived the necessity of closing the exit from the Altenberg road upon Tœplitz; but it was an error to have made the attack before he had convened all his forces; and this error is explained by the delay of his columns in the mountains, and by the natural desire to dislodge the enemy before they should be firmly established. Moreover, General Vandamme halted, and he resolved to guard Kulm carefully, for he could not there be forced, having fifty-two battalions at his disposal and about eighty guns in battery. His intention was to wait there till Mortier, who had remained in his rear at Pirna, should come to his aid, and Saint Cyr and Marmont on his right, on the other side of the mountains, should cross them in pursuit of the allies. The execution of these movements required only twelve or fifteen hours, and with the concurrence of all these forces he trusted to be able on the 30th to offer splendid results to the Emperor; melancholy self-deception, though as well founded as the most reasonable expectation could be! On the same evening he wrote to inform Napoleon of his situation, to demand aid, and to declare that till the arrival of succour he should remain stationary at Kulm.

The letters written at Kulm on the evening of the 29th could not reach Dresden before the morning of the 30th, and orders issued in reply to them could not be executed sufficiently soon to secure aid to Vandamme early in the 30th. During the evening of the 29th Napoleon had received news which left Peterswalde in the morning; he knew that the Russians were retiring in haste, that Vandamme was following close upon their heels and had already deprived them of several thousand men. Supposing from this information that the allies were completely routed, and calculating that the brisk pursuit of Saint Cyr, Marmont, and Murat would oblige them to cross the mountains in disorder, and that Vandamme, on the other side, would sweep them away in thousands and perhaps close against them altogether the principal passage from Altenberg, he had repeated to Saint Cyr, Marmont, and Murat the order to urge them briskly in all directions, and to Mortier to be continually on the alert, ready to rush to Kulm if required by Vandamme. With his head full of the past, recalling the facility with which he swept away the Prussians and Austrians when beaten, taking no account of the passion which now animated them and made them so difficult to subdue, he considered that these precautions were sufficient to reap great results from the victory at Dresden. Besides, he was at the time absorbed by a vast scheme,\*

\* When Napoleon wished to estimate accurately his own ideas, he committed them to paper, aware, as all thinking men, that to draw up his ideas in a regular form was the best method of examining them. He, therefore, dictated his plan in an admirable note, entitled *Note upon the*

by means of which he hoped to avail himself of the severe blow given to the army of Bohemia, and to advance upon the Berlin road five marches from Dresden, to crush the army of the North, at one blow to overwhelm Prussia and Bernadotte, to revictual the fortresses of the Oder, to encourage those of the Vistula, and thus to impress a new aspect on the war, the theatre of which should for a time be transported to the North of Germany. Thus Berlin and the fortresses of the Oder and Vistula, which had already inclined him too widely to extend the circle of his operations, again occupied his mind and diverted him from that which for some hours ought to have been his single and essential object. No doubt, as we shall soon see, his conception was singularly great, but it was, unfortunately, unseasonable and premature by at least two days! Wholly engrossed in his calculations and in the heat of a first idea, he despatched the following orders on the morning of the 30th. He ordered Marshal Mortier at Pirna to send back to Dresden two divisions of the Young Guard, and with the two others to go to the succour of Vandamme; Murat to restore one-half of his heavy cavalry, and with the rest to pursue the enemy on the Freyburg road; Marmont to urge the enemy upon the pass from Altenberg and Zinnwald, where, from all accounts, the columns of Russians, Prussians, and Austrians were pressing pell-mell; Marshal Saint Cyr to second Marmont in this operation, or, which was better, to seek by a lateral road to gain that of Peterswalde, so as to join Vandamme, and he thus hoped that, pressed in the rear, threatened in flank, and checked in front, the allies should suffer some disaster. He ordered that the troops he demanded should be immediately sent across the Elbe, and did not conceal from Murat that it was with the intention of marching upon Berlin.

While he was conceiving these plans and issuing these orders, the allies, at Tœplitz, were forming no such vast combinations, and were thinking only of extricating themselves from the danger which they had imprudently incurred by descending on the rear of Dresden. Some confidence had been restored to them by the successful resistance to Vandamme on the 29th. All the Russian and Austrian troops which had reached them by the road from Altenberg to Tœplitz had been sent back to the left and placed behind Priesten and Karbitz, so as to present a barrier of iron to Vandamme. They flattered themselves that they could prevent him debouching from Kulm, and perhaps give him a check, which would compensate in some degree for the events of the 26th and 27th and would procure to all their columns time to repeat the mountains in safety. However, there re-

*general situation of my affairs, August 30 very similar to those which he wrote at Moscow in October, 1812, and disclosing his whole thought at the time when Vandamme was at Kulm. In this note we see the true cause of the negligence which led to the misfortune of Vandamme, especially by comparing it with the orders given the same day to Murat and Mortier, and we perceive how ridiculous is the story of indisposition invented by certain historians and eagerly embraced by those who incline to trace great events to the smallest causes—a singular note, and one which argues a mediocrity of mind. No man less was for those who more readily believe in small causes than is great!*



mained to them a source of serious uneasiness in the Prussian corps of Kleist, which ought to have followed the Austrian corps of Colloredo in the first plan of retreat, and to pass with him by Dippoldiswalde, Altenberg, Zinnwald, and Toplitz, but which had been prevented by the transverse movement of Barclay de Tolly, which, as we have seen, had passed quickly from the Peterswalde road to that of Altenberg, in order to avoid Vandamme. Delayed in the march, and obliged to wait till the road should be clear, Kleist's corps was still on the reverse of the Geyersberg on the evening of the 29th, and great anxiety was entertained for them, for St. Cyr's corps was directly upon their heels. The King of Prussia, after conference with Alexander, sent Colonel Schöler, one of his aides-de-camp, to General Kleist, to warn him of the presence of Vandamme's corps at Kulm, to leave him the choice of the road he should pursue to save himself, and to promise him that they should stand their ground well before Kulm on the following day, that he might have leisure to cross the mountain and to débouche into the basin of the Eger.\* At the same time, they considered this corps so much compromised that they ordered M. de Schöler to bring across the woods the young Prince of Orange, who was making that campaign with the Prussian army and had been placed with General Kleist. They were unwilling to leave such a trophy to Napoleon, if Kleist's corps should be made prisoner. M. de Schöler then left immediately, to recross the mountains, and at all risk to fulfil the difficult mission with which he was charged. Such were the hopes of some and the fears of others at midnight of the 29th!

On the morning of the 30th the two armies were in the same position as on the previous night. The allies were opposite Vandamme, their left, composed of Russians, near the mountains, their centre, also composed of Russians, in front of Priesten and opposite Kulm, their right, formed of Austrians and the cavalry of the allies, in the meadows of Karbitz. They were arranged to assume the offensive, to arrest the passage of General Kleist across the mountains by occupying the French; but they were ignorant of the road by which he should endeavour to emerge from the gulf in which he was plunged. They supposed that Vandamme had no more than 30,000 men, while his real number amounted to 40,000. They could not, therefore, hesitate to begin the attack, which they resolved to do immediately.

Vandamme, on the contrary, having at day-break discerned more clearly the disproportion of his forces to those of the enemy, and expecting every moment the appearance of Marshal Mortier in his rear and of Marshal St. Cyr on his right, determined to maintain the defensive till the arrival of his reinforcements. This he communicated to Napoleon at 6 A.M. With orders to push on to Toplitz, and with his venturesome character, the best that could be

hoped was that he should halt at Kulm. To return to Peterswalde was not to be thought of, for the position of Kulm was strong enough to enable him with 40,000 men to defend himself against any force; and in the rear, between Kulm and Peterswalde, they could anticipate no danger, as Mortier was there and was expected every moment to débouche. To maintain himself at Kulm and not to venture on the plain in order to reach Toplitz was, therefore, the only course indicated by circumstances.

General Vandamme had distributed his troops in the following manner. To his right, opposite the Russians, at the foot of the Geyersberg, he had nine battalions of Mouton-Duvernet's division, and a little to the rear, but inclining to the centre, was the Philippon division, with fourteen battalions. He was, then, in full force on that side of the mountains, whence every moment were descending numerous columns of the enemy. In the centre, before Kulm, opposite to Priesten, he had Quoy's brigade of Teste's division, a little in the rear the brigade of De Reuss. Behind Kulm he had Doucet's brigade of Dumonceau's division, and to the left, toward the meadows, Dunesme's brigade, also belonging to Dumonceau's division, to support the cavalry. Finally, General Kreutzen, with the rest of Mouton-Duvernet's division, had been sent to Aussig, considerably in the rear, to guard the passage of the Elbe, in accordance with Napoleon's orders. Thus, with twenty-three battalions on his right and along the mountains, eighteen in the centre, seven or eight to the left supporting twenty-five squadrons on the plain, and a formidable artillery, he might think himself secure, especially as he had the Peterswalde road in his rear, from which he constantly hoped to see the approach of Mortier. He, therefore, waited without anxiety; and yet many hearts indulged sinister presentiments without knowing the reason. At 8 o'clock the tirailleurs of the enemy began the fire, to which ours replied; but nothing, as yet, indicated a serious engagement. Soon were seen on our left the Russian horse of General Knorring crossing an eminence which commanded the meadows, and then pouring down upon a battery of horse-artillery a little in advance of our line of cavalry. Three pieces were taken, and a battalion of the 18th Light, which endeavoured to defend them, suffered severely. Then General Heinrodt's brigade of light cavalry, under the intrepid Corbineau, charged and repulsed the Russian cuirassiers. But Colloredo's Austrian infantry having deployed their battalions to support the Russian cavalry, General Heinrodt's chasseurs were obliged to fall back. General Corbineau, wounded in the head, was forced to quit the field.

Vandamme then withdrew from the centre Quoy's brigade, and brought it toward his left to support the Dunesme brigade and our cavalry. Scarcely had they reached the plain on the left when they were assailed by the whole of Knorring's cavalry. General Quoy formed that gallant brigade, which consisted of six battalions, into three squares, and for more than an hour endured, without wavering, the assaults of the enemy's cavalry. This last wishing to turn our squares and to approach Kulm, General Gobrecht's brigade of chasseurs à cheval charged them in their turn, and drove

\* The Russian Danilewki has endeavoured to ascribe to the Emperor Alexander the honour of a profound combination, consisting in bringing Kleist down upon the rear of Vandamme; but M. de Wolsogen, in his memoirs, equally instructive and intelligent, has completely falsified that assertion, which he had more right to do than any other, having been present when the order we have mentioned was given to M. de Schöler,—an order which is thus reduced to the dimensions we have assigned.

them back on the Austrian infantry. The efforts on our left indicated the design of driving us upon the Peterswalde road by out-flanking us, but hitherto none of those efforts had succeeded, and being masters of the plain to the left, and firm in the centre and right, where the enemy seemed afraid to attack us, we thought we had no cause for alarm.

But suddenly, about 10 A.M., some disorder was occasioned on our rear. The sound of guns and of many artillery-carriages was heard: at length were perceived thick columns, which Vandamme with joy very naturally believed were those of Mortier arriving from Pirna. Vain illusion and terrible discovery! He rushed forward and recognised the Prussian uniform. It was General Kleist descending by the Peterswalde road. Who, then, could have extricated him from a frightful danger thus to throw him on our rear? Chance!—a happy movement of despair! The case was as follows.

On receiving the report from M. de Schœler, General Kleist had informed his officers of the presence of the French at Kulm, and as he was between the Peterswalde road on the left, which was occupied by Vandamme, and the Altenberg road on the right, which had been all day encumbered by Russians and Austrians, and was at that moment intercepted by Marmont's corps, his only course was to follow straight before him the paths leading to the reverse of the mountain, at the risk of finding Vandamme in his way. And, moreover, as he had Saint Cyr's corps immediately on his rear, if he stopped for a moment he might be assaulted and overthrown. In presence of this triple danger, the Prussians, in a transport of enthusiasm, had determined to climb the mountain before them, and if that path should lead them to the midst of Vandamme's corps, to cut their way through or to die. They had marched all night without being followed by Saint Cyr, and had discovered on their left a cross-path which joined the Peterswalde road by Furstenwalde and Streckenwalde and brought them safe and sound on the rear of Vandamme. Seeing him attacked in front by 100,000 men, while they were themselves on his rear to the number of at least 30,000, they began the attack immediately, fully confident of a prodigious result.

At this sight, Vandamme, with remarkable presence of mind, after consulting with General Haxo, perceived that only one thing remained to be done, i.e. to return by the Peterswalde road and to cut his way over the Prussian columns, sacrificing his artillery. Such a sacrifice was not to be considered if it involved the preservation of the army. He immediately gave orders accordingly. He ordered Quytot's brigade, which he had brought to his left in the plain, to fall back, and the brigade of De Reuss, which had been left before Kulm, to do the same; and both of them to form in close column to break the Prussians, while Dunesme's brigade with the cavalry should continue in the plain to keep in check the Austrians of Colloredo and the numerous squadrons of Knorring, and on the right Mouton-Duvernét and Philippon, retracing their steps along the mountains, should in their turn assault the Prussians. In the centre, on the eminence of

Kulm, Vandamme, determined to sacrifice his artillery, placed it in battery, with orders to use it with desperation against the Russians. Doucet's brigade was to support the artillery as long as possible, and when they had cleared their way they were all to retire together, leaving the guns, but saving the horses and men.

These orders were immediately executed. The brigades of Quytot and De Reuss quitted the plain on the left to regain the Peterswalde road, while Philippon and Mouton-Duvernét retired slowly. At this sight the sixty Russian battalions whom we had before us on our right and centre raised a shout of joy and pursued us. Mouton-Duvernét and Philippon checked them; Baltus in the centre poured grape upon them from the heights of Kulm; but on the left, in the plain, where remained only Dunesme's brigade, a formidable mass of enemies poured down upon the gallant brigade so nobly defending themselves. In the rear, the brigades of Quytot and De Reuss, attempting to regain the Peterswalde road in close column, charged the Prussians violently. This movement produced frightful confusion in General Kleist's troops, and a conflict impossible to describe, in which men seized, strangled, and slew each other with sabres and bayonets. At the same moment a brigade of cavalry, that of Montmarie, followed by many artillery-soldiers, fell upon the Prussian artillery and took it. General de Fezensac, brought to this point by Vandamme with the remains of his brigade, joined in the common struggle. They thus succeeded in opening up a road by overthrowing Kleist's first line, and there was still a chance of saving themselves if Mouton-Duvernét and Philippon, by falling back in due time and in good order, could help to force the second line of the Prussians. But a strange accident occurred and destroyed all the calculations of the unfortunate Vandamme. Our cavalry, vigorously charged upon the left of the road and thrown back upon the right, fell upon that part, followed by a multitude of artillery-soldiers still separated from their guns. In their disorderly course horsemen and gunners rushed upon Mouton-Duvernét and Philippon, threw confusion into their ranks, and by their example determined a general movement in retreat toward the woods. Every thing then took that direction. General Baltus, after having riddled the Russians with grape, withdrew on the same side with his equipages and the Doucet brigade. In the plain there remained only Dunesme's brigade, assailed on all sides, honourably defending themselves, but at length yielding. Part of the soldiers of this brigade were killed or wounded; the rest endeavoured to find refuge in the mountains. Vandamme and Haxo were wounded and taken prisoners, being the last in the midst of danger. General Kreutzer, posted at Aussig, perceiving the confusion from a distance, determined to withdraw, and saved himself and some battalions as if by miracle. Excepting a small number of columns falling back in order, nothing was seen in a short time but a cloud of men escaping as they could, and effectually escaping from the enemy by the aid of the wooded mountains, which rendered pursuit impossible.

Such was the unfortunate battle of Kulm, which cost us 5000 or 6000 in killed or wounded, 7000 prisoners, forty-eight guns, two generals, illustrious in very different ways, and which, though it cost the allies 6000 men, raised them from their defeat, restored to them the hope of victory, and effaced in a moment from their memory the glorious days of August 26 and 27.

What reason can be assigned for this singular catastrophe? How can it be explained that so many French corps surrounding the allied army to such a degree that one of those corps, that of Vandamme, was already on their line of retreat, that while they were themselves entangled in the gorges of Geyersberg, with one of the detachments so enclosed as to make it difficult to see how they could escape, how can it be explained that the aspect of affairs should so suddenly change that the French corps intended to secure the destruction of the enemy should be destroyed themselves, and that the author of the disaster should be precisely the Prussian detachment which was supposed to be without resource?—that victory should thus pass in a moment from one side to the other, with all its consequences, military, political, and moral? Was it the fault of Vandamme, who engaged too early, of Mortier, of Saint Cyr, who did not afford aid in time, of Napoleon, who too much left matters to themselves? Or was it the military genius displayed on this occasion by the generals in the enemy's army? Facts, disclosed in simple truth, have already almost answered these questions, and explain without further comments this change of fortune,—one of the most astounding recorded in history.

Vandamme, with many faults and many great qualities, is not justly chargeable with the misfortunes of this day. From the beginning he was placed at Pirna with the special mission of falling on the rear of the enemy, and his whole attention must have been directed to that single object. On the 28th of August, seeing several Russian columns defile before him, he received a formal order to follow close upon them into Bohemia, and to go as far as Tœplitz to close against them their principal outlet. He knew that he was surrounded with French corps on his flanks and rear, ready to assist at a moment's notice. He therefore followed the Russians in all haste; and it would have been strange if in his ardour he had not gone as far as Tœplitz, which he was ordered to do, and he was certain that only at that point could he obtain the great results which Napoleon expected from his presence in Bohemia. However, after having endeavoured to drive the enemy beyond Priesten, and having committed the error of making the attack without the full amount of his forces, an error very excusable in itself and without any direct influence on the result, he had the prudence to halt at Kulm, though Tœplitz was before him, the end assigned both by his instructions and his own legitimate desire. He there fixed himself in a strong position, secured on all sides except one, by which Mortier was to arrive, and he waited until he should receive succour and further orders. What other course could he have adopted? Should he have retraced his steps

to Peterswalde and Pirna? This would have been to abandon his post and his mission, and to oppose not only the text but the meaning of his instructions; for he was charged to bar the way against the enemy, and he would have opened it to them. Every sacrifice that could be made to prudence he had made by not advancing to Tœplitz but halting at Kulm. If, while in this position, which he had the good sense not to leave, it was General Kleist instead of Marshal Mortier who appeared on his rear, this was an extraordinary incident, which it would be highly unjust to lay to his charge. As to the sequel, Vandamme at the moment of the catastrophe retained all his presence of mind, and adopted the only possible resolution, that of retreating over the bodies of the Prussians,—a resolution which it became impossible to execute from the inevitable confusion of the situation. There is, therefore, nothing to bring against him; and the supposition that he lost himself by too eager pursuit of a marshal's baton, which he had deserved better than some others by his military services and not more forfeited than they by his violence, is a calumny upon a man more to be pitied than blamed.

If Vandamme were not culpable, if all his misfortune arose from the appearance on his rear of a Prussian instead of a French corps, must we accuse the various commandants of French troops who might have come to his aid, and particularly Marshal Mortier or Marshal Saint Cyr, the only ones within reach of Kulm? Marshal Mortier, established at Pirna as if for the purpose, with the alternative of being recalled to Dresden or sent to Tœplitz, ought to have remained between the two, and, with a greater amount of spontaneous action and vigilance, he would have been able to hasten himself to the aid of Vandamme. But in the strict observation of his duty, destined to be sent to one point or the other, it was natural that he should wait in complete inaction the declaration of Napoleon's will; and the precise order to aid Vandamme with two divisions only reached him in the course of the 30th, when the catastrophe had already taken place. No charge, therefore, can justly be brought against that marshal.

We wish that as much could be said for Marshal Saint Cyr; but he is certainly the most obnoxious to reproach, nor is it easy to find excuses in his favour. Being directly in the pursuit of Kleist's corps, he ought to have kept constantly on his track and never to have lost sight of him for a moment: if he had fulfilled that positive duty, Kleist's corps, at the moment of falling upon Vandamme, would have seen a French corps on their rear, and would probably have been taken and destroyed, instead of contributing to the capture and destruction of Vandamme. Unfortunately Marshal Saint Cyr, a man of distinguished intellect but of factious disposition, zealous in no operations which he did not immediately direct, capable when off the field of nothing but criticizing his neighbours and his master, always more pleased to discover difficulties than their remedy, spent the 28th in reaching Maxen, the 29th advanced only as far as Reinhardt-Grimme, and thus accomplished only a league and a half on that day so decisive for pursuit,

employed that precious time in demanding of the staff whether he ought to follow Marmont on the Altenberg road, and, while he was positively ordered to follow the enemy to the utmost in every direction, lost sight of Kleist, and allowed him to fall upon Vandamme's rear. Thus, on the following day, the 30th, when the order to join Vandamme by a lateral road reached him, an order so plainly indicated that Berthier sent it him from Dresden forthwith, he at length put himself in motion, and by the road which had brought Kleist to the rear of Vandamme, and which would have brought himself upon the rear of Kleist, he arrived in time to hear the guns proclaim our disaster. Thus was lost the 29th in grumbling and complaining that he had no orders, while there existed the constant and all-sufficient order to follow the enemy without intermission.\*

\* Though I have no inclination to adopt the ill-natured judgments passed upon each other by contemporaries, and in particular have little confidence in those of the Duke of Ragusa, commonly both superficial and severe, it is impossible, after a careful study of the facts and perusal of the orders and correspondence, not to admit that the judgment expressed by him on this occasion on the conduct of Marshal Saint Cyr is nearly correct. It is distressing to find fault with so distinguished a man as Marshal Saint Cyr; but truth is due to the world, and we may surely tell it in reference to him when in the course of this history it has been found requisite to be equally explicit in regard to Moreau, Massena, and Napoleon.

Marshal Marmont is not alone in the judgment he has passed upon Marshal Saint Cyr. In a narrative still manuscript, worthy of that which he wrote concerning the events of 1812, General de Fezensac has passed, in very moderate but decided terms, the same judgment as Marshal Marmont on the part acted by those concerned in the events at Kulm. Indeed, the facts are so striking that it is impossible to explain them in any way but one. General Vandamme was not lost by going too far, for, as we have said, he was ordered to go to Toplitz, and he stopped at Kulm. At Kulm, with fifty-two battalions, he was invincible, and he would have remained so if 30,000 Prussians had not fallen upon his rear. Who was ordered to follow these Prussians? Not Mortier, who was to the left at Pirna, with orders to remain there; not Marmont, who was to the right on the Altenberg road, with orders to remain there; but Marshal Saint Cyr, who was between the two, with repeated orders from Napoleon to pursue the enemy without intermission in every direction. But on the 29th he halted at Maxen which, indeed, was feasible. But he spent the 29th in marching a league and a half, and sent to know whether he was to follow Marmont, whom he had just met on his right. Admitting that he required this information, his first duty in the mean while was not to lose the trace of the enemy, nor to allow them the liberty of which they made such a fatal use. The next day, when the order came to join Vandamme rather than to follow Marmont, an order dictated by the simplest common sense, it was too late, and Vandamme was lost. Marshal Saint Cyr, without the ill will to his neighbours with which he has been charged on other occasions, was, by the mere suspension of his march on the 29th, the manifest, though undoubtedly the involuntary, author of Vandamme's disaster. Even while demanding instructions from headquarters he ought not to have stopped, but to have considered, with his intelligence and experience, that while he was waiting for orders the enemy would effect their escape; and again, if this were all, the evil would not be great, but by saving themselves they destroyed Vandamme and turned the fate of the campaign. It is with great regret that we find so noble an historic character in error; but history must flatter neither the living nor the dead. It is found merely to be true, without either malevolence or weakness.

We here insert some letters extracted from the correspondence of Napoleon and Berthier the Major-General.

"THE EMPEROR TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

"DRESDEN, August 27, 1813, 7-30 P.M.

"Send to obtain accurate information of the situation of Marshal Saint Cyr. Tell him of my displeasure at having received no tidings from him all the morning; he ought to send me an officer every hour to let me know his proceedings."

Marshal Marmont pressed the enemy as closely as he could, and fought several battles with success; but he was too distant from Vandamme to afford him any aid. Placed wholly on the right, he could not think to cross the mountains before Saint Cyr without exposing himself to the risk of falling into the midst of enemies, unassisted, as into a gulf. Nothing, therefore, can be laid to his charge. It was impossible for Murat to exert any influence on this deplorable event, for he was leading his squadrons on the great Freyberg road.

Of those responsible for this catastrophe there remains Napoleon himself, who, if present with his lieutenants, might have made them converge to a common point, and would certainly have obtained what he anticipated and was entitled to expect. But he had been diverted from this great duty on the 28th by the news brought from the neighbourhood of Lowenberg and Berlin, and also, it should be said, by the confidence that the expected results were sufficiently guaranteed by the orders he had given. In fact, 80,000 men under Saint Cyr, Marmont, and Murat, driving the allies against the mountains, and 40,000 under Vandamme to receive them on the reverse, constituted an extent of precautions as great as he had ever adopted to insure the consequences of his victories. If the allies had been as easily disconcerted as our enemies in former times, if they had been less determined to fight and less prompt to regain confidence, Vandamme, instead of allowing them to halt, would have chased them like sheep before a wolf. Judging from the past, Napoleon believed, and

"TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

"DRESDEN, August 28, 1813.

"Order Marshal Saint Cyr to march upon Dohna. He will place himself upon the heights and follow the retreat on them, passing between Dohna and the plain. The Duke of Treviso will follow on the high-road. As soon as a junction shall have been effected with General Vandamme, Marshal Saint Cyr will continue his route & fall upon Gleschule with his corps and that of General Vandamme; the Duke of Treviso will take his position at Pirna. Further, I shall repair thither myself as soon as I shall know that the movement has begun."

"TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

"DRESDEN, August 29, 1813, 3-30 A.M.

"Order the King of Naples to make for Fraustadt and to fall upon the flanks and rear of the enemy, and for this purpose to combine his cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Order the Duke of Ragusa to follow the enemy to Doppelswalde and in whatever directions they may have taken. Order Marshal Saint Cyr to follow the enemy to Meissen and in whatever directions they may have taken. Inform those three generals of the position of the two others that they may be able to give mutual support."

"TO THE KING OF NAPLES.

"DRESDEN, August 29, 1813, 5 P.M.

"At six this morning General Vandamme attacked the Prince of Wurtemberg near Hollendorf: he has taken from him 1500 prisoners and four guns, and driven him before him: they were all Russians. General Vandamme was marching upon Toplitz with all his corps. General Prince de Reuss, who commanded one of our brigades, has been killed. I write this for your guidance. General Vandamme writes me that the whole Russian army is panic-struck."

"THE MAJOR-GENERAL TO MARSHAL SAINT CYR.

"DRESDEN, August 28, 1813.

"I have received your letter dated from Reichenbach Grimme, in which you inform me that you had yourself to the rear of the 6th corps. His majesty intends that in this case you should support the 6th corps; but it is preferable that you should find a way on the left between the Duke of Ragusa and the corps of General Vandamme who has obtained great success against the enemy and taken 2000 prisoners."

with reason, that he had done enough to secure the most brilliant triumphs. Unhappily, times were changed, and to effect the ruin of the grand army of Bohemia it would not have been too much if Napoleon had himself watched over the accomplishment of his designs to the last moment. In any other circumstances he would not have failed to be near Vandamme with his entire Guard, to have led Saint Cyr and Marmont, and to have pursued his victory till he had reaped all the results it could yield. But his mind was distracted, violently carried away in another direction, not, like many other heroes, by the love of ease and pleasure, but by the common passion of his life,—the desire to obtain all results at once, even the most opposite and contradictory. His genius was now deceived by the false colours thrown from Berlin and Dantzic, as it had been a year before by those from Moscow. In order to give a blow to Prussia and Germany at Berlin, and to be able always to say that his power extended from the Gulf of Tarentum to the Vistula, he had, from the commencement of this campaign, entertained the idea of sending one of his corps to Berlin, and of retaining a garrison at Dantzic, and in this idea he had allowed, as we have seen, the introduction of a hidden error into his profound plan of the campaign, viz., that of singularly enlarging the circle of his operations, of which the centre was at Dresden, of placing Macdonald at Lowenberg instead of at Bautzen, of sending Oudinot against Berlin instead of fixing him at Wittenberg,—a great error, which prevented his hastening in time to any spot where his presence might be necessary to complete his own victories and to repair the losses of his lieutenants. The same cause continuing to produce the same effects, when he heard of a misfortune to Macdonald, he wished to assist him as quickly as possible; he also wished to conduct in person Oudinot's army to Berlin, and, for this double motive, turning away from Pirna and Kulm, where he ought to have been present with his Guard, he left his most important victories incomplete, to run after others, and thus exposed himself to the loss of all his aims by wishing to attain them simultaneously. Thus in Napoleon's misfortunes we may always trace the same cause and the same source of error.

But our reproach must be limited to the disasters at Kulm: in the details he committed no error. His enemies had little merit in contributing to the result. Their plan of retreat was very little studied; they retired in haste with the idea of going beyond the Eger, and their stopping before Kulm was an after-thought, when they saw the position of a corps both dangerous and annoying to them, and they were, therefore, determined not to advance without giving them a check. Yet they would not have succeeded had not the singular chance of a Prussian corps making a desperate effort to save themselves from danger furnished them with an involuntary and unexpected combination of immense importance, the merit of which some have wished to ascribe to the Emperor Alexander, but which was due only to the energy of the Prussians, resolved to make their way or to die. The promptitude of the allies in seizing the opportunity at Kulm

is not, then, to be ascribed to their genius, though they were by no means wanting in military talent, but to their ardent patriotism, which strengthened them against defeat. Another lesson of a profoundly moral character may be learned from these prodigious events,—viz., that we should take care not to drive men to despair, a feeling which gives rise to supernatural powers, defies all calculation, and sometimes surmounts the most consummate skill.

The allies, who, on leaving the battle-field of Dresden, thought themselves completely beaten, and sadly pondered whether in opposing Napoleon they were not struggling against fate, at the sight of Vandamme conquered and taken suddenly conceived that they had regained an excellent position, and thought they perceived the balance of fortune at least in equilibrium. However, on counting the cost of the two days at Dresden, of the pursuit of the 28th and 29th, and of this day, the 30th, they had lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, more than 40,000 men, and the defeat of Vandamme, after all, only cost us about 12,000 men in prisoners, killed, and wounded. But they had regained confidence: they resigned themselves to joy, and, far from abandoning their part, and allowing Napoleon to strike the armies of Silesia and the North, they were resolved to allow him no rest, but to combat without intermission. In these immense hecatombs, 40,000 men were a trifle; feeling was every thing; and the feeling of the allies was more that of victory than of defeat. For them, not to be conquered was almost to conquer, and for Napoleon, on the contrary, not to annihilate his adversaries was to have done nothing. To these extreme and almost impossible conditions had he attached his safety!

Let us add, on closing this melancholy narrative, that the only man that could for a moment have been opposed to Napoleon—viz., Moreau—was expiring in his neighbourhood, at Tann. Both of his legs had been amputated, an operation which he had borne with characteristic tranquillity. But he had suffered dreadfully. Carried on the shoulders of the enemies of his country, he had passed over twenty leagues in cruel suffering. On the reverse of the mountains, all the sovereigns, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor Alexander, had repaired to his couch and lavished upon him marks of esteem and respect. The greatest personages, M. de Metternich, Prince Schwarzenberg, the generals of the coalition, had all visited him in turn: Alexander clasped him in his arms, for he had conceived a real friendship for him. Rather embarrassed than elated by these expressions, Moreau, whose soul, though for a moment misled, was always honourable, questioning himself on his own conduct, repeated, continually, "Yet I am not guilty: I sought but the good of my country; I wished to snatch her from a humiliating yoke!" Thus, while his dying hours were surrounded with respect, he was himself wholly occupied in self-examination, and found rest only in that which afforded excuse for conduct which gained him such high testimony. Another exclamation often escaped him:—"This Bonaparte is always happy!" These words he had uttered at the

moment of being struck, and he often repeated them before his death. Bonaparte happy! He had been so, he might still appear so to the eyes of an expiring rival; but Providence was soon to pronounce upon his fate, and to condemn him to a close more sad, perhaps, than that of Moreau, if any be more sad than to die in the ranks of our country's enemies. Fatal illusions of hatred! We envy, hate, and per-

secute our adversary, and suppose him happy, while we all, bending under the burden of life, walk amid griefs and misfortunes nearly similar! Men would be less inclined to envy if they knew how equal their several fortunes were, though apparently different, and, instead of cherishing division under the inevitable hand of fate, they would unite to support in common the overwhelming load!

## BOOK L.

### LEIPSIK AND HANAU.

EVENTS in Silesia and near Berlin—Operations of General Blücher—Capture and destruction of Puthod's division—Retrograde movement of Macdonald—Arrival of Bernadotte—Battle of Gross-Beeren—Retreat of Marshal Oudinot—Plans of Napoleon in consequence of the disaster at Kulm—Arrival of Napoleon at Bautzen—Return to Dresden—Battle of Dennewitz—Napoleon contracts the sphere of his operations—Plans of the Allies—Return of the main French army to Leipzig—Terrible battle of Leipzig—Death of Poniatowski—Battle of Hanau—Return of the Prussians to the Rhine—Capitulation of Dresden—Character of the Campaign of 1813.

THE serious and unforeseen events which, by suddenly attracting Napoleon's attention, had diverted him from Kulm, had taken place upon the Katzbach in Silesia and at Gross-Beeren in Brandenburg. Marshal Macdonald, whom Napoleon had left in pursuit of Blücher, had suddenly met with a disaster, and Marshal Oudinot, whom Napoleon considered ready to enter Berlin, had been thrown back under the guns of Wittenberg by an unfortunate battle. It is necessary to know what occasioned these events to form an exact idea of the situation, and to understand the combinations which had absorbed Napoleon during the 28th, 29th, and 30th of August, and had prevented him from rushing with all his reserves to the aid of the unfortunate Vandamme.

After having thrown back the army of Silesia from the Bober to the Katzbach, Napoleon had left to Marshal Macdonald, to continue the pursuit, the 3d corps, of 25,000 men, commanded by General Souham since the departure of Marshal Ney, the 5th corps, of 20,000 men, under General Lauriston, and the 11th, of 18,000, under General Gerard, since Macdonald had taken the superior command of the three combined corps. To this amount of infantry must be added Sebastiani's cavalry, which might afford a reserve of 5000 or 6000 horse, and which was independent of the detachments of light cavalry attached to each *corps d'armée*. The total amounted to about 70,000 men, exclusive of 10,000 or 11,000 Poles under Prince Poniatowski, posted on the frontier of Bohemia in the rear, and to the right of Marshal Macdonald, to guard the passage of Zittau. Napoleon had instructed Marshal Macdonald to throw back Blücher to Jauer, and even farther, then to establish himself firmly on the Bober, between Lowenberg and Buntzlau, so as to keep the army of Silesia at a distance from Dresden and to prevent the army of Bohemia from forming detachments against Berlin. Napoleon did not doubt that, with 80,000 victorious men, Macdonald would fulfil his mission satisfactorily. Nor did the marshal himself doubt it;

and he continued to advance boldly against Blücher.

An incident, apparently unimportant, introduced a fatal change into this very favourable position. Napoleon, on leaving, had ordered Marshal Ney to follow him to Dresden: but, as this order did not clearly specify that Ney himself was intended, and not his troops, the 8d corps had been directed to Dresden, and the French army had appeared to retreat as to its left wing. Blücher, anxious to resume the offensive, both from his natural temper and from his position, had concluded, from the retrograde movement of part of our line, that Napoleon was no longer there, and that it would be right to fall upon the French army when deprived of his presence and probably also of part of the forces which had deployed for a time. Macdonald, on his side, had wished to restore to his troops the attitude they had lost, and hastened, without due regard to circumstances, to make a movement in advance. From this disposition on both sides speedily resulted a violent shock.

The 3d corps (Souham's,) having first made a march to the rear, and then one in advance, so as to return to Liegnitz, had in this useless movement left several men on the roads. On the evening of the 25th of August, they had returned to their first position. The 11th corps (Gerard's,) forming the centre, had not quitted Goldberg, and the 5th, (Lauriston's,) forming the right, had also remained stationary. Marshal Macdonald, with all his men in line, resolved to move the next day (26th) upon Jauer, which his instructions required him to occupy. Though Napoleon was unwilling to establish his army of Silesia at a greater distance than the Bober, he wished to have advanced posts on the Katzbach, from Jauer to Liegnitz, to secure provisions with greater facility, and more certainly to intercept any detachment sent from Bohemia against Berlin.

To execute his movement, Macdonald proceeded as follows. Though at Goldberg he would be on one of the arms of the Katzbach, consequently much beyond the Bober, there

was on his right a point of the Bober still in the power of the enemy, viz., Hirschberg in the mountains. He detached a division of the 11th corps, General Ledru's, with orders to ascend the Bober on our side, i.e. by the left bank, while Puthod's division of Lauriston's corps should ascend by the right, so as to surprise Hirschberg by each bank. While this movement should be effected on our extreme right, and quite in the mountains, Marshal Macdonald determined to march in person upon Jauer, with the corps of Lauriston and Gerard, each deprived of one division. To reach Jauer involved the passage of no important stream, but only several ravines of various depths, in which might be found the enemy in force. Macdonald flattered himself that he should elude them either by a direct attack of Generals Gerard and Lauriston upon Jauer, or by a lateral movement of Generals Souham and Sebastiani upon Liegnitz.

He ordered General Souham to leave Liegnitz with the 3d corps and to take the road to Jauer, which would bring him out directly on the side of Jauer, by crossing the plateau of Janowitz. He hoped that 25,000 men threatening the enemy in flank would remove all idea of resisting the attack in front, which would be executed against them by Generals Lauriston and Gerard. Unhappily, there was a considerable distance between the road to be followed by General Souham on the plateau of Janowitz and that which was to be followed by Generals Gerard and Lauriston, to march in a straight line upon Jauer. General Gerard, the least remote of the two, was to ascend the deep ravine of the Wutten-Neiss, a rapid little river which passes Jauer to fall into the Katzbach, turning round the plateau of Janowitz. To establish some connection between the two main bodies of his forces, Marshal Macdonald assigned to General Sebastiani an intermediate road,—that from Buntzlau to Jauer, which, following first the ravine of the Wutten-Neiss, then crossing that river, issues on the plateau of Janowitz. All orders were to be executed on the morning of the 26th without fail.

On the 26th, a deluge of rain, which had lasted the whole night, had swelled the rivers and rendered the roads almost impracticable. Marshal Macdonald, eager to resume the offensive, made no account of the weather, but required that his orders should be obeyed. While the Puthod and Ledru divisions ascended the two banks of the Bober as far as Hirschberg, the corps of Lauriston and Gerard marched upon Jauer, descending the rivers, climbing by turns the banks of the ravines, which it was necessary to cross in order to reach that small town. Notwithstanding the difficulties occasioned by the rain, our active tirailleurs, displacing those of the enemy, everywhere forced them to give ground. To the left there was greater difficulty.

General Sebastiani, having set off a little later, had not reached the entry of the ravine of the Wutten-Neiss, while General Gerard had already penetrated it, and Lauriston, marching parallel to the latter, was far in advance. General Souham, on his side, having found the Katzbach flooded at Liegnitz, had sought a passage higher up, and had thus come to take the same road as General Sebastiani. For

some time there were at that point between 23,000 and 24,000 infantry, 5000 or 6000 cavalry, and more than 100 guns engulfed in a deep ravine, until rising on the border of the ravine they should be able to debouche upon the plateau of Janowitz. At this moment, the Prussian cavalry reconnoitring had descended from the plateau, and, not perceiving our troops, had advanced far into the ravine of the Wutten-Neiss. General Gerard, marching on the opposite bank of that river, discovered the Prussian squadrons, which had already passed his left, and he fired on them from behind. The rain, which had not ceased, caused that not more than about forty guns should be discharged. But these sufficed to warn the Prussian squadrons of the mistake they had made, and they retraced their steps with speed. General Gerard, having brought up his artillery, and fired from bank to bank, strewed the defile with a good number of these rash horsemen.

This incident suggested to Marshal Macdonald the idea of immediately launching some battalions of Charpentier's division, one of the two belonging to General Gerard, upon the plateau of Janowitz, to get possession of it, and thus to aid Generals Sebastiani and Souham in deploying there. The order was immediately executed. General Charpentier, with one of his brigades and a reserve-battery of twelve guns, passed the Wutten-Neiss at Nieder-Krayn, ascended the plateau, and there deployed in spite of the Prussian advanced posts. He was immediately joined by Sebastiani's cavalry, who came to take position on his left. General Souham prepared to follow him, but slowly, as was required by the weather, the nature of the locality, and the number of troops crowded in that narrow defile.

At this moment Blucher arrived at the spot with the greater part of his forces. Depending on the position at Jauer, he had left there only Langeron's corps, and had brought at once York and Sacken on the plateau of Janowitz to parry the flank movement which threatened it. At the sight of our troops climbing the side of the ravine of the Wutten-Neiss to establish themselves on the plateau, he had thought that we could not oppose him with many men at once, and that by attacking us with 40,000 men he would easily throw us back into the ravine from which we were attempting to escape. He sent before him a powerful artillery, whose fire was well endured by Charpentier's brigade and replied to by his battery of twelve guns. He, further, sent against them 10,000 horse. Our infantry, formed in square, endeavoured to fire upon them, which was prevented by the rain; reduced to their bayonets, they used them bravely, and stopped short the impetus of the enemy's cavalry. General Sebastiani, repairing his slowness by his vigour, charged the cavalry and made them give ground, but was again repulsed; nor could he long resist troops three times the number of his own. He was constrained to effect a retrograde movement, and thus exposed the left of Charpentier's brigade. Then Blucher, who had been unable to move that brave brigade with his cavalry, sent against them more than 20,000

infantry. They received and sustained several charges, but soon, overcome by numbers, they gave ground, and were at length driven to the border of the ravine of the Wutten-Neiss, into which they were forced to descend, where they became mixed up with Sebastiani's cavalry, which had also fallen back, and with the head of Souham's corps, which was coming up. It is easy to imagine the confusion and disorder and loss, especially in guns, which must have ensued, for our artillery, sunk in the mud, had lost almost all the horses by the fire of the enemy.

They, therefore, withdrew, briskly pursued in that narrow passage as far as the village of Kroitach, where the Wutten-Neiss joins the Kutzbach, and where Blücher dared not pursue them.

This skirmish at a single point, which cost us not more than 1000 men, was sufficient to change into a kind of general rout an operation which had succeeded in the rest of our line. In fact, Generals Gerard and Lauriston, attacking with great energy the positions successively occupied and abandoned by Langeron, had already come in sight of Jauer, notwithstanding the bad weather, and would have made themselves masters of it, when they were arrested by the news of what had occurred on their left. They were, therefore, constrained by prudence to retire as far as Goldberg, which they entered about midnight in a very sad plight, having met on their road the wrecks of the troops which had been beaten on the plateau of Janowitz, and having had to traverse an immense mass of carriages sunk in the mud, and of wounded men, who were carried with the greatest difficulty, owing to the most terrific weather. It was necessary to bivouac as they could, under continual rain, some in Goldberg, others outside, the greater part without provisions or shelter, in a word, in a miserable condition.

It is in such cases as this that the superiority of good soldiers appears. When actually under fire, young soldiers led by vigorous officers are, no doubt, more impetuous, because less aware of the danger; but at the first reverse they are stunned, at the first suffering they are discouraged, and if they have been only a short time at their colours, a check is sufficient to disturb all their ideas and to change their rash courage into profound dejection. Yet with food it would have been possible to retain our conscripts in their companies, and at the return of day, with a new impulse given by energetic commanders, they would have regained their confidence. But it was necessary to pass a horrible night without either food or shelter, with the certainty of meeting 30,000 men the next day, victorious or supposing themselves so. The following morning, the sky still poured down torrents of rain. Fortunately, they were protected from the impetuous pursuit of Blücher by the Kutzbach, which they had crossed the day before. That river was so swollen that it was with great difficulty that the cavalry had been able to pass. They therefore retired without being annoyed by the enemy's infantry, but they were pursued by a crowd of horsemen, on whom our muskets produced little effect from their frequent failure. Our young soldiers, more resolute

before the enemy than before bad weather, presented with their bayonets a barrier of iron to the Russian and Prussian horse, and thus kept them in check. Yet, forced to withdraw in haste, they left behind a great part of their artillery, sunk in the mud, and many of them, dispirited or dying of hunger, scattered through the villages for food, were taken, or became easily initiated in the dangerous and degrading habit of marauding. General Souham's corps, protected by Sebastiani's cavalry, was able to retire in safety across the plain to Buntzlau. The corps of General Gerard and Lauriston, more actively pursued, and without the protection of heavy cavalry, found shelter in the woods separating the Kutzbach from the Bober, between Goldberg and Lowenberg. They there passed the night with a little better shelter, but not better nourishment, than the preceding day. These two corps, who had returned during the 28th to the front of Lowenberg, in vain endeavoured to pass the Bober at that point. The bridge was not destroyed, but it was necessary, in order to reach it, to traverse an inundation three-quarters of a league in extent, and there was no other resource than to redescend the right bank of the Bober, to cross it at Buntzlau, where Souham and Sebastiani already were. For the first time for three days they found food and shelter, and that not without a struggle, for at least 50,000 were concentrated on one spot.

Marshal Macdonald, firm, wise, experienced, and loyal, but almost always unfortunate since the fatal day of the Trebbia, was not guilty of shutting his eyes to his ill fortune. Accordingly, having returned to Buntzlau, he did not consider as appeased the cruel fate which persecuted him, and he trembled for Puthod's division, left by itself on the other side of the Bober, as far up as Hirschberg. There was no reason to be anxious for Ledru's division, which had marched by the left bank, which belonged to us; but if Puthod's division had not profited by the Hirschberg bridge to recross the Bober, it would be in evident danger. And this had really occurred. That division, having ascended the Bober by one bank while Ledru's division ascended it by the other, had not used the Hirschberg bridge when in their power, and had become separated by a vast body of water from their companions-in-arms, who vainly endeavoured to aid them from the left bank. On the 29th, they proposed to descend by the right bank, opposite Lowenberg, near Zopten. There, reduced from 6000 men to 3000 by fatigue, hunger, nightly cold, dejection, they were assailed by Blücher's troops, refused to surrender, defended themselves with valour, and were at length either taken or destroyed. The still more unfortunate Macdonald, hearing from Buntzlau the fire of the artillery, and conjecturing the frightful sacrifice which was being consummated, wished to ascend by the right bank with some troops as far as Zopten; but the danger and the probable fruitlessness of the succour was pointed out to him, and he was obliged to see the unhappy soldiers sacrificed before his eyes to his own evil destiny.

On the 30th they were all united on the left of the Bober to the number of 50,000, instead of 70,000 as a few days before, after having



left 100 guns in the mud. Of the 20,000 missing men, not more than 8000 had been destroyed by the enemy's fire; but 7000 or 8000 had been taken by the enemy, and 9000 or 10,000 had left their ranks, throwing away or losing their muskets, without any desire to return. A too sudden experience of the sufferings of war, succeeding to blind confidence, had suddenly awakened in them the sentiment they had cherished six months before on leaving their cottages,—the sentiment of hatred to the man who sacrificed them at the dawn of manhood to a boundless ambition. Brave they still were, and every thing might be expected of them if they could be induced to return to their ranks; but this was not easy. Irritated and disgusted, they preferred living by pillaging the enemy's country, to resuming arms in the service of a cruel deity, who, they said, devoured their youth without pity or reason. Macdonald, therefore, saw himself upon the Bober with 50,000 dispirited soldiers, and 9000 or 10,000 stragglers following the army, excusing their absence from their colours by the want of muskets. Poniatowski remained safe at Zittau with his 10,000 Poles.

The causes of this misfortune were various,—some accidental, some general. The accidental were the bad weather, the equivocal order to Marshal Ney, which had involved a retrograde movement attended with unavailing fatigue to the troops, brought back the enemy prematurely, and compelled Marshal Macdonald to assume the offensive with precipitation, and perhaps, also, some errors of the commander-in-chief, who had sent two divisions to Hirschberg to expel the enemy, which might have been effected by our presence at Jauer,—who, during the battle, had left in too great isolation the two fractions of his army, and who, in attempting to combine them by occupying the plateau of Janowitz, had done so with insufficient forces,—and who, finally, had too lightly estimated the difficulties of the weather and the roads. The general causes, still more formidable than the others, were the patriotism of the allies, their ardour to return to the charge whenever they saw the least chance of an advantage, and, especially, the youth of our troops, impetuous in action, but too new to the vicissitudes of war, who had left home with the conviction that they were sacrificed to a mad ambition, a sentiment which was forgotten in presence of the enemy, but which awoke with greater force than ever at the first reverse, and who, after behaving with valour on the field, threw away their arms during the retreat from disgust, discouragement, and moral and physical exhaustion.

The same causes had produced on the Berlin road a reverse less striking, but not less distressing in its consequences.

We have seen the importance attached by Napoleon to the despatch of a corps against Berlin, in order to remove the army of the North far from the theatre of the war, to humiliate Bernadotte, to strike the imagination of the Germans by entering the principal of their capitals, to strike a mortal blow on the Tugend-Bund, to dissolve the combination of which he thought Bernadotte's army was composed, and, finally, to assist our garrisons on

the Oder and Vistula. To attain these various ends, he had assigned to Marshal Oudinot, besides the 12th corps, which was under his immediate command, the 7th, under General Reynier, and the 4th, under General Bertrand. The 12th, comprising two good French divisions and one Bavarian, reckoned about 18,000 men; the 7th, formed of Durutte's French division, and of two Saxon, reckoned 20,000; the 4th, having only one French division, Morand's, which was, indeed, excellent, and two foreign, the Italian of Fontanelli and the Wurtembergian of Franquemont, reckoned, like the former, about 20,000 men. The Duke of Padua, with 6000 horse, formed the cavalry reserve. There were nearly 64,000 men, instead of 70,000, which they had at first expected, among whom were many whom Napoleon called *ramassis*, (a hotch-potch,) for, in the effective total, one-third, at least, consisted of soldiers of all nations, some very moderate, and the greater part very ill disposed. In respect to commanders, the condition was equally unsatisfactory. Marshal Oudinot, though in the field as brave and determined as possible, had never held so important a command, and, from an honourable modesty, was deficient in self-confidence, and scarcely ventured to exert his authority upon his lieutenants, Generals Reynier and Bertrand. General Reynier, a skilful and solid officer, as we have elsewhere said, but unfortunate, was full of pretension, thought himself superior to most of the marshals, bitterly complained of being only lieutenant-general, and, like Vandamme, was perhaps too impatient to attain a dignity so long withheld. General Bertrand, honoured with the favour of Napoleon, and setting much by it, which he justified by great application to his duties, by the most certain kind of bravery, that of devotion, but better adapted to the labours of an engineer than to the direction of troops, possessed of intelligence but not always accuracy of judgment, was a subordinate who showed much deference, but was rather obsequious than submissive. Marshal Oudinot, much embarrassed with the regulation of these different pretensions, did not venture to exercise it without a degree of delicacy scarcely compatible with the vigour and promptitude of command. Being nearer the locality than Napoleon, and collecting all the reports of the country, he was not deceived as to the force of the enemy and the difficulty of the ground. He knew that Bernadotte, with a certain number of men of all sorts, levied in haste, had nevertheless an excellent Swedish corps, a very solid Russian corps, and especially a Prussian corps, Bulow's, very numerous, animated, and eager for battle. Besides Bulow's corps, there was a second Prussian corps, under General Tanenien, destined at first for the blockade of the fortresses, the cream of which had been taken for the offensive war. These troops combined made a total of about 90,000 men encamped before Berlin. The Prince of Sweden had detached, under General Walmoden, about 20,000 men, comprising the *ramassis*, to resist, behind the numerous canals of Mecklenburg, the *corps d'armée* which had left Hamburg under Marshal Davout. The rest of the 160,000 men commanded by the

Prince of Sweden had been devoted to the blockade or the siege of the fortresses on the Oder and Vistula.

Marshal Oudinot was perfectly informed of this state of things, and was justly occupied with it. The locality increased the difficulty of his task. In advancing upon Berlin between the Elbe and the Spree, the way passes between a double line of waters, alternately stagnant or current, which may be marked out, one by the river Dahne, which falls into the Spree above Berlin, the other by the river Nuttha, which falls into the Havel at Potsdam. In the angle formed by the double line of waters was the army of the North, well positioned at Ruhlsdorf, protected by a powerful artillery and guarded at a distance by a numerous cavalry. To cross this labyrinth of woods, sands, ponds, and rivers involved a double danger, that of being outflanked or turned, if on a single road, and if on several, that of being separated into two or three corps, which should be rendered incapable of rendering mutual aid by the want of transversal communications.

At the moment of leaving for this expedition, Marshal Oudinot, distrustful of the enemy, the locality, his lieutenants, and himself, would gladly have yielded to others the dangerous honour assigned him. Napoleon had written to him that in a few days there would be more than 100,000 French at Berlin; for in his calculations, made at a distance, he had comprised the 30,000 men under Marshal Davout, and the 10,000 men who were to leave Magdeburg under General Gerard. But before this union could be effected it was necessary that the first difficulty should be overcome, that of reaching Berlin, which must be surmounted with an army much inferior to that of the enemy, and across a country almost impenetrable. Marshal Oudinot, therefore, had not regarded those promises in a serious light, and he always saw himself in the midst of a most difficult country, obliged with 64,000 men to march against Berlin protected by 90,000. On the 18th of August he had mustered at Baruth, three days from Berlin, with his three corps. But, having to rally the division of heavy cavalry under General DeFrance, which was to form part of the Duke of Padua's reserve, and which was to join the army by Wittenberg, he effected a transverse movement from right to left, from Baruth to Luckenwalde. After having rallied his heavy cavalry, he resumed his northerly route, advancing between Zossen and Trebbin, in the centre of that double line of waters which converge, as we have said, upon Berlin.

On the 21st he was before Trebbin, some leagues from the enemy's army, which began to concentrate in proportion as the ground became restricted and as we approached. Between the two lines of water was a series of wooded hills, on the side of which were formed the two roads leading to Berlin. One of two roads, that to the left, passing by Trebbin, had to cross a stream, then to ascend a hill covered with wood, to debouche upon Gross-Beeren. That to the right, entirely separated from the former, after having also ascended some hills, debouched upon Blankenfelde on the right, at some distance from Gross-Beeren. Marshal Oudinot resolved to follow both of these roads

at once, first from precaution, to avoid being turned by neglecting either of them, and next from complaisance, for his lieutenants preferred marching separately, and he flattered himself that when these obstacles should have been surmounted they would unite to attack the enemy *en masse*.

On the 21st he attacked Trebbin with the 12th corps, sent the 4th (General Bertrand's) toward Schultzendorf, and the 7th (General Reynier's) between the two, toward a village called Nunsdorf. The small town of Trebbin, tolerably well intrenched, was occupied by a detachment of Bulow's troops. Tauenzien's corps kept the right road,—that of Blankenfelde. Marshal Oudinot began by pouring projectiles into Trebbin; he then sent thither a brigade of Packard's division, while the 7th corps threatened to turn their position by Wittstock. These combined movements produced their effect. The brigade of Packard's division entered with fixed bayonets a faubourg of Trebbin; and the Prussians, seeing themselves already outflanked by the 7th corps, abandoned that small town to us, repassed the stream which they were commissioned to defend, and fell back upon the hills on the rear. Toward the road on the right, General Bertrand had occupied Schultzendorf with the 4th corps.

The following day, the 22d, it was necessary to cross the stream which had been disputed the day before, then to ascend the hills on which rose the Berlin road, and on the road on the right to ascend the heights along which passed the Blankenfelde road. Marshal Oudinot came to the river at two points,—Wilmsdorf and Wittstock. Guilleminot's division of the 12th corps, (Durutte's of the 7th,) having restored the passage by pile bridges, boldly attacked the enemy's redoubts, and secured them without much loss. The troops of Bulow's corps evacuated them, retiring finally toward the central position selected by the Prince of Sweden. On the opposite side, General Bertrand, after a brisk cannonade, reached the position of Juhnisdorf, leading to Blankenfelde. They had, therefore, made a fresh step in this labyrinth, where they were obliged to march divided upon two lateral roads almost without communication, or to march without precaution against a flank movement if they adhered to one road. Undoubtedly, it would have been possible to parry this great inconvenience by advancing with the mass of his forces upon a single road, and directing upon the other only some detachments of light troops; but it would have been necessary to displace the several corps, and for that purpose to exercise toward their commanders a degree of authority which Marshal Oudinot, directly commanding the 12th, and rather counselling than commanding the 7th and 4th, could not assert.

Every thing announced that they were at length approaching the enemy, and that they should be in direct opposition. When they should even have crossed the stream on the banks of which they had fought the day before, they would have to pass along the side of the wooded hills and issue in a village called Gross-Beeren, opposite the central position of Ruhlsdorf occupied by the army of the

North. By the road on the right they should effect a similar movement on the side of the hills of Juhnisdorf and Blankenfelde, and if they there overcame the resistance of the enemy, they were sure on that side to outflank the position of Gross-Beeren.

Marshal Oudinot, hoping that he should not meet the enemy till after he had passed Gross-Beeren, when he should have time to unite his forces, by an excess of complaisance left a distinct task to each of his lieutenants. He determined that on the road to the right General Bertrand should take Blankenfelde, and then proceed to Gross-Beeren; that on the road to the left General Reynier, who had on the previous day forced the stream at Trebbin and ascended the hills beyond, should proceed on the side of these hills following the skirts of the woods as far as Gross-Beeren, and there halt to take up his position. For himself, instead of marching with the 12th corps behind General Reynier to serve him for a support, he proposed to pass by Arensdorf on the other side of the heights which that general should traverse, as if afraid of annoying his lieutenants by his presence. He was then to debouche upon Gross-Beeren, at two leagues to the left, a distance nearly equal to that of General Bertrand on the right.

On the morning of the 28d of August, each set in motion in the direction assigned. On the road to the right, General Bertrand, having presented himself before the heights of Blankenfelde, found there General Tauenzien firmly established, and was forced to engage in a violent cannonade. On the road to the left, General Reynier, with the 7th, marched for nearly three leagues along the side of the hills, the reverse of which was traversed by Marshal Oudinot, made his way without great difficulty, and debouched before Gross-Beeren. He immediately attacked that village, and drove out from it the division of General de Borstell. With an ill-judged impatience of success, he advanced far beyond the village, instead of fixing himself there, and perceived in position at Ruhlisdorf the entire army of the Prince of Sweden. To the right, before him, he had De Borstell's division, fallen back on the Prussian corps of Bulow, in the centre, but a little to the left, the Swedish army, and quite to the left, the Russians,—i. e., without reckoning Tauenzien's corps, an assemblage of about 50,000 men, protected by a numerous artillery. To meet this formidable line, he had only 18,000 men, of whom 6,000 were French and excellent soldiers, and 12,000 were Saxon, who were not equal in value to those who, under his orders, had made the campaign of Russia. He certainly had no desire to measure his strength with such a mass of enemies; but, having advanced sufficiently near to be within reach, he could not fail to have them soon on his hands.

In fact, the Prussians under Bulow were burning with impatience to engage, and to cover with their bodies the road by which we proposed to reach Berlin. Bernadotte hesitated. It was the first time of his meeting the French, and he feared them more than his conscience. He trembled to see the extinction, in a single day, of the prestige which he had endeavoured to assume in the sight of

foreigners by giving himself out as the principal author of Napoleon's success. He also feared to compromise the Swedish army, which he knew that he could not replace if once it were destroyed. His fortune and his crown were, therefore, at stake; and his hesitation was so great as to reflect upon his personal courage. General Bulow, like all the Prussians, still less confident of Bernadotte's loyalty than of his courage, did not wait for his command, but, with the 30,000 men under his orders, marched against General Reynier. He was preceded by many guns, and, to be more certain of success, he directed Borstell's division against his adversary's flank. Bernadotte, unable to recede, but unwilling to engage all his forces, contented himself with detaching his cavalry and a numerous artillery against Reynier's left, whose right was threatened by Borstell's division. General Reynier, who at the post of danger behaved with the valour of an old officer of the army of the Rhine, stood firm, hoping for speedy succour. He made a retrograde movement to obtain a better position, and supporting his right with the houses of Gross-Beeren, and his left with a hill, from which his artillery could pour down upon the enemy, he presented a firm aspect. The Prussians, notwithstanding a shower of grape, advanced boldly, animated by the twofold desire of saving Berlin and of seizing a prey which seemed certain. Dürutte's division made a heroic resistance; but the Saxons, chiefly conscripts of that year, whose physical constitution was immature, and whose temper was very unsatisfactory, hard-worked by officers who reminded them that Bernadotte had commanded them in 1809 and had treated them like a father, made no long stand, but left Dürutte's division unsupported, which was therefore obliged to retire, though in good order, and in condition to deprive the enemy of all desire to pursue. Guilleminot's division, of the 12th corps, advancing, under Marshal Oudinot, on the reverse of the position, reached Arensdorf at the moment of the most violent cannonade. They hastened to the fire, and crossed the woods to the right, in order to aid Reynier by the shortest road. Too late to change the fate of the battle, they halted to check the enemy, and then fell back, repeatedly attacked by the Russian cavalry, but never shaken. Each returned to the spot he had left in the morning,—the 12th corps to Thyrow, the 7th to Wittstock. The 12th was in good condition, the 7th was disorganized by the complete rout of the Saxons, of whom more than 2000 had been taken, and 15 guns; several thousands had left their ranks, some to join the Swedes, others to fly to the rear. General Bertrand, who commanded the 4th corps, had made great efforts to surmount the resistance of Tauenzien at Blankenfelde, but without success, which he could not have attained without carrying his efforts to the extreme; and this he supposed to be unnecessary, thinking that the success of the principal corps at Gross-Beeren would oblige Tauenzien to decamp. In this manner each had fought without unity or concert, unwisely counting upon his neighbour, some without loss, as Bertrand and Oudinot; others, on the contrary, with great loss, as General Reynier.

However, this check, if our troops had been exclusively French and wholly trustworthy, would not have been followed by serious consequences; for, after all, they had lost only 2000 men on the field. But when one-half of the effective was composed of Italian and German troops, ever ready to leave us, and another half of young French soldiers, at first too confident, and now stunned by a reverse, it was difficult to continue to advance upon Berlin in the presence of 90,000 men. Already more than 10,000 allies, Saxons and Bavarians, had left our ranks, and were rushing to the Elbe, exclaiming, *Sauve qui peut!* In such a state of things, Marshal Oudinot thought it necessary to sound a retreat, and to approach the Elbe. On the next day, August 24, he began his retrograde movement, which he effected in good order, always close pressed by the Prussians, intoxicated with joy and pride, accusing Bernadotte of treason or cowardice, because not so ardent as themselves, and pursuing the enemy, more conquered, in their opinion, than they really were, without consulting him. Marshal Oudinot might have stopped, and perhaps repressed their ardour; yet, since he was no longer marching upon Berlin, and had relinquished the hope of entering that capital, to risk a doubtful action with defeated soldiers seemed to him unwise, especially as it could only result in his keeping his ground between Berlin and Wittenberg, in a country affording neither support nor resources. He, therefore, adopted the safer plan of placing himself under the guns of Wittenberg, where he was sure to incur no danger, where he protected the Elbe, where provisions would be abundant, and where he might restore the morale of his soldiers. He arrived on the 29th and 30th of August, disputing his ground at every step. In the mean while, the active division of Magdeburg had left that fortress under the command of General Gerard, had been assailed by General Hirschfeld and the Russian scouts of Czernicheff, and, subdued by numbers, had returned to Magdeburg, after having lost about 1000 men and some guns. In the environs of Hamburg, Marshal Davout, having left the fortress with 30,000 men, of whom 10,000 were Danes, had advanced in the direction of Schwerin, driving back the Anglo-German corps which were before him, and ready to cut through them if he should hear of any success of Marshal Oudinot in the neighbourhood of Berlin. But, while there remained any doubt, he was called upon to exercise much circumspection, and he carefully avoided a check, still more a disaster.

As soon as the principal corps—that of Marshal Oudinot—had proved unable to reach Berlin, the union of more than 100,000 men in that capital, desired by Napoleon, became merely a dream. Undoubtedly some errors had been committed. Marshal Oudinot had not kept his corps sufficiently together; his lieutenants had not been inclined to march in union, and he had too much given way to their inclination. Certainly this error might be charged against the movement on Berlin; but the essential error, it is scarcely necessary to say, lay with Napoleon, who had too much despised what he called the *ramassis* of Bernadotte, who had opposed it by a real *ramassis*

of his own, in which, for one-half of Frenchmen ready for vigorous action; there was one-half of Germans and Italians ready to leave their ranks, who had counted too much upon the union at Berlin of corps leaving for posts so distant as Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg. The best plan would plainly have been not to hazard Oudinot against Berlin, which would have rendered it unnecessary to retain Macdonald on the Bober; and here, as always, the exaggeration of political designs in the mind of Napoleon had frustrated his military plans,—a reflection which has become wearisome from repetition, but which we repeat unconsciously because the melancholy subject gives rise to it, and because it affords the only solution of the errors of so great a commander.

These serious misfortunes, and not a sudden illness invented by flatterers, had surprised Napoleon the day after his victories of the 26th and 27th of August, and, being communicated in rapid succession, had brought him from Pirna to Dresden, and had there detained him on the 29th and 30th August, whilst Vandamme remained unsupported at Kulm. These misfortunes were of the highest consequence, for instead of leaving Macdonald victorious in Silesia in pursuit of Blücher, to have Blücher victorious and Macdonald routed,—instead of 100,000 men in Berlin, to have Oudinot fallen back upon Wittenberg, and deprived of more than 10,000 men, Gerard driven back to Magdeburg, with the loss of 1000 soldiers, and, finally, Davout condemned to feel his way with 30,000 men among the marshes of Mecklenburg,—was a very different situation from that which Napoleon had anticipated when he proposed to extend his arm from the Elbe to the Vistula. On the 30th, still ignorant of Vandamme's disaster, which he only learned on the following morning, he had formed, after profound meditation, a new plan of a vast and complicated character; for the reverses of his lieutenants had not yet disconcerted his genius or shaken his confidence in fortune. More than once he had thought of marching for Prague, and striking Austria in one of her capitals, and in a manner breaking the coalition at the head-quarters of the principal army and the residence of three allied sovereigns. If, in fact, after the battle of Dresden, he had pursued to extremity the army of Bohemia, already so broken, it is probable that he would have dissolved the coalition; and without the news from Silesia and Berlin, it is certain that he would have done so. The most intelligent of his lieutenants, whose capacious spirit was distasteful to him, and the justice of whose views he sometimes suspected, but whose rare talents he appreciated, Marshal Saint Cyr, continually invited him to this plan, but there were serious objections to its adoption. In the first place, it was necessary to pass the mountains of Bohemia, to give battle on the other side, with the danger which the grand army of the allies had just escaped by miracle,—that of having, if beaten, no other retreat than through frightful defiles; next, it was necessary to take Prague, the defences of which, though hastily raised, might present an unexpected resistance; finally, if even they were to triumph over this obstacle, they would have prolonged their line, already too long, by all the distance between Dresden and Prague,—a distance much aggravated by

local circumstances and by the mountains. Napoleon would thus have been farther from his army of Silesia, farther from that of the Lower Elbe, and unable to afford them aid in case of a reverse. These objections had always deterred him from the project of entering Bohemia, and he had only thought of it for an instant, when, being at Zittau, he had hoped to fall unawares on the midst of the corps which should have formed the army of Prince Schwarzenberg; but Macdonald being conquered, and Oudinot brought back from Berlin to Wittenberg, to remove from thence at this moment was inadmissible, and accordingly Napoleon, when he learned their reverses, thought only of approaching them, and suddenly, with the inexhaustible fertility characteristic of his genius, he proposed to make the centre of his operations no longer at Dresden, but at Berlin.

It was necessary to beat Blücher, who on the 22d and 23d August had only received a shock which was not followed up; and Bernadotte, who, far from receiving checks, had obtained advantages, and it would be equally useful and agreeable to abate his pride, to punish his treason, and to destroy his false renown. There were serious reasons for turning our efforts in that direction. By marching for Berlin with his Guard and half of his cavalry reserve, i.e. with 40,000 men, Napoleon would join Oudinot on his road, overwhelm Bernadotte, enter Berlin, summon thither Gerard's division and Davout's corps, effect the concentration of 100,000 men, on which he had counted so much, direct them to Stettin and Custrin, where our garrisons stood in such need of re-equipping, would raise the courage of those on the Vistula, and he might then return in person to Luckau, between Berlin and Dresden, ready to fall upon Blücher's flank if he should have ventured to the Elbe.

Napoleon was distant from Berlin six or seven marches: it would therefore require, at most, eighteen or twenty days to go and return, and he made the following arrangements for the protection of Dresden in his absence. He intended there to leave Vandamme with the first corps, (for on the morning of the 30th, when forming these plans, Napoleon was ignorant of the disaster at Kulm,) and, besides Vandamme, Saint Cyr, Victor, and Marmont, with part of the cavalry reserve. He proposed to place these forces, constituting an army of 100,000 men, under Murat, who, he considered, supported by Dresden, with Macdonald in his rear, (who, according to this plan, was to be brought as far as Bautzen,) would be in a condition to resist the return of the army from Bohemia,—a return which, owing to the recent disaster, could hardly be effected before fifteen days. Napoleon hoped thus to have time to return, after having struck a decisive blow at Berlin, and at his approach every new attempt upon Dresden would vanish. Certainly, when Blücher should hear of the battle of Dresden, and know that Napoleon was on his flank, (which he would be when on the road to Berlin,) he would never venture to go beyond Bautzen. In any case, when Macdonald should approach the Elbe, and be placed *dos à dos* with Murat, neither would have any serious danger to fear.

The Berlin expedition ended, Napoleon pro-

posed to establish himself at Luckau, between Berlin and Dresden, thither to draw the corps of Marmont and all the cavalry reserve, to leave 60,000 men at Dresden and in the camp at Pirna, and 60,000 at Bautzen, whilst with 60,000 more he should be ready to hasten either to Berlin, Bautzen, or Dresden, according to need, which might be done in three days' rapid march. In this position he was certain to be equal to any emergency, for at three days' march from Berlin he would also be on Blücher's flank, and sufficiently near Dresden to reach it in time if the army of Bohemia should appear. It is even probable that by following this plan he would have succeeded in transporting the war to the north of Germany, for the assemblage of the North being broken up and Bernadotte punished, the Prussians would seek to regain their country to defend it, and would attract the Russians thither, the horrors of war would thus be thrown upon the most hostile of the Germans, and while exposing a little the Upper Elbe, they should wholly protect the Lower Elbe, i.e. Hamburg, where was the best line of communication, that from Hamburg to Weesl. In this case, it is true, there remained the chance of seeing the Austrians on the Upper Rhine, a chance not very probable, for they would not venture to advance so far so long as Napoleon could fall upon their rear. Besides, Napoleon could urge with them his efforts to remove the war from their territory, from which he would be able to derive a new opportunity for negotiation, which was not impossible, as the Austrians were the least pledged of all his enemies, the least implacable, and the only ones inclined to treat on reasonable grounds.

Such was his plan on the morning of the 30th, a plan already written out and accompanied with a draft of orders,\* when all his vast conceptions were subverted by news from Kulm. He was cruelly afflicted by Vandamme's disaster, which with those at Katsbach and Gross-Beeren made three severe checks, equal in importance to his success at Dresden, or even superior, for the prestige of victory had passed over to the side of the allies, and on the side of Napoleon remained only the prestige of his former glory. For the first time he thought that he had perhaps too much presumed upon his strength when he refused the conditions offered at Prague, and he formed a more correct estimate of the youth of his soldiers, of the contagion of Germanic sentiments in his allies, and of the discouragement of his lieutenants; perhaps he went even so far as to regret having himself disgraced, or disparaged, or lavishly exposed to fire such commanders as Massena, Davout, and Lannes! No doubt he still had brave men, heroes such as Ney, Oudinot, Macdonald, Victor, and Murat, but they were little accustomed to command in chief; he put them to the trial at a time little adapted to encourage them, a time when the passions of Europe, fortune, and the gales of prosperity were all against us.

For more than a day he was prostrated, so to speak, by these repeated blows. But his inexhaustible mind was not paralyzed: his energy,

\* The note in which this plan is exposed and discussed, and the consequent orders, exist in the office of the Secretary of State; and from those irrefragable documents we derive our narrative.

his imagination, even his illusions, all revived the following day, and he formed a new plan, which, though less vast than the preceding, was conceived with equal power. First, he determined to assign another commander to the three corps destined to march upon Berlin, and he chose Marshal Ney, who had no superior in valour in the field, but who had never yet commanded large armies. Napoleon selected him because his resolute and fearless mind had not yet experienced that discouragement which was visible in the other generals. He sent him to Wittenberg with the most encouraging expressions and precise instructions, founded on the following general plan.

Napoleon ordered him, after collecting and reuniting the 7th, 4th, and 12th corps, (the direct command of the last was still assigned to Marshal Oudinot,) to repair to Baruth, two days' march from Berlin, and there to wait for orders from headquarters. He resolved to go in person to Hoyerswerda, three days' march from Baruth and two days' from Dresden, with the Guard, the greater part of the cavalry reserve, and Marmont's corps. When thus posted in Lusatia, between Berlin and Gorkitz, he could at pleasure either go to the left upon Berlin and aid Ney to effect an entrance into the town, which was to revert to his vast plan of the morning of the 30th, or to the right and throw himself upon Blücher's flank and destroy him if, by continuing to press upon Macdonald, he should create any anxiety for Dresden. It was certainly impossible to imagine any more skilful or appropriate combination, for Napoleon was sure, by joining one of his two lieutenants, who respectively were opposed to Bernadotte and Blücher, to render him victorious. Only on this occasion he placed himself merely at two short marches from Dresden, being doubtful of the designs of the army of Bohemia. If that were to advance again, reinstated from the defeat at Dresden by the success at Kulm, he would immediately return and inflict a second blow like that of August 27. If Blücher should be the one to show boldness, he would fall upon his flank from Hoyerswerda, and send him back to the Oder for a long time. And, finally, if neither of the armies of Silesia and Bohemia should exhibit any tendency to vigorous action, he could from Hoyerswerda urge Ney against Berlin without following him thither. It was, in fact, enough to give him support at Baruth, for the impetuous Ney, with such a rear-guard, would rush upon Bernadotte, and enter Berlin over the bodies of his soldiers. This great act once accomplished, Napoleon would be free to return to Hoyerswerda, whence he would threaten Blücher or Schwarzenberg, whichever of the two should make any attempt. Every thing in these combinations was not only profound but true and accurate, and ten years before every one of them would have succeeded wonderfully, when our soldiers were accustomed to the stern vicissitudes of war, when our generals were full of confidence, when Napoleon was as confident of others as of himself, and when his enemies, less resolved to conquer or die, were not determined to persevere even in the midst of the greatest defeats. But at this time, in the moral condition of ourselves and our enemies, every thing was uncertain, though the heroism of

the soldiers and the generals remained unshaken.\*

After having given suitable orders, Napoleon made the best possible arrangements to prevent Dresden being left unprotected during his absence. First, he reorganized Vandamme's corps, many remains of which had already returned. Besides the 42d division, restored to Marshal Saint Cyr, which had not suffered severely, about 15,000 men of all arms, belonging to the first corps, had returned either separately or in companies. Every Frenchman had returned to his colours, except those who were disabled or taken prisoner. They had lost their artillery and some of the most distinguished officers. There was no intelligence of Haxo and Vandamme. Some even supposed that both were dead. The secretary of General Vandamme having returned, Napoleon ordered all the papers of that general to be seized, in order to extract his military correspondence and withdraw the proof of the orders sent to that unfortunate person. He had even the weakness to deny the order to advance upon Toplitz, and without greatly blaming Vandamme, but rather, on the contrary, pitying him, he wrote to all the commanders of corps that that general had received instruction to halt at the heights of Kulm, but that, seduced by excess of zeal, he had allowed himself to engage in the plain, and had thus been destroyed. The authentic narrative which we have given proves the falsehood of these assertions, invented in order to maintain Napoleon's influence over the minds of men, now more needed than ever.

His first care was to seek for this corps, so sadly handled, a commander as brave as Vandamme, but more prudent. He chose the illustrious Count Lobau, who to singular energy united a remarkable military discernment and tact, concealed under a rude and martial exterior. Count Lobau, in fact, deservedly possessed the entire confidence of Napoleon, who always kept him near himself when either vigorous strokes were necessary, or missions requiring judgment, exactness, and candour. This intrepid and intelligent soldier, so well known to the men of our time, uniting to the stature of a grenadier and the expression of a bulldog the most delicate finesse, discharged every mission intrusted to him by Napoleon without either deceiving or displeasing him, and, in truth, without compromising himself or others. With extreme address and singular bravery, he combined the talent and taste for the organization of troops, in which he excelled. No better choice could have been made to restore to the first corps the military spirit which they must have lost in the disaster of Kulm. Napoleon distributed this corps into three divisions of ten battalions each, restored to it the half of Teste's division, which had for a time been withdrawn, took from it the brigade of De Reuss, which had been lent to it also for the time, and thus, by means of the soldiers who had returned, and

\* To this epoch of Napoleon's history have been assigned the most chimerical and unreasonable projects, from ignorance of his correspondence and of that of his lieutenants. But, owing to the possession and close study of that correspondence, we ascribe to him no project or design which is not supported by authentic evidence.

some marching battalions from Ments, procured it an effective of about 18,000 men. In the arsenals of Dresden, where an immense *matériel* had been gathered by his care, he sought the means of replacing the lost muskets and the seventy-two guns left on the battlefield of Kulm. He furnished shoes and clothing to those who were in need, and omitted nothing to restore the *morale* of the men, either by encouragement or reviews, or by those little material gratifications which constitute the happiness of the soldier. Count Lobau was ordered to effect this resurrection in a few days, as Napoleon intended to make use of the fresh corps for the defence of Dresden during his approaching absence.

For the preservation of Dresden he provided as follows. Instead of leaving there only the 14th corps, as when he marched against Silesia, he left the 14th (Saint Cyr's) in the camp of Pirna, the 2d (Victor's) at Freyberg, and the 1st (Lobau's) within Dresden, where he would have greater facilities for organization. The 14th corps, which, on regaining the 42d division, should possess four, was to keep Königstein and Lilienstein, the bridge over the Elbe uniting those fortresses, the camp of Pirna, the defile of Peterswalde, and the secondary passages of Bohemia, which issued upon the right of the Peterswalde road. Marshal Victor at Freyberg watched at once the high-road of Freyberg and the road from Toplitz by Altenberg. An active surveillance was maintained between the two by Pajol's cavalry. In case of a reappearance of the army of Bohemia, these two corps were ordered to oppose a moderate resistance, only sufficient to delay the march of the enemy without endangering themselves, and to fall back upon Dresden, after giving it warning. They were then to take their position, Saint Cyr on the left of the intrenched camp,—where he had already fought bravely on the 26th of August,—and Victor on the right, where he had decided the battle on the 27th. If seriously attacked, they were ordered to retire behind the redoubts, which had been increased from five to eight and much better armed. During the attack on Dresden, Napoleon having remarked several defects in their establishment, he had named a special commandant for each, had increased their artillery, had prepared a relay of artillerymen to serve the guns, had forbidden any ammunition-wagons to be left in them, and had constructed, with bags of earth, a species of reduts to take the place of powder-magazines during the combat. He had divided their armament into artillery of position, stationary, of course, and horsed-artillery, which might be taken to either side of the Elbe, as might be required. He had carefully recommended that troops should be held in reserve behind each redoubt, to recover immediately any that might be taken; and, lastly, he had determined that all the first corps under Count Lobau should be placed in reserve behind those of Saint Cyr and Victor, to debouche at the last moment upon the enemy when they supposed themselves victorious, as the Guard had done on the 26th of August. This was, as we see, a much improved repetition of the 26th, which promised the same success, for the three corps

of Saint Cyr, Victor, and Lobau comprised nearly 60,000 men,—i. e. more than Napoleon had to resist 200,000 of the army of Bohemia on the 26th. Adding to this the fact that instead of being four or five days' march distant, as at the former appearance of the enemy, he would only be at two days' when at Hoyerswerda, Napoleon took his departure without any anxiety for Dresden if the army of Bohemia should repeat the recent manoeuvre, by operating by the left bank of the Elbe. If, on the contrary, changing their march, they should make the attack by the right, Poniatowski, Macdonald, and Napoleon himself would be ready to overwhelm them. These wise arrangements having been made, he sent forward, on September 2, the cavalry of the guard under Nansouty, with two infantry divisions of the Young Guard under Curial, and brought them to Königsbrück, to the left of the Bautzen road in the direction of Hoyerswerda. He reckoned on sending the Old Guard from Dresden on the 8d, and the rest of the Young Guard from Pirna, in the same direction. On the 4th he intended to leave for Hoyerswerda. M. de Bassano was to remain in Dresden, with full information, even of the military movements, which he understood sufficiently, in order that, with that devoted activity which redeemed a too blind submission, he should be able to transmit to every one in good time an intimation of all in which he was specially interested.

On the morning of September 3, Napoleon was occupied in giving his orders, when he received from Bautzen the hurried despatches of Marshal Macdonald. To use an expression of Napoleon, that marshal was wholly put out of countenance (*décontenancé*) by the vehement march of Blücher, who was not a man to halt in a successful career, and who, therefore, as soon as the water had somewhat subsided, had advanced that he might reap as many results as possible from the event of the Katsbach. Placing his infantry partly toward the mountains, partly on the high-road from Breslau to Dresden, and his immense cavalry in the damp plains watered by the Bober, the Preiss, the Neisse, and the Spree, he had, by constantly outflanking Macdonald's left, obliged him to retrograde from Löwenberg to Lobau, from Lobau to Gorlitz. He opposed 80,000 men to Macdonald, who had no more than 50,000 under arms, and who could not procure 60,000 capable of fighting unless he were to withdraw Poniatowski from the post of Zittau. Marshal Macdonald, notwithstanding his well-known intrepidity, feared lest discouragement among his own men; vexation of defeat in his generals, and the retrograde movement with all, should lead to new misfortunes. He urgently demanded aid. It was possible, according to him, that in twenty-four hours he should be driven from Gorlitz to Bautzen, and perhaps even to Dresden.

Napoleon, who was not long in making up his mind, judged this not the time for moving to Hoyerswerda,—that is, to the left of the high-road of Silesia, and in the flank of Blücher,—for Macdonald was too hard pressed to allow a single hour for manoeuvring. The only manoeuvre admissible was to aid him directly by the shortest road. Napoleon

counted upon joining him at Bautzen, when he would restore his confidence, send him forward, and drive Blücher back beyond the Neisse, the Queiss, and the rivers which he had crossed. Seeking above all things a battle with those of his enemies who dared to remain within his reach, he hoped to find it in this new encounter with Blücher, and he imagined that with the impetus he had given himself, he would be unable to stop with sufficient promptness to escape us again.

His resolution being taken, he corrected the movement given the day before to the two divisions of the Young Guard, and to the cavalry which followed them. He had directed them to Königsbrück; he brought them back from Königsbrück to Bautzen by Camenz. He immediately sent off the Old Guard from Dresden for Bischofswerda, and the rest of the Young Guard who awaited his orders at Pirna under Mortier to Stolpen. The same direct movement upon Bautzen was ordered to the reserve cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and the infantry of Marshal Marmont. Despatched on the morning of the 3d, the troops ought to reach Bischofswerda in the evening, and Bautzen the following day. Napoleon prepared to quit Dresden himself in the night of the 3d, employing, as usual, the whole day in issuing his orders, and devoting to sleep only the time spent in his carriage. He gave notice to Macdonald of the considerable movement which was being effected toward Bautzen, and recommended secrecy, that Blücher might advance without warning in full force upon the main body of the French army. At Dresden he forbade the passage of even a single peasant across the bridges, hoping thus to hinder the news of the departure of the Guard reaching Blücher, and, lastly, he sent word to Marshal Ney that, though for a time turning away from Hoyerswerda, he should return in that direction in three or four days, and he appointed Baruth as the place of meeting, whence they should ultimately leave for Berlin.

Napoleon left Dresden on the evening of September 3, halted some hours at Harta, and reached Bautzen the following morning. He was preceded by seventy wagons, carrying ammunition, muskets, and shoes, in order to restore to the soldiers of Marshal Macdonald part of what they had lost. He treated Macdonald with kindness, without dwelling upon the errors that may have been committed at the Katzbach, freely acknowledging to every one the difficulty of their circumstances, aware that, in such a situation, it is necessary to raise the spirits by encouragement, rather than to depress them by reproach. Besides, Marshal Macdonald inspired so much esteem as to silence reproach. Napoleon kept himself concealed, unwilling to display himself until the arrival of the cavalry of the Guard, and of Latour-Maubourg, when he should be able to pour down upon Blücher with sufficient force.

Unfortunately, in the midst of a German population, all unfriendly to us, even though compelled by our presence to assume the character of allies, it was impossible to keep any secret except such as tended to the advantage of our adversaries. Many despatches sent from Dresden, either for the army of

Silesia or for that of Bohemia, had already made known, not, indeed, the designs of Napoleon, which were known only to himself and his principal lieutenants, but the movements of the grand army begun on the morning of the 2d. This sufficed to lead to the supposition that Blücher would be the object of Napoleon's aims. Accordingly, the Prussian general, with all his impetuosity, faithful to his plan of withdrawing as soon as Napoleon should appear, prepared to retire, and though he had not as yet sounded a retreat, he advanced with less speed. Having reached Górlitz, he pushed his advanced guards upon Bautzen, but halted his main body at Górlitz, and took his position upon a height called the Lands-Krone, from which could be seen the whole country from Górlitz to Bautzen.

About noon on the 4th of September, Latour-Maubourg and Nansouty having arrived, Murat put himself at the head of their squadrons, and poured down upon Blücher's advanced guards, whom he had met toward the close of the day in the neighbourhood of Weissenberg. Immense clouds of dust announced his presence, and from the vigour of the impulse, Blücher immediately recognised the presence of the master in whose sight retrogression was unknown. His advanced guard, being vigorously assailed, were driven back with the loss of several hundred men. Night suspended the pursuit. Blücher immediately resolved to repossess the Neisse on the following day, and to leave at Górlitz only a rear-guard, which would occupy the city, situated on our side, while every preparation should be made for the destruction of the bridges.

On the following morning, the 5th, Napoleon, at the head of his advanced guards, went before Reichenbach, to see if he could so handle the Prussians as to cure them of so rapidly returning after his departure. But at the first glance, he had the vexation to perceive that Blücher was again, as on the 2d and 23d of August, about to elude our approach. He, however, made a movement in advance, and his whole satisfaction on reaching Górlitz was to take or kill about 1400 enemies. After rapidly traversing the city, he found the bridges over the Neisse broken, and the Prussian rear-guard completing the destruction of that by which they had escaped.

From this moment it was plain to Napoleon that all he could gain by further pursuing the allies would be to fatigue his own troops to no purpose, and to be at a greater distance from Dresden. He, therefore, resolved to halt at Górlitz, there to spend two or three days in repairing the bridges, resting his soldiers, and encouraging by his presence Macdonald's corps, which was much shaken.

But on the same evening, the 5th, despatches from Dresden altered his determination, and obliged him not even to spend two or three days at Górlitz as he had proposed. They announced a new appearance of the army of Bohemia upon the Peterswalde road,—i.e. to the rear of Dresden,—precisely as on the occasion of the recent battles of the 26th and 27th of August. It was again Gourgaud, *officier d'ordonnance*, who roused the fear of Marshal Saint Cyr, and who described too vividly what had occurred at Dresden. Was this an actual



descent of the army of Bohemia, determined to make another attack upon Dresden, notwithstanding the rudeness of their former repulse? or was it merely a vain demonstration on their part, and was it not probable that, having learned the movement of Napoleon upon Bautzen, they wished to recall him to Dresden, and thus to make sport of the promptitude of his decisions and the agility of his soldiers, by fatiguing both himself and them, exhausting them with fruitless movements, sometimes against one army, sometimes against another, never allowing them the advantage of coming sufficiently near to either to admit of fighting? This last supposition was the most probable; and if Napoleon had had any chance of joining Blücher, he would not have been diverted from him in the hopeless pursuit of Prince Schwarzenberg. Unfortunately, Napoleon made no sacrifice in halting, since Blücher, equally ready to retreat and to advance, was already beyond his reach, and it was natural that, as he could effect nothing of importance at Górlitz, he should return to any point which presented either the slightest symptom of danger or hope of battle. He, therefore, ordered his Guard to go no farther, but to rest, in order to be ready to execute his orders on the following day, and he himself returned from Górlitz to Bautzen to be nearer the source of news and to be able more certainly to estimate the strength of the reinforcements sent from the camp of Pirna. Without losing a moment, he travelled the whole of the evening and night, and reached Bautzen at 2 A.M. of the 6th. Certainly it was impossible to display greater activity, and less regard to fatigue; for, leaving Dresden in the evening of the 3d of September, and reaching Bautzen on the morning of the 4th, and Weissenberg in the course of the same day, and Górlitz on the 5th, he returned to Bautzen during the night of the 5th. Unhappily, his troops, being on foot, fell far short of his rapidity.

Napoleon found at Bautzen the details sent by M. de Bassano, in the name of Marshal Saint Cyr, from which it appeared that the grand army of Bohemia had suddenly debouched from Peterswalde, the right upon Pirna, the centre upon Gieshubel, the left upon Borná, with every appearance of a serious determination, and with such vigour that Marshal Saint Cyr had thought it his duty to draw back his four divisions in orderly retreat. In consequence of such intimation, and being detained by no important objects at Bautzen, Napoleon replied that he should start immediately, so as to be at Dresden the same evening, the 6th, and that he should be followed by his Guard. However, as he was not easily deceived, and did not yet regard this demonstration in a serious light, he gave his orders accordingly. Having always in view his movement upon Hoyerswerda, from which point he could at once support Ney in the direction of Berlin and check Blücher in the direction of Górlitz, he brought back determinately toward Dresden only the Guard, young and old, comprising nearly 40,000 men of all arms. He directed Marmont, who was on the march, to join him, toward Camenz and Königsbrück, whence it would be easy to recall him to Dresden or urge him on to Hoyerswerda. He

added a strong detachment of cavalry to give chase to the Cossacks, and to unite him with Ney and Macdonald. He ordered Marshal Macdonald, after having replaced Poniatowski at the pass of Zittau, to establish himself firmly at Bautzen, to re-arm his disbanded soldiers, and to endeavour, at least, to guard the line of the Spree with an effective which he might raise to 70,000 men if he could recover the marauders. It might be hoped that, being now only two days' march from Dresden instead of four, Macdonald would be less prompt to retreat, and Blücher less prompt to advance. Marshal Macdonald, with modesty highly honourable to himself, earnestly requested to be exonerated from the chief command, offering to remain as commander of a division at the head of the 11th corps, and there to die at his post, but resolved no longer to retain responsibility which he felt to be too heavy, and complaining of the want of agreement among his lieutenants, perhaps with some degree of injustice arising from misfortune. Napoleon had no longer any choice, for generals disappeared as well as soldiers in the frightful destruction which spared neither. He listened to Macdonald, consoled him, treated him as he would have treated a victorious general, and, after having encouraged him as well as he could, left for Dresden, where he arrived on the morning of the 7th. M. de Bassano had come to meet him to employ the time on the road in discussing the affairs of the Empire, and the information received from the head-quarters of Marshal Saint Cyr before Pirna.

After a few hours' stay at Dresden, he set off for Pirna, and halted near Muggeln, where he found the rear-guards of Marshal Saint Cyr. The Prussians and Russians, without the Austrians, had issued from Bohemia by the high-road of Peterswalde, which we have already described, had attempted on one side to take the plateau of Pirna and on the other that of Gieshubel, and had drawn before them the four divisions of Saint Cyr, who occupied these several positions. Another corps, under Count Pahlen, issuing by the Furstenwalde road, which Kleist had followed after the events of Kulm, had come toward Borná, where the mountains begin to lose their abruptness and to subside into a plain. An immense body of cavalry, sent in that direction, had greatly annoyed those under Pajol, and caused him great loss, though inferior to him in vigour and tact.

Saint Cyr, being thus pressed, had brought back his 42d division from the camp of Pirna to Pirna itself, leaving, as usual, some battalions in the fortress of Königstein, the 48d and 44th from Gieshubel to Zehist, and the 45th, which supported Pajol, from Borná to Dohna.

In this position Napoleon found him, not at all disconcerted, much less alarmed than he had professed, and quite ready to resume the offensive. What signified this new appearance of the enemy? Was it a continuation of the tactics by means of which they hoped to exhaust the French army, or was it a *bona fide* attack? It was well worth while to discuss this doubtful question with so intelligent an officer as Marshal Saint Cyr. Napoleon questioned him upon it with much confidence and

cordiality. Though his character was little to his mind, he highly appreciated his intelligence, and, besides, in the present state of affairs he was obliged to study every one, especially the military leaders who were already much fatigued. For all these reasons he discoursed long with Marshal Saint Cyr, and did not appear to be convinced that the last attack was serious, or that it was any thing more than one of those perpetual alternations which seemed to constitute the present tactics of the allies. Moreover, Napoleon said that he wished nothing better than to repair, by means of a decisive action, the evil he had sustained at Kulm, the Katzbach, and Gross-Beeren, but he reasonably doubted whether the allies, after the lesson received at Dresden, would venture to incur another. They were evidently not disposed again to present their head at Dresden and their rear at the defiles of the Erz-Gebirge, and to seek them beyond that point, *i.e.* in Bohemia, was to play too hazardous a game, and to adopt the unfavourable position which they had relinquished after trial. It was more likely that if they should renew an enterprise on our rear it would be still farther back, *i.e.* by the high-road from Commotau to Leipsic; and the appearance of some scouts in that direction, which had been intimated a few days before, led Napoleon to think that such would be the case, which, as we shall soon see, evinced his profound sagacity. He repeated that he would greatly rejoice to have on his hands once more the army of Bohemia between Dresden and Peterswalde, but that he could not flatter himself that he should be so fortunate, that he had come with that view, that his reserves were on the march, that the next morning they would be at Dresden, the next evening at Muegeln, and that he should act as circumstances might require.

Marshal Saint Cyr seemed to be of another opinion. He was convinced that a real attack had been determined on by Prince Schwarzenberg, judging from the vigour with which the divisions of the 14th corps had been urged during two days; and he was astonished to see that prince advance so near Dresden, if it were merely for a simple demonstration. He maintained, as he already had done, that it was in the direction of Bohemia that Napoleon ought to endeavour to gain a great battle, which would be rendered more decisive by the presence of the sovereigns, whose courage he hoped to shake; to which Napoleon replied, with good reason, that to him it would be acceptable anywhere, especially against all the sovereigns combined, but that it did not rest with him to choose his locality, and that he must fight wherever Fortune gave him the opportunity.

Marshal Saint Cyr was still preoccupied with one idea, very correct, though very improbable,—that at the present time the Austrians were separated from the Prussians and Russians; for the latter only were visible, without a single Austrian detachment. In this case, he would have to do with 80,000 or 90,000 men instead of 140,000 or 150,000, and it would be an excellent opportunity for destroying the allies. But a remarkable contradiction was implied, for the separation of the allies ex-

cluded the idea of a serious attempt upon Dresden, and Napoleon thought rather that if the Austrians had withdrawn it was with the view of preparing a final march upon Leipsic, by assuming the directions leading to that city. These discussions between two such competent soldiers, which show so plainly the difficulties in the midst of which a commander has to steer, had no influence on the conduct to be pursued; for they had agreed, if the army of Bohemia allowed, to have a serious engagement with it immediately, and that they were only debarred from instant action by the absence of reserves occupied in crossing the space between Bautzen and Dresden. Napoleon left Saint Cyr to return the same day to Dresden, where he was to give orders of every kind to his various *corps d'armée*. It was agreed that the marshal should intimate by an officer the first movement of the enemy.\*

\* In Marshal Saint Cyr we honour, besides great intelligence, much independence of character: we only regret that it was spoiled by an excessive love of contradiction, which led to more than one error in his career, otherwise so glorious. Of this tendency we shall give a striking instance in reference to the period described in the text. It is certainly difficult to find days more actively employed, though perhaps not fortunately; for Napoleon left Dresden on the evening of the 3d, slept three or four hours at Hama, reached Bautzen on the morning of the 4th, spent the forenoon of the 4th in that place in adding the pursuit of the enemy, pushed on as far as Gurlitz during the 5th, to convince himself by personal observation whether the Prussians would stand firm, returned the same evening to Bautzen, on the report of a new appearance of the army of Bohemia, arrived there at 2 A.M. of the 6th, issued all his orders in the course of that day, reached Dresden that night, and on the morning of the 7th repaired to Marshal Saint Cyr for the conference which we have narrated. Marching during the night, spending the day on horseback or in his study, giving directions to a multitude of corps, of which he received intelligence every moment, Napoleon displayed all the activity of a young man. Yet the following are the very words of Saint Cyr in his *Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 126:—"There remained to him [after the retreat of Blücher] the possibility of marching against Schwarzenberg, who was advancing upon Rumburg by the right bank of the river; I presume he must have been informed, as he was by the 14th corps on the 3d and 4th of September of that of the Russian army. Nevertheless, after Blücher's retreat, he remained during the 5th, 6th, and 7th completely undecided: on the 7th he wrote by the Major-General to Marshal Gouvion Saint Cyr a letter of reproach. . . ." Without seeking in this last expression the secret of Saint Cyr's judgment, we may see, from what we have set forth, the extent of foundation for his assertion. On the 5th Napoleon marched against Blücher, returned on the 6th at the summons of Saint Cyr himself, spent only a few hours in ascertaining the reasonableness of the summons, (and even these hours were not lost, for they were occupied in giving orders,) and on the 7th repaired to the marshal. He, therefore, did not lose the 5th, 6th, and 7th in indecision. The supposition that Napoleon must have been aware of the pretended movement of the Austrian army upon Rumburg, *i.e.* on the right bank of the Elbe, is also quite erroneous; for, on one hand, the Austrian army did not execute that movement, nor did it fall back behind the Tetschen, and, on the other, Napoleon might not have known that movement if it had taken place, for the disposition of the mountains and the ill will of the Germans condemned us to total ignorance, to such a degree that on the 7th Napoleon and Marshal Saint Cyr, having met at Muegeln to the rear of Pirna, were ignorant whether they were in presence of the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, or only of the two latter. Every thing, therefore, in the passage is inaccurate, both opinions and assertions; and we make this remark not as the flatterers of Napoleon, but which we leave to others, nor as the detractors of Marshal Saint Cyr, whose spirit and independence we admire, but as historians deeply impressed with the difficulties of history. Certainly it appears that a witness of such sense and with such capabilities of observation, being beside Napoleon part of the days during which he pretends that Napoleon did nothing, ought to have known the truth: and yet we see how, from not having read what Napoleon wrote on these days, he was led to pass erroneous judgments. This is a new proof that we ought not to judge men who have figured in great events without having known their orders, and in particular their correspondence.

In order better to appreciate the difficulty of exercising command, it should be known that at this time both Napoleon and the marshal were in the right, and even when opposed. As soon as news had been received by the allies of a march of Napoleon into Lusatia, the Austrians had executed a retrograde movement corresponding in Bohemia to that of Napoleon in Lusatia, and had repassed the Elbe behind the curtain of mountains between Tetschen and Leitmeritz. In this they had a double aim: first, to provide against unforeseen events, especially against any operation of Napoleon against Prague; secondly, to recover a little from the shock experienced by the Austrian army in the battle of Dresden. They had left the Russians and Prussians on the high-road of Peterswalde, with the view of attracting Napoleon thither by strong demonstrations, of thus setting free the army of Silesia against which he was marching, and of continuing the plan concerted at Trachenberg, of being most venturesome where he was not, and very prudent where he was, until, after having exhausted him by useless expeditions, they should at length be able to overwhelm him. Wittgenstein and Kleist, who commanded the Russians and Prussians under Barclay de Tolly, and who were full of ardour, had not half completed the demonstrations assigned to them, had attacked in earnest the four divisions of Marshal Saint Cyr, so that he had required all his firmness and talent in defensive warfare to extricate him without a check. While the Russian and Prussian corps were thus fighting at Peterswalde, Klenau, still shaken with the blows received at Dresden, was between Commotau and Chemnitz, occupied in refitting himself, sent parties to Zwickau and Chemnitz, and in this manner prepared for the decisive operation which the allies, without yet venturing to put it in execution, were meditating on our rear, but this time in the direction of Leipzig instead of Dresden.

Napoleon, therefore, was right in thinking that they were not planning another attack upon Dresden, and that if a new march were to take place on our rear it would be attempted at a greater distance, i.e. by Leipsic; and Marshal Saint Cyr, being deceived upon these points, was right in thinking that the Russians and Prussians were actually separated from the Austrians, and that the present would be a good opportunity for attacking them. Napoleon objected nothing to this latter opinion, and said, very sensibly, that whatever might be the truth, there was only one course to adopt,

which contains the real motives of their conduct. And when we see such a person as Marshal Saint Cyr, who had commanded armies, who knew by experience the foolish judgments frequently passed by ill-informed persons on those who command, commit such errors, we see that we ought not to pronounce without authentic evidence and after having read and compared all that can possibly be procured. This is what we have ourselves done with scrupulous attention, affirming nothing but on certain grounds mutually corrected, never seeking to exalt or depreciate one or another, acting neither as the flatterer nor detractor of Napoleon, who is to us a purely ideal person, seeking only the truth, and seeking that with enthusiasm, and expressing it equally whether favourable or detrimental to Napoleon. Truth is the aim, the duty, and the happiness of a real historian. When we know how to appreciate truth, when we perceive its beauty, and even its convenience, being the only explanation of every fact, we desire, seek, love, and present truth alone, or what we honestly take to be truth.

which was to wait till the 8th to see how the enemy would behave, and to allow time to the Guard and the cavalry reserve to arrive. It is seldom, especially when circumstances admit of contrary suppositions, that only one line of conduct is admissible. This was the case here, and Napoleon had returned to Dresden on the evening of the 7th, ready to return in person at the first signal, but anxious in the interval to watch the movements of his innumerable corps. In fact, while he was on the alert to seize the first error of the army of Bohemia, new events were occurring on his wings.

The reader will no doubt remember that on leaving Dresden, first for Hoyerswerda and then for Bautzen, Napoleon had appointed Marshal Ney a rendezvous at Baruth, in the intention of uniting himself with him either to support his movement upon Berlin, or to march thither himself. Recalled to Dresden by the appearance of the heads of columns of Kleist and Wittgenstein, he little believed, as we have just seen, in any serious intention on their part to engage him a second time in the rear of that capital: he, therefore, designed, as soon as he should be entirely assured in that respect, to resume his projects against Berlin, and he was impatient to know what Marshal Ney had done in that direction.

That marshal, having been sent to take the command from Marshal Oudinot, reached Wittenberg on the 3d of September, the same day that Napoleon set off for Bautzen, and, wishing to be on the march by the 5th at latest, he had reviewed his three *corps d'armée*, which in the affair of Gross-Beeren had lost much in *matériel*, in numerical force, and in moral condition.

The *matériel* had been replaced by means of the vast depot of Wittenberg; the numerical force it had been impossible to restore, for about 12,000 men were killed or wounded on the field of Gross-Beeren, or scattered on the roads in a state of entire disorder. The Frenchmen among them had been collected and again supplied with muskets, but they were a minority, and the utmost that could be presented by the three *corps d'armée*, including the Duke of Padua's cavalry, was 52,000 men instead of 64,000 men as reckoned at the resumption of hostilities. As to their moral condition, they had no longer the blind confidence in themselves which had been inspired by Lutzen and Bautzen, and which had been seriously shaken by the first check. The commanders were not satisfied. Marshal Oudinot, though he had desired to be exonerated from command, could not see with pleasure the mission of Marshal Ney, which seemed to involve a condemnation of his conduct. General Reynier, displeased with Marshal Oudinot, and prepared to be so with Marshal Ney, sympathizing in spirit with the Saxons under his command, could not possibly be actuated by the best temper, though always ready to do his duty on the field. General Bertrand, invariably devoted to the service of the Emperor, was the one from whom Marshal Ney had the least to fear, though he might have hoped for a more independent position than that which had fallen to his lot. Marshal Ney, having seldom or never exercised the chief command, though he had had under his direct orders numerous bodies of troops, more anxious to employ his instruments than minutely to examine their character, re-

viewed his troops on the 4th, and announced to them that they should leave on the following day. His rendezvous being appointed at Baruth, he was to go from Wittenberg to Juterbock, and for this purpose to slip, as it were, from left to right, so as to elude the enemy's army, which was in full force before Wittenberg, provided with an immense cavalry, and thus able to reconnoitre in every direction.

The French army was ranged in a semicircle before Wittenberg, the 7th corps (Reynier's) to the left, the 12th (Oudinot's) in the centre, the 4th (Bertrand's) to the right. They were so closely pressed by the army of the North that the advanced posts were continually skirmishing. Marshal Ney, with much address, left his right, formed of the 4th corps, in presence of the enemy all the morning of the 5th, and began the projected movement by his centre, composed of the 12th corps. He brought it in the direction of Zahna, passing behind his right, and went to take Zahna from the Prussian troops of Tauenzien. There was a small river to cross at the village of Zahna: this they forced, after some resistance, and debouched on the other side. The 7th, which formed the left, followed the 12th, and supported their efforts against Zahna, and when both had defiled, the 4th, having sufficiently occupied the enemy, raised their camp and joined the rest of the army, which in one day thus found itself at Seyda, five leagues to the right of Wittenberg. This movement, executed with bravery and deliberation, had cost us about 1000 men; but it had cost the Prussians double that number. Yet it was essential to know whether, being preceded, flanked, and followed by a numerous cavalry, watched in all our movements, it would be possible to continue this flank march without being attacked and struck in the flank, which we were forced inevitably to present to the enemy.

If Napoleon had formed commanders-in-chief instead of forming admirable lieutenants,—the only kind of pupil that ever could emanate from his school, since he never permitted them to be anything else,—he would not have been exposed to see his orders interpreted as they were on the present occasion. Though he had enjoined Marshal Ney to go to Baruth, which absolutely implied the necessity of a flank movement in presence of the enemy, the marshal, less submissive, would rather have deferred the execution of these orders, than expose himself to the chance of a general battle, in a false position, and against greatly superior forces. But Marshal Ney, accustomed not even to examine the correctness of Napoleon's orders, and thinking only of obeying them with punctuality and skill, and rendered still more confident by his happy operation of the 5th, continued his movement from the left to the right without any hesitation.

On the 6th it was necessary to penetrate as far as Juterbock, after which one march would bring them to Baruth. Marshal Ney determined that General Bertrand, who continued to form with the 4th corps the right of the army, and who had been the least engaged the day before, should be the first to leave for Juterbock, about eight o'clock in the morning; that General Reynier should follow with the 7th, and Marshal Oudinot with the 12th. The enemy being thus warned and so nearly approached,

it would have been proper to march *en masse* close to each other, especially in effecting a flank movement by day with 50,000 men against 80,000. But the three corps were at a distance from each other of two hours, and, to increase the misfortune, they journeyed on a sandy plain, exposed to a wind which raised impenetrable clouds of thick dust.

From eight o'clock till noon they marched always harassed in flank by a numerous cavalry, which our own had the greatest difficulty in restraining. That Bernadotte had been informed of our project, and that he had moved *en masse* to bar against us the road to Juterbock, it was not possible to doubt, from the direction he had taken, and from the number of his horsemen. But if we could reach the defile of Dennewitz, which it was absolutely necessary to cross before the enemy should reach it *en masse*, we might very readily force the passage and be the first to reach Juterbock. Then all the French army would be out of danger, and the Prince of Sweden would be reduced to follow in their rear, without any hope of reaching them.

About mid-day they were suddenly attacked with grape from the middle of a cloud of dust. Without knowing it, they were in presence of Tauenzien's corps, which on the previous day they had driven before them, which they still had before them, and they were just at the defile of Dennewitz, the only obstacle at all difficult to surmount in traversing this vast plain. It may be described as follows.

Transversely before us ran a stream, not deep, but very marshy, flowing from Niedergorndorf to Juterbock, which could be crossed only at two places,—Dennewitz and Rohrbeck. This stream, after having flowed from our left to our right, on reaching Rohrbeck takes a turn to penetrate right before us as far as Juterbock, a little town before which it flows with many windings. As the high-road, which was absolutely necessary for our parks in this ocean of sand, traversed Dennewitz, it was necessary to force the passage at Dennewitz itself. General Bertrand, attracted by the fire, on the cloud of dust being for a moment dissipated, recognised the Prussians. He perceived that it was necessary to repulse them, to pass the defile of Dennewitz in spite of their resistance. Marshal Ney came up in his turn, and, seeing that no other course could be followed, he gave the order immediately to do so.

The Italian division of Fontanelli marched at the head. The general, followed by some battalions, entered Dennewitz, over the bodies of a Prussian detachment, and crossed the stream. But it was not in the village of Dennewitz itself, but beyond it, in good positions opposed to our left, that the enemy had resolved to make a stand, by opposing all that they had of forces actually combined. Fortunately, there were present only Tauenzien's corps; Bulow's was advancing in haste, as were also the Swedes and the Russians, but they were still farther off. If, on their side, all the French corps pressed on with energy, they might possibly arrive in time to cross the defile and destroy Tauenzien, perhaps even Bulow.

Scarcely had the Italian division passed the village of Dennewitz, when thousands of horsemen and a large amount of artillery poured down upon them. But they stood firm. On having

Dennewitz we entered a plain bordered by woods as far as the eye could reach, and terminated on the left by some hills surmounted by a windmill. To the left, in the distance, appeared Juterbock. Ney, ever able in the field, personally directed all the arrangements. To the left he placed, near the windmill, Morand's fine division, whose valour was enhanced by the presence of Morand himself; in the centre, the Italian division; to the right, in the direction of Juterbock, the Wurtemberg division. Our artillery, well posted on the salient points of the ground, commanded and even silenced that of Tauenzien. Then the very numerous cavalry of the enemy fell upon ours, who returned the charge, but were routed. Some of our squadrons, being briskly pursued, rushed across the intervals of the Italian battalions, who feared to fire lest they should fire on their friends. Two of these battalions, thus losing their fire, were routed by the enemy's cavalry, and occasioned some disorder in our line. At this sight, General Morand took two battalions of the 13th, advanced to the left, and, protecting our staggering line, gave them time to recover themselves. All the Prussian and Russian cavalry fell upon him, but he received them in squares, and neutralized their efforts. But the arrival of our corps was urgently necessary, for those of the enemy were approaching, and already was seen Bulow's corps of 25,000 Prussians, in high spirits, emanating from the village of Niedergorsdorf, situated above Dennewitz. General Bulow, as at Gross-Beeren, anticipating the orders of Bernadotte, had marched with all haste, and the heads of his columns were appearing to our left, whilst on our rear could be seen neither Reynier nor Oudinot. Shortly the columns of Bulow, issuing from Niedergorsdorf, met the two battalions of the 13th, placed by Morand on an eminence to the left to support our line of battle. These two battalions stood firm, but, oppressed by numbers, they were forced to yield the ground on which they had been placed. Our artillery of twelve guns, placed a little to the rear and on higher ground, protected them by pouring a shower of grape upon the Prussians. Ney, changing his character of commander-in-chief for that of a commander of a division, took two battalions of the 8th, belonging to Morand's division, advanced them, and regained the ground which had been yielded by the two battalions of the 13th. At the same time he despatched officers in close succession to Reynier and Oudinot, to press on their arrival. The whole corps of Bulow deployed; but Morand's division, successively engaged, resisted all the forces of the enemy. Pressed by the floods of cavalry, they received them in squares, and surrounded themselves with a rampart of killed or dismounted enemies. Thus the combat was maintained by 15,000 men against nearly 40,000.

Commencing at mid-day, the struggle had continued with various success for three hours, without forcing us to relinquish the passage we had gained beyond the stream of Dennewitz. But the Russian and Swedish army was distinctly perceived advancing by forced marches upon the village of Golsdorf, on our left, on the other side of the river which we had crossed, and at right angles with that river. Bulow had already a detachment there, and if the progress of the enemy continued the communication might

be cut off between our troops actually engaged and those on the road. Reynier and Oudinot, imprudently left by Ney at too great a distance from Bertrand, though they heard the report of the guns, yet, having heard the same on the previous day, and being enveloped in a cloud of dust which prevented their seeing any object, did not feel themselves obliged to quicken their pace. Being warned at length, they had made more haste; and the 7th preceding the 12th, had in some degree diminished the inequality of forces under which the 4th corps had almost succumbed.

In accordance with the orders of Marshal Ney to form *en potence* upon our left, to check Bulow and to face the Swedes and Russians who were approaching, Reynier, delayed for a moment by the baggage of the 4th corps, pushed forward the French division on which he most depended, that of Durutte, and posted it to the rear of Dennewitz, on the other side of the river. This division, placed there upon a slight eminence, could make great use of their artillery, and they failed not to do so. Reynier directed Lecoc's Saxon division against Golsdorf, and kept in reserve his second Saxon division, that of Lestoc. Scarcely had these arrangements been executed, when General Durutte, moving to the point of the angle described by our line, stopped short the Prussians who were debouching from Niedergorsdorf. Again, Mellentin's brigade of Lestoc's division penetrated into Golsdorf, drove out the Prussians, and thus prevented the enemy establishing themselves on our left. In this manner the combat was maintained with vehemence in the midst of clouds of dust, which concealed every thing but the troops immediately in front.

Oudinot at length arrived, passed behind the corps which had preceded him, and perceiving the storm which threatened us on the left, on which side 40,000 Swedes and Russians were marching upon Golsdorf, placed two of his divisions behind Lestoc's Saxons, and kept the third in reserve. Owing to this reinforcement, it was still possible, should no accident occur, that the 50,000 soldiers of Ney should make head against the 80,000 enemies opposed to them, and reach Juterbock without any disaster.

But at this moment a combined effort of Tauenzien and of one-half of Bulow's force against Bertrand's corps, weakened by a protracted struggle, obliged the latter to fall back; and about four o'clock, having already lost more than 3,000 men, he gave ground, not by recrossing the stream of Dennewitz, but by moving a little to the right toward Rohrbeck, remaining always in advance of that stream. Ney, too much engrossed with what was immediately before him, and not sufficiently thinking of the whole features of the battle, feared lest Dennewitz should be exposed by Bertrand's movement, and ordered Reynier to place Durutte's division at Dennewitz. At the same time he ordered Oudinot to move from Golsdorf, where he supported the Saxons, to Rohrbeck, to form a reserve behind Bertrand. This was a double error, for our right, since Bertrand had approached Rohrbeck, was less in danger than our left, which had fallen back *en potence* and was threatened by the irruption of 40,000 enemies. General Durutte, on the order transmitted by

Reynier, left with one of his two brigades the good position which he held behind Dennewitz, passed the stream, and took possession of the mill of Dennewitz, which had been left by Bertrand. His second brigade, now left alone, was not sufficient to guard the point of our angle. At the same moment, Oudinot quitted the left side of that angle, where his support was indispensable, to move toward the right side. Then the Prussian division of Borstell, supported by a host of cavalry and by all the Russian and Swedish artillery, attacked Golsdorf and carried it from the Saxon brigade of Mellentin. Oudinot tried before retiring to aid the Saxons to recover Golsdorf, but, being obliged to continue his movement, he soon left them to themselves. The Saxons, who from a sense of honour had hitherto behaved well, but in whose hearts hatred was ever ready to silence the dictates of honour, believing themselves to be abandoned by the French in whose cause they were fighting, and seeing the Russians and Swedes advance before them, began to draw back. Certain perfidious alarmists, seeing the clouds of dust raised by Oudinot's troops in their movement from Golsdorf toward Rohrbeck, said that it arose from the enemy's cavalry who had turned the French army. At this report, the Saxons broke up notwithstanding all Reynier's efforts, deserted Golsdorf, left our left wholly exposed, and fell in confusion upon Oudinot, before whose ranks they passed. Unfortunately, all the parks and baggage were accumulated in the interior of the angle formed by our line of battle. A frightful confusion was thus produced, and a total rout in all directions. Nevertheless, Durutte's division, compelled to quit Dennewitz, retired in order; Oudinot, on whom the left had fallen back in confusion, stood firm; and Bertrand was able to repossess in safety, at the village of Rohrbeck, the much-disputed stream. However, the battle was lost, for the ground had been yielded, the Juterbock road was closed, and therefore the aim was missed. The plain was covered with 6000 or 7000 of our men, and with 8000 or 9000 of the enemy. But 10,000 or 12,000 of our soldiers, principally Saxons and Bavarians, flying with all speed, reported on the Elbe the rout and destruction of the French army. The disorder, much increased by the misfortune of a thick dust, was such that several Saxon battalions, hearing the sound of horses galloping around them, supposed them to be the French cavalry, and therefore did not assume the attitude of defence, nor did they discover their error till too late to form in square. Some were cut down, the greater number taken. To the latter it was deliverance rather than captivity, and their fidelity was more at fault than their courage, for they fought well till the moment when they could desert us to join the ranks to which their affections attracted them. During the evening and the next day, one-half of the Saxon corps, and at least an equal number of the Bavarian division, deserted. The Saxons, concealing themselves in the villages, easily regained their country, which was near at hand. The Bavarians hastened toward the Elbe to return to their country as marauders. It was no longer possible to fall back upon Wittenberg, which they had left seven or eight leagues to the left in the march upon Juterbock, and the only possible retreat was

Torgau, which they should find in their rear on returning to the Elbe. Marshal Ney, therefore, retired thither in good order, but after having lost about twenty guns, the horses having been killed, and more than 15,000 men, of whom at least one-half were deserters. He was reduced to about 32,000 fighting-men. The Italians, as usual, had remained faithful and had fought well. The Wurtembergians had kept their excellent military bearing. Among the deserters were only a very few young French soldiers, who still kept near the army, which, in those distant regions, was like their country.

On the 8th of September, Marshal Ney found himself collected with all his troops under the guns of Torgau. As might be expected, extreme bitterness prevailed among the different staffs. Ney complained of the slowness of Reynier and Oudinot, but especially of the feeble co-operation of Reynier, whose Saxon divisions had run away. Reynier, defending the Saxons, accused Marshal Ney of having himself compromised every thing by the false manœuvre of bringing Oudinot's divisions from left to right. Oudinot, the least bitter of the three, said that he had marched as quickly as he had been ordered, and threw the fault of his slowness on his chief, who, not foreseeing the battle, had not kept his corps sufficiently near to each other.

All that was true in these sad recriminations is manifest to every one from the preceding narrative. The rendezvous of Baruth assigned by Napoleon in a general manner, and too literally understood by Marshal Ney, who hastened to execute a dangerous and protracted flank movement, which was well performed the first day, not so well the second, and without sufficient precautions; the tardy arrival of the corps, imputable to the commander-in-chief, but also a little to the lieutenants, who ought on their side to have foreseen a battle, and to have believed its occurrence when they heard the cannonade; the annoying circumstance of the wind and dust, which placed an impenetrable cloud between the two armies; the ardour of Ney under fire, which led him to be absorbed in the command of a single corps instead of attending to the whole army; the unfortunate order given to Marshal Oudinot to quit the left for the right; and, finally, the inclination of the allies to disband; such were the causes of the loss of this battle, some of which were, no doubt, accidental, but the greater part depended on the general causes which we have so often intimated, and which threatened speedy ruin to our affairs.

Having reached Torgau, Ney found what he called a sort of hell. Besides the discontent of the soldiers and the recriminations of the commanders, the chaos of fugitives and the difficulty of obtaining provisions of all kinds, especially at the approach of the enemy almost at the gates of Torgau, he was also in fear of seeing the Saxons rise in insurrection. Little restrained by Reynier, whose ill humour made him their advocate, they loudly threatened defection. Orders had been given to bring cattle to the right bank of the Elbe to provision Torgau and the army. The Saxons not only refused, but seized a park which had been

brought together, and distributed the heads of the cattle to the Saxon peasants in the neighbourhood. From such an act of disobedience to an open revolt the step was not far. Nor was it surprising that in an army composed of such different elements, two battles lost in twelve days should have occasioned such a degree of demoralization: it would have been astonishing if it had been otherwise. Ney, as well as Macdonald and Oudinot, wrote to Napoleon, begging to be exonerated from the supreme command. "I prefer," he said, nobly, "to be a grenadier rather than a general on such conditions. I am ready to shed all my blood, provided it be for some profitable result."\* Supported by Torgau and the Elbe, he might prevent the passage of that river for some days, but not for long, at least without new succours, especially against the combination of forces which it was easy to foresee would be brought against that part of our line of defence.

While these events were occurring, Napoleon, having returned to Dresden on the evening of the 7th, had been summoned to Pirna on the morning of the 8th to Marshal Saint Cyr, to resist the Russians and Prussians, who seemed disposed to carry their attack to the extent of a really serious enterprise. Napoleon would have gladly had it so; but he could scarcely hope as much. His great military tact forbade him to believe that any serious operation would be undertaken against Dresden after the events of the 26th and 27th of August. He, therefore, believed in nothing more than a simple demonstration; yet he had left for Pirna with his Guard and part of his reserve cavalry, which had returned from Bautzen the same morning, and had repaired to Marshal Saint Cyr, to concert with him measures suited to this new occurrence.

The Russians and Prussians, not having perceived the Guard and the cavalry reserve, which always intimated the presence of the Emperor, had persisted in their offensive movement, and Saint Cyr, who, by retrograding, had reached the banks of the little river Muggeln, near Muggeln, determined not to re-pass it. That river, flowing from the mountains of

Bohemia, falls into the Elbe near Muggeln. By repassing it they would have finally abandoned the heights, and would have been wholly thrown back into the plain. Marshal Saint Cyr, in view of a speedy return on the offensive, had resolved to maintain himself beyond the Muggeln, the banks of which he had defended, while he remained at Dohna. Napoleon, having come on the spot on the morning of the 8th, far before the reinforcements which were following him, had thought, like Marshal Saint Cyr, that, with the certainty of speedy support, the 14th corps might march unbroken upon the enemy without leaving any reserve. Accordingly, three of the divisions of the 14th corps had immediately been formed into columns of attack, and had vigorously pushed the troops of Wittgenstein and Kleist from the lower to the higher ground. On our side, on the Peterswalde road, they had recovered the plateau of Gieshubel, and on the other, on the Furstenwalde road, they had driven the masses they had encountered in the direction of Liebstadt. However, the allies had fallen back without precipitation, and so as to leave some doubt of the attitude they would assume on the following day. Whether they would withdraw or would stand firm was a question which neither Napoleon nor Saint Cyr could as yet solve. Resolved to march vigorously on the enemy if he kept his ground the following day, they passed the evening together, and, in company with Murat and Berthier, made such a meal as war and the bivouac can afford.

At this moment—the evening of the 8th—an aide-de-camp brought the news of the battle lost at Dennewitz on the 6th. This was the fourth unfortunate event since the two great victories of Dresden,—those of the Katsbach, Gross-Beeren, Kulm, and Dennewitz,—without one redeeming success. The last, especially, was of the most serious import, for, besides the moral effect continually increasing with the series of misfortunes, it placed in danger the lower part of the Elbe, and threatened us with the sight of that river crossed upon our left, whilst the army of Bohemia, descending from the Erz-Gebirge on our right, should threaten to turn our flank, and join the corps which should have passed the Elbe at Wittenberg. Napoleon perceived immediately the drift of this event. Nevertheless, he remained calm, and, even to the maliciously observant eyes of Marshal Saint Cyr, displayed neither vexation nor irritation toward Marshal Ney. Certainly a moment of irritation would have been excusable; yet, in the frank intercourse of military men speaking of their profession, he seemed to regard the matter simply as a question of art. "Our profession is a very difficult one," he repeated, and, as if penetrated with the difficulties of that great art,—the greatest of all after that of government,—he reviewed, with admirable acumen, free from all severity, the errors committed in that short campaign of three days, beginning at Wittenberg and ending at Torgau. In these errors he saw only the difficulties inherent in the art of war, which he repeatedly declared to be singularly difficult and calling for great indulgence toward those who exercised it, and exhibited in himself a rare degree of equity, as

\* The following curious letter describes the situation better than can be done by any narrative.

"THE PRINCE OF THE MOSKOWA TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.

"WURTZEN, September 10, 1813.

"I consider it my duty to declare to your Serene Highness that it is impossible to derive any advantage from the 4th, 7th, and 12th *corps d'armée* in the present state of their organization. These corps are united by right, but certainly not in fact: each of the generals-in-chief does nearly what he judges most for his own safety. Things have come to such a pass that it is very difficult for me to keep my ground. The moral condition of the generals and the other officers is singularly shaken: the power of command is, therefore, very imperfect, and I had rather be a grenadier. I entreat you, my lord, to obtain from the Emperor that I should either be sole general-in-chief, having only under my orders generals of wing divisions, or that his majesty should deliver me from this hell. I think I need not speak of my devotion; I am ready to shed all my blood, provided it be with some profitable results. In the present state, the presence of the Emperor can alone restore unity, because all wills yield to his genius, and petty vanities disappear before the majesty of the throne.

"Your Serene Highness should also know that the foreign troops of all nations manifest the worst spirit, and that it is doubtful whether the cavalry with me is not more injurious than useful."

if warned by a superhuman instinct that the time was at hand when he should himself demand the same indulgence which he now claimed for his unsuccessful generals. Carried on by the excitement of conversation, in which he brilliantly excelled, he said that the generals had not exercised sufficient reflection: that, if he should ever find time, he would compose a book, in which he would teach the first principles of war, so as to render the application easy and plain to all, and he spoke of this project of writing some day as if he had foreseen that he should spend the last six years of his life in a cruel exile, compelled to write upon a rock of the ocean! Marshal Saint Cyr, whom the love of contradiction often rendered paradoxical, denied the existence of any military science or even experience, maintained that men were *born* generals but never *became* such; that generals gained little by growing old in the exercise of their profession, and that Napoleon himself had conducted his most glorious campaigns at the age of twenty-six years. Napoleon granted that unless generals were endowed by nature with certain faculties, experience profited them little, and then, plunging into the past, he exclaimed, "There was but one who gained as he grew old, by incessantly meditating on his profession,—viz., Turenne."

Thus, after the receipt of terrible news, which greatly changed his position, Napoleon passed the evening in discussing his art, and charming his hearers, some of whom were not very friendly to him. Wonderful man, who, without being naturally phlegmatic, was able, by the power of his mind, to tear himself from present affairs, to forget them, to disdain them, to judge them from the elevation of the eagle, which springs on vigorous wing from earth to soar to the regions of the heavens!

However, he indulged in no self-deceit, and, considering that in his vast empire every thing had been arranged in anticipation of conquest and nothing for defence, he determined to send to the minister of war an indirect order to occupy the fortresses on the Rhine. To write personally to the Duke of Feltré that he was beginning to doubt the possibility of maintaining himself in Germany, was a confession both painful and dangerous, for the emotion of the person who should receive such a communication might possibly lead to its being divulged. He, therefore, on the same evening, conceived the plan of addressing M. Clarke, the minister of war, through M. de Bassano, a letter in cipher in the following terms:—

"September 8, 1813.

"Events have become so urgent that, while they leave to his majesty excellent and even brilliant chances, it is, nevertheless, prudent to foresee the reverse. I, therefore, think it my duty, my dear duke, to explain myself confidentially to you.

"The Russian army is not our most dangerous enemy. It has experienced great losses; has not been reinforced; and except in respect to its cavalry, which is numerous, its part in the present struggle is subordinate. But Prussia has made great efforts. A high

degree of enthusiasm has favoured the cause pursued by the sovereign. Her armies are considerable, her generals, officers, and soldiers in high spirits. Yet Russia and Prussia would have presented feeble obstacles to our arms, had not the accession of Austria greatly complicated the question.

"Our army is still numerous and in good condition, notwithstanding the cost at which we have bought our victories. But the generals and officers, wearied with war, have no longer that momentum which had led to great actions. The theatre is too wide. The Emperor is conqueror whenever he is present; but he cannot be everywhere, and the isolated commanders correspond but little to his expectations. You know what has happened to General Vandamme. The Duke of Tarentum has met with checks in Silesia, and the Prince of the Moskowa has been beaten when marching upon Berlin.

"In such circumstances, my dear duke, with the genius of the Emperor we may still hope. But it is also possible that our affairs may be unfavourably influenced by opposite chances. We must not fear this extravagantly, but we ought to regard it as possible, and neglect nothing which prudence may dictate.

"I give you this description that you may know every thing and be able to act accordingly.

"It will be well to see that the fortresses are all put in good condition and well supplied with artillery, for in the present war we often meet with considerable losses. Also, communicate secretly with the commissary-general, that the fortresses on the Rhine may be supplied with extraordinary provisions; and, finally, to prepare beforehand whatever is necessary, that in any extraordinary circumstance his majesty may not experience any new difficulties, and that you may not be found unprepared. You perceive that, if I write thus, it is because I have well reflected on what I see, and that I am assured that I do nothing which his majesty will disapprove. Some great instance of success may change every thing, and restore affairs to the prosperous position in which they had been placed by the immense advantages gained by his majesty.

"Acknowledge, if you please, the receipt of this letter."

On the following day, the 9th, Napoleon repaired early to the ground, to inspect personally the movements of the enemy, and to make his arrangements accordingly. He had in hand the first corps, recently reorganised by Count Lobau, and posted before Lobau on the Peterswalde road,—the 14th, under Marshal Saint Cyr, drawn up before Dahn on the Furstenwalde road. A little to the rear, at Mugeln, in a good position for action, he had three divisions of the Young Guard under Marshal Mortier, and the light cavalry of the guard under Lefebvre-Desnoettes. The rest of the Young Guard, the Old Guard, Marmont's corps, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, were at Dreden to prepare for unforeseen accidents. At some distance to the right, a few leagues on the Freyburg road, Marshal Victor with his corps d'armée watched



the passages from Bohemia leading to Leipzig. The first and fourteen corps, and the three divisions of the Young Guard, might amount to about 55,000 men,—a sufficient force to crush the enemy before them, especially if they had known that the Austrians had committed the error of retrograding in Bohemia as far as Tetschen and Leitmeritz and that only Wittgenstein and Kleist were before them. But it was impossible to know this with certainty, and when the Austrians were not to be seen, they could only ask themselves where they could be. Besides, Kleist and Wittgenstein showed a firm aspect, and appeared in no degree disposed to sound a retreat.

They were then at Zehist and at Dohna, on two roads at once,—on one side that of Peterswalde, which passes by Zehist, Gieshubel, and Peterswalde, a new, broad road, everywhere suitable for artillery,—and on the other that of Liebstadt, passing by Furstenwalde, an old road, practicable for artillery only as far as Furstenwalde, and from that point crossing the high mountain of the Geyersberg by paths inaccessible to heavy wagons. This latter road is that which Kleist had followed on the fatal day of Kulm as far as Furstenwalde, and which he had then quitted to reach the Peterswalde road by a *détour* to the left, and to fall unawares upon Kulm. Marshal Saint Cyr, who understood as well as any one the art of taking advantage of the ground, proposed to take the old Bohemian road, moving rapidly with the 14th corps and the Young Guard upon Liebstadt and Furstenwalde, then to throw himself upon the flank of the enemy's column, which had taken the Peterswalde road, thus to cut off some part of that column, and, having reached Furstenwalde, to cross the Geyersberg and intercept the retreat of the enemy toward Bohemia. With a vigorous effort, and plenty of sappers, he thought they should be able to clear a way for the artillery, and reach the reverse of the Geyersberg—i.e. the rear of the enemy—with a sufficient quantity of guns.

Napoleon immediately approved this ingenious plan, though he was not sure of being able to pass the Geyersberg with the artillery; but in any case they had more chance of annoying the enemy by keeping on their flank than by attacking them directly on the high-road to Peterswalde. Consequently, while Count Lobau, with the first corps, was advancing from Zehist to Gieshubel, from Gieshubel to Peterswalde, pressing upon the enemy in front, Napoleon, keeping in person near Saint Cyr's column, advanced laterally, at quick pace, with the 14th corps and the Young Guard. Thus they marched during the whole of the 9th.

Kleist and Wittgenstein, without having perceived the reinforcements brought by Napoleon, had recognised his presence by the mere aspect of the troops, and had immediately begun a retreat. But they fell back without haste, and Napoleon, marching parallel to them on the old Bohemian road, always saw them on his flank, and though he was not sufficiently in advance to divide them by throwing himself from one road to the other, he hoped to take them in the rear the next day, if he should be able to cross the mountains with his artillery.

They bivouacked on the evening of the 9th at Furstenwalde.

On the morning of the next day, September 10, they went by Ebersdorf toward a ridge, from which might be seen the sad theatre of the events at Kulm. To the right were the heights of the Geyersberg, to the left those of the Nollenberg, along which was stretched the high-road of Peterswalde into Bohemia. Napoleon crossed this ridge accompanied by Marshal Saint Cyr and his light troops, and saw at some distance on his left the enemy's troops hastening to recross the mountains, and in danger of being prevented doing so if our army could cross the ridge with adequate artillery. Then, by taking up a good position on one of the heights commanding the road, they might compel the enemy to make a disastrous retreat by scarcely practicable roads, and thus avenge themselves signally for Kulm.

The artillery, full of ardour, bravely ventured among the rocks. Soldiers and sappers set to work, but were unable to hoist their guns to the top of the ridge, and the artillery was thus found to be impeded by insurmountable obstacles, which could not be overcome in less than twenty-four hours, during which the enemy would have defied unbroken. By not crossing the Geyersberg till the following day, or by taking a *détour* to the left to regain the Peterswalde road, it would have been possible, indeed, to press the Russians and Prussians sufficiently close to reach them, and boldly to attack them, if we had known that they were separated from the Austrians. But this plan involved chances which prudence forbade to encounter. In fact, the absence of the Austrians was merely conjectured. They had not been seen on that side of the mountains, but they might be on the other, and it would not be prudent to attack 180,000 men with 55,000. Even without the Austrians, Kleist and Wittgenstein should have nearly 70,000 men, including the Russian and Prussian guards left on the other side of the mountains, and though with 55,000 men well positioned they might cause them much damage, it was not prudent to descend into the plain after them, especially when several grave reasons recalled them to Dresden, such as the lost battle of Dennewitz, a new aggressive movement of Blücher against Macdonald, and, finally, the appearance of many parties on the roads from Bohemia into Saxony. As soon as it was found impossible to cross the Geyersberg in two hours, in order to cross the high-road, there was no useful attempt to be made, and Napoleon, who seized all the aspects of the position at a glance, lost no time in coming to a decision, but resolved instantly to halt. But as he was continually annoyed by the reiterated reports of the irruption of parties into Saxony, he determined that his troops should remain in position, Marshal Saint Cyr at the Geyersberg, Count Lobau at Nollenberg, each at the outlet of the mountains. He intended, if these parties were merely the forerunners of more considerable corps about to make an attack upon Leipzig, which he had always thought probable, to detain them some days by intimidating them by his presence above Kulm, which would give him time to make arrangements adapted to this new danger.

Consequently, on these rocky heights, where the sappers and the soldiers were exhausting themselves in useless efforts to convey the artillery, Napoleon took Marshal Saint Cyr apart, and declared to him that he renounced the attempt, without communicating all his motives, too numerous to be detailed, and scarcely good enough to be fully revealed. He ordered him to remain at least two days in a threatening position above Tœplitz, and then left the marshal much surprised, and displeased at the relinquishment of a project with which he was much charmed and from which he expected great results.\* Napoleon went by Breitenau to Hollendorf, to give the same instructions to Count Lobau, enjoining him to maintain a threatening attitude at the outlet of the mountains, and then returned to spend the night at Breitenau. He devoted the 11th to revisiting all the positions of that country, both on the plateau of Pirna and on that of Gieshubel, and returned to Dresden on the 12th.

His situation now called for serious reflection, and was indeed not free from anxiety. The plan adopted at Trachenberg, of marching against him in a body, retiring whenever he was present in person, and advancing only against his lieutenants,—thus exhausting him by useless movements, and, when they had sufficiently weakened him, endeavouring to surround and crush him,—this plan, which required a condition perfectly realized on the present occasion,—viz., combined and persevering efforts, and resignation to any amount of loss,—was now but too evident, and was carried out with fatal constancy. Napoleon perceived this with singular acumen, and, without being discouraged, he clearly saw forming around him the iron circle in which it was sought to enclose him. Four battles had been

lost when he had been absent, by errors which we have pointed out,—errors accidentally attaching to his lieutenants, fundamentally to himself. These battles of the Katzbach, Gross-Beeren, Kulm, and Dennewitz had more than counterbalanced the victory of Dresden: Napoleon, wishing to remedy the evil, had to no purpose hastened some days before to Gœrlitz, and now to Peterswalde, and he had continually lost the opportunity of a decided battle by means of which he hoped to repair all. This situation disclosed the only defect of his plan of a concentric war around Dresden, that of having too far extended the radius,—of having carried it to the left as far as Berlin, in front as far as Lowenberg, whilst on the right he was forced to carry it as far as Peterswalde,—which caused him to be too distant from his lieutenants to direct and succor them and gave rise to the necessity of executing expeditions which wasted his own time and the strength and courage of his young soldiers. This defect Napoleon now perceived, and under the force of evidence, and the bad state of his troops, he formed the design of bringing his lieutenants nearer to himself. In this intention he returned to Dresden, and in accordance with it were devised and issued his new orders.

Napoleon on the resumption of hostilities had about 360,000 active troops upon the Elbe, from Dresden to Hamburg, exclusive of the garrisons of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, the corps of Augereau destined to Bavaria, and that of Prince Eugene devoted to Italy. After the events just recorded there remained scarcely 250,000. Instead of 80,000 men, Macdonald, with the 11th, 3d, and 5th corps, could not muster more than 50,000, and with Poniatowski 60,000. Instead of 70,000 Oudinot's corps, transferred to Ney, retained no more than 32,000. The cavalry had lost many men and horses in their continual excursions. The corps remaining around Dresden had also suffered loss, less considerable it is true, because they had not been affected by desertion, the most serious result of defeat, yet by no means insignificant, and the sum total of our troops, including Davout's corps, did not exceed 250,000 men, who represented our whole disposable forces from Dresden to Hamburg. Here, then, was a loss of more than 100,000 men by war, fatigue, and desertion.—a desertion which was very great among the allies, and though much less and of a different character among the French, yet not inconsiderable. The allies either went over to the enemy or fled to their homes disguised as peasants,—as the Saxons and Bavarians: the French never went to the enemy, and only sought in small numbers to reach the Rhine, though some marauders were perceived on the road to Mentz, but they wandered without arms about the army, consuming the resources of the villages where they found shelter. This sad disposition to leave their ranks, which had been developed to a disastrous extent in the army of Russia by fatigue, cold, and especially hunger, began to reappear in our army of Germany to an alarming degree, and every new march, every uncertain event, especially every defeat, aggravated it greatly. The attention of Napoleon was remarkably awake to this fact,

\* Here again our anxiety to state the exact truth leads us to quote a passage from the Memoirs of Marshal Saint Cyr, who, retracing in his own way the facts we have related. (Memoirs, vol. iv. p. 157, and following,) mentions with astonishment and vexation the sudden change of determination in Napoleon, and deploras his not finding in him on that day the great man whom St. Bernard could neither intimidate nor arrest. If it were true, which it is not, that in these last campaigns the greatness was wanting which was exhibited at Rivoli and Marengo, it was not on this occasion. In the first place, there were facts which Saint Cyr exaggerated, and others of which he was ignorant. He pretends that it was easy to render practicable the passage of the Geyersberg: but a letter from Napoleon to M. de Bassano, which, fortunately for history, gives an account of this circumstance, positively asserts that it was impossible to clear the road, and certainly the interest and inclination of Napoleon were both so much involved in the operation, that, if it had been possible, (within the necessary time,) he would not have failed to make the attempt. The marshal, again, dwells much upon the error of not having availed himself of the absence of the Austrians to overwhelm Kleist and Wittgenstein: but this absence, though suspected by him, but not known at the time, and little to be presumed, has only been made unquestionable since numerous historical publications, and the judgment of the marshal is, therefore, merely a judgment after the fact, and rests upon data inexact in reference to the circumstances of the moment. Finally, the marshal was ignorant of all that Napoleon had just learned, but had not communicated to him, of the situation of Macdonald and Ney, and of the appearance of parties in Saxony, which was a source of anxiety and admitted of a variety of interpretations. The marshal has, therefore, passed an erroneous judgment, from want of knowing all the facts, or of being able to interpret them equitably: and this difference of opinion between two men present at the same spot, and at the same time, and both very competent, is a *fiat-hoc* proof of the difficulty of correctly estimating events of this nature, and, consequently, of writing history with perfect truth.

and, among other cares, he was much occupied with that of procuring provisions, which were becoming scarce, so many thousand men had been living around Dresden in a radius of twenty-five leagues since the month of May.

Such were the reflections which occupied Napoleon on his return to Dresden, and which found little consolation in the evils experienced by the enemy. The losses they had incurred were to be ascribed to the battle-field, and not to desertion or privation. An unheard-of ardour among the Germans brought forward every moment new soldiers by voluntary levies; great efforts on the part of the Russian Government had procured for them the recruits which had been long expected. An army of reserve was spoken of, from Poland, under General Benningsen; and the Austrians, whose ranks had been much thinned at Dresden, had been compensated by the completion of their preparations, which had not been terminated at the renewal of hostilities. Provisions were abundant with them, owing to contributions from the population, to the British subsidies, and to a paper money whose credit was maintained by a universal good will. Also, the coalition, far from having fewer soldiers than they had hoped, had more. Instead of falling below 500,000 men, their effective force nearly amounted to 600,000. Against this formidable mass Napoleon was to stand with 250,000, (220,000 deducting Davout's corps, which had been sent to Hamburg,) young, somewhat fatigued, already worse fed than at the beginning of the campaign, confounded though not discouraged by several consecutive checks, but, though less confident of the good fortune of their chief, still exercising unshaken faith in his genius.

Napoleon, without as yet thinking of evacuating the Elbe for the Rhine, a sacrifice which could hardly be expected of him, nor yet of placing the centre of his operations at Berlin, a vast project, already rendered impracticable by the loss of two battles on the road to that capital, resolved only to narrow his position around Dresden, and to concentrate himself there so as to have a shorter distance to traverse when he should go to any point of his circumference, and to be able, by narrowing the circle he had to protect, to keep in hand a stronger reserve.

Marshal Macdonald had been constrained to leave the Spree and Bautzen by a movement of Blucher made with the view of throwing back Poniatowski from Zittau to Rumburg. He had placed himself before Dresden, along the small river Wessnitz, which flows transversely toward that capital in numerous windings and a little to the right falls into the Elbe on a level with Pirna. Along this river, or a little in the rear, Napoleon established Marshal Macdonald with his former corps and Poniatowski, Poniatowski's (8th) at Stolpen, Lauriston's (5th) at Drobnitz, Gerard's (11th) at Schmiedefeld, Souham's (3d) at Radeberg. He could receive tidings from them in an hour, in two hours be at their head, and in six hours send 40,000 men of the Guard to the aid of any of them that might be attacked.

Napoleon further applied himself to connect the position of Macdonald beyond the Elbe

with that of Saint Cyr on the other side; and nothing can equal the skill and depth of calculation with which he disposed every thing conformably to this new aim. In the first place, he was unwilling to be obliged to run at every alternation of this game of see-saw which the enemy continued to play, a course at once fatiguing and ridiculous, and he took such measures that the enemy, if they should again descend from Peterswalde to Pirna, should be obliged to carry extremely strong positions, and, therefore, to engage in earnest, in which case it would be worth his while to make some movement to meet them. Consequently, Napoleon intrenched all the points of access of the two plateaux of Pirna and Gieshubel, upon which the enemy must necessarily debouche in coming from Peterswalde. The plateau of Pirna, superior to that of Gieshubel, was accessible toward Langen-Hennersdorf. Napoleon ordered the construction of several redoubts at that spot, and placed there the 42d division (Mouton-Duvernets) of Saint Cyr's corps, which at the same time guarded the two forts of Lilienstein and Konigstein on the Elbe. The plateau of Gieshubel was crossed by the road from Peterswalde to Gieshubel; Napoleon constructed in that place, also, numerous redoubts, and sent thither the three divisions of the first corps under Count Lobau. For the sake of unity, the 42d, separated from the 14th corps to which it belonged, was ranged under the orders of Count Lobau, and Count Lobau himself under those of Marshal Saint Cyr, which placed every thing in the hands of the latter. In the case of the two plateaux being forced toward their outer border, Napoleon intrenched the castle of Sonnenstein at the extremity of the plateau of Pirna, and the Kohlberg at the extremity of that of Gieshubel, so that the enemy should be obliged to carry a second line of defensive works. Lastly, to the right of these two positions, opposite the old road of Toplitz which leads to Borna by Liebstadt, Napoleon posted Marshal Saint Cyr with the other three divisions of the 14th corps, and ordered him to raise redoubts armed with a powerful artillery, so that any fresh attempt upon these redoubts, well intrenched and defended by seven divisions, should no longer be a counterfeit.

To these seven divisions he also prepared a reserve, consisting of two divisions of the Young Guard established in the town of Pirna. The rest of the Young Guard, and all the Old, remained as usual in Dresden. Nor was he content with these precautions. By a most skilful calculation he wished to create a secret and unknown link between the two positions of Macdonald on one side of the Elbe and Saint Cyr on the other. There were, as we have seen, two bridges between the forts of Konigstein and Lilienstein; he formed a third at Pirna, so that the Young Guard and a portion of Saint Cyr's corps might be able to pass the Elbe unawares, and fall upon the left of the enemy who should attack Macdonald, while Poniatowski, on his side, with a portion of Macdonald's forces, should fall upon the right of the enemy who should attack Saint Cyr. Owing to these combinations, Napoleon might hope to have no more excursions, or, at least,

were at a pure loss, against corps which amused themselves by annoying him without any intention of fighting in earnest.

Marshal Victor was to remain at Freyberg, whence he could observe the other passages which, still farther in the rear of Dresden, allowed the enemy to march upon Leipsic by the road from Commotau to Chemnitz. At Freyberg he did not perfectly intercept that road, but it was easy for him to go thither in one or two marches, and at the same time he was not sufficiently in advance to be unable to draw back as far as the position of Marshal Saint Cyr, if the enemy should debouche by Torpitz upon Peterswalde or Altenberg.

With respect to the parties, of whom a good many were seen not only on the high-road from Commotau to Leipsic, but even on that from Carlsbad to Zwickau, Napoleon occupied himself in sending a certain amount of cavalry in pursuit of them, to drive them off if they were merely parties despatched at a venture, and to discover their destination if they were the vanguard of an enemy marching upon Leipsic. From Dresden he despatched Lefebvre-Desnoette, and caused him to fall back upon Leipsic with 3000 light cavalry. That brave general was to receive as a temporary loan the light cavalry of Marshal Victor, which was at Freyberg, that of Marshal Ney, who had approached much nearer since the battle of Dennewitz, to borrow 2000 infantry from General Margaron, who had at Leipsic many marching battalions, and with these combined forces to pour down upon the parties which infested Saxony and which had cut off some of our convoys. These parties seemed to be under the direction of the Saxon General Thielmann, the same who had passed over to the enemy some months before, and who, with the Austrian light infantry and Platow's Cossacks, was attempting at once to cut off our communications and to rouse Saxony to insurrection in our rear. Lefebvre-Desnoette, with 7000 or 8000 horse and 2000 foot, was ordered to pursue him without intermission. And, finally, Napoleon gave the following orders in relation to Marshal Ney, who, at the time, had fallen back upon Torgau. First, in order to give more unity to his army, he had decreed the dissolution of the 12th corps specially commanded by Marshal Oudinot, and had recalled that marshal to himself. He had then divided the two French divisions of that corps between the 4th and 7th, to give greater consistence to these last, and had devoted what remained of the Bavarian division to the escort of the great parks, for that division could no longer be employed safely before the enemy. He had made up to Marshal Ney for the 3000 or 4000 men lost by this new distribution, by assigning to him the excellent Polish division of Dombrowski, whose past conduct had been distinguished by heroism which their future conduct was not to disgrace. They had formed part of the active division of Magdeburg, which had left that fort under General Gerard and was now condemned to inaction for an indefinite period. Marshal Ney, reinforced a little in numbers, and considerably in the quality of his troops, having now only lieutenant-generals under his orders, was established between Torgau and Wittenberg, to arrest, or at least greatly annoy, the first corps of the enemy that

should cross the Elbe. Reckoning about 35,000 men, among whom there were of Germans only a few thousand Saxons well surrounded, he certainly could not resist a great army determined to cross the Elbe; but he might dispute the passage till the arrival of aid, which was easy, since Napoleon had so skilfully, though so tardily, concentrated his forces around Dresden. Napoleon adopted a temporary measure to secure to Marshal Ney the succour he might require, a measure, like all the rest, so combined as to provide for several objects at once. He placed Marshal Marmont with 18,000 infantry, and General Latour-Maubourg with 6000 cavalry, at Grossenhayn, a little beyond the Elbe and halfway between Dresden and Torgau. These 24,000 men, besides being ready to support Marshal Ney, were to protect the navigation from Hamburg to Dresden, save the victorious enemy on our left were approaching the banks of the Elbe. But it should be remembered that our principal supply of provisions was derived from Hamburg. That town had redeemed itself by means of a contribution of 50,000,000 francs, paid in great part by corn, rice, salt meat, spirits, leather, and horses. Part of this provision had been sent as far as Dresden and was consumed. Part remained at Torgau, of which there was already need, for notwithstanding the constant cares of M. Daru, and the skill he displayed in the support of the army, he had difficulty in finding adequate supplies, especially since his hands intercepted the roads from Leipsic to Dresden and prevented the completion of bargains with the inhabitants. The corps stationed at Grossenhayn was, therefore, to secure the arrivals by the Elbe, as well as the discharge of the sick and wounded into Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg, as Napoleon had ordered.

Such were the arrangements of Napoleon on his return to Dresden, about the middle of September. With four corps combined under Macdonald before the Elbe, with those of Lobau, Saint Cyr, and Victor behind that river, all supported by good intrenchments and communicating by several bridges; with Ney guarding the Lower Elbe in the neighbourhood of Torgau; with Marmont and Latour-Maubourg placed between Torgau and Dresden to protect the arrivals by the river and to flank Macdonald, or to descend to the help of Ney, finally, with all the Guard concentrated at Dresden, and ready to furnish an aid of 40,000 men to any of our generals who should be in danger, without reckoning 7000 or 8000 horse in our rear in pursuit of the bands, Napoleon thought he had sufficiently contracted his position, and even flattered himself that when the provisions should arrive he should be able to pass the winter there without being obliged to exhaust himself by useless expeditions after counterfeit demonstrations. He hoped henceforward to be obliged to move only in consequence of serious attempts, which would repay the trouble they would occasion. In this new position there was only one great inconvenience, viz., the probable loss of the fortresses on the Oder and Vistula, whose numerous garrisons, blockaded for more than eight months, would certainly not hold out beyond the autumn. These garrisons, neglected in the hope of re-

turning upon the Vistula after gaining a battle, were made a sacrifice to the chimerical desire of restoring his greatness in a single day. Napoleon no longer reckoned upon this, and he saw with regret the sacrifice of those excellent troops; but the evil was unavoidable, and for the present he thought only of maintaining himself upon the Elbe, which, as long as he remained there, was a source of confidence to those garrisons and a reason for perseverance in their resistance. And, after all, it was not impossible that after some instances of success a further armistice should be obtained, which should involve, as an essential condition, the revictualling of the fortresses of the Oder and Vistula.

Whilst at Dresden, absorbed in these thoughts, a new act of the enemy suddenly recalled him toward Pirna. The Austrians had withdrawn for a moment from the Russians and Prussians, only to reorganize themselves a little in the rear of the theatre of war, and to parry any attempt upon Prague, which they had reason to fear when they saw Napoleon march toward Bautzen and Górlitz, as he had done on the 4th and 5th of September. Reassured upon this point by his return to Dresden, recovered from the rude shock of the 26th and 27th of August, they had returned to Toplitz, well aware that it was a serious error to leave Kleist and Wittgenstein alone before the main body of the French army. Scarcely had Wittgenstein known of their return, than, on the morning of September 13, he resolved to recross the mountains and to appear again before the camps of Pirna and Gieshubel. It required no great effort to attract the Prussian Kleist, and they both returned to the charge against Saint Cyr and Lobau, especially the latter. Unfortunately the works ordered by Napoleon on the 11th at Langen-Hennersdorf, Gieshubel, and Borna could not be executed by the 13th, and Count Lobau was obliged to fall back upon Gieshubel, as had been done so frequently before. Though little inclined to it, and though he expected no result from it, Napoleon was constrained to effect a new movement toward the mountains of Bohemia, to throw back once more behind those mountains the annoying and indefatigable visitors. Having also retained part of the Guard at Pirna, he had merely to displace himself, whom he was little apt to spare, and he returned with the vain hope, which he indulged but little, but of which he could not absolutely divest his mind, of thoroughly punishing the vexatious enemy which he had on his right and already a little on his rear. Eagerly desiring a grand battle, which alone could change his situation, he unconsciously indulged the hope of obtaining one whenever the enemy approached.

On the 15th, therefore, placing himself at the head of his troops, he drove the enemy from Gieshubel to Peterswalde in great disorder. But the only result of this movement was a few hundred men taken or disabled. The enemy still remained proudly before the defiles of Hollendorf, at the foot of the ridge which separates Saxony from Bohemia. Earnestly did he wish that they would remain as confident on the next day; but he scarcely hoped it. The following day, the 16th of September, notwithstanding very severe weather, Napoleon resumed his march toward the defile of Hollendorf, while,

on his right, Marshal Saint Cyr moved from Furstenwalde toward the ridge of the Geyersberg, which they had been unable to cross on the 10th. They briskly pursued the Russians and Prussians, and, having crossed the passes, the red lancers of the Guard, pouring down upon them full charge, pierced or took a good number. In one of these charges Colonel Blücher, son of the general of that name, fell into our hands, with many lance-wounds. He was treated with much respect, and from his language it might be learned that the allies were kept united by necessity rather than by affection and confidence. The sentiment which formed their bond of union was of little import, if it sufficed to preserve unanimity for one or two campaigns. At the end of the day they reached the neighbourhood of Kulm, and found all the army of Bohemia established in strong positions, which it was difficult to attack successfully. They mustered 120,000 men since the return of the Austrians, and Napoleon had no more than 60,000. It would have been necessary to strip the banks of the Elbe to bring any more, and the occasion did not warrant the exposure of important points in his line.

He employed the morning of the next day, the 17th, in cannonading the Russians with some effect; but he was compelled to withdraw by a frightful storm of rain, hail, and snow, which caused great suffering to the soldiers. He repassed the chain of mountains, bid a final adieu to the plains of Bohemia, and took up his position at Pirna, near the bridge which he had secretly constructed, that the enemy might have no idea of the mass of forces which in a few hours might issue upon either bank. Here he mustered all the Guards, and kept on the alert, ready to seize the opportunity of leading 40,000 men to the aid of Macdonald or Saint Cyr if a serious attempt should be made on either side of the Upper Elbe. At this moment Marshal Macdonald observed unusual movements among the enemy. It appeared as if on one side new troops were ascending from left to right, to enter Bohemia by the pass of Zittau, and, on the other, troops were passing from right to left, leaving Blücher to join Bernadotte. Yet, as the most serious events seemed about to take place on the front of Macdonald, Napoleon thought fit to remain in his position at Pirna. If, indeed, it should be necessary to pour down upon assailants attacking Macdonald, he preferred crossing the Elbe at Pirna or Königstein rather than at Dresden, for, besides saving the march to his troops, he would thus take in flank and in the rear the enemy who would have attacked in front the position at Dresden. Moreover, by remaining at Pirna with all the Guard, he retained the power of easily falling back upon the flank of the column which should return to annoy Count Lobau at Gieshubel. Finally, by his presence he accelerated and directed the works ordered at these different points. It was, therefore, impossible to take a better position or to combine his operations more skilfully. But these wise manœuvres did not prevent the war from being sadly protracted, nor the young soldiers being fatigued beyond their age, nor the delay of those decisive actions to which Napoleon had rendered France and Europe familiar, and which he required to maintain the morale of his army and to disconcert the ever-growing

hatred of his enemies. Accordingly, he was vexed, though not discouraged, and he heard numerous criticisms even among his own officers, who, instead of boldly condemning his rash ambition, blamed unjustly his admirable tactics, which were perfect in themselves, or, if ever at fault, were so in virtue of his policy. The idea most prevalent in the staff was that he ought to have taken position on the Saale, a line which, as we have said, could not have been defended for more than eight days, and toward which they could not retrograde without immediately falling back upon the Rhine, which would have implied the abandonment of all the pretensions for continuing the war. It is forever to be regretted that those pretensions had not been abandoned two months before; but it was now almost impracticable. To have relinquished the military position on the Elbe would have been difficult, would have involved the immediate retreat upon the Rhine, with the sacrifice of all that was left upon the Vistula, the Oder, and perhaps the Elbe, i.e. with the sacrifice of 120,000 men, and 80,000 sick, with the chance of demoralizing the army, and of losing some great battle while retreating. If this were to be done, it would have been better to have abandoned that line politically, by offering immediately to renew negotiations on the basis of abandoning Germany; but would the allies, in their intoxication of hope, have consented to this at the time? This was not likely. The error, then, of having remained on the Elbe, not for the sake of the Elbe itself, but of all that which they professed to defend there, almost condemned them to the necessity of remaining there to the last extremity. Moreover, Napoleon was far from thinking himself reduced to such an extreme measure. He always contemplated either a little see-saw war, in which he was well resolved no longer to fatigue his soldiers, and which would allow him to reach the winter in safety, or a considerable enterprise on his rear, originating from Bohemia on the Lower Elbe, which would involve a decisive battle. The latter alternative was that which he most willingly anticipated, and which, indeed, was the most shortly to be realized, but on conditions different from those which he had always hoped.

In fact, the allies had determined to close the campaign with a direct encounter with Napoleon. Their tactic of avoiding him and falling upon his lieutenants could not last forever, and it had already sufficed to reduce him to such a numerical inferiority that they were nearly double his number, and were soon to be nearly in the proportion of three to one. But they must have recourse to it till the period, at once feared and desired, when they should be able to fall upon him *en masse* to overwhelm him. To desire this was easy enough, especially as the season was advancing; but to execute it was not equally so. The grand army of Bohemia, much the strongest and best formed, almost restored by Kulm from the shock received under the walls of Dresden, influenced by the presence of sovereigns impatient for a result, was disposed to attempt a new descent from Bohemia into Saxony, on the rear of Napoleon, but not so near, and they had reverted to the former idea of marching upon Leipzig by Chemnitz and Chiemnitz. The numerous bands despatched under Thielmann and Platow, between the El-

ter and the Saale, were like forerunners to clear their roads. Yet, as they were to undertake so vast an enterprise, which should involve a mortal encounter with Napoleon, they could have wished that two of the three armies should march in combination,—those of Silesia and Bohemia, for instance. For this end, they could have wished that the Russian army of reserve, ready for a long time in Poland under General Benningesen, and actually at Breslau, should take the place of Blücher before Dresden, that this latter, taking the opportunity of escaping, should proceed by Zittau to effect his junction in Bohemia with Schwarzenberg's army, and that all together should march upon Leipzig. On this condition only would the grand staff of the three sovereigns indulge the idea of risking a second battle of Dresden, but in this case at Leipzig.

It will readily be believed that the desire of terminating the present campaign by a speedy decisive result would be specially urgent in the mind of Blücher and his friends. Proud of having driven the French from the Bober to the Elbe, they burned with the desire of an issue, and were ready to brave any thing to attain it. Early in September Blücher had sent a confidential person into Bohemia, to sound the Prussian officers who surrounded the king, and to excite in them the idea of a grand operation on the rear of Napoleon. That emissary had found them much disposed to make an end, and occupied with the idea we have stated of transporting Blücher himself into Bohemia, to descend upon Leipzig with the two armies of Silesia and Bohemia combined. But Blücher and his friends of the Tugend-Bund, by whom he was surrounded, had too much taste for independence to place themselves willingly under the direct authority of the staff of the sovereigns; and they had still better reasons than their love of independence for resisting the proposal. It was, indeed, difficult for the army of Silesia to conceal sufficiently their march from Napoleon to allow of their re-entering Bohemia, crossing the mountains, and skirting their foot as far as Tœplitz, without bringing upon themselves some heavy blow. However, as it was necessary, sooner or later, that Blücher, unless he wished uselessly to dally before Dresden, should execute a daring manœuvre either on the Lower Elbe or on the Upper, the reason assigned was not unanswerable. A still more powerful one was assigned by the staff of Silesia, which it was not easy to answer. The news received of the army of the North was far from satisfactory. The Russian and Prussian generals, but especially the Prussian, placed under the Prince of Sweden, complained of his inaction during the battles of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz. They accused him formally either of prudence approaching to weakness, or of unfaithfulness approaching to treason. They maintained that on those two occasions he had left every thing to the Prussian generals; that, although knowing them to be in difficulty, he had used little haste to extricate them; that when able to destroy the French army he had either not wished or not dared to do so. The last supposition was the true one. He had trembled to risk his false renown, and his excessive prudence had thus called into doubt his military energy or his loyalty. At this moment, though he had before him only Sax, reduced to 36,000 men, he remained sitting under

the guns of Magdeburg, and professed to make preparations for passing the Elbe, which he had no intention of following up by action. Consequently, Blücher said that if the army of Silesia was to be displaced to make it co-operate with that of Bohemia or of the North, it would be better to unite it with the latter, which would certainly not act unless influenced and stimulated by another. He, therefore, proposed, instead of going to Bohemia, to send thither Benningsen's army, which, entering by Zittau, protected by himself during this march, would have nothing to fear, and would join without any danger Prince Schwarzenberg at Töplitz. He offered, on the termination of this movement, to execute a feint upon the intrenched camp of Dresden, then to leave in his place some troops of cavalry to deceive the French, to descend with 60,000 men upon the Lower Elbe, to force Bernadotte to pass that river near Wittenberg, then to ascend with him the course of the Mulda as far as Leipzig at the head of 120,000 or 130,000 men, whilst Prince Schwarzenberg, strengthened by Benningsen, should descend thither with more than 200,000. Thus they would have at least 320,000 men in the rear of Napoleon, and would compel him to a general battle, disastrous to him if lost, and nearly secure to the sovereigns with their great numerical superiority.

This plan, which, without any great depth of conception, possessed considerable chance of success in the power of numbers and the passions of the allies, appeared, with reason, very preferable to that conceived in Bohemia, and, the ardent desire of a common triumph silencing all dictates of selfishness, it was adopted. It was, consequently, agreed that General Benningsen with his army of reserve, which comprised about 50,000 men and had already crossed Silesia, should march toward the defile of Zittau, which was no longer guarded by Poniatowski, should penetrate into Bohemia, pass the Upper Elbe, under protection of the mountains, between Leitmeritz and Tetschen, and join Prince Schwarzenberg at Töplitz; that the latter, who should then have about 200,000 men, should begin his march, and, merely masking the defile of Peterswalde, should debouche in Saxony by Commotau upon Chemnitz; that at the same time Blücher, after some active demonstrations against Dresden, should pass the Elbe at Wittenberg, should force Bernadotte to cross it at Roslau, that both should reascend upon Leipzig between the Mulde and the Saale, while Prince Schwarzenberg should descend thither, following the course of these two rivers, each thus tending to unite in the neighbourhood of Leipzig to risk a gigantic battle. The evident danger of this manœuvre, perfectly comprehended by these pupils and enemies of Napoleon, was to be assailed by him before the general combination of all their forces. But, Blücher's staff fanning all his passions, they resolved to brave this danger whatever it might be, for a great result could be attained only by a great risk. But they promised themselves extreme prudence in the dangerous march, and desperate energy when the battle had begun.

Such were the military skill and implacable hatred with which Napoleon had inspired the world by trampling Europe under his feet for fourteen years.

The plan, once adopted, was immediately put in execution. General Benningsen penetrated the gorges of Zittau on the 17th of September, and had reached Töplitz by the 22d or 23d. Blücher had secretly informed the Generals Tauenzien and Bulow of his designs, had urged them to occupy fully the French before Wittenberg, Torgau, and Grossenhayn, and had kept himself in constant motion around Dresden to conceal the great movement he prepared with his right toward the Lower Elbe.

This incessant agitation on our front, the appearance of the bands of Thielmann and Platow on our right and rear,—preparations for passage toward the Lower Elbe, (by this name we designate the Elbe below Torgau,) and, lastly, the advanced season,—were circumstances more than sufficient to give Napoleon the idea of serious events at hand. He had always thought that, as they were unable to attack him in front in his position at Dresden, they would endeavour to turn his flank either on the right by debouching from Bohemia, or on the left by crossing the Lower Elbe, and perhaps by the two sides at once. He had himself so great a desire of a decisive event that he had begun to wish some such manœuvres, never supposing that a battle in which he should be personally present with all his reserves could be other than disastrous to his enemies, and considering that the only tactic attended with danger to himself was that see-saw manœuvre which had so much exhausted his troops and even somewhat injured his great prestige. But he kept continually on the watch, to avoid surprise, and to fall instantly upon the first who should be so rash as to venture on his rear.

On the 22d of September his attention was roused by a concurrence of trivial events. Marshal Marmont, strengthened by the reserve cavalry of General Latour-Maubourg, had been placed, as we have seen, at Grossenhayn, to protect the convoys of provisions approaching Dresden and the convoys of wounded leaving that city. This precaution had succeeded; a load of flour had reached Dresden, and many wounded had safely arrived at Torgau. But suddenly the light cavalry of General Chastel was attacked by the heavy cavalry of General Tauenzien and briskly thrown back. At the same time General Bulow, who was bombarding Wittenberg, seemed about to throw a bridge over the river near that fortress; and higher up the Russian General Sacken, who formed Blücher's right opposite the camp at Dresden, effected several very apparent movements. Napoleon, immediately divining the plan of the allies, imagined that all this agitation from Dresden to Wittenberg concealed an attempt of Blücher to reach the Lower Elbe, and he instantly put himself on his guard. Since his last marches to Kulm on the 15th, 16th, and 17th of September, he had remained on the watch, ready to throw himself by the bridge of Pirna, either on the right or left bank of the Elbe, as the rashness of the enemy might demand. He immediately quitted his post, came to Dresden, and ordered Macdonald to make a thorough reconnaissance with his three corps, to push the enemy upon Harta, or even Bautzen, in order to be quite sure whether Blücher was there or not. Napoleon informed

Macdonald that he should follow him with a portion of his Guard to act vigorously against the army of Silesia if it should be found to occupy the same positions.

He repaired thither, then, in person, and this reconnaissance by all the French troops composing Macdonald's army, of the different corps which constituted Blücher's, was begun on the 22d of September, and continued on the 23d as far as Bischofswerda, and disclosed the presence of Blücher with the same forces and in the same places. Certain prisoners, in fact, were taken belonging to the corps of Langezon, D'York, and Sacken; Napoleon concluded from this that he had too hastily ascribed bold designs to his enemies, and almost doubted their existence, because he had assigned to them too early a date. General Blücher employed a useless artifice to deceive him, which was to send to the advanced posts by a herald a letter for his son, who was prisoner, signed by himself, and dated from Bischofswerda.\* He hoped by that to persuade Napoleon still more fully that nothing had changed, or would change, in the arrangements of the allies. It was not this letter, to which no importance was attached, but a more serious circumstance,—the presence at Bischofswerda of the three corps composing the army of Silesia,—which, without deceiving Napoleon or destroying his conviction of the plan which he had so early divined, induced him to regard the execution as more remote than it proved to be. Finding Blücher still before him on the 22d and 23d of September, Napoleon did not conclude that he would always remain there, but that he would not leave so soon, and he made arrangements less prompt, but not less correct, than those which he would have made otherwise. Thus, he resolved to contract still more his position, and to leave before Dresden only the 11th corps, which Marshal Macdonald had always directly commanded, and to satisfy that marshal, by relieving him from the command of the 3d, 5th, and 8th, he sent the 3d (General Souham's) to Meissen, a little town upon the Elbe below Dresden. He brought Marmont with the 6th corps, and Latour-Maubourg with the heavy cavalry from Grossenhayn to the same point, Meissen, that they might be within reach of Ney in case of an attempt to pass the river toward Torgau or Wittenberg. He brought the 5th (Lauriston's) to Dresden, and sent the 8th (Poniatowski's) to the road of Waldheim and Leipzig, to aid Lefebvre-Desnoette against the bands of Thielmann and Plätow, and to form the head of the

column if it should be necessary to fall back upon the masses of the enemy coming from Bohemia. So that Napoleon formed his plan on a true idea of the designs of the enemy, but, we repeat, without using haste, for he did not believe these designs so near the period of execution as they really were.

To these measures he added some others, which proved that he was warned by a vague presentiment that the war might speedily be carried to the Rhine, or, at least, to the Saale. In fact, he ordered General Rogniat, who commanded the engineers of the grand army since the captivity of General Haxo, to restore the defences of Merseburg on the Saale, and to prepare bridges at that point in order to have a sure line of retreat on that river. He ordered to be removed from Dresden to Leipzig, from Leipzig to Erfurt, from Erfurt to Meitz, all the sick and wounded who could be transported by land; and to the wounded officers who were able to move at their own expense, he conveyed certain insinuations to determine them to regain the Rhine, carefully avoiding anything that could render those insinuations alarming. Foreseeing that the war would be long and destructive, he drew up a decree for the levy of 120,000 men on the former classes of 1812, 1811, 1810, and another for the levy of 160,000 men on the conscription of 1811, which should thus be anticipated by two years. That of 1811 was already wholly at the depot. He reckoned that, with the refractories whom at the moment the movable columns were hunting up, he could raise that levy to 300,000 men, and by accomplishing it in autumn he hoped to have all at his disposal in winter, and ready to engage in spring. At the same time, he drew up the address which the Empress regent was to deliver to the senate on this occasion; he ordered her to go in person, and thus to hold, as it were, a *lit de justice*, certainly unnecessary to secure the submission of a body which was to remain submissive till the very day of the fall of the Empire. Finally, he gave direct orders to the minister of war to put in a state of defence the fortresses on the Rhine, and also, very particularly, those of Italy. However, while prescribing these prudential measures on his frontiers, he countermanded the vast supplies of provisions ordered by the Duke of Feltré upon the Rhine in consequence of the letter of M. de Bassano, formerly quoted, that he might spare the population distressing and, as he considered, premature alarm.

While Napoleon was taking these measures, the allies were executing, earlier than he had supposed, their double movement upon Leipzig, by Bohemia and the Lower Elbe. Prince Schwarzenberg, preceded by an Austrian column, was marching from Toplitz to Commau, and Blücher, after having remained motionless in the presence of Napoleon the 22d, 23d, and 24th of September, was suddenly stealing away to descend the Elbe from Dresden to Wittenberg. The better to conceal his movement, he had advanced his right formed by General Sacken, ordering it to direct a powerful attack against Meissen, in the intention of defiling with his centre and left behind this right, which was thus rendered so apparent, and to hasten upon Wittenberg. He then proposed to withdraw the right also, and to smite

\* M. de Muffling, in his interesting Memoirs, greatly applauds this feat, and thinks that by this letter Napoleon's vigilance was beguiled. He is wrong; and Napoleon's correspondence shows that, if he was deceived at all, the very limited extent to which he was so is to be ascribed to the presence of the three corps of the army of Silesia, which had not left their position on the 22d and 23d. It is a fresh proof of the hazards of war, that an act of singular foresight on the part of Napoleon occasioned—as we shall soon see—the same result as would have been occasioned by a total want of foresight. This is not a motive for diminishing the estimate and the practice of vigilance; but it is a good reason, while doubting our cure and zeal, for believing that there is always a superior Providence, which sometimes frustrates the most profound calculations, and for seeking in higher reasons, in the justice or injustice of our cause, the secret of the failure of genius at the very moment of displaying its loftiest faculties.



before Wittenberg, where he was to cross the Elbe.

He began his operations on September 25, and while Sacken was attacking the advanced posts of Macdonald on one side and those of Marmont on the other, he began his march for the Lower Elbe. To take his place before Dresden, he left the Russian corps of Sherbatow, 8000 strong, and Bubna's Austrian light division, 10,000 strong, charged with the protection of Zittau, till the appearance of Poniatowski at that spot. This body of about 18,000 men was sufficient to deceive the most experienced, especially after such a reconnoissance as that of the 22d and 23d of September, which must have appeared to Napoleon quite conclusive. General Blücher thus succeeded in eluding our observation, and on the 26th, 27th, and 28th took his way for Wittenberg without being perceived. So vigorous an attack upon Sacken seemed to be at first inexplicable, and was interpreted as a method of testing Macdonald's left, and perhaps as the indication of a speedy attempt against our intrenched camp before Dresden. Napoleon ordered the left to be reinforced, to protect it from any effort of the enemy.

But the march of General Blücher, concurring with the other movements of Generals Tauenzien and Bulow and of the Prince of Sweden, could not escape the vigilance of Marshal Ney, against whom these various operations were directed. He had seen Bulow construct a bridge at Wartenburg and maintain it for several days, the other corps of the Prince of Sweden prepare their means of passage both at Barby and Roslau, and, not venturing to oppose those various attempts with 36,000 men, lest he should bring 80,000 upon himself, he had been satisfied with resisting more particularly the passage attempted near Wartenburg, because that was the nearest to Dresden, and, therefore, the most urgently requiring prevention. He immediately wrote to Napoleon to intimate the state of things, and to announce to him as in the course of execution, or about to be so in a few days, a passage of the Elbe, between Wittenberg and Magdeburg, by considerable forces.

Events were not less significant in the direction of Bohemia. General Lefebvre-Desnoette, with several thousand horse, had undertaken the pursuit of Thielmann, who, having entered Saxony by the passage from Carlsbad to Zwickau, had taken his course for Weissenfels, as if desirous of cutting off our communications with the Saale. General Lefebvre-Desnoette had at first given him some checks, and thrown him back as far as Altenburg. But at this moment Platow, debouching with his Cossacks and 5000 Austrians, 3000 of whom were cavalry, had attacked Lefebvre-Desnoette in front with more than 10,000 men, while Thielmann, by a rapid movement, took him in the rear. The only way of escape was to fall back upon Leipzig, with the sacrifice of several hundred men. This check had been soon rectified by Prince Poniatowski, who, having passed the Elbe and retrograded as far as Froburg with the 8th corps and the 4th cavalry, had, in his turn, poured down upon Thielmann and Platow, killing 400 of their men and taking 300. These different encoun-

ters, alternately prosperous and the reverse, had been attended with the advantage of enlightening us perfectly on the enemy's march, and we had been able to see at the passages from Commotau to Chemnitz, and from Carlsbad to Zwickau, something quite different from mere excursions of companies; for we had recognised on these two roads the heads of columns of the grand army of Bohemia, composed of Austrians, Russians, and Prussians. Report of its speedy approach had been circulated throughout all Saxony. Napoleon could no longer entertain any doubts of the speedy execution of those plans of the enemy which he had already detected, after the news received simultaneously from the Lower Elbe and the frontiers of Bohemia. It became evident that, on his left, the army of the North, reinforced, perhaps, by Blücher, was crossing the Lower Elbe, to ascend toward Leipzig along the Mulda; that, on his right, the army of Bohemia, crossing the mountains of Bohemia, was descending toward Leipzig, also following the course of the Mulda; and that both, or even all three, after having transported themselves to the left bank of the Elbe, would attempt to take him in the rear. The army of Silesia, which the Russian General Sherbatow and the Austrian General Bubna represented at this moment before Dresden, might well be supposed not to have quitted its position, but to have remained before Dresden in order to detain us there.

But Napoleon did not allow himself to be deceived by these false appearances, and he immediately began a double movement to direct his forces simultaneously on the two points threatened by the enemy, so as to place himself with his reserves between the two allied armies and to fall on either of them which should be most easily within his reach. He had already sent Prince Poniatowski to the rear of Dresden, on the road from Leipzig by Waldheim and Froburg, whence he might arrest Thielmann and Platow. He also called back the 5th corps, (Lauriston's,) which had become available since there remained only the 11th corps (Macdonald's) before Dresden, and sent it toward Mittweida to support Poniatowski. The 2d corps (Marshal Victor's) had been long at Freyberg, watching the passes from Bohemia to Saxony. Napoleon sent him still farther, and advanced him to the environs of Chemnitz. These three corps, to which had been annexed the 4th cavalry, placed at one march from each other, could rapidly combine, and present to the enemy, in the first instance, a mass of about 40,000 men. Napoleon added to them the 5th cavalry, which he had recently intrusted to General Pajol, that they might be able to reconnoitre to a greater distance, and he placed all under the orders of Murat. They were, while retrograding toward Thuringia, to keep along the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, and to advance cautiously so as to be always between the grand army of Prince Schwarzenberg and Leipzig. Marshal Marmont, established at Meissen, below Dresden, with the 6th corps and the 1st cavalry, received orders to recross the Elbe, and to fall back upon Leipzig, leaving at Meissen the 8d corps, (General Souham's,) which had been sent to that point since Napoleon had crossed

trated his forces around Dresden. Marshal Marmont, thus posted at Leipsic with nearly 30,000 men, infantry and cavalry, could, if necessary, go toward Murat or join Ney on the Lower Elbe, if the danger were more urgent in this direction. One march would bring him to Murat, two to Ney. If, with his 30,000 men, he joined Murat, he would raise his number to 70,000; if he joined Ney, who, with Dombrowski, had about 40,000, he would raise his number to about 70,000; and thus two considerable forces would be prepared against the armies of Bohemia and the North, Leipsic being the centre where it was intended to interfere between them. As soon as the enemy's movements should be perfectly clear, Napoleon resolved to leave Saint Cyr and Count Lobau at Dresden, and himself to retrograde with the 40,000 men of the Guard, Macdonald, and Souham, who should join him from Meissen on the road, and thus come with a reinforcement of 75,000 men to the aid of either of his two principal bodies. If the danger were most imminent in the direction of Murat, he would hasten to his side and with him form a mass of 145,000 men; if in the direction of Ney, he would hasten to him and likewise form a mass of 145,000 men. In these two cases, this would suffice, in his opinion, to obtain a decisive victory over one or other army, perhaps over both in succession. If even evacuating Dresden, on the condition of returning to it after the victory, he rallied to himself the 30,000 men of Saint Cyr and Lobau, he might still have nearly an equal force against the army of Bohemia, and an overwhelming superiority against those of the North and Silesia. Such were his calculations, and, in the present state of things, it was impossible to form any more excellent.

The corps of Poniatowski, Lauriston, and Victor, the 4th and 5th of cavalry, having been sent forward under Murat in the direction of Mittweida and Froburg, the corps of Marmont and Latour-Maubourg in that of Leipsic, Napoleon kept himself ready at the first signal to join either of them with 75,000 men. He gave several months' pay to the officers, who were suffering severely, and he supplied the necessary money from his own treasury, that of the army being exhausted. He gave shoes to the soldiers, prepared parks of ammunition, and made every thing ready for a general movement. A column of 8000 or 9000 men of marching battalions and squadrons had arrived at Leipsic. He ordered it to be left there to guard that city conjointly with the detachments already there under General Margaron, and, finally, he brought thither, in addition, Augereau's corps, which had been at first destined to reassure and to keep in check Bavaria, threatened by an Austrian corps. This corps of Augereau, which should be nearly 30,000, had been repeatedly weakened by sending reinforcements to the Elbe. It now contained only 12,000 men, of whom nearly 3000 were the old dragoons of Spain. But, such as it was, the presence of this corps at Wurzburg had had some effect upon Bavaria, whom Austria was at that time endeavouring to draw over to the coalition, sometimes by threats, sometimes by caresses. But Napoleon, perceiving that the fate of the war would be

decided in the fields of Leipsic, and that all alliances would be there either consolidated or dissolved, did not hesitate to call Augereau thither. These arrangements having been made during the 28th, 29th, and 30th of September, he waited, with every faculty alive to discover what should transpire around him.

In the mean while, the allies carried on the execution of their plans. Blucher having, as we have seen, left Generals Sherbatow and Bubna to take his place before Dresden, and having made his centre and left flank behind his right, which feigned an attack upon Meissen, he had arrived before Wittenberg on the 30th of September. He had there replaced Bulow's corps, which had left to join the army of the North, and had then hastened to make his preparations for crossing. At the same time he had written to Bernadotte, who was posted one or two marches lower down, to prepare to cross the Elbe, for he hoped in two days to find himself on the left bank. As Wittenberg still belonged to the French, he could not effect a passage at that point. He, therefore, proposed to construct a bridge a little higher up, *i.e.* at Elster, where General Bulow had attempted to do so some days before. On the 1st of October he brought boats, and on the 2d, having constructed a bridge, he landed on the left bank. But it was necessary to carry the position of Wartenburg, which it was not easy to force, for already General Bulow had there met such a resistance that he had been obliged to destroy his bridge, thinking that he could make no use of it himself, and being unwilling to leave it to the French.

Marshal Ney, warned by his reconnaissance of the presence of the enemy on the left of the Elbe, had in all haste sent thither General Bertrand with the 4th corps, to prevent, as had been done a short time before, the success of this attempt. The 4th corps, not having yet received Guilleminot's division, which reverted to it in the distribution of the 12th, was wholly composed of Morand's French division, Fontanelli's Italian division, and Franquemont's Wurtembergian division,—all three amounting to no more than 12,000 men. This was a small number against Blucher's 60,000 men; but all inequalities of numbers may often be compensated by local circumstances, talent, and coolness, of which a memorable example was furnished on the present occasion.

The Elbe, as it approaches Elster, forms a very marked angle, and thus encloses a low and marshy ground situated on the left bank. On this ground is the old castle of Wartenburg. To secure it from inundations, it had formerly been protected by a dike resting on the two sides of the Elbe, like the chord of an arc. The castle itself is at one extremity of this dike, the village of Blodden at the other. The enemy having crossed the Elbe at Elster, if he wished to proceed farther must follow a road ending perpendicularly in the middle of the dike. General Morand, posted in the castle of Wartenburg, at the point of junction of the road with the dike, was, naturally, charged with the task of greatest difficulty. A little to the right were the Italians; directly to the right, at the village of Blodden, were the Wurtembergians.

General Morand, one of the three heroes of Davout's corps, while that glorious corps existed, had made his arrangements with admirable sagacity. He had ranged his 4000 or 5000 French behind the dike, where they were protected to the head as if behind a parapet, and he had disposed all his artillery on the left, on the sandy eminence of the castle of Wartenburg. And thus he waited the appearance of the Prussians, like a hunter on the watch.

In fact, they debouched on the morning of October 3, by the bridge constructed at Elster on the 2d, and bravely advanced upon the road, without foreseeing the terrible reception that awaited them. They were allowed to approach, and when within very near range, fire was opened upon them unexpectedly from all points of the dike, embracing their whole column, which decimated them cruelly. At the same moment, the fire of a numerous artillery was added to that of the musketry, and they were thrown back in disorder upon the bridge.

But, with such passions as animated both officers and men, such an obstacle could not prove insurmountable. They returned to the charge, and, being received always in the same manner, they were in the same manner prostrated without being able even to reach the dike. Blücher held firm; but this led only to the slaughter of a more considerable number of his soldiers. Annoyed by the artillery on our left, he thought to counterbalance it by a battery on the other side of the Elbe. Our artillery was not disconcerted, but, directing part of their guns against the Prussian battery, reduced it to silence, and resumed their fire upon the road, which had now become truly a field of slaughter.

The combat had lasted about four hours, and nearly 5000 of the enemy crowded the marshy plain, when Blücher at length adopted the idea of directing a vigorous attack on our right against the village of Bleddin, defended by the Wurtembergians. The column of attack, having ascended the banks of the river by the favour of some woods, assailed Bleddin furiously, for this was the only way open to the army of Silesia, and at length carried the village from the Wurtembergians, now reduced to about 2000. At this sight, General Bertrand launched Hulot's brigade of Morand's division against the flank of the enemy's column. This brigade overthrew and routed three battalions, but came too late to save Bleddin, where the enemy were already established. General Hulot was obliged to return behind the dike and to join the Morand division.

Without this last unprotected attack, our loss would scarcely have exceeded 100 men; but this sortie cost us 200 or 300. The Wurtembergians on their side, while bravely defending Bleddin, lost a certain number. Yet we had not more than 500 men disabled, while the enemy lost 5000 or 6000. This brilliant affair, one of the most remarkable in our long wars, and one which did great honour to Generals Bertrand, Morand, and Hulot, could not prevent the passage of the army of Silesia, now that Bleddin had been taken. General Bertrand was therefore obliged to retrograde upon Kemberg, in order to get nearer to Gene-

ral Reynier and the Dombrowski division, established along the Mulda from Duben to Dessau. The prisoners whom we took informed us that we were engaged with the whole army of Silesia, which had thus crossed the Elbe and was on the right of Ney. Other reconnaissances disclosed to us that the army of the North had begun to cross the Elbe below Wittenberg from Roslau to Barby, and that Ney had them consequently on his left. The ground on which these two armies were aiming to unite against Marshal Ney's corps may be described as follows.

The Elbe, which from Dresden to Wittenberg flows obliquely from southeast to northwest, flows from Wartenburg to Roslau, almost as far as to Barby, from east to west, i.e. in relation to the position we had assumed, from our right to our left. From Wittenberg to Barby the Elbe receives first the Mulda, in the neighbourhood of Dessau, and then the Saale, near Barby. Thus, Marshal Ney had on his right the Elbe, flowing laterally to him as far as Wittenberg, then on his front the Elbe again, altering its course at Wittenberg, passing before him, and then on his left the Mulda, falling into the Elbe at Dessau. Ney was, therefore, between Blücher, who had crossed the Elbe on his right at Wartenburg, and Bernadotte, who, having passed the Elbe below the confluence of the Mulda, was ascending the Mulda on his left. He had, it is true, the advantage of possessing all the bridges of the Mulda, since he had retained Duben, Bitterfeld, and Dessau, of being, therefore, able to manœuvre on the two banks of that river, and of protecting himself by it sometimes against Blücher, sometimes against Bernadotte. Unfortunately, he had scarcely 40,000 men, while Blücher had 60,000, and Bernadotte, after having left Tauenzien to guard his bridges, had still upwards of 60,000. He behaved with great prudence between these two forces, endeavouring to manœuvre in such a manner as to keep them separate, but also to be able to retrograde rapidly toward Leipsic by ascending the Mulda. In the mean time Blücher and Bernadotte endeavoured to meet, and, indeed, did actually meet, to concert their plan of operation, and agreed that as soon as they could safely quit the banks of the Elbe to get behind the Mulda and ascend it as far as Leipsic, they ought to do so. But both, after having ventured to cross the Elbe before the French, wished to secure for themselves a loophole of retreat, i.e. to construct at Wartenburg and at Roslau solid *îlles de pont*, in order to recross the Elbe in safety if fortune should prove adverse to their arms. They required to devote not less than three or four days to these necessary cares.

While these events were occurring between the Elbe and the Mulda, Marshal Marmont, who was authorized by his instructions to repair to whatever point seemed most menaced, hastened at the first summons of Marshal Ney to quit Leipsic and to descend the Mulda with his *corps d'armée* and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. He had stopped at Eilenburg, in the rear of Marshal Ney, who had fallen back upon Duben.

Murat, on his side, charged with the observation of the passages from Bohemia, had

advanced with Poniatowski, Lauriston, Victor, and the 4th and 5th of the cavalry, from Mittweida to Froburg, keeping along the foot of the Erz-Gebirge and protecting Leipsic. The heads of columns of the army of Bohemia were now plainly seen, debouching in two principal masses from Commotau to Chemnitz, from Carlsbad to Zwickau. Ney, Marmont, and Murat had forwarded to Napoleon exact information of all that passed under their notice.

On the morning of October 5, Napoleon received the account of the glorious battle of Wartenburg, and in course of that day the detail of all the movements effected by his different *corps d'armée*. As he was told that the forces which had appeared at Wartenburg and had succeeded in crossing the Elbe at that point were the army of Silesia, he immediately ordered a new reconnoissance before Dresden, i.e. on the other side of the Elbe, and he knew that the confidence founded on the reconnoissances of September 22 and 23 had been fallacious, for Blücher had just defiled from the 25th to the 30th to reach Wittenberg. From that moment it was evident that at Dresden they had before them only a *screen* of troops, and that the armies of Silesia and of the North, combined upon the Lower Elbe, had crossed it to ascend in common along the Mulda as high as Leipsic, whilst the grand army of Bohemia would there descend from the mountains, which would speedily effect the anticipated union of all the allied forces in our rear.

By this Napoleon was neither excited nor alarmed. It was the announcement of that which he eagerly desired, i.e. a general battle, and in his confidence he feared only one thing, lest the allies after so bold a movement should not have courage to persevere in their enterprise, and therefore should seek to elude him. It was not to be doubted that it would be necessary to retrace from Dresden in order to march against them. But on which of the two masses ought he first to fall, so as to beat them in succession? This was the only question; nor did that admit of any long hesitation. The army of Bohemia had not nearly reached Leipsic; besides, Murat with 40,000 men, on finding about 12,000 at Leipsic, and receiving shortly the 12,000 under Augereau, which would raise his numbers above 60,000, could take up successive positions to protect Leipsic, and then gain some days, while Napoleon, who required only three marches to reach Düben on the Mulda, would have time to throw himself between Blücher and Bernadotte, to overthrow one after the other, and then to return upon the army of Bohemia and beat them in their turn. If that army, which had so frequently shown themselves merely to withdraw almost immediately, should not wait for him but hasten to return into Bohemia, instead of pursuing them he would pursue Bernadotte and Blücher, already conquered, close upon their heels as far as Berlin, would thus realize his favourite project of lending a helping hand to his garrisons on the Oder and the Vistula, and probably in this case would transport the theatre of the war to the Lower Elbe, where he had two strong *points d'appui*,—Magdeburg and Hamburg.

These were the most favourable chances; and Napoleon, though still very confident, was not so blind as to overlook the unfavourable, especially when he beheld the enthusiasm of the allies. In this view he had sent General Rognier to Merseburg, there to prepare means of secure retreat to the Saale. Should events prove doubtful, not to say unfavourable, he would fall back upon the Saale, and would make that the line of his operations for a shorter or longer time according to the means of resistance which he should find upon that line.

In all these various cases every thing seemed to issue in the evacuation of Dresden and of that part of the course of the Elbe comprised between Königstein and Torgau. If, in fact, after having conquered the armies of Silesia and of the North, Napoleon were immediately to establish himself upon the Lower Elbe, or if he should be compelled by reverses in Saxony to repossess the Saale, in each case he must relinquish Dresden. It is also true that, if after having beaten the armies of Silesia and the North he could also beat that of Bohemia, he would be master of the country to such an extent as to require to evacuate no point. But this was the most favourable case possible, and prudence did not allow it to be taken as the basis of his calculations. Napoleon arranged affairs so as to render his movement complete and to evacuate even the city of Dresden itself. Accordingly, on the morning of the 6th he sent off all the Guard, Young and Old, for the Lower Elbe, i.e. for Meissen. The 8d corps (Souham's) had taken the road for Torgau at the first report of the battle of Wartenburg. He also ordered Macdonald to leave the camp of Dresden for Meissen, keeping along the right bank, which was without danger, the army of Silesia being no longer in the neighbourhood, and which also had the advantage of not encumbering the left bank. The Guard, and the corps of Souham and Macdonald, comprised about 75,000 men, who in two days would be very near to Ney, and in three days in presence of the enemy. There remained at Dresden the corps of Count Lobau (1st) and Marshal Saint Cyr, (14th,) including seven divisions and about 30,000 men. This was a considerable force, which on the different hypotheses we have enumerated would not be necessary at Dresden, and which might decide the victory on one of the two fields where it was expected to fight. Napoleon sent for Marshal Saint Cyr, who commanded the two corps, and gave him great satisfaction by the exposition of his views; for that marshal, besides being on this occasion of the same opinion as Napoleon, was very unwilling to be left at Dresden. Napoleon then traced out to him all that he had to do in the evacuation of that city. First, he was to evacuate successively Königstein, Lillienstein, and Pirna, at the same time to remove the bridges constructed at these points, to collect the boats thus acquired, retain part of them at Dresden itself in case of returning thither, load the others with provisions, ammunition, and the wounded and forward them to Torgau. While acting in this manner, which presented so much the aspect of a final evacuation, Marshal Saint Cyr was to give out that there was no thought of quitting Dresden; so far from this, he was about to establish himself there,—and by this language to check any im-

dency to excitement among the people. When these arrangements should be completed, and his 30,000 men on foot, he was to decamp at the first signal and join Napoleon by Meissen. Such were the instructions given to that marshal: would to heaven that they had been observed! The fate of France and of the world would probably have been changed!

It remained to give some explanation to the court of Saxony. It was impossible without inhumanity, and, as it seemed, without peril, to leave that timid court, so little habituated to the horrors of war, in the midst of dangers of every kind. It would thus be exposed to witness a formidable attack repelled by extreme measures, or else, if it were taken to the scene of action, it might be made to take part in a battle of unprecedented magnitude. The alternative was cruel. Napoleon offered the choice of remaining at Dresden or accompanying him to head-quarters. The good king Frederick Augustus, whose only resource seemed to consist in his attaching himself to the fortunes of Napoleon, preferred to be with him rather than with one of his lieutenants,—with 200,000 men rather than with 30,000. He expressed the desire to follow Napoleon. It was, therefore, necessary to resolve to bring with him a numerous court, crowded with old men, women, and children, for there were brothers, sisters, nephews, worthy and respectable people, accustomed to the most quiet and regular life, rising, eating, sleeping, praying, always at the same hour, and recalling, almost offensively, the simplicity, ignorance, and timidity of the Spanish Bourbons. Napoleon wished that as far as possible they should march in full security, with all the honours due to them,—which was not easy in the midst of 600,000 men, of 3000 guns, and 20,000 war-carriages, which were to circulate at some distance from each other for fifteen days. He determined that while he should himself leave on the 7th of October, with what he called the minor head-quarters, *i.e.* Berthier, his aides-de-camp, one or two secretaries, and some domestics, the greater head-quarters, composed of the administratives of the army, M. de Bassano's officials, the general parks, escorted by 4000 men, should leave on the following day, the 8th. The King of Saxony, protected by a division of the Old Guard, should join this party with his numerous carriages. M. de Bassano, accustomed to camp-life, and taught by his master to fear nothing, was ordered to follow the King of Saxony, to keep him company, to make him acquainted with passing events, and to support his courage by describing every thing in the most favourable colours, however far from the truth. An officer of the Old Guard was to be always at his gate to learn and to gratify his most trivial desires. In this manner, amid the difficulties of the vastest armies ever beheld, difficulties which he himself augmented in no small degree, the good King of Saxony was to travel by short journeys, hearing mass every morning, living as if at Dresden, in the suite of his terrible ally, who marched almost day and night, scarcely allowing himself time to eat or sleep, working almost without interruption, though at this time he had acquired the corpulence of one of the effeminate princes of the old dynasties. But the animation and activity of youth were imparted to his oppressed and suf-

fering body by a soul of fire, a prodigious genius, and the pride of a demon!

Having sent forward part of his troops on the 6th of October and part on the 7th, Napoleon himself set off on the 7th, and, after staying a few hours at Meissen, he pushed on to Seerhausen, on the road to Wurtzen. His great military experience had taught him that the most important news might be expected about midnight, or an hour later, because the generals posted at ten or fifteen leagues distant forwarded in the evening an account of the day's proceedings, by officers who performed the journey on horseback in five or six hours, which would enable them to arrive about the time stated. By despatching the answer immediately, the necessary orders would reach on the following morning, in sufficient time to be executed, and thus corps placed at a great distance would act under the immediate direction of Napoleon, as if they had been at hand. In this manner, the night, indispensable to the repose of the troops, had sufficed to demand and to receive instructions. But this prodigious machine could only receive impulse on the condition that the genius which was its prime mover should be ever on the watch, at least at the moment most essential for the transmission of orders. Consequently, especially in this last campaign, Napoleon commonly went to bed at 6 or 7 P.M. and rose at midnight and dictated his correspondence during the night. There was, indeed, a call for incessant watchfulness, as he had to move immense masses, in the midst of other immense masses, and with the utmost precision. Napoleon, reaching Seerhausen, read some letters, forwarded some replies, then took a little rest, and set off in the night for Wurtzen, where he arrived on the 8th, in time to issue his orders.

At Wurtzen he was upon the Mulda, nearly on the same level as Leipsic on the Pleisse, and able to repair to Leipsic or to Duben in the same space of time. His plan on quitting Dresden had been to delay his final resolutions till he should have reached Wurtzen. Thence he would either immediately direct his course to Leipsic, if Murat, closely pressed, could not stand against the army of Bohemia, or else, if Murat were able to keep his ground for some days longer, he would descend the Mulda as far as Duben, and free himself from the armies of Silesia and the North by throwing them beyond the Elbe. He would thus give Marshal Saint Cyr the expected signal for evacuating Dresden.

He had received intelligence during all the journey, either from the outlets from Bohemia, (*i.e.* from his left as soon as he had turned his back upon Dresden and his face to Leipsic,) or from the Elbe and the Lower Mulda, *i.e.* from his right. Every communication tended to show that the danger was most urgent in the latter direction, for Blucher and Bernadotte combined were ready to fall upon Ney, whilst Murat, though he distinctly saw two strong columns debouche from Commotau upon Chemnitz and from Zwickau upon Altenburg, was, nevertheless, not yet sufficiently pressed to cause any alarm on his account. An unhappy disagreement between Ney and Bernadotte afforded an additional reason for going to them. This occurred as follo

battle of Wartenburg, Ney, having retrograded as far as Duben, and having urged Marmont to come to his aid, which the latter had done by going to Eilenburg, had suddenly quitted his position and passed behind Marmont to approximate the Elbe in the direction of Torgau. So that Marmont, instead of supporting Ney, was found to be in front of him, and exposed to considerable danger, besides which, the movement required of him exposed Leipsic to the attempts of Bernadotte and Blücher. The motive impelling Marshal Ney to this inexplicable movement was no other than the desire to rally to himself the 3d corps, (Souham's.) Not believing himself capable of effecting much with the corps of Reynier and Bertrand, (7th and 4th,) he had determined as soon as possible to combine with his own forces this 3d corps, which he had long commanded, and on which he placed great reliance. Marmont, not knowing what to think of Ney's conduct, and being alarmed for Leipsic, had in his turn retrograded as far as Taucha.

He was therefore induced to turn to the right to the Mulda, by the double motive of first striking a blow against Bernadotte and Blücher, since there was time to do this, and then of reconciling the discordant lieutenants. Napoleon suddenly made up his mind, and resolved to march from Wurtzen upon Eilenburg, that is to say, to descend the Mulda with the 75,000 men whom he brought with him, while he moved forward Ney and Marmont. He thus hoped, by marching between the Mulda and the Elbe as far as it was necessary, to gain upon Bernadotte and Blücher, and to meet them before they should have time to recross the Elbe. Having always seen them remove whenever he approached, his anxiety was not to avoid them, however strong they might be, but to reach them, for he feared lest they should too soon take alarm at what they had attempted, and again seek to fly at his approach. But unfortunately this was not now their case, and several advantages gained in succession over his lieutenants had so far emboldened them as to make them fear himself less than formerly.—Blücher and Bernadotte having been beaten, Napoleon proposed to turn against Prince Schwarzenberg, should he have persisted in advancing with the army of Bohemia, or, if he should have fallen back on the report of a lost battle, to continue the pursuit of Blücher and Bernadotte, perhaps as far as Berlin.

He consequently ordered Marshal Ney to move forward with Reynier, Bertrand, Dombrowski, Souham, and Sebastiani's cavalry, (2d reserve,) which had been attached to his army to replace that of the Duke of Padua. He ordered him to descend between the Mulda and the Elbe, having the Mulda on the left and the Elbe on the right, protecting himself by his cavalry, to avoid being surprised and to enable him to surprise all the movements of the enemy. He brought forward Marmont, made him march by the left bank of the Mulda nearly to the level of Ney, who was upon the right bank, and he himself marched with all the Guard and MacDonald behind his two lieutenants. At the same time he communicated to Murat his designs against the combined armies of the North and Silesia, recommended him not to entangle himself, to keep by the

side of without encountering the enemy who was debouching from Bohemia; to keep always between him and Leipsic, where he would find a reinforcement of from 20,000 to 24,000 men, which would procure him upwards of 60,000 combatants. Napoleon, in fact, had placed the Duke of Padua at Leipsic, with part of the 3d corps of cavalry, (withdrawn from Ney's army to pursue the bands,) had also given him the marching-battalions which had arrived from Mentz, and the old division of Margaree. This combination might amount to about 12,000 men in active service, and 24,000 including Augereau, who was approaching. Napoleon ordered these to keep well on their guard, especially in the direction of the Lower Mulda, lest Bernadotte and Blücher should make some attempt upon Leipsic while making their escape. Unfortunately, to all these judicious instructions Napoleon added a resolution, justifiable at the time, but much to be regretted. He suspended the evacuation of Dresden, for which Marshal Saint-Cyr was quite prepared. He did not wholly countermand it, but delayed it, on the ground that, the enemy being thoroughly engaged, both in the direction of Bohemia and that of the Mulda and the Elbe, the much-desired battle became certain, and also the victory, and that he would then be very happy to have preserved Dresden, whither the headquarters should return almost as soon as they should have left it. It was evidently because the great battle was at hand, that he ought to have concentrated his forces; but on this occasion Napoleon reasoned in respect to Dresden as he had in respect to Dantzic, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, with the rash hope of repairing by a single blow a fortune compromised by superior and almost insurmountable causes.

Having passed at Wurtzen the evening of the 8th and the whole of the 9th, to allow his troops time to arrive in line, Napoleon left in the night of the 10th, and reached Eilenburg at 4 A.M. He placed himself at the head of the light cavalry of his Guard, and marched, surrounded by all his corps, upon Duben, an essential point, where he expected to meet the enemy, and perhaps the battle so eagerly desired. In these last moments he remained in person with his troops, and commonly in the van. He advanced with about 140,000 men in the following order. Ney, at the head with all that remained to him of the Duke of Padua's cavalry (3d of reserve) and Sebastiani's corps, (2d of reserve,) descended upon Duben, having Reynier on the left beyond the Mulda, Dombrowski and Souham in the centre on the Mulda, Bertrand on the right, marching at nearly an equal distance from the Mulda and the Elbe, Napoleon following in exactly the same order with the cavalry of the Guard and of Lausmaubourg in front, Marmont forming the left on one bank of the Mulda, all the Guard forming the centre directly on the Mulda, MacDonald forming the right between the Mulda and the Elbe. At two days' march to the rear came the greater headquarters with all the parks, and particularly with the good French princes, proceeding at the rate most in accordance with their habits. Napoleon continually sent them intelligence. In no war had any more carefully studied march been executed, nor any on a vaster scale. They advanced

with extreme precaution, expecting every hour, and evidently desiring, the appearance of the enemy. They were, indeed, seen in all directions, but in the act of falling back; and Napoleon might on this occasion also fear to see the allies renewing their offensive tactics toward his lieutenants, and retreating before himself, again elude his blows. On their side events had occurred as follows:—

In an interview which Blücher had had with the Prince of Sweden on the 7th, in presence of the principal officers of the two staffs, he had agreed with him to march in common against Leipsic, believing that he had to do only with Marshals Ney and Marmont. The movement of the armies of the North and of Silesia was to begin as soon as they should insure by strong *têtes de pont* their means of crossing the Elbe in case they should be compelled to retreat. The two chiefs of these armies were far from being congenial. The pride, impetuosity, and offensive suspicion of Blücher were by no means agreeable to Bernadotte, and the timidity of Bernadotte, concealed by remarkable moroseness, had excited neither esteem nor confidence in the mind of Blücher. Cold marks of respect had imperfectly veiled their reciprocal antipathy, and they had parted with the promise of concord, which was all the more necessary from the more perilous operations in which they were engaged. On the 9th, secret intimation derived from the country had warned Bernadotte and Blücher of the approach of Napoleon with all his reserves. This was enough to disturb the future King of Sweden, and to induce him to adopt the resolution of recrossing the Elbe. Blücher, who was not of the same opinion, had sent one of his officers to the Swedish camp to satisfy himself upon the point. Bernadotte at once declared that he was going to place himself behind the Elbe to prevent a disaster, unless the army of Silesia would join him on the other side of the Mulda, so as to combine in one body the armies of the North and of Silesia.\* The idea was reasonable, and

\* In an atlas prepared for the explanation of his campaigns, and accompanied by detailed historical letter-press, the Prince of Sweden has said that on the 7th of October he had invited an interview with General Blücher, and that at the first sight of the distribution of the corps upon the map he had perceived the danger incurred by General Blücher, and that he had advised him to pass the Mulda in order to join him,—advice which had saved the coalition. Since this publication, M. de Muffling, in some interesting memoirs, impressed with the character of truth though not free from the passions of the time, has supplied the means of completing and rectifying the assertions of the Prince of Sweden. At the interview of the 7th, the departure of Napoleon was unknown, for he did not quit Dresden till the 7th: consequently the danger of Blücher was also unknown. On that day, October 7, the only question agitated was the march upon Leipsic. It was only on the 9th that the arrival of Napoleon with his reserves was known, and on that day Blücher sent a confidential officer to concert with the Prince of Sweden. That officer found the prince much excited by the approach of Napoleon, and anxious to recross the Elbe immediately, unless the army of Silesia should join him behind the Mulda, and then to shelter himself behind the Saale. Blücher consented to this, for it did not admit of two opinions even with an inferior officer of moderately good sense, and he immediately began his march to cross the Mulda. There was, therefore, no room for controversy, nor for any opinion that could save the coalition. During the following days, indeed, there were differences, and it appears from the narrative of M. de Muffling that the opinion which decided the triumph of the coalition was not suggested by the Prince of Sweden, and that, on the contrary, great efforts were requisite on the part of General Blücher and the English minister to induce him to adopt it.

the least eminent of the generals might have conceived and adopted it without dispute. Accordingly, Blücher readily conformed to it, though this movement cost him his bridge at Wartenburg. It was then determined that, in course of the 10th, General d'York, who at the time formed the right of the army of Silesia, should cross the Mulda at Jesnitz, that General Langeron, who formed the centre, should cross it at Bitterfeld, and, lastly, that General Sacken, who had now become the left, should cross at Duben. All the corps of the army of Silesia were then in motion, defiling before us from our right to our left, along the contour described by the Mulda from Duben to Bitterfeld. D'York's corps had but a step to enable it to cross at Jesnitz. That of Langeron had only to traverse four leagues from Duben to Bitterfeld. But Sacken, who was at Mokrehna, between the Mulda and the Elbe, had, on the contrary, to traverse a much greater distance to reach Duben; and, in particular, he had to manœuvre very near the French,—which rendered his passage very perilous.

Whilst, during the 10th, the French army on each side of the Mulda was descending that river toward Duben, Marshal Ney at the head came suddenly upon Langeron's corps, which had remained in the rear to await Sacken's and resign to them the bridge of Duben. He repulsed it vigorously, and took a park of 800 carriages. Sacken, much pressed by General Bertrand's troops, which had marched between the Mulda and the Elbe, withdrew as he best could, and, finding Duben occupied by our advanced guard, made a great circuit in order to cross the Mulda at Raguhn.

Napoleon, having entered Duben about 2 o'clock p.m., immediately interrogated the prisoners whom he had taken, and learned that he was in presence of the whole Silesian army, which had defiled, and was still defiling before him, to gain the Mulda on our left. Napoleon resolved to pursue them immediately in all directions. He ordered Marshal Ney to go with Souham three leagues to the left, to Grafenhaynchen, on the road to Dessau; Generals Dombrowski and Reynier to go to the right, to Wittenberg, on the banks of the Elbe; General Bertrand, with his 4th corps, and Sebastiani's cavalry, to make for Wartenburg, also on the banks of the Elbe, in order there to destroy the enemy's bridges; and, finally, he ordered Macdonald to support Bertrand. All were to rout Blücher's corps, who being surprised on the march could offer little resistance, and to take from them all the means of crossing the Mulda and the Elbe, in order to appropriate them exclusively to us. Napoleon halted at Duben with the Guard, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and Marshal Marmont's corps, there to arrange his further movements.

From the aspect of affairs, Napoleon was much occupied with one anxiety. He knew that the army of the North was upon his left, behind the Lower Mulda, occupying the bridges of that river, and those of the Elbe below its junction with the Mulda, and, consequently, possessing every facility for repassing the Elbe and escaping our pursuit. He knew that the army of Silesia, after having crossed the Mulda at Wartenburg on our right, had defiled along our front, to cross the Mulda on our left, and

join the army of the North. It was not very unreasonable to suppose that they were going to renew those evasive tactics which had so much exhausted us, and, on our approach, recross the Elbe towards Acken or Roslau. This would be a real misfortune to Napoleon, who longed for a decisive battle, and who, at each step, choked the road with young men sick or disgusted. It was equally to be feared that after having in vain effected a long march to reach the armies of Silesia and the North, and wishing then to fall back upon the army of Bohemia, he should not be able to come up with it. Their march upon our rear no doubt indicated some designs of unusual daring, but it might also signify the desire to avoid any engagement till the union of the three allied armies. But Napoleon could not allow them to unite merely to give them courage to engage, for this would make their proportion to us that of two to one, a numerical superiority too great to be risked; and yet, as long as he persisted in interposing himself between the two bodies of the enemy, one descending the Mulda, the other ascending that river, it was probable that each army individually menaced would endeavour to escape. In this perplexity, unwilling to allow their union, and obliged to choose which he should first attack, he determined to throw himself in full force upon the mass formed of the armies of Silesia and the North, and, in order to combine them without losing the power of ultimately returning upon the army of Bohemia, he suddenly formed a plan, one of the boldest and most skilful ever devised, and deriving an unparalleled grandeur from the proportion of the forces with which it was to be put in execution.\* Napoleon resolved to pursue without intermission the armies of Silesia and the North, to cross in their steps the Mulda and the Elbe, to destroy all the bridges except those belonging to us, and thus to force himself thoroughly to rout those two armies, then, as in this interval, Prince Schwarzenberg, continuing to descend the Mulda, would have urged Murat briskly upon Leipsic, and perhaps even still lower, to recross the Elbe without leaving the right bank as far as Torgau or Dresden, to recross that river at one of those points and to pour down upon the army of Bohemia, separated from the mountains and taken in a true *cul-de-sac*, between the Mulda and the Elbe, the bridges over which were in our possession. The success of this combination, no doubt, demanded much good fortune, much precision of movement, and excellent instruments, for it was equally vast and complicated; but it was possible that after having furnished Napoleon with the means of beating the armies of the North and Silesia, it would enable him also to ensnare and entirely destroy the army of Bohemia. These were prodigious results, certain of attainment with the soldiers of Friedland and Austerlitz, but doubtful at this time, though not impossible, even with

inexperienced soldiers and discontented generals.

Napoleon immediately gave his orders accordingly, in cipher, enjoining the utmost secrecy on all to whom they were imparted, saying that for some days this would be "the secret of the army and the safety of the Empire." He ordered Murat to behave with the utmost prudence, at once to restrain and to invite the enemy, to fall back upon Leipsic, where he would meet the Duke of Padua, and probably Augereau, to maintain his ground there as firmly as possible, for the preservation of that city was important in a political, moral, and military point of view, but, rather than expose himself to an unequal contest, to retrograde upon Torgau or Wittenberg, where he would find an asylum behind the Elbe, until Napoleon, crossing that river by Torgau or Dresden, should fall like a thunderbolt upon the army of Bohemia, destined to perish in the snare in which they should have been caught. Napoleon ordered the Duke of Padua to collect all the provisions, ammunitions, clothing, shoes, and, in short, all valuable *matériel* that could be found in Leipsic, to send them in one vast convoy on the road to Torgau, where General Lefebvre-Desnoettes would come to collect them by a retrograde movement, and to escort them to Torgau itself. In this way, if they were obliged to evacuate Leipsic, they would lose nothing. Napoleon further ordered the Duke of Padua to write to Erfurt and to Mentz, that he was in full manoeuvre, that the movements would be very complicated, and, therefore, they must not be alarmed if they should hear that Leipsic was occupied by the enemy, that such an event might very possibly occur, but only owing to combinations which would probably terminate as by a thunderclap.

Napoleon designed, when he had reached Dessau in pursuit of Blücher and Bernadotte, never to halt till he should have overtaken them: however, if after having well beaten them the further pursuit should involve the loss of the chance of reaching the army of Bohemia, he was resolved to allow them to drag their shattered remains as far as Berlin, while he should himself recross the right bank of the Elbe to execute his great idea, the success of which would thus have been rendered very probable, for the river, which he should have placed between himself and the army of Bohemia, would conceal his movement, and would keep that army in ignorance of their approaching fate until there should be no longer time to retrace their steps toward Bohemia.

One very serious inconvenience attended this profound combination, viz., that it involved the final determination of the question of evacuating or preserving Dresden. The preservation of that city was, indeed, rendered necessary, since after having passed the Elbe in pursuit of Blücher and Bernadotte, it was necessary to recross it in order to surprise the army of Bohemia, and it was possible that to succeed in this it might be necessary to ascend not only as far as Torgau, but even as far as Dresden. For this reason, Napoleon ordered Marshal Saint-Cyr, in opposition to his former order, to remain at Dresden definitely, to establish himself firmly there, and to await with confidence his own return, for he would probably

\* This plan has been much spoken of, but little understood, and it has been rendered almost ridiculous by the rash conjectures indulged, from ignorance of the real thought of Napoleon. By comparing his with that of the generals under his orders, we are able to recover his actual idea, day by day, hour by hour, and we shall see that on the eve of the greatest calamity, occasioned, we may add, by the errors of his policy, his military genius was displayed with as much force and grandeur as ever.



soon see him reappear under the walls of Dresden, not by the left bank, but by the right, after the accomplishment of great designs, and in pursuit of still greater. Unfortunately, if these designs were not realized, and if they were obliged to engage where they were, i.e. between Duben and Leipsic, our forces would be deficient in 30,000 men requisite to decide the victory, and if it should be necessary to recross the Saale after the loss of a battle, or even after a battle not attended with any decisive result, these 30,000 men would be added to those who, shut up in the strongholds of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, would be unable to return to France, and would be forced to capitulate.

Having conceived these vast arrangements, Napoleon resolved to remain a day, or perhaps two, at Duben, to receive news from Murat, or from the various corps sent in pursuit of Blücher and Bernadotte; for it was of importance to know whether he was to seek the armies of Silesia and the North behind the Mulda, crossing that river between Duben and Dessau, or beyond the Elbe, by crossing that river at Wittenberg. The weather was very bad, they were marching through a deep mud, washed by continual rain, which greatly augmented the difficulties of the soldiers, and Napoleon was obliged to await the result of the reconnoissances in a little castle surrounded by water, in the midst of woods already ravaged by autumn and bad weather. This forced inaction was painful to his impatience, and, though still very confident, he was not without vague presentiments, which sometimes filled him with sadness. His only resource was to converse with Marshal Marmont, with whose cheerful, open, and cultivated mind he was pleased, and with whom he had formerly held the familiar intercourse customary between a general and his aide-de-camp. He spent the whole night from the 10th to the 11th in discoursing on the singularly-complicated situation of the belligerent armies, between the Elbe, the Mulda, and the mountains of Bohemia, and though he had not been brought into this position by any confusion in his own mind, which was the clearest possible, but by the force of circumstances, and though he was perfectly able to take an accurate view of his position, yet he was by no means free from anxiety on seeing himself involved in such a labyrinth, and he repeatedly exclaimed, "What a tangled thread is here! I alone can unravel it, and it will cost me some trouble!" Thus he passed the night, conversing on all subjects, even literature and science, until he left the marshal exhausted by fatigue, while quite untouched by it himself.

On the 11th, reports from the lieutenants announced the following results. General Bertrand with the 4th corps had gone to Wartenburg, where he had found the great *l'île-de-pont* begun by Blücher, and he had undertaken to destroy it, for it was agreed that no means of passage should be allowed to remain except those at Wittenberg and Torgau, which were in our possession. Generals Dombrowski and Reynier had drawn from the environs of Wittenberg the troops which blockaded that fortress, had effected their entrance, and, coming out upon the right bank of the Elbe, had gone in pursuit of the Prussian detachments. Marshal

Macdonald had come to place himself at Kemberg, behind Wittenberg, to support Dombrowski and Reynier. Lastly, on the left, Ney had approached Dessau and driven back all the enemy's detachments on the right of the Mulda. The prisoners who had been taken, and the movements which were perceived, were calculated to throw Napoleon into great uncertainty. In fact, at Wartenburg on our right, at Wittenberg on our front, at Dessau on our left, had been seen not only detachments, but whole corps and immense convoys, so that it was impossible to say whether the enemy was recrossing to the right bank of the Elbe at our approach, or was halting behind the Mulda waiting to give battle till we should dare to cross that river before them. It was possible also that the two armies of the North and Silesia, united behind the Mulda, should ascend that river to effect their junction with the army of Bohemia in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. This last movement on their part exposed us to the very serious danger of having all the allied force to encounter at once. It was, therefore, necessary, while endeavouring to destroy Bernadotte and Blücher, first, to manoeuvre in such a way as to remain always interposed between them and Prince Schwarzenberg, i.e. between the mass ascending from the Lower Elbe and that which was descending from Bohemia. In this view, Napoleon ordered Marshal Marmont to cross the bridge at Duben, and, giving him a strong division of cavalry, brought him to the left of the Mulda toward Dolitzsch. Marmont would then be behind a detached branch of the Mulda flowing from Leipsic to Jesnitz, sometimes forming swamps, sometimes passing in a narrow stream to join the principal arm at Bitterfeld. In this position Marmont was sufficiently protected; by sending out his light cavalry, he could detect the movements of the enemy, and if he learned that the army of Silesia or of the North was ascending behind the Mulda, in the direction of Leipsic, it was easy to march thither in a few hours and to be there before them. Joining Murat with 25,000 men, he would raise his numbers to nearly 90,000, and that was sufficient to insure time for Napoleon to return and to maintain himself always between the two masses who were endeavouring to combine for his destruction. Having taken this salutary precaution, Napoleon did what was necessary to prevent any injury to his grand design if, as he hoped, the fear of a movement of Blücher and Bernadotte upon Leipsic should prove a chimera. He ordered Dombrowski and Reynier to debouch from Wittenberg upon all the enemy's corps which they should meet beyond the Elbe, to descend even along the right bank, there to destroy Bernadotte's bridges from Roslau to Barby, which would in any case be a great injury to the allies, for if they had recrossed to the right bank of the Elbe to take refuge in the direction of Berlin, they would be deprived of all means of returning to the aid of the army of Bohemia, and if they had remained on the left bank, they would be shut up in a *cul-de-sac*, to be taken and crushed by Napoleon. He ordered Ney to make himself master of the bridges of the Mulda at Dessau. He left Macdonald at Kemberg to support Reynier and Dombrowski in case of need, Bertrand at Wartenburg.

complete the destruction of Blücher's *ête-de-pont*, and he concentrated Latour-Maubourg and the Guard around Düben, ready to follow Ney to Dessau, to fall upon the armies of Silesia and the North beyond the Mulda, or to fall back toward Marmont if it should be necessary to retrograde in the direction of Leipsic. In such perplexities, in such profound and constant calculations, did Napoleon pass the 11th,—a day which many critics, ignorant of his real thoughts, have reproached him for having lost!

On the 12th, having risen, according to his custom, between midnight and one o'clock, he collected with eagerness all the intelligence that came from every quarter. Two indications, very marked the day before, were now still more obvious. It appeared that one of the two armies of the Lower Elbe, that of Bernadotte, had crossed over to the right bank, and that the other, on the contrary, that of Blücher, had remained on the left bank, showing some tendency to ascend toward Leipsic, behind the Mulda. The movements ordered the day before, particularly that of Marmont, exactly corresponded to this indication. An important piece of news, that of a successful battle fought on the 10th by Murat with Wittgenstein, was calculated to confirm Napoleon in his purpose of throwing himself forthwith upon the armies of the North and Silesia.

With Murat events had occurred as follows. Having gone with Poniatowski, Lauriston, Victor, and the 4th and 5th cavalry to Froburg, he had succeeded in intercepting the road leading by Comotau and Chemnitz to Leipsic, but he had not had time to intercept that which leads to that city by Carlsbad and Zwickau. Profiting by the road which remained open, Wittgenstein had been able to occupy Borna, and Murat found himself on the 10th with the Austrians on his left at Penig, and the Russians on his right at Borna. Unwilling to remain in this position, and especially unwilling to allow the head of one of the two columns of the enemy to reach Leipsic before him, he had boldly fallen to the right, and had attacked Borna with the utmost vigour. The Russians defended themselves bravely; but Poniatowski and Lauriston had attacked them with still greater valour, and had recaptured Borna with the bayonet. This battle, which had cost Wittgenstein 3000 or 4000 men, had made us masters of the Leipsic road, and had replaced Murat in his natural position, that of protecting Leipsic against the two columns of Schwarzenberg debouching from Bohemia. To judge from first appearances, Wittgenstein, repulsed from Borna, seemed to be in retreat, and our cavalry said that they had seen him returning toward Bohemia. Murat, in writing to Napoleon, stated that he believed the army of Bohemia to be in retreat, and urged him to use every endeavour to dispose of the armies of Silesia and the North. These news were dated October 11, 11:30 A.M.

On receiving these details on the morning of the 12th, Napoleon again thought that the army of Bohemia was in no hurry to engage, that the allies had still the same desire to avoid him, that it was, therefore, necessary to begin, by falling upon the armies of Silesia and the North, pursuing them beyond the Elbe, then ascending that river on the right bank, and surprising the army of Bohemia by unexpectedly

crossing to the left bank. Napoleon confirmed his former orders as late as 10 A.M., and made preparations for passing the Mulda, in order to fall first upon Blücher, who was appearing to our left, and then upon Bernadotte, who seemed to keep his ground on our right, on the left of the Elbe. He brought the Imperial Guard nearer to Düben, in order to join Marmont, and march directly against Blücher on the other side of the Mulda.

But at 10 A.M. the face of things suddenly changed. A second letter from Murat, written the day before, *i.e.* the 11th, at 5 P.M., was of a very different intelligence. Instead of finding the enemy in retreat, they had found them in full march upon Leipsic. The Austrians, pursuing their march by the Chemnitz road, continued to advance upon Froburg and Borna, and Wittgenstein's column, after having fallen back for a moment upon the Zwickau road, as Altenburg, had then boldly resumed its march upon Leipsic. Murat, who until this time was retrograding upon Leipsic, first to a battle with disproportioned forces, and secondly to protect the city. He was about twenty miles himself at some leagues from Leipsic, in a position, where he hoped to keep his ground, reinforced by the troops which expected him. He urged Napoleon not to relinquish his purpose, that he were sure of reaching the armies of Silesia and the North, and promising, for his own part, to devote himself in the mean while to the ungrateful and dangerous task of struggling against an enemy three or four times superior in number. At the same time, Murat's reconnoissances had discovered Blücher's army quitting the banks of the Mulda for those of the Saale, which flows parallel to the Mulda but at a greater distance, and, ascending toward Halle, tending plainly toward Leipsic.

At these news Napoleon, with the promptness of a great warrior, hesitated no longer, and changed all his plans. He abandoned the grand design of rushing first upon Bernadotte, and then returning upon Schwarzenberg's army by the right bank of the Elbe, and he resolved to make for Leipsic immediately by the shortest road. As long as he could hope to keep between the two armies which were coming, one from Bohemia, the other from the Lower Elbe, with the prospect of throwing himself at pleasure upon either, his plan of occupying that of Bohemia by Murat, while he should begin by attacking that of the Elbe, was the most able and prudent. He now that the tendency of one toward the other was evident, while he was not sure that Murat could withstand for several successive days the army of Bohemia, nor yet that he could rejoin the armies of Silesia and the North, and keep them separated from Leipsic, the most urgent manœuvre was to oppose the junction of the three allied armies, and that the reason to engage the army of Bohemia at Leipsic as soon as possible. This was the way out of the difficulty: for to persist in throwing himself by Dessau upon the armies of Silesia and the North, when he was not sure of defeating them combined, since one appeared to be ascending toward Leipsic, and the other to be recrossing the Elbe, and thus to expose himself to the possibility of reaching neither, while the other should go to join the army of Bohemia.

at Leipsic, and these two last should overwhelm Murat, was a line of conduct not to be adopted by such a commander as Napoleon, and we cannot fail to admire the readiness with which he passed from one of these plans directly to the other. But from this moment his situation was less favourable; for having lately had a well-founded hope of beating the enemy's armies in succession, perhaps even of inflicting a real catastrophe upon them, he was now in his turn threatened with a combination of overwhelming forces, and his greatest triumph would be not to inflict a disaster upon his enemies, but to escape one himself. It is true that he had a chance of routing Schwarzenberg before the arrival of Blücher, and perhaps also of routing Blücher before he could be joined by Bernadotte; but to obtain these results were required a precision and rapidity of movement very difficult to be attained by soldiers worn out by continual marching and by the most unfavourable weather.

At this moment,—i.e. on the 12th, between 10 o'clock and noon,—he formed his plans and issued his orders. Murat, who on the 11th had seen the renewal of the offensive movement of the army of Bohemia, might easily occupy the whole of the 12th in falling back upon Leipsic, where he could defend himself on the 13th, 14th, and even 15th, with the succours which would be forwarded to him successively. In fact, Marmont, already at Dolitzsch, was only one march from Leipsic, and if the order were immediately sent him to repair thither, he ought to reach that city on the evening of the 12th or morning of the 13th at latest. This reinforcement of nearly 25,000 men, including cavalry, joined to Augereau, whose arrival was announced, would procure Murat about 90,000 men by the 13th. The Guard and Latour-Maubourg had been retained in the neighborhood of Düben, and might fall back there during the day to cross the Mulda and take the road for Leipsic. Had it not been necessary to cross by the single bridge of Düben with immense convoys of artillery and baggage, the Guard and Latour-Maubourg might have been on the other side of the Mulda the same evening, and have made one march upon Leipsic, which they might in that case have reached on the evening of the 13th. Reckoning the Guard at 38,000 men of all arms, after the fatigues they had undergone, Latour-Maubourg at 6000 horse, (the nominal effective was much higher,) there would have been 44,000 men who, on the evening of the 13th, or the morning of the 14th, should reinforce Murat, and raise his numbers to 134,000 men, and form an impenetrable barrier between the army of Bohemia and that of Silesia. There remained Bertrand, occupied near Wartenburg in destroying the works of Blücher, and Macdonald, who had been sent into the neighbourhood of Wittenberg to support Reynier and Dombrowski. Macdonald and Bertrand, being brought to Düben on the 13th, might be at Leipsic on the evening of the 14th, or at latest on the 15th, and thus raise to 160,000 men the grand army which was being there formed. Lastly, Dombrowski with 5000 men, Reynier with 15,000, Sebastiani with 4000 horse, had been sent to the other side of the Elbe, to destroy all the bridges of that river as far as

Barby, and Ney, with 15,000 men, had been charged to seize those of the Mulda, in order to keep at a distance the army of the North, which seemed determined to remain on the other side of the Elbe. These were 38,000 or 39,000 more men, who, being collected at Leipsic, should raise the general concentration of our forces to a total of about 200,000 fighting-men. In the concentric position of these 200,000 men, in the midst of all the armies of the allies, it was possible to venture a battle, which would no doubt be formidable, but which might be successful, even on the supposition that the allies could muster more than 300,000 men.

Napoleon forwarded his orders between 10 o'clock and 12 to the different masses destined to combine at Leipsic, Marmont from Dolitzsch, the Guard and Latour-Maubourg from Düben, Bertrand and Macdonald from the environs of Wittenberg. With respect to the last portion of 38,000 men, occupied some on the other side of the Elbe by Wittenberg, some on the other side of the Mulda by Dessau, Napoleon calculated that even if he should bring them the next day to Düben, they could not there cross the bridge of the Mulda, on account of the encumbrance of men and *matériel*; he therefore allowed them to finish the task assigned to them. Having reason to suppose that the army of the North had repassed the Elbe, he wished to put it altogether beyond the power of action, by fully destroying the means of passage. He consequently ordered Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani to terminate as quickly as possible their operations against the bridges of Roslau, Acken, and Barby, Ney to carry those of Dessau, and all to neglect nothing that could deprive Bernadotte, who was supposed to be beyond the Elbe, of the possibility of recrossing that river.

Thus, in these deeply-calculated orders every thing was provided for as far as is possible by human foresight. On the following day, October 13, Murat should have nearly 90,000 men at Leipsic, on the 14th, 134,000 with Napoleon in person, which would render impossible any union of the enemy's masses. Finally, on the 15th and 16th, the grand army, raised successively to 200,000 men, was to be placed with all its forces between the allied armies. It remained only to fight with valour and success: valour Napoleon justly expected of his soldiers; success he still hoped from his genius and his fortune.

He resolved to wait at Düben the execution of his orders. It was, in fact, of little consequence that he should be at Leipsic before his troops were collected there; and at Düben, on the contrary, he could watch the defiling of his *corps d'armée* and the measures prescribed for getting rid of Bernadotte, who constantly appeared to have returned to the right bank of the Elbe. During the 12th, Dombrowski and Reynier, preceded by Sebastiani's cavalry, having crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, drove before them the Prussians, and even took some prisoners from Thümen's division, which had always made part of Bernadotte's corps. This was a new reason for believing in the return of the army of the North to the right bank of the Elbe. Dombrowski and Reynier then fell back to the left to destroy the bridge of Ros-

lau, and there fell in with the troops of General Hirschfeld, also belonging to the army of the North. They did not descend farther, as considerable forces seemed to be there collected. At the same time Ney, operating upon the Mulda, crossed the bridges of Dessau, situated near the confluence of the Mulda with the Elbe. A little before Dessau, and to the right, —*i.e.* at Worlitz,—was a detachment of the enemy. Ney directed against Worlitz the cavalry of General Fournier, with some infantry troops of the 3d corps, and with the rest of that corps he threw himself upon Dessau itself. The enemy was briskly thrown back upon the bridge of Dessau, whither cavalry and infantry fled in frightful confusion. About a thousand prisoners and several guns were taken. In the mean while, the Prussian detachment occupying Worlitz, attacked with equal vigour, was thrown upon Dessau, where we already were, and, being caught between two fires, was taken or killed by General Fournier's cavalry. These affairs cost the enemy nearly 3000 men and many guns. The troops met at this point were those of Tauenzien's corps, which, though not belonging to Bernadotte, had habitually served with him. He appeared to fall back upon the Elbe. Marshal Ney did not engage further, having orders to hold himself in readiness to retrace his steps.

These various rencounters confirmed the supposition that the army of the North had remained on the right of the Elbe, for the Thumen division, the corps of General Hirschfeld, and that of Tauenzien, had continually marched along with it. The most probable supposition was that it was remaining on the Elbe for the protection of Berlin, whilst the army of Silesia, having gone from the Mulda to the Saale to effect its movement under the protection of two rivers, was ascending toward Halle and Leipsic, in order to join the army of Bohemia. Such a hypothesis involved no doubt many difficulties, for it was not easy to understand why the armies of Silesia and the North had, at great risk, effected their junction and the passage of the Elbe to separate again, nor why Blücher had not gone simply to join Prince Schwarzenberg across Bohemia, instead of taking the immense circuit from Bautzen to Dessau, from Dessau to Leipsic. But this was not the first time that they had seen the allied generals perform unusual manœuvres; and, as all reconnoissances confirmed the separation of the two armies of the North and of Silesia, it was impossible not to yield to unanimous evidence. It seemed, then, established that they had to do with Schwarzenberg reinforced by Blücher alone, if, indeed, the latter should succeed in joining the generalissimo through the masses of the French army.

On the 13th, these appearances were again confirmed by reconnoissances effected in every direction, and, consequently, Napoleon persisted in his opinion, which, indeed, was not of practical import; for in any case it was necessary to concentrate as completely and as quickly as possible around Leipsic. Marmont, with the cavalry of General Deforge, having reconnoitred the Mulda, between the principal arm and the smaller arm which passes Do-

litzsch, continually kept by the soldiers of Blücher's troops, who effected the same movement along the Saale, and were near Halle as we were for Leipsic. On the evening of the 13th, Marshal Marmont posted his army behind Leipsic in the position of Blücher, which faces the road to Halle. He was in a condition to prevent Blücher's entry into Leipsic. On the same day, Murat took the order upon the opposite side of Leipsic, where he kept in check the army of Prince Schwarzenberg. Augereau, after having sent the light troops of Lichtenstein and Thümen beyond Wiessenfels, not far from the park of Lutzen, had put them to the sword, and taken 2000 men. The dragoons of Silesia, accustomed to handle the sabre, had made great carnage of the enemy's cavalry. Augereau was at the very entry of Leipsic toward Dessau, which presented another obstacle to the junction of Blücher and Schwarzenberg. Thus on the evening of the 13th, 100,000 men were gathered at Leipsic, in such a manner as to interpose between the masses of the enemy.

On the Düben road the same movement of concentration took place on the same day, the 13th. The Guard and Latour-Maubourg's corps crossed the bridge of the Mulda the day before, notwithstanding a very inconvenient crowding, followed the track of Marshal Marmont, and marched in the same order, taking care to protect themselves by their light cavalry in the direction of General Blücher. Bernadotte's Macdonald approached Düben to cross the Mulda at that point in the evening of the 13th following day. Ney retrograded from Dessau to Düben to pass after them. Reynier, Lefebrowski, and Sebastiani returned to Wittenberg. The rain being incessant, the roads were in a frightful state, and unnumbered many soldiers, too young for such toils, remained behind encumbering the roads. The principal head-quarters, composed of the Saxon court, of the engineer and artillery parks, and the bridge-apparatus, comprising at least 2000 vehicles, had followed Napoleon as far as Eilenburg upon the Mulda. These head-quarters were guarded by 4000 men and 12000 an immense convoy. They were half-way on the road from Leipsic to Torgau. Napoleon had ordered that all belonging to the army should be directed toward Leipsic, and that all the rest should be shut up in Torgau. The Saxon court had been left free to encamp between Torgau and Leipsic. At Torgau they had to fear a siege and frightful malices of Leipsic a battle. But, guided by an excessive confidence in Napoleon, they had thought that the greatest safety was with him, and they had decided in favour of Leipsic at the risk of witnessing the most terrible conflict ever known among civilized nations. This occasioned an additional encumbrance of the crowded and broken roads. At the bridge of Eilenburg the soldiers of the artillery-park and those of the bridge-apparatus had almost come to blows.

On the morning of the 14th, after having all night superintended the execution of his orders, Napoleon prepared to start for Leipsic. At the moment of his departure, a despatch from Marshal Ney, received very near the enemy, placed him in doubt as to the position

of the army of the North. It no longer appeared upon the right of the Elbe, but on the left, and behind the Lower Saale, always extremely careful to avoid an encounter with us. It was thus much below Blücher on the Saale, and at a much greater distance than he from Leipsic; but while he should ascend toward Halle,—i.e. toward Leipsic,—it could follow his movement, even though at a distance; and in this case it was possible that we should have it still on our hands, which would give us three armies to engage instead of two. It is true that Leipsic, in our occupation, would always present a very difficult obstacle between them. On receiving this last information, Napoleon sent new orders to Ney, Reynier, Dombrowski, and Sebastiani, who had the longest road to traverse, and recommended them to hasten, for the more enemies they perceived in their way the greater necessity was there of concentration. He then left Düben so as to reach Leipsic the evening of the same day, the 14th. On the road he met the King of Saxony, already much moved by what he had seen, encouraged and charmed him as he always did by his energy and grace, and went forward to alight in the faubourg of Reudnitz, half a league outside of Leipsic, on the same side as Murat. He took up his abode in a private residence which had been prepared for him.

Here he found himself in company with Berthier, Murat, Marmont, and various officers of his family; and he exhibited to them all the utmost confidence. Yet the situation was far from encouraging. The utmost he could muster around Leipsic were 190,000 men, while eight days earlier he had about 210,000, and two months earlier 360,000. In eight days he had lost 20,000 men from the march and from different engagements, and 80,000 were remaining paralyzed at Dresden. If Bernadotte should join Blücher, he might have to fight from 320,000 to 350,000 men; and this was a terrible struggle against men in a high state of enthusiasm. He was to see himself surrounded, cut off in a manner on the south and east of Leipsic by the army of Prince Schwarzenberg, on the north by the armies of Blücher and Bernadotte, perhaps even surrounded on the west and cut off from Mentz, if Blücher, by means of Thielmann's light troops, should succeed in joining Schwarzenberg across the plain of Lützen. The situation, then, was very serious, though he had great resources in the indomitable courage of his soldiers, in his own genius, and in the concentric position which allowed him to keep some in check whilst he combated others, and thus to overcome them in succession. Moreover, he had never ceased to hope.

The political events which he learned were also unfavourable, and of a nature to put his temper to a new trial. The kingdom of Westphalia had just suddenly fallen on the mere appearance of a troop of Cossacks. This might have been easily foreseen; but the blow was not the less sensible, nor the augury less ominous. In fact, after the battle of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, Bernadotte, who had reached the Elbe, many points on which he had occupied between Wittenberg and Magdeburg, undertaking always those offices which were attended with most pain to Napoleon and least

honour to himself, had taken pleasure in sending against Hesse-Cassel, with some light infantry and a number of Cossacks, in the design of overthrowing the throne of Jerome. While Thielmann and Lichtenstein were invading Saxony and Thuringia, these troops had invaded Hesse, and had made for Cassel, where a great sensation might be occasioned by the overthrow of one of the thrones founded by Napoleon. Everywhere favoured by the people, well received, well informed, well fed, they had reached the gates of Cassel without difficulty. King Jerome had for his defence only one battalion of grenadiers and two regiments of Westphalian cuirassiers, besides some French hussars. These last had been recently formed in order to secure him a guard on whom he might depend, and were to have been raised to 1200 men. But they scarcely numbered 700 or 800, who had arrived from France within a few days, and many of them were still unable to ride. On the approach of the party of Czernicheff, all spirits had been much excited, and the hope of shaking off a foreign royalty had almost roused them to revolt. The troops, few in number, and for the greater part Westphalians, restrained by military discipline, had abstained from exhibiting their sentiments, but they could easily be guessed. Jerome was, therefore, in a frightful position; nevertheless, he had braved the storm, and had addressed the Duke of Valmy at Mentz, requesting the aid of 3000 or 4000 French, and in the mean while had attempted a sortie at the head of his battalion of grenadiers and of 400 French hussars, selected from such as were able to ride. This sortie was at first successful, and the French hussars had bravely charged the enemy, who fell back for a moment. But shortly, excitement increasing at Cassel, the greater part of the Westphalian troops deserting, and the Duke of Valmy being unable in such a critical conjuncture to displace 3000 or 4000 French without formal leave from Napoleon, Jerome had been obliged to evacuate his capital and to withdraw to Coblenz. On September 30, Czernicheff entered Cassel, and the kingdom of Westphalia ceased to exist.

This intelligence was followed by another not less annoying. Bavaria was on the point of abandoning us, and there was even a report that she had signed a treaty of adhesion to the European coalition. She had, however, prepared us for this event. The king, continually complaining that he was left to his own resources, had repeatedly said that his army placed upon the banks of the Inn, under General de Wrede, would not be able to resist the Austrian army; that unless a corps of 30,000 men were immediately sent to him, he should be obliged to yield to the demands of the allied Powers, to the dissatisfied feelings of his troops, and to the unanimous opinion of his people. Our minister, M. Meroy d'Argenteau, who behaved at Munich with much zeal and prudence, had been unable to reply to these complaints, except by promises always contradicted by facts, and he had frequently warned M. de Bassano of the danger which threatened us in that quarter.

The departure of Marshal Angereau for Bavaria had been the signal for defection, and Bavaria

had yielded and signed a treaty of alliance with our enemies. We ought, therefore, to expect, if forced to retire, to find on our rear an army of 30,000 Austrians and 30,000 Bavarians ready to bar our retreat. It was, therefore, necessary, at any price, to prove victorious at Leipsic, under pain of a disaster not more tragical, but more irremediable, than that of Moscow.\*

This situation, which appeared to grow every hour more gloomy, did not escape Napoleon, but it by no means disquieted him. The idea of being conquered by the generals and soldiers of the coalition never entered his mind. His generals had been four times beaten in this campaign, but he had himself never been beaten in this or in any other. After having fought more than fifty pitched battles, which had occurred to no captain, ancient or modern, he had not lost one. No doubt he found his soldiers somewhat young for the endurance of great fatigue, but he had never seen braver; he was conscious of his prodigious penetration, which gave him such advantage over his enemies, as one is conscious of the excellence of one's sight by exercising it continually: he, therefore, had no doubt that he should gain one or even two or three battles. His hope was first to conquer Schwarzenberg the first day, then Blücher the second, and thus to escape from the network in which they sought to entangle him. Yet his numerical inferiority appeared to him very great, for he could not hope to muster 200,000 fighting-men, and his adversaries ought to have more than 300,000, if they succeeded in uniting. Foreseeing this difficulty, he had ordered an arrangement of which he had often thought, which was to place the infantry in two ranks instead of three. He maintained that the third rank was of no use, either in firing or in charging with the bayonet, and he would not acknowledge to himself that the third rank might, nevertheless, support the

other two, impress them with firmness, and recruit their numbers. But, in his present want, it was well to try the plan, however difficult to defend it.

Shut up during this evening in a room heated after the German manner, and leaning against a large stove, he held a long, familiar, and important conversation with Berthier, Murat, Marmont, and several of his generals. He maintained the formation of the infantry in two ranks, and said that at least on the following day this would have a great effect,—that of representing the army as one-third stronger than it really was, since the enemy would be ignorant of the new arrangement. They discussed the subject, and then spoke of the possibility of judging by the eye of the strength of an army on the ground, and Napoleon affirmed that with his long experience he was never sure of not being deceived to the extent of at least a fourth. Suddenly Augereau was announced, whom he had not yet seen, for that marshal had only just joined head-quarters. "Ah! my old friend Augereau," he exclaimed, "here you are! Come away: you have been long expected." Then without bitterness or censure, but in a friendly though melancholy tone, he added, "You are no longer the Augereau of Castiglione!" "Yes," replied the marshal, "I should still be the Augereau of Castiglione if you will restore to me the soldiers of Italy." This repartee did not irritate Napoleon, but he continued to complain of a sort of general falling off about him. From a tendency very common to men of charging their misfortunes more readily on others than on themselves, he accused everybody, though very mildly. He began with his brothers,—as if they had been exclusively guilty of what had passed in their states, as if he had himself had no share in their misfortunes. He complained of Louis, who, from Switzerland, whither he had with-

\* The wretched flatterers who during his reign contributed to the destruction of Napoleon, and since his fall have more than once compromised his memory, have ascribed to the defection of Bavaria all the disasters which have signalized the close of the campaign of 1813. It is because Napoleon is returned to Leipsic, they say, instead of descending to Magdeburg and Hamburg, to take his position upon the Lower Elbe, that he fell. By saying this, they prove that they have neither known the most important part of the documents of this period, nor correctly interpreted those which they had before their eyes. It was not the defection of Bavaria that brought Napoleon from Düben to Leipsic, which would have been a very insufficient motive for such a commander as he. He returned, as we have related, in order to remain always between the army of Bohemia and those of Russia and the North; and he could do this only by going to Leipsic before Blücher should have time to arrive there. Had not ten of these common-sense reasons, there are others absolutely insupportable. In the letter of Napoleon himself. It was on the morning of the 12th that he changed his plan of march, and relinquished the movement upon Berlin for that upon Leipsic; but on the 13th he was still ignorant of the defection of Bavaria, for, relating to M. de Bassano, who was at Eilenburg, the arrest of the secretary of M. Pozzo di Borgo, and his conversation with him, he said that the dispatch which he had received upon Bavaria, but without being certain of having secured her. On the 13th Napoleon did not then know what was the position of Bavaria, but his orders to march upon Leipsic had been given on the 12th. Finally, it is proved by the diplomatic correspondence of M. de Mory d'Armentau, that that minister did not know till the 9th of October of the treaty signed at Munich on the 5th, that his despatches announcing these news were intercepted and never reached Napoleon. In the actual state of communications, those despatches, obliged to go as far as Frankfurt or Meutz in order to gain the front of the grand army, would certainly not reach Düben before the 12th, even had they not been intercepted.

These are positive and indisputable facts. On the 16th, there were at Leipsic only vague reports derived from the allies, who knew what had passed between them and Bavaria, and whose joy on the occasion betrayed the intelligence. Napoleon, therefore, could not have gone to Leipsic on account of the defection of Bavaria, being ignorant of that event. This false statement has been founded on an assertion of the *Moniteur* of the time, which pretends that the defection of Bavaria had compelled Napoleon to return to Leipsic. We have seen by substantial proofs that the assertion is radically false. Napoleon's motive for dissimulation on this occasion was this: Seeking a palpable explanation for the public mind for the manoeuvre which had brought him back to Leipsic, which had been attended with such a disastrous result, he invented the reason of the defection of Bavaria, which was of striking force to the ignorant, and which served to conceal what might be supposed an error, as in 1812 he had assigned the cold as the cause of our misfortunes, and as he had ascribed the disaster at Kulm to Varnhagen's neglect of instructions. But while Napoleon in this manner justified himself to the ignorant, he condemned himself to the better-informed. If, in fact, he had been certain that the road from Eilenburg would be closed by the defection of Bavaria, this would have been an additional reason for descending upon Magdeburg and Hamburg, instead of ascending to Leipsic, since he would thus have secured a much better road, and one still open,—that of Wittenberg. But Napoleon, desiring to make the public understand how he had been forced in virtue of very able manoeuvres to return to Leipsic, adopted a specious assertion, palpable to every one, and published it in the official reports, at the expense of truth and of his own glory. Happily, truth always ultimately triumphs, for sooner or later men are found who love it and how to discover it; and sometimes it condemns, sometimes justifies, those who have had the imprudence to conceal it. It is often, indeed, more advantageous to them than the falsehood which they have invented in their own justification.

drawn, now demanded that Holland should be restored to him; of Jerome, who had just lost Cassel; of Joseph, who had just lost Spain. Then he added that his misfortune had been to do too much for his family, that his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, had repeatedly reproached him with this, and that he now recognised the truth when too late. "You yourself," he said to Murat, with singular frankness, rendered supportable by the total absence of bitterness, "were you not ready to abandon me?" Murat repelled the insinuation, saying that he had always had concealed enemies, eager to injure him with his brother-in-law. "Yes, yes," replied Napoleon, in a tone of such confident assertion that it was easy to see that he had known or conjectured every thing, "you were ready to act like Austria; but I forgive you. You are good, you have real friendship for me, and you are a brave man; but I was wrong to have made you a king. If I had been content to have made you viceroy, like Eugene, you would have acted like him; but, as a king, you think of your own crown more than of mine." These truths, softened by the tone in which they were uttered, greatly moved those who heard them, and formed the subject of conversation till the night was far advanced. Then, with a kind of lofty resignation, and with affectionate expressions, Napoleon left his lieutenants, saying that it was necessary to prepare to fight well, for they should have to do with a strong party the next day, and the approaching battle would decide their fate, his own, and that of France.

This sad reference to the past was the only sign given by Napoleon of his gloomy presentiments, for he was otherwise calm, tranquil, and resolved as if the circumstances had been similar to those which preceded Austerlitz or Friedland.\*

On the following morning Napoleon was early on horseback to inspect the field of battle, unwilling to take the initiative because of his corps still in the rear, and supposing that the enemy would not take it. The case was urgent; for this field of battle, immortalized by our valour and our misfortunes, deserved to be well studied in all its extent, in order that, from a perfect knowledge of the places, Napoleon might be able to command where he was not personally present. He went first to the south of Leipsic, in the direction where Murat was established after he had retired before the army of Bohemia.

The Pleisse and the Elster, like the Saale and the Mulda, descend from the mountains of Bohemia, traverse the whole of Saxony,

\* I need not repeat what I have so often said,—that I only relate the conversations of Napoleon when I have authentic proof of their perfect accuracy; and I record that in the text because it appears to me to be of singular significance the evening before the battle of Leipsic. It proves that already the mind of Napoleon was admitting a confused melancholy. This conversation had a witness, M. Jouanne, one of Napoleon's confidential secretaries, a respectable man, worthy of all credit, who, being there to write certain orders from Napoleon's dictation, heard the conversation, and committed his remembrance of it to writing. From this document, preserved by M. Jouanne, I have retraced this conversation, briefly recapitulating the subjects in a historic style, which does not allow every familiarity of language, and which does not demand the repetition of military colloquialisms, which are suited only to private memoirs.

flowing nearly in the same direction until, either separately or united, they fall into the Elbe. A little above Leipsic, the Pleisse and the Elster, not far from each other, are divided into a multitude of branches, and below that city they unite, then turn a little to the left, and fall into the Saale, and flow toward the Elbe in a direction nearly parallel to that of the Mulda. The movements of the different armies were as follows. Prince Schwarzenberg, having debouched from the mountains of Bohemia with the grand army of the three sovereigns, had reached Leipsic, descending between the Mulda, the Pleisse, and the Elster. Napoleon, on the contrary, coming to meet him from the Lower Elbe, had ascended the rivers as far as Leipsic. Prince Schwarzenberg had his left on the Pleisse and the Elster, and his right in the slightly-undulating plains around Leipsic. Napoleon had his left in the same plains, and his right at the two rivers. Firmly supported by Leipsic in his rear, and strongly occupying that city, he might expect to keep Blücher and Bernadotte wholly separate from Schwarzenberg. In fact, Blücher, being unable to traverse Leipsic, which was in our possession, was forced to turn to the right or the left in order to join the grand army of Bohemia. To turn to his right, it was necessary to cross an obstacle of great importance, viz.: the Pleisse, the Elster, and the Saale united, covering with their many arms a wooded valley more than a league in width, behind which he might have found the French, and in particular Augereau, who was advancing by the Lutzen road, after having beaten Platow and Thielmann. If, on the contrary, he had endeavoured to turn to the left, he would have met, across the vast plain of Leipsic, the French army returning from Düben, and would have been exposed to the greatest danger. Hence he had the French army like a wall between him and Schwarzenberg. It was, therefore, sufficient that Napoleon should arrest Schwarzenberg on the south of Leipsic, and Blücher on the north, to prevent them combining, and if he succeeded in beating one and then falling upon the other, it was possible that he should triumph over the two in succession, especially as Bernadotte was at a great distance and nothing as yet proved that he should arrive. Napoleon, knowing that Schwarzenberg was the nearest, determined first to engage with him, reserving the combat with Blücher till the following day.

He began his review, then, by the south, i.e. by the field of battle on which he expected to meet Prince Schwarzenberg. The Pleisse and the Elster, sometimes confounded, sometimes separated, embracing a large extent of ground, marshy and wooded, flowed, as we have said, from Bohemia to Leipsic, i.e. from south to north. Napoleon ought naturally to support his right by it, as Schwarzenberg supported his left; and it was a solid support, for the bed of the two rivers was not easily crossed. And even if that bed were crossed, it would have been necessary to ascend a ground of considerable elevation to debouch behind our right in the plain of Leipsic. In his front, Napoleon had as a battle-field a ground very little broken, and which was perfectly defended by some villages.

ning at Mark-Kleeberg on the Pleisse, passing by Wachau, and ending at Liebert-Wolkwitz, a slight depression of the ground serving to carry off the waters toward the Pleisse separated our line from that of the enemy. Such as it was, this valley, if it may be so called, was the obstacle which we were about to dispute with desperation. Lastly, on his left, Napoleon had the vast plain of Leipsic, abounding in large villages, and scarcely furrowed by a very small river, the Partha, which, rising at some distance from Liebert-Wolkwitz, after numerous windings, fell, in our rear, into the Pleisse, traversing a faubourg of Leipsic. On this side Napoleon was almost without support, but the presence of his columns from Duben would keep the enemy in check, and prevent any effort on their part in that direction. Murat, having taken his position to the south, had established Poniatowski at Mark-Kleeberg on the Pleisse, Victor at Wachau, Lauriston at Liebert-Wolkwitz, and in the intervals the 4th cavalry, (Polish cavalry,) and the 5th, under Pajol, in which had been fused the dragoons of Spain.

On the other side of this small valley were perceived opposite to us Kleist and Wittgenstein, between Gross-Possnau, Gulden-Gossa, and Crobern, with the Russian and Prussian guards as reserves. The Austrian army was partly on our right, between the Pleisse and the Elster, advancing in the angle formed by these rivers, and threatening the Dolitz bridge, partly on our left in advance of the wood called the University wood, opposite Liebert-Wolkwitz, and intended at a later period to unite with Blücher across the plain of Leipsic, if we should lose ground and the allies should gain it.

Napoleon perfectly approved the position taken by Murat. He resolved to dispute with energy the line from Liebert-Wolkwitz to Wachau and Mark-Kleeberg; for that purpose to double the three corps of Murat, placing Augereau to the right near Mark-Kleeberg, the Guard and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg in the centre at Wachau, Macdonald with Sebastiani's cavalry to the left beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, to prevent our left wing becoming outflanked, and even to attempt, as we shall soon see, to outflank the right wing of the enemy. The Austrians advancing between the Pleisse and the Elster against the Dolitz bridge, Napoleon, to avoid being turned on his right, placed there Lefol's brigade, taken from the troops which formed the garrison of Leipsic. After the battles that had been fought, and the marches that had been performed in the mud, the corps of Lauriston, Victor, Poniatowski, and Pajol, led by Murat, might amount to 38,000 men, Augereau and Lefol to 12,000, the Guard to 36,000, Latour-Maubourg to 6000, Macdonald and Sebastiani to 22,000, which made about 114,000 or 115,000 men opposed to 160,000. But by skilful manœuvring and energetic fighting, both of which might be relied on, by using, for example, some of the corps left in the rear under Ney, it would be possible to reinforce Macdonald with 25,000 or 30,000 men, and then fall back *en masse* by the left upon Schwarzenberg's right and drive them into the Pleisse. This was, in fact, the plan of Napoleon, if the corps actually on the

march were not indispensable in the North against Blücher and Bernadotte.

Having finished his review of the ground and made his arrangements, Napoleon returned by the left to the faubourg of Reudnitz. He traversed the banks of the little river Partha, which, as we have said, rolls its feeble waters in a scarcely perceptible cavity, and, passing by Tancha and Schonfeld, empties them into the Pleisse on the north of Leipsic, traversing the faubourg of Halle. There, if the enemy should come to closer quarters, might be found a new field of battle a little to the rear of our left; but it did not call for much attention, as the enemy had not appeared there, and as we had only cavalry to place.

It was not enough to have made every arrangement to resist the grand army of Bohemia; it was necessary also to think of opposing Blücher, who must be expected to appear at any moment to the north of Leipsic. On that side, fortunately, by crossing the Partha, was found a tolerably advantageous position, extending from the village of Mockern to that of Euteritzsch, barring the road from Halle to Leipsic, and presenting a wide, elevated ground, supported on one side by the Pleisse and the Elster, on the other by a large ravine, where a corps might deploy easily and command an enemy which might be coming from Halle. If obliged to abandon this position, they had the resource of falling back behind the Partha, and of placing themselves in advance of the Halle faubourg, with Leipsic in the rear.

Here it was that Marmont, who had never ceased to observe Blücher during the march of our troops, had taken his position to combat him if necessary. Napoleon approved the position, and recommended him to maintain it. Ney, with Bertrand, Souham, Reynier, and Dombrowski, all delayed by the destruction of the bridges of the Mulda and the Elbe, was to range himself to the right of Marmont, then, in proportion as his forces came up, to fall back around Leipsic, from north to south, and to connect himself across the plain watered by the Partha with Murat's left. When these last troops should have arrived, the circle around Leipsic would be completely closed.

It remained to guard carefully the city of Leipsic itself, and not only the city, but the high-road of the Rhine, which, after having crossed the Pleisse and the Elster over a long series of bridges, issued by Lindenau in the plain of Lützen, and went forward to Weissenfels, Erfurt, and Mentz. It was indispensable to guard this road with care, because it was our only line of retreat, and also because by occupying it we prevented Blücher and Schwarzenberg from forming any communication beyond the Elster and the Pleisse. Napoleon had left the Margaron division, composed of marching-troops, in Leipsic, with the duty of defending the bridges of the Pleisse and the Elster, and the large village of Lindenau, which forms the outlet to it in the plain of Lützen. Provided that this city and village were well defended, some light troops on the Lützen road would suffice to give warning of what was occurring, in time to afford assistance. To the troops of Margaron Napoleon added General Bertrand, who had marched



with Macdonald, and who had just entered Leipsic. He was to support, as occasion required, either Margaron in the defence of Leipsic and the entrance to Lindenau, or Marmont in the defence of the position of Mockern. The other corps, arriving in succession, were, as we have said, to take position behind Marmont, and to connect him with Murat. Thus, in the first day, Napoleon had, for the battle to be fought to the south of Leipsic, 115,000 men, who were to be opposed to 160,000 under Schwarzenberg. Should the struggle occur on the north at the same time, he had, in opposition to Blücher's 60,000 men, Marmont with 20,000, Bertrand with 10,000, besides 10,000 under Margaron guarding Leipsic and the high-road of the Rhine. Ney, with Souham, Dombrowski, and Reynier, brought us a reinforcement of 35,000 men, and might alternately succour Marmont or Napoleon himself. Including him, the total of our forces should amount to 190,000 men; but no time must be lost in the conquest, for if Ney raised our forces to 190,000 men, the enemy, in the same space of time, might find theirs raised to 320,000 or 330,000 by the probable arrival of Bernadotte, who had remained in the rear of Blücher, and of Bennigsen, who had remained in the rear of Schwarzenberg. Napoleon, however, hoped to secure decisive results on the first day, for he hoped to have at least Ney's *tête de colonne*, to unite this to Macdonald, and, throwing both to the right of Schwarzenberg, to drive him into the Pleisse. These arrangements were all that could be expected from his genius and from the situation; and, after having employed the whole of the 16th in rallying his troops, he resolved no longer to delay, but to attack Schwarzenberg on the following day, the 16th. He redoubled his expressions of confidence in his lieutenants, and of benevolence toward them, anxious to dispose them to shed their last blood. And though not without secret uneasiness, and though they disapproved his policy, they were unreservedly determined to do so. To conquer or to die was the universal feeling.

The allies, on their side, had not remained idle, but had made great efforts to effect their union under the walls of Leipsic. Blücher and Bernadotte, as we have seen, at the approach of Napoleon, had taken refuge behind the Mulda, and, since they were together, had been incessantly in dispute as to the line of conduct which ought to be pursued. Bernadotte wished first that the army of Silesia should take position above him on the Mulda, i.e. between him and Leipsic,—so as, in case of a reverse, to have more ready and certain means of escape toward the Elbe. Blücher, who divined the motives of Bernadotte, wished, on the contrary, to place himself lower down, so as to keep him between himself and Leipsic and thus to force him to march against the enemy. But as Bernadotte positively refused such an arrangement of the two armies, and assigned as a pretext his concern for his communications with Sweden, Blücher had been obliged to yield, to avoid a rupture. After this dispute had arisen another. Bernadotte wished that the movement toward Leipsic should be effected not behind the Mulda, but

behind the Saale, so as to put two rivers between himself and the French. Blücher, on the contrary, wished to be protected only by the Mulda, so as to arrive the sooner at Leipsic. He had yielded again to avoid an outbreak. But, with his habitual impatience, he had brought only one of his corps behind the Saale, and at the head of the other two he had marched before that river on the Halle road, very near Marshal Marmont, whose side he had never left. Finally, a third dispute had suddenly arisen between the two commanders of the armies of Silesia and the North, and had brought their misunderstanding to a height. On seeing the French occupied on the other side of the Elbe in destroying the bridges, Bernadotte supposed that Napoleon was designing a movement upon Berlin, and he therefore wished to recross the Elbe, to avoid being cut off from the north of Germany, where was the base of his operations. His whole staff, consisting greatly of Russians and Prussians, had, contrary to their custom, inclined to his opinion. Accordingly, he brought into force the eventual authority with which he had been invested with regard to the army of Silesia, to enjoin Blücher to follow him on the right bank of the Elbe. On receiving this order, Blücher contested the movement of Napoleon toward Berlin, alleging in support of his opinion the considerable forces which had been left around Leipsic, and further replied by formal disobedience, and had advised the Prussian and Russian officers of Bernadotte's army not to quit the left bank of the Elbe. But the debate was closed by a fact independent of the will of all parties,—namely, the complete destruction of the bridges by Ney and Reynier; and Bernadotte, deprived of his means of passage, had been compelled to remain on the left bank of the Elbe, following Blücher at a great distance. However, the divisions of Thümen and Hirschfeld, and the corps of Tauenzien, had remained on the other side of the river, and occasioned the mistake of Napoleon, who had thought the whole army of the North resolved to maintain its ground on the right of the Elbe and on the road to Berlin.

In this manner Blücher and Bernadotte had occupied the time which Napoleon had spent in returning to Leipsic. On the 16th, Blücher was on the Halle road, four or five leagues to the north of Leipsic, with a great desire to approach that city; not venturing to unite with Prince Schwarzenberg across the plain of Lützen, because it would have been necessary for him to cross the Pleisse and the Elster, much tempted to do so on the opposite side, across the vast plain of Leipsic, but not venturing to do so from the sight of the French corps, who were marching in that direction. He renewed his demand to Bernadotte to join him, for, if united, they would form an army of 120,000 men, which would have nothing to fear from any one. Meanwhile he had endeavoured to send an officer to Prince Schwarzenberg to tell him that he was there, to the north of Leipsic, at a very short distance from himself, ready to march on the first report of cannon to the south of that city.

In the army of Bohemia there had prevailed a greater degree of unanimity, owing to the conciliating spirit of Alexander, to the



his troops on the preceding day. Macdonald and Sebastiani having arrived, he had directed them to Holzhausen, to the left of Liebert-Wolkwitz, to oppose Klenau. Ney was expected at Leipsic on the morning of the 16th, Reynier on that of the 17th. Blücher not yet appearing on the Halle road,—which was natural, since he was not to venture upon the field of battle till summoned by the roar of cannon,—Napoleon supposed that perhaps he should not have to engage him during that day, and he ordered Marmont to leave his position on the north of Leipsic, to traverse the Halle faubourg, and to place himself on the rear of the grand army, so as to co-operate with the decisive manœuvre against Schwarzenberg's right, by which he hoped to insure the battle. He ordered Ney to take the position vacated by Marmont, and to be ready, in concert with Bertrand, to keep in check the enemy who should appear to the north of Leipsic. After these orders had been given, Napoleon was, from break of day, on horseback in the midst of his Guard, on an elevated ground near the sheepfolds of Meusdorf, whence he commanded the field of battle, and saw to his left Liebert-Wolkwitz, in the centre, and a little removed, Wachau, to the right, also somewhat removed, Mark-Kleeberg, still farther to the right, the Pleisse and the Elster, against which were advancing the Austrians to force the bridge of Dolitz. He had, as we have said, about 160,000 men before him, and about 115,000 to oppose to them, including Macdonald and Sebastiani. The rest of the French army was two leagues to the rear, to meet any eventualities that might occur at other points.

At 9 A.M., three guns fired by the allies became the signal for a frightful cannonade. From Mark-Kleeberg to Liebert-Wolkwitz, the allies advanced on our front in three strong columns preceded by 200 guns. They had formed the very rational idea of mingling together the troops of all nations, in order that the danger might be equally shared, and that emulation might be excited by proximity. To our right, General Kleist, with the Prussian division of Prince Augustus of Prussia, several Russian battalions, and Levachoff's cuirassiers, marched by Crobern and Crostewitz upon Mark-Kleeberg. In the centre, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with the Russian division under his command, and the Prussian division of Klux, marched against Wachau. To our left, and to the right of the allies, Prince Gortschakoff with his corps, and the Prussian division of Pirch, marched against Liebert-Wolkwitz, which Klenau, with a fourth column, endeavoured to turn by Seyffertshayn. These various columns advanced boldly, like men determined to overcome all obstacles. Our very numerous artillery, in battery on the slope of the ground, covered them with projectiles without checking their progress, and they reached the foot of our positions without faltering.

Kleist's column, directed against Mark-Kleeberg on our right, was soon engaged with Poniatowski, and, notwithstanding his resistance, succeeded in taking that village, situated on the Pleisse. It comprised not less than 18,000 men, while Poniatowski had only 8000

or 9000. He was therefore obliged to withdraw to the somewhat elevated ground forming the extreme right of our line. Angereau, then brought forward, came to support Poniatowski. A powerful artillery was directed against Kleist, who endeavoured to ascend the ground to which we had retired. In the centre, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, with his Russian infantry, and the Klux division, appeared before Wachau under a shower of grape, and endeavoured to effect an entrance. But Marshal Victor, who occupied the village, made an obstinate resistance. Lastly, on our left, Gortschakoff, leaving from Stormthal, a more distant point of departure than that of the other columns, was still at some distance from Liebert-Wolkwitz, which Klenau, with the Austrians under Mohr, was ready to outflank. But Lauriston's corps was at Liebert-Wolkwitz, favoured by the elevation of the ground, and soon to be supported by Macdonald, who was debouching from Holzhausen.

This first step of the allies was firm and resolute, and was executed under a shower of balls from 800 guns from Mark-Kleeberg to Liebert-Wolkwitz. The cannonade on each side was so violent as to be unparalleled in the experience even of our Old Guards; and Napoleon, though placed in the rear at the Meusdorf sheepfolds, saw many officers and horses fall around him. With his accustomed confidence, he remained unmoved and allowed the battle to be still further involved before adopting any decisive resolution. To the left, Liebert-Wolkwitz, built upon an eminence, and firmly held by Lauriston, might long defend itself. In the centre, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg appeared unequal to surmount the resistance of Victor's three divisions. Only to the right, the necessity in which Poniatowski had found himself to abandon Mark-Kleeberg and to give ground a little had caused our line to bend slightly to the rear. Semelf's division of Angereau's corps had already come to the aid of Poniatowski. Napoleon ordered them to make use of the numerous and excellent cavalry which they possessed on that side, that of the Poles and of Pajol, (4th and 5th corps,) to check Kleist's infantry on the slope of the ground which they were attempting to ascend.

General Kellermann, who on that day commanded the 4th and 5th corps, fell with his dragoons upon the infantry of Prince Augustus and checked them. But Levachoff's cuirassiers, launched at the proper moment and with skill, crossed a ravine at the foot of our positions, took Kellermann's dragoons in flank, and drove them back. Received, in their turn, by the plunging fire of our artillery, the cuirassiers of Levachoff were obliged to retreat. The effect was reciprocal, the Prussians being unable to gain more ground than they first acquired, and the French being unable to recover Mark-Kleeberg, but still retaining the commanding points which they had occupied. A formidable mass of artillery checked the course of the enemy, and, though our line did not quite recover itself, it did not appear necessary to throw it farther back.

In the centre, i.e. at Wachau, to the left, i.e. at Liebert-Wolkwitz, the battle continued obstinate and bloody. Repeatedly had the

Prince of Wurtemberg and General Kleist entered Wachau, which was in a hollow, but at each time Victor's divisions, pouring upon them in close columns, had repulsed them. In the course of two hours that village had been taken and retaken five times. It now presented only a heap of ruins and of the slain. At Liebert-Wolkwitz, Lauriston, attacked in front by Gortschakoff, on the left by Klenau, had received them in such a manner as to leave them no desire to return. Klenau having appeared the first on the left with Spleny's brigade, General Rochembeau had charged and overthrown him, whilst they cannonaded Gortschakoff, who was again at a distance by the University woods. After having riddled with ball the Russians of Gortschakoff and the Prussians of Pirch, General Maison had allowed them to ascend the projecting ground on which stood Liebert-Wolkwitz, and had then charged them vigorously, throwing part of them on the University woods to the left, part upon Gulden-Gossa on the right, and covering them with grape whenever they showed themselves.

At noon, 18,000 men had fallen in the two armies, but two-thirds of that number were on the side of the enemy; and it seemed everywhere impossible to break our invincible line, except on the right, where, as we have said, it had slightly given way.

At this moment firing was suddenly heard to the north, and then in different directions, which showed that we were assailed on all sides at once. In fact, aides-de-camp arrived at full speed and stated that, on the right of Leipsic, Margaron was attacked at Lindennau by Giulay, who wished to deprive us of our line of communication with Lutzen, and that in the rear—i.e. to the north of Leipsic—Marmont was engaged with Blucher, who had hastened from Halle to take part in the general battle. Marmont sent word that he could not execute the order to go to the rear of Napoleon, for he was obliged to make a stand against Blucher; and he even asked for succour. Fortunately, Marshal Ney appeared at this moment with Dombrowski's division and Souham's corps, and Napoleon sent word to that marshal that, while aiding Marmont, it was necessary to send any of his divisions which he could spare behind Macdonald to support the main army. Ney was commanding, at the same time, the 4th corps, (Bertrand's,) the 3d, (Souham's,) the 7th, (Reynier's,) besides Dombrowski's division. He had Bertrand in Leipsic to support Margaron; Dombrowski and Souham were arriving to support Marmont and to come into connection with Napoleon. Reynier could not arrive before the following day.

At noon, the battle having been more clearly developed, Napoleon at length thought of quitting the defensive to assume the offensive with vigour. He resolved to debouche at once from Liebert-Wolkwitz and from Wachau, in order to crush the enemy's centre, whilst on the extreme left Macdonald, debouching from Holzhausen beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, should drive back Klenau as far as possible, then, turning from left to right, should fall upon the enemy's centre, already attacked in front by Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau. For the exe-

cution of this movement, Napoleon brought down on one side two divisions of the Young Guard under Mortier, in order that being united to Lauriston they should fall upon Gortschakoff, and on the other side two other divisions of the same Young Guard, under Oudinot, to fall with Victor on Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg. The artillery-reserve of the Guard, forming a battery of eighty guns, was to advance between these two columns and aid them with its fire. The cavalry of Latour-Maubourg was drawn up in the rear to support this movement and to seize the opportunities of charging. Kellermann, with the 4th and 5th corps, also held himself in readiness on the right. The Old Guard, composed of the Curial and Friant divisions of infantry and of the cavalry of Nansouty, came to take the position vacated by the Young Guard of Latour-Maubourg. Every thing, therefore, was preparing for this offensive movement, at the very moment when Alexander, already struck by what was passing before him, had sent one of his German officers, M. de Wolsegen, to entreat Prince Schwarzenberg to renounce his attack between the Pleisse and the Elster, and to occupy himself more with what the Prussian and Russian armies were engaged with, between Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau.

Scarcely had the signal been given when our two columns of attack advanced, having between them the formidable battery of the Guard, directed by Drouet, of which thirty-two 12-pounders were commanded by the brave Colonel Griois. The fire was dreadful, and such it seemed as none could resist. On one side Marshal Mortier, preceded by Maison's division, descended from Liebert-Wolkwitz, attacked Gortschakoff, and threw him back between the University wood and the marshy village of Gulden-Gossa. On the other side, Oudinot and Victor, debouching from Wachau, repulsed Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, made him recross the little valley which separated us, and drove him back upon the sheepfolds of Avenhayn, on the right of the village of Gulden-Gossa. While they were thus advancing victoriously toward the middle of our line, Macdonald, making an irruption to the left, beyond Liebert-Wolkwitz, attacked Klenau, and obliged him to give ground to a great extent. On the way he came before an old redoubt called the redoubt of the Swedes, whence issued a shower of grape, masked by means of the Charpentier division, and with the Ledru and Gerard divisions, carried Seyfertshayn. The enemy defended themselves vigorously, but they were thrown back on one side to Klein-Possnau, on the other to Gross-Possnau and the University wood; there, favoured by the local difficulties, they halted and faced us. If a corps of reserve supporting Macdonald at that time had aided him in his movement from left to right, they might have thrown back a part of Klenau upon Gortschakoff, both of these upon Prince Wurtemberg and Kleist, and all together into the Pleisse. But Marmont was at this moment engaged with Blucher, Margaron with Giulay, Bertrand, between the two, kept himself to go to the aid of the most threatened. Ney did not venture to dispose of Souham, as violently did

Marmont appear to him to be attacked. He left Dombrowski on the right of Marmont, to meet the masses which he saw confusedly in the distance, and he was still waiting for Reynier. It was therefore necessary that Napoleon should gain the victory by the means he had in hand.

The enemy, after having lost on the whole breadth of the ground, disputed the extreme limit with tenacity. Klenau resisted at Gross-Possnau, and at the head of the University wood. Gortschakoff, thrown upon the other side of that wood, defended himself, and at the same time endeavoured to support himself with the village of Gulden-Gossa, which was well adapted for defence, being situated very low, and presenting a long series of woods and pools of water. Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, placed in the neighbourhood at the Avenhayn sheepfolds, endeavoured to keep his ground there with the remains of his corps. At the sight of the danger with which they were threatened, the allied sovereigns were in the greatest perplexity. M. de Wolkogen, as we have said, had been sent to Prince Schwarzenberg, General Jomini had joined him, and, on the urgent representations of both, the prince, recognising the difficulty of taking Dolitz to debouche on our rear, and the pressing danger of the Russian and Prussian armies, had consented to send the Prince of Hesse-Homburg's reserve of more than 20,000 men to the right bank of the Pleisse. But these reinforcements could not arrive before 8 p.m. In the mean while, the sovereigns determined to employ all their reserves, certain of their being soon replaced by part of the Austrian army. They first launched the Russian cuirassiers against our infantry, while they brought into line the 10,000 grenadiers of Rajeffsky, one column of whom was sent against Gulden-Gossa, and the other against the Avenhayn sheepfolds.

Such were the events on the side of the enemy. Lauriston and Mortier on our left toward Gulden-Gossa, Victor and Oudinot on our right toward the Avenhayn sheepfolds, received in squares the Russian cuirassiers, and with an imperturbable fire slew horse and man. The 10,000 grenadiers of Rajeffsky, distributed between the sheepfolds of Avenhayn, the village of Gulden-Gossa, and the University wood, drew themselves up like a long wall, supported at intervals by cannon. The brave Drouet, who had remained between our two columns of attack with his formidable battery, conceived the idea of directing all his guns against that magnificent infantry, neglecting the enemy's artillery, however important it might be to silence it. Though already very near the enemy, he advanced still nearer, and began to fire grape upon the Russian grenadiers, who fell like mason-work under our fire. When they appeared sufficiently shaken, Dubreton's division, separating from Victor's corps on our right, charged the Avenhayn sheepfold with the bayonet, and carried the position. To the left, General Maison, forming the head of Lauriston's forces, fell upon Gulden-Gossa, and effected an entrance. But the grenadiers of Rajeffsky, favoured by the farm-buildings, the woods, and the pools of water, defended themselves with the utmost

obstinacy. Part of the Russian guard was brought to their aid, and, while Maison held one extremity of the village, the Russians held the other, and refused to relinquish it. Maison, repeatedly wounded, covered with blood, three times changed his horse, and brought back his soldiers to the village of Gulden-Gossa, which he could not take from the Russians and which the Russians could not take from him. To the left, Macdonald, turning Klenau by Seyfertshayn, had thrown back upon Gross-Possnau Ziethen's Prussian brigade, the Austrian brigades of Spleny and Schoffer, and the Austrian division of Meyer; but the Swedish redoubt on the left of Liebert-Wolkwitz had remained inaccessible. Napoleon, who was seen in every direction, perceiving the 22d light at the foot of the redoubt, asked what regiment it was, and, being told that it was the 22d light, he replied, "It is impossible! the 22d light would never remain thus under fire without rushing upon the artillery which was crushing them." The 22d, led by Colonel Charras, climbed the height at the charge, killed the enemy's artillerymen with the bayonet, and carried the redoubt. The point which arrested Macdonald having been taken, that marshal continued his movement on our left as far as one-half of the University wood.

It was now 8 o'clock: the enemy, everywhere driven back even beyond their first position, seemed about to yield the victory. On our left, opposite Liebert-Wolkwitz, they kept their ground at the University wood. In the centre, repulsed from the Avenhayn sheepfolds, they disputed Gulden-Gossa with General Maison, favoured by the character of that village, which presented a range of woods and marshes. On our right, they had not retrograded farther than Mark-Kleeberg, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of Prince Poniatowski.

Napoleon felt the necessity of conquering at any price, for the victory could not be adjourned. Not to conquer on that day, with the multitude of enemies who were advancing, was not only to be conquered, but to run the risk of being destroyed. He, therefore, resolved to send all his cavalry against the enemy's line. Murat, on the left, descended with ten regiments of cuirassiers between Wolkwitz and Wachau; on the right, Kellermann descended between Wachau and Mark-Kleeberg with the Polish cavalry, the dragoons of Spain, and the dragoons of the Guard, under General Letort. At this moment, Pajol, placed at the head of the dragoons of Spain, was lost to his soldiers by a howitzer which, bursting under the belly of his horse, gave him a violent shock, without killing him.

Thus 12,000 horse advanced in two bodies, one on the left, the other on the right, full of the remembrance of the Dresden victory, which was due to them. General Bordesoulle, with his cuirassiers despatched by Murat, charged and dispersed Pahlen's cavalry, then poured down upon the Russian grenadiers and guards, who after having remained masters of Gulden-Gossa had deployed before that village, overthrew them, and took twenty-six guns. On the right, the dragoons of Spain and those of

the Guard charged Levachoff's cuirassiers, and made them atone for their success in the morning. This first shock had everywhere succeeded, and only one effort was wanting finally to pierce the enemy's centre, and to drive, on the right, Kleist and Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg into the Pleisse, and, on the left, Gortschakoff upon the University wood. But it was past 3 o'clock. Suddenly were perceived on our right deep masses arriving from the other side of the Pleisse. These were the Austrian reserve of Hesse-Homburg, the head of which, formed by the cuirassiers of Nostitz, preceded the grenadiers of Bianchi and Weissenwolf. The cuirassiers of Nostitz, in fact, debouching in full speed, met Kellermann's horse in the disorder of pursuit, took them in flank and drove them back. The brave Letort with the dragoons of the Guard fell, in his turn, upon the cuirassiers of Nostitz, and checked them. But, instead of being decisive, the movement of our cavalry upon the right was merely fluctuating: sometimes we advanced, sometimes retired. In the centre, Murat, after having carried every thing with the first shock, committed the error, in the hope of being supported, of engaging all his squadrons, and he had also advanced upon a ground which he had not been able to reconnoitre, and the character of which could not be discerned from a distance. At a distance, the village of Gulden-Gossa presented only a few clumps of trees; but when near, Murat found a great hollow, and in it buildings, clusters of trees, pools of water, and behind each obstacle well-posted infantry. Arrived at the village, the cavalry was obliged to stop short, and to remain in line under fire. The Emperor Alexander then consented to charge with all that remained in hand, even the hussars and Cossacks of the guard. These last, passing between the practicable openings of Gulden-Gossa, of which the Russians were still masters, fell unawares upon the flank of Murat's cavalry, whom they obliged to fall back, carrying with them only six of the twenty-six guns they had just taken. The brave Latour-Maubourg lost his leg by a ball. The hussars and Cossacks, in full charge, surrounded on all sides the great battery of the Guard, which had remained unshaken in the midst of the field. Drouot, then, bringing back the two extremities of his line of guns upon his flanks, opposed, as it were, a square of artillery to the enemy's cavalry, and when they came within gunshot, he covered them with grape.

The battle, then, had not been decided by this general action of our cavalry, though a good part of the field was in our power. On the right, indeed, we had almost blockaded Kleist in Mark-Kleeberg; toward the centre, Victor still occupied the Avenhain sheepfolds; in the centre, inclining to the left, Lauriston, the battery of the Guard, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, were before Gulden-Gossa; to the left, Macdonald, master of the Swedish redoubt and of Seyffertshayn, bordered in all directions the University wood. But the enemy, though he had retrograded, still held ground. Napoleon, therefore, determined to make a last effort. He reformed his columns of attack; Mortier with Lauriston, Oudinot

with Victor, had order to reform in columns and engage again. The two divisions of the Old Guard, comprising about 10,000 men, our only remaining reserve, were to support them, and to engage themselves, if necessary. All the cavalry was ranged *en masse* behind this infantry: their duty was to conquer or to die. But suddenly loud shouts were heard on our right. The grenadiers of Bianchi and Weissenwolf, following in the steps of the cuirassiers of Nostitz, had crossed the Pleisse, relieved Kleist in the village of Mark-Kleeberg, exhausted with fatigue, and they were endeavouring to subdue Poniatowski, who still presented invincible resistance to all their attacks. Finally, on our rear, to the right, at the post of Dolitz, which Prince Schwarzenberg had hoped to carry, General Merfeld, having made a vigorous effort, had forced all the passages of the Pleisse, and was ready to ascend the height which formed the bank of that river. At this danger, Napoleon checked the movement of his Old Guard, and directed the Curial division against Dolitz. Oudinot was withdrawn to resist the grenadiers of Bianchi and Weissenwolf. But the Austrian grenadiers were checked by the obstinacy of Poniatowski and the Semelé division of Augereau's corps. Curial, executing a transverse movement from left to right, in the rear, threw himself upon Dolitz. He first sent the grenadiers of Turin and Tuscany against the woods surrounding Dolitz, and then, with the fusiliers of the Guard, he proceeded to enter Dolitz itself by the bayonet. It was necessary to cross an arm of the Pleisse, and then to engage in a series of contiguous farms dependent on an old castle. He effected this charge with such vigour that he crossed the Pleisse, traversed the farm-yards in succession, put to the bayonet all who resisted, and, anticipating the enemy at the castle, captured all those who had remained behind in the courts. He thus took General Merfeld and more than 2000 men.

It was 5 o'clock, and night was drawing on. Napoleon, after having provided against the accident on his right, could not refrain from making a last effort against the enemy's centre. Victor was still at Avenhain; it only remained, then, to take Gulden-Gossa. Lauriston, unmoved amid a terrible fire, had suffered enormous loss; there remained, however, General Maison, who, though wounded in several places, and retaining only the wrecks of his division, was insatiable of danger until Gulden-Gossa should be conquered. Followed by Mortier, he had returned to the fatal village. His success might have decided every thing, when Barclay de Tolly, learning the danger, sent against him Firch's Prussian division supported by the Russian guard. The latter, by a desperate effort, regained Gulden-Gossa. Maison tried once more to enter it, but the combatants were shortly separated by the darkness. Like a roaring lion, Maison remained outside the village, deprived of sixths of his division, covered with wounds, and in despair at being interrupted by the night. In the morning he had said to his soldiers these noble words:—"To-day, my children, is the last day of France; we must all be dead by this evening." These heroes had kept

their engagement; not one thousand survived. This was the last act of the dreadful battle of the 16th, called the battle of Wachau. About 20,000 men on our side, and 80,000 on the side of the allies, were heaped upon the ground, dead or dying.

But this terrible effusion of blood was not confined to this spot. Two other battles had been fought on that day, one to the west, the other to the south, of Leipsic, one on our right at Lindenau, the other in the rear at Mockern. At Lindenau, General Margaron was engaged with Giulay, and had fought valiantly, with no other advantage than that of repulsing the enemy and remaining master of the field.

At this village of Lindenau, the ground presents a plateau ending sharply toward the Elster, but sloping like a glacis toward the plain of Lutzen. It was, then, possible to defend it with some advantage, especially if secure of the bridges of the Elster and the Pleisse, which were to the rear. Only they ran the risk of being turned on the right by the village of Leutzsch, on the left by that of Plagwitz, both on the Elster. The arms of that stream were, in fact, so divided at that part, and so diminished by their division, that it was easy to cross them and to pass the woods and marshes, and thus turn the bridge of Lindenau, which would have gained the position. Accordingly, Giulay, executing a direct attack on the plateau in front of Lindenau with Thielmann's cavalry and Lichtenstein's light infantry, had made a lateral attack by Leutzsch on one side, and Plagwitz on the other. He had even penetrated those two villages, and sent tirailleurs into the woods on the other side of the Elster. But General Margaron, keeping his ground, with his artillery and four battalions, on the plateau, had pushed forward against Leutzsch and Plagwitz columns of infantry, who, charging with the bayonet, had regained those villages and extricated his two wings. From 8000 to 9000 men had withstood 25,000, and yet they would probably have ultimately yielded, if the sight of Morand's division of Bertrand's corps, ranged between Lindenau and Leipsic, had not intimidated the enemy and checked their efforts. This combat had cost us 1000 men, and at least twice that number to the Austrians. While masters of Lindenau, we could always keep the road open to Lutzen.

At Mockern the battle had been more serious, especially in respect to the number of combatants and extent of slaughter. General Blucher, suspecting that the decisive battle was about to commence, and unwilling to leave Prince Schwarzenberg to engage alone, had not remained there after he had heard the cannon on the morning of the 16th, and had marched by the Halle road issuing on the north of Leipsic. When leaving, he had sent officers repeatedly to Bernadotte, to let him know the situation and to urge him to advance. His private connection with the Prussian and Russian staffs of the army of the North gave him considerable influence over that army, and made him hope that they would at length respond to his summons. But this could not be on the 16th, and he, accordingly, had advanced with caution, fearing that he should have the greater part of the French army on

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his hands, though he heard the guns of Prince Schwarzenberg, who was only three leagues to the south. He had about 60,000 men, but if he should meet between 80,000 and 90,000, he might find himself in difficulty. The sight of our columns approaching from Duben to Leipsic occasioned him some anxiety, and he had taken the precaution of placing Langeron in observation on the Dollitsch road. In the centre he had drawn up Sacken's Russian corps between the road of Dollitsch and that of Halle, and upon the latter, which leads directly to the north of Leipsic, he had brought the Prussian corps of D'York, the most enthusiastic of all, being German and Prussian. These precautions had delayed his arrival before Leipsic till 11 A.M., being unable to distinguish any thing of the battle going forward in the south, and only hearing a formidable cannonade. He had before him about 20,000 men, slowly withdrawing from Breitenfeld and Lindenthal to Leipsic. These were Marshal Marmont's corps, executing the order received in the morning to fall back upon Leipsic, and to cross that city in order to form the reserve of the grand army. This order, however, was conditional, and depended on events which might occur on the Halle road. The enemy appearing there in force, the order ceased to be valid, and the duty indicated became that of resistance to Blucher's army, a duty which Marshal Marmont was disposed to discharge to its full extent.

The position of Marmont was difficult from his numerical inferiority and from certain local circumstances. In the first place, he had only 20,000 men in hand, and he could not count very confidently on succour being sent when he saw how every one was occupied. His only hope was in the support of Dombrowski's division, which Ney had directed toward Euteritsch to defend his flank. Secondly, the height upon which he was posted between Mockern and Euteritsch, supported on one side by the Elster and the Pleisse, on the other by the ravine of Rietschke, though strong enough in itself, was attended with the serious inconvenience of having in the rear the same ravine of Rietschke, which, after skirting the flank of the position, terminated in the rear in the Pleisse at Gohlis. It was possible, if repulsed, to be thrown into it in disorder. Accordingly, the marshal had determined to cross it in order to draw up behind the Partha. He had not time to do so, which was fortunate, for if he had committed the error of suddenly sheltering himself behind the Partha, we should have been too much compressed into Leipsic, and deprived of communication with those of our troops still on the march. However this be, it was in this somewhat commanding position of Mockern that the third battle of that fatal day was fought, and with a degree of enthusiasm worthy of that displayed at Wachau.

The combat began between 11 and 12, as soon as Blucher had appeared in line. Engrossed with the sight of the last troops of Souham and the park of artillery ascending from Duben to Leipsic, Blucher had left all Langeron's corps in observation before Breitenfeld, and had directed against Marmont only D'York's corps and part of Sacken's, making

something more than 80,000 men. He had first proceeded to Mockern to carry that village, which supported Marmont's left, and he had attacked it with the fury which characterized this dreadful war. Marmont had defended it with equal fury. In this village he had the 2d marine of Lagrange's division, a little to the rear Lagrange's division itself, in the centre on the slope of the plateau Compans' division, to the right and to the rear Friederichs' division, and in reserve the Wurtembergian cavalry of General Normann, and the French cavalry of Lorge. His front was protected by eighty-four guns. About 20,000 men composed the actual numbers of his fighting-men on that day.

The village of Mockern had been long disputed, and often had the 2d marine, repulsed from the smoking ruins, re-entered it with the bayonet. At length, overcome by numbers, they had been forced to quit. Then the 4th marine and the 85th light, forming the 2d brigade of Lagrange's division, had charged furiously with the bayonet, overthrown one of the four divisions of D'York's corps, and regained Mockern. Blucher seeing that he gained nothing by endeavouring to deprive us of the support of our left, had brought forward two divisions to attack openly the inclined plateau on which was extended Compans' division. The two Prussian divisions had bravely deployed before Marmont, but they had seen a third of their soldiers fall under the thunder of our eighty-four guns. Every thing might be decided by a charge of cavalry, and Marmont gave the order without delay. Unfortunately the Wurtembergian cavalry, not in the best temper, seeing before them and on their right 6000 horse of Blucher's reserve, charged feebly and too late, and on their return were even thrown upon the marine battalion, which they threw into disorder.

The combat had thus been sustained for half the afternoon, when Blucher, more at ease with respect to the troops which he saw at a distance, knowing that the main body of the French army was not upon his left flank, had directed Langeron's corps toward Dombrowski, to keep him in check, recalled to himself the whole of Sacken's corps, and attacked Marmont's line with the Prussian division supported by all Sacken's Russian divisions. At this sight Marmont had advanced on the enemy with Compans' division under the command of the gallant Compans himself. Then ensued one of the bloodiest struggles of the war, at the distance of one hundred and fifty paces. Marmont had been wounded in the hand, had suffered a confusion of the shoulder, had received several balls in his dress, and had lost three of his aides-de-camp. Compans' regiments had deployed with heroic firmness, and their formidable artillery again decimating the Prussian ranks had covered the ground with a line of dead. This resistance would have been crowned with a complete triumph, had not a howitzer fallen in the midst of one of our batteries, blowing up the wagons and creating disorder. The enemy, profiting by this circumstance, had attacked the battery and taken it, while at the same moment several thousand horse pouring down upon the right of Compans' division already broken by grape, had forced

them to give way. Friederichs' division had hastened to their aid, but Mockern having been taken at that moment, our left was deprived of that support, while our right was threatened by Langeron, who was on the point of surrounding Dombrowski, Marmont thought it prudent to sound a retreat. He had withdrawn in good order and without any accident, owing to the precaution he had taken during the battle of throwing several bridges over the ravine of Rietschke. Dombrowski, aided by one of Souham's divisions, had also withdrawn, safe and sound, after having had the honour of checking at Euteritzsch the whole corps of Langeron; 24,000 men had held in check 60,000 of the bravest and most infuriated. This combat, according to the acknowledgment of the enemy, cost them 4000 or 10,000 men. It cost us 6000, with twenty guns lost by the explosion.

Such was the dreadful battle of October 16, consisting of three battles, which cost us 26,000 or 27,000 men, and the enemy nearly 40,000. A sad and cruel sacrifice, which clothed our army in immortal honour, but our unhappy country in mourning for the torrents of blood shed not to secure her glory but her fall.

On no point had our position been forced: we had kept our ground to the south between Liebert-Wolkwitz and Wachau, and to the west, toward Lindenau; we had abandoned it, but almost voluntarily, on the north, to secure a better. But as we had not so separated Schwarzenberg and Blucher as to prevent their union, the battle, though not lost, might speedily become a disaster. At this moment Bernadotte approached with 60,000 men; Benningsen was announced with 50,000, and on our part 15,000 were advancing under Reynier, 10,000 of whom were ready to betray us. The situation, then, became most perilous from our not having gained a brilliant victory. Was it possible to have obtained a decisive result on this first day, the 16th? This question has divided all historians of the period. Perhaps if Napoleon, after having placed himself in an extreme position, had carried his boldness to the last degree, and leaving at Leipzig only Margaron simply for the defence of the city, and only Marmont and Dombrowski to the north of Leipzig on the Partha to restrain Blucher, had summoned to himself Bertrand and Ney to reinforce Macdonald with 80,000 men, these 50,000 men under Macdonald, Bertrand, and Ney, thrown from our left upon the right of Prince Schwarzenberg, might have overwhelmed him and thrown him into the Pleisse. A great victory obtained on this side, our communications with Lutze and Mentz would have been speedily reopened, and Blucher would have been severely punished the following day for the progress he might have made. Instead of that, Bertrand's troops had remained in Leipzig almost inactive, and Souham's divisions, sometimes directed toward Napoleon, sometimes brought back toward Marmont, had lost the day in useless movements. Thus had been wanting a decisive force on the principal theatre of action. But these reasonings, true or false, have been made after the event. Napoleon must have foreseen that Lindenau would not be the object



of principal attack, that Bernadotte would not arrive with Blücher on the north and east of Leipsic, and Reynier's corps must not have been so far in the rear. What may justly be laid to Napoleon's charge is not that he showed want of skill in the battle, in which, certainly, none could have shown greater, but that he had placed himself in a position in which, assailed on all sides at once, obliged at the same time to face all kinds of enemies, he could not conjecture which should be the most urgent at any given moment. His general conduct and not his particular conduct on that day is that which, as in so many other instances, is open to severe censure.\* However this be, the position of Napoleon had suddenly become one of the greatest peril, from his not having repulsed to a distance the army of Bohemia, so as the next day to fall upon those of Silesia and the North. No doubt it may be said that the enemy had suffered severely, and that their losses might discourage them from renewing the combat. It was, strictly speaking, possible and even probable, if new reinforcements had not arrived; but with the ardour which animated the allies, with the certain appearance of Bernadotte within a day or two, and the probable arrival of Benningsen's army, the slight hope that they would not continue this terrible struggle was the straw at which the drowning man will grasp. Whilst the allies were almost certain of receiving 100,000 men, Napoleon could expect barely 15,000 under Reynier, of whom two-thirds were very doubtful Saxons, which would bring his forces, reduced by 26,000 or 27,000 men by the battles of the 16th, to 165,000 actually present, and about 150,000 on whom he might depend; and could he hope to face 300,000 enemies fighting with the utmost fury, with 150,000 soldiers, heroes, no doubt, but opposed to adversaries whom patriotism rendered their equal in the field?

It was impossible that Napoleon should deceive himself as to his position. Having hoped, even the day before, that after beating the principal of the allied armies he should have easy work with the other two, his feelings must have been severely hurt on seeing, at the close of the day, an indecisive battle which, instead of setting him free, had closed him in

the embrace of a sort of polypus of enemies of every kind. However, fully to be convinced of so new and so desperate a situation, it was necessary to examine it more closely. After a few hours' rest, he took horse on the morning of the 17th to ride over the field of battle. The sight was horrible even to him, to whom such scenes were so familiar. A sullen coldness was expressed in every face. Murat, Berthier, the major-general, and Daru the minister, accompanied him. Our soldiers had fallen in their places, but so also had the enemy. And if he were sure that our soldiers would not draw back in another battle, it was nearly as certain that the allies would do so neither. But a new struggle which should leave us where we were and in which we should gain nothing, but should see ourselves continually more closely pressed by the iron circle which surrounded us, and the outlets hitherto open closed successively against us, such a struggle would leave us no prospect but that of the *Furcæ Caudinæ*. This every one perceived, but no one dared to express. Murat, whose kind heart sought for some consolation to offer to Napoleon, repeatedly observed that the ground was covered with Austrians, Prussians, and Russians; that never except at the Muskowa had there occurred such a slaughter of his enemies,—which was true. But there remained enough, and certainly enough would come to repair the breach in that living wall which was gradually rising around us. The only possible resolution was immediate retreat by the road to Lutten, to prevent the speedy closing of the egress from Lindenau. Napoleon, walking on foot with his lieutenants under a gloomy and rainy sky, in the midst of shots fired with languor, so exhausted was each party, was himself the first to pronounce the word retreat which none had ventured to utter. The silence with which it was received was indicative of entire approbation. But even retreat was attended with serious inconveniences. The battle we had just fought might be claimed as a victory more justly by us than by our enemies, for we had constantly recovered ourselves, driven back the allies to their ground, and even taken a part of it from them. Yet that which gave the battle its true significance on this occasion,

\* Some writers, who will allow that our generals were cowardly or treacherous, and that our soldiers misbehaved, rather than ascribe an error to Napoleon, have laid the blame of the result of the 16th on every one except on him. First, according to them, Murat was even at Leipsic a traitor, and for that reason executed so imperfectly the grand charge of cavalry ordered by Napoleon. Now, it is true that poor Murat was actuated during all the winter, and for a moment was ready to follow the impulse of Austria, but he had returned with his whole heart to Napoleon as soon as he was in his company, and he was quite incapable of treachery on the field. Besides, the nephew of Lord Cathcart, an eye-witness of Murat's charge, and a better judge of the ground than was possible on our side, has explained in his memoirs, since published, the cause of the failure of this charge, which was no other than the form of the ground along the village of Guldens-Gossa, a village which it is sufficient to see in order to understand how our cavalry should have been arrested. After Murat, there are two other of Napoleon's lieutenants, Marmont and Ney, who have been accused. Marmont, it is asserted, ought to have recrossed the Partha, and Ney ought not to have left Bertrand unless in Leipsic. But Bertrand was left in Leipsic by Napoleon's order, and Marmont, when he wished to withdraw behind the Partha, could not do so, being engaged with the enemy, and having only one bridge over which he could defile. It was Napoleon who placed Marmont

between Breitenfeld and Lindenthal, on the supposition that Blücher was still at a distance. If he had known that he was so near, he would, the day before, have placed Marmont on the Partha, and in this way the concentration would have been sufficient, and it would have been made in good time. It is true that in this case the Düben road might have been closed to the rest of Souham's corps and so that of Reynier; but then, if from this consideration there is nothing to be charged against Napoleon, neither is there any reproach to be brought against Marmont for having remained on the other side of the Partha, where, moreover, he was by superior orders. For ourselves, we seek only truth, and Napoleon, in this campaign, remains so great a warrior even after terrible misfortunes, that we do not understand how any one can consent to pass off our generals as fools and traitors rather than acknowledge an error in him. We do not see that the influence of France in the world can be thus promoted, since the world well knows that Napoleon is dead and cannot be revived. That which does not die and ought not to die is France. Her glory is of greater consequence than that even of Napoleon. Such should be the reflection of those who seek to establish his infallibility, even though they were not bound as well as ourselves by a reason superior even to all patriotic consideration, viz.: truth, which must be sought for and brought to light before every thing.

as at Luizen and Bautzen, was the attitude assumed on the following day. If we retired, it would imply that we had been defeated. This would, therefore, be to acknowledge to all the world that we had been overcome in a decisive battle, when, on the contrary, we had crushed the enemy wherever they had appeared. In truth, it was a painful acknowledgment. But this was not all. What would become of the 170,000 French left at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, Hamburg, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, and Dantzic, as the base of an edifice of greatness which was to be raised by a single battle? In that number were many sick and wounded, but it was possible to derive from them 100,000 or 120,000 excellent soldiers, who, joined to those we had remaining, would render invincible the frontier of the Rhine. Could they be brought together and form a mass competent to reopen the way to France by Hamburg and Wesel? This was a great question. The marshal who commanded at Dresden, the only one in a position to begin this movement, had sufficient intelligence to conceive this plan; would he have sufficient boldness to execute it?

To retreat, then, was to add to the confession of defeat an irreparable loss,—a loss which was the consequence of a prodigious error, that of wishing to retain to the last the elements of greatness which it was impossible to restore; a loss of a most distressing character, to whatever it might be ascribed. We cannot blame Napoleon for having spent the 17th in the most painful perplexity, without judging very superficially the movements of the human heart. To own himself conquered in a general battle, suddenly to abandon 170,000 Frenchmen in the fortresses of the North, without some hours of meditation, regret, and struggles to find some other means of escape, was a sacrifice scarcely to be demanded of any one. Moreover, there was another very cruel sacrifice involved in an immediate retreat,—that of Reynier, who was at that moment marching surrounded by enemies, and who could not arrive before the 17th. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to temporize the greater part of that day. Then, after waiting twenty-four hours before the allied armies, he could say that he had, as in a duel, waited long for them, and, having waited in vain, he had decamped to secure a more advantageous line. Besides, a little rest must be allowed to his wearied soldiers; his corps, disorganized by the combat, must be reformed; their individual parks, whose ammunition was exhausted, must be supplied from the grand park: all these things were indispensable if they should retire while still engaged with the enemy. To remain for a day and to decamp the following night was plainly the only course suited to Napoleon, the only one which could be advised, but on the condition of adopting it with determination, of preparing every thing in such a manner that the retreat should begin at the close of the day, and that on the morning of the 18th the allies should have before them only some inaccessible rear-guards.

The perplexities of Napoleon were, unhappily, extreme. Immeasurable pride subjected to the most terrible trial, and supporting itself in resistance by very cogent reasons, caused

him to pass the whole day almost without issuing an order. He walked about, sometimes alone, sometimes accompanied by Murat, Berthier, and M. Daru, gloomy and anxious, constantly repeating sadly to himself that he must order a retreat, but unable to resolve upon doing so, and pleasing himself with the thought that since the enemy had remained inactive that day they would not attack him on the following, and that Schwarzenberg, in accordance with an old maxim very popular with prudent commanders, would make a bridge of gold for a retreating enemy. He might then defile through Leipsic in an imposing manner, changing his base of operations without having been conquered. A vain hope, which his mind required, and which he cherished for some hours!

In this condition, he thought of summoning to his presence M. de Merfeld, who had been taken prisoner the day before at Dölitz, whom he had long known, and who was a soldier of great intelligence. He wished to question him with some ingenuity as to the disposition of the allies, to suggest to him some insinuations with regard to peace, to intrust him even with the proposal of an armistice, then to send him back free to the camp of the sovereigns to induce them, perhaps, to lose a day in hesitation and to extract from them some acceptable overture. To such a point had he been reduced by having refused, two months before, to listen to M. de Caulaincourt when negotiating at Prague.

About 2 p.m. he received M. de Merfeld, to whom he had returned his sword.\* He received him with courtesy, and complimented him on the attempt upon the Dölitz bridge, though unsuccessful; he then said that in memory of his merits and of his former connection with the French head-quarters, he was about to send him back on parole, for which the Austrian general thanked him warmly. Then, leading the conversation to the subject in which he was most interested, Napoleon asked if when they made the attack they were aware of his presence. General Merfeld having replied in the affirmative, Napoleon rejoined, "You wished, then, to give me battle on this occasion?" General Merfeld having again answered in the affirmative, respectfully but firmly, because they were resolved by a bloody and decisive action to terminate this protracted strife, Napoleon replied, "But you are deceived as to my forces. How many soldiers do you suppose me to have?" "Not more than 120,000," said M. de Merfeld. "Well, you are mistaken; I have more than 200,000." From what has been said before, we see how far each was in the wrong.—*etc.*

\* M. Fain, who was at head quarters, has pretended that Napoleon summoned M. de Merfeld on the 16th and restored him his liberty. Many other writers have repeated this error, because it furnishes a natural explanation and excuse for the loss of the 17th. In this case Napoleon should have waited a reply to his proposals during the whole of the 17th. But the publication of the conversation with M. de Merfeld, due to the Earl of Westmoreland, recently ambassador at Vienna, and at that time employed in the British legation with the allies, enables me to correct this mistake. M. de Merfeld, in the published article, gives the day and hour, and places his interview at 2 p.m. of the 17th. As it cannot be supposed that he had any interest to make any alteration in this matter, the supposition of those who assign this conversation to the evening of the 16th falls to the ground, with all its supposed consequences.

from ignorance, the other from design. "And how many have you?" resumed Napoleon. "850,000," said M. de Merfeld,—a number not far from the truth. Napoleon, acknowledging that he had not supposed they had so many, which explained his having placed himself in his present situation, added, with sang-froid, and even the semblance of good humour, "And will you attack me to-morrow?" M. de Merfeld replied with equal confidence that the allies would infallibly engage on the following day, being determined to purchase their independence with their last blood. Napoleon, concealing his emotion, changed the course of the conversation, by saying to M. de Merfeld, "This struggle has become very serious. Shall we not terminate it? Shall we not think of peace?" "Would to Heaven that your majesty would do so!" exclaimed the Austrian general: "we seek no other reward for our efforts; we fight only for peace! If your majesty had desired it, it might have been procured at Prague two months ago." Hereupon Napoleon, alleging false excuses, pretended that he had not been frankly treated at Prague; that finesse had been employed; that they had endeavoured to shut him up in a fatal circle, a treatment which did not suit him; that England did not wish for peace; that she regulated Russia and Prussia, and would regulate Austria also, and that it belonged to the last-named Power to labour for peace if she really wished it. M. de Merfeld, after affirming that he only spoke for himself, and without authority, (which was true, but did not prevent his being perfectly well informed in every point,) maintained that England desired peace, and required it, and that if Napoleon could make the sacrifices necessary to the happiness of the world in general, and of France in particular, peace would be concluded immediately. "Sacrifices," exclaimed Napoleon, "I am ready to make," and, in order to convey the idea that he had insisted on retaining certain possessions in Germany merely as pledges to insure the restoration of his colonies, he added, "Let England restore my colonies, and I will restore Hanover." M. de Merfeld intimating that this was not enough, Napoleon used an expression which, if uttered at the Congress of Prague, would have changed his lot and ours. "I will return, if you please, the Hanse towns." Unfortunately, it was now too late; this sacrifice had been rendered insufficient by Kulm, Katsbach, Gross-Beeren, Dennewitz, and Wachau. M. de Merfeld expressed the opinion that in order to obtain peace from England he must consent to the sacrifice of Holland. Napoleon resisted strongly, saying that Holland would be in the hands of England a means of maritime despotism; for England, he knew well, wished to limit the number of his vessels. This was a singular idea which may have entered the mind of some persons, but which the British cabinet had never seriously entertained. "If, Sir," replied M. de Merfeld, "you think to join to the vast sea-board of France those of Holland, Spain, and Italy, then, as no maritime power can equal yours, it is possible that they might think of restricting the number of your ships; but your majesty, so tenacious of honour, will no doubt rather abandon territories of

which you have no need, than submit to a condition the very idea of which I can readily believe you would reject."

From this interview Napoleon might conclude that, although two months earlier he might have obtained peace by sacrificing merely the duchy of Warsaw, the protectorate of the Rhine, and the Hanse towns, it would now be necessary to relinquish, in addition, Holland, Westphalia, and Italy, the latter on condition of its being independent of Austria as well as of France. Certainly, France, with the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, would still be sufficiently great,—as much so as ought to be desired. In all these respects Napoleon seemed to allow that great sacrifices should be made for a general peace, and even presented the appearance of being more ready to make them than he really was. But he was much less occupied with the idea of peace than with the hope of an armistice, unfortunately very vague. To this conclusion he wished to bring M. de Merfeld. "I do not attempt," he said, "to speak to you of an armistice; for you pretend that I have a great fancy for armistices, and that they are part of my military tactics. But much blood has been shed, and much more is destined to flow, and if we all make a retrograde step, the Russians and Prussians to the Elbe, the Austrians to the mountains of Bohemia, and the French to the Saale, we shall allow a little breathing to unhappy Saxony, and at that distance we may treat seriously of peace." M. de Merfeld replied that the allies would not accept of the Saale as the line of armistice, for they hoped that autumn to be upon the Rhine. "That I should return to the Rhine!" exclaimed Napoleon, haughtily, "I must first lose a battle, which I have not yet done! This may, no doubt, happen, for the fate of arms is variable, as you know, M. de Merfeld," (that general had formerly come to seek an armistice after Leoben and Austerlitz,) "but this misfortune has not occurred to me, and without the loss of a battle I will never relinquish Germany as far as the Rhine. Go: I grant you your liberty on parole; this favour I accord to your merits, and to my former relations with you; and if, from what I have said, you can do any thing to bring about a negotiation, or, at least, a suspension of arms, which will give some respite to mankind, you will find me ready to listen to your proposals."

This singular conversation, in which we see the art which Napoleon possessed of governing himself when he chose to do so, had in view, the reader will see, to learn exactly what he might expect from the allies the following day, and to create, if possible, some hesitation among them, by uttering some words with respect to peace which never before had passed his lips. If they had suffered as much as he supposed, (and suffered, certainly, they had severely, but they had not been at all staggered,) they might find in these words a reason for discussion, and he might find time to change his position.

The close of the day only threw fresh and gloomy light upon his situation. Strong columns were seen on the road from Dresden, and the ranks of Schwarzenberg's army were considerably augmented. From the steeples

of Leipsic could be clearly discerned Bernadotte's army coming northward. The horizon was lighted up by a thousand fires. The circle was almost closed around us on the south, the west, and the north. Only one outlet remained open,—that on the east across the plain of Leipsic, for hitherto Blücher had not been able to join Schwarzenberg on that vast plain. But this outlet, the only one remaining, led to the Elbe and Dresden, whither there was not now time to go. Napoleon, with a final effort of self-command, at length determined to retreat,—a resolution not only painful to his pride but serious in a more important aspect, that of a change of attitude, and, above all, that of sacrificing 170,000 French left without succour, almost without means of safety, on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula.

Unfortunately, he formed his decision too late and with some degree of inconsistency. Instead of a retreat frankly admitted, and, therefore, studied in all its details, commencing in the evening of the 17th and terminating in the morning of the 18th, he resolved upon one which, from its imposing character, should not be a real retreat at all and should be accomplished in the open day. He determined that about midnight, i.e. toward 2 A.M., the forces should retrograde concentrically upon Leipsic for one league; that Bertrand with his corps, and Mortier with part of the Young Guard, should go by Lindenau to secure the Lützen road; that when the day had dawned they should defile, one corps after the other, through Leipsic, energetically repulsing the enemy who should venture to attack our rear-guard. Such a march, while withdrawing us from a false position, would also present the appearance of a change of line rather than a retreat.

Napoleon thought himself still so imposing that the enemy would not interfere with a retreat of this description. No doubt he was so in a high degree; but to passion intoxicated by sudden hopes, nothing is imposing, and such a passion animated the allies. Such were Napoleon's resolutions for the night of the 17th.

That which had taken place during the day with the allies corresponded little to the illusions which he had indulged. Their first intention had been to fight without intermission, to sacrifice any number of men until they should have overcome the resistance of the French, and with such determinations there was no motive for remaining inactive even on the 17th. However, the news received from the north of Leipsic had taught them that the Prince of Sweden might be on the field if he were allowed one day more. News not less important had been brought from the environs of Dresden. Before that city had been left the Russian division of Sherbatow and the Austrian division of Bubna on the right of the Elbe, and the whole army of Benningsen, with Colloredo's corps, on the left bank. These amounted to about 70,000 men, very unprofitably employed in restraining a French corps whom it was sufficient to observe and from whom they had nothing to fear. Having profited by the lessons of Napoleon, who had taught all the generals of the age the art of concentrating their troops on the point where they might be most useful, they had ordered

General Benningsen to leave Tolstoy's corps before Dresden, and to march with his own to Leipsic. The same order had been forwarded to Colloredo's corps and to Bubna's division. Thus the arrival of 50,000 men was announced for the close of the day. 50,000 on this side, and 60,000 on the side of Bernadotte, made a reinforcement of 110,000, which it would be imprudent to neglect. There was, therefore, no need to be very saving of time, which might be so profitable to the allies, and could be of so little use to the French, and they could do nothing better than defer the decisive attack for a day. The soldiers who had so boldly fought on the 16th would obtain a little rest on the 17th, and this rest would little avail the soldiers of Napoleon, who were too intelligent not to perceive the danger constantly increasing around them, and who would be rather depressed than refreshed by the prolongation of such a condition. For these reasons, which, in our state of trouble, were all excellent, they had determined to defer the final battle till the 18th.\* The arrival of M. de Merfeld in the afternoon, and his detailed reports, affected no one, but, on the contrary, disclosed to all the distress which had extracted from Napoleon such novel proposals. It was universally resolved not to stop short of the Rhine.

To the north of Leipsic, the resolutions, adopted with less unanimity, had equally tended to the same result. The Prince of Sweden, assailed by the violent reproaches of the English minister, who accused his inaction of perfidy, by the remonstrances of his different staffs, and particularly by the urgency of the Swedish officers, whose patriotic reminiscences were awakened by the fields of Leipsic, had at length marched on the 17th, and taken position behind Blücher, with whom he demanded an interview. This Blücher had declined, aware of the object of the prince, and determined not to consent to it. It was of importance boldly to cross the Partha, in order fully to invest the French, and whoever should cross it without having first united with Prince Schwarzenberg would be exposed to considerable danger. But the Prince of Sweden, on this occasion, or some days before, on the

\* Those writers who are determined to see in the reverses of Napoleon no other cause than the treachery of his allies or the weakness of his lieutenants, (as if the treachery of allies and the weakness of lieutenants did not themselves arise from serious errors,) have pretended that the generals of the coalition had not intended to make the attack on the 17th or 18th, but that they had come to a determination on the 18th, at night, upon learning the proposed treachery of the Saxons. Accordingly, Napoleon would have calculated in this case also with infinite accuracy. In fact, by remaining one day longer in position he would have retired safe and sound, with the appearance of a conqueror, and this design was frustrated only by the treachery of the Saxons. This new hypothesis is as unfounded as the rest. M.M. de Wobres and Oubert, present at the head-quarters of the allies, have disclosed to us the detail of the deliberations of those head-quarters, and we now know that it had been resolved to make the attack on the 17th, and that it was deferred till the 18th only by the arrival of new reinforcements. Besides, if the defection of the Saxons were at all known beforehand, it was only at Bernadotte's head-quarters, where it had been prepared by some Saxons who had taken refuge with him; but it was altogether unknown at the head-quarters of the three allied sovereigns. These inventions, then, whose design is to show not the prodigious genius of Napoleon, which no one doubts, but his infidelity, are contrary to truth and wholly devoid of foundation.

Mulda, wished Blücher to occupy the post of greatest danger. Blücher, weary not of danger, but of complaisance toward an ally whose fidelity as well as energy he suspected, replied that his troops, exhausted by the battle of the 16th, were much less fitted to maintain a difficult position than those of the army of the North, and he demanded that Bernadotte should cross the Partha on the left of the army of Silesia, and expose himself in the plain of Leipsic, opposite to Napoleon. At the same time he had come to a secret understanding with the Prussian and Russian generals who commanded the different corps of the army of the North, and he had promised to pass the Partha with them on the following day to fight Napoleon to the last extremity, for Blücher was resolved to take a personal share in the last struggle, but he wished to constrain Bernadotte to assume a position from which it would be impossible to withdraw.\* Every thing, then, was prepared for bringing about 800,000 men against Napoleon. The allies had actually 220,000 or 280,000 on the 16th: if they had lost about 40,000 during that day, and had been joined by Benningen with 50,000 and by Bernadotte with 60,000, their whole number would amount to nearly 800,000. Napoleon, who before the battle of the 16th had 190,000, including Reynier's, could not have had more than 180,000 or 165,000 on the 18th, including even the very doubtful allies in his ranks.

Napoleon, knowing this situation, had made up his mind, at the close of the 17th, to withdraw. Unfortunately, as we have said, he had resolved to execute not one of those nocturnal retreats, such as the art of war authorizes when an army wishes to elude a superior enemy, but a retreat in open day and at a slow pace, so as to maintain an imposing attitude, and to cross without difficulty the long defile from Leipsic to Lindenau, consisting in numerous bridges thrown over the divided branches of the Pleisse and the Elster. At 2 A.M., he was busily engaged in forwarding the following orders. All the corps which had been engaged on the south, i.e. Poniatowski, Augereau, Victor, Lauriston, Macdonald, the Guard, the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 5th cavalry, were to retrograde one league, and to form around Leipsic, on the plateau of Probstheyda, a closer, and therefore an almost invincible, circle. Should the enemy follow, they were to fall upon them and drive them to a distance. To the north and east, Marmont, who after the battle of Mockern had recrossed the Partha, was to concentrate his forces from Schonfeld to Sel-

lerhausen. Ney, who with Reynier had arrived in the afternoon of the 17th, formed the prolongation of Marmont's line, was to draw back his right, until he should meet Macdonald's left across the plain of Leipsic, and thus close the circle to be described by the French army. Then the connection which had been effected between Ney and Macdonald only by means of cavalry, should be formed by means of a continuous line of troops of all arms, occupying the villages of Paunsdorf, Melkau, Holzhausen, and Liebert-Wolkwitz. From that time, instead of a circle of 5 or 6 leagues, they would form one of about 2 leagues, everywhere solid. To the east and north, as to the south, they were to retrograde slowly, to repulse the enemy when too urgent, and, if they were not followed, to follow the example of the other corps and move toward Leipsic by the Lindenau road. But this road must be opened. On the 16th, Margaron had held the village of Lindenau, situated at the extremity of the bridges of the Pleisse and Elster. To General Bertrand Napoleon intrusted the duty of crossing Lindenau, debouching in the plain of Lutzen, piercing through every enemy he should find on his road, and forcing his way as far as Weissenfels on the Saale. He reinforced him with Guilleminot's French division, which had been previously under the command of Reynier and Durutte's division, with the intention of placing the Saxons between two French divisions. General Rogiat had orders to leave with the engineers of the Guard, in order to throw new bridges over the Saale below Weissenfels. Margaron and Dombrowski were charged with the defence of Leipsic. Margaron was to occupy the interior, Dombrowski the exterior as far as Schonfeld, where Marmont was stationed, and where, consequently, was the beginning of Marshal Ney's line. As Margaron might be insufficient, Napoleon deprived himself of Mortier's division of the Young Guard, and sent them into Leipsic. The parks and the useless baggage were to begin the march immediately, so as to have defiled when the columns should reach the bridges. At 8 A.M., every thing was in motion; the weather was gloomy and rainy, and the wagons which were burned or blown up owing to the want of horses to serve them, added by the conflagration and explosion to the melancholy of the retreat. Nothing could better prove that they did not seek to effect a clandestine retreat, and that the misplaced pride of victory remained with us even in defeat,—a defeat, indeed, not on the field, but a defeat of the campaign, which was, unhappily, still more serious.

Napoleon, after having forwarded his orders, had gone himself to Ney at the faubourg of Benditz, to express his intention *vis à vis*.<sup>\*</sup> Among other instructions was that of providing for the safety of the general head-quarters, which had remained in the rear on the road from Duben to Leipsic. These general head-quarters, which included all the administrations, particularly the army treasury, the en-

\* The following passage of M. de Wolszen describes what had passed at the staffs of Blücher and Bernadotte. The statements of M. de Mülling, an eye-witness, are still more striking and bitter:—

"Prince William, brother of the King of Prussia, had already determined the hesitating prince to take a serious part in the battle, and in a friendly way had roused his attention to this point, that the opinions of the Prussian and Russian troops in his army were very unfavourable to him, and that they even went so far as to doubt his personal courage and his loyal resolution to act efficaciously in the interest of the common cause of the allies. This confidential statement, and the observations of General Adlarkevitz, chief of his staff, that the Swedes, far from hanging back, wished to maintain their former renown on the field where Gustavus Adolphus had fought so gloriously, are said to have exercised decisive influence on the resolution of Charles John."

\* We have a brief but formal exposé of these instructions in a letter of Marshal Ney to General Reynier, dated at 5 A.M., in which he states what Napoleon had come to do and to order in his neighbourhood, i.e. at Benditz, where he had his head-quarters.

gineer park, part of the general park of artillery, and the bridge-equipage, had been brought to Eilenburg, and then, when endeavouring to follow Reynier, had been prevented by the presence of the enemy. Napoleon left orders that, if they were unable to join, they should fall back upon Torgau and there enclose themselves,—a melancholy resource, which could only delay their destruction a few days, unless the garrison of the fortresses should be saved by an armistice.

These orders having been issued, Napoleon repaired to Leipzig, where he communicated his views to his other generals, and he returned very early in the morning to his bivouac, in the midst of the ranks of his main army, which he had not left for several days.

Colonel Montfort, of the engineers, who replaced General Rogniat, who had left for Weissenfels, had been much struck with the difficulty of making the whole army defile by a single bridge of great length, that from Leipzig to Lindenau. He had, therefore, proposed to Berthier to throw other secondary bridges above or below, which should serve for the passage of the infantry, so as to reserve the principal road for the artillery, cavalry, and baggage. Whether it was that Berthier, still sensible of the trouble incurred by speaking to Napoleon of retreat, did not venture to revert to the subject, or (which is more probable) from his inveterate habit of trusting all to his foresight, he repulsed the colonel, saying that it was necessary to obey the orders of the emperor, but not to pretend to anticipate them. Perhaps, also, Napoleon had considered this matter, and had been unwilling to order any thing which might too soon betray his retreat. However this be, they were voluntarily reduced to the single bridge of Lindenau, which in certain cases might be attended with extreme danger.\*

Scarcely had Napoleon returned to Probstheyda, where he had bivouacked, when he perceived from the top of a hill on which he stood, three large columns, much stronger than those observed two days before, marching concentrically upon his new line of battle. Toward our right, but no longer supported by Mark-Kleeberg, but a little to the rear by Politz, was the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, who, with

the grenadiers of Bianchi and Weissenwolf, the cavalry reserve of Nostitz, Colloredo's corps, and the light division of Aloys Lichtenstein, was advancing upon Poniatowski and Augereau. In the centre were Kleist and Wittgenstein, now united in one column of attack, and followed by the Russian and Prussian guard, who were marching from Wachau and Liebert-Wolkwitz to Probstheyda, where were Victor and the Guard. To the left were Klenau, Benningsen, and Bubna, who, from the University wood and Seyffertshayn, were marching upon Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen against Macdonald. This last column, turning their right about our line, came across the plain of Leipzig to threaten Ney's position, but with much circumspection, for they deferred engaging till Bernadotte should have crossed the Partha. These three columns might comprise from 55,000 to 60,000 men each, except that of Benningsen, which contained about 70,000. To meet these 180,000 men, Napoleon had, as two days previously, Poniatowski, Augereau, Victor, Lauriston, Macdonald, the Guard, the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 5th cavalry, amounting on the whole to something more than 80,000 men. In the angle formed by the Elster and the Pleisse, the allies had left Merfeld's corps, and on the other side of the Elster, toward Lindenau, Giulay, which made upward of 25,000 men more. Finally, Bernadotte and Blücher had still 100,000 between them. To oppose them, Ney had Marmont reduced to 12,000 or 13,000 men, Reynier nearly to the same number, Souham to 13,000 or 14,000 men. Margaron, with the Duke of Padua and Dombrowski, had not more than 12,000. There were, then, something more than 130,000 men opposed to 300,000. Bertrand, with 18,000, was on the road for Weissenfels. Mortier supported him with two divisions of the Young Guard.

All the columns of Napoleon, on retiring, had left strong rear-guards scattered as tirailleurs, who disputed the ground step by step, and never yielded till they had caused great loss to the enemy. In the rear of Wachau and Liebert-Wolkwitz, at the Meusdorf sheepfold, situated in advance of Probstheyda, they covered the ground with the Prussian and Russian dead before they retired. At Zuckel-

\* No circumstance in this campaign has occasioned more controversy than the existence of only one bridge to effect the retreat from Leipzig. Writers, whose ordinary theme is, that in his whole life Napoleon was never guilty of an error or an omission, profess that he ordered Berthier to throw several bridges either above or below that of Lindenau, and that Berthier failed to execute this important order. Berthier, who never neglected even the most trivial, this new assertion, however improbable, might be admitted. If we allow that Berthier, wearied, dispirited, ill, as he then was, had forgotten Napoleon's orders. But, unfortunately for this hypothesis, there is the assertion of Colonel Montfort, who has declared, since the event, that he had addressed to Berthier the most urgent requests to be authorized to construct secondary bridges, which would have been sufficient to refresh the memory of the major-general, if this had been necessary. It is true that we may accuse Colonel Montfort, subsequently called in question on this subject, of having invented the assertion as an excuse. But besides the good faith of the colonel, which could be doubted by none who knew him, I have another proof of the truth of this assertion and of his exactness. On the very day of the very difficult passage of the Lindenau bridge, i.e. the 19th, Colonel Montfort, in the middle of the crowd which was pressing on the bridge, conversing with Colonel Lamare of the engineers, said, with vexation, that he had the day before most urgently solicited Berthier

to be authorized to throw other bridges, and that Berthier had replied that he must wait for the emperor's orders. Thus, at the very moment, before Colonel Montfort was called upon to justify himself before a council of war, and before he could have thought of such a thing, asserted the fact with evident sincerity and want of premeditation. The fact, therefore, cannot be doubted. But how can we suppose that Berthier should have failed to execute any orders received from Napoleon? The improbability is striking, for Berthier must have been either stupid or treacherous. But, though fatigued, that old companion of Napoleon was equally devoted and skilful. Only one supposition, therefore, is admissible, viz.: that Napoleon, either from want of thought, or, which is more probable, from a desire to effect a voluntary retreat, so to speak, without haste, thought the Lindenau bridge sufficient. Perhaps, also, he was unwilling that the morale of the soldiers should be affected by any preparations indicative of a precipitate retreat. However it be, this is the only explanation consistent with common sense. It is true that in this case we allow that Napoleon committed an error. For counsel, while regarding him as one of the greatest geniuses among men, we demand, not of his admirers, for we are enemies of that number, but of his admirers, among whom we are not, the privilege of believing that, in the course of his life, he may possibly have erred.

hausen, at Holzhausen, where Macdonald's corps was posted, they resisted the Prussian division of Ziethen, and Klenau's Austrians, killing many before falling back upon Stotteritz. This last position once taken by Macdonald, our new line of battle was as follows. From the banks of the Pleisse, i.e. from Dolitz to Probstheyda, it formed a continuous line, turned at right angles near Probstheyda, and stretched in a northerly direction as far as the banks of the Partha, by Stotteritz, Melckau, and Schonfeld, where were Macdonald, Reynier, and Marmont.

Probstheyda, then, was the salient angle which the enemy ought to carry, and which Napoleon was determined to defend with obstinacy. Besides Victor, who guarded Probstheyda, there was in the rear Lauriston, who was united with Macdonald, the Guard, and the cavalry. Until the moment when they should reach the line of positions which Napoleon wished to preserve, the allies met only rear-guards, who disputed the ground, but at length relinquished it. Arrived before Dolitz, Probstheyda, and Stotteritz, they found the lines impregnable and imposing, and presenting little prospect of yielding. Yet they made the attempt with a sort of desperate energy.

The column of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg fell upon Dolitz, carried it, lost it, regained it, and lost it once more. This point was defended by Poniatowski and Augereau, much exhausted, and commanding only 10,000 men between them. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg was here seriously wounded, and immediately replaced by General Bianchi. We were obliged, however, to relinquish some ground, and to take our position at Connewitz, behind a piece of water, alternately stagnant and flowing, which passes from Probstheyda to Connewitz to fall into the Pleisse. Before retiring thither, our cavalry made some admirable charges, several times repulsed the cavalry of the Austrians, and then fell back with the infantry behind the stream just mentioned. Once at Connewitz, Poniatowski and Augereau established themselves there impreguably. Oudinot, with the two remaining divisions of the Young Guard, (the other two, we have seen, were under Mortier at Leipsic,) posted themselves behind the stream, from Connewitz to Probstheyda, the cavalry drawn up in the intervals of the infantry. Part of the artillery of the Guard was placed in battery, and thundered upon the enemy's masses. Several times the Austrians attempted to cross the obstacle, and each time they were slain at the foot of their position. Merfeld's corps, commanded by Soderer, and placed on the other side of the Pleisse, on the low wooded ground everywhere crossed by the Pleisse and the Elster, renewed their attacks against our right, as two days before, with the view of turning it. They could only send us some balls, which we returned with interest.

It was now noon: the guns were heard toward the north, which announced that Blucher and Bernadotte were entering into action, which made three battles to be going on at the same time. There might almost be said to be a fourth, for, on our right, beyond the Pleisse and the Elster, in the plain of Lutzen, were heard the guns of Bertrand engaged with

Giulay in his attempt to open for himself the Weissenfels road. This frightful extent of carnage disturbed neither the countenance of Napoleon nor the courage of his soldiers, who were rather elated, as it were, by the solemnity of a battle unequalled in history, for during three days 500,000 men had been disputing on the plains of Leipsic the empire of the world. Never had been seen an equal number of men on the same battle-field.

The guns of Blucher and Bernadotte were the signal to Prince Schwarzenberg's army for a furious attack upon the decisive point of Probstheyda. Already had Kleist and Wittgenstein, who formed the column of the centre, advanced, Kleist with the Prussian division of Klux, Pirch, and Prince Augustus, Wittgenstein with the Russian divisions of Eugene of Wurtemberg and Gortschakoff, followed by the reserves. Arrived before the position, the Prussians, who always courted the front for the honourable reason that the aim of this terrible struggle was the freedom of Germany, were the first to fall upon Probstheyda, at the charge. Drouot, drawn up before Probstheyda, awaited them with the artillery of the Guard, Victor with his infantry. It was necessary to ascend an inclined plane in the form of a glacis. Drouot allowed them to approach, and then covered them with grape and hurled them in confusion upon each other. However, under the influence of an absolute fury of patriotism, they recovered their ranks, marched a second time against Probstheyda, and succeeded in effecting an entrance. But Victor, with his decimated divisions, charged them with the bayonet and brought them to a stand; after which he drove them out, and our artillery again covered them with grape. The three Prussian divisions, having suffered severely, went to some distance to reform, at the foot of the glacis on which Probstheyda is placed. Napoleon brought forward Lauriston, and, in person, under a shower of balls, drew up in the rear, in deep columns, the two divisions of the Old Guard, Friant's and Curial's, his only remaining reserve. These fine grenadiers, with their enormous bearskins, immovable under fire, were placed, like two powerful supports, behind Lauriston and Victor. A new attack was expected, which they proposed to meet as the preceding.

In fact, the three Prussian divisions, after drawing breath and closing their ranks, were joined by the Russian divisions of Wittgenstein, and simultaneously advanced, always under a shower of grape from Drouot. They fell all together upon Probstheyda, surrounded it, effected an entrance, and seemed about to become the masters; but Victor, though his troops were exhausted, and Lauriston, though his were reduced to two-thirds by the battle of the 16th, charged the combined Prussians and Russians with the bayonet, fighting hand to hand, then, by a last effort, drove the assailants from the village upon the declivity, where our artillery, profiting by this new opportunity, again covered them with grape.

While thus resisting in front, another enemy appeared on the left, the Prussian division of Ziethen, who, having made an unsuccessful attempt upon Stotteritz with Klenau's Austrians, had fallen back upon Probstheyda.

But part of Drouot's artillery, established on the left side of the village, received them in flank and repulsed them simply by their guns.

After these attempts, Prince Schwarzenberg, having already more than 12,000 men disabled, could not hope to carry a position rendered impregnable by the valour of our soldiers. He determined, as two days before, to proceed against the French army by successive approximation. On the 16th they had pressed Napoleon toward Leipsic; on the 18th they had compelled him to move one league to the rear; on the 19th they would drive him into Leipsic itself by uniting with Bernadotte and Blücher. The generalissimo, therefore, resolved, on his side, to occupy the day with a battle of artillery, and, in order to maintain it with less disadvantage, he retrograded some hundred paces upon a slightly-raised ground, whose elevation was opposed to that of Probstheida. There, posted opposite to the French, he proceeded to exchange with them one of the most formidable cannonades ever heard.

In the mean while, Benningsen, opposed to our left, which extended northward from Probstheida to Leipsic, had attempted to attack Melckau, but less boldly than Schwarzenberg, because he waited for Bernadotte and Blücher before he should engage seriously. With the two latter, events had proceeded as follows.

After having refused to see Bernadotte, Blücher had at length allowed an interview with him at 8 A.M., and they had agreed to cross the Partha; but Bernadotte had consented to this only on condition that Blücher should lend him 30,000 men, which the latter had promised, placing himself at the head of the 30,000 belonging to Langeron. In fact, while Sacken and D'York, who had remained on the other side of the Partha, to the north of Leipsic, were exchanging shots with Dombrowski and Margaron, Blücher had passed the Partha, at the nearest point, i.e. toward Neutzsch, then, turning to the east of Leipsic, had descended upon Schonfeld, where was established Marmont's second division. Marmont with his other two divisions, Ney with Souham and Reynier, had effected a movement in the rear, in order by Sellerhausen to connect their right with Macdonald, who was at Stotteritz. Bernadotte, making a long circuit in order to cross the Partha as far as possible from the French, had gone to cross it at Taucha, and was advancing, with the Prussians in front, against Reynier, by Heiterblick. Such had been the movements of both in the course of the morning during the terrible battle of Probstheida.

In advance of Sellerhausen, where Reynier was, was the village of Paunsdorf, projecting into the plain, and holding a somewhat commanding position, which Ney had wished to occupy, because from that point they could interpose between the army of Bohemia and that of the North, and perhaps even prevent their junction. Reynier did not agree in this view, for a sufficiently good reason. He suspected the Saxons, who were continually murmuring and threatening desertion. Hitherto they had been tolerably faithful, being placed between the two French divisions of Durutte and Guilleminot; but since the departure of

Guilleminot they were flanked only on one side, and Reynier was unwilling, by putting them forward, to expose them to the temptation of leaving us. Ney, more boldly, made them advance in column toward Paunsdorf, taking care to place Durutte's division behind them, to support and keep them in check. But no sooner had they seen the standards of Bernadotte, with whose staff many of them were in secret communication, than they marched suddenly toward him, certainly not under the influence of the homage which fidelity pays to fidelity. The cavalry was the first to desert; the infantry followed. Marshal Marmont, who was on their left, thought that they were carried away with excess of zeal, and hastened after them; but he was soon undeceived; and in odious treachery, when a few paces from our line of battle, they turned their guns against us, firing upon Durutte's division, with whom they had served for two years. No doubt Napoleon had done violence to their feelings, had chained their hearts and their arms to a cause which they hated; they had a right to leave us, but not upon the field of battle; and if God were now punishing us for having too heavily oppressed Europe, He was preparing for them a just and terrible chastisement, in the partition of their country.

Ney hastened to the spot to aid Durutte's division, who, assailed suddenly by Blücher's corps, had the greatest difficulty in keeping their ground. For more than an hour 5000 men struggled against 20,000, and struggled bravely. However, it was necessary to yield, and to fall back upon Sellerhausen. Ney brought up the Delmas division, to prevent their being overwhelmed in their retrograde movement. Delmas, an old soldier of the republic, died honourably while coming to the aid of Durutte with his division. Whilst, on the right of Ney, Durutte and Delmas were fighting between Paunsdorf and Sellerhausen, Marmont, on the left, maintained a furious combat in the beautiful village of Schonfeld. This was the essential point at which our line, when turning to the north, should become supported by the Partha, and it was the point which Blücher wished to take with Langeron's soldiers. In a few hours the division of Lagrange lost and gained the village seven times. At length they were about to yield, when Ney reinforced them with one of Souham's divisions, that of Ricard. A last time they regained Schonfeld. Between Schonfeld and Sellerhausen, Marmont, with the divisions of Compans and Friederich, formed in square, resisted all the assaults of the Prussian and Russian cavalry. But 28,000 men could not struggle long against 90,000, and they relinquished Schonfeld and Sellerhausen, to approach Leipsic with the fear of seeing Bernadotte and Bubna, now united in the plain of Leipsic, penetrate by the breach made in our line by the defection of the Saxons.

Happily, a considerable reinforcement of cavalry and artillery arrived, at full gallop. These consisted of Nansouty with the cavalry and artillery of the Guard, under the emperor himself. The report of the defection of the Saxons, having reached head-quarters, had roused every heart, and Napoleon, leaving Murat at Probstheida, to replace him in the



battle on the south, which had become a cannonade, had come, in all haste, to repair this unforeseen evil, which completed the measure of our misfortunes.

At this sight, Bulow on one side and Bubna on the other, who were ready to combine, each formed an angle to the rear to present a flank to Nansouty's cavalry. Nansouty charged them with vehemence, right and left, without shaking their deep lines. But he cut short their progress, and there, as on the three sides of this immense battle-field, from Leipsic to Schonfeld on the north, from Schonfeld to Probstheyda on the east, from Probstheyda to Connwitz on the south, a cannonade of 2000 guns ended this battle, justly called the battle of the giants,—certainly the greatest hitherto recorded in history.

As long as they could see, they fired upon each other with fury, but without any hope on the part of the allies to drive the French from the line they had assumed. Our soldiers remained immovable, as if fixed to limits which no human power could cross. The heart of even their enemies was filled with admiration, though justly enraged, the freedom of their country being at stake. The cost of this battle cannot be stated with perfect accuracy. It can only be conjectured from the number of effective men left in the belligerent armies. Nearly 20,000 on our side and 30,000 on that of the allies, who were exposed to commanding and well-directed fire, fell victims to the transactions of this third day. Thus in three days more than 40,000 French, and 60,000 Germans and Russians, were struck. Oh, let us openly declare in the sight of this horrible carnage that war, when not absolutely necessary, is no less than criminal madness!

After this fearful day, whatever may have been the resistance of our army, it became indispensable instantly to sound a retreat, and certainly it would have been better to decamp by night on the 17th than to risk the terrible battle of the 18th for the sake of retaining for a few hours longer a victorious attitude. But it was not the less necessary to withdraw this day as promptly as possible, at the risk of experiencing enormous losses while crossing such a city as Leipsic, with an army which, formerly immense in *personnel* and *matériel*, was still so in *matériel*, and possessed, as the only means of evacuating the city, the single bridge of Lindenau, half a league in length, including woods, marshes, and several streams.

Napoleon, in bitter anguish, but concealing his suffering by the haughty impassibility of his countenance, quitted his post at Probstheyda toward the evening, and repaired to Leipsic to make arrangements for an immediate retreat. Four-and-twenty hours before, he had refused the protection of the night; he was now constrained to accept it, and to withdraw as much as possible from our difficulties, before the attack which might easily be expected on the following day. Napoleon alighted at a simple hotel in the centre of the city, and thence issued his orders. He ordered the staffs of the different corps to defile all night with the *matériel*, the wounded whom they could carry, and the artillery, which had been preserved entire, except about twenty guns lost by an explosion at the battle of Mockern.

He ordered that the corps d'armée should then retire in succession with the Guard at the head, two divisions of which had already passed under General Bertrand. The bridge once crossed, the Guard were to place themselves in order of battle on the plateau of Lindenau, which commands the Elster, and to present to the enemy an invincible rear-guard. As it was probable that the allies, on seeing our departure, would attempt to fall upon us, in order to add the difficulties of a bloody battle to those of our passage through Leipsic, orders were given to the 7th corps, (Reynier's,) at the time composed of the single division of Durutte, to dispute the faubourg of Halle on the north of the city. Dombrowski's division was to aid in this perilous task. Marmont, with the remains of his 6th corps, and a division of the 8d, (Souham's,) was to defend the east of the city, whither Blücher and Bernadotte were pressing on. Finally, Macdonald, whose corps had suffered less than the others on the 18th, uniting with Marmont by his left, was, with Lauriston and Poniatowski, to protect the south side against the grand army of Bohemia. These corps were to dispute the faubourgs to the utmost, while the Guard, all the cavalry, and the remaining troops of Victor, Angereau, and Ney, were decamping, to barricade the streets as well as they could, then to defile by a vast boulevard bordered with trees, which surrounded the town, and separated it from the faubourgs. Falling back in succession on that road, three or four times wider than a street, they were to come by the west to gain the Lindenau bridge, and to cross in succession the two rivers Pleisse and Elster. Colonel Montfort, summoned to Berthier, not to receive orders for the establishment of supplementary bridges, of which there was no longer time to think, but for certain precautions, was ordered to construct a mine under the arch nearest to the city, in order to blow it up as soon as the last French corps should have passed, and whenever the enemy should make their appearance; an order easily given, but exceedingly doubtful in execution. Would the battle which was to be maintained in the faubourgs be long enough to allow a passage of men and *matériel*? Would the corps which were ordered to fight in the faubourgs have time to withdraw and to escape the enemy? Finally, was it not to be feared that the allies, making their way in some points, should reach the bridge before the last French corps? and then, how would it be possible to arrest the pursuit of the one without hindering the retreat of the others? Napoleon did not trouble himself about any of these questions, nor indeed could he to any great degree, for affairs having come to the point to which he had brought them, chance alone could determine the consequences. Besides, while seemingly occupied with giving orders, he was also occupied in casting a glance into the gloomy depths of the future, where he could already see not only lost battles, but fallen empires, and himself precipitated with their ruins into the abyss.

To these instructions concerning the retreat from Leipsic, he added some others for the corps left upon the Elbe, all reduced to capitulate, unless their way to France, now closed, should be opened by a miracle of energy and

presence of mind, which should unite them with Marshal Davout on the Lower Elbe. He sent orders to the chief head-quarters, from which he had remained separate, to take the road for Torgau with the parks. He sent messengers to Dresden, Torgau, and Wittenberg to point out a way of safety, which was, that Marshal St. Cyr, who had still 30,000 men, and could, if he lost no time, overthrow all in his way, should leave Dresden, repair to Torgau, then to Wittenberg, then to Magdeburg, collecting all the garrisons in succession, and join Davout with 70,000 men. Having between them 100,000, they might still save some garrisons on the Oder, and then re-enter France by Wesel at the head of 120,000 soldiers. But what miracles were implied in the arrival, execution, and success of such an order! Miracles scarcely to be expected of soldiers and officers in all the force and confidence of victory! And even in that case, how many thousand wounded, perhaps 40,000, left to the barbarism of a conqueror so blunted by patriotic fanaticism as to believe that patriotism can dispense with humanity!

The passage of the different corps occupied all night of the 18th to the 19th, and was retarded especially by that of the artillery, still very numerous, their guns having been so bravely preserved. The unfortunate men wounded on the 18th were almost all sacrificed, from the absolute impossibility of carrying them off. But they had had time to collect some of those wounded on the 16th, and they dragged them along on little carriages which they had been able to procure. This series of guns, wagons, and carriages bearing the wounded, formed a prodigious encumbrance, and greatly retarded the passage of the columns. The Guard, which had fought bravely, but which was not free from the arrogance of a select corps, chanced to pass as soon as they appeared, and often trampling under foot the unarmed multitude who crowded the bridges, augmented the disorder and raised exclamations of hatred against themselves. A further difficulty was created by the sad pride of conveying 5000 or 6000 prisoners, some taken at Dresden, others at Leipsic, for they occupied the place of an equal number of sound or wounded soldiers. On the return of day, the crowd became still greater, for every one, designing to fly after a few hours' rest, hastened to recover the time lost in sleep. Unparalleled efforts were made to enter the compressed torrent rolling on toward Lindenau, which from time to time was checked in its course like a freezing stream by the blocks of ice. Every new company, struggling for entrance, occasioned resistance, cries, and actual combats. Add to this melancholy spectacle the roar of a thousand guns resumed on the return of morning, and we may form some idea, though still inadequate, of the horrors of our departure from Germany.

Napoleon, at the break of day, went to take leave of the royal family of Saxony. For a moment he had restored to them the dream of their ancestors by bestowing the crown of Poland, but at this price he had unintentionally caused their ruin as he had caused his own. And to crown their misery, of glory, the only thing which remained imperishable

to himself, he left nothing to that unhappy family; while to the Poles, whom he had also ruined, he left at least a share of his immortal honour. The good and timid court of Saxony had, in fact, spent the last ten years at the foot of the altar, which so many others had spent on the field of battle. Napoleon might expect severe reproaches from the old king, and on the other hand, he might find cause for equally serious reproach on his side in the conduct of the Saxon soldiers the day before, but his pride would not allow him to spend the few moments he had devoted to his ally in such a manner. He expressed his regret at leaving him thus without defence to the wrath of the allies; he urged him to treat with them, to separate himself from France, and he affirmed that, for himself, he would never think of regarding such a cause as matter of complaint. Then proudly recovering his grave but not dejected countenance, he expressed the hope of soon becoming formidable behind the Rhine, and promised to make no stipulation for peace which should involve the sacrifice of Saxony. After mutual embraces, he left that good and unfortunate family, alarmed at seeing him remain so long in the midst of surrounding dangers.

Having left the king, he endeavoured in vain to make his way through the streets of Leipsic. He was obliged to reach the boulevards by a circuit, and to follow them as far as the bridge, where the crowd opened before him; for though he began to excite bitter sentiments against himself, yet admiration, faith in his genius, and obedience, remained perfect. He crossed the bridges, and went toward Lindenau, to wait on the other side of the Pleisse and the Elster till the army should pass over in his sight.

In the mean while, a new combat had occurred around Leipsic. The allied sovereigns and generals could not believe in their success, for this was the first victory which they had ever gained over Napoleon since the beginning of the century: nor was even this truly a victory which had cost them so much blood and suffering; it was rather a series of actions, whose real character must be decided by the closing one. And they had expected on this fourth day a formidable conflict, the horrors of which they were resolved to support like true martyrs to their cause. But what were their surprise and joy when, between eight and nine A.M., on the dispersion of the autumn mist, they perceived the French army closing in successively upon Leipsic, and pouring over the interminable bridge of Lindenau into the plains of Lutzen! They thanked Heaven for a result which they had not dared to hope, and immediately ordered their soldiers to fall upon the enceinte of Leipsic, to increase the difficulty and the loss of the retreat of the French army. All marching in the order observed the day before, the column of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, which formed the left of the allies, pursued Poniatowski into the faubourg corresponding to the Peters-Thor gate. The column of the centre, that of Kleist and Wittgenstein, presented itself before the same faubourg, but at a barrier a little to the right, that of Windmühlen. The column of the right, that of Klenau and Benningen, presented

itself at the barrier of the Hospital, ending at the old Grimma gate. Bulow, of Bernadotte's corps, directed himself against the faubourg situated between the Grimma and Halle gates. Blucher, Langeron, and Sacken fell upon the faubourg of Halle; and General D'York, who had rested the day before, was ordered to go by the north to the banks of the Elster and the Pleisse, to impede as much as possible the passage of our columns. But everywhere the allies met a firm resistance. Our soldiers were as irritated as their adversaries, and were as mortified by their pretence of beating them as the Germans had been by our pretence of governing them. Proud of their conduct during these days, they had the feeling of misfortune, but not of defeat, and they were determined to make the enemy pay dear for their defeat or their life. To the north and east of Leipsic, in the faubourg of Halle, the remains of the 7th, 8d, and 6th corps vigorously repulsed the troops of Sacken and Langeron. These brave men, posted in a large building, killed 2000 or 3000 men before evacuating it, and even some light companies of the 6th corps, pouring through the Halle gate upon the troops who were attacking the building, made a terrible slaughter. Marmont, with a division of the 6th corps and one of the 3d, defended the eastern side against Bulow, and, some heads of columns having penetrated into the city, sent against them the 142d of the line and the 23d light, who slaughtered nearly the whole. Macdonald, Lauriston, and Poniatowski, with their infuriated troops, received in the same way the enemy's columns who appeared before the faubourgs to the south. Everywhere the impatience of the conquerors was cruelly punished, and we inflicted severe injury on the allies with little loss to ourselves. But it was necessary to cut short this combat, not from inability to resist, but from inability to arrange our movements in concert. Being impossible to communicate from one street to another, and to discern the direction of the fire in the midst of a frightful cannonade, which embraced all the four sides of the city, they could not know whether the resistance was everywhere equally successful, or whether, by resisting too long, they might not be anticipated at the bridge by the victorious enemy. Some Saxons and Badians, left within the city, added to the confusion by firing upon our soldiers. In the ranks of Marmont, i.e. toward the east, it was believed that on the side of Macdonald and Lauriston, i.e. toward the south, the line of the faubourgs had been forced. Toward these two sides the same was believed with respect to the north, where Reynier and Dombrowski were engaged. In this fear they almost simultaneously began to retreat, debouching on the boulevards which separate the faubourgs from the city. The press then became as great there as on the bridge. From each street of the faubourgs there came columns, which fell back as they fought, and which added to the encumbrance to such an extent that even the enemy could not make way with their bayonets. Marshal Marmont, obliged to retire, had great difficulty in penetrating this thick crowd, which filled the boulevards. Happily for him, some

officers of his corps, having recognised him, seized his bridle, and, clearing a way for him with their sabres, introduced him into the dense torrent which flowed slowly toward the bridges.

At this period of this fearful evacuation occurred a sudden catastrophe, which might readily have been foreseen, and which filled those with despair who, for the common safety, had devoted themselves to the defence of the faubourgs of Leipsic. Colonel Montfort, of the engineers, had been ordered to mine the first arch of that long bridge which is sometimes a bridge, sometimes an elevated mound, and embraces, as we have said, the numerous arms of the Pleisse and the Elster. This arch was situated at the extremity of Leipsic corresponding to Lindenau, and was built over the principal arm of the Elster. Colonel Montfort, having mined it, had placed there several sappers with a corporal, who waited for the signal with his match in his hand. But his perplexity was great; for the fire of musketry was heard approaching from the side of the faubourg of Halle through the woods which cover that part of the environs of the city. Every moment it was expected that the enemy should appear pell-mell with our soldiers; not was it known whether other French troops still combating might not be beyond. Accordingly, Colonel Montfort asked of every one who came whether there were still several corps in the rear, in what order they were coming, which would be the last; and, as no one knew very clearly what passed immediately before his eyes, no one was able to reply. In this difficulty, the colonel thought of going to the other end of the bridge, i.e. to Lindenau, where Napoleon was, to obtain instructions, and, on leaving for a moment, he ordered the corporal of sappers not to set fire to the mine till he should see the enemy appear instead of the French. Scarcely had he taken a few steps through the thick crowd which encumbered the bridge, before he perceived the impossibility of reaching Napoleon and returning. He wished to retrace his steps to his post, but in vain. At the bridge which he had quitted the scene was most tumultuous. Some of Blucher's troops, pursuing the debris of Reynier's corps across the faubourg of Halle, appeared at the beginning of the bridge along with the soldiers of the 7th corps. At this sight, some cried out, in alarm, *Set fire, set fire!* The corporal, hearing the demand repeated on all sides, thought the time had come, and fired the mine! A frightful explosion ensued: the ruins of the bridge, thrown into the air, and falling on the two banks, made victims on each side. But this deplorable error had, in a few moments, very different consequences. Reynier, with some remains of the 7th corps, Poniatowski, with what survived of the Poles, Lauriston, Macdonald, with the wrecks of the 5th and 11th corps, were still on the boulevards of Leipsic, pressed between 200,000 enemies and several arms of rivers, the means of passing which had been destroyed. More than 20,000 of our soldiers, with their generals, were thus condemned either to perish or to become the prisoners of an enemy exasperated to inhumanity. They thought themselves betrayed, uttered cries of rage, and, in the

alternations of despair, rushed on their pursuers with the bayonet, and again struggled toward the Pleisse and the Elster, with the view of swimming across. After a confused and sanguinary mêlée, some surrendered, others threw themselves into the rivers, some succeeded in swimming across, many were carried away by the stream. The generals commanding, among whom were two marshals, determined not to leave such trophies to the enemy, sought to save themselves. Poniatowski, who had been made a marshal the day before by Napoleon, as a reward for his heroism, without hesitation leaped his horse into the Elster. Reaching the other side, he found it steep, and, reeling under his wounds, he disappeared in the water, and buried in his glory the fall of his country and of ours. Macdonald, following his example, reached the opposite bank, where he found soldiers who assisted him to climb it, and was saved. Reynier and Lauriston, surrounded before they could attempt to fly, were brought before the sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in whose presence they had never for a long time appeared except as conquerors. Alexander, recognising General Lauriston, the prudent ambassador who had made so many efforts to prevent the war of 1812, extended his hand to him, reproaching him at the same time for having sought to withdraw himself from his esteem. He treated with respect the French generals who had become his prisoners, concealed, in consideration of them, his gratified pride, but made them contribute to the splendour of his triumph. In fact, the victorious generals and princes assembled in the principal square of the city, congratulating each other with mutual compliments on their performances, in presence of the inhabitants of Leipsic, who, still pale with the terror of those three days, left the recesses of their houses, and uttered shouts of acclamation in honour of the sovereigns, their liberators. In the midst of these animated personages was observed Bernadotte, convinced that he alone had decided the victory because he had arrived the last upon the field, a conviction in which no one else participated; but he met a gracious reception from Alexander, whose refined policy induced him to retain his influence over the future sovereign of Sweden. While Alexander received so favourably this Frenchman in arms against France, he exhibited great harshness toward a German prince, whom he unjustly called a traitor to Germany, the unfortunate King of Saxony. Twice since the morning officers had come from him to seek a moment's interview, and had been repulsed. A third was now present, hat in hand, to supplicate Alexander to allow the aged king to offer him his respects. That unhappy monarch was a few steps off, bare-headed, vainly imploring a look from the conqueror. Napoleon, it must be acknowledged, being more accustomed to victory, had better treated the conquered sovereigns. Alexander, yielding to a sentiment unworthy of himself, sent word to the King of Saxony that he refused to see him; that, having been taken in arms, he was a prisoner of war; that the allied sovereigns would determine upon his fate and signify to him their decision. Thus, by abandoning us

upon the field, the Saxon soldiers had not even purchased the pardon of their king.

Let us return to the French army, withdrawing, mutilated, across the numerous arms of the Pleisse and the Elster, and leaving again on that day 20,000 soldiers either prisoners, or dying in the streets of Leipsic, or drowned in the ensanguined waters of the Pleisse and Elster. This last of the four fatal days of Leipsic raised the losses of the French army in dead, wounded or prisoners, drowned or missing, to about 60,000 men. The enemy had not lost a smaller number of men on the field; but their wounded would receive the grateful attention of German patriotism: what should become of ours?

Napoleon had heard a violent explosion from his position at Lindenau: he soon detected the cause and its consequences, exhibited great anger toward all those to whom he could ascribe this sad accident, and professed to seek the guilty, when there were really none, or, if any, it was himself alone, the author of this horrible war.

Such was the protracted and terrible battle of Leipsic, one of the most sanguinary and certainly the greatest of any age, which terminated so disastrously the campaign of Saxony, so prosperously commenced at Lützen and Bautzen. We may, no doubt, inquire how, after such profound calculations, such skilful manœuvres, such exalted hopes, Napoleon could have been led on to such a catastrophe, and we shall understand it only by forming an accurate estimate of all the motives of his conduct, which converted into a frightful reverse some of the most brilliant conceptions of his life. If we suppose an inferior general placed in a less difficult situation, not called upon to restore a prodigious fortune at a single blow, nor actuated by a hundred motives of pride to conceal the truth from himself, and unaccustomed to seek extraordinary results from bold and complicated combinations, he would certainly have acted in a different manner, and very probably, if he had not obtained distinguished results, he would, at least, have avoided a disaster. At the first threat of a movement on his rear, either by the Lower Elbe or by Bohemia, he would, without a moment's delay, have decamped from Dresden, leaving in that city only the sick who could not be removed. He would thus have brought, besides the 200,000 men remaining to him at that time, the 30,000 who were left in Dresden, probably, also, the 30,000 of Meissen, Torgau, and Wittenberg, and would have reached the Saale in a compact body, not weakened by forced marches and compulsory detachments to the Elbe. If in this situation, one of the two armies of the enemy, either that of Bohemia or that of the Elbe, had committed the error of anticipating the other at Leipsic by a day, he would have beaten it, and then fallen upon the second. Even had no such opportunity of triumph been afforded to him, he would, at least, have regained the banks of the Saale in safety, and if he had been unable to defend that short and accessible line, he would prudently have resumed the road to the Rhine, and, by sensible instructions to all the garrisons of the

fortresses on the Lower Elbe, he would have ordered them to fall back successively as far as Hamburg, which they certainly could have reached without accident, the enemy being wholly occupied in following the main army. They would thus have formed with Marshal Davout a fine army of 80,000 men, who would have reached the Rhine by Wesel, and, after that, nearly 800,000 soldiers in good condition would have mustered on the frontier of the Empire, and have imposed an invincible barrier against invasion. But to Napoleon a line of conduct so simple was rendered impossible by his character, his pride, his previous habits, and his demand for extraordinary results.

At the news of a double march of his enemies upon Leipsic, some descending from Bohemia, others ascending from the Elbe along the Mulda, he did not think of his own safety for a moment. Accustomed to see them continually elude his grasp, his only fear was lest they should escape again, and, instead of going direct to Leipsic by the straight road, which would have saved him 12,000 or 15,000 soldiers, left in the mud of autumn, he descended the Elbe in the direction of Duben, to make sure of Blücher and Bernadotte, always convinced, in his pride, that they were more anxious to avoid him than to fight. Scarcely had he begun his march, ever in quest of combinations which might procure vast results, when he formed the design of falling upon the track of Blücher and Bernadotte, of pursuing them without intermission beyond the Elbe, of driving them back upon the Berlin road, then of ascending by the right bank of the Elbe as far as Torgau or Dresden, passing that river again at these points, and falling unawares upon the rear of the army from Bohemia. Certainly this combination was equally profound and daring, and with the soldiers, the seal, and the good fortune of Austerlitz it should have effected prodigious results. But to realize this chimerical hope it was necessary to consent to the loss of 80,000 men at Dresden; and Napoleon left them there. Reaching Duben, on the Lower Mulda, he could soon see that, far from avoiding him, Blücher and Bernadotte sought to anticipate him at Leipsic, there to join Schwarzenberg and overthrow Napoleon. He formed his resolution immediately, retraced his steps toward that city, and, with his ordinary accuracy, placed himself in the only position calculated to prevent the union of his enemies. But he returned to Leipsic after a useless march of fifty leagues, which had exhausted his men and greatly diminished their numbers; he returned deprived of 80,000 fighting-men left at Dresden, of an equal quantity left at Wittenberg, Torgau, and Meissen, and he marched in a long column, of which at least one-third could not be present at the first and most decisive battle. Obligated to prepare against all his enemies, not only those actually present, but those which might become so, it was impossible for him on the 16th to bring Bertrand and Ney to himself, to throw them with Maedonald on the right flank of Schwarzenberg and overthrow him, and therefore, not having proved an overwhelming conqueror on the first day, he suddenly found himself in a frightful posi-

tion, which compelled him to fall in the following days under a crushing combination of forces. The only conduct worthy of a prudent captain, more anxious to save his army than to preserve his own prestige, was immediately to retreat, if not on the 17th while he was still expecting Reynier, at least on the night of the 17th to the 18th, to regain as soon as possible, by Lindenau, Lützen, and Weissenfels, his threatened communications, and for that purpose to construct the necessary bridges over the Pleisse and the Elster. But to make a proud and imposing retreat in open day, falling upon the enemy who should venture to pursue him, not to save himself, but to retain his victorious attitude, was (and naturally so) the thought of a conqueror long spoiled by fortune,—of a conqueror who could not even leave Moscow in due time; and hence ensued the fatal battle of the 18th, and the still more fatal retreat of the 19th effected by a single bridge. The inevitable confusion introduced at the last moment into affairs thus conducted led to the explosion of the bridge of the Elster, which stamped the impress of fatality upon this dreadful battle of four days' duration.

This *résumé* of facts shows the true cause of all the misfortunes we have related. No more here than at Moscow must we seek in the failure of the leader's talents the cause of such deplorable results,—for he was never more fruitful in resource, more bold, more resolute, nor more a soldier,—but in the illusions of pride, in the wish to regain at a blow an immense fortune which he had lost, in the difficulty of acknowledging to himself his defeat in time, in a word, in all those errors which we may discern in miniature and caricature in an ordinary gambler, who madly risks riches acquired by folly, errors which are found on a large and terrible scale in this gigantic gambler, who plays with human blood as others play with money. As gamblers lose their fortunes twice,—once from not knowing where to stop, and a second time from wishing to restore it at a single cast,—so Napoleon endangered his at Moscow by wishing to make it exorbitantly large, and in the Dresden campaign by seeking to restore it in its full extent. The cause was always the same, the alteration not in the genius but in the character, by the deteriorating influence of unlimited power and success.

In consequence of such reverses, the only resource left to Napoleon was to return immediately to the Rhine. After having had 860,000 effective troops on the resumption of hostilities, not including the garrisons, and still retaining 250,000 two weeks before, and leaving 80,000 at Dresden, perhaps an equal number on the road from Dresden to Duben and from Duben to Leipsic, after having lost 60,000 or 70,000 in the different battles of Leipsic, and a number not easily estimated by the defection of his allies, he retained from 100,000 to 110,000 at most, in a most deplorable condition. The only thing which he had still in a considerable quantity and of an excellent quality, but difficult to transport, was artillery: this was very good and well served, and had always made it a point of honour to save their guns, and had lost only those which the destruction of the bridge of the Elster

had prevented being transported in time from one bank to the other. His remaining artillery was double in proportion to his remaining soldiers. If this occasioned a difficulty, it also afforded a most valuable resource on the field of battle.

Napoleon spent the night of the 19th of October near Lutzen with the wrecks of his army. Bertrand and Mortier had repulsed Giulay, and, having reached Weissenfels, had secured the possession of the Saale. On the morning of the 20th, Napoleon hastened to Weissenfels to direct the retreat in person and to anticipate all the corps of the enemy at the essential points. If they should follow on the left (the left, returning toward the Rhine) the high-road from Weissenfels to Naumburg and Jena, they would meet the famous defile of Kosen, where Marshal Davout had covered himself with glory by defending the plain of Awerstaedt, and where they had a chance of finding Giulay, who, repulsed by Bertrand and Mortier, might very possibly there seek his revenge. Napoleon, whose foresight had not been impeded by his misfortune, thought of making a détour to the right, and, instead of passing the Saale at Naumburg, crossing it at Weissenfels, where the bridges were in our possession, of then gaining Freyburg, there to cross the Unstrutt, of debouching from that point into the plain of Weimar and Erfurt; while Bertrand, brought rapidly by a movement to the left on the defile of Kosen, should endeavour to anticipate the enemy at that point and to defend himself as long as possible against the grand army of Schwarzenberg. No sooner was this plan of march conceived than its execution was ordered. Bertrand, whose 4th corps had been augmented, as we have seen, by Guilleminot's division, was immediately sent off for Freyburg, with Mortier, who commanded two divisions of the Young Guard, with the light cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoette, and the 2d cavalry of General Sebastiani. This numerous cavalry, everywhere scouring the country and sabreing the Cossacks, was to precede and flank the advanced guard; then, when they had reached Freyburg, and had occupied the city and the bridges over the Unstrutt, Bertrand was to hasten to Kosen, and Mortier to remain at Freyburg to protect the passage of the army.

These orders were punctually executed. Bertrand arrived at Freyburg on the evening of the 21st, with the different corps which attended his march. In that city there were only some light troops of the enemy, which were expelled. They seized a stone bridge over the Unstrutt, solid but narrow. A wooden one was added during the night to facilitate the passage of the army, and, while Mortier was occupied with these cares, Bertrand, ascending the heights on the left, took position at Kosen, which he reached before the enemy.

These measures, seasonably adopted and resolutely executed, had the expected result. The army, after having crossed the plains of Lutzen, reached Weissenfels on the evening of the 21st, where they crossed the Saale without being pursued by any other troops than the scouts of the enemy. Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte had remained at Leipsic,—one to refresh his army, exhausted by three battles,

the other to hold reviews. Giulay alone had marched by the road of Naumburg and Kosen. Of the indefatigable army of Silesia, only the corps of General d'York was able to follow us, and, the means of passing the Pleisse and the Elster having been destroyed at Leipsic, Blücher himself had been obliged to make a détour, and to descend far below Leipsic to cross these rivers. We had him on our right, but to the rear, while to our left we had only Giulay, who in order to reach us had been compelled to force the defile of Kosen.

The Saale having been crossed on the 21st, the army halted for the night at Freyburg, where, as we have seen, the means for passing the Unstrutt had been prepared. The enemy's cavalry had rescued several thousand prisoners whom Napoleon had intended to take with him, a mortification to our pride rather than an actual loss; but it proved by what masses of horse we were pursued, for this affront had been shared by Bertrand, Mortier, Sebastiani, and Lefebvre-Desnoette. That cavalry effected little against organized corps; but the disbandment which had been begun in the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Ney, in consequence of the reverses of the Katsbach, Gross-Beer, and Dennewitz, had become very general throughout the army after the frightful battle of Leipsic. The first pretext for leaving the ranks was found in slight wounds, which obliged the men to march without arms behind the columns; the second was hunger, which authorized straggling in search of food. Once from the ranks, the men never returned to them. Military habits were, in fact, too recent with our young soldiers to allow them to leave their standards with impunity. When their companies were once left, disgust, suffering, a taste for marauding, and a natural desire to avoid new dangers, prevented their return. Of 100,000 or 110,000 men still following Napoleon, there were more than 20,000 of whom some wore their arms in a sling, others were lame, the greater part professed to be wounded without being so at all, or pretended to have lost their arms, which in reality they had thrown away; these marched between the armed columns or behind them, scattered themselves through the villages for plunder, and consumed, without any return, the resources which might have supported the organized corps. What was still worse, was the example, which threatened to become contagious, and which the efforts of the cavalry were unable to repress. Courage had not for a moment failed in those young men, but military habits, too feebly rooted, had not retained their force against a great defeat, and they had almost forgotten that they were soldiers. The cavalry, which commonly keeps in check this kind of error, was itself infected, and among the disbanded multitude might be seen dismounted cavalry, and some even still mounted. From this portion of the army chiefly had the scores of the enemy taken prisoners. They scattered the marauders like flocks of frightened birds, and gathered them up in great numbers, which gave occasion to the coalition to say that they had made thousands of prisoners. Guns deserted for want of horses, and marauders caught in the villages, obtained them pretended trophies, much more injurious to us than glo-

rious to them. The whole night of the 21st and the day of the 22d were spent in the passage of this multitude of men, armed and disarmed, by the two bridges of Freyburg. It was, however, effected by means of the vigorous resistance presented by Marshal Oudinot to the Prussians of D'York's corps on the banks of the Unstrutt. Since leaving Leipsic, that marshal had protected the retreat with two divisions of the Young Guard, whilst Mortier with the two others, and Bertrand with the 4th corps, were charged to clear the road. Oudinot lost some hundred men in this obstinate contest, but killed many more of D'York's corps; nor did he quit his post till the whole army had defiled. In the mean while, General Bertrand, having reached Kosen before Giulay, had fought an obstinate battle with him, his rear toward Awerstädt and his front toward the Saale. For a whole day he was assailed by the Austrians, and as often as he was attacked by them he repulsed them with the brave division of Guillemot, and drove them from the heights of Kosen into the deep gorges of the Saale. When Bertrand knew that Oudinot had evacuated Freyburg, and that all our columns had defiled upon Erfurt, he quitted his post, fearing that the enemy might get before him and cut him off from the rest of the army by passing the Saale at Jena. On the evening of the 22d they encamped in different villages between Apolda, Buttelsstadt, and Weimar. On the 23d all the army was collected in the neighbourhood of Erfurt, the cavalry scouring the country around to protect them from the irruption of the Cossacks.

At Erfurt, in a place furnished with great resources, Napoleon determined to allow two or three days' respite to the army, of which it was much in need, both for the sake of repose and of restoration of order. At Erfurt there were many detachments which had arrived, in marching battalions and squadrons; there was abundance of clothing, shoes, provisions, and ammunition. They distributed among the various corps the detachments which were found at Erfurt, and which had not been sent forward toward the Elbe, owing to the difficulty of communications. Augereau's corps, reduced to the single division of Semelé, and to 1600 infantry, instead of 8000 as on the day before the battle of Leipsic, was thus raised to 4000. They were to march with Durutte's division, the only remains of the 7th corps. It is to be understood that the other corps did not gain in the same proportion, for, at the most, the depot at Erfurt could furnish only 9000 or 10,000 men. Clothes, shoes, and provisions were distributed, the parks of artillery were furnished anew, and the marauders were solicited to resume their muskets by the inducement of such distributions. In this respect the success was not great; for the vice of marauding, favoured by the season, the bad weather, and the age of our soldiers, had become widely diffused.

Napoleon profited by these two days of leisure to write to Paris and communicate his situation to the principal members of his government. While palliating his reverses, and seeking to explain them by imaginary causes, he did not conceal his necessities, and, in ad-

dition to 280,000 men already demanded, he asked for new levies of grown-up men taken from past conscriptions. "I cannot defend France with children," he said. "Nothing can equal the bravery of our young men; but at the first doubtful event they evince the character of their age." Napoleon was no doubt right; but grown-up men who should have been no longer at their standards, and who should have been subjected to such severe trials on their entrance into service, would probably have borne them no better. Only they would have sent fewer sick to the hospitals.

While he asked *men*, and *not children*, he also demanded imposts, i.e. money, and was no longer willing to accept bills, good or bad, upon the public domains. He demanded 500,000,000 by means of a war-percentage on all taxes, direct and indirect. In the present state of things, nothing could be better than his proposals.

To the painful impressions of the moment was added the departure of Murat. Napoleon, while blaming the levity of his brother-in-law, admired his heroism, his *coup-d'œil* in the field, and he was not insensible to the excellence of his heart. He knew what had passed in the mind of Murat better than he knew it himself; he knew all the conflicts to which the unhappy King of Naples had been a prey, between the desire of retaining his crown and that of remaining faithful to his benefactor. As a reason for leaving, Murat assigned the necessity of defending Italy, which was threatened, the hope of furnishing Prince Eugene with 30,000 well-organized Neapolitans, and, finally, the advantage to the French and Italian armies of placing at their head a more experienced commander than Prince Eugene. Napoleon acknowledged the force of these reasons, as well as the probability, if the series of misfortunes should continue, that Murat should follow the common course, and imitate those German princes, our allies, who, after having been for ten years loaded by us with the wealth of the German Church, now pretended that they had been the victims of France. But notwithstanding some remaining illusions, and the last deception of his flatterers, Napoleon knew in his conscience that he had abused both men and things. Well capable of rendering justice to himself, he rendered it to others, and, foreseeing the approaching defection of Murat, he as it were pardoned him beforehand. On leaving him, and receiving his protestations of fidelity as perfectly sincere, he embraced him repeatedly, and with much grief. He felt that he should never again see that old companion of arms in Italy and Egypt. Alas! if prosperity blinds, adversity, in a manner, imparts sometimes a strange foresight, when we may say that an avenging Providence, to crown our punishment, raises the veil of futurity. Napoleon left Murat as for the last time. Murat set off, regretted by the whole army; for in this autumn campaign he had shown himself equally skilful and brave, and, notwithstanding some slight errors of detail, he had rendered immortal service to our arms.

But it was necessary to decamp, for on all sides the allied troops advanced; and, moreover, the presence of a new enemy on our rear

was announced, ready to bar our road to France. This was no other than the Bavarian army, so long our companion, anxious to atone for their long alliance with us by a defection as similar as possible to that of Bernadotte and the Saxons. Napoleon had not only learned the defection of Bavaria, which he had known, generally, on reaching Leipsic, but the manner also in which it had been brought about. During this second part of the Saxon campaign, events had proceeded in Munich as follows.

The king, a weak man, but attached to Napoleon, who had loaded him with benefits, seconded by an intelligent and ambitious minister, who had sought his own greatness and that of his country in alliance with France, had been opposed in this policy by his wife, a vain and self-willed princess, sister of the Empress of Russia and of the deceased Queen of Sweden, with the passions of the late Queen of Prussia and a share of her beauty. He was also opposed by his son, a prince more friendly to the arts than to war, whom Napoleon had employed and treated with harshness. The queen exerted her opposition in the palace. The king's son, retired to Innspruck, fomented personally the insurrectional spirit of the Tyrolese against Bavaria. As long as France had been victorious, the king had smiled at the aristocratic sallies of his wife and son, allowing both to talk, and accepting what Napoleon gave him after each war, as worth taking, in the first place, and as worth showing, in the second, as a reply to the detractors of his policy. Since Moscow, doubt of Napoleon's power, the popular cry, the news of losses experienced by the Bavarians, the suggestions of Austria, and the contagion of the German spirit, had shaken the king, who for a moment was again confirmed by the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen. But the resumption of hostilities, the character of events, every day more gloomy, the recent losses of the Bavarian corps at the battle of Dennewitz, reported with exaggeration at Munich, the efforts of the three courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had more than ever endangered the fidelity of Bavaria to France. This situation was rendered greatly more critical by the arrival of a new personage at Munich,—viz., General de Wrede, a man of impetuous and uncertain character, a brave but not judicious officer, unwarrantably self-conceited, who had returned to his country deeply wounded by the contempt of Marshal St. Cyr, under whom he had served in the campaign of the Dwina. Having brought to Munich all his vexations, and exhibited them imprudently, he had, nevertheless, like his sovereign, renewed his intimacy with us after Lutzen and Bautzen, and had himself disclosed the secret of the half-completed defection of the court of Bavaria, in order to regain the favour of Napoleon. M. d'Argenteau, perceiving the need of attaching him to us, had asked for him the ribbon of the legion of honour, become vacant by the death of the excellent general Des Roys; and Napoleon, who had already given titles and wealth to General de Wrede, did not think right to add this last distinction. General de Wrede, returning displeased, had remained in Bavaria, and had suddenly ac-

quired great importance, by obtaining the command of the Bavarian army upon the Inn, opposite the Austrian army of Prince de Reuss. If Augereau, with about 20,000 men, had joined him on the Inn, he would have been retained; and M. d'Argenteau greatly insisted on this precaution. But Napoleon required Augereau elsewhere, and the Bavarians, being neither supported nor held in check, had soon yielded to the universal sentiment of the Germans. Instead of making head against Prince de Reuss, General de Wrede had entered into parley with him. The Austrians, in the name of the coalition, had promised to General de Wrede the command of the Bavarian and Austrian armies united on the Inn, and to the king the preservation of his states, saving an equivalent in population and revenue for the provinces which they intended to recover, i.e. the Tyrol and the banks of the Inn. M. de Mongelas himself, perceiving that he could not retain his post without a sudden change of policy, had accepted the proposals of the allied Powers, hoping that if Bavaria preserved her aggrandizement he would preserve his situation. But he had made the change not as when change is the result of strength, (as in the case of M. de Metternich,) but as when it is the result of weakness, and he had joined the coalition without giving us warning. He professed fidelity while he abandoned us. The king, being opposed by his wife, his son, his people, his ministers, his general, had not decision of character to resist so many opponents, and when he was told that, with the exception of an equivalent, he should retain his states, and especially when it was added that if he refused it would be necessary, as in 1805, to evacuate his capital before the Austrian army and to throw himself into the arms of Napoleon, no longer a conqueror, but conquered, he had hesitated no longer, and on the 8th of October had signed a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the coalition. At this news Bavaria had broken out into transports of joy, which confirmed his resolution.

Such a change had been brought about by irresistible causes; but decency required at least that Bavaria, whom we had so richly endowed, while leaving us for her own safety, should, for her honour, leave to others the work of destroying us. But it was not so; and the Bavarian Government, to insure her restoration to the favour of the allied sovereigns, and General de Wrede, to secure a marshal's baton, used great haste in bringing the Austro-Bavarian army from the Inn to the Upper Danube, from the Danube to the Main. This army, composed of Austrians and Bavarians, 60,000 strong, had marched with such rapidity that it was said to be already at Würzburg, and ready to intercept the road to Mentz, in the neighbourhood of Frankfurt.

At this announcement Napoleon smiled with contempt; but he did not fail to perceive the error of his policy in regard to Germany,—a policy which, instead of limiting itself to granting a little support to the secondary states, had gone so far as to aim at making them subjects of France. He therefore determined to quit Erfurt, and to take the road to Mentz. The Austro-Bavarian army occasioned him little alarm, but, with 200,000 men in his rear, it behaved



him to calculate his time with the utmost minuteness and precision.

After spending three days at Erfurt, he left for Eisenach, in order to cross the defiles of the forest of Thuringia before the allies. General Sebastiani with the 2d corps of cavalry, General Lefebvre-Desnoette with the light cavalry of the Guard and the 5th cavalry, formed the advanced guard, and covered the flanks of the army, scouring the country right and left. Marshals Victor and Macdonald followed, with the remains of the 2d and 11th corps; then came Marshal Marmont, who united under his orders the remains of the 6th, 5th, and 3d corps, Dürutte and Semelé leading their divisions, the only remains of the 7th and 16th corps. Napoleon with the Old Guard, the 1st cavalry, and the heavy cavalry of the Guard, formed the principal nucleus of the army. Oudinot and Mortier with the four divisions of the Young Guard, Bertrand with the 4th corps, augmented by Guilleminot's division and the 4th cavalry, composed the rear-guard. The total of these troops did not exceed 70,000 armed men,—so greatly had the ranks been deserted between Leipsic and Erfurt. Then followed 80,000 or 40,000 unarmed men, mingling with the organized corps, annoying them in battle, and consuming their provisions at the bivouac.

The allied armies, after having spent two or three days at Leipsic in enjoying their triumph and recovering themselves from so rude a struggle, had been newly arranged, and were then directed toward their ultimate destination. General Klenau had been sent back to Dresden with his corps, to endeavour to effect the surrender of that place and the French troops who occupied it. General Tauenzien, already detached from the army of the North, had been charged to effect the surrender of Torgau and Wittenberg; and General Benningsen, with the army of Poland, had been sent forward to Magdeburg and Hamburg to effect the blockade and, if possible, the conquest of those fortresses. The army of the North had been sent on the road to Cassel, to complete the destruction of King Jerome's monarchy, if not already done. It was then to return toward Westphalia, Hanover, and Holland. Finally, Blücher and Prince Schwarzenberg, with about 160,000 men, had set off in pursuit of Napoleon's army, which they pressed on closely, in the hope of placing them between two fires, De Wrede in front, themselves in rear. Blücher, promoted by his sovereign to the dignity of marshal, having deserved more than any other the rewards of the coalition, had been directed against Eisenach, thence to repair not to Frankfurt, but to Wetzlar, in order to cut off Napoleon from the Coblenz road, as he had already been cut off from that of Mentz. The grand army of Bohemia, divided into two, was to march partly by Eisenach, Fulda, and Frankfurt, upon Mentz, partly by Gotha, Schmalkalden, and Schweinfurt, upon Würzburg. Prince Schwarzenberg, for an obvious reason, had sent the Austrians to Frankfurt, while he sent the Russians and Prussians to Würzburg. Though the Emperor Francis, as well as his able minister, had wisely declined the Imperial crown of Germany, yet they desired under some form to maintain supremacy in Germany, and their presence at Frankfurt, the city of the Imperial election,

might there elude some useful demonstrations, which they might employ to recover something of their former dominion, or at least to exhibit with advantage their disinterestedness.

The forces having been thus distributed, all had followed the French army. Sebastiani and Lefebvre-Desnoette had found near Eisenach many Cossacks and scouts of all kinds, on foot and on horse, and had scattered them, forcing them to hide in the forest of Thuringia. On the 26th and 27th of October the army had itself defiled without great difficulty, though the rear-guard of Oudinot and Mortier, consisting of the Young Guard, had been assailed by the impetuous Blücher, whom they had resisted with energy. The loss on both sides was about 1000, but they had taken many stragglers, whom in their bulletins, much less exact than ours, they represented as prisoners taken in the field.

On the 26th Napoleon slept at Vacha, beyond the defiles of Thuringia, on the 27th at Hünfeld, on the 28th at Schluchtern. Having reached the aspect of the forest of Thuringia which looks toward the Rhine, we were less actively pursued, because Blücher had turned to the right, to take the road for the Rhine by Wetzlar, and the Prussians and Russians had gone to the left, in the direction of Würzburg. Hence there were on our track only the Austrians, firmly kept in check by Mortier, Oudinot, and Bertrand. They had chiefly to do with the Cossacks and the enemy's cavalry in general, which caused us all the harm they could by capturing the stragglers. This harm was but too great; for the rapidity of our marches, and the difficulty of subsistence, deprived our ranks of men in thousands. The Semelé division, for example, which, after being reorganized at Erfurt, reckoned about 4000 men, was reduced on the other side of the Thuringian mountains to 1800. The divisions of the Young Guard, themselves affected with this contagion, had fallen from 3000 men each, after Leipsic, to less than 2000. The sick and wounded who at first composed the fluctuating and unarmed multitude had expired on the roads from fatigue or the lances of the Cossacks. They were replaced by the famished, by those who were disgusted with the service, and by the disaffected, whose numbers were sensibly increasing. Fortunately, the cold was not like that of Russia, and they were approaching Mentz; for the soldiers of 1813, much inferior to those of 1812, could certainly not have sustained the same trials.

On the 27th of October, it was learned at Schluchtern that General de Wrede was at Würzburg, occupied in cannonading that fortress, which General Tharreau refused to surrender. General de Wrede had only one step to take to intercept the road between Hanau and Mentz. An advanced guard was sent forward, with what could be collected of stragglers and equipages, in order to get rid of what was most embarrassing. Some light troops of the Bavarian army had already reached Hanau, a small half-fortified place at the confluence of the Kinzig and Main, whose guns commanded the high-road to Mentz. These Bavarian advanced guards were not strong enough to intercept the road, and, besides, General Preval, sent by the Marshal Duke of Valmy to meet the grand army, had just arrived at Frankfurt with 4000 or 5000

men. That general had taken his position between Frankfort and Hanau on the Nidda, that the enemy might be unable to offer the obstacle of that river, and thus prevent the passage of the grand army. Owing to this precaution, our disbanded soldiers, once through Hanau, would meet a force which should receive and protect them as far as Mentz. Different detachments defiled on the 27th and 28th of October, compelling the light troops of the enemy to fall back into Hanau, and each time saving thousands of wounded, sick, or wandering. Thus passed from 15,000 to 18,000; but on the 29th the road was wholly closed; for General de Wrede, despairing to conquer the resistance of General Thureau, had left merely a detachment to blockade Würzburg, and had gone to Hanau with 60,000 men, one half Bavarians, the other Austrians. Having reached that place, he had detached one division to Frankfort, and had posted himself with his main body before Hanau, in the forest of Lamboy, which is crossed by the high-road.

On the 29th, Napoleon, having come to Langen-Sebold for the night, learned that the head of the army was in his path, and that the Austro-Bavarians, to the number of 50,000 or 60,000 men, ventured to bar his progress to the Rhine. Indignant at such impudence, but without regretting it, for he proposed to make the weight of his indignation fall upon the rash adversary who dared to oppose him, he resolved to quicken his steps during the 30th, to clear a passage for himself with the Old Guard. He did not count upon his numbers, but upon the temper of his men, for had there been only 10,000 they would have cut through the adversaries who, so long their allies, now thirsted for their blood and liberty. Alas! we had only 40,000 or 50,000 men under arms, so greatly had disorganization increased during the recent marches; and of that number Napoleon could scarcely collect more than a third during the 30th. At the advanced guard there were only Sebastiani with the 2d and 5th cavalry, Lefebvre-Desnoette with the light cavalry of the Guard, making about 4000 horse, Macdonald and Victor with 5000 infantry, the Old Guard, comprising 4000 grenadiers and chasseurs, the heavy cavalry of the Guard, retaining 2000 or 3000 mounted horsemen, and Drouot's reserve of artillery,—in all 16,000 or 17,000 men. Marmont with the remains of the 5th, 3d, and 6th corps, Semelé and Durutte with their divisions, Mortier and Oudinot with the Young Guard, Bertrand with the 4th, were in the rear, the latter at two days' march. Nevertheless Napoleon did not hesitate to fall upon the Bavarian army and make them repent their temerity. It was of importance to force the passage, to prevent the growth and strength of the obstacle in our way.

On the 30th, in the morning, they left Langen-Sebold for Hanau.

At some distance they met the division of General de Wrede's advanced guard, the Lamotte division posted at Ruckingen. They attacked it promptly, and repulsed it. They followed it rapidly, and met, before the forest of Lamboy, which is traversed by the high-road from Mentz, the Austro-Bavarian army itself. The following arrangements had been adopted by General de Wrede.

The forest of Lamboy extended from left to right, from the Kinzig to the mountains in the country of Darmstadt. Beyond the forest the ground was open, but in it was found the obstacle of the Kinzig, a small river which falls into the Main and, before doing so, surrounds the fortress of Hanau. The road, after having crossed the whole depth of the forest, debouched upon the plain, reached the Kinzig near the point where that river joins the Main, then passed directly under the guns of Hanau, and, finally, continued as far as Frankfort and Mentz between the Main and the mountains. General de Wrede had placed in front, and on the border of the forest, sixty guns well served and supported, had filled the interior of the forest with tirailleurs, and drawn up his army in the plain beyond the rear toward the Kinzig, the right at the bridge of Lamboy on the Kinzig, the left in front of Hanau. He was protected by 10,000 cavalry. He thus disposed of about 52,000 men, deducting those he had left at Würzburg and those he had detached at Frankfort. He had been joined by the scouts of Theilmann and Lichtenstein.

Napoleon, at the head of his advanced guard, had personally reconnoitred and estimated the arrangements of the enemy. He had with him only the cavalry of the advanced guard and the 5000 foot remaining to Macdonald and Victor. The Old Guard was following.

To the right he ranged Macdonald's infantry under General Charpentier, to the left that of Victor under General Dubreton, and ordered each to scatter themselves through the woods as tirailleurs. He remained with all his cavalry on the high-road, in presence of the Bavarian artillery, until he should be joined by the artillery of the Guard. Immediately upon the signal being given, our able tirailleurs penetrated the forest with their characteristic boldness and intelligence. The thick darkness of the wood was lighted up by the fire of a thousand muskets. Our tirailleurs gradually gained ground on the flank of the troops who supported the enemy's artillery, and forced them to recede. A little later, a portion of our artillery, having been brought up, briskly cannonaded that of the Bavarians, which was deprived of the support of the infantry, and forced them to fall back. They thus drove the Bavarians into the interior of the forest, and traversed the greater part of it, keeping up a fire upon their flanks. However, Curial's division of the Old Guard having joined, Napoleon directed two battalions of that division against the retreating column, and succeeded in driving them from the forest into the plain. On reaching the skirts of the wood, they perceived 50,000 men in battle-array, their rear to the Kinzig, supported on one side by the bridge of Lamboy opposite our left, and on the other by the town of Hanau opposite our right. In front were the fine and numerous cavalry of the enemy. Napoleon waited till all his artillery, as well as the infantry and cavalry of the Old Guard, should have arrived, before he would debouche. When the Bavarians, who had served with honour in our ranks, but who well knew the nature of the Guard, saw them appear in file, they were deeply moved,—particularly their general, de Wrede, who became sensible of the error he had committed in placing himself be-

fore such troops with a river in his rear. He had thought that the steps of the grand army would be so pressed by the allies that his only task would have been to collect prisoners.

Napoleon, perceiving these arrangements, said, ironically, "Poor de Wrede! I have been able to make him a count, but not a general." He immediately drew up eighty guns of the Guard on the skirts of the forest, extended to the left Friant's division, and to the right the cavalry of Sebastiani, Lefebvre-Desnoette, and Nansouty.

After a short but violent cannonade, he acted at first with his right, and launched all his cavalry against that of General de Wrede. Our grenadiers and *chasseurs à cheval* of the Guard were impatient to trample under foot the faithless allies who imprudently sought to bar their way to France. The Bavarian squadrons were at a single charge thrown back upon those of Austria. The latter charged in their turn; but the exasperation of our cavalry was at its height: they overthrew all that opposed them, and drove back upon the Kinzig and Hanau the left of the Austro-Bavarian army. In the centre, the enemy's cavalry, in the vicissitudes of these different charges, for a moment attacked the eighty guns. Drouot, collecting his pieces, and placing before them his gunners with their carbines in their hand, checked the enemy's squadrons and then riddled them with grape, when they retired. When our infantry ran to his aid, he was already extricated from the difficulty.

General de Wrede, driven back upon the Kinzig, saw no other resource than to collect his army to the right, in order to bring it across the Kinzig by the bridge of Lamboy. To favour this movement, and to procure the necessary space, he attempted an attack on our left. But exactly at that point were Friant's grenadiers. Those brave men, whose courage was too often kept in check, shared in the general exasperation of the army. They marched, supported by the troops of Marmont, whose van had just appeared, attacked the Bavarians with the bayonet, drove them upon the troops engaged in crossing the Kinzig, and wounded with the bayonet 700 or 800. De Wrede crossed the Kinzig in disorder, leaving in our hands 10,000 or 11,000 killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. This brilliant encounter had not cost us more than 3000 men. The majesty of the French army was worthily avenged.

Yet no time might be lost in counting our trophies, for De Wrede, who had fallen back behind the Kinzig with 40,000 men, might perceive the smallness of our numbers, and issue from Hanau to bar our progress. On the following day, October 31, Napoleon, proud, not of himself but of his soldiers, for this new battle of the Beresina, set off in company with Sebastiani, Lefebvre-Desnoette, Macdonald, Victor, and the Old Guard, to clear the way to Mentz, if it should be anywhere intercepted. He left Marmont to watch the banks of the Kinzig, and to prevent the enemy issuing from Hanau, whose guns commanded the road.

On the morning of the 31st, Marshal Marmont captured Hanau, which the enemy in their terror had almost evacuated, and on leaving, about mid-day, confided the keeping of that post to General Bertrand, who fol-

lowed him. General Bertrand passed the night there, with the intention of restraining the Bavarians and preventing their intersecting the road. On the morning of November 1, De Wrede, wishing to be revenged, and hoping to find before him only a feeble rear-guard, on which he might revenge his misfortune, endeavoured to debouche from the Kinzig, crossing the bridge of Lamboy on our left, and endeavouring to regain Hanau on our right. Before the bridge of Lamboy Bertrand had placed Guilleminot's division, in the centre Morand's division, which could cannonade Hanau above the Kinzig, before Hanau itself the Italian division, partly in the town, partly along the Kinzig, with orders to protect the high-road.

De Wrede, at break of day, assailed the Italians in Hanau, took one of the gates, penetrated into the city, and drove them back upon the bridge of the Kinzig, toward which he hastened in order to secure it and then occupy the road. But Morand, firing from above the Kinzig, covered with projectiles the flank of De Wrede's column. The Italians, regaining courage, returned to the charge and drove back the Bavarians into Hanau. De Wrede received a wound in the abdomen, which for a time was supposed to be mortal.

At the same moment, on our left, the Austro-Bavarians attempted to cross the Kinzig on the half-burned piles of the Lamboy bridge. Guilleminot allowed a certain number to pass, and then drove them into the Kinzig with the bayonet. On all sides they were thus driven back beyond the Kinzig, and condemned to a fresh humiliation. This attempt cost them an additional loss of 1500 or 2000 men. Our guns, now free to pass upon the Mentz road, found so many bodies that, to use the words of an eye-witness, they rolled through a quagmire of human flesh.\* Sad and fearful return of the grand army to France!

General Bertrand's corps had been the last to take the road to Hanau. Marshal Mortier, with the Young Guard, informed of the difficulties to be encountered in that road, had made a turn to the right, and regained Frankfurt safe and sound. On the 4th of November the grand army accomplished their entrance into Mentz, sadly triumphant. The cavalry alone remained outside the town, to collect the last of the stragglers. About 40,000 of these had passed in a few days.

Thus we again saw the Rhine, after so many victories, now followed by so many reverses,—the Rhine, which we had hoped confidently to pass quietly, after having secured a glorious and general peace. It might have been so, but the indomitable pride of Napoleon forbade.

Napoleon was at this time in Mentz, in a condition to convince himself by his own eyes of the extent of his errors. The Rhine, which was so entirely our property that six months before it would have been regarded as a great proof of moderation on our part to be contented with it, it was now doubtful whether we should be able to defend. Napoleon had thought so much of conquest and so little of defence, that the territory of the Empire was almost unprotected. Except in Italy, which

\* Marshal Gerard, from whose lips I heard the expression.

was also part of his conquests, nothing had been done to any of the fortresses of the frontier. Napoleon had, indeed, begun to think of this, but at a period when there was no longer time to execute his orders. Even the great supplies which had been called for through M. de Bassano, after the battle of Deunewitz, considered and resolved upon by the principal ministers of Paris, had been countermanded by Napoleon, on account of the expense, and still more on account of the alarm which he feared might be spread along the Rhine. Accordingly, the whole length of that frontier, which ought to have been the principal object of our attention, was in a deplorable state. They had exhausted their ammunition and arms of all kinds for the sake of Erfurt, Dresden, Torgau, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, and the French arsenals were empty. The supplies of wood agreed upon a few days since had not been ordered; supplies for the siege were in the same case;\* the *personnel* was even more insufficient than the *matériel*. At Strasbourg, Landau, Mentz, Coblenz, Cologne, and Wesel, there were only a few companies of national guards, hastily levied by the prefects, who hardly knew how to fire a gun. Mentz, the vast depot of recruits, whom they had not had time to forward, of marauders, who had returned from time to time, of sick and wounded, brought thither as opportunity served, in short, the rallying-place for our *débris* of every kind, alone contained the means of defence. But a whole army was wanted in this fortress, and that which was returning, though the grand army, would not have supplied 40,000 effective men. The divisions of the Young Guard, who had behaved so well, comprising 8000 men at the resumption of hostilities, 3000 men after Leipsic, were now reduced, some to 1000 and others to 1100 men. All the corps were diminished in the same proportion.

Napoleon, wishing to retain his best forces in Mentz, left in that city the 4th corps under General Bertrand, destined to form the advanced guard of the future army which he hoped to construct. It was to comprise Morand's division, which had always formed part of it, Guilleminot's division, which had been recently joined to it, and those of Durutte and Semelé, the only remains, as we have said, of the 7th and 16th corps. These four divisions, even after several days' rest, reckoned less than 15,000 men. Napoleon ordered them to be immediately reorganized by means of the disbanded men whom they should apprehend at the passage of the Rhine. The cavalry of the Guard was employed to collect these men at several leagues above and below Mentz. But the muskets, garments, shoes, and provisions distributed among them could not overcome the influence of the bad habits which they had contracted, and, although the greater part of them had behaved with great bravery two or three weeks before, it was doubtful whether they could be again converted into true soldiers. They deserted to the interior the moment they could escape observation. The cadres remained excellent,

and every thing proved that, owing to them, it would be more easy to create soldiers from conscripts leaving their cottages, than from men who had been too early and too suddenly exposed to the most cruel extremities of war without the encouragement derived from previous victory.

In a few days, however, a report was given of upward of 20,000 men of this 4th corps, the last representation of the army which had fought at Lutzen, Dresden, and Leipsic. Le-fevre-Desnoette was attached to it with the light cavalry of the Guard and the old dragoons of the 5th corps, composing in all 3000 or 4000 horse. A good artillery was annexed. The protection of the Rhine was divided between the three marshals, Marmont, Macdonald, and Victor. Marshal Marmont was to guard it from Landau to Coblenz with the *débris* of the 6th, 5th, and 3d corps of infantry and the 1st and 5th of cavalry. He was to have Mentz and General Bertrand under his orders, and to proceed to reorganise the troops comprised in his district. The Young Guard was placed a little in the rear of Mentz to be reformed under the eyes of Marshal Mortier; the same with the cavalry of the Guard. Marshal Macdonald was sent to Cologne with the 11th corps, which he was also to reform. The 2d cavalry had been assigned to him to keep a watch upon the Rhine and to prevent the Cossacks from crossing. The remainder of the Poles, infantry and cavalry, were sent to Sedan, the former depot of these allied troops, there to receive a new organization. Marshal Victor was established at Strasbourg with the 2d corps, which had made the campaign of 1813 under his orders, with great honour to themselves. With these shattered remains the three marshals were to protect the frontier of the Empire. The gendarmes and the custom-house officers, returned from all the countries which we had occupied, arrested on the Rhine the disbanded men as they arrived, and endeavoured to make them return to their ranks. With this resource the value of which we have stated, it was hoped to recruit the troops cantoned on the frontier. Unhappily, in addition to their moral defects, they were now attacked by a terrible physical contagion. The hospital-fever, which took its origin in our vast depots on the Elbe, from the excessive numbers, fatigue, bad nourishment, the continual rains of the last two months, and the depressing passions to which our sick and wounded had been subjected, had spread everywhere throughout our progress, and had now invaded the banks of the Rhine. Of all the scourges with which we had been pursued, this was the most formidable. It had reached Mentz, and had already committed serious ravages, and threatened much worse. It had followed the Rhine in each direction. Thus we seemed to be the victims of every kind of calamity.

Napoleon, after having provided for the most urgent necessities by remaining at Mentz for a week, left for Paris on November 7, in order to be present in the centre of a government of which he was the indispensable moving-power, and to prepare the means for a new and final campaign. While occupied in making unusual efforts to extract from France

\* We speak upon the authority of the report of the marshals sent to command on the Rhine.

in her exhausted state all her remaining resources, and to check on her frontier enemies rendered implacable by a long oppression, there were between the Rhine and the Vistula, in old and young soldiers actually besieged or blockaded by the legions of combined Europe, means for the composition of one of the best armies ever assembled. He had left at Modlin 3000 men, at Zamose 3000, at Dantzic 28,000, at Glogau 8000, at Custrin 4000, at Stettin 12,000, at Dresden 30,000, at Torgau 26,000, at Wittenberg 3000, at Magdeburg 25,000, at Hamburg 40,000, at Erfurt 6000, at Wurzburg 2000, which made a total force of 190,000 men, almost all effective, (for we have not included the sick and wounded,) all accustomed to war or trained, commanded by excellent officers, and comprising, particularly, incomparable artillery-men and engineers. Never had a finer army borne the French standard, if, by a miracle of good fortune, they could combine their scattered fragments, and give them that unity which had been lost by their isolation in distant posts. Napoleon, as we have seen, in the hope of finding himself by a single battle brought back to the Oder and the Vistula, had resolved to retain the fortresses on those rivers, so as suddenly to resume his former position. For this reason he had devoted about 60,000 men to the strongholds on the Oder and Vistula. During the armistice he might have recalled them all, and with them have strengthened his line upon the Elbe; but, led away by the same hope, he had persisted in the same error, and had now greatly aggravated it by quitting the Elbe without withdrawing the garrisons. Thus were sacrificed these most valuable men, 190,000 in number, sufficient to form the basis of a noble army of 400,000 men in spring. It is true that this number included 80,000 foreigners, anxious to return to the bosom of their country, since their Governments had broken with France; but in these 80,000, while there were 20,000 Germans, or Illyrians, on whom no further dependence could be placed, there were 10,000 Poles, who had become as brave and had remained as faithful as the soldiers of our old army. Here, then, was the certain loss of 170,000 men, due to the blind confidence in victory, and to the fatal passion to re-establish in a single day a greatness which had been destroyed by several years of irreparable errors!

They might, as we have said, be restored to France by a miracle. No doubt, if an intrepid, bold, and, above all, fortunate man, at the head of one of these garrisons, should quit the fortress which he occupied by forcing the blockade, and should join the nearest garrison, and thus, going from one to another, should form an army, it is probable, considering the small number of troops left by the allies on their rear, that he might reach the Elbe and the Rhine, and enter France at the head of a formidable force. But in which of the blockaded fortresses could this miracle be performed? Certainly not in the most remote. The garrisons of Modlin and Zamose, for example, composed of Lithuanians and Poles, little inclined to leave their homes, were much too distant from each other and too few in number to attempt any bold concentration of troops. That of Dantzic,

which, even after the diseases brought from Russia, still reckoned upward of 20,000 men, might, no doubt, have escaped by destroying those who should attempt to arrest them. But they would have been followed to extremity by superior forces, perhaps destroyed before reaching the Oder, where, indeed, they would have found, if they could reach it, 9000 French or allies at Stettin, 4000 at Custrin. But, besides the difficulty arising from distance, the instructions of Napoleon involved another. He had ordered General Rapp not to surrender Dantzic without an order from his own hand, rather to die there than to surrender; and General Rapp, deprived of all news, and not entitled to place confidence in the reports of the enemy, could not sufficiently know the situation of affairs to feel himself authorized to make any alteration in the exact and formal instructions he had received from Napoleon. The three garrisons on the Oder, those of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, though nearer the Elbe, were still too far separated from each other, of too great importance, and too well watched, to attempt with any chance of success such combination of forces as should have enabled them to regain the Rhine.

The garrisons on the Elbe—viz. those of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden—were those which formed bodies of 20,000 or 30,000 men which were very near each other, and which in order to reach France had only to traverse Westphalia, which was clear of the enemy, and which could have taken the initiative, and restored to France 100,000 men, with illustrious commanders such as St. Cyr and Davout. Of these strong fortresses on the Elbe, those at the two extremes—viz. Dresden and Hamburg, which had marshals at their head, and possessed at least 30,000 men each—were evidently those which could have attempted to effect a sudden concentration; and of these two Dresden was that from which such an attempt might most reasonably be expected.

In order that a commander of a considerable force charged with an important point should take upon himself to evacuate it, and to return to the Rhine, it was necessary that he should be authorized to do so by the ideas which had previously been impressed upon him. Marshal Davout was not in that case. He knew that Hamburg had been the principal cause of breaking off the negotiations at Prague; that Napoleon had risked a mortal war rather than relinquish it; that Hamburg was the support of the garrisons on the Oder and of Dantzic, the boulevard of Westphalia and of Holland, the link with Denmark, and that to abandon it was a resolution of such capital importance as to belong exclusively to the chief of the State. Such a crowd of considerations was little calculated to inspire him with the thought of evacuation. But there were two other decisive reasons. At Hamburg he possessed all the means of maintaining himself for a long time, and this he shortly proved: hence there was no immediate obligation to change his position on his own account. Secondly, supposing that he felt the necessity of returning to France at the head of the garrisons which had been left beyond her territories, he could not have ventured to ascend the Elbe in order to reach Torgau and

Dresden, since this would have brought him into a cul-de-sac without any possible escape, the whole coalition being between Dresden and Meitz. If, therefore, he had entertained any idea of a spontaneous concentration, he must have waited in his present post until the garrisons of Dresden, Torgau, and Magdeburg should have joined him, and then, with 100,000 men, he might have returned to France by Westphalia and Wesel. Thus, not only did the ideas previously inculcated upon him forbid his quitting Hamburg without urgent necessity, but it appeared that the concentration was practicable only from the Upper Elbe to the Lower, and not from the Lower to the Upper.

These simple reflections show that Dresden was the quarter from which might be expected to arise the resolution to combine the neighbouring garrisons and to form a constantly increasing force, with the view of returning to France. Every thing, indeed, was calculated to incline Marshal St. Cyr, who commanded at Dresden, to that course,—his previous ideas, the urgency of the situation, and the means he possessed. Dresden was not a strong place where he could maintain himself long: it was a military post, to be held merely for a few days, which Napoleon had intended to keep only temporarily, and which, without any formal order, he had almost ordered to be evacuated by anticipation, by saying in his instructions that, if unforeseen accidents should prevent Marshal St. Cyr from remaining in Dresden, he should direct his course to Torgau. The most natural thought, therefore, on learning that Napoleon had withdrawn to the Rhine, was to quit Dresden. Nor was that place, which could not hold out a week, of any importance after the departure of the grand army: it protected nothing, was purely useless, and contained not the slightest resource in provisions. It was, therefore, necessary to form some decision with respect to it, and as it was impossible to return to France through Saxony, which involved cutting through the allied armies, it was evident that Torgau was the point on which it was necessary to fall back. Torgau might be reached in two days. They would have there found 26,000 men, of whom 18,000 were effective Frenchmen, and their forces would have been raised to 48,000 men,—a number superior to all the enemies on the banks of the Elbe. They would have collected, in passing, 3000 men at Wittenberg. In two days they would have arrived at Magdeburg, where they would have been reinforced by 18,000 or 20,000 effective men. They would then have formed at once an army of 70,000 combatants, an army which, before three weeks, would have been certain of not meeting its equal between themselves and the ocean. At Hamburg they would have combined 110,000 excellent soldiers; and then who could hinder those brave men from reaching the Rhine?

From Dresden, therefore, and the marshal commandant, should have sprung the first impulse toward these spontaneous concentrations. It should be added that Marshal St. Cyr could not claim the excuse, at that time real and often alleged, of the want of any independent authority in Napoleon's lieutenants, always accustomed to obey, never to command. Independent by the force and determination

of his character, admiring no one,—not even Napoleon, finding fault with all his instructions,—he could not, as so many others, explain his want of decision by his punctual submission to superior orders,—orders, moreover, which since the retreat of the army tended rather to the evacuation than to the conservation of Dresden. Consequently, if the 170,000 French left, by a deplorable error of Napoleon, upon the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe, had any chance of being saved, it must have been, as regarded at least 100,000, by a spontaneous resolution of Marshal St. Cyr. That resolution he did not adopt: how far he was justified in this must be inferred from the facts themselves.

Scarcely had Napoleon left Dresden for Duben, when continual movements of troops were effected around Dresden, the interest of the allies seeming evidently directed elsewhere, and only a few insignificant forces were left before Dresden, over whom it would be easy to triumph, to attempt some useful enterprise. At the very moment of the battle of Leipzig, when Bubna, Colloredo, and Benningen turned aside to join the main army of Prince Schwarzenberg, their disappearance was promptly recognised, and a general as fortunately bold as Richemont had been at Hohenlinden might have been tempted to follow these corps, and if he had appeared in their rear on the 18th, he would certainly have effected a great change in our destiny. It is true that this would have been a singularly rash resolution, difficult to reconcile with the order to guard Dresden, which Napoleon had given when he had formed his great design of marching upon Berlin after Bernadotte and Blücher, to return by Dresden on the rear of the army of Bohemia. There is therefore no just ground for reproaching Marshal St. Cyr with not having adopted it. That marshal quickly perceived the departure of the principal forces stationed before Dresden, and he procured himself the very natural and commendable satisfaction of inflicting a blow upon the weak party left to blockade him: but he went no further. Some days afterward, receiving no intelligence, and perceiving no arrivals, he began to be uneasy: he was shortly surrounded by persons anxiously inquiring what had become of the grand army. To remain shut up in this prison, short of provisions and ammunition, amidst a quiet but not well-disposed population, to whom they were a great burden,—to remain, we say, in circumstances of such imminent peril was repugnant to every one, and the idea of departure was constantly present; for they well knew that to remain at Dresden was to die. This thought being in every one's mind, Marshal St. Cyr convoked a council of war, composed of Count Lobau, General Durosnel, General Maubert, and some others. With his usual remarkable sagacity, Count Lobau observed that the only course was to retire upon Torgau, where they should find a numerous garrison, provisions, and, at any rate, an open road to Magdeburg. The other generals were alarmed at the responsibility involved in retiring, and said that the time was not yet come for considering themselves abandoned, and therefore warranted to take so decided a step. There was, indeed, room for doubt on October 21, as

Leipsic had not been evacuated before the 19th. Soon, however, we learned the disaster at Leipsic, and the forced retreat of Napoleon upon the Rhine, from the unconcealed joy of the Saxons, and from communications of the enemy, who were interested in driving us to despair. From this moment it was evidently necessary to come to a decision, and that immediately, before all the roads should be closed. It would now have been right to summon a council of war, and to oblige each person to deliberate in presence of the known disaster of the grand army, and of the manifest impossibility of receiving succour.

At the lowest estimate, 25,000 effective men might have been placed under arms, and there is good reason to believe that the news of departure would have brought forward 30,000 ready armed. There were not 25,000 before them, and had there been twice that number, as they must have been distributed on each side of the Elbe, they were certain to make way for themselves by breaking at some point through the very wide circle described round Dresden. They had the sure prospect of dying of hunger and wretchedness in a few days, without gaining the honour of a defence, which the fortifications of the city did not allow, and of being all either killed or captured if they waited till the enemy's forces, which had left for Leipsic, should return to Dresden. Certainly, if ever there was satisfactory evidence to lead to decision, it was on this occasion.

Marshal St. Cyr was a man of great intelligence, a brave soldier in the field, and possessed of real independence of character: yet in this instance he afforded a proof that these really great qualities are not those which in some circumstances give rise to truly great conceptions. He determined nothing, did nothing, but lost time in lamentable hesitation. He entertained the singular idea of sending a secret agent to the governor of Torgau, to know whether he could afford him provisions if he should fall back upon that place. The question was unnecessary; for, besides the fact of his having always drawn his provisions in grain from Torgau, and his having with him the excellent General Matthew Dumas, familiar, by his office, with all the resources of the army, there was no intention of remaining at Torgau, but only of passing through it,—a very different thing. The agent made his way to Torgau, received the reply that they had provisions, which they would willingly share with their neighbours at Dresden if they were disposed to come; but he was unable to retrace his steps, and was taken. Thus they remained without reply, and irresolute, not only during the latter part of October, but for some days in the beginning of November. Two weeks having thus passed away, the blockade becoming every hour more close, all hope of succour being exhausted, Marshal St. Cyr came to a determination, but, owing to its incompleteness, it was the most dangerous possible. As only one thing could be attempted, viz., a retreat to Torgau, he did not contemplate any other, but resolved to send Count Lobau with 14,000 men in the direction of that fortress, to make him descend the Elbe by the right bank, then, if Count Lobau should succeed in getting through, to

follow in person with the rest of the army. It is inexplicable how a man who had so often displayed great sagacity in war should have thought of such an attempt. If they had a chance of piercing the blockade, and they had not one, but a hundred, it was by marching all together, and leaving nothing behind them. It was impossible that they should fail in a determined attempt to break that line, necessarily narrow because of its extent. General Brenier had to surmount very different difficulties in quitting Ciudad Rodrigo in 1811, but he had, nevertheless, succeeded.

Marshal St. Cyr, then, assigned to Count Lobau the task of descending by the right bank to Torgau with 14,000 men. The latter observed correctly that the enterprise, though safe enough fifteen days earlier, with all the forces of the corps d'armée, was very doubtful at the present moment, with only one-half the corps. Nevertheless he obeyed, and left Dresden on the 6th of November. He had with him a lieutenant of great merit, the brave and intelligent General Bonnet. At some leagues from Dresden, on the right bank, they met and cut their way through the first posts of the enemy. Farther on they found a well-defended position, which, though not insurmountable, could not be taken without much bloodshed. They also perceived the enemy weakening their front and strengthening their wings, in order to intercept their return to Dresden by getting to the rear. This movement clearly proved that, in the natural desire to prevent our return to Dresden, they were themselves opening our road to Torgau. Had all the army been united, they could have wished nothing better than such a manoeuvre, since the difficulty was not behind, but before. But, one-half of the corps d'armée having remained at Dresden, this movement occasioned much anxiety, and they hastened to return to Dresden, to avoid being separated from the forces still there.

The result was certainly the clearest proof of the error that had been committed, a strange error on the part of one of the most distinguished warriors of that great martial era. Once the column had re-entered Dresden, this false step was regarded as the formal condemnation of any attempt upon Torgau; and, as there was no other to propose, they waited in profound sadness the termination of their present situation. General Klenau, who was sent before Dresden, had resolved, though naturally very enterprising, to wait the voluntary surrender of the 30,000 men shut up in that fortress. Eight days' patience would exonerate him from the necessity of shedding torrents of blood. He accordingly temporized, and soon had reason to be satisfied with the result.

Every one in the army was in despair. Provisions were failing; the frightful contagion, extending from the Elbe to the Rhine, was gaining ground. The inhabitants, submissive, but rendered hopeless by the length of our stay, entreated us to withdraw, and, although Germans, they had exhibited so little hostility that they were entitled to some consideration. The garrison had no longer any hope even of a glorious death; they therefore opened up a negotiation, and capitulated on the 11th. There was no other course to take; for they

could neither remain, depart, nor fight. The capitulation, therefore, is not to be blamed, but the conduct which led to it.

Nor were the conditions objectionable. The garrison was to lay down their arms, to return to France by stages, with the privilege of serving again if exchanged. They had thus the hope of preserving to France 30,000 soldiers tried by a terrible campaign, and with them many wounded and sick, who would have been lost without a capitulation. Those who had signed it might congratulate themselves on being extricated from this disastrous position in a manner detrimental neither to themselves nor to France, which they would soon be in a condition to defend again. No doubt they were distressed to capitulate, but consoled by the impossibility of doing otherwise, and rejoiced at the thought of seeing France in a few days. They made preparations for departure, and then it was that they saw what forces would have been combined toward the Lower Elbe if they had marched, for when there was a prospect of departure more than 80,000 men appeared in the ranks.

They took the road, therefore, with more hope than grief. But scarcely had they left Dresden when every heart was thrown into consternation by a terrible communication. General Klenau, with many apologies, intimated that the Emperor Alexander did not sanction the capitulation, and required the garrison to consider themselves prisoners of war without leave to return to France. This distressing decision fell upon all like a thunderbolt. They could then appreciate the error they had committed by placing themselves at the mercy of an enemy who, though honourable, had sacrificed their good faith to their passion. Marshal St. Cyr loudly and forcibly remonstrated. He was answered with cruel irony that, if he wished to resume his former position in Dresden, they would consent,—as if such a return were possible among inhabitants delighted at our removal and little disposed to welcome us back, while our means of defence were either destroyed or made public. He represented the unworthiness of such a procedure; they replied by the same ridiculous proposal: it was necessary to submit and to terminate in captivity a career of twenty years of glory.

The violation of this capitulation was an unworthy act, but committed by honourable men, for the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria were honourable men, whose history must be tarnished by their conduct on this occasion. A lesson may be derived from it applicable even to men of honour, viz., that they should guard against political passions, which may lead them to the perpetration of abominable acts. The passion indulged against France at this time resembled the political passions which agitate the opposite parties in a civil war, when each party deems every thing justifiable against the other. Thus, after a protracted domination, we had drawn upon ourselves a foreign war which had all the violence of civil war. Melancholy though glorious period! as glorious as it was unreasonable and inhuman!

No impulse having been given from Dresden, the only point where existed a considerable force, a commander of high rank, of known

capacity, and warranted by former instructions to retreat toward the Lower Elbe, each of our garrisons was destined sadly to expire at their post by famine, typhus, the fire, or captivity. Quite near Dresden, at Torgau, under the brilliant Count of Narbonne, were at least 26,000 men, including the head-quarters brought thither by General Durrieu. Among these 26,000 men were about 8400 Saxons, Hessians, Wurtembergians, who either died or left. The rest were composed of French, some of whom belonged to the special troops attached to the grand parks of artillery and engineers. There was, therefore, a force there which, combined with that of Dresden, would suddenly have supplied an army of from 45,000 to 50,000 men, able to overcome any force which they might encounter between Torgau and Magdeburg. The fort was tolerably strong, situated on the left bank, and protected by an excellent defence-work,—Fort Zinna. It contained immense quantities of grain, spirits, and salt meat. The accident of a fall from his horse had procured the most useful of all accessions, that of General Bertrand, aide-de-camp to the emperor, one of the first engineer-officers of the day. Having shortly recovered, he joined the Count of Narbonne with his characteristic patriotic zeal, and each promised to render himself illustrious by a long resistance. Availing themselves of the numerous men at their disposal, and the pecuniary resources introduced with the head-quarters, Ney had executed great works, and the place was in a condition to make an energetic defence. But an enemy of the most formidable character had entered, viz., typhus fever, which made many victims, and in September had carried off 1200 of our soldiers, and in October 4900. The besiegers, therefore, had merely to leave that plague to do its work, and the gates of Torgau would be opened. Accordingly, the enemy had hitherto satisfied themselves with a bombardment, which caused great ravages among the inhabitants, but little among our soldiers. Only, the bombs having fallen in the cemetery upon the carriages which conveyed the dead, and the persons engaged in burials having fled and refused to resume their functions, the hospitals were filled with bodies which could not be buried, and which would have caused a terrible infection had they not been perfectly congealed by the frost. To this melancholy picture is to be added the saddest of all circumstances. The Count of Narbonne having slightly bruised his head in a fall from his horse, this insignificant wound issued in an attack of typhus, and he died, regretted by the garrison and by all who knew him. Thus died that interesting man, who joined to the intelligence of the French aristocracy of the eighteenth century the knowledge of an enlightened administrator, the sagacity of a diplomatist, the noble sentiments of a liberal landlord, but who, unfortunately for himself, had become attached to the Empire from his admiration of the emperor at a time when he could only be proud at the mistakes of our diplomacy and the disasters of our armies. General Detaillie had replaced the Count of Narbonne in the command of Torgau, where he had behaved with valor. Nothing now remained but to witness the slow death of a garrison which had been almost equal to an army.



At Wittenberg, General Lapoype, who with only 8000 men had, during the spring campaign, defended with energy that place against the first appearance of the allies, had, since the autumn campaign, collected his little garrison, and prepared them to resist vigorously the assaults of Tauenzien's corps. He could scarcely exert any influence over the course of events by his foresight; but he did himself honour by it, as he had done on former occasions. He was not short of provisions. Not having received the remains of the beaten armies, as the fortress of Torgau had done, he had few sick, but many foreigners. He regulated them by his energy, and seemed prepared to sustain a long siege.

General Lemarois, aide-de-camp to the emperor, deservedly enjoying his entire confidence, had received the government of Magdeburg. There was no reason that could authorize his spontaneous evacuation of a fortress so important, so capable of resistance, commanding the middle course of the Elbe and the centre of Germany. Nothing could have induced him to leave it but the claims of a grand concentration, which he could not himself initiate, and which nobody, unfortunately, was to afford him the opportunity of seconding. He was, therefore, freed from the necessity of considering the serious question of evacuation, and he had quietly shut himself up in his fortress, where, with considerable provisions, a numerous garrison, powerful walls, and few sick, because he had remained at a distance from the pestilential carnage of Saxony, he could long hold out against the allied armies, and have the painful honour of surviving France herself.

At Hamburg was posted the fearless and imperturbable Davout, whom Napoleon, on account of the discontent arising from the Russian campaign, as well as from esteem for his inflexible character, had placed in a distant situation, to the great detriment of the operations of this war; for he had thus deprived himself of the only one of his generals to whom, since the death of Lannes and the disgrace of Massena, he could intrust 100,000 men. The marshal, who had left Hamburg with 82,000 men to commence a movement upon Berlin, which had been rendered impracticable by the battles of Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, had returned thither on learning the misfortunes in Saxony, and had resolved, with his 80,000 men and 10,000 others left in the works of the place, to maintain a long siege, which should be more than a siege,—rather an actual defensive campaign of a nature to protect Lower Germany, Holland, and the Lower Rhine. Separated from the emperor and from France, unmoved amidst all the disasters, foreseeing them without being agitated by them, he proposed to be the last of the great warriors of this reign who should resign his sword to the coalition.

On the Oder the strongholds of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau still held out, but simply for the honour of their arms. The governor of Stettin was General Grandean, replaced for some time by the brave General Dufresse, who during the armistice had exhibited so little excitement at the shot fired at Bernadotte. He had provisions, a garrison of 12,000 men, 8000 of whom were the maimed from Russia, and 9000 were effective. His authority extended

to Stettin and the fortress of Damm, which commands some vast lagunes dependent on the Grosse-Haff. It was General Ravier who defended Damm; and this he did with the greatest energy. Besides the Prussian army, they had to do with the English fleets which had come by the Oder. The defense had been conducted with admirable vigour, and they had obliged the besiegers to surround the place with about twenty redoubts, in which they seemed more occupied in guarding themselves against the besieged than attacking them. They left the English fleets to bombard the garrison, who, little concerned, smiled, as it were, at a method of attack fatal only to the unfortunate Prussian inhabitants. But, while this impassibility enabled them to resist the fire of the enemy, it was powerless against the pains of hunger. The time being at hand when provisions must fail, (they had been blockaded for nearly a year,) General Grandean, on the advice of his council, had entered into parley with the enemy, that he might not be reduced to surrender at discretion if he should treat when his provisions were wholly exhausted. It had been proposed to declare his garrison prisoners of war; for the coalition was resolved not to allow any soldier to return to France who could contribute to her defence, and this end they pursued, as we have seen, by persevering blockades of the garrisons which resisted, and by violations of faith with those which capitulated. General Ravier, with the troops of Damm and almost all those of Stettin, had revolted at the news of the conditions offered, and refused to obey General Grandean. That valiant garrison had determined that the flag of France should wave over Germany to the last moment. By the end of November, nothing had been decided.

At Custrin, General Fournier d'Albe, with scarcely 1000 French among 3000 Swiss, Wurtembergians, and Croats, with great energy held his ground against all the attempts of the enemy. Though his garrison suffered severely from scurvy, he did not evince the slightest inclination to surrender.

At Glogau, General Laplane, after having sustained with glory a siege in spring, sustained a second with equal energy. Having 8000 men, provisions, and works tolerably well armed, he had hitherto repelled every attack. But these brave men in Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau defended themselves for the honour of their flag, without hope of joining the French army or of seeing the French army approach them. What was true of them was, if possible, still more so of the immortal garrison of Dantzic, which, continually blockaded since the month of January, had only once received news from France, and were supported only by their courage and industry. On retiring into the fortress in December, 1812, after the retreat from Russia, General Rapp, the governor and defender of Dantzic, had shut himself in with about 36,000 men and some thousand sick. This garrison, a mixture of troops of every kind, chiefly French and Polish, had brought with them a different but not less severe scourge than that which afflicted Torgau and Ments, viz., the congelation-fever, which arose from cold, while the hospital-fever arose from moisture and bad air. This fever, which had carried off Generals Hild and Laraboisiere, had reduced the garrison by

nearly 4000 men. Nevertheless the remaining troops were good and well commanded, but insufficient for the immense works of Dantzic, which consisted in the fort itself, an entrenched camp, and the citadel of Weichselmunde at the mouth of the Vistula. As soon as he had entered the place, which was not yet armed, Rapp had found himself in great difficulty. In fact, the waters of the Vistula, which surround all the works of Dantzic, and form this principal defence, being frozen, there was a risk of seeing the Russian soldiers of Barclay de Tolly's corps cross the ditches and inundations on the ice and take Dantzic by escalade. It had therefore been necessary to break the ice, which was two or three feet thick, for five leagues in extent, to haul the artillery upon the ramparts, and to hold out against a bold enemy intoxicated with unexpected triumphs, and anxious to get possession of Dantzic, because they feared to see Napoleon again upon the Vistula as much as he himself hoped to be there. The garrison, after having provided all works preparatory to defence, had repulsed the enemy to a distance, and overcome them on all occasions. They had then thought of procuring provisions by foraging in the isle of Nogat. Grain, salt meat, spirits, ammunition, they possessed in great quantities, for they had inherited supplies collected for the campaign in Russia, which had been left in the magazine for want of means of transport. But they were deficient in fresh meat and forage. They had found these in the islands of the Vistula by the boldness of their excursions. They had thus employed the winter in making themselves formidable, and in depriving the enemy of any hope to succeed by a regular attack.

When the armistice was signed they had not received more than a fifth part of the provisions due to them, but they had renewed their excursions in the islands of the Vistula, and had put the last stroke to the works not yet completed. On the resumption of hostilities they had remained quite well intrenched and resolute. At this time there remained about 25,000 men fit to bear arms and to resist the fatigues of a siege.

The outer works had been bravely disputed, and at length lost, as happens in every fortress, even the best-defended. But seconded, by able engineer-officers, General Rapp had raised some redoubts well placed and well armed, which, acting on the rear of the enemy's trenches, had rendered them untenable.

Around these redoubts had been displayed on each side the greatest courage, in defence and in attack. The enemy, despairing of success, had here, as elsewhere, designed to have recourse to the frightful method of bombardment. Ammunition and guns were not wanting, as the English were able to convey them in abundance by sea: they had, therefore, prepared against Dantzic the most formidable artillery which had ever threatened a fortress. About a hundred English gunboats had come to unite their fire with that of the batteries on shore. All the month of October had been spent, without intermission or pity, in the most desecrable bombardment which had occurred during all that sanguinary period. Our soldiers, accustomed to cannonades such as those of the Moskowa, and despising the slight risk,

as it appeared to them, of the bursting of a bomb in a spacious city, regarded this mode of attack with as much indifference as a shower of musketry beyond gun-shot, and merely pitied the inoffensive inhabitants, who were much more exposed than themselves to the showers of fire which fell upon their city. The besiegers had formed the horrid design of annoying us by setting fire to the masses of wood contained in Dantzic. Accordingly, on November 1, fire had been set to the docks and of Dantzic, and a frightful conflagration ensued. The inhabitants, in despair, fled to themselves in cellars, afraid to extinguish the fire under the shower of bombs. Our soldiers attempted to do it for them, but did not succeed till three-fourths of those large masses of wood had been consumed. Immense volumes of flame continued to hover over the city, while the thunder rolled incessantly. Our soldiers evinced no intention to surrender. Rapp, not anxious to conjecture the issue of the war after the disaster at Leipzig, believing that no prodigy was too great to expect from Napoleon, held to his instructions, which required him not to surrender Dantzic without an order written and signed by the hand of the emperor. Having still 18,000 men for defence, and some oxen of Nogat for support, he called on the English to fire their guns, and to burn the woods of Dantzic, and waited till Napoleon's order should arrive, or France should be destroyed, or the enemy should enter by breach, before he would surrender. Müllers and Zamose, after having done their duty, capitulated. The Polish garrisons had been led into captivity.

Thus upon the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, lived or died the 100,000 soldiers at such a distance from the Rhine, which they might have rendered invincible! Thus terminated the campaign of 1813, intended to repair the disasters of 1812, and which would have repaired them, if Napoleon could extend his limits to his desires!

This great and terrible campaign, unequalled in history for the immensity of the struggle, the variety of the manœuvres, and the effusion of blood, is distinguished, as to Napoleon, by a peculiar and significant feature, which we have already pointed out,—that of issuing in the loss of everything by the desire to regain at a single blow what he had lost before. Had Napoleon entertained the desire to check the progress of his victorious career, to re-establish the prestige of our arms, and, having attained that object, to treat upon a basis which would still have been greater than was at all necessary, he would infallibly have succeeded. In fact, after Lutzen and Bautzen, when his arms had again been rendered victorious by his genius and the inexperienced bravery of his young soldiers, he had driven the Russians and Prussians as far as the Vistula, with an armistice of Pleiswitz, he would have separated them from the Austrians, and certainly have completely scattered the coalition. But to do this with impunity would have been necessary to be ready to give a satisfactory reply to Austria, who urged him to explain himself at once in reference to the conditions of peace! Long as this tragical

narrative may have been, we cannot forget the reason which arrested Napoleon: this, as we said, was his desire to prepare an army against Austria, and to be in a condition to reject her conditions, however moderate. For this sad reason he stayed his course, and voluntarily left Russia and Prussia within reach of Austria, and able to unite with her.

During this fatal armistice, we have seen how easy it would still have been for Napoleon, by sacrificing the Duchy of Warsaw, which could not survive the Russian campaign, by renouncing the protectorate of the Rhine, which was a useless insult to Germany, and by restoring the Hanse towns, which we could neither defend nor turn to the advantage of our commerce, to retain Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome as French departments, Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples as vassal kingdoms of the great empire! Hamburg, a possession we could not possibly retain, the protectorate of the Rhine, a vain title even if retained, were the causes of our insane rupture. But when the resolution to continue the war had really been formed, advantage should have been taken of the armistice to withdraw from Zamosc, Modlin, Dantzic, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau the 60,000 men whom we had no longer any reason, political or military, to leave there, since the Elbe had become the seat of our operations, and their limit as well as their support. Napoleon on this occasion again, by the desire and hope of being carried by a single victory back to the Oder and the Vistula, persisted in this deplorable sacrifice which was to entail so many others! In order to be within reach of his garrisons, he extended the circle of this concentric war (a method which had proved so successful on the Adige, when he closed around Verona) to 40 leagues on the side of Geldberg, 50 on that of Berlin, he gained the glorious victory of Dresden; but at the moment of reaping the fruits of it at Kulm, was recalled by the disasters of his lieutenants, who had been left at too great a distance from him; hastening to their aid, he arrived too late, wasted his strength in useless movements for two months, saw the extinction of the prestige of the victories of Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden, found himself soon surrounded by debilitated soldiers, inharmonious generals, enemies elated by unexpected triumphs, and finally, when a simple retreat upon Leipsic, bringing with him all that remained on the Elbe, would have saved him once more, without display, but with certainty, he attempted, from a desire to re-establish his affairs by some brilliant stroke, skilful manœuvres against Duben, admirably conceived, but failing, unfortunately, by the want of proportion in his means to the boldness of the enterprise, was caught in the snare of his own combinations, and succumbed in the fields of Leipsic, after the most terrible battle on record, a battle in

which—horrible to relate—there fell more than 120,000 men, and then returned to the Rhine with 40,000 armed and 60,000 unarmed men, leaving on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe 170,000 Frenchmen, condemned to an unprofitable defence of foreign walls, whilst the walls of their country were defended by the powerless arms of youth or age!

Certainly, we repeat, during these fatal days Napoleon was neither less fruitful in vast combinations, nor less energetic, nor less imperturbable in danger; but his ambition caused his immense genius to be disturbed and perverted by the insatiability of his desires. In 1812 he suffered a striking reverse, from having attempted the impossible. In 1818, from not being satisfied with repairing that loss, but from wishing to efface it wholly at a single blow, he prepared for himself an equally striking and a still more irreparable reverse, because it deprived him even of hope. Thus, one reverse arising from a desire to effect the impossible, another arising from the wish to repair wholly the first, such were the successive steps by which he descended into the abyss! One only was wanting to bring him to its lowest depth. Would he halt upon that fatal incline? The allies, stationary as soon as they had reached the Rhine, trembling at the idea of crossing that formidable limit, were resolved to offer him France, true France, so powerfully enclosed and protected by the Rhine and the Alps, which the revolution had consigned to him, and with which he had been contented even after Marengo and Hohenlinden. Would he be content with it in 1814? Such was the last enigma to be proposed to his pride by the sphynx of his destiny. According to his answer, he was to terminate his career on the most glorious throne or in the deepest abyss. Let us for a moment forget the history of 1814 and 1815, which we all know too well ever really to forget; let us efface from our memory the crash of that glorious throne which resounded in our youthful ears; let us place ourselves in the month of December, 1818, let us endeavour to ignore the occurrences of 1814, and propose to ourselves the question which was to be proposed to Napoleon. Well, then, which of us, after having read the account of the Russian and Saxon campaigns, could hesitate in his reply? Alas! men carry in their own characters the destiny which they look for around or above them, in short, everywhere but in themselves, where it really dwells, which saves or destroys them according as they yield to their reason or their passions, whatever they may do, whatever genius they may possess! And when they are destroyed, they accuse their soldiers, their generals, their allies, men and gods, and declare themselves betrayed by all, when they have been betrayed by themselves alone!







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